ML20149E766

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Rept 50-382/87-29 on 871130-1204.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previously Identified Items & Implementation of Licensee Actions Taken in Response to NRC Bulletin 87-002
ML20149E766
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/08/1988
From: Jaudon J, Tapia J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149E756 List:
References
50-382-87-29, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8801140012
Download: ML20149E766 (6)


See also: IR 05000382/1987029

Text

-

. ., . .

1

'

.

.

APPENDIX

,

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

!

'

NRC Inspection Report:

50-382/87-29-

Operating License: NPF-38

Docket:

50-382

-

Licensee: - Louisiana Power.& Light Company (LP&L)

,

317 Baronne Street

'

'

New Orleans, Louisiana 70160

!

Facility Name:

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (WSES)

Inspection At:

Taft, Louisiana

[

Inspection Condacted:

November 30 through December 4, 1987

Inspector:

. w ,1

i '6

88

J. /1.)Tapi'a, Projpit ' Engineer, Project

Date

St< tion A, DiviMon of Reactor Projects

0

[

Approved:

A

, h ar d

//5[fA

,

J. P' Jaudon, ';hief, Project Section A

Ddte'

)

Division of Reactor Projects

l.

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted November 30 through December 4, 1987'(Report 50-382/87-29)

,

i

Areas Inspected:

Routine, announced inspection of previously identified items

(one violation and two unresolved items), and implementation of licensee

actions taken in response to NRC Compliance Bulletin No. 87-02.

Results: Within the two areas inspected, no violations or deviations were

identified.

l

,

,

,

.

8801140012 880108

{DR

ADOCK 05000382

DCD

-

_

_

__

. . , .

,

_

.

.

.

0

2

,

l

.

lj

. DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

'

WSES

  • G. Wuller, Operational Licensing Supervisor

T. Garrets, Nuclear ~ Services Manager

_

l

  • R. Bennet, Supplier Audits Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor

'l

B. Toups, QA Representative

Partek-Laboratories

T.'Blanchard, Marketing Manager

R. Sutton, Chief Engineer

  • Denotes those present at the exit interview.

In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspector. held discussions

<

with various operations, engineering, technical support, and

administrative members of the licensee's staff.

2.

Followup of Previously Identified Items

"

(Closed) Unresolved Item (382/8602-01):

Procedure for Documenting

Evaluations of Events - During an inspection in January 1986, the NRC

inspectors found entries in the shift supervisor and reactor operator logs

R

for the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. shift on January 8, 1986, indicating that control

element assembly (CEA) No. I had dropped:with the reactor at approximately

40 percent power.

The logbooks indicated that the electrical breaker was

found open, was reclosed, the dropped CEA' recovered, and power ascension

continued.

The NRC' inspectors questioned licensee management at the time

of the event on the extent of the evaluation of the incident _since no

evidence of a formal. evaluation could be identified.

It was explained

that althoughLan evaluation had been performed by the assistant plant

'

manager for operations and maintenance, the operations superintendent, and

the maintenance superintendent, it had not'been documented.

The plant

manager committed to conduct a review to determine if a weakness existed

in the licensee's event reporting and evaluation program.

Since the

dropped CEA and ensuing actions did not violate Technical Specification

requirements, the dropping of the CEA did not constitute a reportable

event.

Nevertheless, the pending results of the licensee's review were

considered an unresolved item.

This item was subsequently addressed in June 1986 (NRC Inspection

Report 50-382/86-13).

During that inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed

the results of the licensee's evaluation of the event reporting and

evaluation program.

The inspection disclosed a memo from the plant

manager to various members of plant management on the subject of

'l

'

.

.

-

_-

- .

,.

..

_.

.

.

'

. .

e,

.

..

'

3

.

determining accountability when investigating and reporting events and

also disclosed various event rcoorts documented by memos to file,

.

including one for the dropped CEA incident.

The NRC inspector noted that

it appeared that an independent review.of event reports would be

appropriate in some instances and that the threshold for initiating a

report was not clear in all instances.

Also,-the method of documentation

required was not always clear (e.g. , potential reportable event, condition

identification work authorization, quality' notice, memo to file, etc.).

Based on these observations, the unresolved item remained open.

In response to these additional observations, the licensee. established an

Event Analysis and Reporting Group consisting of a Senior Engineer and two

Associate Engineers and having primary responsibility for the

investigation, documentation, and closure of Potentially Reportable

Event (PRE) reports.

Administrative Procedure No. UNT-6-010,. Revision 4,

dEvent Notification and Reporting," provides the instructions to all plant

personnel for reporting conditions potentially adverse to quality.

The

procedure also references Administrative Procedure Nos. UNT-5-002,

Revision 7, "Condition Identification," and QP-015-001, Revision 3,

"Nonconformance and Corrective Actions." These three documents p; vide

the threshold and define the appropriate document to obtain resolution of

reported conditions.

In addition, Procedure No. UNT-6-010 now requires

approval of PRE reports by the Plant Operations Review Committee.(PORC).

,

Discussions with the head of the Event Analysis and Reporting Group

'

disclosed pending changes, as yet unfinalized, in the overall method for

reporting problems.

This licensee representative indicated that a generic

problem report modeled after the Institute for Nuclear Power

,

Operations (INP0) Human Performance Evaluation System is forthcoming.

Based on the actions taken to date, the unresolved item concerning the

procedure for documenting evaluations of potentially reportable events is

considered closed.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (382/8606-01):

Component Cooling Water Valve

Checklist and Drawing Comments - During March 18-21, 1986, NRC inspectors

reviewed the component cooling water system standby valve lineup and

performed a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to verify

operability.

As a result of that inspection, discrepancies were noted

between the valve lineup procedure and the affiliated drawings.

Although

,

all main flow path valves were correctly identified in the valve lineup

'

procedure and were found correctly positioned during the walkdown, the

noted discrepancies were considered an unresolved item.

Previously, on

January 9, 1986, the NRC inspectors performed a walkdown of the Essential

Services Chilled Water System and generated comments siinilar to the

discrepancies which are the subject of this unresolved item (see NRC

Inspet. tion Report 50-382/86-02, paragraph-8).

At the time of the January

inspection, the Assistant Plant Manager for Operations and Maintenance and

the Operations Superintendent responded to the NRC inspectors' comments by

describing an upgrading program for retagging all plant valves and

reviewino and updating each safety-related valve line-up checklist.

During

following subsequent inspections, the.NRC inspectors augmented

,

the li

-

discrepancies noted during ESF system walkdowns:

.

,-.r.--

p

-m.

- ,

4

-

- . . - . - . . .

--.--,y

. , ,

-

- - + -

, , < * -

.

'

, . . . .

'

4

NRC Inspection Report No.

ESF System Walked Down

50-382/86-11

Auxiliary Component Cooling Water

50-382/86-15

High Pressure Safety Injection

50-382/86-17

Low Pressure Safety Injection

50-382/86-29

Emergency Feed Water

50-382/87-01

Emergency Diesel Generators

The upgrading program completion and correction of the deficiencies

identified in the listed NRC inspection reports were reviewed during this

inspation.

Although the upgrading program was at one point expanded to

include the labeling of all electrical breakers, only the quality of valve

tagging and associated valve line-up procedures were addressed. .The

results of the upgrading program indicate that all noted discrepancies

were corrected and that the program encompassed all safety-related

systems.

In order to ensure that the quality of valve tagging remains

l

current, Procedure Nos. PMI-315, "Instructions for Dispositioning Detailed

Construction Packages," and PE2-006, "Administrative Procedure - Plant

EngineerinC Station Modification," require that all components be properly

tagged before any modification is tested and placed in service.

Based on

!

the implementation of these procedural requirements and on the results of

l

the valve line-up checklist walkdowns, this matter is considered closed.

(Closed) Violation (382/8634-01):

Failure to Quantify Containment

l

Isolation Valve Leakage - During an inspection conducted December 8-11,

l

1986, it was datermined that the lucal leak rates for six valves required

to be tested had recorded as-found leak results of "off-scale" with no

recorded value, so that the continuous running sum of local leak rates was

not known and the required comparison with the Appendix J criterion could

i

not be made for the as-found condition.

This was identified as a

'

violation of the requirements of Appendix J,Section III.C.3, which

states, in part, "The comt'ined leakage rate for all penetrations and

valves subject to Type B and C tests shall be less than 0.6 La."

At the

time that the local leak rate testing was being performed, the plant was

in Mode 5, cold shutdown.

The six valves in question had as-found leak

rates which exceeded the capability of the test equipment.

Prior to

performing maintenance on the six valves, the local leak rate testing

i

equipment was modified to provide a greater flow measuring capability.

Corrective action was initiated by maintenance on all six valves and tne

'

appropriate retests were conducted.

Of the six valves identifitd as

having leak rates of "off scale," numerical values were identified for

,

I

five of these valves.

The sixth valve, a 24-inch containment vacuum check

valve (CVR-102) could not be pressurized with the modified test unit, thus

i

'

no leak rate could be established.

In accordance with the requirements of

Appendix J, it was assumed that the leakage for Valve CVR-102 would result

in exceeding the 0.60 La limit.

Accordingly, per the requirements of

Appendix J,Section V.B.3, Valve CVR-102 is the subject of a separate

I

accompanying summary report to the "Reactor Containment Building

Integrated Leak Rate Test" report.

.

.

<

....m

. .

'

.

5

.

,

,

In order to prevent recurrence, Surveillance' Procedure No. PE-5-002,

"Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT)" was modified to require that, "After each

individual test.a cumulative leakage total shall be updated to reflect the

new as-found leakage."

In addition, the procedure now requires that if

the leakage-is higher.than the current measuring capabilities, then it

will be assumed that the.0.6 La limit has been exceeded and the applicable

-

portions of Technical Specification 3.6.1.2 will be invoked.

Based on the-

review of the actions _taken in response to the Notice of Violation, this

matter is considered closed.

3.

Response to NRC Compliance Bulletin No. 87-02:

Fastener Testing to

Determine Conformance With Applicable Mate"ial Specifications

'

l

The licensee's ongoing actions taken in response to NRC Compliance

Bulletin No. 87-02 were addressed during this inspection.

The bulletin

was issued to request that licensees review their receipt inspection

requirements and internal controls for fasteners and determine, through

independent testing, whether fasteners in storage' meet the required

,

mechanical and chemical specification requirements. . The bulletin also

required the participation of an NRC inspector-in the selection of the

sample for testing.

The NRC inspector's examination of ongoing actions included reviewing the

licensee's receipt inspection program and procedures for safety-related

and nonsafety-related fasteners to determine what characteristics are

inspected and in reviewing the maintenance and warehousing procedures for

the issuance and control of fasteners.

The following site quality

'

procedures, including historical revisions, were reviewed:

I

QI-010-006, "Materials Receipt Inspection"

QI-010-002, "Material Storage Inspection"

QI-004-001, "Site Review of Procurement Documents"

QI-004-002, "Records Review Checklist"

UNT-8-044, "Requisition and Return of Items to Stores"

The following QA procedures, including historical revisions were also

,

reviewed:

'

QAP-208, "Procurement Administration"

QAP-250, "Materials Receipt Inspection"

The NRC inspector participated in a meeting held onsite between licensee

representatives and personnel from Partek Laboratories.

This meeting was

held to discuss bulletin requirements and the testing schedule.

The NRC

inspector verified that the testing laboratory was on:the licensee's

qualified suppliers list and reviewed the results of the licensee's audit

which was performed to provide the basis for the testing laboratory's

qualification.

It was agreed that LP&L would conduct a surveillance of

all ongoing testing.

The following safety related sample site was decided

upon after discussion of the Bulletin requirements and plant fastener

usage:

- - . - ~

. _ _

_ _ , .

._.

_ _ . _ _ _ . _

. _ .

-

_ _ , _ _

_

_ . _ _

.

_ _ .

._.

-

_

.

.

_

_

_ _ ,

_ _ _ _ _ _

..j

x-

u . , , ,

.

'

6-

.

.

Type

_ Quantity'to be Tested

Approximate Percent of Use

,

A193, Grade B7

6

10

- 1

A193, Grade B8

6

10

j

A325', Type 1

24

45'

H

A490

12

25

A307

. 6

10

i

The total sample of 54 safety-related fasteners was selected in. increments

of three to provide one chemical, one hardness, and one tensile test.

For

nonsafety-related fasteners, six lots of four fasteners each were selected

for a sample site of 24.

No tensile testing is required for

nonsafety-related fasteners.

With the NRC inspector participating, the samples selected for testing

.

were pulled from warehouse stock.

The samples were bagged by lot-and

identified by type and quantity.

The NRC inspector confirmed that tF.e

sample taken was properly tagged.

The results of all. tests, togeth.:r with

supporting information, will be reviewed during a subsequent insp2ction.

'

4.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized with those persons

indicated in paragraph 1 at the end of this. inspection.

5

4

.

l

r

, - , . , - - - - - - -

a-..-

- - - _ . . . .

...w.--

,,.._-,,,._.,,,.,.,.,,,,,,,~,e,,--,,,,,,--,,,-,,r-,

-,-,,-,-.r.-+,,.-

,-r,

--

,-,w

r-

-