ML20148S457
| ML20148S457 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 11/22/1978 |
| From: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Gary R TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7812010343 | |
| Download: ML20148S457 (16) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
.* f;h NOV 2 21978 1
ms Docket Nos:
50-445 50-446 1
1 Str. R. J. Gary Executive Vice President and General Manager Texas Utilities Generating Company 201 Bryan Towers Dallas, Texas 75201
Dear htr. Gary:
1
SUBJECT:
REQUESTS FCR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ER COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 ANT 2 Enclosed are requests for additional information which we require to complete our evaluation of your application for an operating license for Comanche Peak. The information requested is in addition to that requested in our letter of November 2,1978 and covers those areas of our review performed by the following:
(1) Mechanical Engineering Branch, (2) Materials Engineering Branch, (3) Structural Engineering Branch, and (4) Hydrology-Meteorology Branch, Hydrology Section. Please amend your FSAR to include the information requested in the enclosure.
Your schedule for responding to the enclosed requests for additional information should be submitted by December 6,1978. Based on your schedule for response and our workload, we will determine any licensing i
review schedule adjustments and inform you of any significant changes.
Please contact us if you desire any discussion or clarificaticn of the enclosed requests.
Si$cerely,
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'stevenA.YargaVChier((
Light Water Reactors Brapch No. 4 Division of Project Management
Enclosure:
As Stated cc:
See next page 1
7812010Ytb 6
NOV 2 21978 Texas Utilities Generating Company ces:
Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.
Debevoise & Liberman 700 Shoreham Building 800 15th Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C.
20005 Spencer C. Relyea, Esq.
Worsham, Forsythe & Sampels 2001 Bryan Tower Dallas, Texas 75201 Mr. Homer C. Schmidt Project Manager - Nuclear Plants Texas Utilities Generating Company 2001 Bryan Tower Dallas, Texas 75201 l
Mr. H. R. Rock Gibbs and Hill, Inc.
393 Seventh Avenue New York, New York 10001 Mr. G. L. Hohmann Westinghouse Electric Corporation P. O. Box 355 Pitts. burgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Richard Lawene, Esq.
Office of the Attorney General P. O. Box 12548 i
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112-1 NOV 2 " F3 112.0 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH 112.13 Provide the limits which will be used for bolting material (3.9N) for components which are subjected to loads associated with (3.9B) the faulted condition, since such limits are not provided (5.2) either in the body of ASME Section III or in Appendix F of Section III.
112.14 Provide in the FSAR a summary of the results of analyses for (3.9N)
ASME Class 1 components, systems and supports together with (3.9B) critical locations and applicable allowable stresses and deforma tions.
112.15 The information presented in Sections 3.9N.2.2 and 3.10N (3.9.2.2) of the FSAR concerning seismic qualification of mechanical (3.10) and electrical equipment may not be completely acceptable.
For example, Section 3.10N references WCAP 8587.
This topical report has not yet been accepted by the staff.
Criteria which are acceptable and are currently being implemented on all plants docketed af ter October 27, 1972 are contained in NRC Standard Review Plan, Section 3.10 Paragraph II.2.
Revise Sections 3.9N.2.2 and 3.10N to be consistent with the above noted Standard Review Plan.
112.16 The last sentence in Section 3.78.2.1.3(1)(f), pg. 3.78-16 (3.78.2) of the FSAR requires some clarification.
Provide a (3.9B) description of how the phase relationship between horizontal
( 3.10B) and vertical motion is defined if single frequency input is used. An acceptable approach is to test with vertical and horizontal inputs in-phase and then repeat the test with inputs 180 degrees out-of-phase.
In addition, the test must be repeated with the equipment rotated 90 degrees horizontally.
112.17 Explain in detail how the loads discussed in Section 3.9.3.1
- 3. 9. 3.1 )
and Tables 3.9N-4 and 3.98-1 are combined for various plant 3.9N.3) conditions.
3.9B.3) 112.18 Provide the criteria used in the design of supports for all ASME Class 1, 2 and 3 active pumps and valves to assure that the supports do not deform to the extent that operability of the supported components will not be impaired.
112-2 NOV 2 2 EB 112.19 Provide the following information in the Comanche Peak FSAR:
(3.9N)
(3.98) 1.
A tabulation of snubbers utilized in your facility as supports for safety related systems and components including:
a.
System Identification and Location b.
Type (Hydraulic, Mechanical) c.
Fabricator and rated load capacity d.
Function (Shock or Vibration Arrestor, Dual Purpose) 2.
A sumary of the contents of the snubber design specifications.
3.
A description of snubber suppliers performance qualifi-cation tests and load tests.
4.
A sumary of system and component structural analyses showing:
a.
Structural analysis model.
b.
Description of the characterization of snubber mechan-ical properties used in the structural analysis in-cluding considerations such as (i) differences in tension and compression spring rates, (ii) effect of entrapped air and temperature on fluid properties, (iii) othe factors affecting snubber characteristics.
c.
List load conditions and transients analyzed.
d.
Maximum snubber loads, corresponding piping or component stresses, e.
Comparison of computed loads and stresses from (d) above with rated snubber load and component stress intensity limits.
112.20 For the design of Class 2 and 3 standard component supports, (3.9.3.4)
Subsections 3.9N.3.4.1 and 3.98.3.4.1 state that:
1.
For upset conditions, the allowable stresses or load ratings are 20 percent higher than those specified for normal conditions, and
112-3 NOV 2 21979 1
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For emergency conditions, the allowable stresses or load ratings are 80 percent higher than those specified for normal conditions.
These limits are not in conformance with the ASME B & PV Code,Section III, Subsection NF. Revise the section on standard '
component support allowable stresses and load ratings in such a manner that it will comply with the code.
112.21 For active pumps and valves and for all other components (3.9)
(including piping and vessels) required for safe shutdown of the plant, provide assurance that the design criteria i.e. stress limit, deformation limit etc., which have been i
utilized to evaluate the acceptability of each such component 1
under exposure to its worst case postulated loading environ-ment will provide for sufficient component dimensional stability to assure its system functional capability as has been assumed in the FSAR Ch.15 analyses.
112.22 The response to Question 112.9 references IEEE-344, 1974.
(3.9N.3.2)
Revise this reference to be consistent with SRP 3.10 as requested in Questions 112.9 and 112.15.
112.23 Provide the allowable buckling loads for all ASME Class 1 (3.9N) component supports subjected to faulted load combinations.
(3.98)
Provide justification if your criteria exceed the limits (5.2) of Paragraph F-1370(c) of the ASME Code Section III, Appendix F.
112.24 The discussion of Regulatory Guide 1.121 in Section lAN of
-(1AN) the FSAR is not completely acceptable.
The staff is currently requiring a commitment to this guide in the FSAR.
Revise the discussion in Section lAN to provide a more definite commitment to Regulatory Guide 1.121.
1 4
121-1 NOV 2 21073 121.0 MATERIALS ENGINEERING BRANCH - MATERIALS INTEGRITY SECTION 121.4 Your response to Question 121.3 is not acceptable because (5.3.2)
Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision I curves are based on data from surveillance test specimens.
However, when surveillance data
.l from Comanche Peak reactor are available, the heatup and cool-down curves can be adjusted accordingly.
Sample calculations for-pressure-temperature limit curves should be submitted based on Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 1.
i 121.5 With regard to 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, " Fracture Toughness Requirements :"
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Compare all of the requirements of this Appendix to the
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methods, tests, calculations, etc., presented in the Comanche Peak, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 FSAR, Technical i
Specifications, and any other referenced sources (such as topical reports) on a point-by-point basis.
Explicitly l
identify all possible areas not in strict compliance to this Appendix.
a.
Probable Areas of Non-Compliance Paragraph III.B.1, impact specimen orientation Paragraph III.C.1, description of beltline region impact test program f
Paragraph III.C.2, location from which weld metal test specimens were removed Paragraph IV.A.3, toughness test of piping and j
pump and valve materials Paragraph IV.A.4, toughness test of bolting 121.6 With regard to 10 CFR 50, Appendix H, " Reactor Vessel Material
]
Surveillance Program Requirements:"
(1). Compare all of the requirements of this Appendix to the 1
design, calculations, programs, etc., presented in the Comanche Peak, Unit Nos.1 and 2 FSAR, Technical Specifications, and any other referenced sources (such as topical reports) on a point-by-point basis.
Explicitly identify' all possible areas not in compliance to this Apoendix.
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Probable Areas of Non-Compliance ASTM E 185-73, specimen selection, location Paragraph II.C.3, withdrawal schedule 4
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NOV 22 1973 STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING BRANCH 130.20 In your reply to 0-130.2 you identified the three types of vents (3.3.2) considered and used in this tiPP Seismic Category I Structures other than the Containment building.
For the " Dampers" and " Roll-up Doors" you considered and dismissed any effects due to the impact of tornado missiles.
However, you did not specifically address and dismiss the damage potential of tornado mi'ssiles impacting on the " Blow-cist,"
Danels" and the consecuences of missile passage through the opening developed by the elimination of this type of panel'at the established release pressure.
Address the effects of the missile impact on the " Blow-out Panels" and the consequences of missile, passage through the opening developed by the elimination of these panels.
130.21 Your reply to 0-130.5 agrees in general with our pos.1, tion on ductility (3.5.3) factor limits for structural barriers.
However, regarding our position for conditions wnere shear may control the design,youF assigned ductility values of 1.3 wnen snear is carried by concrete alone, and 1.6 when shear is carried by concrete and stirrups or bent bars do not agree with the respective values identified in our staff position of 1.0 and 1.3.
Comply with our position or justify in details the values identified in the FSAR.
130.22 State if in the seismic dynamic analysis you have considered adequate (3.7.2.1) number of masses or degrees of freedom in the dynamic modeling to determine the response of all Category I structures and plant equipment.
The number is considered adequate when additionti degrees of freedom do not result in more than 10% increase in response.
Alternatel.y, the number of degrees of freedom may be taken equal to twice the number of modes with frequencies less than 33 cps.
Identify the criteria adopted for Comanche Peak NPP.
130.23 In your answer to 0-130.9 you provided the acceptance criteria employed (3.7.2.3) for B0P system / subsystem decoupling.
This criteria is in agreement with the staff position on the subject. However, you did not provide an acceptance criteria employed for the NSSS system / subsystem decoupling.
You only stated that system / subsystem decoupling is considered and failed to provide the related acceptance criteria.
Provide your accept-ance criteria for NSSS system / subsystem decoupling.
4 130.24 Provide a summary table for each Category I structure, showing the loading (3.8.1) condition considered, the related stresses computed and their corres-ponding allowable ~ stresses at key locations of the structure.
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. NOV 22 1973 130.25 In your answers to 0-130.5, 0-130.16 and 0-130.18, you cnanced the (3.2.1) load combinations for the containment building to acree witn the (3.5.3) requirements of ACI 359 Code (1973) with certain exceptions as identified in the applicable sections of SRP 3.8.1.
For tne internal structures and for other Category I structures, you stated comoliance with the respective requirements identified in SRP 3.8.3 and 3.8.4.
In view of these changes, identify in detail how these cnanges in the i
design criteria have affected the final design of the containment and other structures, if any. Specifically, state if they have resulted in any changes in the physical sizes of the structural comoonents, rebar placement, properties, design stress levels, etc...
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NOV 2 21078 HYDROLOGY 4
371.4 You have not demonstrated that the service spillway will not fail during the occurrence of a Probable Maxieum Flood, According, provide the following additions 1 '.nformarisa regarding the spillway and appurtenant structures.
(1) Provide the height of the spillway chute sides downstream of the crest in the chute.
Document the freeboard provided and the basis for its selection.
Provide a drawing of the chute shoving the height of the sides for the entire length together with a profile of vater surface ' elevations for the Probable Maximum Flood, Provide the "n" values and velocity distribution coefficients that were used and the bases for their selection.
2 (2)
Provide more detailed and larger scale drawings in plan and profile of the approach channel, spillway and appurtenant 1
structures.
(3) Provide a detailed plan view of the transition area between the stilling basin and the spillway discharge channel.
(4) Discuss the gradation limits of the 24 inches and the 48 inch l
riprap to be provided on the sides of the discharge channel.
Provide the median rock size to be used.
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NOV 2 21978 (5) Provide the equations used to define the upstream and downstream quadrants of the ogee crest.
Also, p rovide the radius of curvature of the transition between the downstream quadrant and the spillway and the coordinates of the points of tangency.
(6) Define the location and length of the hydraulic jump in the i
stilling basin and assure that the side walls are "of sufficient height - to contain this j ump.
(7) Provide a ta11 water rating curve and a water surface profile in.the spillway discharge channel. Discuss the computational technique used to derive this profile.
371.5 You have not demonstrated that the auxiliary spillway is designed to safely discharge the Probabit Maximd'm Flo'od' without failure.
Accordingly, prowide the following additional information.
(1) Detailed drawings in plan and profile.
(2) Discuss velocities caused by the' Probable Mtximum Flood discharge over the spillway and demonstrate that these velocities are low enough to preclude failure of the unlined spillway.
(3) Describe the composition of the spillway crest.
(4) Provide the basis for design of any erosion control structures.
(5) Demonstrate that a probable Maximum flood discharge through the spillway will not endanger the Squau Creek Dam embankment.
(6) Provide a tailwater rating curve.
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371.6' Provide the rip-rap gradation limits for the Safe Shutdown Impoundment Spillway.
Provide the velocities through the spillway.
371, 7-There are many discrepancies between various tables, figures and the text.
Some of these are listed below.
These and others should be corrected.
(1) Page 2.4-31 shows the storage of Squaw Creek Reservoir (SCR) at elevation 775 feet to be 151,953 acre-feet while' Table 2.4-17 shows this as 150,953 acre-feet.
(2)
Page 2.4-31. also shows -the area of SCR at elevation 770 feet to be 3043 acres while Table 2.4-17 shows this as l
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(3)
Page 2.4-14 shows the area of SCR at elevation 775 feet to be 3,228 acres while Table 2-4-17 shows this as 3272 acres.
(4)
Page 2.4-31 shows the storage of SCR at elevation 770 as 135,062 acre-feet while page 2.4-49 shows this as 135,360 acre-feet.
(5)
Page 2.4-1 shows the elevation of tne operating deck of l
the service water intake structure as 796 feet while page 2.4-15 states this 795 feet.
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4 NOV 2 91c78 (6)
Page 2,4-19 shows the maximum water surface in the Safe Shutdown I=poundment (SSI) to oe 790.7 feet while Table 2.4-15 shows 791.8.
(7)
Page 2.4-29 and Figure 2.4-14 show the effective fetch 1
i of enc SCR as 1.28 miles while page 2;4-18 and page 2.4 32 show 1.56 miles.
(8) Page 2.4-37 shows the effective fetch for the SSI as 0.42 mile while figure 2.4-15 shows 0. 36 miles.
(9)
Riprap thickness on page 2.4-37 should be 24 inches instead of 24 feet as shown.
(10) Note on bottom of Table 2.4-24 makes reference to figure 2.4.13.2.1.2-1.
Shouldn't this be figure 2.4-33?
(11)
In section 2.5.4.6 you state, "As discussed in Section 2.5.4 5, g:cundwater was not encountered in the primary unweathered Glen Rosa Limstone." Section 2.5.4.5 does not contain this description.
Please correct this reference.
(12)
Figure 2.5.5-77 shows the piezemetric level of boring P-9 at a minimum elevation of 750 fee; bu't page 2.5-133 states that the piezametric level in boring F-10 is at elevation 670 feet. Furthermore, the logs of these 'evo borings show the e
base of the Glen Rose formation at elevation 610.
This means that the static water levels are 60 feet and 140 feet above I
the base of the Glen Rose formation for borings P-9 and P-10, respectively. Explain then your statement in the previous question that groundwater was not encountered in the Glen Rose Limestene.
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(13) On page 2.5-133 you state that the static water level in the Twin Mountains formation was observed in boring P-10 at elevation 670 feet. As mentioned above, elevation 670 is in the Glen Rose formation.
(14) on psge 2.5-133 you state that groundwater observations for piezometers insta;11ed at the site ara provided on fig. 2.5.5-5. This should be fig. 2.5.5-77.
371.8 In developiag hydrographs for flood anhlyses, you divided the SCR catchment into three areas, the upper anc lower areas and the area within the reserveir.
It appears that only the first two were considered in developing a -Probable Maximum flood.
Provide additional information showing that the area within the reservoir was considered, or revise your r.femputations by assuming that all of the Probable Maximum Precipicion which falls en the reservoir contributes to the total Probable Maximum h
Flood.
371.9 The available storage in the SSI will be reduced by sediment depletion from 367 acre-feet to about 300 acre-feet during the life of the. plant. Discuss sedimentation effects on the service water intake structures.
Provide assurance that the intake will not be clogged. Discuss your monitoring and maintenance programs that will be implemented to detect and remove sediment.
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~371.10 Provide the basis for your conclusion that water from the Service Water Discharge Structure enters the SSI at a point remote enough from the Service Water Intake Structure and at a velocity high enough to ensure adequate mixing, dispersion and evaporative cooling of the effluent.
371.11 Provide the basis for your statement that an effective porosity of 0.28 is conservative. (Section 2.4.13.3.3) 371.12 Exp)ain your, statement in section 3.8.5.1.5 that, " ground water is not expected to reach higher than 775 feet because of the impermeable nature of the reek," when in figure 2.5.5-77 you show piezometric water levels as high as 830 feet and the packer test results shown in table 2.5.6-1 indicate that the Glen Rose formation is not uniformly of low permeability but rather contains more permeable lenses.
371.13 You have not demonstrated that your subsurface groundwater design level, which is normal maximum water level in Squaw Creek Reservoir, r
elevation 775 feet, is conservative. We note that the water level in borehole P-4, which is located between the two reactor units, fluctuated between elevation 780 and 830 during the period when water level observations were made. (Figure 2.5.5-77) You should therefore, substantiate and show by pertinent analyses that your design groundwater levels will never be exceeded. Alternately, you should use a more conservative groundwater design level.
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