ML20148N367

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Ack Receipt of 880311 Response to NRC 880203 Notice of Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-267/87-34.Implementation of Corrective Actions Will Be Reviewed During Future Insp to Determine That Full Compliance Achieved
ML20148N367
Person / Time
Site: Fort Saint Vrain Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/29/1988
From: Callan L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Robert Williams
PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO
References
NUDOCS 8804060482
Download: ML20148N367 (2)


See also: IR 05000267/1987034

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In Reply Refer To:

Docket: 50-267/87-34

Public Service Company of Colorado

ATTN: Robert O. Williams, Jr.

Vice President, Nuclear Operations

2420 W. 26th Avenue, Suite 15c

Denver, Colorado 80211

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Gentlemen:-

Thank you for your letter of March 11, 1988, in response to our letter

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and Hotice of Violation dated February 3,1988. We have reviewed your reply

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and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We

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will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future

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inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be

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maintained.

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Sincerely.

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L. J. Callan, Director

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Division of Reactor Projects

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CC.

Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Station

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Manager Nuclear Production Division

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16805 WCR 19)

Platteville, Colorario 80651

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Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Station

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P. Tomlinson, Manager Quality

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Assurarce Divisicn

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(same address)

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Colorado Radiation Control Program Director

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Colorado Public Utilities Comission

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DISTRIBUTION:

bectoDMB(IE01)

bec distrib. by RIV:

  • RRI

R. D. Martin, RA

  • Section Chief (DRP/B)
  • Project Engineer DRP/B
  • RPSB-DRSS

Lisa Shea, RM/ALF

  • MIS System
  • RSTS Operator
  • K. Heitner, NRR Project Manager
  • RIV File
  • DRS
  • TSS
  • DRP

D. Powers

  • w/766

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Public Service ~

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o.nSUcImotawo

R O WILLIAMS. JR

March 11, 1988

veg ens are

Fort St. Vrain

NucLEia onaa'cu

Unit No. I

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P-88083

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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ATTN:

Document Control Desk

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Washington, D.C.

20555

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Docket No. 50-267

SUBJECT:

NRC Inspection Report 87-34

REFERENCES:

(1) NRC

letter, Callan to

Williams, dated February

3, 1988 (G-88026)

(2) PSC letter. Williams to

Document Control

Desk,

dated

January

6, 1988

(P-88006)

(3)

PSC lettsr. Williams to

Document Control

Desk,

dated

January

6, 1988

(P-88007)

Gentlemen:

This

letter is in response to the Notice of Violation (Reference 1)

received as a result of the inspection conducted by Messrs.

R.

E.

Farrell

and

P.

W.

Michaud during the period November 22 through

December 31, 1987.

As discussed with Mr. T. F. Westerman on March 2,

1988, an extension of this response was granted until March 11, 1988

in order to address any hRC concerns discussed at the PSC/NRC

management meeting on March 3, 1988.

The following response to the

item contained in the Notice of Violation is hereby submitted:

Inadequate Procedural Controls

Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 states, in part,

"Activities affecting quality shall

be prescribed by documented

instructions,

procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the

circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these

instructions, procedures or drawings."

The licensee's quality assurance program as documented in FSAR,

9

Appendix B, Section B.5.5.2, states, in part,

"Each Change Notice

"

package

authorizing

a

modification

or

selected non-routine

$ '5

Q<

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P-88083

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March 11, 1988

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maintenance to the Plant, or any part therenf, requires

the

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development of a Controlled Work Procedure," and "All maintenance,

inspection, and surveillance activities are performed tc procedures

duthorized

under

controls

imposed by the FSV Administra tive

Procedures Manual."

Contrary to the above:

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On December

7,

1987, a wire was incorrectly teminated

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following maintenance,

in violation of the

procedural

recuirements of Clearance

17895, causing a reactor scrcm

signal and equipment damage,

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Also, on December 7, 1987, a wire to be '.ifted during a test

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was incorrectly specified by Station

Service

Request

87509817 resulting in a loss of offsite power.

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On December 21,

1987, emergency lighting batterics were

damaged beyond repair due to the failure to establish proper

installation requirements

in Control Work Procedure (CWP)

87-47 through 56, 182, and 183.

This is a Severity Level IV violation.

(SupplementI)(267/8734-01)

(1) The reason for violation if admitted:

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The

violation

is admitted.

Licensee Event Report 87-029

(Reference 3) described the first instance

of

inadequate

procedural controls cited in the Notice of Violation. The

identified cause of the incorrect termination of the cable 7487

wire was the inattentiveness on the part of both the electrician

and the

individual who performed the subsequent independent

verification and functional test.

The identified cause of the second instance of inadequate

procedural control, described in Licensee Event Report 87-028

(Reference 2), was failure of the test procedure preparer to

properly incorporate precautions that would ensure that the

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Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) would not trip during the

test. A contributing factor was a deficiency in Station Manager

Administrative Procedure 23 (SMAP-23) which does not require that

an independent review be performed on Post Maintenance Tests.

In the third instance cited of inadequate procedural controls the

damage to the new emergency lighting systern was caused when a

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portion

of the manufacturer's

installation precautions was

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omitted from the work instructions.

The actual installation and

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wiring was done properly; however, the precautions related to

battery storage and re-charging when not in service were not

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included in the work instructions by the designer and therefore

not performed by maintenance personnel. When the pre-operational

test was performed, the batteries were already discharged,

resulting in boiling several

batteries dry when the charging

circuitry was energized.

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P-08083

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March 11, 1988

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PSC recognizes that although the instances cited had variable

conditions (i.e. plant status, personnel involved, work activity

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in progress, etc.), personnel error or procedural inadequacy were

present in each case.

In further discussing the cited instances

with plant personnel, PSC has determined that a primary factor in

all

three instarees was a perception by performance level

personnel

that management was emphasizing the need for plant

operation, without an adequate and simultaneous emphasis on the

need for quality work performance.

Additional

contributing

factors included the use of personnel new to Fort St. Vrain who,

although qualified to perform the work, are still becoming

familiar with new prograns, procedures, and are still

gaining

experience with Fort St. Vrain plant systems.

(2) Corrective steps which have been taken and the results

achieved:

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In the first instance,

the Superintendent of Maintenance and

Station Manager discussed this event in detail

with

the

individuals who returned the clearance on cable 7487. The

results of mislanding the lead,

including personnel

safety,

equipment damage, and associated costs were covered.

It was

emphasized that work must be performed correctly above all other

considerations.

In

the second instance- the deficient test procedure was

corrected and the affected relay was successfully tested and

verified to be operable.

Following the test, all systems and

components involved were returned to their normal configuration.

To

ensure an independent review of Post Maintenance Test

Procedures, a revision to SMAP-23 has been initiated.

in the third

instance, new replacement batteries have been

received,

installed and successfully tested.

Emnhasis

on

preparing better work instructions is an essential element being

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incorporated into PSC's overall enhancement to the design control

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program.

PSC

recognizes the need to carefully plan all

modification activities, including post modification testing, as

part of the design control process.

PSC executive management has met with instrument and control

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technicians, plant electricians and all

intermediate

levels of

supervision to discuss the importance of controlled maintenance

activities.

Proper troubleshooting techniques and the need to

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ensure accurate configuration management were also emphasized.

Executive management has also impressed upon these personnel that

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many areas of support activities

(and the quality of these

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Ictivities) have the potential

to directly impact maintenance

tasks.

PSC has a goal

of zero defects

in all maintenance

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activities which is shared by maintenance, support and management

personnel alike.

Discussions have been held with all levels of

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management to emphasize the

importance

of

quality

work

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performance as a fundamental factor in meeting plant operational

schedules. All levels of management are involved

in ensuring

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Nuclear Operations personnel are aware of the direct relationship

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P-88083

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March 11, 1908

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of quality to all activities supporting plant operations, and the

need for feedback when conditions appear suspect.

(3) Corrective steps which will

be taken to avoid further

violations:

To address the condition related to lifted leads, an interim

policy snd administrative process concerning lifted leads

has been implemented on a pilot basis. A final policy and

supporting administrative procedures are being developed

using extensive contributions from personnel who actually

perform maintenance and testing activities related to lifted

leads.

Additionally,

improvements in the post maintenance

testing program are being formulated.

Executive management

will meet with mechanical maintenance personnel to emphasize

the importance of quality work, configuration msnagement and

proper troubleshooting techniques.

Management personnel

will also be cautioned to pay particular attention to work

perfomed by newer Fort St. Vrain personnel who, although

they may be cualified by training and experience, may still

not be ccmpletely familiar with specific Fort St. Vrain

programs, procedures, equipment of systems.

(4) The date when full compliance will be achieved:

The fomal

policy and supporting administrctive procedures

related to lifted leads will be issued by May 31, 1988. The

revision to SMAP - 23 concerning an independent review of

post maintena9ce test procedures will be issued by April 30,

1988.

Executive meetings with mechanical maintenance and

management personnel will be complete by March 31, 1988.

Should

have any further questions, please contact Mr. M. H.

Holmes (you303) 480-6960.

Very truly yours.

AW4wl-

R. O. Williams Jr.

Vice President, Nuclear Operations

R0W:DG/dd

cc: Regional Administration, Region IV

ATTN:

Mr. T. F. Westerrran, Chief

Projects Section B

Mr. Robert Farrell

Senior Resident Inspector

Fort St. Vrain

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