ML20148K087
| ML20148K087 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/10/1986 |
| From: | Conran J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Bernero R, Cunningham R, Starostecki R NRC COMMISSION (OCM), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148K054 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-714, REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8803310007 | |
| Download: ML20148K087 (9) | |
Text
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OCT 101986 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Robert M. Bernero, NRR I
Richard W. Starostecki, IE Richard E. Cunningham, NMSS Denwood F. Ross, RES Clemens J. Heltemes, Jr., AEOD Joseph Scinto, OGC THRU:
John E. Zerbe, Director Regional Operations and Generic Requirements Staff FROM:
James Conran, Senior Program Manager ROGR Staff
SUBJECT:
CRGR MEETING NO. 98 - USI A-46 REVIEW, SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Enclosed is additional information relating to the Comittee's review of the proposed USI A-46 resolution to be discussed at 2:00 p.m. on October 16, 1986. The enclosed letter from the Nuclear Utility Group on Equipment Qualification appears to present a serious challenge to the staff's position that the initial review and evaluation of older operating plants against experience data that has been collected (as proposed by the staff under the USI A.46 resolution submitted for CRGR review) does not qualify as backfitting. The general issue involved has much wider application than just to US! A.46, and would appear to warrant the Comittee's si Jus attention for discussion at the meeting on October 16, 1986.
Because of the complexity of the issue involved, that letter is being distributed in advance of the ROGR staff issue sheet for USI A-46 review which will follow shortly.
James Conran Regional Operations and Generic Requirements Staff 1
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
J. Sniezek Distribution:
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Robert M. Bernero NRR Richard W. Starostecki, IE Richard E. Cunningham, NMSS Denwood F. Ross, RES
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Clemens J. Heltemes, Jr., AE00 Joseph Scinto, OGC l
THRU:
John E. Zerbe, Director Regional Operations and Generic Requirements Staff FROM:
James Conran, Senior Program Manager ROGR Staff
SUBJECT:
CRGR MEETING NO. 98 - USI A-46 REVIEW, SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Enclosed is additional information relating to the Comittee's review of the proposed USI A-46 resolution to be discussed at 2:00 p.m. on October 16, 1986. The enclosed letter from the Nuclear Utility Group on Equipment Qualification appears to present a serious challenge to the staff's position
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that the initial review and evaluation of older operating plants against experience data that has been collected (as proposed by the staff under the USI A-46 resolution submitted for CRGR review) does not qualify as backfitting. The general issue involved has much wider application than just to USI A-46, and would appear to warrant the Committee's serious attention for discussion at the meeting on October 16, 1986.
Because of the complexity of the issue involved, that letter is being distributed in advance of the 80GR staff issue sheet for USI A-46 review which will follow shortly.
Nm Aames Conran Regional Operations and Generic Requirements Staff
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
J. Sniezek i
SUMMARY
AND ISSUE IDENTIFICATION FOR CRGR REVIEW ITEM MEETING NO. 90 MAY 28, 1986 IDENTIFICATION Proposed Comission paper transmitting a proposed final rule modification to the onsite property insurance requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w) as a condition of licenses.
ONECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION CRGR review and a favorable reconinendation is being sought on the proposed package that is seeking Comission approval to publish a final rule to modify existing requirements for onsite property damage insurance (Conditions of
- Licenses,10CFR50.54(w). The proposed final rule would require electric utilities with comercial power reactors to increase and maintain a certain level of onsite property damage insurance (such as 1.06 billion dollars) as financial security against a reactor accident. Also the proposed final rule would explicitly establish that in the event of a reactor accident, a decontam-ination and cleanup priority for use of the insurance proceeds could be imposed by order of the Director of NRR and that insurance policies should be modified accordingly. The final rule being proposed for publication derives from public coment received on a proposed rule change noticed in the Federal Register
)
(49 FR th damage _44645) on November 8,1984 and it would modify (w)ose onsite property 1
insurance requirements first codified in 50.54 on March 31, 1982 following TMI-2. As the proposed package clearly notes, the NRC is injecting
)
itself explicitly into the regulation of terms and conditions of onsite property damage insurance agreements and the allocations of the insurance proceeds after a reactor accident. This action is said to have been taken in the interest of protecting public health and safety, but it has also raised a number of interesting coments, issues and potential conflicts (such as NRC economic regulation affecting investatnt risks and capital costs, the abridgement of contractual rights, Federal preemption of traditional State regulatory juris-l diction over insurance practices Federal preemption of certain States laws and State constitutional prohibitions on public power entities within these States,etc). The matter of the NRC prioritizing insurance proceeds for cleanup and decontamination purposes was viewed as one of the more controversial issues.
In light of these problems, the staff has offered alternative approaches that the Comission may wish to take into further consideration prior to issue of a final rule on this matter. The package also contains analyses intended to address the provisions of the existing backfit rule (10 CFR 50.109).
These analyses conclude with a staff belief that because of the minimal cost impact on licensees and because such insurance does reduce the potential for public and occupational exposures, the final rule is justified even though a finding CONTACTS: RobertWood,SP(29885)
Merrill Taylor, DEOROGR (x24356)
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of substantial improvement to public health and safety cannot be made. The staff further observes in its CRGR transmittal letter for this package that on September 20, 1983, the Commission as a matter of policy, directed the EDO and staff to revise the property insurance rule to conform to its explicit directions.
BACKGROUND On November 8,1984, a proposed rule was published in the Federal Register (49 FR 44645) which would increase the amount of onsite property damage insuTa'nce that commercial reactor licensees are required to carry pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(w) and proposed a decontamination priority on any proceeds from such insurance at the order of the NRR Director. Operating reactor licensees are currently required to carry both (1) the maximum amount of property Mutual Atomic Energy Reinsurance Pool (y either American Nuclear Insurers insurance offered as primary coverage b AN!/MAERP) or Nuclear Mutual Limited (NHL) -- currently $500 million -- and (2) any excess coverage in an amount no less than that offered by either AN!/MAERP -- $85 million -- or Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL-!!) -- recently increased to $550 million. Thus, the minimum currently required under the rule is $500 million primary coverage and
$85 million excess coverage.
By buying both excess layers, most utilities are able to purchase a total of $1.135 billion in property insurance (per site) except where perhaps State constitutions or law prohibits.
Also, see memorandum dated April 25, 1986 from G. Wayne Kerr to J. H. Sniezek transmitting the CRGR review package. This memorandum transmitted the following:
1.
September 20, 1983 memorandum from SECY to E00 providing Comission directions for final rule revisions to 10 CFR 50.54(w).
Proposed Comission paper seeking) approval to publish the proposed final 2.
rule to modify the 10 CFR 50.54(w requirements that power reactor licensees maintain property damage insurance.
- 3., draft Federal Register Notice concerning the final changes in property insurance requirements and an analyses of public connents received.
- 4. regulatory analyses of proposed final rule change.
j 5.
Enclosures 3.1 and 3.2, letters dated August 5,1985, Attorney Generals (States of Texas and Louisiana) concerning Federal preemption of State laws.
- 6., status of property insurance coverage of cocunercial nuclear reactors as of April 1,1983 through April 1,1985.
- 7., backfit analysis pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109.
ISSUES There are numerous comments and issues already addressed in the proposed final rule package that CRGR may wish to explore to greater depth to better under-
3-stand the underlying conflicts within the proposed property insurance rule.
In its recomendations on this matter, CRGR may also wish to consider the merits I
of alternative rule fonnulations (e.g., Alternative 3.B. page 43, Enclosure 1 of the CRGR package) to improve resolution of conflicts.
1.
There appears to be a "gray" area insofar as how the decomissioning costs are taken into account in setting the amount of onsite property damage insurance required and how this would be taken into account by the Director of NRR in setting his priorities given a severe accident ultimately resulting in decomissioning. CRGR may wish to explore these interactions between accident decontamination cleanup and decommissioning costs.
(Note: Attached for information (Attachment I hereto) is a copy of a proposal to exempt Lacrosse from the property insurance requirements of 50.54(w). This decision evidently has included decomissioning costs into the determination). CRGR may also wish to explore what thresholds exist to determine where proceeds from property damage insurance would stop and decom,issioning funding would begin.
CRGR may wish to explore those safety) incentives that exist within the 2.
property damage insurance and 50.54(w framework to reward with premium returns etc. a good safety record over say, a 40 year plant life, when plant decomissioning is iminent. On the other hand, CRGR may wish to explore safety disincentives given a pool of property damage insurance funds available that could far offset the need for available decomissioning l
funds. With the 50.54(w) proposal, NRC has entered the business of regu-lating insurance contract terms and CRGR may wish to consider what kind of l
added provisions would need to exist (if any) to guard against economic incentives to use the property damage insurance proceeds for decom-missioning purposes.
3.
The Federal preemption of State laws and State constitutional provisions against such property insurance arrangements (as is being called for by the proposal of 50.54(w)) raises interesting possibilities that certain applicants may(be blocked from an OL without recourse except to the Supreme Court after having sunk many billions of investment dollars into its plant) since these applicants could not fulfill this condition of license without being in violation of State laws.
It would seem that NRC i
would require a much stronger case on public health and safety than is now evident in the proposed package to off-set the perception of intrusion into economic regulation or of being arbitrary and capricious in this matter. Accordingly, CRGR may wish to determine in some detail the i
magnitude and strength of the staff's arguments concerning safety benefits to the public from this proposed final rule.
CRGR may also wish to detennine, for example, how the two Texas plants that have yet to receive an OL would meet (or be exempted from) the proposed 50.54(w) rule. What would be the exemption rationale? Could safety goals be relied upon in any fashion given the considerable controversy about inclusion of any of the averted onsite property damage costs into the regulatory safety decision process?
If it has been decided by NRC to regulate the amount (and disposition) of onsite property damage insurance proceeds in the public interests and to protect public health and safety,'would the public
in Texas have less safety if the Texas plants had much less than the specified 1.06 billice dollars of insurance? Should the safety goals for plants in Texas, Louisiana and Nebraska be different? Should NRC demand a proportionally higher degree of accident prevention or lower frequency of those accidents causing decontamination and cleanup?
4.
CRGR may wish to determine the stability of the 1.06 billion dollar insurance requirement, given the degree of uncertainty that appears to exist on costs of waste disposal.
5.
The 1.06 billion dollar amount chosen by the staff reflects results of analyses perfonned by PNL on various accident scenarios involving very limited core damage to large-scale core melt scenarios.
(Note:
Attachnent 2 hereto illustrates some of these results as incorporated into NUREG/CR-3568, "A Handbook for Value-Impact Assessment.")
It appears that the 1.06 billion amount derives from accident scenarios that assume a high degree of containment integrity is maintained through the accident and the scenarios do not cover the somewhat less likely cases where contamination of property out to or beyond the site boundary occurs.
CRGR may wish to explore the ramifications of these less likely scenarios and what, if any, additional dollar costs for cleanup and decontamination would be needed and from where these proceeds would be obtained. Consider, for example, a less likely case where property out to and beyond the site boundary becomes contaminated but does not trigger an ENO determination (or the Price Anderson funds). Presumably the Director of NRR could allocate /
priortize the onsite property damage insurance proceeds to cleanup and decontaminate the plant as well as land out to the site boundary but no further. Who would fund any decontamination and cleanup beyond the site boundary and what would be the process involved to obtain these funds?
CRGR any wish to explore what NRC analyses or provisions exist for such contingencies.
6.
10 CFR 140 defines the NRC meaning of financial protection and the staff is proposing to revise the language of 50.54(w) to reflect financial security so as to eliminate conflicts, etc.
CRGR may wish to determine if a conforming definition will be placed in Part 50 so that the true differences between financial protection and financial security can be understood by all.
7.
The analyses perfoned in Enclosure 5 of the CRGR package, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109, is highly qualitative, and does not "stand alone" and of course, the proposed action runs the risk of being blocked by the standard required for substantial increase in the overall protection of public health and safety for the costs involved. Further, the degree of public protection provided for the aggregated insurance premiums has not been shown to be absent conflicts for without relationship) to other proposed and existing requinments.
The aggregate industry costs are substantial and as one commenter noted, these expenditures could be used for other improvements to safety. CRGR may wish to explore with the staff the merits of providing a more quantitative analyses pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109. The CRGR may also wish to detennine why the staff views an incremental cost per site year of say 3 million dollars, as "relatively minor costs" (for a single unit site) and the fraction of operational costs that such expenditures represent.
74f
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SUMMARY
AND ISSUE IDENTIFICATION FOR CRGR REVIEW ITEM MEETING NO. 92 JULY 11, 1986 OVERALL ASSESSMENT BY 60GR STAFF Experience cited by the staff of unreliable and unpredictable operation of the subject dp switches at two operating reactors would appear to justify the prompt actions, the 7-day actions, and (with minor modifications) the 60-day actions proposed by the staff.
Because of considerable uncertainties that ex-ist at this point regarding the exact nature and scope of the problem, and re-garding the number and duraticn of operating reactor shutdowns (or shutdown extensions) that could be required in implementing rigorously the dp switch testing requirements proposed by the staff, it does not appear that sufficient information has been provided to CRGR to fully justify the 30-day actions cur-rently proposed by the staff.
The prompt actions and 7-day actions proposed would serve to enhance licensees'/ operators' abilities to recoonize and miti-gate plant conditions that could result from failure of the subject dp switches.
Consideration should therefore be given to allowing alternative actions / measures by licensees if shutdown would necessarily result from adhering to the 30-day testing requirements now proposed (e.g., continued operation with suitable mitigative measures until the "problem" is better defined or until SOR switches can be replaced with another device). Allowing a longer-than-30-day interval in which to complete initial testing of dp switches is another option that should be considered.
. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS / ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY ROGR STAFF 1.
Clarification of Specification of Scope Prompt Action #1 refers to switches in "... systems important to safety as defined in 10 CFR 50.49(b)..." Considerable confusion has existed within the industry and utilities for some time now regarding proper usage of the safety classification term "important to safety" vis-a-vis the term "safety-related." Connission decision on this issue is pending currently.
Given these circumstances, usage of the term "important to safety" in de-fining the intended scope of the bulletin seems doomed from the start to misinterpretation and/or misapplication by at least some licensees, even without any additional confusion factors. An additional possible source of confusion in this case, however, is that 10 CFR 50.49 addresses explic-itly electric equipment important to safety, whereas the proposed bulletin addresses components in fluid systems important to safety.
The language of the bulletin should be modified to avoid confusion regard-ing the intended scope of application; one suggestion would be to specify as the intended scope those plant systems already addressed explicitly in plant Technical Specifications (LCOs, surveillance test, etc.)
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2.
Scope of Impact Assessment The scope of the impact assessment specified in proposed 60-day Action #2 does not appear to adequately take into account the possible adverse im-pact of SOR dp switches in major systems that are "important to safety, but not safety-related," (e.g. BOP systems) the failure of which could cause too high a rate of safety system challenge and/or whose failure or malfunction could interfere with the successful functioning of safety-related systems.
3.
Lack of Overall Risk Perspective The staff has not provided information that would give CRGR the necessary perspective on the risk implications of the SOR dp switch problem suffi-cient to make a balanced judgment regarding the absoluted need to obtain-the dp switch test data sought within 30 days, even if that requires the shutdown of operating reactors (or continued shutdown of reactors in some cases). The following kinds of additional infonnation are needed to pro-vide that perspective:
a.
Qualitative Unreliability Estimates How many tests total have been performed on dp switch operation at LaSalle? At Oyster Creek?
Of the total tests performed, how many resulted in total func-tional failure? How many resulted in successful operation, al-beit outside specified limits /setpoints?
What is the staff's best estimate of SOR dp switch unreliability (total failure per demand)?
What is the staffs best estimate (as contrasted to postulate) of dp switch comon-mode failure rate?
Is there any evidence or credible technical opinion that, in most cases, operation outside specified limits /setpoints can be compensated by establishing new (conservative) limits /setpoints?
Has any licensee proposed doing so?
What evidence is there that SOR dp switch problems observed to date are truly generic in a way that leads logically or reason-ably to the conclusion that the possibility of comon-mode, si-multaneous, complete failure of the subject dp switches in any/all plants is serious enough to warrant shutdown, if neces-sary, to obtain more test data?
There does not appear to be indication of SOR dp switch failure in other than two opercting plants. Does the staff understand why this is so, sufficiently at least to justify extrapolation of the observed problem to a generic condition affecting
(potentially) all reactors? Have any licensees cited more fa-vorable experience with SOR dp switches on the basis of surveil-lance testing or controlled reliability testing?
b.
Risk Implications of Unreliable Switch Operation In the event of failure (i.e., complete functional failure or operation outside specified limits), is there other plant in-strumentation to indicate reliably vessel water level and/or pump flow?
Plant conditions resulting from switch failure have been noticed and reacted to effectively by plant operators in the operational events cited by the staff in the package provided to CRGR.
Based on this experience, and assuming further the additional training plant operators would receive regarding recognition and mitigation of dp switch failure (in connection with prompt ac-tions and 7-day actions specified in the proposed bulletin),
does the staff have any quantitative estimate of adverse risk increment associated with continued operation of plants with SOR dp switches for 30 days? For longer than 30-days? Has any utility, vendor, or industry group offered any estimate in this regard?
4.
Possible Adverse Risk. Effects Associated With Proposed Actions To what extent has the staff considered the possible adverse risk impact of licensees testing dp switches in scram systems (or other systems) at power (e.g. inadvertent trips and effects of resulting transients 5.
Adequacy of Proposed Actions Should licensees be required to simply replace SOR dp switches l
with another device?
1 6.
Test Rig Procurement Problems On the basis of ROGR staff contacts with Equipment Qualifica-tions Group representatives in the limited time available, it appears that current availability of test equipment for dp switch testing may well pose a serious problem for licensees in meeting the 30-day action requirements of the proposed bulletin.
Realistic procurement schedules are more like 45-90 days in the estimation of the utility representatives spoken with, if all the licensees known to be affected try to order (rather than build) their test rigs. Consideration should be given to allow-ing a longer interval to complete the initial testing of dp switches than the 30 days now proposed by the staff.
i 1
FEB 3 567
.~
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Robert M. Bernero, NRR Richard W. Starostecki, RI Richard E. Cunningham, NMSS Denwood F. Ross, RES Clemens J. Heltemes, Jr., AE00 Joseph Scinto, DGC THRU:
John E. Zerbe, Director Regional Operations and Generic Requirements Staff FROM:
Walter S. Schwink, Senior Program Manager Regional Operations and Generic Requirements Staff
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
AND ISSUE IDENTIFICATION FOR CRGR MFETING NO. 108 4
Fnclosed for your information and use is the ROGR staff summary associated with the proposed final rule, "Requirements for Criminal History Checks." This j
matter is scheduled for CRGR review at Meeting No.108, Thursday, February 5, 1987, 1-2 p.m.
/s Walter S. Schwink ROGR Staff
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
J. Sniezek Distribution:
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Sumary and Issue Identification on CPGR Review Item, Meeting No. 108 February 5,1987 l
IDENTIFICATION
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As mandated by law (attachment) NMSS proposes a final rule entitled, "Require-ments for Criminal History Checks."
OBJECTIVE The CRGR is requested to review the proposed final rulemaking.
DISCUSSION The proposed final rule to amend 10 CFR Part 73 would add requirements for the control and use of criminal history data received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as part of pending Federally mandated criminal history checks of individuals with unescorted access to nuclear power plants or individ-uals granted access to safeguards infonnation by power reactor licensees. Fnact-ment of Public Law 99-399, "The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986,' requires nuclear power reactor licensees to conduct criminal history checks of individuals with unescorted facility access or access to safe-guards information through the use of FBI criminal history data. Criminal history is made available to the private sector only through Federal law. The legislation requires the NRC to issue regulations to establish conditions for the use and control of the criminal history data received from the FBI. These conditions include procedures for the taking of fingerprints, limits on use and redissemination, assurance that the information is used solely for its intended purpose, and provisions that individuals subject to fingerprinting are provided the right to complete and correct infonnation in their criminal history records prior to any final adverse action.
Individuals granted unescorted access to sensitive areas within the reactor facility or access to sensitive information will be subject to FBI criminal history checks to help ensure that these indi-viduals do not have a criminal history bearing upon their personal trustworthi-ness and reliability.
An earlier version of the rule (proposed rule) was reviewed by the CRGR at Meeting No. 96 held on September 17, 1986. The Comittee reconnended EDO approval of the proposed rule after modification.
(A copy of the Meeting Minutes is attached.)
ISSUES 1.
Pust fingerprinting and criminal history checks be completed before or after a temporary person is granted unescorted access to protected / vital areas or access to safeguards information?
2.
Will there t'e grandfathering?
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2-3.
What is the safety rationale basis for waiving the rule for protected and devitalized areas when all or part of the facility is in cold shutdown, refueling or devitalized status?
4.
Is the term "facility" in the law interpreted to mean both protected areas and vital areas? What is the safety concern for concluding protected areas, which by definition do not contain the means for couaitting sabotage that could cause a radiological release?
5.
Is the transfer of an individual's criminal history file / granting of unescorted access at another facility conditional upon positive identifi-cation of the individual?
6.
How does the fact that an individual has been given access to safeguards i
information warrant exemption of the individual from the rule?
7.
How will contractors, manufacturers and suppliers be treated by the rule?
8.
Is a periodic recheck (i.e.,10-20 percent random check per year) needed after the initial criminal history check?
9.
How will the rule apply to people responding to emergencies at the site?
- 10. Reciprocity concerning transfer of information pertaining to granting /not granting unescorted access needs to be better articulated; i.e., could a central clearing house be used?
- 11. The paper states that NPC's NUREG-0794, "Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information" provides criteria and guidelines; NUREGs are not to contain criteria or gu,'ince.
- 12. Why is there a 3-year record retention period?
- 13. What is the administrative impact on NRC/ licensees / individuals?
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Section 3 sets forth amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of f'
1954 (42 U.S.C section 2011 et seq.) and adds a new section dealing t
with Angerp(a)nting for escurity clearance.would mandate that any entity licensed to op ri Section 8 utilitation faculty commercially, under 42 U.S.C. section 2133, or to p#4 rate ladustrially and
, under 42 U.S.C. section of84(b), must require tha anescorted ecosas to the 2
nuclear facility is to be ted, with those finge ts submitted to the Attorney ral for identincation a
history record check. The mandda on the part of the licensee is in force Irrespective of who. mploys the indivktual hsving unescorted e
acomes.
N subeection would also authorize the Attorney Genersi to pro.
vide all resuts of such fingerprint chose to the person designated by the Commission in ' consultation with the Attorney General
- The subeection also would that the licensee witi bearahe (
.I cost of the criminal regords thereby ensuring.that the. bill will not reate a burden to the taxpayer.
W subeection grants rulemaking ashrity to the Nuclear Reg-ulatory Commission to. waive the requirements of.this yAnds under conditions, terms, and for periods that h C9==t-e consistent with its responsibuties "to the comm= defense and security ud to the and safety of the 9" 4.T; R
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np commi that this exception be used
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the C-'& to prescribe regula-56M4 "M**-
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tions to the taking of fingerprints and for estabbshing the condi-tions for both using h information and limi the rad'-
Gq tion of th+ information provided by b record in a
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limit 4d to the contained in %e Act. The legislation gives 7
- d disention'to tb mmission to implement a practical program.
%"76 3 through regulation, for out the of this act. Be-cause of the possible incom of the is criminal history records mentioned earlier the report and because of the impor-tant due process and privacy internets of prospective em the Commitee believes that the regu1% pececribed by E
mission shall contain h f mialmum ulrements:
(1) Individuals who are to submit orprints under the program will be notined that the is will be used to run a criminal history records check FB4.
(2) Indiv$ duals who are subject to ting will be pro-vided with an opportunity to emplete correct the informa-
' tion contained B h FIlfs criminal history records prior to any adverse job action being and (3) b Cwmi-im wul procedures to ensure that the information provided to the plant operator will only be
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used to determine whether the is 8t to be given oneo-coated access to the nucl.ar
, and for no other purpose.
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4
. to the Minutes of CRGR Heeting No. 96 Review of Proposed Rule Entitled, "Criminal History Checks" R. Burnett and K. Jamgochian (NMSS) presented for CRGR review a legislatively mandated proposed rule ' entitled, "Criminal History Checks." A copy of their presentation is attached.
The proposed rule essentially repeats Section 606 of Public Law 99-399, "The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986." The Act adds a new section (149) to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, entitled "Fingerprinting i
for Criminal History Checks" and requires the NRC to administer the Act through regulation (s). In this regard, the proposed rule would amend 10 CFR Part 73 to require that each power reactor licensee or applicant for license:
i 1.
fingerprint each individual who is permitted unescorted access to the protected or vital areas of the reactor facility or access to Safeguards Infomation concerning access to those areas, 2.
submit the fingerprints through the NRC to the Attorney General of.the United States for national criminal history checks, 3.
use the results of criminal history checks solely for the purpose of detemining an individual's suitability for access, and 4.
process and use fingerprints / criminal history infonnation in a manner that assures the rights of individuals are not infringed upon and facilitates receipt of information.
In detemining whether to grant a person unescorte'd access to certain areas of a power reactor facility or access to Safeguards Infonnation concerning those areas, licensees and applicar.ts currently make judgments concerning a person's identity and criminal history. These judgments and others are considered in detennining the person's trustworthiness (not likely to comit or facilitate sabotage). Currently, licensees and applicants have limited or no access to only local criminal history infonnation. The Act and the proposed rule would.
nt access through the NRC to FBI national criminal history information.
ess to such information would significantly reduce'the uncertainty concern-ing a person's identity and criminal history. While substantial safety in-provement will not be readily evident from implementation of the rule, it is both prudent and consistent with the Comission's defense in depth policy to minimize uncertainty associated with determining the trustworthiness of a per-son needing the aforementioned access. This is particularly important from the safety perspective because a person granted such access would have access to or information concerning access to equipment and structures that prevent and mitigate radiological releases to the environment. Sabotage of such equipment and/or structures could threaten public health and safety. HRC has emphasized human trustworthiness rathee than additional equipment and/or structures be-cause of the number of insiders granted such access; the balbucing of security
2 conce.rns ind impediments to safe facility operation; and the unpredictability of wt!ch equipment and/or structure (s) would be degraded or failed as a result of sabotage.
The CRGR review focussed on the proposed rule's implementation of the Act rather than the need for the rule since the rule is mandated by the Act and the Committee strongly supports the emphasis on human trustworthiness. The CRGR raised the following issues concerning the proposed rule:
1.
The term "facility" in the Act is interpreted in the proposed rule to mean both protected and vital areas. Since by' definition the means for radio-logical release does not exist in protected areas, there does not appear to be a safety rational for interpreting "facility" to mean protected areas. Mr. Burnett remarked that protected areas were included at indus-try request rather than for safety reasons. The CRGR reconsnended that tha rule not include requirements for protected areas.
2.
Although the Act permits the Comission to relieve persons from the act under certain circumstances, the rule is silent on this matter. The CRGR reconinended that this matter be explicitly addressed in the rule. While it was agreed that "grandfathering" should not be pennitted, it was agreed that reciprocity between NRC and other licensees and applicants should be addressed in the rule to preclude unnecessary and redundant fingerprinting and criminal history chects by each licensee. When they were done, whether they should be repeated, and how often they should be repeated should be taken into account. Also, the rule should address the matter of emergen:y access without fingerprinting and/or criminal history checks.
3.
The Act implicitly requires that fingerprints be taken correctly and that criminal history infonnation be used along with other infonnation to de-termine whether an individual shall be pennitted unescorted access to the facility or access to Safeguards Infonnation concerning the facility. The CRGR recommended that the proposed rule be explicit in these matters.
4.
Both the Act and the proposed rule address the matter of individual rights. The CRGR reconinended that the rule be more aggressive and expli-cit concerning the disclosure of criminal history information in various situations, e.g., withdrawal of application for access, disclosure to others who have a need to know, etc.
5.
Upon the rule becoming effective, licensees and applicants will have six months to submit fingerprint cards for their employees and contractors who have unescorted access and/or access to Safeguards Information. It is estimated that during that period 240,000 people will be fingerprinted (includes replacement of rejected fingerprints) and roughly 480,000 docu-ments (includes replacement of rejected fingerprints) will be processed through the NRC to the FBI for criminal history checks. After this ini-tial effort, roughly 28,000 documents will be processed annually. A 13 to 21 day FBI turnaround time has been assumed. Depending upon whether
~
)
3 licensees grant access before or after criminal history information is considered, there could be significant impacts on operating plants if criminal history information is not promptly forwarded to licensees. Out of concern for the capability to accomodate such a work load, the CRGR recoesnended that the staff confirm industry's ability to accomplish their effort, obtain firm connitments from the FBI concerning their effort and assure that NRC resources are available and comitted to accomplish their effort.
6.
An NRC automated system is planned to track the handling of documents pro-cessed by the NRC in connection with the proposed rule. There were dif-fering staff views about whether the NRC should maintain any information (sumary or detailed) about the criminal histories of individuals proces-sed under the rule. The CRGR recomended that no such infonnation in any form be maintained by the NRC.
i 7.
A backfit analysis in res >onse to the 10 CFR 50.109 requirement for such an analysis accompanied t1e proposed rule. The CRGR recomended that the staff review its finding that "...the proposed rule will result in a sub-stantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety..." to assure that the finding is correct and supportable.
8.
The staff intends that the proposed rule and final rule be issued by EDO signature without Comission involvement. The CPGR recomended that is-suance of the rule in this manner be discussed with the EDO before proceeding.
In sumary, the CP.GR recommended that after the Connittee's recomendations in 1 through 8 above have been adopted, the proposal has been modified accordingly and the modified proposal has been reviewed by the DEDROGR staff, the proposed rule should be forwarded for EDO approval.
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