ML20148H852

Forwards IE Circular 78-18

ML20148H852
Person / Time
Site:	Marble Hill
Issue date:	11/06/1978
From:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Coughlin J PSI ENERGY, INC. A/K/A PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF INDIANA
References
NUDOCS 7811150024
Download: ML20148H852 (1)

Text

..

p TEP A d p atov4 UNITED STATES c

v ft NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f 'g.-

2 799 ROOSEVELT RO AD

,I 1) f R EGloN 111

[

G LE N E LLY N, IL LINOIS 60137 Docket No. 50-546 NO\\/ G1979 Docket No. 50-547 i

Public Service of Indiana ATTN:

Dr. James Coughlin Vice President, Nuclear i

1000 East Main Street Plainfield, IN 46168 Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Circular No. 78-18 is forwarded to you for infor-mation. No specific action is requested and no written response is required.

If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact ttitt office.

Sincerely, 1-

, jpy g..w

,/ James G. Keppler Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Circular No. 78-18

2. List of IE Circulars Issued in 1978 cc w/encls:

R. M. Brown, Construction Project Engineer Central Files Director, NRR/DPM Director, NRR/ DOR PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae l

781115 0 C AL[

P. '...

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEtIEFT RECION III L

IE Circular No. 78-18 November 6, 1978 UL FIF.E TEST

Background

on September 15, 1978, a fire test of a full-scale vertical cable tray array was conducted at the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) near Chicago, Illineis. It was part of the fire protection research program managed by Sandia Laboratories under NRC contract. The purpose of the test was to demonstrate the effectiveness of area sprinklers and cable tray fire barriers constructed of ceramic fiber blankets in preventing damage to cables as a result of an exposure to a flammable liquid fire. The test resulted in damage to some electrical cables.

Discussien f

The configuration of the fire test was selected to simulate a section of a plant area with vertical cable trays containing redundant safety divisions arranged such that the redundant divisions could be simul-taneously exposed to a potential fire resulting from an inadvertent spill of flammable liquid in the area. The arrangement of the cable trays and the designation of the redundant tray divisions is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 2 shows the location of the fire detectors and the three groups of sprinklers. Each of the five cable trays contained cable insulated-with polyvinyl chloride and was enclosed in a separated ceramic fiber blanket fire barrier from floor to ceiling in accordance with the manu-facturer's recommendations. The sprinkler and detector arrangement was as permitted by NFPA Code. However, no water was actually used at any time during this test due to the failure of some sprinkler heads to e

actuate, as explained below.

Each sprinkler location in the test arrangement contained three nominally identical tempera _ure sensing sprinkler heads with fusible links adjacent to an open sprinkler head which was connected to a manual water supply valve. The temperature sensing heads were wired to signal when their links fused. After all three temperature sensing heads at a given loca-tion activated, then the water supply for the open head was to be manually admitted. The sprinklers were of a type which actuate at the

{

slow end of acceptance for reaction time. The test procedure required that all three temperature sensing heads had to activate before water would be turned on.

In this way, it was expected to get'some data on variability in the response time of identical sprinklers.

j..

-)

t

.. ~

I

\\

l IE Circular No. 78-18 November 6, 1978 Test Details The test was started by igniting the two gallons of heptane that was poured into the floor pan. A fully developed fire occurred almost immediately. The ceiling smoke detector alarmed in about 15 seconds.

In about 50-60 seconds, two of the three temperature sensing sprinklers located between the wall and cable trays I and 2 activated. The fire between cable trays 1, 2, 3, and 4 appeared most intense, apparently because of a chimney effect between the four trays. The flames between cable trays 3 and 5 did not appear to be so intense. The ceramic fiber blanket absorbed some of the heptane so that after the heptane in the pan burned, most of the flame seemed to come from the bottom outside surf ace of the ceramic fiber blanket. No additional temperature sensing sprinkler heads at any location activated; thus, the sprinkler water supply was not turned on for any of the three sprinkler locations.

The apparent slow response of the third temperature sensing sprinkler is being investigated, since this was not intended to be a slow response sprinkler.

At about 3 minutes into the test there was an indication of a short circuit in cable tray 3, which was probably caused by the fire. After 5-7 minutes the height of the flames appeared to subside; however, residual flames continued for about 40 minutes.

Preliminary Results and Analyses Preliminary information indicates that the flammable liquid or flames penetrated the protective barriers at the bottom of the vertical trays and caused fire damage to the polyvinyl chloride insulation on cables in four of the five trays.

On subsequent 500-volt mesger tests, it was found that another cable in tray 2 had also experienced some damage, as evidenced by a conductor to ground short.

The most probable cause of the fire damage in certain cable trays appears to be. related to the absorption or seepage of heptane under the ceramic fiber blanket at the juncture with the floor. Once the heptane entered the interior regions of the. cable tray, then ignition apparently occurred via the amall opening at the floor or through a vapor / air path within the joints. There is some indication that some cable damage was caused by absorption of heptane on the inside of the barrier (vicking effect) and its ignition which heated a cable tray ladder rung, causing damage to a cable.in contact with the rung. The ingress of the heptane inte the ceramic fiber needs to be further evaluated since this appears to be the most significant failure mode.

e e

m-r-

---..n-,=n.

e-e--r

=,

ee+-

e e-e*-s--e

1.

i IE Circular No. 78-18 November 6,1978 Tentative Conclusions

~

T.he test results are still being analyzed, and it would be premature to establish firm conclusions at this time; however, the results now available

' indicate that the folluving areas of the fire protection program need close consideration:

1.

To protect against spills of flammable liquids, barriers or curbs may be needed to prevent entry of the flammable liquid behind fire barriers. A vick effect may also need to be considered in the design of fire barriers.

i 2.

Some small fires may not actuate sprinkler heads. To reduce this

)

Possibility in sprinkler systens to be installed, f ast response sprinkler heads should be considered (less than approximately 3 minutes in the UL Standard 199 " Automatic Sprinklers for Fire Protection Service").

3.

The location of the fire detection devices and the sprinkler heads relative to the fire and components being protected is of great importance. The path of the air movement in the area influences the actuation of such devices and should be considered in the system layout.

The final results of this test will be issued when the analysis of the test is complete.

This circular is being issued for information only. No specific action is requested and no written response is required. If you desire addi-tional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Attachments:

1.

Figure 1 2.

Figure 2 I

e e

n y

e ww

s Figure 1 e

e approximate boundary of pan for liquid spill fire

/

// / / / / / /J 7 f y f / / / /_f / / / / / I

\\

^

\\

/

/

~3 '

i H

/-

q3p

/

i

-r,

/

i f b.v i i

[Oiv 1 1x

/

t c V['

ll T

-3 @iv i

_1 i on 2.

f l

/

8

'/

g 1

/

/

l 1 D sv UI 2)

I l-M P r -i j e

/

I--

i s

Vertical Tray Corner Test 0

9 e

e 5

• • • • • Me-e s,

.m m.

o, e-y e

f-

3 steesmenee dee 9

S O

q

• • 'e y

's O

e e

e 4

e e

j

_ z

)

1

• a k

e.

W am 1

=

e q

e O

s b

=

am C

8 M~

b 4

.u

.j eo g il (N

l

'M

.4 h

j a

b[

[ ++

.J k

• q C.

g d

C E

D E

E N

h M

e w

(

t m

O S

4 C

N b'

Q

-e

\\#

4-I.

f

=

L O

e

< O'-

y_

g go--

4 1r e

g 4Q A

~q

%c J

L' I

s d

s(%

w

(

o

• 4

~

s

,p34 e

g.4 E.. s 1-

.2 i

g

+

),,,,,

O 9

i i

IE Circular No. 78-18 j

November 6, 1978 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978 1

Circular Subj ect Date Issued To No.

of Issue j

78-01 Loss of Well Logging 4/5/78 All Helders of Source Well Logging Source Licenses 78-02 Proper Lubricating 011 4/20/78 All Holders of for Terry Turbines Reactor OLs or cps 78-03 Packaging Greater Than 5/12/78 All Holders of Type A Quantities of Reactor OLs, cps, Low Specific Activity Fuel Cycle, Radioactive Material Priority I Material i

for Transport and Waste Disposal Licenses 78-04 Installation Error That S/15/78 All Holders of Could Prevent Closing of Reactor OLs or Fire Doors cps 78-05 Inadvertent Safety Injection 5/23/78 All Holders of During Cooldown Reactor OLs or cps l

I 78-06 Potential Common Mode 5/23/78 All Holders of Flooding of ECCS Equipment Reactor OLrs or Rooms at BWR Tacilities cps 78-07 Damaged Components of a 5/31/78 All Holders of l

Bergen-Paterson Series Reactor OLs or 25000 Hydraulic Test cps i

Stand 78-08 Environmental Qualification 5/31/78 All Holders of of Safety Related Equipment Reactor OLs or at Nuclear Power Plants cps 78-09 Arcing of General Electric 6/5/78 A1) Holders of Company Size 2 Contactors cps l.

.. ~..

.. - -.. ~.-

e IE Circular No. 78-18 November 6, 1978

~

LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978 Circular Subj ect Date of Issued to No.

Issue 78-10 Control of Sealed 6/14/78 All Medical Sources Used in Licensees in Radiation Therapy Categories G and G1 78-11 Recirculation H-G 6/15/78 All Holders of Set Overspeed Stops BWR OLs or cps 78-12 HPCI Turbine Control 6/30/78 All Holders of Valve Lift Rod Bending BWR OLs or cps for plants with EPCI Terry Turbine 78-13 Inoperability of Hultiple 7/10/78 All Holders of Service Water Pumps Reactor OLs and cps except for plants located in: AL, AK, CA, FL, GA, LA, MS, SC 78-14 HPCI Turbine Reversing 7/12/78 All Holders of BWR Chr.mber Hold Down Bolting OLs or cps for plants with a EPCI Terry Turbine excepting Duane Arnold and Monticelle 78-15 Cheekvalves Fail to 7/20/78 All Holders of Close In Vertical Reactor OLs or cps Position 78-16 Limitorque Valve 7/26/78 All Holders of Act uators Reactor OLs or cps 78-17 Inadequate Guard Training /

10/13/78 All Holders of Qualification and Falsified and applicants Training Records for Reactor OLs..