ML20148H165
| ML20148H165 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/29/1978 |
| From: | Moore R NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7811130385 | |
| Download: ML20148H165 (3) | |
Text
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SEP 29 M Memorandum to the Files STAFF CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXPORT SOURCE MATERIAL TOSWITZERLAND(XU08422)
In June 1978, Transnuclear., Incorporated filed an application for a license to export 672,000 pounds of depleted uranium to Switzerland.
The material will be fabricated into plates by NL Industries in Albany, New York for use in a total absorbtion counter at the Cern Laboratory-in Geneva, Switzerland.
The uranium counter is used in experiments
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'at Cern, where research on high e'nergy partiiil's bylis~e of intersection e
s_torage rings has been conducted since 1969.
The counter is on loan under the US-Switzerland Agreement for Cooperation.
The loan extends until December 30, 1983 after which time the counter will be returned to the US for use at the Brookhaven National Laboratory.
In response to our July 7, 1978 request for views, the Executive Branch has (1) concluded that issuance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the interests of the US, inciuding the common defense and security; and (2) confirmed that the material will be subject to all the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the US and Switzerland.
These views and license application analysis by the Executive Branch were forwarded by the State Department memorandum of September 13, 1978.
Confirmation 'of the applicability of the US-Switzerland Agreement for Cooperation was also set forth in the letter of August 2, 1978 from the Embassy of Switzerland.
The staff has reviewed the subject application in light of the considera-tions below:
o Safeguards. Although a party to the NPT, Switzerland has not yet concluded an NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA pursuant to INFCIRC/153.
Nevertheless, all materials or facilities proposed to be exported'or previously exported pursuant to the. US-Switzerland Agreement for Cooperation and any US-supplied nuclear material used in' the facility, or produced through the use thereof, will be subject to IAEA safeguards agreement based on INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2.
It is expected that IAEA safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 will be brought into force this year'or in 1979. Therefore, the staff is of the view that criterion (1) of the.NNPA is met w1th respect to Switzerland.
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o No Nuclear Explosive Use.
As a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT, Switzerland has undertaken the obligations not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever F
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of.
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive dqvices.
Therefore, the staff believes that criterion (2) of the NNPA is met.
o Physical Security.
The Executive BrEnch has assessed the physical security measures maintained in Switzerland with respect to nuclear material and facilities and has found them adequate for the material covered by this license. The Executive Branch has also advised that Switzerland has implemented IAEA guidelines reaardina the ohysical security for nuclear materials. In view of this, the_ staff believes that criterion (3) of the NNPA is met.
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It should be noted that in the letter dated August 2,1978 from the Swiss Embassy, the written physical assurance required by 110.43(b) has been obtained from Switzerland for this specific case.
o Retransfer. The US-Switzerland Agreement prohibits the re-transfer of any material supplied by the US, beyond the jurisdiction of Switzerland without US approval to such retransfer, and then only if it is within the scope of an agree-ment for cooperation between the US and the other nation or
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group of nations.
Similarly, it prohibits the transfer of special nuclear material produced through the use of US-supplied material or facilities without US approval'.
Therefore, the staff believes that. criterion (4) of the NNPA is met.
o Reprocessing.
The US-Switzerland Agreement stipulates that any reprocessing of US-supplied material shall be performed in facilities acceptable to both parties upon a joint determination that safeguards may be effectively applied. Thus, it is the rtaff's view that criterion (5) of the NNPA is met.
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o Sensitive Technology.
The proposed export does not involve sensitive technology.
As more fully developed in its memorandum dated September 13, 1978, the Executive Branch has determined that Switzerland currently meets all the criteria of P.L.95-242, including the requirements of Section 126(a)(1) and the specific criteria of Sections 127 and 128 and that Switzerland has adhered to all the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the US.
The staff has concluded that issuance c# the proposed license would be consistent with the recently enacted Nuclear Nonproliferation Ac',
including the specific criteria of Section 127.
In view of all the considerations above, and as required by Section 64 of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR 110.44, the staff has concluded that the export to be made pursuant to the proposed license (1) would be subject to the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the US ard Switzerland, and (2) would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States or constitute an unreasonable risk to the public. health and safety.
b R. Neal Moore Senior Licensing Reviewer Office of International Programs
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