ML20148G682

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Special Rept 88-06:on 880303,fire Barrier Nonfunctional for Interval Greater than 7 Days.Caused by Reassigning Maint Personnel Working on Charging Pump 1B-B to Unit 2 Charging Pump.Roving Fire Watch Established to Inspect Charging Pump
ML20148G682
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 03/25/1988
From: Shawn Smith
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
NUDOCS 8803290202
Download: ML20148G682 (2)


Text

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 March 25, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.

50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SPECIAL REPORT 88-06 the enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire barrier being nonfunctional for an interval greater than 7 days. This event is reported in accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.12 Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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S. 25m Plant Manager Enclosure ec (Enclosure):

J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlan*a, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

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PDR ADO DCU S

An Equal Opportunity Employer

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J SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-06 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On March 3, 1988, with unit 1 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 3 psis, 123 degrees F), a fire breach permit issued on February 24, 1988, for fire door A-29 (to IB-B charging pump room, elevation 669, Aux 111ary Building) exceeded the 7-day limit allowed by Technical Speelfication (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12. The fire breach was issued to keep the fire door open so that a temporary air lock in the passage could be installed to allow purging of the room, while maintenance on the IB-B charging pump is being performed.

CAUSE OF EVENT While the maintenance activities on IB-B charging pump were in progress, the unit 2 charging pump required maintenance. The maintenance personnel assigned to work on 18-B charging pump were reassigned to work on unit 2 charging pump. As a result, maintenance on IB-B charging pump was delayed.

Removal and reconstruction of the temporary air lock would be a time consuming activity; therefore, it was decided to keep the fire door A-29 open until completion of the maintenance activities on 1B-B charging pump.

This resulted in exceeding the 7-day limit allowed by action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT .

This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12. A roving fire watch was established to inspect the IB-B charging pump room on an hourly basis as required. The existing fire detection and fire suppression system for the charging pump room were operable and would have actuated in the event of a fire. During mode 5, only one charging pump is required operable, and charging pump 1A-A was in servlee at the time of this event. Therefore, there was no danger to redundant safety-related equipment.

CORRECTIVE ACTION A roving fire watch on an hourly basis was immediately established to inspect IB-B charging pump room and was maintained until the fire door returned to functional status on March 11, 1988.

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