ML20148F461

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Notifies of 970604 Meeting W/Nuclear Energy Inst in Rockville,Md to Discuss Views on Issues Re NRC in 92-018 Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During CR Fire. Agenda Encl
ML20148F461
Person / Time
Issue date: 05/30/1997
From: Malloy M
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To: Matthews D
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
PROJECT-689 IEIN-92-018, IEIN-92-18, NUDOCS 9706040258
Download: ML20148F461 (7)


Text

._

May 30, 1997 MEMORANDUM T0:

David B. Matthews, Chief Generic Issues and Environmental 1

Projects Branch Division of Reactor Program Management i

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM:

Melinda Malloy, Project Manager Original Signed By:

Generic Issues and Environmental Projects Branch Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF MEETING WITH THE NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (NEI) a i

DATE AND TIME:

June 4, 1997 9:00 p.m. - 11:00 a.m.

i LOCATION:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j

One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Room 0-3 B4 PURPOSE:

Discuss NRC and NEI views on issues related to NRC Information Notice 92-18, " Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown capability During a Control Room Fire."

(See attached agenda)

PARTICIPANTS:

NRC El T. Marsh F. Emerson, et al.

K. S. West E. Connell P. Madden, et al.

Attachment:

Proposed Agenda Project No. 689

\\

cc: See next page Meetings between the NRC technical staff and applicants or licensees are

'/h;1

/

open for interested members of the public, petitioners, intervenors, or other parties to attend as observers pursuant to " Commission Policy Statement on Staff Meeting Open to the Public," 59 Federal Reaister 48344,9/20/94.

i Members of the public who wish to attend should contact Melinda Malloy at i

(301) 415-1178.

]

,4g]

DISTRIBUTION:

See attached ge Document Name: g:\\mxm\\MTG060

.N0T OFFICE PGEB: DEEM ChEB hNoy:sw FAksthwicz NAME DATE 05/fo/97 05/9D/97

)

9706040258 970530 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY PDR REVGP ERGNUMRC ty 7 -NO g, y. 01 NBC FILE CENTER COPY

k gM Ef g-UNITED STATES g

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20665-0001

'+9,,,,,d May 30, 1997 MEMORANDUM 10:

David B. Matthews, Chief Generic Issues and Environmental Projects Branch Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM:

Melinda Malloy, Project Manager g

-Generic Issues and Environment 1 f5 Projects Branch Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF MEETING WITH THE NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (NEI)

DATE AND TIME:

June 4, 1997 9:Or, p.m. - 11:00 a.m.

LOCATION:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Room 0-3 B4 PURPOSE:

Discuss NRC and NEI views on issues related to NRC Information Notice 92-18, " Potential for Loss of Remote i

Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire."

(See attached agenda)

PARTICIPANTS:

N!LQ HE1 T. Marsh F. Emerson, et al.

K. S. West E. Connell P. Madden, et al.

Attachment:

Proposed Agenda Project No. 689 cc: See next page Meetings bete:::9n the NRC technical staff and applicants or licensees are open for interested members of the public, petitioners, intervenors, or other parties to attend as observers pursuant to " Commission Policy Statement on Staff Meeting Open to the Public," 59 Federal Reaister 48344, 9/20/94.

Members of the public who wish to attend should contact Melinda Malloy at (301) 415-1178.

l

r NEI-NRC MEETING ON INFORMATION NOTICE (IN) 92-18 F

June 4, 1997 l

Proposed Aaenda

)

t 2

1.

Opening Remarks (NRC, NEI) l

2.. titility positions on issues related to IN 92-18 (NEI) a.

Technical Issues (see attached list of questions for details)

)

(1) Consideration of mechanistic valve failures (involving damage), as stated in IN 92-18, versus functional failures, f

j as stated in Generic Letter (GL) 86-10, Question 5.3.1

)

(2) Consideration of multiple hot shorts (3) Consideration of fires outside control and cable spread rooms b.

Other Areas (1)

Improved communication with NRC staff on fire protection i

issues (recommendation to be made to benefit both NRC and industry)

(2)

Process for clarifying NRC staff expectations on the technical issues in 2.a. above (recommendation to be made to benefit both NRC and industry)

(3)

Enforcement of IN 92-18 issues (recommendation to be made j

which considers NRC-role and intent as stated in NRC staff's letter to R.E. Beadle of NEI dated March 11,1997)-

3.

Further clarification of NRC staff positions in letter of March 11, 1997 1

4.

Industry recommendations for formal clarification of staff positions (NEI) 5.

Closing Remarks (NRC, NEI)

Attachment:

Detailed Questions (2 pages)

Attachment

4 4

4 Distribution: Meeting Notice w/ NEI Re:

IN 92-18 dated May 30, 1997 Hard Cooy Docket File PUBLIC-PGEB r/f ACRS 3

OGC OWFN Receptionist MMalloy SMagruder E-Mail SCollins FMiraglia RZimmerman FGillespie TTMartin GHolahan SNewberry LMarsh KSWest Econnell PMadden DSkeen MSlosson SWeiss DMatthews FAkstulewicz MMalloy 1

MSatorius, OE NPKadambi, RES JMoore, OGC WDean, ED0 Dross, AE00 PMNS i

OPA j

040041

DETAILED QUESTIONS FOR NEI-NRC MEETING ON JUNE 4, 1997 Ouestions Related to NRC Letter to R.E. Beedle of March 11. 1997 1.

On page 2 of the enclosure to the March 11 letter, the staff stated, "The guidance of GL 81-12 recognized that a fire is capable of inducing multiple hot shorts, shorts to ground, or open circuits." On the same page, the staff stated "In GL 86-10, the staff issued additional guidance...regarding the need to... mitigate spurious actuations (more than one)...".

On page 3 of the enclosure the staff referred to the need to evaluate " multiple spurious actuations caused by fire-induced hot shorts."

On page 4 the staff reiterates the design criteria for the alternative or i

dedicated safe shutdown system, including "The safe shutdown capability should not be adversely affected by a fire which results in the loss of all automatic function...from the circuits located in the area in conjunction with one worst-case spurious actuation or signal resulting from the fire..."

a.

Please contrast the general circumstances for which the staff expects j

a licensee to analyze one worst-case spurious actuation versus multiple spurious actuations.

b.

Please explain the difference between " multiple hot shorts" and

" multiple spurious actuations" in terms of what the staff expects the licensee to analyze.

c.

If a single fire can cause, for example, five different valves to spuriously actuate, please indicate whether the staff expects the licensee to determine the effects of this spurious actuation for one worst-case valve, each of the five valves separately, or all five valves in combinations of two or more valves.

d.

Please indicate whether the answer to question 1.c is different for high/ low pressure interface valves versus other valves, e.

Please indicate what other failure modes (such as pump failures), if any, should be considered as occurring simultaneously with valve failures.

2.

On page 2 of the enclosure, the staff states, "Therefore, in order for the alternative shutdown capability to perform its intended function, the shutdown equipment that it relies on must be capable of performing its functions after it has been electrically isolated from the fire area of concern (e.g., control room and the cable spreading room)." Does this statement mean that no other fire arets need be considered in responding to IN 92-187

i O

I,

DETAILED QUESTIONS FOR NEI-NRC MEETING ON JUNE 4, 1997, continued 3.

On page 3 of the enclosure the staff quotes a portion of GL 86-10, Question 5.3.1, "For consideration of spurious actuations, all functional failure states must be evaluated, that is, the component could be i

energized or de-energized by one or rnora of the above failure modes.

3 Therefore valves could fail open or closed...".

At the end of the same parreraph, the staff states "Later, in IN 92-18, the staff alerted licensees to the potential for fire-induced hot shorts to cause valves to 4

fail open or closed and that hot shorts could bypass the protection features of the valve motors." This GL 86-10 reference had been l

interpreted widely by utilities to mean that only the functional failure modes (open/ closed, running /not running, without damage), needed to be considered.

Is (or was) this interpretation correct?

Other Questigni 1

4.

Is it necessary to consider

]

a.

Conductor-to-conductor hot shorts in the same cable?

j b.

Cable-to-cable hot shorts in the same cable tray or panel?

f c.

Cable-to-cable hot shorts in different trays (vertically stacked or j'

otherwise) or panels?

d.

Intermittent hot shorts?

i i

l i

l t

i i

1.

.. _ =

NEI Project No. 689 cc:

Mr. Ralph Beedle Mr. Thomas Tipton, Vice President Senior Vice President Operations and Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Energy Institute 4

Nuclear Energy Institute Suite 400 Suite 400 1776 I Street, NW 1776 I Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3708 Washington, DC 20006-3708 Mr. Alex Marion, Director Mr. Jim Davis, Director Programs Operations Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Energy Institute Suite 400 Suite 400 1776 I Street, NW 1776 I Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3708 Washington, DC 20006-3708 Mr. David Modeen, Director Ms. Lynnette Hendricks, Director Engineering Plant Support Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Energy Institute Suite 400 Suite 400 1776 I Street, NW

~1776 I Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3708 Washington, DC 20006-3700 Mr. Anthony Pietrangelo, Director Licensing Nuclear Energy Institute Suite 400 1776 I Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3708 Mr. Ronald Simard, Director Advanced Technology Nuclear Energy Institute Suite 400 1776 I Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3708 Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo, Manager Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Activities Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division Westinghouse Electric Corporation P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 j