ML20148F458

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Presents Staff Conclusions Re Proposed Lic to Export low- Enriched Uranium to the Netherlands.Since Euratom Meets Criteria 1,2 & 3 of Atomic Energy Act,1954,Section 127 Issuance of Lic Consistent W/Nuc Nonproliferation Treaty
ML20148F458
Person / Time
Issue date: 10/05/1978
From: Moore R
NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
References
NUDOCS 7811090023
Download: ML20148F458 (4)


Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON p 't

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007 5 E3 MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE STAFF CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXPORT LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM TO THE NETHERLANDS (XSNM-1313)

In April 1978, Transnuclear, Incorporated applied for a license to export 14,151 kilograms of uranium, enriched to 3.35% U-235 to the Netherlands...Except for a 1; kilogram sample," the matefialiill be

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converted and fabricated into fuel be Reaktor Brennelement Union for' ~ ~~ ~

use in the Bdssele Power Station! ~ ~~ ^ ~ ~ ~ ~

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The Borssele is a 470 We pressurized water reactor located at Vlissingen, the Netherlands.

Shipment of the material is scheduled to begin in January 1979.

In response to our May 12, 1978 request for views, the Executive Branch has (1) concluded that issuance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the interests of the United States, including the common defense and security, and (2) confirmed that the material will be subject to all the tems and conditions of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and EURATOM.

These views and license application analysis by the Executive Branch were forwarded by the State Department memorandum of July 25, 1978.

Confirmation of the applicability of the US-EURATOM Agreement was set forth in a letter of July 13, 1978 from the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities.

The staff has reviewed the subject application in light of the consideration below.

Safecuards.

The export will be subject to EURATOM safeguards, which may be regarded as equivalent to

, IAEA safeguards. As parties to the Nonproliferation

'\\ Treaty (NPT), the.. Netherlands,and the FRG have under-taken an obligation to accept 1AEA safeguards on all source or special. fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the Netherlands and the FRG, under its juristiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

The State Department memorandum of July 25, 1978 notes that (1) the IAEA-EURATOM safeguards agreement has come into force and subsidiary arrangements are now l

being negotiated to bring IAEA verification into practical effect; and (2) the IAEA has the right to apply the verification procedures of tne safeguards 7sno9ceg J

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Memorandum to the File l

agreement prior to completion of the subsidiary arrangements.

t The staff is not aware of any probleas with application of EURAIOM safeguards in the Netherlands and the FRG and therefore, is of the view that the equivalent of criterion (1) is met.

l No Nuclear Exolosive Use:

As parties to the NpT the Netherlands. and the FRG have undertaken the obligation not to receive any transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manu-facture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-sive devices.

In addition, under the US-EURATOM Agreement, the Community guarantees that (1) no material, including equipment and devices transferred pursuant to the agreement, and no source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or devices transferred pursuant to the agreement, will be used for atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose; and (2) no material transferred pursuant to the agree-ment will be transferred to unauthorized persons.

Therefore, the staff believes criterion (2) of the NNPA is met with respect to the Netherlands and the FRG.

physical Security.

With respect to the proposed license, NMSS states that it has not conducted a review of the program in the Netherlands for pro-i tection of Category III material, inasmuch as no information is available concerning the protection of such material. However, in the July 25 memoran-dum from the Department of State, the Executive Branch notes that both the Netherlands and the FRG, as members of the Community, are committed to maintaining a level of protection for their program fully comparable to that set forth in the reconnen-dations in IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.1.

Based upon visits of physical security review team:, subse-quent exchanges and review, and information provided by the Executive Branch, the staff has concluded,

that the proposed export would be consistent with

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3 Memorandum to the File the NNPA, including the requirement that the physical security program adequate to protect the material will be maintained in the FRG and the Netherlands.

In view of this, the staff believes that Criterion (3) of the NNPA is met.

Although the written physical segurlityEassurances

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required by 10 CFR 110.43('b) have not been ob-tained, an exemption from this requirement will be issued pursuant to authority under 10 CFR 110.10(a).

Retransfer and Reorocessing.

a.

Retrans fer.

Criterian 4 of the NNPA requires, among other things, that prior approval of the United States be obtained for the retransfer

_ of US-supplied material, facilities or sensi-tive technology, and special nuclear material.

b.

Reoroces sino.

Criterion (5) of the NNPA requires that the U.S. be given the right of prior approval over the reprocessing of US-supplied material and SNM produced through the use of such material.

By note dated July 7, 1978 EURATOM agreed to nego-tiations as called for in Section 404(a) of the NNPA, leading to renegotiation of the US-EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation.

The State Department advised the Commission of the receipt of this note and its determination that the note constituted an agreement to renegotiate on July 20, 1978.

Under Section 126(a)(2) of the NNPA, exports to EURATOM are,-therefore, exempted from criteria 4 and 5 of the NNPA until March 10, 1980.

Sensitive Technology.

The proposed export does not involve sensitive technology.

The staff is of the opinion that EURATOM meets criteria (1), (2), and (M of Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the NNPA, or their equivalent.

Under Section 126(a)(2), exports to EURATOM are exempted from criteria (4) and (5) until March 10, 1980.

Therefore, the staff concludes that issuance of the proposed license would be consistent with the recently enacted Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.

In view of all the considerations above, and as required by Section 57 of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR 110.44, the staff has concluded

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4 Memorandum to the File that the export to be made pursuant to the proposed license (1) would be subject to the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the US and EURATOM,..and (2) would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States or constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety, stVuL-s oore Senior Licensing Reviewer Office of International Programs

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