ML20148E410
| ML20148E410 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1988 |
| From: | Conlon T, Fillion P, Hunt M, Mark Miller NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148E402 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-425-88-07, 50-425-88-7, NUDOCS 8803250101 | |
| Download: ML20148E410 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000425/1988007
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA, OEORGI A 30323
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Report No.: 50-425/88-07
Licensee:
Georgia Power Company
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P. O. Box 454C
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket No.:
50-425
License No.: CPPR-109
Facility Name:
Vogtle 2
Inspection Conducted: February 1-4, 1988
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. Inspectors:-
M. D. Hunt
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Date Signed
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M. N. Mill
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- Approved @
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E. Conlon, Chief
Cate 41gned
Plant Systems Section
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Division of Reactor Safety
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
This routine, announced inspecti.;9 was in the areas of cable
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installation documentation; cable related deficiency reports;
local
instrumentation installations and records; and construction deficiency reports.
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Results:
One violation was identified, 425/88-07-01, Failure to follow
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Procedures for High Potential Testing of Cables,
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8803250101 880318
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ADOCK 05000425
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REPURT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- J. Adams, Lead Instrumentation Engineer Mechanical
W. Chenault, Startup/ Test Engineering Supervisor
- D. M. Figuett, Manager- Field Construction, Unit 2
- J. J. Gilmartin, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor
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- E. 0. Groover, Quality Assurance Site Manager-Construction
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- A. W. Harralson, Electrical Discipline Manager
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W. Hayes, Quality Assurance Manager, Site
- R. E. Hollands, Engineering Field Office, Construction Supervisor
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- G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator
- R. H. Pinson, Vice President
- P. D. Rice, Vice President and Project Director
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Other licensee _ employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and
office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
R. J. Schepens
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 4,1988,
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with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
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areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding listed
below.
Dissenting comments were not rcceived from the licensee.
The
following new items were identified during this inspection:
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Violation 50-425/88-07-01
Failure to Follow Procedure for
High-Potential Testing of Cable.
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Unresolved Item C0-425/88-07-02, Variation of Industry Standard Used
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for High-Potential Test Procedure (Cable).
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
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Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
(Closed) Unresolved Item 425/88-05-01, By-Pass of QC Hold Point During
High-Potential Test on Cable.
This item was unresolved pending the
acquisition of all information related to the problem.
The inspection
effort was completed during this inspection, and the item was upgraded to
Violation 425/88-07-01, Failure to Follow Procedure for High-Potential
Testing of Cable (Paragraph 5).
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required
to determine whether they are acceptable or may involv( violations or
deviations.
One unresolved item identified during this inspection is
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discussed in Paragraph 5.
5.
Electric Cables - Record Review (51065)
During this inspection, a follow-up examinatica of cable installation
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and testing records for previously inspected cables was performed.
This followup examination was performed to verify certain conditions
not sufficiently identified during an earlier inspection (Report
No. 50-425/88-05).
The NRC Inspector conducted interviews and reviewed documents to determir,e
all the circumstances surrounding a problem identified as Unresolved
Item 425/88-05-01, By-Pass of QC Hold Point During High-Potential Test on
Cable.
The conclusions of this inspection effort may be surrenarized as
follows.
Procedure 25733-C, Rev
4, "High-Potential Testing Cable," dated
January 23, 1987, was the procedure that should have controlled the con-
ducting of high-potential test or proof on 4160 Volt cable and' cable bus.
Some 38 safety-related cables and four cable bus sections were to be high-
potential tested under the licensee's construction program.
Testing began
about July 11, 1987 and only one cable had not been pested at tte time of
the inspection.
Revision 4 to Proceduce 25733-C whs i'n effect during the
entire period of cable testing.
Several instancesif the licensee falling
to follow Procedure 25733-C, idertified by the NRC, are listed below:
a.
The data sheet for a high-potential test conducted on cable
2AA0204EA (feeder to nuclear service cooling water pump A motor) on
September 15, 1987, indicates that the leakage current for Phase C
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conductor was slowly increasing.
According to Paragraph 4.15, since
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the leakage current was increasing, the voltage should have been
maintained on the conductor for 15 minutes, but the test was stopped
at five minutes,
b.
The data sheet for a high-potential test conducted on the generator
leads for emergency generator A on July 30, 1987, indicates that the
test voltage was 36kV DC.
However, since the generator leads consist
of cable bus, the test voltage should have been 56kV according to the
procedure (Paragraph 4.11).
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c.
Quality Control was not notified prior to performing each txt as
required by Paragraph 3.3.
This occurred in 30 of the 42 teso
d.
The safety classificationhas not checked as reovired by Paragrnh
3.2.
This occurred in 21 of the 42 tests, and is eviden ed by the
fact that in one case the nonsafety-related block was checked when
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in fact the cable was safety-related.
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The licensee had several opportunities to identify the fact that Procedure
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25733-C was not always followed in the performance of high-potential test
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on cables.
As mentioned in Report No. 88-05, a technician from Nuclear
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Operations Maintenance reported to his superviror, on November 24, 1987,
that Procedure 25733-C was not being followed M th respect to the notifi-
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cation ofeQC.
However, a deficiency report (07.) was not written at that
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time.
When ' DR T-2-88-067 was written on January 18, 1988, to resolve
Items C and -.D (previous paragraph), the data sheets were apparently not
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reviewed, and Items A and B were not discovered.
It would have been
reasonable to review all data sheets when dispositioning DR T-2-88-067
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to determine whether or not hardware had been effected.
DR T-2-88-179
was written on February 2, H88, to resolve Items A and B.
In summary,
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the NRC inspector identified several instances of failing to follow
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Procedure 25733-C for the perfomance of high-potential tests on cables.
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This matter is identifie6' as Violation 425/88-07-01, Failure to Follow
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Procedure for High-Potential Testing of Cable.
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Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.30, "Quality Assurance Requirements for the
Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Instrumentation and Electric
Equipment," staten that when overpotential tests are performed, the
values shall confom to the applicable codes and standards.
The licensee
committed to RG 1.30.
The licensee's procedure for performing the high-
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.cotential tests was based on their corporate standard and manufacturer's
application manuals, which apparently differ from indhtry standards.
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IEEE Std 400"1980, "Making High-Direct-Voltage Tests on Power Cable
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Systems in the Field " calls for a 15-minute duration test, but the
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licensee concluded his tests at five minutes if the 1erkage current was
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stabilized at .that time.
If the licensee's procedure bs not equivalent
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to IEEE Std 400 mor in conformance with other industry standards, this
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departure from RG1.30 would be a deviation from a commitment.
Pending
the licensee's investigation. to support his position, this matter is
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identified as Unresolved Item 425/88-07-02, Variation of Industry Standard
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Used for High-Potential Test Procedure (Cable).
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Procedure GO-T-01, "Nonconformance Control," Revision 15 dated Januny 29,
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198h was reviewed by the NRC inspetor including Field Procedure Change
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Notices 49 and 50.
The procedure covered the purpose, scope, definition
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of terms, references, general instructions, as well as, soecific instruc-
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tions for processing DRs. . The pr'.,edure requires that all deviation
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reports tie reviewed by Quality Assurance personnel for
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requirements, and the inspector confirmed the implementatim of this step.
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Twelve DRs applicibl'e' tc, cables, termination and installat' ion of cables
wera reviewed.. by t the NRC inspector for legibility, comp.'eteness and
promptness cf disposition.
The following reports wot;e reviewed:
. ED-157.77, - ED-16175, ED-162ih ED-16305
ED-16318, ED-16325, ED-16342,
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ED-16470, ED-16518, ED-16515, L 2-88-057 and T-2-88-179.
All open DRs L t
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and recently closed DRs were_ storud under the conWol of a DR cler.k1 An
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interdt@.e computer program is us'rd to quickly letermine the status of.
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any DR;
The DR clerk maintained an index to track the flow path of each
7\\DR.
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Istruments and. components - Work Ooservation (52053) and: Record Revin;b 3,
(520b5)
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The inspectorpperfor'm!l wsIkdowns in the Reactor Buildirg to' ;hb've and
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evaluate portions of the cor.'pleted, york tor instruments and Fsadiated
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items 1[sensinf lities, tubing runs,' valves, supports] to 'be used for
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monitoNh): process variables import @t .to safety.
The instr #;dants
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selecteu are used in the Reactor Tria . System [RTS] and the Engineered
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The process variahrs are
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Safety Fr,atude.s Xctuation fystem [ESFAS]elevel, containment jrMure,
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thq ' pres surizer pressure, the pressurire
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ann a acttd coolant flow.
The instruments were inspected for varitsis
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att ribetes, such as:
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The location, configuration, and Tinsta?lation, are according to the
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latest approved design and construction speciFcations.
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The instruments have been correctly and permanently identified.-
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Cleanliness requirements are satisfied,
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The ';Juipment is adequately protected for in-place' storage,
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l.5pecified instruments have beenjsed,
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The as-built corditicr. $ss Liisi, (erified.
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The following instruments and associated items we're examined during the
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walkdowns for the RTS and ESFAS:
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~ Pre:surizer Prs 1sure - PT-455, 45C,- 457, 458 '
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Containment Pressure - PT-935
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Reactor Coolant Flow - Loop 1
Fi-410 415, 416
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Leop 2
FT-424, 425, 426
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Luop 3
FT-434, 435, 436
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Loop 4
FT-444, 445, 446
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Tressteizer Devei
LT-461
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The inspectors examined and reviewed plant records for instruments in the
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RTS and ESFAS, to determine if the requirements were met and verified by
QC. The receipt inspection records were reviewed to ensure the instrument
was properly identified, inspected and had a certificate of conformance.
The installation record packages were reviewed to ensure the.t each
contained the following:
As-built drawing (s)
A tubing blowdown inspection record
A visual inspection and verification material acceptance and marking
transfer / tubing bend record
A hanger / track inspection record
A process sheet record
A weld rod store requisition record.
Receiving inspection and installation work records of the following
instruments for the RTS and ESFAS were examined.
Pressurizer Pressure
PT-455*, 456*, 457*, 458*
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Containment Pressure
PT-935, 936
Pressurizer Level
LT-459*, 460*, 461*
Steam Generator Level
527, 528, 529
Reactor Coolant Flow
FT-424, 425, 426
The personnel qualification records were reviewed for three quality
control inspectors and five welders to ensure they were qualified to
perform their work assignments and their certifications were current. The
QC inspectors and welders were identified in the installation work
packages'for the instruments listed above with an asterisk (*).
Within the areas examined, no deviations or violations were identified.
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7.
Licensee Identified Items, 10 CFR 50.55(e) (92700)
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(Closed) CDR 425/83-49, Transamerica Delaval - Class 1E Cable.
The
deficiency was reported to RII on October 3,1983, and involved the
failure of some Class 1E cables to pass the IEEE-383 flame test.
The
shielded cables in question are engine mounted and furnished as part of
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the diesel generator.
These cables connect the control junction boxes to
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the magnetic pickups and the woodward governor.
The cable was rated for
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167 F.
With an ambient temperature of 98 F and heat from the engine when
operating, the rating would be exceeded.
The final report containing the evaluation and corrective action
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commitments was submitted November 3,1983.
The cables were replaced and
QC accepted for diesel generator A on October 5,1987 and diesel generator
B on November 3, 1987.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) 50-425/86-CDR-114, Diesel Generator (D/G) Breaker Trip Circuit.
On April 25, 1986, the licensee reported a design condition that could
buses.
The D/G trip con-
prevent the D/G from energizing the emergency (when an abnormal operating
tains multiple protective trip devices which
condition occurs) trips the D/G while being operated in the maintenance /
test mode, but not during a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) or
in the automatic mode.
It was found that during a LOCA condition if the
D/G unit experiences multiple abnormal operating conditions, the multiple
protective trip devices may be actuated.
Records were reviewed which verified that QC inspections had been
performed documenting that cable installations and cerminations were
completed for the revisions necessary to correct the reported deficiency.
The testing to verify that the licensee's modifications made to the D/G
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electrical circuits are incorporated in Section 6.5 of the following
pre-operational procedures.
2-3XJ-03, Rev. O,
Diesel Generator A Switchgear Controls and
Auxiliaries
2-3KJ-04, Rev. O,
Diesel Generator 8 Switchgear Controls and
Auxiliaries.
This item is closed.
(Closed) 50-425/87-CDR-137, Diesel Generator (D/G) Excitor Circuitry.
This item was reported to the NRC, RII, on January 7, 1987. As the result
of a review of the D/G field flash circuit for conditions described in
IE Notice 86-73 (Recent Emergency Diesel Generator Problems), a similar
problem was identified as follows:
In response to shutdown signal, the VEGP EDG exciter de-energizes the
generator field circuit which shuts down the generator.
The exciter
circuitry is designed to reset at an engine speed below 200 RPM to
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re-enable the exciter after the diesel generator has been stopped
manually or tripped due to a normal trip (i.e., a trip that would be
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bypassed during an SI condition).
If an SI signal is received while
the diesel is coasting down from its normal operating speed of
450 RPM to the exciter reset speed of 200 RPM (estimated to take 45
seconds), the diesel engine pneumatic control logic will override the
normal stop signal and the diesel will re-accelerate to 450 RPM.
However, the exciter would have remained shut down and the generator
would not have output voltage and would not have accepted load,
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The inspector verified the QC inspection of the field wiring changes which
were completed in accordance with Field Engineering Order No. E-281-B.
The exciter modification verification is part of the Preoperational
Procedures listed below.
2-3KJ-05, Rev. 0, D/G Train A Synchronization, Load Rejection, 5 Air
Starts and 35 Consecutive Starts
2-3KJ-06, Rev. 0, D/G Train B Synchronization, Load Rejection, 5 Air
Starts and 35 Consecutive Starts
Section 61.6, Exciter Enable SI Override on Engine Shutdown, in each the
above listed procedures is dedicated to testing the circuitry to insure
that the exciter can be energized (flashed) if required during coast down
of the D/G.
This item is closed.