ML20148C851
| ML20148C851 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1988 |
| From: | Shawn Smith TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 88-05, 88-5, NUDOCS 8803230135 | |
| Download: ML20148C851 (2) | |
Text
________________ - -.
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-!!6isy, Tennessee 37379 March 18,'1988 U. S. Nuclear ~ Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20553 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH. NUCLEAR PLANT JNIT 2 - DOCKt" NO.
50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SP6CTAL PFPORT 88-05 The enclosed special report provides.dutalls c.onearnlor, a fira berrior being nonfunctional for an interval greater than 7 daye. This ovsnt is reported in accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting Condititas for Operation 3.7.12 Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY S. J. S ith P ant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW l
Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center i
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 15 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant gb>k 8803230135 88031G dh ADOCK 05000328 g (
DR DCD An Equal Opportunity Employer
11 2,.
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 88-05 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On February 24, 1988, at 1630 EST with unit 2 in mode 4 (0 percent power, 550 psig, 335 degrees F), a cable tray fire barrier penetration 774ABA12010000, located in Auxillary Building elevation 774, control rod drive equipment room, was' nonfunctional for an Interval greater than seven days. The cable tray penetratica was breached to install new cables. The new cables were being installed by Engineering Change Notice L6835 and Workplan 1249? which replaced existing cables with high ampacity cables.
CAUSE OF EVENT:
This event resulted due to a personnel error. The Modification personnel
. marked flamastic application "not applicable" on modification and addition instruction No. 13 data sheet; as a result, the penetration was sealed without flamastic applied to the new cables. Shortly after closing the penetration, It was realized that the penetration was not sealed properly, and a new fire breach was issued to complete flamastic application on the new cables.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT:
The report is being submitted as required by the action statement of Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7 t2 (a).
Although the fire breach was closed improperly, the roving fire watch to inspect the control rod drive equipment room, was continuing on an hourly basis for another fire breach which was still in effect.
Therefore, the fire watch inspection in the room was never stopped. The existing fire detection and fire suppression system for the room are operable and would actuate in the event of a fire. Therefore, there is no danger to safety-related equipment.
CORRECTIVE ACTION Shortly after closing the breach, it was realized that the penetration was not sealed properly, and a new fire breach was issued. The application of the flamastic to the new cables was completed, and the penetration was resealed and returned to functional status on March 2, 1988. As a recurrence control, the Modification personnel was counselled to psy more attention to detail while preparing procedure data sheets and of the obylous consequences of failures in these areas.
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