ML20148C344
| ML20148C344 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/04/1978 |
| From: | James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-78-530, NUDOCS 7811020021 | |
| Download: ML20148C344 (33) | |
Text
'c M M\\~fNf October 4, 1978 SECY-78-530 COMMISSIONER ACTION For:
The Commissioners From:
James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs hh..C[~
Thru:
Executive Director for Operations
!/
XP0RbdW\\
Subject:
PROPOSED LICEN ENRICHED URANIUM TO WEST GERMA Y (XSNM 1281)
In February 19 h5 Incorporated applied Discussion:
for a license to export 107,386. kilograms of uranium, enriched to 3.25% U-235, to West Germany for use as the initial core in the GR0HNDE Unit i reactor.
Reaktor Brennelement Union will convert the material and manufacture the fuel.
The GROHNDE Unit 1 is a 361 MWe pressurized water reactor scheduled to begin r
operation in 1981.
As this is an initial core loading and not a routine reload it is being forwarded for Conmission review.
The staff is of the opinion that EURATOM meets criteria (1), (2) and (3) of section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the NNPA, or their equivalent.
Under section 126(a)(2), exports to EURATOM are exempted from criteria 4 and 5 until March 10, 1980 since EURATOM has agreed to negotiations as called for in section 404(a) of the
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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.
The FRG, as a party to the NPT, has agreed to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities, The staff has requested additional information from the Executive Branch on the status of facility attach-ments in EURATOM (including the GROHNDE reactor) and this information will be forwarded to the Commission 4
upon receipt.
It should be noted that the GROHNDE reactor is scheduled to go critical in mid-1979 and to reach full conmercial operation in February,1981.
Contact:
G.G. Oplinger (492-7866)
.D. Lee (492-7984) 6e
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.. -Discussion:
The written assurance on physical. security required (continued)-
by 10 CFR 110.43(b) has not been.obtained from the FRG.
Although the physical security program in the FRG is considered adequate to protect the material covered under the proposed license, the US expects to obtain more specific written assurance, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 110.43, from the FRG.
Pending receipt of these additional written assurances, the~ staff will issue an exemption.from this requirement, as discussed in SECY 78-291 and 78-386,'if the Comission approves issuance of this license.
The following documents are forwarded for Commission review of the subject application:
(1) staff review and conclusion that the proposed export. meets statutory requirements (Appendix A); (2) Executive Branch views of May 9,:1978 recommending issuance (Appendix B);
(3) application of February 21~, 1978-(Appendix C);
and (.4) copy of. proposed license (Appendix D).
Recommendation:
That the proposed license be issued to Transnuclear, Incorporated.
Coordination:
0 ELD has no legal objection..NMSS wishes to inform the Commission that it has not: received country-specific information which permits it to make an independent conclusion as to the effectiveness of EURATOM and IAEA material control and accounting safeguards to deter and detect diversions in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
With regard to physical' security, NMSS has reviewed the program in the FRG and found it adequate for the purposes of the export, L.-
,.p J
s R. Shea, Direc or '
l-fice of International Progranis
Enclosures:
As stated
4
- NOTE:
Commissioner comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary, by c.o.b.
Friday. October 13, 1978 Commission staff office comments, if any, :hould be submitted to the Commissioners NLT October 11. 1978
, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Executive Director for Operations Secretariat
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APPENDIX A
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o UNITED STATES N.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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SEP 1 8 F/8 MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE STAFF CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXPORT LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM TO WEST GERMANY (XSNM-1281)
In February 1978, Transnuclear, Incorporated applied for a license to export 107,386 kilograms of uranium, enriched to 3.25% U-235 to West
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Germany.
Except for 3 kg samples, the material will be converted and fabricated into fuel by Reaktor 8rennelement Union for use as the initial core for the GROHNDE Unit i reactor.
The GR0HNDE Unit 1 is a 361 MWe pressurized water reactor scheduled to begin operation in 1981.
Shipment of the material is scheduled to begin in September.1978.
In response to our February 28, 1978 request for views, the Executive Branch has.(1) concluded that issuance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the interests of the United States, including the common defense and security, and (2) confirmed that the material will be subject to all the terms and conditions of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and EURATOM.
These views and license application analysis by the Executive Branch were forwarded by the State Department memorandum of May 9, 1978.
Confirmation of the applicability of the US-EURATOM Agreement was set forth in a letter of March 3, 1978 from the Delegation of the Commission of European Comu,nities.
The staff has reviewed the subject application in light of the considera-tions below.
o Safeguards.
The export will be subject to EURATOM safeguards, which may be regarded as equivalent to IAEA safeguards.
As a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),theFRGhasundertakenanobligation to ac:;ept IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of.the FRG, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
The State Department memorandum of May 9, 1978 notes that (1) the IAEA-EURATOM safeguards agreement has come into force and subsidiary arrangements are now being negotiated to bring IAEA verification into practical effect; and (2) the IAEA has the right to apply the verification procedures of the safeguards agreement prior to completion of the subsidiary arrangements.
l APPENDIX A
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- Memorandum to the File The~ staff is.not. aware of any problems with application of EURATOM safeguards in the FRG.
o No Nuclear Explosive Use.
As a party to the NPT the FRG has undertaken.the obligation not to_ receive any transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire-nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek.or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
In addition, under the US-EURATOM Agreement, the Community guarantees that (1) no material, including equipment ano devices-transferred pursuant to the agreement, and no source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or devices. transferred pursuant to the agreement,.will be used for atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose; and (2) no material transferred pursuant to the. agreement will.be transferred to unauthorized persons.
Therefore, the staff believes Criterion (2) of the NNPA is met, o
Physical Security.
As noted in the. State Department memorandum of May 9,-the FRG is committed to maintaining a level of protection for their program fully comparable to that set-forth in the recommendations in-IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1.
Based upon visits of physical security review teams, subse-
.quent exchanges and review, and information.provided by the Executive Branch, the staff has concluded that the proposed export would be consistent with the NNPA, including the requirement that tne physical security program adequate to protect the material will be maintained in the FRG. -In view of this, the staff believes that Criterion (3) of the NNPA is met.
4 Although'the written physical security assurance required.by 10 CFR 110.43(b) has not been obtained, an exemption from this requirement will be issued pursuant to authority under 10 CFR 110.10(a).
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3 Memorandum to the File o
Retransfer and Reprocessing.
a.
Retransfer Criterion 4 of the NNPA requires, 2
tmong.other things, that prior approval'of the.
United States be obtained for the retransfer of US-supplied material, facilities or sensitive technology, and special nuclear material.
b.
Reprocessing.
Criterion (5) of the NNPA requires that the U.S. be given the right of prior approval over.the reprocessing of US-supplied material and SNM produced through the use of such material.
By note dated July 7, 1978 EURATOM ag' reed to nego-tiations as called for-in Section 404(a) of the NNPA, leading to renegotiation of the US-EURATOM Agreement.for Cooperation. The State Department advised the Commission of.the receipt of this note and its determination that the note constituted an agreement to renegotiate on July 20, 1978.
UnderSection126(a)(2)oftheNNPA,exportstoEURATOM are, therefore, exempted from criteria 4 and 5 of.the NNPA until March 10, 1980.
o Sensitive Technology.
The proposed export does not involve sensitive technology.
The st'aff is of the opinion that EURATOM meets criteria (1), (2), and (3) of Section 127 of the Atomic. Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the NNPA, or their equivalent.
Under Section 126(a)(2), exports to EURATOM are exempted from criteria (4) and (5) until March 10, 1980.
Therefore, the staff concludes that issuance-of the proposed license would be consistent with the recently enacted Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.
In-view of all the considerations above, and as required by Section 57 of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR 110.44, the staff has concluded that the expor to be made pursuant to the proposed license (1) would be subject to t,.e terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation
-between the US and. EURATOM, and (2) would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States or constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
R. Neal Moore Senior Licensing Reviewer 0ffice of International Programs
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e APPENDIX B i
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$1 BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIOMAL vjfd7g. M Sgj ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS
> qc u'w' 16 t" P 53 May 9, 1978 7
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES R.
SHEA d
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Enclosed is an Executive Branch analysis covering three license applications for the export of low-enriched uranium to various members of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).
In accordance with the requirements of Section 126 a.
(1) of the Atomic Energy Act, the analysis addresses the extent to which the specific criteria in Sections 12"i and 128 are met, as well as certain additional factors en-visaged by Section 126 a. (1).
The Executive-Branch, on the basis of its review of these cases, has concluded that the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and P.L.95-242 have been met except Criterion (5) of Section 127.
Moreover, the members of EURATOM have adhered to the provisions of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation, as amended.
As you know, at such time as EURATOM agrees to.negotia-tions, called for in Section 404(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, the provisions of Criterion (5) of Section 127 export criteria would not apply to the ap-proval of such exports as covered by the enclosed analysis to EURATOM.
In this event, the exports covered in the en-closure would meet all applicable export criteria and would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the l.
United States.
In anticipation of such agreement, we are forwarding the attached analysis so that preliminary processing, prior to any Commission action, may begin.
The Executive Branch recommends that the referenced export license applications be approved at such time as the. Department of State notifies j
the Commission that EURATOM agrees to negotiations.
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Louis V. Nosenzo Deputy. Assistant Secretary l
Enclosure As stated
9 EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION ANALYSIS XSNM-1281 Country:
Federal Republic of Germany i
Transaction:
The export of 2,730,246 kilograms of U-235 contained in 107,383.0 kilograms of uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride enriched to a maximum of 3.25 percent plus 3 kilograms of uranium containing.098 kilogram of U-235 for sample analysis.
Applicant:
Transnuclear,, Inc.
Applicant's
Reference:
RBU 215'EU/103 78-045/01 Date of Application:
February 21, 1978 Purpose of Export This quantity of low-enriched uranium will be shipped l
to Reakt'or Brennelement Union GmbH (RBU), FRG, for conversion i
and fabrication into fuel elements for the Grohnde Unit 1,a 1, 361 megawatt electric pressurized water reactor owned and operated by the Gemeinschaftskernkraftwerk Grohnde GmbH Emmerthal, FRG.
Three kilograms of this material will be used as the shipper of record sample by the Nuclear Audit and Testing Co. of Vienna, Virginia.
DELEGATION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES March 3, 1978 JM/mc Mr. Vance H. Hudgins Assistant Director for Politico-Military Security Affairs Division of International Security Affairs Department of Energy Washington, D.C.
20545
Subject:
XSNM#1281(
- Application from Transnuclear Inc. No. RBE '1 ; sEU/103 78-045/01 dated February 21, 1978 for West Germany
Dear Mr. Hudgins:
We certify that the material mentioned in this application, namely 2730.246 Kg of U-235 contained in 107,383.0 Kg of U plus 3.0 Kg of sampling material containing 0.098 Kg of U-235 and the transfer of this material will be subject to all terms and conditions of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation.
Further we certify that RBU, Hanau, West. Germany, and NATCO, Vienna, Virginia, for the sampling material only, as intermediate consignees, and Gemeinschaftskernfraftwerk Grohnde GmbH, Emmerthal 1, West Germany, as ultimate consignee, are authorized by, EURATOM to receive and possess this material pursuant to the aforementioned Agreement for Cooperation.
The above material will be used in the RBU facilities for the manufacture of fuel elements for reactor Grohnde, Unit 1.,
Sincerely yours, p F.
SPAAK Head of Delegation cc:hdr William Moffitt, State Dept.
Ms. Janice-Dunn, NRC Ms. Vicki Matson, Transnuclear Inc
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EURATOM) EXPORT MCENSE APPLICATIOtl At1ALYSIS 1.
Applicable Agreement for Cooperation _
The material covered by the export license application is subject to all of the terms and conditions of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM),
as amended.
This fact has been confirmed by letter from the Delegation of,the Commission of the European Communities, a copy of which follows the description of the transaction.
The Additional Agreement entered into force on July 25, 1960.
The European Atomic Energy Community has adhered to all provisions of this agreement witi, the United States.
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2.
Extent to Which Export Criteria Are Met A.
Section 127 Criteria As provided in Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act, the following criteria govern exports for peaceful nuclear uses from the United States of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sen-sitive nuclear technology:
Criterion (1)
"IAEA safeguards as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof."
Under Article V of the Additional Agreement for Coopera-tion of 1960, as amended, which incorporates Article XI, XII and Annex B of the November 8, 1958 Joint Program Agreement, as amended, the Community undertakes the responsibility of es-tablishing and implementing a safeguards and control system designed to give maximum assurance that any material supplied by the US or generated from such supply will be used solely for peaceful purposes
(" EURATOM Safeguards System").
The Community is bound to consult and exchange experiences with the IAEA with the objective of establishing a system reasonably compatible with that of the latter.
The Community is respon-sible for establishing and maintaining a mutually (with respect to the US) satisfactory and effective safeguards and controls system in accordance with stated principles.
EURATOM safeguards are being applied to material and faci-lities previously exported and subject to the US-EURATOM Co-operation Agreements and to special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.
These agreements require these safeguards to be applied to such material and facilities and to the proposed export and special nuclear material produced through its use.
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Therefore, it is the
<ecutive Branch view that the equivalent of criterion (1) is met.
All of the member states of the Community, with the ex-ception of France (a nuclear-weapons s+. ate), are parties to
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the NPT.
An agreernent for the IAEA application of safeguards pursuant to the MPT was signed by the IAEA and Belgium, Denmark, the FRG, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATCM), on April 5, 1973.
(As a nuclear-weapons state, the United Kingdom permits the application of IAEA safeguards pursuant to the NPT under a voluntary offer whi.ch was signed on September 6, 1976.
Simi-larly, France has agreed to application of the IAEA safeguards verification system at all of its civil facilities under a France-EURATOM-IAEA trilateral approved by the IAEA's Board of Governors on February 21, 1978.)
The EURATOM accountability system was adapted to that of the IAEA through the publication of C-mission Regulation 322/76, which came into force during Jan 'ry 1977.
On Febru-ary 17, 1977, the Commission of the Eur a 2n Com.nunities notitied the IAEA that all of the necesary steps had been taken for the IAEA-EURATOM Safeguards Verification Agreement pur-maant to the NPT to come into force and the Agreement came in-cc force on February 21, 1977.
Currently, EURATOM and the IAEA are negotiating the Sub-sidiary Arrangements and Facility Attachments which are neces-sary to bring IAEA verification of EURATOM safeguards into practical effect.
Pending the completion of these negotia-tions, the 1AEA has been conducting ad hoc inspections under Article 48 and 71A of *he Verificati53 Agreement.
Through late 1977, it had concucted more than 80 such inspections at approximately 70 percent of all EURATOM-safeguarded f acilities.
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Criterion (2)
"No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported or previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on
'or development of any nuclear explosive device."
Each ncn-auclear-weapons state (NNWS) of the Community is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
As such, it is pledged not to develop nuclear explcsive devices for any purpose.
This pledge applies to any material, facili-4.es and sensitive nuclear technology previously exported to such state by the US and subject to the US-EURATCM Agree-ments for Cooperation and to special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.
Since this pledge will apply to'the proposed export and to any special nuclear material produced through its use, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (2) is met with respect to the NNWS of the Community.
With regard to the two nuclear-weapons states (NWS) of the community, the UK and France, the proposed export and any I
special nuclear material produced through its use, if trans-ferred tc a NWS member, is subject to the continuing applica-bility of the US-EURATOM Agreemcy;, for Cooperation.
Article XI(l) and (3) of the November 8, 1958 Joint Program Agree-ment, as amended, which is incorporated into the Additional Agreement for Cooperation by virtue of Article V of the Additional Agreement', provide that "no material, including equipment and devices, transferred pursuant to this Agree-ment" and "no source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of material, equipment or devices transferred pursuant to this agreement...
will be used for atomic weapons, or for research er develop-of atomic aeapons or for any other military purpose."
ment The US--with the support of most other ma]or nuclear supplier statas--has taken the position that nuclear explosive devices
" atomic weapons', within the meaning of this guarantee, are regardless of the intended end use of such devices.
Botn the UK and France have accepted this interpretation, as members of the Nuclear Surpliers Group, have agreed as a
- -- - --- m matter of national policy to authorize the export of t-igger list items "only upon formal governmental assurances from recipients explicitly exluding uses which would result in any-nuclear explosive device" (underlining supplied) and have each notified the IAEA to this effect.
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that the
,, equivalent of criterion (2) is met with respect to NWS of the Community.
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Criterion (3)
" Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or pro-duced through the use thereof.
Following the effective date of any regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant to Section 304 (d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,
' physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that re-quired by the applicable regulations."
The Commission has not, as yet, promulgated new regula-tions pursuant to Section 304 (d) of P.L.95-242.
Each member state of the Community has established phy-sical security measures which, as a minimum, meet those recom-mended in the IAEA's INFCIRC/225/Rev.1, "The Physical Protec-tion of Nuclear Material".
In additien, all states in the Community (except Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg) also are members of the Nuclear Sup-pliers Group and, as such, have agreed to levels of protection consistent with INFC.- 2/225/Rev.
1, to be ensured with respect to nuclear materials and equipment and facilities containing these materials, which are detailed in transmissions of the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines to the IAEA.
Therefore, it is the view of the Execdtive Branch that criterion (3) is met.
m Criterion (4)
"No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such retransfer.
In addition to other
' requirements of law, the United States may approve such re-transfer only if the nation or group of nations designated to receive such retransfer agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions required by this section."
Article XI(2) of the November 8, 1958 Joint Program Agreement, as amended, which is incorporated in the Additional Agreement for Cooperation, as amended, by Article V of the latter Agreement, provides that no material (including equip-ment and devices) may be transferred beyond the control of the EURATOM Community, unless the United States agrees.
Article 1 bis D of the Additional Agreement for Coopera-tion, as amended, provides that special nuclear material pro-duced through the use of US-supplied material may be exported to any nation outside the Community or to a group of nations, provided that such nation or group of nations has an appro-priate Agreement for Cooperation with the United States or guarantees the peaceful use of the produced material under safeguards acceptable to the Community and the United States.
The European Community's interpretation of'this language--as set out in a april 15 letter to the Department of State from Fernand Spaak, Head of the Delegation of the Ccmmission of the European Communities--is that the Earopean Community Supply Agency prior 'to any prcposed transfer will consult with the United States to find out whether, in the view of tne US, the preposed recipient of such produced special nuclear material has an Agreement for Cooperation with the United States which is " appropriate".
A letter of February 11, 1977 1/
from Fernand Spaak to the Department of Energy (then ERDA) makes clear that this provides the US a consent right, since the US has the exclusive ability to decide whether an agree-ment is appropriate".
This letter states that:
"It isourunderstaNding that any transfer of recovered materials frcm the Community to a third country is subject, in accor-dance with the terms of the EURATCM-US Agreement for Cooperation, to prior US authorization."
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A copy of this letter was provided by the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities to tne Nuclear Regulatcry Comm,ssion by transmittal letter dated February 14, 19.
4 Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that, with regard to the proposed export and special nuclear material produced through its use, criterion (4) is met.
With respect to transfers within the Community, it should be noted that the use of the words " group of nations" in criterion (4) makes clear that no retransfer consent
- right is required within a group of nations under this cri-teria.
With respect to this provision, the Senate report states:
"It should be noted that under the US-EURATOM Agreements, the US does have a right of prior approval on retransfers of certain material outside of the EURATOM Community.
It should also be noted that paragraph 4 does not require prior approval with respect to trans-fers within the EURATOM Community, con-sistent with US policy of treating that Community as a (single) entity."
The Congressional intent not to require US consent rights for transfers within the Community is also clear in Section 123 a.(5) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, since it re-quires that the US seek a guarantee "by the cooperating party" (which in this case is EURATOM as a whole).
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Criterion (5)
"No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear materisi produced through the '.se of such material will be processed, and no irradiated fuel elements contain-ing such material removed from.. &eactor shall be altered in form cc content, unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or alteration."
Criterion (5) of Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act is not met.
Pursuant to the first proviso in Section 126 a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act, continued cooperation under the US-EURATOM Agrtements for Cooperation shall not be prevented by failure to meet criteria (4) or (5) of Section 127 for a period of 30 days after enactment of this Section (March 10, 1978), and for a period of 23 months thereaf ter if the Secre-tary of State notifies the Commission that the nations or group of nations bound by the US-EURATOM Agreements for Cooperaticn have agreed to negotiations as called for in Section 404(a) of P.L.95-242.
The Executive Branch is currently seeking such agreement to negotiate from EURATOM.
Upon notification of the Com-mission by the Department of State tht EURATOM, has agreed to these negotiations, the provisions of criterion (5) of the Section 127 export criterion would not apply and the Com-mission mcy continue to issue export licenses until March 10, 1990, pursuant to the authority in the first previso in Section 126 a.(2).
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Criterion (6)
"No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported unless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or ecuipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such exported sensitive nuclear technology."
The proposed export does not involve sensitive nuclear technology.
Criterion (6) is, therefore, not applicable.
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a B.
Section 128 Criterion Section 128 a. (1) of the Atomic Energy Act establishes the following additional criterion:
"As a condition of con-tinued United States export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such expert shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are main-tained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the control of such state at the time of the export."
It should be noted that this criterion only applies to exports to take place after March 10, 1980 or pursuant to an application submitted after September 10, 1979.
We anticipate that this recommended export will occur before March 10, 1980.
In any case, as partier to the NPT, all non-nuclear weapon states that are members of the European Atomic Energy Community have agreed to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities.
Therefore it is the Executive Branch vf.,w that the equivalent of this criterion is met with respect to the FRG, a non-nuclear weapon state member of the Community.
Since France is a nuclear weapons state, this criterion is not applicable to license application XU-8408.
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3.
Additional Factors A.
Safecuards Implementation -- Significant infor-the Executive 3 ranch possesses bearing on mation the effectiveness of implementation of IAEA safe-guards in the recipier t country, including any such information on steps being taken to correct any identified deficiencies in the application of IAEA safeguards in that country:
The IAEA Secretariat has concluded in its Special Safeguards Implementation Report that with regard to nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards, while some deficiencies exist in the system, "in none of the 41 states in which in-spections were carried out was there any diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material".
Although rec-ogniting the need to correct existing deficiencies in safe-guards implementation, the Executive Branch has no reason to believe that the IAEA Secretariat.'s conclusion is not a valid one.
In the light of this and'other factors associated with the proposed. export, the Executive Branch believes the framework of commitments, assurances and safeguards is adequate for the purposes of these exports.
Soecial Non-Proliferation and Other Foreicn Policv B.
Implications As the Commission is aware, there is a long history of cooperation and strong bonds between the member states of the Community and the United States in the economic and security The Community countries have worked closely with the areas.
United States in efforts to further common non-proliferation objectives, through bilateral cooperative efforts and in such forums as the United Nations, IAEA and Nuclear Suppliers Group.
More recently, Community countries have agreed to participate in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation and are actively participating in this program in order to develop more pro-liferation-resistant means to help meet future world energy needs with nuclear power.
Maintaining these essential re-lationships and cooperative arrangements is a primary US
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fcreign policy objective.
x In view of the significant. foreign policy implications of any prolonged interruption in the US-EURATOM supply arrange-the Executive Branch strongly urges that the Commission
- ment, consider and issue the proposed export license at such time as the Department of State notifies the Commission that
EURATOM has agreed to negotiations as called for in Section 404 (a) of the P.L.95-242.
Once EURATOM agrees to negotia-tons, it is the view of the Executive Branch that the license applications described herein would meet all applicable ex-port criteria.
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Inimicality Judcment Based on review of the proposed export, it is the judgment of the Executive Branch that the proposed ex-ports will not be inimical to the common defense and security, and that the licenses should be issued.
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APPENDIX C 1
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atC4 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Poem approved iogpDs,4o Washinpon D.C. 20545 IyN7meu No.
ySjy/M-12kl APPLICATION FOR LICEH5E TO EXPORT 7#, gg,/
BYPRODUCT, SOURCE, OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERI AL r-WP Submit un Tripitcale
(,,
y carefully Read Instructions on Back p k 4 f.,f Q l D ATE OF APPLICATION 2 A PPLIC AN T's REF ERENC E N O.
3 COUNTRY OF ULTIM ATE DESTIN ATION' February 21, 1978 RBO#fTS EU/103 78-045/01 W. Germany 4 N AME OF APPLIC AN T S ULT tM ATE CONstGNEE IN FOREIGN COUNTRY Transnuclear, Inc.
%n, and address)
Gemeinschaftskernkraftwerk Grohnde GmbH STREET ADOREss 5205 Leesburg Pike 3254 Emmerthal 1, Hauptstrabe 52 CITY, sT ATE, ANO zip CODE Federal Republic of Germany Falls Church, Va. 22041 6 IN TE R MEOt A TE CON 510N E E IN F 0FIElGN COUNTRY (Ging none
- 7. IF PURCH AS ER tN FOREIGN COUNTRY 15 OTH ER TN AN NU a'kNo'r""i8eNE"E$eE8Sf" Uni'8;E DnTR iM4TE CpNslp,NEEfn pper o cpsfor SamplG u
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,,,, a, D-6450 llanau 11 Nuclear Audit & Testing Co.
Quantity Only Postfach 110060, W. Germany 8206 Leesburg Pike Vienna, Virginia 22180 8 lai Cu nN TtTY TO DE sHIPPE O (b) COMMOO1TY OESCRIPTION (include chemecal and physical fornt; for special nuclea material and iSee snstrucesons on backI bstmaluct marertal also spret/y isotopic content: ti en a device, identsfy the device, manufacturer,
,107,303.0 Kg U Ur n i tNeformofuraniumhexafluorideenrichedtoamaximum 2730.246 KgU235 3.25 percent U235. This material will be supplied and packaged Samples (NATCO) by Goodyear Atomic Corp., Piketon, Ohio and Union Carbide Corp.,
3.0 Kg U Oak Ridge, Tn. for shipment beginning in September 1978.
0.098 Kg U235 (c) sNiPP:No AN D P ACxiNo PROC EOuR rs (Required for spec,al ra.cle, matenal, see instructions on bact)
I. A.E. A. Certificate of Competent Authority 4909 in accordance with 10 CFR Part 71.
C NO USE OF COMMOOtT1CS COvCREO eY THi% A PPLf C A TtON (Describe full % stating lthat tutil be produced or mQrnslactured, uhat sentcr u til be render, J. or the nature of the resrech that util be performed.) (See unstructuuns nn bacin for spectat nuclear matertal.)
Material will be used in the RBU facilities for the manufacture of fuel elements for reactor Grohnde, Unit 1.
(See attached End Use Statument) io The applicant, and any official esecuting this certificate on behalf of the spplicant named in item 4, certify that this application is ptepared in conformity with Title 10, Code of Federal Reputations, Parts 30 and % (if for byproduct material) or Part 40 til for source material), or Part 70 (if for special nuclear material),'and Part 71 (for transpan of radioactive material, if app!! cable) and that all information contained herein, including any supplements attached hereto, is true and correct to the best of their knowledge and belief.
'Ihis material is privately owned.
Please issue for period of one year.
Transnuclear, Inc.
( Applicant nantd in item 4)
Vicki Matsony' f,
b Dyt Traffic Coordinator bN f,j,
'T y (Title of certriyng allucrat authr>ruzed to act on behalf of the 4tdocant) t N ','I
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' d ' bA EI NS C H AFTS K ER N K R AFTWE R K GROHNDE G.M.B.H.
E Gemeinschaftskeinkraftwerk Crohnde GmbH, 3254 Emmerihall, Hauptstro6e $2 Postfachi Emmeithal 1 Nr.17I Bankkontoi Kreissparkaise Homeln.Pyrmont Klo. 315 Antwort on:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN t,g 26 8
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FEB 17 lg73 END USE STATEMENT L
We hereby certify that the quantity of enriched uraniumhe M oride 4 as follows:
1.
37,612 kgs U 1.92 % enriched 722.150 kgs U-235 2.
37,066 kgs U 2.55 % enriched 945.183 kgs U-235 3.
32,705 kgs U 3.25 % enriched 1,062.912 kgs U-235 and as also specified by Transnuclear Inc., Falls Church /Va., in their application to export special nuclear material to our company under contract E - (49-14) - UES/EU/103 will be used in the RBU facilities for manufac'ture of fuel elements of our reactor GROHNDE, Unit 1.
Please note that Nuclear Audit and Testing Co.,
(NATCO) Vienna, Va.
should be listed as shipper of record on Transnuclear Inc 's license to export, only for the sample quantities of 3.0 kg U containing 0.098 kgs U-235 enriched to a maximum 3.25 percent.
Therefore, the intermediate consignee for the UF6"
~
RBU Reaktor-Brennelement Union GmbH s,
],}c;ygg. O. Box 110060
-6450 Hanau 11/ West Germany CD FEB >2 pa,.,
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It ir not possible to refer to the date of the Transnuclear app 11-cation at this time as it will not be initiated until Transnuclear-.
receives this documer Place and date of issue; Emmerthal January 26,.1978.
Signatures of ultimate consignee:
Gemeinschaftskernkraftwerk Gro de'GmbH V
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I February 21, 1978 Mr. N. Moore Nuclear Regulatory Commission of fice ' of International Programs 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, Maryland 20014 Re UES/EU/103 045/01 (RBU-215)
Dear Mr. Moore; Enclosed is an application for Export License, in triplicate, for your handling on the following material:
107,383 Kg U (plus 3 Kg U) containing 2730.246 Kg U235 (plus.098 Kg U235) enriched to a maximum 3.25 percent U235 Thanking you in advance for your help and cooperation.
Sincerely,
,. ; in 'f, i d L Vicki Matson Traffic Coordinator VM/ak-
Enclosures:
Export License Application Original End Use Statemant ii,,",,([3 1970 FE8 22 RI i. 32 b '0,I/!s'l,R ",T;f
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- ' * *. 't.i;\\ \\ 'L, ((?g
$KYLINE CENTER 5205 LEESBURG PlhE. FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA 22041
'i TfLEPHONE: 703 820 2450. CABLE: 1RANSNUL FSCH. TELEX: 89-9463
I s-APPENDIX D~
M FXVORT L_ ICE'NSE
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THIS LICENSE EXPIRES
{p,t XSNM01281
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Nuclear Regulatory Commirsion
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a Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,os.aniended.ond the the licensee, a license is hereby issued to the licensee author-rd Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the regulations of the izing the export of the materials ond/or production or u l Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued pursuant thereto, and in facilities listed below, subject to t E
reliance on statements and representations heretofore mode by utnen consic~u is roeocs cou~ny l
j ucessu Gemeinschaftskernkraftwerk l
Transnuclehr. Incorporated '
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1 "4ae N^at 3
5205 Leesburg Pike Grohnde GmbH roonssFalls Church, Virginia 2204.1 4eouss3254 Emerthal 1, Hauptstrabe 52 p
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R Attn: Vicki Matson, '
Federal Republic of Germany pl
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,.3 istnueoun co~ sic ~n is renoc~ cousny orHee runes to enon (dj
,,,, RBU-Reaktor Brennelement Union GmbH Nuclear Audit & Testing Company d
r D-6450 Hanau II 8206 Leesburg Pike ifj d
Postfach 110060, W. Gennany.
Vienna, Virginia 22180
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Shipper of Record for Sample Quantity
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cousny or utnere oesn~4nos W. Germany M
oructurs up. so. RBU 215 EU/103 78-045/01
>71 ou4snn oescunos or uruuts on raciunes.
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$d 2,730.246 kilograms uranium-235 Contained in 107,383 kilograms uranium, )
as uranium hexafluoride, enriched to k
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3.25 w/o maxistet.
i 0.098 kilograms uranium-235_
Contained in 3 kilograms uranium, as l
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uranium hexafluoride, enriched to 3.25 g
N w/omaximum(asNATCUsAnples) n r
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Conditions 6 and 8 on page two of this license apply to this export.
pg W Mfd ///////////////////////////////////////END///////////////////////////////////////[
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Neither this license nor any right under this license shall be assign-fHrs uceNse is isVAUO UMess secNeD Snow 8Y ^utwoeino sec nrnsestanve
{ ed or otherwise troniferred in violation of the provisions of the n Actof 197l.
Gerald G. Oplinger, Assistant Director f
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Export / Import and International n
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9 This license is subject to the right of recapture or control by Section Safgguards 108 of the Atomic Energy Act of 19$4.os amended and to allof the Office Of International Programs l
j other provisions of said Acts, now or hereafter in effect and to oil an e issu4sce L
valid rules and regulations of the Nuclear Regulotory Commission.
4
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION EXPORT LICENSE Conditions License Number XSNM01281 Condition 1 - 1.icensee shall file with the Customs Officer or the ' Postmaster two copies,in addi-tion to those otherwise required, of the Shipper's Export Declaration covering each export and mark one of such copies for transmittal to the U.S. Nuclear Regu-lotory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. The following declaration should oc-1 company or be placed on the Shipper's Export Declarations for such exports:
"This shipment is being made pursuant to specific license number (specific license number) filed at (location of Customs office where license is filed),
on (date license was filed). This license expires on (expiration date of license), and the unshipped balance remaining on this license is sufficient to cover the shipment described on this declaration."
Cendition 2 - Exports authorized in any country or destination, except Country Groups Q, S, W, X, Y, and Z in Port 370, Supplement No.1, of the Comprehensive Export Schedule of the U.S. Deponment of Commerce.
Candition 3 - This license covers only the nuclear content of the material.
Cendition 4 - The material to be exported under this license shall be shipped in accordance with the physical protection requirements for special nuclear material in 10 CFR 73.
Condition 5 - Special nuclear material authorized for expon under this license shall not be transported outside the United States in possenger corrying circraft in shipments exceeding (1) 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is less, of plutonium or uranium 233, or (2) 350 grams of uranium 235.
Cendition 6-This license authorizes export only and does not authorize the receipt, physical possession, or use of the nuclear material.
Condition 7 - The licensee shall complete and submit on NRC L.n 741 for each shipment of source material exported under this license.
Condition 8 - The licensee shall advise the NRC in the event there is any change in the designo.
tion of the company who will package the nuclear material to be exported under this license, or any change in the location of the packaging operation, or least three weeks prior to the scheduled date of export.
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