ML20148B898
| ML20148B898 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/07/1997 |
| From: | Seale R Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148B866 | List: |
| References | |
| ACRS-3052, NUDOCS 9705130403 | |
| Download: ML20148B898 (3) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE 04 REACTOR SAFE 20ARDS 1
CAsHINGTON. D. C. 20666 February 7, 1997
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1 MEMORANDUM TO:
ACRS Members FROM:
Robert L. Seale, Chairman ACRS
SUBJECT:
NONPOWER REACTOR SURVEY Members are encouraged to review the Nonpower Reactor Survey prepared by AE00 and formulate questions that will focus presentations by AE00 and NRR.
Application of risk-informed, performance-based regulatory concepts to nonpower reactors maybe an issue of interest.
Members should submit questions to Mr. Sam Duraiswamy or Mr. Michael Markley no later than the March ACRS meeting.
Based on the questions, decisions will be made on whether or not there should be presentations at a later ACRS meeting.
s 9705130403 970307 PDR ACRS 3052 PDR -
To:
PLANNING AND PROCEDURES SUBCOMMITTEE From: D.A. Powers subject:
AEOD Survey of Nonpower Nuclear Reactoms
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Some comments and questions elicited by the report Non-Power Reactor Survey (AEOD C96-xx; December 1996) are listed below:
e It is not evident to me that the body of NRC regulations (especially 10CFR50.40 and i
10CFR50.41) as imposed on the nonpower : sectors is sdficient to assure that taken as a whole this class of reactors meets the safety goals. What steps should ".he NRC take to see ifits regulations in tbc area ofnonpower reactars are adequate? Are the b
safety goals properly applied to the regulations of nonpower reactors in 1{5 t of the 1
restrictions placed on the regulation of research facilities by the Attmic Energy Act?
The nonpower reactorn seem unusually susceptible to human errors. A major element e
i of the safety strategy of thr:; facilities is the availability of a highly experi,enced, if not thoroughly trained, operating crew. The report did not seem to address the continued availability of experienced operators, turnover etc. This seems s' serious omission to me.
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e The biggest challenge in the safe operation of a rosearch reactor is assurig that the experimental packages do not cause a consequential event to the reactor.,In light of the complexity of the analyses necessary to provide this assurance, the er;rers m i
similar analyses that seem to creep into power reactor operations, and the less formal safety culture of the nonpower :sactor anvucunent, isn't this an area ofidbstantial potential for human error? Isn't this potential exacerbated by the rather cMual attitude NRC adopts concerning con 5gwation control at these facilities?
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l e Nonpower stactors would seem to be very vulnerable to security and safspards
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failures. The report did not deal with the past events or the potential of Amse events l
of this type. This, too, seems to be a serious omission in evaluating the pmtection of i
the public from risks posed by these facilitias.
l In view of the sunilarities of fuel and work type of the licensed nonpony reactors e
and the DOE rescarch reactors, ought the NRC and DOE encourage the operstors of the nonpower reactors to participene in the ARRO meetings?
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Should the NRC develop a rating system analogous to SALP for the nonpower reactors?
Altogether, I was quite disappointed in the study. Somehow the examples of BORAX SL-1, and SPERT lacked a sense ofimmediacy to me. It was evident that the authors had read hmpson's book. Hasn't our understanding of safety of nuc! car facilities advanced beyond this i t
n the last 33 years? I realize that this is but a peck at this pwtion of the nuclear community. It is aJeck, however, that reminds rne of nothing else but on first peek at the wrj DOE was opepting its class A reactors in 1986! That peck and the follour-up examination led to wholesale avisions of the way things are done at DOE reactors.
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cc:
M. Markley 2
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