ML20148A037
| ML20148A037 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1988 |
| From: | Shawn Smith TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 0886Q, 88-004, 88-4, 886Q, NUDOCS 8803160433 | |
| Download: ML20148A037 (3) | |
Text
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y, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 March 11, 1988 f
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ~ SEQUOYAll NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 'I - DOCKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SPECIAL REPORT 88-04 The enclosed special report provides detalls concerning a fire barrier being.
nonfunctional for greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting Condt.tlons for Operat8.on 3.7.12.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY al J S,
. Sm th Plant Manager Enclosure ec (Enclosure):
J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Reguletory Conunission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NV Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center l
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant j
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880316G433 880311 ~
DR ADO ( 4 ~'05000 An Equal Opportunity Employer
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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SPECIAL REP 0F.T 88-04 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On February 13, 1988, with unit 1 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 4 psig, 124 degrees F), a fire barrier (Door A-62, Auxiliary Building elevation 690, penetration room) was nonfunctional for an interval greater than seven days. On February 6, 1988, the active leaf of the door was found not cloring properly, and a breach (Permit No. 5902) was issued as the door was determined to be a nonfunctional fire barrier. Although the door is capable of being closed and latched, the top half of the active leaf would leave approximately 3/4-inch mismatch with the door frame and would not meet acceptance criteria of Surveillance Instruction (SI)-261 for functional fire door. A roving fire watch was established, and a work request (VR) was issued to repair / replace the door..Iaintenance determined that the door needed to be replaced, and the replacement door could not be procured within seven days which requires a special report in accordance with technical specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 CAUSE OF EVENT The cause of this event is inadvertent pressurization of Auxillary Building elevation 690 penetration room as described below.
The fire dcor is a double-leaf door and opens outside to the penetration room.
At the time of the event, unit I containment equipment hatch and blast doors on elevation 734 were closed, and the containment purge system was tagged out of service to determine Aux 111ary Building gas treatment system (ABGTS) operability (refer to LER 327/88007). The containment pressure slowly started increaalr.g due to control air and service air leakage into the containment. The lower containment access air lock area (elevation 690 Auxillary Building) was also pressurized through the containment personnel access air lock door. When the access area entrance door A-64 was opaned, air rushed through the door opening and pressurized the elevation 690 penetration room which resulted in bending the top part of the active leaf on the door.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12.
A roving fire watch was established to inspect the penetration room on an hourly basis as required by the action statement of LCO 3.7.12.
The existing fire detection and fire suppression system for the affected area are cperable and would activate in the event of a fire.
Therefore, there is no danger to safety-rolated equipment.
During modes 1 thcugh 4, containment integrity is ensured as required by the TS, and service air to the containment is isolated. Therefore, this event is less likely to occur during modes 1 through 4.
CORRECTIVE ACTION As immediate action, service air supply to the containment was isolated.
A roving fire watch at a regular Interval of one hour was established and will be maintained until the fire door is replaced and functional.
A procurement request has been issued, and the delivery of the door is anticipated by June 30, 1988. WR B292433 will be used to document the installation of the door.
The control air and service air leakage into the containment was repaired on February 15, 1988.
LDDITIONAL INFORMATION Refer to LER 327/88007, "Opening of Unit 1 Containment Results in Secondary Containment Envelope Outside the Boundary Set for Surveillance Testing of Auxi'lary Building Gas Treatment System."
0886Q