ML20147G624
| ML20147G624 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/14/1978 |
| From: | James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| SECY-78-657, NUDOCS 7812260268 | |
| Download: ML20147G624 (1) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES December la,1973 sEcy 78-657 INFORMATION REPORT
'7
- l tes, p For:
The Comissioners From:
James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs p
gg.6.
Thru:
Executive Director for Oceratiens
Subject:
EXECU~I'/E SPANCH RESPONSE ':N ENDING EXPCRT L: CENSE APOLICATION XSNM01190, HEU TO JPAN.
Purcose:
To inform the Commission of tne above sucject.
Discussion:
Enclosed for :he information of the Ccmmission are
- oies of the Executive Brancn response en a :encing ex; ort license aoplication. C:;ies of the Executive Branch coments have been :lacec in the Public Cocument Room. A Comission Ac: ion Pacer will be forwarded soon.
Comissi0ners are recuested :: advise the staf' Of any carticular issues or information wni:n : hey can icentify at inis stage anc wnicn they.visn inclucec in the staf#'s analysis.
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- .y James o. Shea,
- : ector i
61? ice Of Internati:nal Or:g*1ms
Enclosure:
Letter ::s 12/12/73 (XSNM01190)
Contact:
- !STU3UT!:N:
G. G. Colinger J 7366' C:mm s sioners J. D. Lee (J?E-7?i-
- missi:n 5:af" 0#fices Exec. :ir. #:r Ocers.
Secretaria:
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JAPAN XSNM-1190
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O hkA' D EFA R T M EN T OF STATE
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RI:pyeg gg wue ce : : : s:o
'M BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL l NRC ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS
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December 12, 1978
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' Nao/M.
7s. x g> y MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES R.
SHEA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Enclosed is an Executive Branch analysis covering a license application for the export of highly-enriched ur ani um to Japan.
In accordance with P.L.95-242, the analysis explicitly addresses how the requirements of Section 126 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act are met, in-ciuding the specific criteria of Sections 127 and 12c, as well as certain additional factors, envisaged by Section 126 a. (1).
The Executive Branch, on the basis of its review of this case, has concluded that the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and P.L.95-242 have been met and that the proposed export would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States.
- Moreever, Japan has adhered to the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States.
Therefore the Execu-tive Branch recommends issuance of the requested export license.
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p:
Icuis V.
Nosen:c' reputy Assistant Secretary
Enclosure:
As stated.
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XSNM-1190 Country:
Japan Transaction:
The export of 4.572 kilograms of U-235 contained in 4.9 kilograms of uranium in the form of U,Og enriched to a maximum of 93.3~ percent U-235 Applicant:
Transnuclear, Inc, Applicant's
Reference:
NUK-186 77-298101 Date of Application:
August 17, 1977 Purpose of the Export The highly-enriched uranium will be shipped to Nukem, GmbH, Hanau, Federal Republic of Germany for conversion.
The highly-enriched uranium dioxide will then be shipped to the Nuclear Fuel Industry for fabrication into fuel assemblies for the Kyoto Company University Critical Assembly.
Shipment of this material is scheduled for (KUCA) at the Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute, Osaka, Japan.
This research facility first achieved criticality on August 6, 1974.
This critical assembly has three cores--in the A and 3 cores square plate type fuel is utilized; in the C core a long flat plate type fuel is utilized.
The A and 3 cores ccabined use about 10 kilograms of uranium per loading; the C core uti.izes another 10 kilograms of highly-enriched T.aterial.
The Research Reactor Institute has 20 ki10 grams of highly enriched uranium on hand for cores A, 3 and C.
The present application of approximately 5 kilograms is intended for a new core experiment utilizing fuel plates of fifferent di ensions (1cng and curved).
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DELEGATION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES June 20, 1978 JM/aks Mr. Vance H.
Hudgins Assistant Director for Politico-
..ilitary Security Affairs Division of International Security Affairs Department of Energy Washington, D.
C.
20545
Subject:
License application XSNM-1190 - S-791 - for the export of HEU to Japan, via Nukem GmbH, West Germany.
Reference:
Transnuclear Inc. application NUK-186 77-298/01 of August 17, 1977.
Dear Mr. Hudgins:
We certify that the material mentiened in this application namely 4.747 Kg of U-235, contained in 5.088 Kg of uranium, and the transfer of this material will be subject to all terms and conditions of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation, dated July 25, 1960, as amended.
Further we certify that Nukem GmbH, Hanau, West Germany and Transnuklear GmbH, Hanau, West Germany as intermediate consignees are authorized by EURATOM to receive and possess this material pursuant to the aforementioned Agreement for Cooperation After conversion at the Nukem plant, the above material will be retransferred to Japan, subject to US DOE authorization.
Sincerely yours, Ch 3
r F.
SPAAX Head of Delegation I
cc: Mr.
R.
Delabarre, State Department Ms.
J. Dunn, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms.
V.
Matson,Transnuclear Inc.
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EMSASSY OF JAPAN 03M MAJ.5ACHUSCT3 AYf. Nut. H.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20CCS November 9, 1978 cw nr=u J
Colonel Vance H. Hudgins Assistant Director for Politico-Military Security Affairs Division of International Security Affairs Department of Energy Washington, D.C.
20545
Dear Colonel Hudgins:
Concerning import of the special nuclear caterial for the facility noted below, this will confirm that the Governmeat of Japan appointed The Kyoto University as an authorized cerson under the terms and condi: ions pursuant to
.Ar:icle VI or ene Agreement for Cooperation be: ween the Government of the United S:ates of A= erica and Govern =en: of Japan concerning Civil Uses of Acccic Energy which entered into force on July 10, 1968, amend by the Pro:ocol on December 21, 1973.
Fuel for the Kyoto University Criticci Assembly:
4,747 grams of U-235 (93.30 percent enrichment)
Further, it is confirmed that the transfer of the special nuclear
=aterial identified above will take place under all the terms und conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation be: ween our Governnen:s, and that the appointee (s) na=ed above have been authorized to receive and possess the material by both Governments.
Also, the Governnent of Japan confirms tha: the safeguards and guarant of the.4 :eecent for Cooperation will always apply to this special 3
nuclear material, except for that material subsecuen:ly retransferred with the written cpproval of the United States.
Sincerely yours, V
t^
n un y
Ka:uo Suzuki First Secretary (Scientific)
P.ef:
This is in reference to the case number of S-791 s ta:ed ir you-le::er dated May 8, 1973.
(XSNM-1190)
Ihe in:ermediate Consigne8, the Nuclear Fuel Indusar" Com an'y' Ltd. is also authorized :: receive and possess
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EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATICN ANALYSIS The proposed export is subject to all of the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-ment of Japan concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, which entered into force on July 10, 1968.
This fact has been confirmed by letter from the Embassy of the Government of Japan, a copy of which follows the description of the transaction.
Japan has adhered to the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States.
___________..__.-_-_m
i 2.
Extent to Which Export Criteria Are Met i
A.
Section 127 Criteria As provided in Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act, the following criteria govern exports for peaceful nuclear uses from the United States of source material, special nuclear material, production or utill:ation facilities, and anv sensitive nuclear technoloa.v:
Oriterion (1)
"IAEA safeguards as recuired by Article III(2) of the Tre a tv. will be ac.clied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and subject te the ap-plicable Ag reement for Cooperation, and to any special nu-clear material used in or produced through the use thereef."
Japan is a Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and deposited its instrument of rati-fica *. ion on June S, 1976.
This Japan / AEA Safeguards Agree-ment pursuant to the NPT entered into force or Oecember 2, 1977.
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that criterion (1) is met.
Criterior
'2)
"No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported or previously ex-ported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Co-operation, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such materials, facilities,or sensi-tive nuclear technology, will be used for any nuclear ex-plosive device or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device."
Pursuant to Article X A.
(2) of the Agreement, Japan has guaranteed that no material or ecuipment transferred thereunder and no special nuclear material produced there-from, will be used for atomic weapons, or for research or development of atomic weapons, or for research or de-velopment of atomic weapons, or fcr any other militari purpose.
Japan, as a party to the NPT, has pledged not to manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear weapon er other nuclear explosive devices.
F u r t h e '.
in accord-ance with the Safeguards Agreement, Japan is precluded from engaging in any research and development on any nu-clear explosive device involving any L'S-supplied material or facilities or any special nuclear material derived therefrom.
Since these commitments will apply to the proposed export and to any special nuclear material prcduced thr agh its use, it is the view of the Executive Sranch thac criterion (2) is met.
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Criterion (3)
" Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material for facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or pre-duced through the use thereof.
F011 cwi ng the effective date of anv reculations promulgated bv the Commission pursuant to Section 304(d) of the Nuclear No'n-Prcliferation Act of 1973, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection equivalent to tha:
required by the applicable regulations."
A USG physics 1 security review team visited Japan ir Julv. 1977 to follow up survev.s made b.y security teams in June 1975 and February 1976.
During the 1977 survey, the Team met eith concerned efficials of the Governmen: cf Japan and visited a number f t.voical nuclear facilities including the Kyoto University Research Institute where tne MUCA critical assembly and :ts fresh fuel storage vault were s=e..
The Team determined that Japanese physical security measures met as a minimum the levels envisaged by !NFC:RC 225.
On September 22, 1978, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan provided the followinc assurance to the Embassv.
of the United States in Tokyo:
"The Government of Japan confirms that the maintenance of physi,1 protection measures previding as a minimun a y.
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documei. INFCIRC/225/Rev. I with respec: to nuclear r.ater:a:s and facilities exported frem the United States to Japan and with respect to nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such materials and facilities, conforms
- the policy of the Government of Japan, and tha; adequate and will ce, physical protection measures as necessary are, implemented in accordance with the relevant laws and requia-tions and also through the administra:ive actions by the governmental authcrities concerned with respect to the aforesaid materials and facilities.
It is the understanding of the Government of Japan that as frem the date of this note verbale, the United States Governmen: does not intend to request the Government of Japan on a case-by-case basis
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in connection with each case of license applica:icr for the exports of nuclear materials."
On the basis of the Physical Securi., Review Team ":si:3, and the assurance frem the OcVernmen o f Japan, the Execu-
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i level of protection envisaced by IAEA INFCIRC/ 2 2 5 / Re'.'
a-d are therefore adecuate for the material covered bv these 1icense applications.
Therefore, it is the view cf the Executive '"'anc" '"a
n criterion (3) is met.
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Criterion (4)
"No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such retransfer.
In addition to other requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only if the nation or group of nations des-ignated to receive such retransfer agrees that i t shall be subiect to the conditions required by this section."
Article X(A)(3) of the 1969 U.S.-Japan Agreement for Cooperation stipulates tha t:
"No material, including equip-ment and devices, trans fe rred to the Government of Japan or to authorized ersons under its.iurisdiction.cursuant to e
this Agreement or the superseded Agreement will be trans-ferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the juridiction of the Government of Japan, except as the United States Com-mission may agree to such a transfer to another nation or international organi:ation, and then enly if, in the opinion of the United Sta tes Commission, the.randfar of the material is within the scope of an Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States...and the other nation or international organi:ation."
Article VIII E. provides that:
"Special nuclear material produced through the use of material transferred to the Government of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreenent or the superseded Agreement may be transferred to any other nation or inter-national organization provided that such nation or interna-tional organication has an appropriate agreement for coopera-tion with the Government of the United Sta:es of America or guarantees the use of such special nuclear ma:erial for peaceful purposes under safeguards accep;acle to the Parties."
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view tha:, as the U.S.
has the right of prior approval over retransfer of U.S.-supplied material and the equivalent for v.aterial pro-duced through the use of U.S. material, criterion (4) is met.
- dhile it is the U.S.
position that Article VII:
E.
accords :he United States the equivalen: of a consen
- right, the provision does not explicitly stipula e whether the
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scope of the agreemen:.)
However, ic should be noted that the only way in which special nuclear material covered by Article VII: I could beccme available for transfer is through Japanese reprocessing of U.S.-supplied sourc. or spec.ial nuclear material.
So long as the produced material remains in the spent fuel it is not separable from the U.S.-supplied material, which is subject to the provisions of article X(A)(3).
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Criterion (5)
"No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the use of sue" material will be reprocessed, and no irradiated fuel ale-ments conraining such material removed from a reactor shall be al tered in form or content, unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such re-processing or alteration."
Article VIII C.
of the U.S.
- Japan Agreement for Cooperation provides that:
"When any special nuclear material received f rom the United States of America re-cuires reprocessing, or any irradiated fuel elements containing fuel material received from the United Sta:es of America are to be removed from a reactor and are to be altered in form or content, such reprocessing er alter-ation may be performed in Japanese facilities upon a joint determinatier, of the Parties tha: the provisions of Article XI may be effectively applied, or in such other facilities as may be mutually agreed."
As no joint determination under Article VIII C.
can be made without the agreement of the United States, and since the facilities to be used must be acceptable to the U.S.
as one of the Parties, it is the Ixecutive Brancb view that criterion (5) is met.
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9 3.
Section 128 Criterion Section 128 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act establishes the following additional criterion:
"As a condition of continued United States export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such export shall be made unless IAEA safe-guards are maintained with respect to all peaceful nu-clear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the control of such state at the time of the ex-port."
As a Party to the NPT, Japan has accepted IAEA safe-guards on all its nuclear activities thereby satisfying this criterion.
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t Criterion (6)
"No such sensitive nuclear technology shall ce ex-ported unless the foregoiag conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such exported sensitive nuclear technology."
The proposed export does not involve the transfer
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of sensitive nuclear technology.
Criterion (6) is, therefore, not applicable.
1 I
3.
Additional Factors A.
Safeguards Implementation The IAEA Secretariat has noted in its Special Sa f e-guards Implementation Report that with regard to nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards, while some defici'encies exist in the system, no diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material was detected in any of the 45 states in which inspections were carried out.
Although recognizing the need to correct existing deficiencies in safeguards im-plementation, the Executive Branch has no reason to believe that the IAEA Secretariat's report is not vali3.
In the light of this and other factors associated with the proposed export, the Executive Branch believes the framework cf com-mitments, assurances, and safeguards is adequate for the purpcse of this export.
S.
Special Non-Proliferation and Other Foreign Policy Considerations The Japanese request is for 4.747 kilograms of U-235, under the 5 kilogram limit, and therefore, a technical and economic jutification is not deemed necessary.
- Mcreover, the application was filed on August 17, 1977, substantially prior to the November 30, 1977, implementaticn by the Executive Branch of the requirement inter a;1a fer an economic and technical justification for all expert license applications for HEU raceived after that date.
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4.
Inimicality Judement Based on review of the proposed export, it is the judgment of the Executive Branch that the proposed export will not be inimical to the common defense and security, and that the license should be issued.
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