ML20147F453

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Special Rept 88-03:on 880204,fire Barrier Nonfunctional for Greater than 7 Days.Caused by Failure to Complete Evaluation & Actions to Ensure Suspended Ceiling in Control Building Meets FSAR Section 9.5.1.3 Requirements within 7 Days
ML20147F453
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 02/26/1988
From: Shawn Smith
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
88-03, 88-3, NUDOCS 8803070352
Download: ML20147F453 (3)


Text

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, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post' Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 February 26,~1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission

. Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND -328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR SPECIAL REPORT 88-03 The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire barrier being nonfunctional for greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.12.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY d

S J. JmSm th Plant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323  !

Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ffp3070352880226 ~

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An Equal Opportunity Employer

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT-UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 88-03 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On February 4, 1988, with unit 1 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 4 pals, 124 degrees F) and unit 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 370 psig.

188 degrees F), a fire barrier (suspended ceiling in Control Building elevation 732, housekeeping area) was nonfunctional for an interval greater than seven days.

On January 22, 1988, Division of Nuclear Engineering issued a Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR) (SQF 880015) that identified the suspended cement plaster ceiling in the Control Building elevation 732, rooms C-5, C-6, C-7, and C-8, ray not provide a 1 1/2-hour fire barrier required by the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 9.5.1.3. While the evaluation of the suspended cement plaster calling was continuing, a fire breach was issued on January 28, 1988, and an hourly fire watch was established.

However, the evaluation and any actions to ensure that the suspended ceiling will provide a 1 1/2-hour fire barrier was not done within the seven days requiring a special report in accordance with t'chnical e specification (TS)

Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12.

CAUSE OF EVENT Evaluation of the suspended ceiling to ensure a 31/2-hour fire barrier was not done within seven days. The questionable 1 1/2-hour fire barrier was based on potential problem discovered in TVA's procurement speelficellon prepared to obtain contractors' services for installation of the suspended ceiling. These were (a) the sand specified (and provided) is appropriate for gypsum plaster, not cement plaster, and is therefore too fine and in too great a quantity and (b) the specified curing method (through dry out of each plaster coat before application of succeeding coats) results in minimal bonding between the plaster coats.

The above described two conditions could potentially decrease the capability of the installed ceiling to resist cracking and delamination of the plaster coats due to thermal effects during a fire.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12.

A roving fire watch was established to inspect the Control Building elevation 732, rooms C-5, C-6, C-7, and C-8, on an hourly basis as required by the action stateaent of LCO 3.7.12. The existing fire detection and fire suppression system for the affected area are operable and would actuate in the event of a fire. Therefore, there is no danger to safety-related equipment.

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CORRECTIVE ACTION A roving fire watch at a regular interval of one hour was established and will be maintained until the. evaluations and actions to ensure the suspended ceiling is fully capable to function as a 1 1/2-hour fire barrier. This evaluation and any subsequent actions will be complete by

, September 1, 1988. CAQR SQF 880015 will be used to document the evaluation and actions taken.

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