ML20147E066
| ML20147E066 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002688 |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1978 |
| From: | Suzuki K JAPAN |
| To: | Hudgins V ENERGY, DEPT. OF |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20147E055 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7812200336 | |
| Download: ML20147E066 (13) | |
Text
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IMBASSY OF JAPAN-
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I 2320 MA35ACHU5ff78 Metut. H.W.
[
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006 i
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November 9, 1978
]
1 Colonel Vance H. Hudgins
{
j Assistant Director for Politico-Military Security Affairs Division of International Security Affairs Department of Energy Washington, D.C.
20545-
Dear Colonel Hudgins:
Concerning import of the special nuclear material for the facility i
noted below, this will confirm that'the.Governmeat of Japan appointed The-Kyoto University as an authorized person under the terms and conditions pursuant to
. Article VI of the Agreement for' Cooperation between the Government of the ' United States of America and Government of Japan concerning Civil Uses of Atomic: Energy'which entered into force'on July 10, 1968, amende; by the Protocol on December 21, 1973.
Fuel for the Kyoto University Critice.1 Assembly:
4,747 grams of U-235 (93.30 -percent enrichment) 1 Further, it is confirmed that the transfer of the special nuclear
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material identified abova will take place under all the terms'and conditions c the Agreement for Cooperation b'etween our Governments, s
and that the appointee (s) named'above have been authorized to receive and possess the material by both Governments.
Also, the Government of Japan confirms that the safeguards.and guaranted of the A;reement for Cooperation will always apply to this special 1
nuclear material, except for that material subsequently retransferred 1 with the written approval of the United States.
1 Sincerely yours, j
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'i Kazuo Suzuki-i First Secretary (Sc.ientific)
Ref:
This is in reference to the case number of S-791 stated in your letter dated May 8, 1978.
(XSNM-1190) 4 The intermediate consignee, the ucle'ar Fuel Industry Company, i
Ltd. is also authorized to receive and possess the material.
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u EXPORT LICENSE' APPLICATION ANALYSIS The proposed export'is subject to'all'of the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America'and the Govern-ment of Japan.concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, which
-entered:into force on July 10, 1968.
_This fact: has been confirmed by letter from the Embassy of'the Government of Japan,La copy of.which follows the description of the transaction.
Japan has adhered to the. provisions of'its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States.
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Extent to Which Export Criteria Are Met A.
Section 127 Criteria-As provided.in Section 127 of'the Atomic Energy Act, the following criteria govern exports for peaceful nuclear.
uses from the United States of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology:
Criterion (1)
"IAEA safeguards as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty will be' applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and subject to the ap-plicable Agreement for Cooperation, and to any special nu-clear material used in or produced through the use thereof."
Japan is a Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and deposited its instrument of rati-fication on June 8, 1976.
This Japan /IAEA Safeguards Agree-ment pursuant to the NPT entered into force on December 2, 1977.
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that
. criterion (1) is met.
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Criterion (2)
"No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported or previously ex-ported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Co-
' operation, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such materials, facilities,or sensi-tive nuclear technology, will be used for any nuclear ex-plosive device or for research on or development of any-nuclear explosive device."
Pursdant to Article X A.
(2) of the Agreement, Japan has guaranteed that no material or equipment transferred thereunder and no special nuclear material produced there-trom, will be used for atomic weapons, or for research or development of atomic weapons, or for research or de-velopment of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose.
Japan, as. a party to the NPT, has pledged not to manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices.
Further, in accord-ance with the Safeguards Agreement, Japan is precluded from engaging in any research and development on any nu-clear explosive device involving any US-supplied material or facilities or any special nuclear material derived therefrom.
Since these commitments will apply to the proposed export and to any special nuclear material produced through its use, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (2) is met.
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" Adequate; physical security measures will be. maintained-with. respect to such material for facilities proposed to be-exported and to any special nuclear material used in or pro-duced through the use thereof.
Following the effective:date of any regulations promulgated by the Commission; pursuant to Section:304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 1Act of 1978, physicalisecurity measures shall be deemed adequate'if such measures. provide a levelLof protection equivalent to that required by the applicable regulations."
A'USG physical security review team visited Japan in July =1977 to follow up surveys made by security teams in June 1975 and: February 1976..During the 1977 survey, the Team met with concerned officials of the Government of Japan and visited a number of typical nuclear ~ facilities including the Kyoto University Research. Institute where,the KUCA critical assembly and its fresh fuel storage vault were_seen.
The Team determined that. Japanese physical security measures met as a minimum the levels envisaged by INFCIRC 225.
On September 22, 1978, the Ministry of Foreign. Affairs of Japan provided the following assurance'to the Embassy of the United States in Tokyo:
i "The Government of Japan confirms that the-maintenance of physical protection measures providing as a minimum a level of protection comparableLto.thatl set forth in.IAEAf document INFCIRC/225/Rev.;1-with respect to nuclear materials and facilities exported from the United States to Japan and with respect to nuclear material used11n or produced through the use of such materials andl facilities, conforms.
to the policy of the Government of Japan, and that adequate ohysical protection measures as necessary are,-and will be, mplemented in accordance with the' relevant laws and regula-
. ions and also through the aaministrative actions by the-governmental authorities concerned with respect to the-aforesaid materials and facilities.
It is the understanding of the Government of-Japan that as from the date of this note verbale, the United States Government does not intend i
to request the Government of Japan on a. case-by-case basis to make written-confirmation concerning physical protection in connection with each' case of license application for the exports of nuclear' materials."
On the basis of the Physical Security Review Team visits, and the assurance from the Government of Japan, the Execu-tive Branch has determined that the physical security measures-maintained in Japan with respect to nuclear mate-rial and facilities are as a minimum compatible with the 1
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i level of protection envisaged by.IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev 1 and are therefore adequate for the-material covered by these license applications.
Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that
- criterion (3)-is. met.
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- Criterion (4)
"No such materials, facilities,.or sensitive nuclear technology proposed.to be exported,;and no special nuclear material produced through'the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or
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group of nations unless the prior approval.of the United States is obtained for such retransfer.
In addition to other_ requirements of law, the United States may' approve such retransfer only if the nation or group of nations: des--
ignated to receive such retransfer agrees that it shall;be subject to the conditions required by this section."
Article X(A)(3) of the 1968 U.S.-Japan Agreement for.
Cooperation stipulates that:
No material, including _ equip-ment and devices, transferred to the. Government of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to-this Agreement or the. superseded Agreement will'be trans-ferred to unauthorized persons or beyondL the juridiction of the Government of-Japan, excapt.as the United States Com-mission may agree to such a :ransfer to another nation or international organization, and then.only if, in the opinion of the United ' States Commission, the transfer of the material is within the scope of an Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the. United States 2.'and the other nation or international organization."
Article VIII E. provides-that:
Special nuclear material produced through the use of material transferred i
to the Government:of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement may be transferred to any other nation or inter-national organization provided that such nation or interna-tional organization has an appropriate agreement for coopera-tion with the Government of the United States of America or guarantees the use of such special nuclear material for peaceful purposes under safeguards acceptable to the Parties."
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' l Therefore,.it.is the Executive Branch view that, as the U.S.-has the right of prior approval over retransfer of U.S.-supplied material and the equivalent for material pro-duced through the.use of U.S. material, criterion (4) is met.
While it is the U.S. position that Article VIII E.
accords the United States the equivalent of a consent right, the provision does not explicitly stipulate whether the U.S.
or the other party is responsible for making the determina-tion whether an " appropriate" Agreement for Cooperation exists.
(This is.more than a pro forma finding that an agreement exists,.since the word appropriate" conveys the intent that the contemplated transfer is fully within the 3"
scope of the. agreement.)
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However, it should be noted that the only way in which special nuclear material covered by Article VIII E could become available for transfer is threa ? Japanese-reprocessing of_U.S.-supplied source or special nuclear i
material.- So long as the produced material remains in the spent fuel it is not separable from the U.S.-supplied material, which is subject to the provisions of article X(A)(3).
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Criterion (5)
"No such material-proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material will be reprocessed, and no irradiated-fuel ele-ments containing such material removed f. rom a reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such re-p::ocessing or alteration."
Article VIII C. of the U.S. - Japan Agreement for Cooperation provides that:
"When any special nuclear material received from the United States of America re-quires reprocessing, or any irradiated fuel elements containing fuel material received from the United States of America are to be removed from a reactor and are to be altered in form or content, such reprocessing or alter-ation may be performed in Japanese facilities upon a joint determination of the Parties that the provisions of Article XI may be effectively applied, or in such other facilities as may be mutually agreed."
As no joint determination under Article VIII C. can be made without the agreement of the United States, and since the facilities to be used must be acceptable to the U.S.
as one of the Parties, it is the Executive Branch view that criterion (5) is met.
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y B.
Section 128 Criterion Section 3 28 a. (1) of the Atomic Energy Act establishes the following additional criterion:
"As a condition of continued United States export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such export shall be made unless IAEA safe-guards are m ',tained with respect to all peaceful nu-clear activ (n, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under ti.
.rol of such state at the time of the ex-port."
r As a Party to the NPT, Japan has accepted IAEA safe-guards cn all its nuclear activities thereby satisfying this criterion.
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E Criterion (6)
"No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be ex-ported unless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such exported sensitive nuclear technology."
The proposed export does not involve the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology.
Criterion (6) is, therefore, not applicable.
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Additional Factors A.
Safeguards Implementation The IAEA Secretariat has noted in its Special Safe-guards Implementation Report that with regard to nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards, while some deficiencies exist in the system, no diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material was detected in any of the 45 states in which inspections were carried out.
Although recognizing the need to correct existing deficiencies in safeguards im-plementation, the Executive Branch has no reason to believe that the IAEA Secretariat's rerort is not valid.
In the light of this and other factors associated with the proposed export, the Executive Branch believes the framework of com-mitments, assurances, and safeguards is adequate for the purpose of this export.
B.
Special-Non-Proliferation and Other Foreign Policy Considerations The Japanese request is for 4.747 kilograms of 'J-235, under the 5 kilogram limit, and therefore, a technical and economic jutification is not deemed necessary.
Moreo er, the application was filed on Augt.1st 17, 1977, substantially prior to the November 30, 1977, implementation by the Executive Branch of the requirement inter alla for an economic and technical justification for all export license applications for HEU received after that date.
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Inimicality Judgment Based on review of the proposed export, i t is the judgment of the. Executive Branch that the proposed export will not'be inimical to the common defense and security, and-that the license should be issued.
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