ML20147E017

Transcript of Hearing at Tulsa,Ok on 781212.re Subj Facil Pp 7286-7389

ML20147E017
Person / Time
Site:	Black Fox
Issue date:	12/12/1978
From:	Purdom P, Shon F, Wolfe S Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:
References
NUDOCS 7812200324
Download: ML20147E017 (103)

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m e-S!"LIC DCCU'ICC ECOM r

NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION

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(202)347 3700 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.

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NAT!ONWIDE COVERACE DAILY

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16 reconvened, nursuant to adjournnant, at 0 : "1.1 a.m.

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DEFORT-t 10l SIIELDO;T C.

5.'O Li'P, ESn., Chairman.

Atomic Safety & Licensinr7 Board.

19 DR. PAUL U. PURDnf t, " ember.

20 FPIOCRICE J.

SUO:i, 'ienber.

21 l APPE72AIICES :

22 For the Anolicant:

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i For the Intervencrs:

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2 CHAIR!W1 WOLFE:

The hearing is resumed.

3 Mr. Thadani, would you tahs the stand.

4 Whereupon, 5

ASHOK THADANI 6

was called as a witness, and having been previously duly 7

sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

8 MR. CALLO:

Does the board wish to take up

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preliminary matters?

10 CHAIPJD.N WOL7E:

All right.

Good.

Il MR. GALLO:

I have prepared a piece of paper 12 that will, hopefully, identify all of the issues.

I have 13 just handed it out to the parties, and I don't know if la they concur or not.

15 (Pause.)

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16 to the board by Mr. Callo, we would appreciate hearing 10 are the remaining board questions and/or contentions or issues remaining to be -- be heard.

If possible, before we adjourn today, I would s

like to hear --

22 MR. FARRIS:

I can tell vcu right now, 23

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l Mr. Chairman.

24 CHAIR.9.?1 WOLFE:

All right.

25 MR. FARRIS:

Me don ' t have any probl.cm with this.

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'I david 2 I {Pl _Ar2 I would lika tc add undar intervenors inam 3

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fossible surrebuttal on board questien 10-4.

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" d,I And Mr. Chairman, we don't int:nd to have

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1 4 q any rebuttal on any other ic2ues other than 7, 3, and - 9, L

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or board questien 10-4 that have already gone bofore uc; II 6h an ADiS or any of the r:maining issues that remain 'co ba 1

7 eJ litigated, we would recerve the right to file rabT:tal.

a 9N We agree that this is a fair :tatement of tha 4h 91 remaining issues and board questicas.

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M. Davis?

D 11 0 MR. DAVIS:

This icoks fine with us.,

Wo may have

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one small mattar-of scme more information en intergranular B

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stress corrosion cracking, but we are not sura about u

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that.

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3d I do want to:mke it clear, howcVer, that uhilo t

p 16 we don't anticipate filina any rebuttal at thic tima t

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7 I we would keep cur options open on 2ny rebuttal ma: tar 3.

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ri: !j MR. GALLO:

Mr. Chilirman, the applicants maka It i

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q f the same reservation as Mr. Farris and.it. Davis on d

X3 the question of rebuttal.

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CHAIZIAN WOL7E:

When we return.tc cur office, 9

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e...,i, discoverv and troduce dccuments, and of. course, cur discussion does not take into r.ccount what additional

• .a ij issues and/cr -- net additional issuec, but what will be g.a.

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I david 3 involved, and so if the.bcard should determine to deny General Electric's motion to quash, this will involve,

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3 I guess, a rethinking of both the matters or evidence t

4 to be educed and the additional-time that will be needed 5

to hear these matters.

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But this can't be resolved at this point, so-7 we won't go into it.

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All right, there was' a.second request with 9

regard to whether the parties had any objections to our

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20 taking official notice of various staff isstances..

i 11 Have the parties. tanded to that as yet?

12 MR. DAVIS:

The staff has no objections.

l 13 MR. PARRIS:

Inter 7enors have no objections.

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14 MR. GALLO:

Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, 1

1 15 we are talking about both task action plans, branch technical l 16 positions, and also regulatory guides, I guess both i

17 draft and ones that are in effect.

13 j Is that correct as to the latter point?

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CHAIRMAN WOLFE:

That's correct, Mr. Gallo.

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20 MR. GALLO:

I would also as to those items, if f

i 21 I understand thepurpose of official notice, it is that 22 the board would take official notice that those l

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23 documents speak for themselves as to what the staff e4 !

position is as contained in the varicus docume.nts thac l

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On that basis, with tha undarstanding, wa ;c7 2 a;

no objection to the board taking official notice of those ti documents.

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a of official notice include any certinan': I:22 s;;andard2.

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CHAIRMAN WOLFE:

Is there any objacticn?

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MR. 7ARRIS:

Not from the interstenors, but 1

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we thought that the board was going to include ui:hin the n,

f embit of its notice also the standard review plana.

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of course indicated in our motion about the River Card

~g decision that the staff's review was inadecuata in s =2 i

areas, and we think it is important to cur point : hat 1

14 standard review plans be censidered in connection with W

that consideration under the River Band decision.

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The staff has no cbjection to the d

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notice on the standard review plan.

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CHAITIAM WOL73:

Included then, th 3 ambit of L

cur official notice will be the I223 rcquirements and 2 5,'.

standard review plans.

All right.

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cross-examination of .r. '"hadani.

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Are you familiar oirh the TX.I Tul; ' ~ 3 a ud.v ?

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IIcw many transienza wre 1.'.or ti'iad in the 7".I I

s Gi July '78 study?

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I chink Sno avarage is on d a crder cf j

0 12 10 per reactor year.

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And hett man" wera identifad the could hc"3 i

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Cur assessment is that aanrc::inatel r 75 w rcant i

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And how many tra..sients with alanificant i

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I ccmprehensive than thcsa done by the "T.C f:alf?

.l I

2 A

Again, is this on transian: Tregu ncy?

i 3l 0

Nc, I don't helieve he :.inited 112 acuc.y iusc l

t 4

to transient frequency, but the entire ATUS prohia.m, includino i

5 frecuency and reliaM 1 icy of scr m.

t t

6

1R. GALLO

Objection.

'M hcve thi tr~.nscri't I',

7 frem the previcus day.

If fir. varris does.'t hava it, I 1

3 will be clad tc land him nine.

You csn peint to the s ea enenif 9

by tr. ?clier and use that as a predicate Mr na nuestien.

i i

I withdrav ' 'ac aue s tion.

10 !

IIR. FARRIS:

c i

11 DY 'IR. FARRIS:

12 0

Do you have dr. Fuller's ta.ctinony uich you,

?tr. Thadani?

13 ;

14 A

I believe I do.

l i.

t 15 !

O ibuld you turn to page 1 Of that testimony, I

1G i please.

3 i

17 Page J,

the second sentence, R ich : ends:

i 13l "Regarding the reliability c2 2he IG :icram jg system, the General Electric position is based on results 20 of a ecmprehensive study perforred by the General Electric t

i l

.e t Ccmpany.'

i

)

viere you here when Tir. Fuller tastified thst in l

22 his opinion -this study was nore ecmprehensive and tr. ore i

23 ;

s t

j 3

thercugh than the Strif study?

i i

4 A

I believe my recollection is tna: Mr. uller di(.

25 I

i i

e 1

4 r

w

.-.s

-w-

I a r g, u

t indicate tnat the GE stud ' was ccmraimac.ve, and ':e 2 7 I

1

.v, f's ' S.. 3. '*. j. c. =.

-.U.'.*

.m-

., a..n.. = u c,.i s.

i'. 2 a*

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4 *a.. a g _i 4

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9 i

uo

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, i

. e A

Yes.

s

.i n.

Do veu ac m..

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t A

.The GE cuali,.ative review of the scram system,

. l l

the BWR shutdown system, I think is very cxcellant.

It is

/

I very thorough.

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.t Electric in nssessing ceram syst en u.::eli'.hiliev 2.a the 22 4

4 i

co-called square rect -edod which w.c -3valoned for tha

't 1

first time, to my knowledge, in the reaccor nafaty s udy i

n

$1

~

.I 1

%SU 1400.

v.

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it a,ces non rersect cerracery :na i

cecaase, in our view,

,..3

4. 4

. o.,~.. > n.. 4. e..'. " <... - -

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1. . 3.4. _' _* m.,

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no.. ac 'u' v. '.'...-.d" cec ^ e w'b a n.-". a ' '. a..,~. s d

'.'..s-'.

.' - d = a.

>.0.

.g tv systems, as a result of cennon mode. failurec.

t

, c,.

Although the failures are not complete, thev i,

,n 1'

. tv i

are only partial, but I think thov are indicatcrc of what l

i could Sancen, The methodology is arbi:.rarv.

There is nc s

9 W:.., #.

"s..

'. b.. r e 4.=..e i

.> u,.4 3 n. 1.a _:,,. 3, a ' c

1. . o

• v'. s -..e e.he d,

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.,. ;r e.a a

-, t a

basis for that methed at all, p.1 end 2 4

40 t

f

s

.~. -

4 l

m. _e g

+

I i

tape 3 l

We have criticized the mcchedology ia diUR2C 0450 i

and a recent review of the reactor.- saf ety s':udy by tha

-i 2

david 1 3'

Lewis Committee came to uhe same concluabn on the k

square root method.

1 1

Mr. Thadani, could you give xe an e:c. tris cf O

6l

'.i the square root method and tha probability analysis?.

]

t 7

A YEs, I can.

1 3

The model is surprisingly simple.

It starts l

i

l

[I with looking at data failures and these cou]d be i

l 10l randem failures, and leu's take control rods as aa 0::amplo.

i

., 4 It may be that the data tells us that the j

d' j!

12 probability cf any one rod failing to insort en demand is

-4 13 i 10 The question is:

what is the possibility of a i

i M

multiple number of rods failing to insert on demand?

i 6

13 Well, the e::perience is limited.

.Th3 reactor i

6 t

t.

l.

16 '

safety study concluded that on the order of 1 parcent of 17 Il failures are due to common modas, so they 4'*

- k a '-

t

-6 6

1 18 10 probability of 10 of a red failing to insert on 10 demand was appropriate when one is 1 coking at common i

20 mode failures.

l 4

i i

21 1 Well, their definition of failure to SCRM1 was i

il i

i 20 three adjacent redo, so now how do wo estimata the

)

i 23y failure probability of thr2e adjacent roac?

6 The methed uced was as follows:

single reds j

.u.,

l failing to insert as a result of some common mcde was i

yo 1

I l'

4 e4 g

I-

-y y

,p.,

,,....,,,e,,,,.nw ww,,,n_.myn-w-.-_,m w.y m. r c,

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,,-e.r,-3,,-

a f

d P.

.,n9

-6 david 2 16 10

for three rods, they icoked.at the independent l

2i failura rates.

_4

_g 3

One red was 10 Two would be 10 Three

-12

-6 4

would be 10 Now, they have 10

, which is

-12 5

presumably due to some common mods.

10 is teually 3,

independent failures, and they assume that there is 7

some coupling.

h The coupling was the equare rect cethed.

They 3

-6

-12

- 1, multiplied 10 by 10

, tcok the equare rcot of that 2

9 quantity which was 10 Then.they locked 2: tha 10 i

1,.

,l combinations, ways thras adjacent rods could fail, and 1.,. I I believe that is several thousand ecmbinations cut of i

185 control rods in the core.

13,i t

And they estimata for SCRAM system reliabill:7 g,

o was I believe, approximatelv 10

difference brm/aen 3...

l to..l their estimate and curs, I think, is abouu a facter of 2, II

.., ]

so our dif.ficultias wers not with the estimata of the o t g

i.

,..,j.

SCPM1 syst3m unreliability, but rather with the 11 4

methodology.

19 11 n

I But General Electric took that method and

.,0 I

1 a

't

j extended it.

They said, well, our' failure to SC32Jt

,,.,i l

,,h definition is five adjacent reds failing, so new my f

-4 independent contribution is 10 raised to 5 times, n~

.l

-20 l'

,U which would give me 10

'I

-20

-5

I Now, certainly, 10 multiplied by 10 and 4

1-

-1

4

~..

i i

7300 t

-13 I

david 3 I

the square root is abcut 10 and then I forget.

There 2

are several thousand combinations.

3 But let's say, I think GE came up with a

-7

~3 4

number which is on the order of 10 or 10 The i

5 arbitrariness of the method, I think, is pretty cbvious.

6 If I take a -- suppose I say my failure to 7

SCRAM definition is 10 reds failing to insert.

Th '. s

-20 8

method would yield an answer on the order of 10 I

i 9

doubt very. seriously anycne believes these estimates.

l 10 MR. SHCN:

Mr. Thadani, as I understand your I

11 description, one simply takes an astimated or sort 12 of guessed probability for a common mode failure.

One i

13 takes the calculated probability from an estimated 14 simultaneous, independent failure, and then simply a:: tracts 15 the geometric mean.

i 10 THE WITNESS:

That is correct.

That gives you l

37 any three adjacent rods failing to insert, and then you 18 take into account various combinations.

gg MR. SHON:

And you take the geometric mean?

20 THE WITNESS:

That is correct.

21 MR. SHON:

I must admit, I don't see why.

I 22 THE WITNESS:

I don ' t ei ther.

I haven't yet

{

l i

l 13 met anyone who believes that is an appropriata methed. I g4 l might a2arify my last statement.

I I

I 25 Several peopic have used the methodology and l

extended the methodology.

General Electric is not the 3

t I

i I

J

,t I,,

1.J ).L t

I 1

david 4 only one.

The Electric l'cwar Institute ha.1 also used

,l

1. 1j the methodology, but I den't think that I havo-heerd ii 3h either GE or EPRI provide justification for why that-

. '4l

^* !!

method is correct.

i q

-J.

• Rather, I think the ctatements generclly hav:

b d

?

been, it has been used in the safoty study.

70'I BY MR. 7ARRIS:

b 11 5

9 ji 0

Mr. Thadani, you said that you didn't think

-20 g ;'

anyone really would believe : probability of 10 4

t u ',

because it is juct -- well, why?

,b A

Well, I would be very careful.

I don't believe

2.,

those numbers.

It is beyond my perception.- It is not 20

3 y clear to me what it means to say 10 I rather suspect a probability of losing-gravity might be acmething l

higher than that.

3 t

$3]

Q Can you identify in your cwn mind then a-1 g j probability that beccmas meaningful to ycur an uppe=cce 1

l gg j bound or icwest probability?

i

-3 3

i il

o. _ a, A

I think clearly numbers like 10 and 10 l

,i

-4 20 ;

10 are things that we have enperienced, and they are j

g, meaningful, I think.

l

.'l 22 {i When you get further away, further and further

-4 g[

away frcm 10

, the uncertainties increasa.

(

e 4, y-In the nuclear industry, I thini entending much E

6

-1 f

o

,y beyond 10

, 10 estimaces would have extremely high

.. u 4

il 1

4 1

4 4

44 r

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l I

l 7302 I i

1

'davida uncertaintias, I think.

}

1-O Ware you hare yesterdaywhen.'4r. ?ualer a3:ifiai

. that by adding redundancy to the.-- I believe thay call i

4 it the air pilot diccharge valvas, that the probability

-6

-8 "e

would -- of an ATWS would go from 10 to 10 A

YEs,.I was here.

O Doesn't that statement t.s3uma that you ars

-6 3

starting first'of all at a probability of 10

?

a't A

Yos.

i 10 '

And we disagree with that estimato.

2eyond i

Il i uhat, the modifications that Mr. hller van talking about i

i 9

would, if implemented, carefully and correctly,'would 12 l protect us from any failure in the cicctrical perticas

.i I4 of the SCRAM system.

8 and 3

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T.itigOtion frOm th?SG 6"?n".2.

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gj in terms of a meaningful ancuer.

~t is imnatorial and has

}

no probative value.

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anybody else to be able to build a machine that's orebable -- l i

2 where the probability rata is 10

, which nE has tas tif_ad 3

their scram syctem would be.

t i

MR. CALLO:

The issue here is not Mr. F rcris '

4 right to probe; it is wnether er not this ci ness 2.:culd 5

answer a question if he knows of any nachine er system in 6

the universe that can be designed to that bsais.

}

7 CIIAIRMAN UCLFE:

Cbjection sustsined.

The iuesci.*

g Igj is much.too general and spaculatire under the circun.:tancas.

Ycu might particularize.

10 t

BY MR. FARRIS:

77 G

Mr. Thadani, in your exporience sc an angineer, p-l would you expect plants of a new design and/cr utill=ing 4

L3 new systems to experience more.transiants than established g

or proven designs?

10 A

I think it is difficul-to say.

Experience -- if l

,6 ycu icok at experienca -- it is unclear.

In se'reral casas 17 newer plants have had fetter transients than ch earlier to versions; but there are still seme plants where the g

-transients frequency has been higher than the earlier j

40 9

plants' transient frequency.-

,1 c

1 So the answer isn't clearcut, based on 22 i

experience, J,

I Q

Mr. Thadani, in your experienca, do 3FF.s tend.

24 l co experience more transients than PURa?

25

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, 311.aw:,

hat l

i i

t 2

tha t was a less eff active way to g:.

Fedific' :ic.ns

.n 1

i i

34 the electrical portion alone might '-is.h c.n u ct:U'.e

,l 4

reliable system, but it is very difficult ec da.ct.a rata 3

tha that reliability has been cbtr.insa.

I u.

Q 2n your opin.,.cn, then, to 1: s.n.c y.ecc c: :::.cul.t i 1

I 7

to determins with cartainty that a syster can ba.ma?.a l

l re_,inhic enough?

2 1

i 9:

A In this case, becauce e.::periance is ~ i.mt: ri, fu.

I,

-.. ~,-

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"., o. ~, -

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u-h n.,. ' "... ' u l !.

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about GE's sc-called synthetic analysis method?

4 I

t 12 l A

Yes.

i 13 '

O Do you agree with the methodolcc.+ c' than l

s 14 analysis?

l i

A IIo.

t M

Q IIhy not?

j 3 '- I A

GE uses tha sane sc.nare roo':

t. z e:r - ic" c I,s i

i I

I I

o '

described earliar and the reasons I gave for ::rf r.c". tcving i

i.

j 19 l adequate confidence in the methodology.

l to Q

Mr. Thadani, are there placea or componenta in o.1 {

the GE scram system which are common acde fo.ilure crane?

l w

A Tha electrical ones certainly are obvicus.

l i

i 23 Multiple relays, icgic cards.

We have certainly loin one I

i ccmon =cde f ailura in the sustem si:r.ilu c.:,

.u ani 2 sac us 1,

a-!

in this countrv in Gi', f.esicac, their diccharge voluna tar.ke, i

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systs: design which seem to stand to as heina more prone

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the plant was shut down and cli c the :als > ve: a 4

5 c;1anged, and the ne'.s

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6 process had been inccm?lat3 se that durir.~ oparr,u:.on 4:'..e

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7j cera was chuu tight so cht.S even 12 th.a ecrsn sig:n1 had.

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3 1, ccen generated, u.ne recays would n.aw r1.1 a..

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Is it.Pocsibia,. MR. 2had:ni uhan :c.iJ s

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b dsvid 1

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type of failure :culd prevent n 3C u l?

t

)

If

~y A

Y?,s, indeed.

a.

i

,* (

0 Whc manufactured tha raldys in the IE plant?

i JI

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g., e.

y s..h...!.., ;. _-

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1-a nm,w

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1. 1 tima quita a long time ago -- I cannot reccl.'.dc'.

c

-ti 1

Q Mr. Thadeni, in 'rcur en. inion, 10 Ganral u

e

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e r.=*.,***...-*.*'.

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3 i

,I question back please?

11 51 U (The record was read as r2c"assted.)

th 14 2 "i MR. GlJ,0:

Thank you.

Mc ebjectice.

.t.

n.',. c,.., o.. ~z...,

a..

u..

m a,

Cr d v_n.h7 u. ~..7 m.

A.

a.

" ~ l, to sconh louder and pre"cct ". cur veico.

~1c nas having Ikn S g'4 some difficulty hearing you.

~

a,

^

m.E2 ',r..-'m. : S.-

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"" is.>.

-'-..'..^._;- 7.'.... 4 a

~

o_

i..

MN control system design, as it etnnds today, sca dalirar s

GU 43 callons per minuts when actuated.

1

.D '!j The actuation is manual.

It is ny undarctanding t

I l

p, 21 ]I that even if the cystem is actuat2d at 10 minu:ss, 43

't 12 y gallons per minuta of standby lip id control syste.n would I

1

47. e.' d

• • .c ~'y t-S.. ' e, n"~3" e..~- _.,.N..1

_4 v...'. ' '.#. o'n t-s

- ~ i.a., s.o b.

4

~.

1

.A typa ATWS avents.

J t

A.* r.a. 4.c t.

44 A.%.. c3

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7

'. g p.%.~%*'.eC.A SC,.R,-

y/ e r1 maj

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L

}'

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t I

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.~.v,-,v.~,-,~w.-,w.,-,

,r

.--a,n.-v

.--,er-ann.,.<------.-

y y

,I 11 7-*t 4

david 2 system is not actuated for a longer time paried.

o

~

To get a perspective on the standby liquid O

d control system, it is important to rec 0gnica itat is 4l l

involved.

If an ATUS event vore to occur, a 1 crc number of annunciators would go.

The operator f.? gcing G

to be under'high stress environment.

7 He would proba4r try to taanually SCM:1 fia

.* I a s.

i reactor.

If he f ad is, I think he vculd try to incart *ca i

1 9 ll rods.

0 Manual insertion of reds takes an cufully J.o aa

'I time.

At this time he may be faced uith a dociaicn:

4

{

should ha actuate standby liquid cont:01 system, and in order to get the key to turn en tho syst ra, at 10ncu on

'4f d

one plant, he has to go through three accesa decra,

5 d y

He has to got his badge cut or a card cut and t0 L

go through each door, see the shift aupervicer, g:t the il mt i

key, come back through'the these same three dec c, anc w'

actuate the system, racognining that actuation of 10 this system might well result in some dcantir.e for

~o 3

that plant and hence an economic penalty.

~;

o I personally have difficulties having 1

-4 significant confidence that the operator would actuato

~

4 An'" li that system fairly early in the event of an A!WS avant.

24

'In addition to that, I don't believa that tha oc ;

p 13 gallons per minute system is adoc;ucts to mitigate

~

i

i 4

h

- _1

a...

l}

' i[

ATWS consequences.

david 3

,^'

3Y MR. FA2RIS:

4 If the ty? ng cystems wara changsd cuch that

., }..

Q i

4

. i..

the standby liquid control syst m had the cap city ed i,

I 5h t*<tice the procent capacity, or in other werda, 86 a

l i

dt gallons per minute, vo'id that chango ycur ancwcr?

E, 70 A

I have been told bv General 21sctric recantiv

~~

i I

O.

I have not seen the analv. acs -- that if 3.! Tallen;.u.:

i, l.

9..'

minuta of tho standby liquid centrol syst:m, el da

~

10di redium pentaborato colution, are incert:d at li r.4.c.utaa.

0 1i L, and no additional failuroc are assumed,.the a:I'*TS acceptance criteria -- whan I say "acceptanco crinaria,'

9 L th 13 :j I am talhing a'cout acceptance limits, prcasure.:,

'1 tamparatures, lovels, at cotara, wculd be canisfiad,

)) ;i Thev mav. not n:coscaril'4r caticiv s*'stras

'i 13 il critaria in terms of the reliability and availabiliuy

i I-of thace systems, but ': hat. if cna accepts all systna,

'l whatever their reliabilities, then I am told by Gancral 15 9..

i h

is li Electric that the acceptance limits will not be N

ii

c [

violated.

y i, Q

Have you reviewed the analy is that G2 has i

.2 '!

prcvidad you in that regard?

I t

rj A

No, I have not ~ ceen any GO analyses in that "i

i

n.,i r2 gard.

The last GE anal'rsis acct *.med aut:matic 4

~

.m actuation of standby liquid control system at sav:n

',h

)

.i

^

i a.. -

I I..

3 4

p david 4

l seconda follouine. the initiation of an AC

fs event.

1 2,

With Sct automatic ::ystem: AIG3.vnnto 3.iu 11 would satir4r the limits.

Ecwovsr, if you scar;.e nny 4i additienc1 aingle failuras, then it d a nacasac *" to

?

a5

.2 9

not only cutcmata the cyctem but to upg cd2 its 4 :

d,.

rata so thr.t it in itself can also act as a high prossare 9

makeup system.

2 y Q

Mr. Thadeni, in ycur cpinion., Jhould '.:he n e i

staadby licuid control cyctem he safatv arnda?

a U

A I think tha inductry ought fs have an option.

i i]

i Ib is =y view that we could giva the.m semo 22cnibio critoria H

I.

);

ti which chey ccn une to have anv. effective dasign cf a

1. 1 p

j If

/

system.

,l In the.> cat we here ah'ava rm-2 ired s.t.'stams to

,2 ba safety grade, that is, to satisfy sema anisting

n. W standards.

It la my view that we hava sullisient t

,1

]

experience to leck at cvs.ilabilitiac of various systems.

.2 a ti The experience gives us sufficient confidanca

.,1 1O J%

that we can estimato on availabilitias on the order of

)

~*

,a v;

H 10 as long as we are not talking ahcut valtas much a

gg cI lower than that.

I think the option zhould be givan to 8 4

.a u the industry to either design a ayatan in accordanca with

'i,

.1 l

lc standards or decign ayatems which antisfy rema minimum

~~

t, critaria that you sat up, but basically which are based t

.m 1

M cn rsliabil2.ty assecsments,

~~~

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would tile r.:tille health and Safety be enhanced by f.o 4

rec.uirement that nuclear powsr n.innts in u. nr :icul.'.

E B1ack I'o:t station, hava an cutccatic Scron inj?.ct.icn

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,, !,l boron.3ystan, the plant will ba ander.

l, O

!3 i!: ycur view that cn autonc::ic bcron j

injaction systar. is cuperior to tha procent stendhy 14,

1 1

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por minuta?

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723, that is my view.

s end 3 l

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0 Would you turn to tabla D.37 david 1 2

A Appendi:: 16?

I4R. GALLO:

Could we ha.c the page nur.ber 3

4 again?

IAR. FARRIS:

Table D.S on Roman numeral T/I --

5 Arabic number 62.

6 t

i DY MR. FARRIS:

7 Q

Have you located the table?

3 A

Yes, I have.

g Q

Would you tell me, Mr. '2hadani, uhat is tha --

g yl what is table D.8 intended to shou?

l A

Table D.8 ic a summary of event trees that j

12 we developed for BWR/ATWS events; that is, it is indicated -- it is designed to show what an ATUS by itcelf could result in, and it goes one stop further.

It icoks i

1 u, l

at various systems that are needed to mitigate the i

1G consecuences of ATWS evento.

l 17 And if one or more of those systems were to 10 fail, what the consequences might be.

Q And at the bottom of the table, sub (a), (b),

(c), and (d) indicate the addition of different systems?

21 l

A Yes.

These -- our ovaluations were based on 22 analyses performed by General Electric in responco to cur

{

23 l

cuestionc.

Subnotes (a), (b), (c), (d) indicate

{

24

i the fc11owing:

if only a recirculation pump trip were

+

25 i

r h

J 7320 ', '

't q

-h devid2 i h!

installed in a hoiling water reactor, column en3 chcws tha II i

crchabilitiac sud the conaccuences of AD.'3 aven':s in P. b

~

n 3

those elants.

i

[

a 1

Colt:mn B --

a.

5 E.,

'O Could I stop ycu for juct a.r.inute.

Me will-1 1

3 come back to D.

r 7-}

In referring to the table itself, under i'

3 'i the colunn entitled "Gequencs T prima, C prime,"what.

t a

f does that mean?

1 10l A

It means an AOiS event that is an anticipated-i.l i

!! I transient which is T primo.

.2l C prime in f ailure to SCPJdl.

It is an AC'iS 1

!3 i event that is proposed.

II:.

y" Q

And under the column anti:12d, "Prason:

1 e

1 Design," with sub- (a) in paron raised abcva that, vhat does that indicate?

A That indicatas the preacnt Soiling water reactor designs, including an A513 recirculation pc:p l

m,

~

l trip.

j 1

33.I i

39l 0

And assuming an ATWS cvent, then, under sub.

I e

I (a)', prosent design, what wocid the coneccuences be?

.e. ! p I.

,m A

The consequencas would be unacceptchlo.

The t

1 scenario would precaed along the lines that I doccribed

~

earlier; that is, even though racirc21ation pump trip

,,., y 1

would rsduce pcuer icvals to scamshcro in the neighborhoed y

n of 35 percent, you would still need ce get sem poisen 6

-,. ~,. _. -. - - -, -, - -... _ _.,,,.. _

-- ~ -

i-i l

1. s, e., j I

in the reactor to bring the pcuer lovel dcwn so tha t'

- david 3 1

I i

l 2

high pressure cystem and then-the. low prescura sy2 tams,

~3 once the vessel pressi;ro has gona dcun, the lov 4

pressure systems can keep t'.e cora covarad.

5 During this time safet' releacs valvas ara

'C cpaned.

They discharge stacm dirnetly to th2.supprescien t

7 pool.

g t

8, The suppression pcol tampar:turas, va believe, j

~

9l would excsed acceptance limits.

P.'huc, th-a pctantial i

1 10 for failure of centainment e::ista, which ulcimataly 11 could well result in the core uncovoring and hones t-12 l the consequences wenic be or could be quita serious.

l a

l Q

In other werda, they could. lead to cora melt?

14l A

There is that potential,

5 Q

Could it lead to the secape of radioactivity

)

into the -- offsite?

i 1

gy A

Yes, I believe ther-a vculd be acme offsite i

o i

pg [

doces.

The extent has not been analyzad simply because

- l 19 we insist that the acceptance limits not be exceeded.

l 20 0

Would the worst case censequences of an ATWS l

event be classified as a Class 9 accident?'

I.

c1 i

A I would lika some clarification on what you 22 I

[

mean by-a Class 9 accident.

i' 13 t

p.

24 j,.

Q Do you have an understanding of what 1 Class s

I 5y 9 accident is?

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l I

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A Wall, my understanding of.Clacc 9 accidente l

t i

2, ic that they are extremoly unlikely to happen and are j

i 2l therefore not included in the decign of the plant.

In il 4[

light of that, I am not sure what the question is.

i

[,

C Mould - 'is this not such an event,'this

a.,

3']

ASfS ovent that we have just been talhing about, the j.

e d

y ",

scenario you just described?

.r i

C[

A It is my interpretation, again.

'I don't think 3

so.

This event is identified in cafety evaluation

. v,,

reports.

• • t is certainly the =taff's intentien to e

consider it in the design of nuclear power plants.

tj nd O

Is the scancrio that we have juat discussed c q

g ll design basis accident?

i o

2, A

At pracent it is not a design basic cccident.

., p ATWS is not in the regulatieno.

At present the n[

plants ara not designed to satisfy Atis limita.

, !l 0

Is it ycur recenmendation that it be 30

l a9 included?

1) 4 79f A

'las.

Our reccsnendation is to recuire olant 2n modifications so as to assure that the consequences of i

ATHS events would be acceptable.

3.,

0 Under column entitled "Prasont Design," under 1

__ !j D.3, what do you nenn by dry-out as a conseqtence of an e

,]

A?G avant, assur.ing only the racirculation pump trip ji 4s installed?

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I 7323 1

david 5

.A Ultimately, the concern there is not o.

having any makeup capability to ksep the coro covered; 3

consequently because the reactor is still producing pcuer 4

and if yoa can't get any coolant in, certainly the i

5 core would be expected to dry out.

l 3

Q MR. Thadani, the same column, "?recent 7

Design," under table D.8, if you 1cck to the fcurth al sequence, T prime, C prime, ?,

could ycu <:cil me what i

L ocenario would be involved in that svent?

j 10 :l 1

A Ycc.

During an ATWS event, as I indicated 11 earlier, the vessel pressure goes up, and safaty and i

l

\\

I 12l relief valves open to relieve steam to the containment.

j 13 l I

We asked General Electric to analyce an evcnt where one j

y' i or two of these valves would fail 20 rcelese ecmpletely.

l l

t i'

1'*

I There would be steam relief to containment I*.l 4

continuously.

Because of this high energy diccharge in I

i t

i I

the containment, the temperatura limit rtquired to assure integrity of. containment veuld in all likeliheed f

I8 19 be exceeded.

So end 7 21 i

12 :

l I

I 23 i

24.

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_________________________E

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Yes, thnt is correct.

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injection system, dces it not?

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Mr. Wadani, in the prasent system cd s tenc':y

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1 A

Yes.

Testing is required and I believe it is 2

monthly testing, but I am not sure of the frecuency of 3

testing l

8 4

0 Are you familiar wi" any incidents of spuriors j

5 initiation of that system?

I i

S A

Yes.

7 0

PTnat were the consequences of that initiatien?

l 8

A The plant was in a shutdown modo, and it tock 53 3

hours to clean up.

30 ;

Q Do ycu know what the cost was to the ptility?

I 11 A

Ho, I don't knew the c::act cost, but based on our 12 understanding of costs for replacement power, we can make i

I 1,,

l some estimates.

They are significantly lower than some of the estimatus provided by General Electric.

y I

Q Based upon your data experience in svents of su spurious initiation, would you say that once averv 10 vears j

g 1

l is a fair estimate as testified to by Mr. Fuller?

I

,,s t,

i MR. GALLO:

Objection.

The question is based l

g on your data experience.

There is no evidance in this 39 record that this witness has seen any data.

He just said g

i i

g [

he didn't knew what the cost figures were.

That was one l

example that he was able to testify to The question assumes !

i

{

circumstances not in evidence, j

23 ;

i i

l MR. FARRIS:

I think, Mr. Gallo, the pre"icus 24, 6

i question wcs hcw cften had this happened.

That is spuricus l

i 4

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i I!

initiation of the presen systen.

That 7as the data I

1 2l e::periance, not the cost e::perience, I tas referring ec.

l i

2' The frecuencv of scurious initiation.

2 t

i 3!

MR. GALLO:

I don't recall that question.

All I i

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incidents.

Che answar sas yes, Coulc ha call ena.

He gave i

7!,

one.

And that was the c:: tent of his tas':imony.

3l CHAIRMAN WOLFZ:

Can we have the questien bach,

?

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BY MR. FARRIS:

Q Mr. Thadani, in your cpinion, based upon your i

e -. 4.enca, is '.ho

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j due to operator arror of uhe scandby liquid control sys+en i

!)i greater than once in every 10 years per p'.:nt?

e MR. GALLO:

Objaction.

There is nc evidence m

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...u 7g answGr that questiCn.

o

-1 1,

MR. FARRIS:

I withdraw it.

m.3 1

I h

BY MR. FARRIS:

':0 4 l8

(

'.,\\

O Mr. Thadani, are you r. rara of anv incidents of

~u 1

scurious initiation of the standhy liquid control systaa?

q

'f A

I am aware of one incif. ant.

_e_

O Co v.our knowladc.a, is :).st.na only incident of

_~..'i

'o sourious initiation that has ever sco'.rred?

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1 A

That is.my understanding.

21 O

And how many plant years of meration are thera l

3l at this point?

l l

4!

A I believa, and we are limiting ourselves to 1

e h

3' boiling water reactors, standby liquid control systems -

t I believe there are on the order of 130 to 150 reactor years g

7 of operation.

j 3f Q

Then based upon your knowledge of one a:cample of l

a. r spurious initiation of the present systam, the standby liquid}

i i.

I s

I control s*jitem, have you fo=ed an opinion about Mr. Tu11er's g;

1,.I testimony to the effect that it is predictad that spurious 12 l initiation would occur once in every 10 years per plant?

i t.

A I think there is some misunderstanding in your

'i

~>

I interpretation'of Mr. Fuller's testimony.

My understanding of his testimony is that if you au:Onate the standby liquid

.,.i.

i. 2 I

control system, then the spurious acuuation frequancy in l-

...a t

his opinion would ha appro:c3nately once in 10 years, i

t 1_.-

I don't beliave I saw cnywhere in his testimony

,_a ;

what h'e thought the frequency of inadvertant actuation of j

g standby liquid control systems by the operator is.

t Q

I stand corrected.

y...

Have you formed an cpinicn about his testi=cny j

u.

in his prediction reccrding the autcmatic boron infection en o

<j system?

I 24 '

I i

A Again I would go back and rely on our e:ccerience.

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Q Thank you, Mr. Thadani.

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CHAIRMAN UCL'.t2:

3L-. Davis, rodi-sct?

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l CHAIRMAN WOLFE:

Mc Davis?

tape 9 j

SY MR. DAVIS

• lavid 1 3

Q Mr. Thadani, you testified that if the 4

standby liquid control system were initiated within 0

seven seconds of an ATWS, Ehat thers would be no j

1 6

unacceptable consequences, and you didn't spacify, what 7

how many gailons perminute figure would be applicable 3

under those situations.

i 9

Could you Octment on that?

i 10 A

Yes.

Tha analtjsos that we have icoked at 11 indicate that if you actuate, automatically actuata 12 approximately 86 gallons per minute of codium sedium e

13 pentaborate solution very early in the ATUS event, the i

14 acceptance limits would not be violated.

i i

15; Q

In a subsequent question and answer to

{

10 Mr. Farris, you indicated the possibility of a single 1

17 failura and the fact that different criteria would 13 :

apply in that instance.

i 19 Co'uld you give us an estimation of the 20 standby liquid control system's gallons per minute pumpage 21 that would be necessary to have a single failure and 22 still mitigate any significant consequences from an ATUS?

23 A

My response to that is based on some 24 )

preliminary calculations that General Electric has performed, 25 and they indicate that if you assume an automatic system with 300 to 400 gallons per minute capability, not 6

s pI4 7520 !

l:;

].Ie i.

david 2 only would the A575 events not sneeed the ac sptance L

~

limits, but any additional single fa47" ms, if they 3i n

l were to be assumed, would still noc rcsult in e::0 ceding 41 i

I the ATiS. acceptance limits.

m

=

l 0

Is that single f:iluro the high presoure S!

core spray failure?'

i

/ '

i A

The critical single failura is the high creccuro

+

, e core spray, but thers are other singla failures, and I g

9h

?,

indicated in response to Mr. Farris's

quction, y

potential for safety relief valvos failing to reclosa.

!! L That could be considerad anothe cingle failure.

.. j But the critical one,as you pointed out, is the i

G j!

t high preszure core spray system.

..,i-

.1 Q

!!r. Farris asked you a cue 0 tion abonu tha 7J.22,

.O

\\

experience; decc the Blach 7c:: plant, ac currently 3

m1 v

d designed, will it use the sane hind of 3CF?2 logic.

(

relays as wora used at KAEL?

,., p

.., a I don t believe so.

I think tha 313ck Fon 2

I A

I

9 il i

9 design has bistables in it, but I stand no be correctad.

d i

Da 9

I am not sure.

P 1

-.u L ti, O

What do you mean by bistabla?

i i

i

~..,. o t

l A

Basically a device which would trip if you e.

H

(

0 c::cesd a certain praset value of any pararoter.

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MR. DAVIS:

I have no further c.uestiens.

v.

wJ b fi CHAIRMA;T WCLTE:

Any recross?

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david 3 MR. GALLO:

I have come questions, 2

Mr. Chairman.

m 3

RECRCSS EXA'IINATION 4

BY MR. GALLO:

l O

Mr. Thadani, with respect to this last lins G

of questions asked by Mr. Davis, I believo you made 7

reference to the KAHL situation; could you define 8

better what kind of a reactor that is and where it is s

located?

10 A

The reactor is locatad in Germany.

Its design i

11 is similar to an earlier versicn of a boiling water l

12 l

reactor.

13 O

Would thia be prior to GE's adoption of the 14 i

BWR-1 design?

15 I

A I don't kncv.

i i

1Gj O

Do you know whether or not this decign is I

a 17 '

i l

similar to a BWR-1, 2, 3, or 4?

i t

iG 8

A It is niy belief that 3NR-4s, Sc, and 63, at i

l 19 1 east those three versions, are different than the KAHL i

20 design..

i 21 Q

Do you know whether or not the KAHL reactor 22 is stillcperating?

(

23 A

It is my understanding it is operating, but l.

{

24 8 i

I don' t know.

25!

'i O

In your opinion, as I understcod i

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david 4 your testimony, that XAHL reactor had cn incidant

)

2 which involved a 2 allure to.SCEAM is that correct?

i I

3 i

A.

No.. It did not involve a failure to SCRAM; j

4 i

rather, the failure was detected before tho. system was

.a called upon.

l 4

i i

6 Q

I see.

Has there aver been - has a failure l

l 7

to SCRAM ever occurred Vithin a BU2 to your h.~.713dge?

l l

3' j

A To my kncwladge, failura to SCPri has never i

-e occurred in any clacs of boiling v ner razeter.

10 Q

Has an ATNS at/ent cccurred in any boiling 11 water reactor?

13 A

No.

13 0

Mr. Davis asked you soma questiet.t abcut the l

14 standby liquid control system.

15 As I understand your testimony, you beliete that 16 the automatic standby liquid control system is superi:r 17 to tha manual initiated' control syntsn; is that corrsct?.

1,3 A

As far.as ATWS is concerned, that is correct.

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potential impact if he wera to actuata such a system.

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Do peopla generally in tlteir jchz have very 3

difficult decisions to make from time to time, high 4

stress decisions, as you characterised them?

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'les, and sometimos they take a lot longer than s

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6 10 minutes, 7

0 Uculd you agree that it is possible that they I

8 might mice it in time?.

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Oh, certainly, I think it i.3 certainly possihie.

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yes.

11 0

Would you agree that'the scaff thamselves scmetime.i.

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12 have to make decisions in a short pericd of tima under high 13 stress?

j 14 A

Yes.

15 Q

With respect to this question of more affective 1

16 f recirculation pump trip, I believe ycu said that GE was 17l still providing you information on that question; is that correct?

18 l 19 A

Yes.-

We had a meeting with General Electric last 20 month.

At this meeting General Electric indicated that 21 the recirculation pump trip would reduce the power level

.e.,

sufficiently t. hat the cora could be covered in the short 23 term with the e::icting high precsura ecolant injection s'fstam.

The discune1.ons were in te.m. a of a ETR-4 design,

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t These discussions were primarily On 3WR-4 designs, but GE has indicated that they be.'.irre :nat aven a

for a SWR-6 design, that in the short term a recircule. tion e,

O' pump trip would ascure that the ccre ic ':ept. co rarud.

9

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!s this a mattar that you and vour Ornanization s

o intend to continua to pursue with GI?

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Yes.

He intand to base our final conclusions i

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on the most recent and correct analycas.

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Q Mr. Thadani, I want to cicar up ona question 4..,

..p on the use of the term squara root.ma.hed.

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May I have minuuo, Mr.

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Yes, the cna en page ncman numeral Tr~.--32?

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Q Yes.

That is the ona ycu ancwered --

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A Would rcu rupe.t the gnastion?

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a 11 Are you ratisfied wi':h -he data base that 12 supports the conclusions shcun in that table, or is it 13 possible that there n y Se ucre revision as a result of i

le; subsequent staff work?

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~1 of core dry-out would still remain in terms of long i

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Would this impact of the recirculation pt:mp I

4 trip -- I take it that is the same matter that in answer 5

to one of my questions you indicated an intent to i

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A That is correct.

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' conclusions in NUREG 0460.

1 MR. GALLO:

That's all I hevo,?!R. Chairman.

f 33 72 l MR. FARRIS:

Me have no further recrosa.

CHAIRMAN WOLFE:

Any re-redirect?

13 MR. DAVIS:

No re-redirect, Mr. Chairman.

g (Board conferring.)

15 DR. PURDCM:

I wanted to ask something about i

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the ccmmitment of PSO;in Mr. Zink's direct testimony j

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ou page 2, 'there is a statement there that -- that the l

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Public Service Ccmpany is committed to incorporating in jg the Black Fox station any generic resolution determined 20 I

by the NRC Commissioners; and taen in an exchanga yesterday,i

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testimony.

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3l MR. GALLO:

Yss, sir, Dr. Jurdcm.

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93 commitment as stated in Dr. Cinh's testimony ic not 10 f limited by time. The only limitation is che tima pericd 1 i 11 (- that the staff gave to establish - if they de establish - n[p a requiznent to mitigate tha effecta of an Arts o77ent. At such time that such a requirement is established, tnen 13

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commitment in a timelv. faelen. 39 pint of the two years was that that is '"h [,\\ vhat two witnesses thcucht vac a time -- :3tri%n that. e -- o .y d .w 4 time

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4 t frame, the next two vaars, the mattar would be resolved S. c..i 1 go 1 one way or the other. j i But I r ceat, thers is no time limit on 9 n i 'I i .,4 'tha ccanitment as stated bv Dr. Zink. 1. h, t e.. DR. PURCOM: Thank you, Mr. Gallo. C

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l, 7340 : I david 4 Q Mr. Thadani, in connection with the revinion 1 2 l volume three which is forthcoming, I believe you indicated 3 that you have a proposed rule or resolution of this matter _ that will be probably contained in that revision; } 5 1 do you know whether or not it.han any impicmantation j ,u recommandations that -- 7 The point I am getting at is as to whether i j G j the design, the proposed implementation wculd apply to a O plant in the stage that~ Black 70x is in. 10 j i A Yes, sir. The next voluma three of NUREG 0460 i 11 l would include an implementation plan, and the plan would 12 cover the Black Fox station. 13 O Thank you. l 14 I DR. PUROCM: That's all the questions I have. 15 i 1 1 end 11 l 16 j i 17 l { l i j l 13 ', i 19 20 21 j 22 23 l i 2a - t 1 25 i i i I i, 1

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~a. 64d*4.* +. " c. m..., s.. m .I b l uould such injection he initiated? I The plan right new is to assure that ac.a.cds t 7l A 3! have not scrammed and at the cums time to 1cok at the 7c~.mr 1 i. 4 e. wo.e, y. z.r, e,r. . o. _4g.n.,.:,,, .4 ~.~m_- : ...._s. e 2.o 1 ey,1. o .e,v m ., a. .2 co:i.nc1.d ant. Q Betueen rod position and p war level?

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i M; A That is my mer.ory. I think that is the propocm I i I

3 I actuation or initiation signals.

Thera may be e.a en power

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t ( I That is based on my e:.:perience of leching at 19l A i 1 i f e 20 > safety systems. 4 1 i MR. SHCli: That's all I hava. ':' hank ycu. l It MR. GALLO: !!o questions. 22, 4 MR. ?JJL".IS : ?!c m:astions. .23 l 1

t.3 ;j MR. DAVIS

"o nuestien'3 frcm the Staff. i. 2.3 ? C*iAIFRAN WOL7E: All right. Th2 witness is ) I l l l' ?.

~ . _. _ _. _ _. - ~ 7342 ar2'- I excused. 2 (Mitness a::cuced.) 3 CHAIR!tMi WOLFE: One quution: 4 What is the status of the^ Applicant.3' exhibits, 5 34 and'35? 6 ' MR. GALI,0 : I would now like to move them into 7 evidence again, Mr. Chairman. 8 MR. DAVIS: We have no. objection. 9 MR. FAF.RIS: We have no objection. 10 CHAIRMAN WOLFE: T.11 right.. Applicants ' 2::hibits 11 34 and 35 are admd.tted into evidence. 12 (The decrr.ents previously ' narked 13 Appliennts' Exhibits 34 and 35 14 for identification, were received 15 in evidence.) 10 MR. CALLO: Off the record. 17 (Discussion off the record.) j t 10 (Pause.) 19 CHAIRMAN WOLFE: Mr. Farris, call your witness. 20 MR. FARRIS: Intervenors would like to call 21 Mr. Gragory C. Minor to the stand. 22 Whereupon, GREGOKY C. MIMOR 23 j. was recalled as a witness by and on behalf of Intarvencrs 24 and, having been previously duly sworn, was examined and 25 -) testified further as follows: I . _.-_~. _.. _.. _. _ _ _..,.-.. _.. _ _ _.. _._.. _.... _.. _. -. _ _ _. _ _ _. _.... _

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'7344-ara 1 A Yes, there ar? a fau. 2. On page 2, at -he bottom of the page., tha third 3 line up, the word " likelihood"' Mas a transpesinion cf i 4 letters. 1 i 5 On page 3, in the middle of the pago, cha words a 6 " mitigate" and "consequenced" should be " consequences".- 7 "The consequences." l 8 And in-keeping wi h our discussion cf last' I week, I would, on the last paga, page 9, after iTUS j g i problam, put a perica, and delete the last statement thera, { g "As consistent with the fiRC position with MUREG Cd60," would - 33 be deleted. 12 0 ^** "Y *

• "9**'

13 modifications that ycu would like to make to your tactimony? 34 1 A No, I believe that's all. g O Is your testimony true and correct, to une bac t , o, of vour knowled'e? s A To the best of my :tnowledge, yes, sir. g O Mr. Minor, have you previcusly filed with the t Board a statement of your qualifications in response to the Applicants' and Staff's motion for summary disposition? l A Yes. 22 i i O And as part of your prafiled testimony here, l 23 i have ycu given'a summary of those qualifientions? l-1 A That's correct. l 25' l I, r 1 i<h J. . -..,,.,,..,..., -. - - -.,. - -, - ~,.,.. -.,.,,....,. - - - -~c

t. t 4 l .,*4..a ard <a 1 MR. 7ARRIS: At -hia cinc, Mr. Chai =an, I + o. would mcVe~the adziasien of Mr. ?!inor'c testimony into j 3 i evidence, and I givs tha recerter 20 copien of Mr. Minor's a testimony for *, hat ourpose, and as% chat it be beund into t t' 5 i the record as if read. i 8 1 6 CHAIRM:UI WOLFE: Any objectione? f 7 !!R. DAVIS: No objecticn 3rca the Ghaff. 8 CHAI'dGM 7lOLFE: Absent cbjection, said testimony I will be incorporated into the reccru cc if road. I 4.T t i (The document follettc :) I o iJ SD em 13 14 4 + s l v.4 e i i t

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l kJNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD TESTIMONY OF GREGORY C. MINOR On Behalf Of CITIZENS ACTION FOR' SAFE ENERGY (CASE) Regarding i CONTENTION ~65 ANTICIFATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT' SCRAM (~ATWS) In The Matter of BLACK FOX STATION, UNITS 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN-50-556, 50-557 SEPTEMBER 25, 1978 i I. INTRODUCTION l My name is Gregory C. Minor. I am a partner in MHB l Technical Associates, a consulting firm located in Palo Alto, California. My educational background is in electrical engi-neering (B.S., University of California at Berkeley, 1960, M.S., Stanford University, 1966). In addition, I participated in General Electric's 3-year Advanced Course in Engineering, gradua-ting in 1963. A full description of my experience and background was given to the ASLB as an attachment to the July 31, 1978 affidavit by MHB in response to the Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition. 65-1

f e6 ~ During the period between 1960 and 1976, I was employed I by General Electric Company in. engineering and management posi-l ' tions' involving the design of components and systems, primarily for.the GE Boiling Water Reactors. These systems included i reactor control and' safety systems.- Between 1972 and 1976, I 1 ~ was Manager of Advanced Control-and. Instrumentation Engineering;. responsible for designs of new safety and control systems whose-first application will be on BWR-6 plants-such as Black Fox Station. I am presently a consulting engineer with~MHB Technical j Associates, consulting on nuclear power issues for'public r.3 private organiztions at a state, national, and international ~ level. I am also a member of the Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee for the Instrument Society of America. II. STATEMENT OF CONTENTION _ The Board has admitted an Intervenor's contention with regard to the ATWS probl'em. It was stated in the. Board's third Prehearing Conference Order as follows: The analyses by the Applicant and the Staff of the facilities' response to certain anticipated transients with simultaneous failure of the scram system (ATWS) have underestimated both.the consequences of such events and their.lieklihood, to such an extent that the~ facilities present an undue hazard to the health and safety of the public. , 2 -, -,. -. s. ewr..w- -,~,,w.,- ,-.r--.,-., .4.,wv, w. r.ww .-m.we--c..-,-.n-w.-~,~w, c.yy-,...-. .w.we,,,w-.,......e.%.., ,,e. mew +--,,w er,.r q ~-- -, - - .-r--

Since it has not_been challenged for Summary Disposition, it remains in its present form for this hearing. I III. DISCUSSION OF ISSUES. I i 3.1:

Background

1 A consultant to the ACRS in 1969 questioned what happens ] if the reactor fails to scram when it needs to. I'm sure he had no idea of the long-term impact of that'important question. i WASH-1270, in 1973, concluded'that as more reactors are built and operating, safety improvements will need to be imple-mented to reduce the probability / year of an ATWS event and/or mitigate the consequenced. During the years following the setting of WASH-1270 guidelines, the industry-has been concerned about ATWS and what to do about it. I, roo, have observed and participated in the growing discussion about ATWS in my job with General Electric and since then as well. When WASH-1400 was published (1975) and showed ATWS as one . of the primary causes of accidents--particularly in BWR's(1), they assumed 10 transients per year and an ATWS probability of about 10-5/ reactor year for BWR's, less for a PWR, It also showed the possible devastating effects of an accident of this type that 'could result from an ATWS sequence. (1) WASH-1400, Appendix I, Figure'4-11, 4-12 65-3

- =. = The recentlyfissued NRC report.on ATWS(2) has further refined the numbers to an average of 6 transients per year (8 for a BWR) and 3x10-5/ demand for a failure to scram,for an.ATWS probability of 2x10-4/ reactor-year (3) (producing significant con-sequences). They set an obj ective of 10'0/Rx-yr as an upper limit of probability of an.ATWS event. 3.2: Issues Related to Transients 'There are several factors which will make Black Fox likely to experience more transients than other plants. Statistica'lly, as shown in NUREG-0460(4), plants of new design experience more transients than older designs. Since Black Fox has many new systems, they are likely to fall into'this category. It seems to also be the case that BIGl's experience more transients than PWR's.(5) This frequency for BWR's is quoted in NUREG-0460 as 8/Rx-yr vs the average of 6/Rx-yr for all reactors. 3.3: Scram Failure Probability The GE design has a new safety system to initiate a scram-signal and a new rod control and information system to monitor the rods and move them during normal operation. These factors may reduce (2) Anticipated Transients Without Scram For Light-Water Reactors, NUREG-0460, April 1978. (3)

Ibid, page 29.

(4) Ibid, Vol 1, page 12. (5) Ibid, p.;e 13. l 65-4 !m.m s n ,4.,., e -,,c_,---,,,4. ~..,, ,--c,s- ,-s-.% -.m,.s.yn.m..co., .v-e ...w.%,,v.c-ry...,,,,-me, ,p. ,,e.-yr, wye ...,,m,-,._w,,,c,,,.- c,y,.ny-gy, g y,

the probability of a failure to scram. GE's calculation of scram failure probability is listed as " proprietary" but generally, BWR's are better than PWR's here.(6) One bounding value is given as "less -6/Ex life"(7) (or 2 x 10~7/Rx-yr assuming a 40-year life) than 8 x 10 as the probability of PGCC preventing a reactor scram. However,'the control rods and drives are basically the same ones GE has used for 15 years. They have redundancy but no diversity. They are clustered an'd rely on bank actuation of group of rods for scram. These factors make them subject to common mode failures both inside the reactor (the control. rods) and outside (the rod drives). Considering the new safety system design, the rod and rod drive failure probabilities undoubtedly dominate the failure to scram probability. 3.4: Black Fox Design Factors Mitigating an ATWS Event The Black Fox design has only one system for Standby Liquid Control (SLC) and this system is not given much credit for miti-gating the effects of an'ATWS event, even when it is assumed to be improved by two orders of magnitude in reliability (i.e., from 2x10-5 to 2x10-7), (8) (6) NUREG-0460., Vol. II, Appendix II, page II-106. (7) NEDO-10466, Revision 2, page 4-3. (8) NUREG-0460, Vol. II, Appendix XVI, page XVI-62, 63. 65-5

Black Fox design also includes an automatic trip of the recirculation pump on f ast turbine trips. This, by itself is evaluated in NUREG-0460 as inadequate to prevent a core melt.(9) 3.5: Proposed Modifications The basic proposal GE has put forward to solve the ATWS problem is shown as " proprietary" in NUREG-0460(10) However, by looking at the evaluation charts, some of the major features can be determined. Improved Design (b)(11) ] Recire, pump trip. Automatic, reliable, liquid poison inj ection. O ; proved Design (c)(12) same as (b) plus automatic, reliable primary make-up system. Another Possible Modification Plan (13) (1) Use existing control rod drives. (2) Provide alternate sensors & scram signals. (3) Redundant scram air header exhaust valves. (4) Trip the recirc. pump. In response to this final proposed modification, the Staff states the following position: I "While the Staff agrees that the proposed revisions would reduce the vulnerability of the scram system design to common mode failures, the Staff does not agree with GE that the CRDS (control rod drive system) has acceptability high reliability. The basis of the (9) NUREG-0460, Vol II, Appendix XVI, page XVI-62, 63. (10) Ibid, page XVI-76. l (11) - (12) Ibid, page XVI-62, 63. (13) Ibid, page XVI-77. 65-6 H

(Staff conclusion is provided in Appendix II of1this - report- (NUREG-0460), Therefore, GE is required to provide design modix1 cations in the mitigating systems ^ 'to assure.that the ATWS= events do not exceed the cri-robability of unacceptable ter,ia of Appendix IV (i.e.5/ r)." (14) consequences less than 10- - They then golon tofadd 13 specific requirements. Several'other possible mofifications should-be mentioned. 1. Replace _present rods and drives with a diverse design of control rods and control rod drives for at least one-half'of the. rods. The' Swedes have such a design and GE has looked at it=for possible use~on their' reactors. - i However, it requires ~ more room below the reactor 1which is a major structural change. It may also require-different pressure vessel nozzles. 2. Add a second (redundant) standby 'iquid control system and increase the pumping. capacity of both. This too, would require added structures and volumes and is a maj or change. This is an alternative to (1), not an addition to it. 3. Increase residual heat removal capability to keep _the pool temperature at a low level during ATWS,_until the SLC can take hold. Even then, the SLC would probably ) need to be increased. (14) NUREG-0460, Vol II, Appendix XVI, page XVI-77. l t 65-7 e l e--- 9 =vr-- T 1 W 'b" 1'*-T*- F' "*WI'e'E'*F 99 '*7 --Pb' '---*+m'---

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a In effect, this is. adding 100% steam bypass capability, but inside the containment (via heat e.. hangers at the pressure boundary) without relying on the main condensors. 3.6: Recent ATWS Actf.vity The ACRS has held a meeting on this subject on July 13, 1978, planned a full committee meeting on ATWS September 7, 8, and 9, 1978, and a subsequent meeting October 5 - 7, 1978. Clearly, ' this' subj ect - is not going away, despite constant attacks by EPRI, AIF, and reactor vendors. The Applicant has cited the cost as a major 'acern for his customers {15)buthefailstocommentontheimp of delaying the decision until the plant is under constructic L' the change is made after construction is well underway, tim at is about 50% more. (16) TV. CONCLUSIONS It is clear from the arguments in NUREG-0460 that an ATWS solution is needed and it will be applied to Black Fox Station in one form or another. Many of the GE-proposed modifications do not appear to re-solve the problem for several anticipated transients and subsequer.t failures to scram. The present design would not survive many of (15) Letter, M. Fate (PS0) to Rusche (NRC), September 30, 1976. (16) NUREG-0460. 65-8 S =- v -tvr-----r r* ~ao e - - - rn-w-**= m-r -e --w>

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i 1 the ATWS sequences evaluated resulting in a corr ncit and/or subsequent containment failure with the potentist of radiation releases similar to those evaluated in WASH-1400. In my opinion,.to make the necessary changes now, in the pre-construction period, is the logical and prudent approach to the ATWS problem, and is consistent with the NRC position in NJREG0460. Cf *l h b Gregory C. Minor September 25, 1978 e e 4 1 t 65-9

'ar6 7346 1 MR. TARRIS: I would ath that the witness ba 2 allowed to give a summary of his testimony with the sama i 3 stipulations. It is not evidence, but it ic hcipful te 4 the' parties and attendees of the hearings. 1 5 . TIC ICT!=SS : The testimony that I prepared on 6 the ' ATWS contention was basically summarizing my understandinc 7 of that problem and' introducing, where appropriate, the 8 experience I have had with the Gencral Electric systems and 9 with the General Electric approach to ATUS in 'he past, and c 10 my understanding of what is going on today. And in that I 11 included information fror the-most recent document that I 12 have from the Staff, NUREG 0160, where it pertained to,this 13 situation, and to my particular understanding. 14 MR. PARRIS: 'The witnesc is available for cross-13 c:: amination by the Board and parties. 16 CIU.IFRAN WOI?E: Mr. Gallc7 17 CT,OSS-EXAMINATIOU ja BY MR. GALLO: 19 0 Mr. Minor, correct my recollection,-when did go you resign from General Electric Company? l e1 A 1976. a 22 O Did you work for GE in 1969? i 23 A That's correct. 35 0 Did your duties er recponsibilities whi.le you were at the General Eleccic Company during the period of 33 i

h 1 C ,t .Jht \\ l I } 'C9 to '76 include ucrk cn the AO'5 question frcr ths GE I. i t. p i 3 s t.ndpoint? f 1 A Yec, it did. ~' s I O Can v. ou e>:c. lain in whct connection? n m.he n

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the ACRS full committoo er ACRE cubcor.rittes the ~ h, lI ELte meccago; ic that right? i 1 v. i s,i y. u.~.,'.'-, th e' .-'uL.~..~...'..'..'.co .'.'. $ '. _i '.'. y.e, o _k~- u..- m q .c *. {. n corr.' ttee meetinas thE I hcrc baen atarc of r.:.va bec-r on a r .; 1 y the ecr.t cor.st and I li'c on ths vsst con t. The trave-- h e i

.l i ,0 i :., i t I i i 6 t david 2 time and c0ct tc go between therc just Ucsn't avti.labic. i i L Q 1.rc you cware that cor onts eauld b: receivsd ? t l ( l in writing by thosa ACRS r* 'cNittes mccti ngs in i ~ 8 l i connection alco with the a 1.' committ; s'i i .e. 1 A 1 imarine they wcid. 'is not directly j t C j tware of that. 7 O Dut ye J.. set submit any such cc ments in i e s writing? e I. A Ro, I did net. i, t 10 j l 0 licve you cttemptei te convey your vie'. c directly 1 t. i to the F C staff eitnr in uriting or crclly? i .,a h Have hcd diccussient with some of the NRC I 13 i stcff on the icsucs of A'."'G. i i 14 ii l O These tre ct meetinc.e in Ecther.dt? e t o_ i i A No, these are minly phonc converections i i 16 where I have attempted to heen t.h::acrt of what is going on t o .a i and what ic being propoe 5.sc citernative solutions. E I to O These were discusriens with meobers of the l i lo w NRO technical sta ?? l 20 { A That. orrect. t I "I l Q Was Mr. Thadani one of those people 7 i I 3, a - A I don't helcive co. I believe I talked te l i v i ..3 t one of his super:..crs. I I A l Q I don't understand vorr ancver. et it

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s 1 david 3 I believe it was Denny Ross that I talked ts in this i 2 t particular situation I an' thinking about. l 3 C Did you engage in a discussion on the J.T!:S 4 issue genertily, or.was it just with respect to a j 5 l 5 particular aspect? j i 6 A I was interested in a comm:nt that I had l l 7 seen in the daily accession list thtt said-General Electric had had a meeting with the HRO to propose j 9 i somepossible -- discuss sono potentici proposed solutions i i 10 i to the ATHS probica. j l li There was no further information r.vai:.cble i i l 12 on it, so I called him up to find out if I could get ? 13 a copy of the minutes of that to keep abretst of uhat 14 was going on. 1 "" Q I sec. But -- well, other than thct, did you I 16 attempt to convoy your vieve, your general views that you have tactified to hcre todcy to members of the MRO 10 staff? 19 A I did express myself to -- in that particular 20 phone conversation to him telling him that I thought that 21 ,e it was important that we did get on wi h a resolution. I I 22 l e:: pressed my concern over the length of time thc: I-23 this issue has been standing around. l; 9, Q Mr. Minor, you were here during the testimony 1 2~* of both Mr. Puller and Mr. Thtdtni; is that correct? I 9 e -,--~e,- e a-.,-.,,v --,e,,,,+ va-,...-,,- ,---,--em-,. ..-,,--o- -m ---,,~,wm-,, ,-e,

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t 1 i.: a 4 } i that the ' staff reaches a fintl decision, the KRC reaches david 6 L 2 a final decision on this matter within c two yecr 1 - 5 period as testified by both MR. Fuller and Mr. Thadcni, i 6 8 and let's assume further'that that decision was to 4 5' require the instcllation of an automatic ctandby a liquid control system in the Elack Fox station as a j 6 t t do I t 7 pcrt of that overall resolution of the ATW5 question; 1 you believe that issing a construction permit todcy and g permittine. that plant to be constructcd would present e.- p, ic' a safety problem to the people of Tulst, if such a I y system wcs inctclied tuo ye:.rs from now? 17 l 7aerc cre so many ifs in that statement, I i A i y.; can't answer it. f.:. h l O You can't ans,7er it?~

g A

I am not sure. I wonid hcVe to have it read L:. 1 4'c i ncluded. back to me to make sure'I got til of the i 3r i O Le.t me try it ngnin: let's assu.e thct the I t s. a 1 liRO staff and thc NRC gensrcily come to a fincl conclusion gg I on what to do with the ATWS iccue, and that decision is that -t La certain mitigating design changes need to be made, and f 3 the URC, turning its attention to the Elack Fon station, I 't _9 r r ,t -~ [ uould suggest cmong other things possibly that ths q V- ? lech Fox stction include and instn11 cn automatic ii u , L. standby liquid control cystem. .o.r s, b Do con think that fcet that that decisior. is a,_ f o Ite il .e. 't--- -,-ge+--wv,*, y uu,,,ww-e,= -s+-- ew,ww .-,en,, -.-~ae --.-aw---*e.,, - - -. - - ..-=---.~-e

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e e r e i mu m:-a n..c._ n.:,.o_ r % - u_ _c,s acn. n... cot,._;m y e n.r 30. p.. c.n~., gu u in g I think possibly vonid be imple tented uithout too much .1 i I, c ..,...c, a e.ce. ,...r. ....cv. .m m.. au L end 13 '"-.' 4 4. 4. i r. a* .-w .\\

- - =..,,. 4 i V' 614'arl I, 7356 1 Me'have to assume that if they are indeed going 2 to be required, that the plant wouldn't operate until they 3 were installed. 4 My point of view is, let's decide.what the fix is. I. t 5 Let's build it into the design frc;.. the beginning, in the 3 preconstruction period, and not in the post or during 7 construction period, and let's get it on.line in a normal S fashion,-and not rush chcad and build the plant anf. then l l 9 figure out how we are going to change it'to echa the syste. 13 work. l l. O You think from an enginacring standpcing that

3 [

makes more sense? 13 A I certainly dc. I think from an economic and 14 safety standpoint, it makes more sense. g. O Let's examine from c scfety stcndpoint, if the j I l I iG j system, when it operates ct the Black Fo:: Station, whan it {

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• 1 operates includes the~stcndby liquid control system that

[ jy i 1 l ) I l vou testified would be effective, uhnt difference doer it i IG make from a safety standpoint whether it is designed and g installed at the outset, or whether it is put in. two years 20 clong the construction path of a si::-year period? 3 i r r i i MR. FARRIS: Objection. That is characteriting n the testimony. g i I don't believs the vitness testified that he .,w. f l' thought this system uould be effective. _a ll' i.- t....-.....

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a ,c a.3 . -- o. 1 opinien that these additionti hards.*are fixo: would minigste 2 the effects cf an ATI?S event, c.s discussed by the Sttff in } S I I"JRUG 04tiO? I 1 4 HP.. TIJIIS: fir. !!incr did not indiccte that t 5 the standby liquid centrci cyst a rce rslicble. Objection. I i 0 IIR. GAI.,LO : I will neart again. i 7 BY MR. GALLO: l f. O fir, Mincr, do you ot'.cre chat a present O j cecign een be n.nde of c str.chv twn:d contro.. syc com t.utt I It l' 10 l you believe would be reliahis? f ., 1

J 7

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.t say yes.

I cm not cure whethar va are ctlhing en ecc::omic-t 13 er design. i l i i 14 i O Is there a design existing today that you bc.lieve { l' t i.r. would be relir.ble?

l i

t. ic !{ A of a str_rdby licuid contrei system? il h t , F e~ a. L 'i ig. l A Not of the troe that vo r.re talking about. I i t 19 'l 0 If we te.he e cetndby liquid control system and l I ji to i-. make it automatic an opposed to mtnucily initiated, does i ( .e., that help reliabilitv? a i i De.cenc..nz on t.oe ces?.gn, c cource, it coua..c L t. 1 a.. I. i f1 improve the reliability of 4.ctun11y cotuating cnd outratine l. '3 b g { compcred to a mcnut'lv initictri cvcter.; which h.c hn:ntn i _.: n..,..w.. .. n _.,.. er - ano o h. .w4ngc-. .s.. 3.e i s i 'i I + I

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L' l The other witnecsec testified at length on thar. l t

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i .~.8n C. ar5 speech. CHAIN!!A". iOLFT.: I have 2.11oved you c cartain l ^ ,2 i f. <. o, _ r,v-. _,., n_ e <,. _,. 3_ v, c_ -g i u, o,. o ac,.y .a..y, e s.. s 1 l 1 cenvinced one way or another by ths.t. i .,.s.e. u _4 o n.e 6.n a e n-.o. 3

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e-. v e TI'I' WITICSS : I t.m not c.ble to give you e. 6 complete design of a reliable standby liquid control system ree.:. vou., meet a 3 or my re~1uirements anc todav. .at A t-6 i the NRC re.uiremsnts. 4 e I e v.. e. 1. -ga e t e.,,. -r

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y 1n a a_te a.._ a. e _ c c. ..., v., weu#.., \\ rn i u, h.3 thev do add additional syster.s and cdditienti a p 5. r o a c h e s e j'I .s ..n.- i1 z.r.i citigatine the effects, j' [ to mitic.atinc., the consecuencec, ,,, t ! -. - o r. e n..,..e) ^ #, c.- -. c _# -.'..c l l,i _.,L qsC_.r se. r-- v ,. w tu4.c;, 4.- ve..;> w n. r, nD s. so. G .w I i i 1 id w ,w

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q c/ ,_G, I further by both General Electric and the Staff, and I thinh the Volume 3 cs describad so far is encouraging thc ve ,1 l are approaching a recclution, and it doesn't menn that tht 0 l 4 is ready to ccme out as a requirement. 5 '"here are c lot of secps lef t, cs we discussed G yesterday. 7 Q Lased on what Mr. Thadani cestified to, do you S have greater encouragamant tht: the resolution might occur i 5-within ths. ns::t two veert? I i 10 h Thtt is c very relative asseccment, but I would I, i 11 cay yes, therc is grectar onceuragement. l l 12 O Dut it is your viet-that the resolution of the l 13 ATUS issue should hold up the issuance of the construction 14 permit on the Black Fox Station: is that it? 1 15 L It is ry vie; that the A?d5 problem is } I 16 sufficiently serious and of sufficient impcct that it should i 4' i be mo.lemented from the decict ur., and not halfuav. throuch l 13 the construction procces, or even pcrt way into the 19 const uction process, and therofere I feel, yes, it chould 0 be resolved before the construction permit. e.I 0 So that if necacecrv the construction permit I 3 for Elack Ten Station should await thc outcome of this a l 25 icsue, whether or not it tches tiro years or longer? 1 1 l A From an engineering point of view, I chi:J: that 24 ) i i 6 [i is the proper way to do it. l 2<e t i i e.14 b i d i d

i 1 -.m tcpe 15 : ) O Is yer concern sc'elj bcsed on engine 5rin-devidlZE E technique and design technique, pocitions of tni f I - - -, o.., < e, 4 o.mr. e. s. e.. 4+ .: e .. ~ -.. -

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e,.p +.t,.,,,c c.,,. l h >t 4e k It is cito bcsed on sciotv concerne cni i n E ray enperience with modifications to rystems and revirions 9 C !,!, and engineering change contr:1 notices and so forth.

h 7 !!

We find that it is less reliable overt 11 u.if S h.. to change things later than to decirn them rig'nt the

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., : =- u. u.- in! O You heard Dr. Zinh8c testirony tht: indicated 4-ie that t.ne present c.ec.g: was su,.::3.c cnt,y :A snan s.c to accor.modate thece chr nges, uhtt it s.ould n t in-'cive a bEchfit situation. ~.,. 4d A There are c lot of ifs in both of then; if volume th.ree doesn't require anything further, then t.-hat I har been decigned into ths Blach Fcn sitettior.? Ani I tJ don't know thct, n. O Do ..s, t,. re,.c.,1 D,. r 4 A. e, u u..%.....,..,.. u.,,...+. sy . c. it i q[ the automatic standby liquid control cystem of a bigger ..f .c...- ;- cepacity could indeed be instclied at the Blach Fcz - I station? ,,w n e.s Be s. u.4.c, e.u.,. ,. e x..,, u,,.,+ w e.

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s 73E5 t I don't think that is very far downstream, ce devid3 1 f the' changes Osat might be required Efter thtt date 2 l could make it a less reliable installation. 3 0 If I understand "our~ testimony, a lot of 4 plant modification is required or backfitting is ~v is that correct? required,.then that will give you concern; 6 A YEs. When you start tearing things apart to 7 put new things in, I think that is less reliable as a way g to install safety syster.s, 0 And to the a:: tent that backfitting and plant ) modification is not required, that lessens your i. concern? A Providing the syctem that is being added is 13 appropriate. O And I guesc if we can assume fer the moment 15 that no modifications would be required, you would hcVe 16 i i no concern if that was cn accurate assumption. 17 A I find that hard to conceive, but if that 18 turned out ts be a pAugerly ascessed situation, und cli 19 the parties agreed, then, yes. MR. GALLO: May I have a minute, MR. Chairman? 21 CIIAIFEAM WOL".E: Yes. 22 ,l' (Pause.) s 23 i s { BY IIR. G.7EO: Si t Q Mr. Minor, do you have any reason of your I 25-l, I h l a

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I I MF. GALLO: I-withdraw the CuSEtion. . david 5 May I hcra a conent c? tin, Mr. Chairncn? . g f CHAIF. MAN WOLI'E : Yes. i (Pause.) n l I i, e i t 9 t t. 6 l t i + I An 'g

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y Lar2 a' scfety significant probicar. is that correct? 7369 3 A Pr bably a more-serious. scfety significant. 2 problem is GE's reluctance to real:.y admit whtt they cre O 4 . going to do about it and continues.to try to rcsiet doina that, a 0 Y u would agree with me that if the KnC -- strike 6 that. / Don't y u believe the KRC is capable of-cctablishir? 4 6 l j a regalctory requiremenu, despite.thc'advoc :y of the e

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Gsneral Electric Company? l ,D q-ll A I certcinly hopa they tro. t, O Do you think they are? It A I ctand by my statenant, I hope they are. 12 i 0 Assuming they do establish such a requirement, they being the NRC, co you think -- strike that. Let me 15 t ctart again, i l 10 ,j Do you believe that the f act -tl ce the NRC Stcff .~ f I has'not yet determined in your opinion sufficient 18 mitigating fixes to mitigcte an ATWS event, do you believe thct presently to be a significant safety problem? ,,aw l Is your safety problem the fact that GE continues r no resist? ~w. I Which is it?

EL A

The safety problem is that the problem is real,

• 4 L,

t i the ATWS prob 1cm is reci, and the 10-year diclogue continues 25-Dr li t. i b

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_-._,=. - ar4 7371 1 installed, and that williinvcive..some' time of being.chut 2 - down. 3 -0. ^ Should they be chut.down today until it can be- . l-4 donc? 5' A That is hard to assess. 6 0 Yee have'no' opinion? . I 7 A I don't believe that that is a realistic solution. i l. 8 O . It is not c realistic solution, so the risk to g-the public hecith and cafety, as you see it, is not immediate; is that correct? .-J l t ii A' Listen, how can you say anything that hEs been a. going on for 10 years is not imediate? Certainly it is not g 1 something'that we have to chuu down everything to do. Thcu r.. is what I just testified to, but I did say that ws should g i get this thing ironed out, como up with a plan to implemenu 3g both backfit and new solutions, and do it quickly, and I g fon't think 10 years of resciution and a pror.isc of twc j; y I years in the future is quickly, i 0 Let's assume that on some reasonable schedule an operating reactor shuts down for refueling, and at the 0 same time'backfitting occurs to include the mitigating ,, \\ i fixes for the AIWS event. Do vou think -- and let's assume t 22 L l l-i that is done -- and these mitigating fixes are the ones y i a I required by the NRC -- do you btlieve that that bcekfitting

.4 l

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7309 david 5 !G.. DAVIS: One short announcement. Mr. Dennis I Dambly het arrived. He has submitted his appearance as 3 co-counsel and will be arguing the Reed report 4 subpoena question tomorrow. 5 CHAIPl!AN WOLFE: His name again? 6 MR. DAVIS: Dennic Dambly: D-e-m-b-1-y -- t 7 D-a-m-b-1-y. 8 CHAIR!iAN WOLTE: All right. 9 (Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the hec. ring was 10 recescad until 9:30 c m., December 13, 1970.) 11 5 13 14 - 15 iG 'i' I 17 I tc 19 h I 20 21 22 23 .I 24 25 i I* 11 r

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lOia z.r 6 A That had not been backfitted: is that your 5 .i. cuartion? .s s I. t! O Lee es try again. _? ll For scf 2:y rst. sons, wou26 you recuire an i t operating plant that had ceen hackfitted with hcrdwcre fi::es against the mitic.ating. er ag. ainst the 7.KS event, e, w would vou require that picnt to be permanently shut down? / A I don't thinh I said anvthine of the kind. E \\ ~ O-I am not suggesting that. I an just asking tho i li l 6 question, uculd you. I cm not su:Tg. sting vou c.ircadv., sr.id l , a,. o h vou would. 1 I e A I believe, if I undcrnuand your question correctlyd 1 Ji h j you are scying taks en old plant, =cdify it to prevent ,,u. o +1 'i an ATUS problem, and you are asking ma would I require it 1./. g to ba pcrmtnently shut dewn? Mo. 15 0 You would permit it to operate? , t. t i A If it were proper'.y n.odified, yac. J e .'tb JL l Ih e., 6e ef .L t I s W.

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~ i 7275 1 A Yes, I am just trying to state my position david 2 2 on -- you are trying to draw a conclusion on what should ~ 3 we do with the old plants, which is really not part c l 4 this hearing, right? l i i o And I am trying to scy what we should do for l 6 Black Fox is resolve the problem, because for me the 7 plants that we tre constructing now, which aren't going l 6 to go into operation until the C0's, are the 1trge 9 volume of plante that uill be opercting for the next 10 30 years, and if we are rec 11y going to reduce thic 11 four out of seven chance that NUPEG 0460 -- cf a major 1 ~9 ATWS accident with significant consequences, we have 13 got to start someplace to implement for the future. 14 0 I would agree, Mr. Minor. I tend to measure 1# l ~ the henith and safety in termo of whether or not IO c plant should be continued to opernte, given c certcin l i problem, given c certcin situction. What I am trying l II I0 to ask you is, as I understand your testimony, you have IS indiccted that you have safety concerns, but they are 20 not of sufficient -- they are not sufficient to require 21 in your judgment a shutdown of operating plants. EE In that an accurate reflection? f 90 A You ached me if I thought I 24 they should all be shut 6cwn today, ad I said no. ? o5 O All right. The safety concerns thct you sec ~ l ..i 1

s a l. p 4 11 7376 1 8 i david 3 '3-p instcilction of mitignting finer two years i in the-t, downstream for Elech -F0:: in that tima frr.me, dc you 3 e feel thct that -- can vou tell me whether-or not Et i i. this time that concern is sufficient, thct should that t 't ,i { cituction occur, do you uhink the Elcek FC:: ctttion [ l c 1 c l. l' +- h should not operate?

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t 7377 david 4 operable. I would not say that that plant should be kept from operating. I o i MR. GALLO: That's all the questions I have, ~ Mr. Chairman. 5 T.. DAVIS: The staff has no questions. 6 CIU.IRMAN WOLFE: Ue villmcess until quarter 7 of 2:00. b MR. DAVIS: I believe that this is the last 5 item on the agenda, aside from board questions. 10 MR. PARRIS: If the board las questbns of II Mr. Minor, then ou "^ thrcugh for the day. 12 (Board conferring.) 12 CIIAIRMAN WOLFE: Did you have any redirect, 14 Mr. Farris? 15 MR. PARRIS: No, sir. l 10 BOARD ETtJCIliATICII ) 17 BY MR. PURDOM: i IB Q on page 65-7 of your testimony, the paragraph l 1 19 numbered one, you have replaced present rods and drives 20 with a diverse design of control rods and control rod 21 drives or at least one half of the rods. 22 What do you mean by diverse in that sentence? l 13 A Hall, the drives for the Swedish reactor 24 1 manufacturer puts out have a hydraulic SCRAM, but they q 25 have a screw drive folluine such that if the hydraulic i -Q

] ( i J devidE 1 j. 7370'I ) i i 2' l SCRAM does not actucte the screw driva, will force the 'I i 2 rod ' in, 'hcause it is autonctically triggered upon SCFJR. i 4 So, there is -- it is diverse from the i 5 l actuttion mechanism point of view. They are both l .) 6 hydraulic and electric drives. 1 i 7 l 0 In other words, the clectric motor powcrs l' l .P the screw drive? 1. .i i E. A That is correct. hi t it 10 {j Q Is that right? And would it b:: poss=.!.c nor N + 1 l' cuch a design to be put in a GE plant; do you knor? U 1 12 j, A We looked very enrefully ct that, and wc ts evaluated it for the control aspectc. As I rocc11, it i I 14 required additional cpace for the control equipment and 1. 3 l1 l' ,3 jl additional spaco under the reactor for the actual drive n icj mechanism, which is tiresdy a very crew /ed space. I; 3 Sc for those reasons among others I cm rure l with licensing and product qualification, things of g

p that nature, they decided not to.

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20 1 0 Do you think it is practicci to do it? i i p [ nh A I believe it is practical. n O I'm ccrry. I didn't hear that. j k n.l A I believe it is practical, but it has come i i il I difficulties which would have lonc lead time. ,%e n g p ]1 O .Eac there boca such a design actutilv .s, y tt-fi l 14 ,,4.... _..... m.,_._.- -. ~. -. _ _ _......, - _,

l 7379 'I constructed? david 6 2 A I know GE went. through ti:e preliminary e 3 . design in order-to be able to evaluate what the impact 4 would-be of that installation. 5 0 You referred to the Swedish design. 6 A. Certainly they are operating on Swedish reactors 7 8 and 17 g. 10 11-12 f 13 't 14 15 's 6 i 17 18 10 20 21 22 4 t l.' 24 I I 25-

1[ ^ l l >{ d l 4 I f lS Erl h: __,C i 1 0 c. n n 1e DT.. PURDOM: hE 'c, a-.1 I havc. ~ ) l e h E1 ..n. c u.u-... n. \\ '. -!i 5 '; O I wonii like to ack your opinion if ant-of whct i I 4 4d has been eclled the squire roo nethod for determining h b the probability on demand to scrcm? E i i S A I think it has serious shor tcomings as has f 4 7 been pointed out in the cri;icue of the IRSH 1400 by various 3 ps.rties. The Lewis Cera.ittee review of UASE 100 j ?! cf. critiqued thtt alco. 1 t !- 17nen you do this, it tends to gre::.tly WEter i i s.e n,,.. c. u, c. c.' yv.. -i-Y E.:.,, e-i Sci *n yo,,,. e.. 4 e r 4 c, rnp - i..- ..n, --u .... ar - -.. s.- .t i '.. '.h, lode EiCht of the range of unc':.rt. linty thE'". You h?~?3 in la .,f theSe numberC. You hCVe to MEhe GCMS Verv SErione CEsuZptions ,~ i i o.p coup _,.4.ng cna ceptnoence c: c:.e.rcrent variah,es c..- rent 1:re z. i i h, f t.iluret, and it tendt, to, in my opinien, dictort the g retl probability. .g Q on page E-4 of you-teccimary, you mahs :bs o ' b. 4 l statsment in the middle of the pLge: ' ss p. !I "It seems te also be the case that EURs experienec '~ I l. n i 6 ts l o more transients than Pims." a 1 I h ,i i ,. ?. Citing footnote 5, UUnEG M60. ) s. I l' +-. !! The difference there is like the d.ifferenza m, n s betusin cight average transiente ps.r reactor year and f ,r, .n so..ething likt five or six. [ m e. t. DO you regard thic as really significant! ... u b c i w. 1 -.. pi O._nh _47

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ar2 7381 significance, which usuclly means an order of magnit;ude 2-or something like that. Two is often lost in the statistical 3 data, a factor of two. This is slightly less than two. Ilowever, we are dealing with real events in this 4 5 case, and the data it a little more firm and has-smaller uncertainty bands than you often deal with in statistics. 6 So I feel that it is meaningful, but not really significant. 7 8 .O The last probability thing. 11 hat do you estimate the probability of spurious initiation of an automatic g boron injection system would be in the current state of the to art? j; A I think that whole argument is hind of a specious gg argumer.t, myself. I think if you are faced with the problem 13 with a reactor that is going to require you, whatever it is,

4

$60 million or something, the evaluation that the AIF fc 15 putting on it, you are gcing to fix it. You aren't going 16 to let that exist and certainly surveillance has been proven 77 to be an historical problem with ECCS and it has been 10 resolved by automating the surveillance techniques to the-g extent possible. Take the maintenance man out of that loop 20 as much as you can, and certainly if you had a one-failure 21 pr bability per 10 years of surveillance of a standby liquid 22 control system, and you had 20 reactors running, you are 23 [ l \\ going to hcVe a couple of those every so often. You just 1 ~~ not are g ing to let that happen. You design an automatic "S i I l l .,_..m.

<r i, \\ 1 i c.,3 'o.' c ' .* 6 s f I eystem to tche the operntor cut of that loop, i i ? f O 17nct dc you thir.h of Mr. Ohtdtni's position l 1 3 e '; thct reliabilitv. of a scfet"- erster and itc proof agcinct a cpurious initiation are in some cense cntitheticEl ari t I L f l, vou can't have it both vavs? If vou mche it very relichle, l t l i 6 then it will work, you will make it much more probable it i I 7 will work when you don't unnt it. Is this alwayc true? i think there is a tendency to do that. He uced Eg n s. t, i i; to hynotherize the cc.fEt rccctor vr.s one that had so n ny ful-o 15 h censcra and monitore and trip cignEls that i.,couldn't ever I, D. cet ctErted up. You uend tc get into th.t if v. u cc over-t' e i i M [' board. t t, is t I don't think that is what the Stsff is aching. { h l ? b O Frca your enevorc to Mr. Gallo's cuestient, I t pf tt!:s it that you believc that definite AT;?S fi::Oc should i u li bs errived c; by the Co= iscion before c CP ir grantei for L tch T'o::. 4 i h If cuch cn action iz indicated on other crounds.

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E A That is ny norconal view. I think we have o.ut t' ( l;3 f i 1 .e. C. thic off lona. enouch. h e O I also take it that you do not rcgtrd the i ~l cc:rr.itmcnt mentioned in Dr. Zink'c testinony and thc c. t ll n e! .o. rovision,or certc_, n cac.._:t2.onne socces in the concrete Enc. _n so on as a resoluticr. of this problem; is that right? .,y t. I I, A I cn not certcin that that vould ccco=0dete .n.. l p ) I t,' b a i e l l

ar4- - 7303 1 the three to four hundred gallon per r..inute standby liquid 2 control system, er if it veuld accommodate it, if it is 3 required in redundant tenhs, whether in single tanks or 4 what the change might be to the volume of sodium pentaborate 5 that it, required to be available if they decide te add 6 more for any reasons. 7 For those reasons,'plus GE's general reluctance 8 to admit that there should be a system solution of that I S nature, I think I have concern about that ec=mitment.- 10 0 Do you feel that unless some steps are taken to il deny construction permite without a recolution of ATUS, 12 l that things will pretty much go on at they have, nnd no l 13 resolution will occur? Is that something that you fear? 14 A I am not alone in that concern, and I do have 15 that. You read the ACKS transcripts an6 there are peopic 16 on those committet meetings that have been hearing the i 17 same question discussed for years and years and years, and 10 they are concerned, too. I think it is a real concern. l 19 Somewhere we have to draw the line and say that from here t 20 on we won't let them be built withcut improvements. 21 MR. SHON: Thank you. 22 (Board conferring.) l - 23 Ci!AIRMJai WOLTE: Any quetions derived pg directly from Board questions? 25 lin GALLO: I have no questions, but I intsud to 1 i i c._ .y., ,_-y-,,, .,,..-,.r,_.m,,- 3-,,,. y,.. ym ,y,., ,-_.....,,,,.._.._--,c, m,,-.....

1 i r i. .i' i ar5 i T30/ i t I i 9 { call Dr. :: ink en rebuttal. I 1 }! e CIII.!P1:Ali WOLFE: All right. l

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~ MR.. F;J.RIS : I have no cruastione.. L t IIR. DIXIS : One short question. f l FURTIE:R RECROES EXIC:I:IATION 6 Er MR. DAVIS: 7 0 rou indicate that beenuse of what you ~ see as l l'. O i reluctance on the part of General Electric to come to cn j E overcl1 solution of the ATFS troblem, that you have some e ] tro::blee t.'ith thr.t, tnd the poccibili.ty cf complying uith T i 1I l! adequate Stcff regulations. 12h Do you have cny infonnction uithin your ponsaccion 2 I O j which would indicate that the Applicant, PSO, will not be l)' t '4 i,. cble to comp 1v with c::ictina repuittions or even those te he i Ii I. 15 [. promulgatcS later with ATES, beccuse of the porition of d, Gtneral Electric? e 4' A lio, I do not. e 18 1B [ l e h i i s i

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_{'_ 3.._ ^ 7385 j i david.1 I .!Gl. GALLO: Mr. Chcirman, I would like to 2. tape 19 call Mr. John Zink at this tima. 2 Whereupon, 4 JOHN ZINK 5 was called as a witness, and having been previoccly 6 duly sworn, wac examined and. testified as follows: 7 MR. GALLO:. IIe has previously testified on this. 1 0 contention. 9 DIRECT EXAMINATION 10 BY MR. GALLO: li 0 Did you prepare rebuttal tertinony with-12 respect to contention 657 / 13 A I did. 14 0 l' show you a document that is entitled 15 rebuttal testimony of Dr. John C. Zink concerning 16 contention 65 and ask if thic is the rebuttri testimony 17 you prepared for this proceeding. 10 (Handing document to witness.) 19 A Yes, it it. 20 0 Is it accurate and complete to.the best of 21 your knowledge and belief? E2 A Yes, it is. 23 MR. GALLO: MR. Chr.irman, ct this time, I 24 would like to cove into evidence the rebuttti i 1 25. testimony.cf Dr. John Zink. cnd I have 20 copies for the i l' l reporter to be' incorporated into the trcnscript as if read. p + -er-

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l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of ) ) PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF OKLAHOMA, ) ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,) Docket Nos. STN 50-556 AND WESTERN FARMERS ELECTRIC ) STN 50-557 COOPERATIVE, INC. ) ) (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2) ) Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. John C. Zink Concerning Contention 65 (Anticipated Transients Without Scram) l l 1 l December 10, 1978 { l l l'

e e ? REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF DR. JOHN C. ZINK CONCERNING CONTENTION.65 (ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT'i WITHOUT SCRAM) 7 My name is John C. Zink and I reside at 12518 E. 134th Street, Broken Arrow, Oklahoma and I have testified previously. + concerning the ATWS contention in this proceeding. In the - NRC Staff testimony on Contention 65 (ATWS), Mr. Thadani lists four potential future design modifications that the Applicant- - must not foreclose during the design and' construction of Black . Fox Station. In my previous testimony I addressed items 1 and ~ 3 of those four items and indicated that the design of Black Fox Station will-not preclude incorporation of these features if they should become requirements as a result of resolution of the generic ATWS issue. Item 2 of the Staff scenario of modifications that might be required is the Feedwater Pump Trip. Specifically, the requirement is that for transients such as trips, motor-driven feed pumps nust be electrically tripped by the FPT." (Staff testimony page 65-9). This requirement does not address the BFS plant which incorporates turbine d' riven feed pumps rather than the specified motor driven feed pumps. ~ The. Staff does, however, mention steam driven feed pumps when they acknowledge that For transients in which the main

f. -s steam isolation valves close early in the transients, steam-driven main feed pumps are tripped due to lack of steam."

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(Staff testimony page 65-9). Thus in the case of the most {-. severe ATWS transients, those leading to isolation'of-the ( reactor, the BFS turbine-driven feed pumps meet the require- ~ \\ ment. Any additional requirement for feed pump trip would' be a matter of control logic which, if required, would-not be precluded by the. construction of'BFS as it is currently designed. The Staff testimony also addressed the need for an alternate h'igh pressure makeup system. Specifically,-it is stated thLt "in the event HPCS. fails to function-on demand, i an alternative high-pressure makeup syste.m other than RCIC would be needed to keep the core covered unless the standby liquid control system is modified as discussed above in item 3." In the " item 3" referenced here, the ' Staff requires that "in order to meet the recommended criteria of NUREG-0460' the SLCS would need to be automated and the rate of reactivity i change would need to be increased." (Staff testimony page 65-10). As I stated in my previous testimony, the BFS design has been established in such a way that an automated high-capacity boron injection system (SLCS) can be accommodated. The high capacity SLCS sufficiently increased the redundancy i of high pressure water makeup to the reactor so that the. modi-fled SLCS would be capable of meeting both Staff items 3 and 4. ^% ) Thus, it is my conclusion that the BFS design does.not preclude incorporating the potential design modifications for (]; . ATWS mitigation that are specified in the Staff testimony.

-} 2 7387. 1 david 30 MR. GALLO: May I go off the record for a 2 s moment? 3 (Discussion off the' record.) 4 MR. GALLO: On the record. l 5 } The witness is available for cross 6 l examination. 7 CHAIRMAN WOLFE: Mr. Davis?- 8 MR. DAVIS: As I indicated earlier,rrf 9 cross examination of Dr. Zink was adequate to cover 10 his rebuttal. 11 The. staff has no questions at this time. 12 MR. FARRIS:.No questionsi, 0 13 CHAIRMAN WOLFE: There may be board questions. 14 We are reviewing the testimony. 15 (Board conferring.) 1G s BOARD EXAMINATION 17 BY MR. SHON: 18 Q The thing I don't see directly here in writing, 19 although it seems hinted at in page two of your testimony, 20 is when you say the BFS design has been established 21 in such a way that an automated high capacity. boron injection 22 C+ system can be accommodated, and do you specifically mean 23 one with 300 or 400 gallons per minute capacity? 24 A Yes, I do. j .a 25- '3 CHAIRMAN WOLFE Any questioning?

} 1. r f. 73SS 1 i david 4 MR. GALLO: 2io questions on redirect. 2 j MR. FARRIS: I!o cuestions. (~~ ~ 3 l j MR. DAVIS: No questiona. l CHAIRMAN WOLFE: The witness is excuued. l 5 i (Witness excused.) 6 i CHAIRMA'T WOLFE: One final matter before wo (. 7

)

recess. t 8 4 The board has been looking at the document you { 9 3 handed to the board, MR. Gallo, on the remaining issues to and incomplete issues; the parties either singly or 11 together, can you give us some idea of hcw much time 12 it will take to hear this evidence: one week, two weeks, three weekr? l 14 i MR. GALLO: My octimate is two to chree I 15, 1Gl Weeks. { I CHAIRMAN WOLFE: 'Ivo to three weeks en tha 17 reamining issues? 10 l MR. GALLO: On everything. I 19 CHAIRMAN WOLFE: Mr.-Farris? l 20 MR. FARRIS:- I agree with that estimate. 21 MR. DAVIS: So'does the staff. t s 22 i .U (Board conferring.) i i 23 CHAIRMAN WOLFE: We will recess until [ 24 i tomorrow morning at 9:30 when we proceed with oral i I 2s 4 argument. + = = =. -. - :. = -}}