ML20141M882

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 72 to License DPR-61

ML20141M882
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	02/19/1986
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Shared Package
ML20141M876	List: ML20141M875 ML20141M880 ML20141M882
References
NUDOCS 8602280812
Download: ML20141M882 (2)

Text

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR PEGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT N0. 72 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-61 CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-213

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 31, 1985, the Connecticut Yankee' Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) submitted a request for changes to the Haddam Neck Plant technical specifications.

The amendment revises Technical Specification 1.8, Containment Integrity (definition), and incorporates a new Table 3.11-2, Non-aJtomatic Containment Isolation Valves, to allow for surveillance testing of normally closed, non-automatic containment isolation valves that are part of the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS). The purpose of this proposed Technical Specification is to allow testing to ensure the operability of normally closed isolation valves in the PASS during operation modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.

A Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for Hearing related to the requested action was published in the Federal Register on January 15, 1986 (51 FR 1873). No coments or requests for hearing were received.

2.0 EVALUATION By letter dated October 31, 1985, the licensee submitted a proposed license amendment to revise Technical Specification 1.8, Containment Integrity (Definition), and to incorporate a new Table 3.11-2, Non-automatic Containment Isolation Valves which concerns surveillance testingofthesevalvesinthepost-accidentsamplingsystem(PASS).

The proposed revision specifically calls for monthly testing (stroking) of the above valves during plant operating Modes 1 through 4 in order to ensure their operability. The licensee stated that the monthly surveillance tests of the required valves will be performed at the same time a containment air sample is taken. The licensee further stated that the proposed change is consistent with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications which allow opening of containment isolation valves on an intermittant basis under administrative control. The licenseealsostatedthattheseisolationvalvesareredundant(physically and electrically), have position indication in the control room, fail-closed upon de-energization, and can be remote manually closed from the control room within 60 seconds of the receipt of a containment isolation 0602280012 060219 DH ADOCK 050 3 ,

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actuation signal (CIAS). This action would preclude a potential radioactivity release from the containment from this source since the Haddam Neck Plant dose consequence analysis involves no fuel failure for the first 60 seconds following the accident. Procedures are provided instructing the operators'to perform the manual containment isolation when required.

The Itcensee also notes the following in support of the proposed change:

1. The PASS system does not directly or indirectly effect reactor or post-accident mitigating safety-related system operation.

2. The probability of the occurrence of an accident (LOCA) during the twelve 45-minute periods a year when the PASS is used to obtain an atmospheric sample is extremely small.

3. The PASS containment atmosphere sampling line is seismically analyzed and supported.

Based on the above, we concur with the licensee's analysis of the minimal impact of the proposed technical specification change on plant safety, and conclude that it provides proper limitations on testing of the PASS containment isolation valves while assuring their operability.

The proposed change is, therefore, acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Corsnission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eli set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)gibility criteria (9). Pursuant forCFR to 10 categorical 51.22(b)exclusion no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This Safety Evaluation has been prepared by J. Raval PEICB, DPWRL-B.

Dated: 02/19/86