ML20141H045
| ML20141H045 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/06/1986 |
| From: | King T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Speis T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8601130341 | |
| Download: ML20141H045 (7) | |
Text
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JAN 0 61986 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Themis P. Speis, Director Division of Safety Review and Oversight THRU:
Karl Kniel, Chief Safety Programs Evaluation Branch, DSR0 FROM:
Thomas L. King, Section Leader Safety Programs Evaluation Branch, DSR0
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETINGS WITH ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL AND GENERAL ELECTRIC ON UPDATES OF THEIR LIQUID METAL REACTOR DESIGNS On November 6 and 7, 1985 representatives from Rockwell International (RI) and the General Electric Company (GE) briefed us on the status of their current-liquid metal reactor (LMR) design concepts.
The briefings were conducted as part of the planned NRC-DOE interactions on LMRs.
Copies of the agendas and lists of attendees at each meeting are attached.
A set of viewgraphs from each meeting are available for inspection at the section
' office.
Presentation by RI on the Sodium Advanced Fast Reactor (SAFR) Concept on November 6, 1985.
The SAFR design concept is a pool type LMR consisting of a standard 350 Mwe unit.
A typical utility installation (~1000 Mwe) would require three such units.
The designer proposes to make maximum use of modularization of major components in the design (the reactor vessel, IHXs, steam generators and other structures) to promote off-site fabrication.
Further-details of the SAFR design concept and of the fabrication, construc-tion, operation and economics involved in this concept are provided in the viewgraphs.
Several aspects of the concept of potentially major safety signi-ficance were discussed.
These are summarized here.
The SAFR design emphasizes the inherent characteristics of its reactor shutdown (RSS) and shutdown heat removal systems (SHRS).
The RSS uses a temperature dependent magnetic latch for the secondary rods and the SHRS relies heavily on the natural convection characteristics of the design of the relevant heat transport systems.
Considerable credit is taken for the relishility of these features to provide assurance that core melt accident are of very low likelihood in this plant.
In addi-tion, negative feeubacks alone, inherent in the fuel design, may be sufficient to shutdown the reactor.under an ATWS condition prior to core melt.
8601130341 860106 PDR ORG EUS
T. P. Speis Based on the expected design and reliability of the safety systems RI proposes to exclude most of the balance of plant (from immediately after the secondary side outlet of the IHXs on out to the turbine generator) from safety related functions.
Based on a design that precludes high pressure accidents the designer proposes a low pressure (2 psig) containment envelope consisting of the reactor guard vessel (GV) and a concrete shell enclosing the reactor head access area. The containment design is based on pressure differen-tial from a design basis tornado.
The 1E power requirements are much less than in an LWR or CRBR, largely because of the natural convection properties used for the SHRS, and no diesel standby power is supplied.
Presentation by GE on the Power Reactor Inherently Safe Module (PRISM) Concept on November 7, 1985.
The PRISM concept is based on groupings of small (425 Mwt) pool type reactor modules, each with its own IHX and steam generator.
Three of these modules are combined to form a " power block" which provides steam to a single turbine generator producing about 415 Mwe. Three of these power blocks, in turn, are combined to provide a typical large (1245 Mwe) installation.
In the present PRISM design each reactor module is located below grade in a dual (inner and outer) silo configuration. The inner silo is supported by seismic isolators.
The designer proposes to make extensive use of modularization so that the major components (reactor vessel, IHXs, steam generators, etc.) and struc-tures can be shop fabricated off-site.
Further details of the PRISM design concept and related information is pro-vided in the viewgraphs. Several aspects of the concept of potentially major safety significance were discussed. These are summarized here.
PRISM also emphasizes the inherent characteristics of its reactor shutdown system (RSS) and its shutdown heat removal systems (SHRS).
Redundancy for the RSS is provided by primary and secondary shutdown system.
Diversity and inherency is provided by a control rod extension enhancement concept on each rod in both the primary and secondary banks. The extender enhances control rod insertion by differential expansion of bi-meltallic driveline components from high sodium outlet temperatures.
For a sufficiently high outlet temperature the rods will release providing a self actuated shutdown system (SASS) for all rods.
Inherency in the SHRS for PRISM is provided by the natural convection characteristics of two of the three decay heat removal paths. These are the auxiliary cooling system (ACS) and reactor vessel auxiliary cooling system RVACS).
m T. P. Speis Similar to SAFR GE proposes to reduce the safety grade envelope as much as possible.
Thus such B0P components as the steam generators will not have safety related functions and will be designed to commercial standards.
The PRISM design will utilize state-of-the-art highly automated plant control systems.
A single operator console will be used for each of the three small unit power packs.
Three such consoles would be required for a typical large (1400 Mwe) station.
The PRISM containment concept utilizes the reactor vessel and guard vessel together with a structure enclosing the head access area as the containment / confinement boundary.
A major element of the PRISM program is the confirmation of the safety characteristics of the PRISM design by a full scale safety test.
The NRC would be asked to participate in the development of test require-ments.
GE intends to pursue a rulemaking activity in the near future to formalize their license by test approach.
General Comments The important safety issues highlighted from these meetings will be the subject of separate meetings between the staff and its consultants and DOE and its contractors.
These are already planned for the remainder of CY-86.
In CY-87 the staff is planning to review a preliminary Safety Information Document (PSID) and prepare an SER on each concept.
Following our review of these conceptual designs DOE's current plan is to submit (or have industry submit) an application (s) for a standard plant review.
Currently, it is projected these applications would take place in the 1989-1991 time frame.
9tisinalA1Mya Thomas L. King, Section Leader Safety Program Evaluation Branch Division of Safety Review & Oversight DISTRIBUTION /
POR Central File /
DSR0 Chron SPEB Rdg.
CAllen BSheron KKniel ZRosztoczy JSwift HHolz RColmar LSoffer RJohnson FEltawila DThatcher SShaukat PNorian EChelliah RCurtis, RES RAudette, RES MEl-Zeftawy, ACRS n
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AGENDA PRESENTATION TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ON THE SODIUM ADVANCED FAST REACTOR NOVEMBER 6,1985 l
l e I NTR O D U CTI O N..................................... B O B LA N C ET
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e PROGRAM OVERVIEW.............................. DICK JOHNSON i
e NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM DESIGN...... ERNIE BAUMEISTER e BALANCE OF PLANT DESIGN............................ BOB HREN 4
j e FABRICATION AND TRANSPORTATION............... ED GUENTHER J,
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- C O NSTR U CTI O N....................................... B O B H R EN
.O e SAFETY AND LICENSING............................. BOB LANCET 5
i e OPERABILITY AND AVAILABILITY............... ERNIE BAUMEISTER 1
e ECONOMICS...................................... DICK JOHNSON
- COMMERCIALIZATION PLANS AND ASSESSMENT..... DICK JOHNSON I
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BRIEFING FOR NRC ON CURRENT PAISM DESIGN (GE)
NOVEMBER 7, 1985, P-110 9:00 A.M.
INTRODUCTION G. L. SHERWOOD, (DOE) 9:05 A.M.
PROJECT SCHEDULE AND OBJECTIVES L. N. SALERNO 9:20 A.M.
OVERALLPLANTDESCRIPTION, F. E. TIPPETS REACTOR DESIGN 10:20 A.M.
IHTS DESIGN, REACTOR SERVICE C. E. BOARDMAN SYSTEMS 10:50 A.M.
BREAK 17:00 A.M.
OPERATIONS AND PLANT CONTROL C. E. BOARDMAN 11:20 A.M.
FUEL HANDLING, BALANCE OF PLANT C. N. SNYDER 11:50 A.M.
LUNCH 1:00 P.M.
CONSTRUCTION C. N. SNYDER 1:30 P.M.-
SAFETY AND RISK EVALUATIONS, N. W. BROWN
~
SAFETY TEST 2:30 P.M.
GENERAL DISCUSSION ALL 3:30 P.M.
ADJOURN 4
p NOVEMBER 7, 1985 PRISM DESIGN UPDATE NAME-ORGANIZATION TELEPHONE C. L. Allen NRR FTS 492-8345 R. 'J. Audette
.RES/DAE FTS 427-4689 R. J. Colmar NRR FTS 492-4446
' Neill Thomasson NRC/ POLICY EVALUATION 202-635-1328 George Sherwood DOE /NE FTS 233-4162 Farouk Eltawila NRC FTS 492-9488 Peter Williams NRR FTS 492-7648 Thomas L. King NRC/NRR FTS 492-7347 Owen Rothberg NRR-FTS 492-7864
' John H. Austin-NRR/0CM FTS 634-3308 Paul Norian NRR
'FTS 492-7487 M. P. Norin DOE /NE FTS 353-4518 Neil W. Brown GE 408-738-7787 Khalid Shaukat NRR FTS 492-4216 Lee N. Saleno GE 408-738-7860 R. M. Ketchell GE 202-637-4567 Med El-Zeftawy ACRS 202-634-3267 Brad Hardin NRR-FTS 492-8507 Chuck Boardman GE 408-738-7242
' Chuck Snyder BECHTEL 415-768-5622 Frank Tippets GE 408-738-7323'
.SMrK MEVIEW nuvEMBER 6, 1985 nAME ORGANIZAT1oN TELEPnvNt C.'L. Allen NRR '
ris 492-8345 R. J. nuaette RES/DAE FTS 427-4o39 R. J. Colmar NRR FTS 492-4446 D. Thatcher-NRK ris 492-9640
'G. J. VanTuyle BNL tis 066-7960 Marv norin DOE /NE FTS 233-4o18 Bill Novak BNL FTS 666-2627 Neill Thomassori nnt/ POLICY EVALUATION 4u2-635-1328 George.Sherwood 00E/NE Fis 433-4162 Bob Lancet ROCKWtLL ini'l 818-700-3640 Faroun citawila NRC FTS 492-9968 Peter Williams NMM rTS 492-7648 Ernie Baumeister ROCKWELL INT'l 816-iou-3032
. Thomas L.
sing NRC/NRR FTS 492-/09/
-0 wen Rotnuerg NRR FTS.492-7864 Joan H. Austin utM-FTS 634-3308 Paul Norfan NRR FTd 994-7487 H. n..dohnson
-AI 818-700-osu4 R. R. Hren BecnTEL 415-768-4263-E.-Guentner Lt 203-265-9365 T. P. Henry
-CE-203-cuo-4616
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