ML20141D088

Summary of 970423 Meeting W/Licensee in Killona,La to Discuss Design & Licensing Basis of Certain Essential Containment Isolation Sys at Plant.List of Attendees & Licensee Presentation Encl

ML20141D088
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	06/24/1997
From:	Chandu Patel NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
NUDOCS 9706260276
Download: ML20141D088 (16)

Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _...-. _ _.. _. _ _ _ _ __ _ _. _ _. _ _ _

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LICENSEE:

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

i FACILITY:

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

SUMMARY

OF MEETING WITH ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. ON THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMS DESIGN I

On April 23, 1997, members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff met with representatives of Entergy Operations, Inc. (E0I) at Waterford Steam 4

Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3), at Killona,~ Louisiana to discuss the design and licensing basis of certain essential containment isolation systems at Waterford 3.

This was a follow-up meeting from the meeting on March 21, 1997.

E01 provided a detailed planning to resolve the containment isolation issues for certain essential systems at Waterford 3.

The short term and long term resolutions for the Containment Spray (Penetration 34 and 35), Component Cooling Water to the Containment Fan Coolers, and Chemical and Volume Control System (Penetration 27) were discussed. The NRC staff provided its generic interpretation of the requirements for the containment isolation systems. The staff requested E01 to provide a detail submittal describing its approach in resolving the containment isolation issue for each system in question.

E0I j-indicated that it will submit a written response for each system in question.

A list of Attendees is provided in Enclosure 1.

A copy of E0I's presentation is provided in Enclosure 2.

Orig. signed by l

Chandu P. Patel, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-1 i

Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

Docket No. 50-382

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees

2. E01's Presentation i

cc w/encls:

See next page DISTRIBUTION:

/

HARD COPl E-MAIL Docket File SCollins/FMiraglia (SJC1/FJM)

RZimmerman (RPZ)

PUBLIC JRoe (JWR)

EAdensam (EGAl)

PD4-1 r/f CPatel (CPP)

CHawes (CMH2)

OGC JClifford (JWC)

PGwynn (TPG)

ACRS JKudrick (JAKl)

TPruett (TWP)

GPick (GAP)

Document Name: WAT42397.MTS 1

OFC PM/PD4-1 a LA/PD4-1

+

I NAME CPatel/vw CHawes 0/UN DATE 6/M97

[/X//97 COPY /YE3/N0 YES/N0 I

0FFICIAL RECORD COPY l

-l 9706260276 970624 PDR ADOCK 05000382 P

PDR i

4%g%

UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION

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WASHINGTCN, D.C. 30566 4 001 l

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,o8 June 24, 1997 LICENSEE:

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

FACILITY:

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

SUMMARY

OF MEETING WITH ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. ON THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMS DESIGN j

l On April 23, 1997, nembers of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff met witn representative of Entergy Operations, I-(E01) at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3), at Killes.4

)uisiana to discuss the design and licensing basis of certain essential

.cainment isolation systems at Waterford 3.

This was a follow-up meeting from the meeting on March 21, 1997. E01 provided a detciled planning W resolve the containment isolation issues for certain essentfal systems at katerford 3.

The short term and long term resolutions for the Containment Spray (Penetration 34 and 35), Component Cooling Water to the Containment Fan Coolers, and Chemical at;d Volume Control System (Penetration 27) were discussed. The NRC staff provided its generic interpretation of the requirements for the cortainment isolation systems.

The staff rec;uetted E01 to provide a detail submittal describing its approach in resolving the containment isolation issue for och system in question.

E01 indicated that it will submit a written response for each system in question.

A list of Attendees is provided in Enclosure 1.

A copy of E01's presentation is provided in Enclosure 2.

wh 0 f Chandu P. Patel, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-382

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees

2. E01's Presentation cc w/entis: See next page l

l l

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W 4A m-a Entergy Operations, Inc.

Waterford 3 I

cc:

Administrator Regional Administrator, Region IV Louisiana Radiation Protection Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 82135 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2135 Arlington, TX 76011 i

Vice President, Operations Resident Inspector /Waterford NPS Support Post Office Box B22 Entergy Operations, Inc.

Killona, LA 70066 P. O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286 Parish President Coun. 1 i

St. Charles Parish Director P. O. Box 302 Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs Hahnville, LA 70057 Entergy Operations, Inc.

P. O. Box B Executive Vice-Prrsident Killona, LA 70066 and Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.

1 Wise,. Carter, Child & Caraway P. O. Box 31995 i

P. O. Box 651 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Jackson, MS 39205 Chairman 4

General Manager Plant Operations Louisiana Public Service Commission Entergy Operations, Inc.

One American Place, Suite 1630 P. O. Box B Baton Rouge, LA 70825-1697 i

Killona, LA 70066 Licensing Manager Vice President Operations Entergy Operations, Inc.

Entergy Operations, Inc.

i P. O. Box B P. 0.' Box B Killona, LA 70066 Killona, LA 70066 1

4 Winston & Strawn i

1400 L Street, N.W.

j Wachington, DC 20005-3502 J

4 i

5 1

Y

MEETING ATTENDEES APRIL 23. 1997 MEETING WITH E01 l

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM AT WATERFORD 3 4

5 E

101 C. Patel A. J. Wrape, III - E0I G. Pick L. Rushing - E01 T. Pruett P. L. Caropino - E01 J. Kudrick K. Walsh -E01 D. Ortego - E01 D. Gamble - E01 M. A. Groome - E01 G. S. Matharu - E0I R. Weicks - EDI D. Viener - E01 E. C. Ewing, III - E0I P. V. Prasankumar - E01 P. M. Melancon - E01

PENETRATIONS 34 & 35 - CONTAINMENT SPRAY DESIGN / LICENSING BASIS-i i

+ GDC 56 PENETRATION Check Valve inside Containment (CS-128A&B) e Solenoid Valve inside Containment (CS-129A&B, parallel to CS-128) e AOV Outside Containment (CS-125A&B) i auto open on CSAS remote manual to close j

air accumulator capable of maintaining closure for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (minimum) j i

+ CLOSED WATER FILLED SYSTEM OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (not credited as iaolation barrier in meeting GDC 56)

CS system does not communicate with the outside atmosphere l

Sl-107A&B, RWSP outlet check valves are a leak tested boundary valve CS piping outside contairiment is located within the Controlled Ventilation Area System (CVAS) boundary piping will be water filled post-accident safety class 2 shutoff valves isolate CS system branch piping f

i designed to Safety Class (SC) 2 requirements e

all CS piping outside of containment designed to SC 2

]

appropriate class breaks taken on branch lines j

designed for iriternal pressure and temperature greater than 1

e 1

containment design conditions minimum design conditions,300 psig @ 190*F can withstand lossv i :oolant accident transient and environment j

e j

ESF system desiw.ad to operate post-LOCA i

designed to Seismic Category i requirements j

all CS piping outside of containment designed seismic cat. l appropriate class breaks taken on branch lines l

not susceptible to overpressurization from thermal expansion when isolated ref. design guide AMEC-D-007 for analysis (T

<150*F) i 4

is protected against a high energy line break outside of containment j

analysis documented in FSAR 3.6.A.2 b

(Note: the above design meets the criteda for a closed system Wside ntainment per ANSI N271-1976, which is endorsed by Reg. *iu dc : 141.)

l ENCLOSURE 2 1

PENETRATIONS 34 & 35 - CONTAINMENT SPRAY 4

DESIGN / LICENSING BASIS (cont.):

i e

l

+ APPENDIX J TYPE C TEST NOT REQUIRED closed water filled system outside containment system included {n the TMI leak reduction program loop seal exists after RAS l

ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

+ OUTSIDE CIV's, CS-125A&B cannot override CSAS e

l fall open AOV with < 30 day air supply l

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

l l

+ PROVIDE REMOTE MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY TO.CS-125A&B i

DC-3523 will be implemented during this refueling outage (RFE) *

+ PROVIDE CS-125A&B WITH SAFETY RELATED CLOSURE CAPABILITY FOR 30 DAY.9 DC-3523 (phase 11) to be implemented during next refueling outage (RFC)

t PENETRATIONS 34 & 35 - CONTAINMENT SPRAY COMPENSATORY ACTIONS (cont.):

i

+ ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS TO CLOSE CS-117A&B (if required)

CS-117 is located upstream of CS-125 CS-117 is a stop check valve accessible after 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> post-accident JUSTIFICATION FOR COMPENSATORY ACTIONS:

+ ACTIONS DO NOT COMPROMISE CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY containment integrity is maintained after a single active failure e

+ TWO ISOLATION BARRIERS EXIST WITH CS-125 FAILED OPEN closed water filled system outside containment e

inside containment isolation valves, CS-128A&B, CS-129A&B e

+ ADDITIONAL BARRIERS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Shutdown Cooling HX Outlet Stop Check, CS-117A&B Shutdown Cooling HX Outlet isolation to RWSP, CS-118A&B CS Pump Discharge Stop Check, CS-111 A&B RWSP Outlet Header Check, SI-107A&B

+ PROCEDURES EXIST TO RESTORE INSTRUMENT AIR POST-ACCIDENT ability to close CS-125 may be restored (when power is available) e

W3F1-96-0207 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM - PENETRATIONS 34 cnd 35 EflCLOSURE 1 (CSASIRAS' Alignment Shown)

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RWSP swi7aae

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CVAS BOUNDARY,,,,; pg Dh_,nmem

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staanse Eg 2] storage cs.1toNun }Z 9

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CS A(8) a: E4 pg 1 I Typical for'Penskelon 35 To Safetyinjection Shutdown Coohng Headers Notes:

1) Prior to a RAS, communication with the containment atmosphere will not occur by ensunng the system is water filled downstream of a

CS-117A(B) assuming a smole faalure of a Containment Spray Pump.

' 2) After a RAS, communscation with the containment atmosphere will not occur sece a loop seal will exist between the Safety injection Swn, ano me conia.nm ni Spear e.o., ensunna me system is FIGURE 1 n

water hiled.

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ll PENETRATION 27 - CHARGING i

e DESIGN / LICENSING BASIS:

i 1

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+ GDC 55 PENETRATION i

j Inside Containment (parallel valves)

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Solenoid Valves, CVC-218A&B for RCS Loops 1 A and 2A post-accident position is open remote manual to close l

Solenoid Valves, CVC-216A&B f or Aux. Spray l

locked closed i

Check Valve, CVC-219 provides overpressure protection when CIVs are closed i

AOV Outside Containment (CVC-209) normally locked open i

post-accident position is open remote manual to close no air accumulator, non-1E power i

j

+ CLOSED WATER FILLED SYSTEM OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (not credited j

as an isolation barrier in meeting GDC 55) does not communicate with the outside atmosphere j

piping will be water filled post-accident j

multiple barriers (safety class 2) exist to prevent through system leakage, including positive displacement pumps safety class 2 shutoff valves isolate CVC system branch piping i

designed to Safety Class (SC) 2 requirements entire loop (letdown and charging) designed to SC 2 designed for internal pressure and temperature greater than e

containment design conditions charging design conditions,3125 psig @ 250 F can withstand loss-of coolant accident transient and environment ESF system designed to operate post-LOCA

l l

PENETRATION 27 - CHARGING DESIGN / LICENSING BASIS (cont.):

I designed to Seismic Category I requirements entire loop (letdown and charging) designed seismic cat. l not susceptible to overpressurization from thermal expansion when isolated ref. design guide AMEC-D-007 for analysis (Te <150 F) is protected against a high energy line break outside of containment e

analysis documented in FSAR 3.6.A.2 (Note: the above design meets the criteria for a closed system outside containment per ANSI N271-1976, which is endorsed by Reg. Guide 1.141.)

+ APPENDIX J TYPE C TEST NOT REQUIRED closed water filled system outside containment e

CVC-209 stem leakage included in the TMI leak reduction program ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

+ OUTSIDE CIV CVC-209 air required to close non-1E solenoid in air supply to actuator e

fall open AOV with no accumulator e

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

+ PROVIDE CVC-209 WITH SAFETY RELATED CLOSURE CAPABILITY FOR 30 DAYS

. DC-3529 (to be implemented during RF9)

7 _._._. _.__ _ _ _ -

PENETRATION 27 - CHARGING' COMPENSATORY ACTIONS:

+ ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS TO CLOSE CVC-208 (if required) i

)

CVC-208 is located upstream of CVC-209 l

i i

JUSTIFICATION FOR COMPENSATORY ACTIONS:

l

+ ACTIONS DO NOT COMPROMISE CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY i

containment integrity is maintained after a single active failure j

i, t

j

+ TWO ISOLATION BARRIERS EXIST WITH CVC-209 FAILED OPEN f

closed system outside containment j

inside containment isolation valves, CVC-218A&B,216A&B,219 e

+ ADDITIONAL BARRIERS INSIDE CONTAINMENT 1

CParging to RC Loop 1 A & 2A Check Valves, CVC-221 A&B

+ ADDITIONAL BARRIERS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT CVC-208 can be manually closed (accessible area)

Charging Pump Discharge Check Valves, CVC-194A,B,A/B Charging Pumps (positive displacement pumps) e RWSP to Charging Suction isolation Valve, CVC-507 RWSP to Charging Suction Check Valve, CVC-508 Emergency Boration Header Check Valve, BAM-135

+ PROCEDURES EXIST TO RESTORE INSTRUMENT AIR POST-ACCIDENT ability to close CVC-209 may be restored (if power is available) can restore power to valve operator (A/B sups) e

i i

W3F1-96-0207 CHEMICAL cnd VOLUME CONTROL - CHARGING SYSTEM ENCLOSURE $

i PENETRATION 27 RWSP

{SIASINo RAS Alignment Shown) i From BAMT

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