ML20140G433

Requests That Encl Info,Re Licensee 10CFR50.59 Evaluation of Elimination of Environ Qualification of Mechanical Components,Be Placed in PDR

ML20140G433
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	06/12/1997
From:	Alexion T NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
TAC-M98912, TAC-M98913, NUDOCS 9706160234
Download: ML20140G433 (29)

Text

. - - , -. . _ . - - .

t o wrv g  % UNITED STATES s* 'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2 WASHINGTON, D.C. 2006H001

\*****/ June 12,1997 i NOTE T0: PD IV-1 File FROM: homAlexion Project Directorate IV-1 l

, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV

] Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

LICENSEE'S 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATION OF ELIMINATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION (EQ) 0F MECHANICAL COMPGidNTS (TAC NOS. M98912 AND M98913)

I requested the licensee to provide the above subject document. The purpose

+

of this memo is to place this information in the public document room. i 1

l Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499 l 1

Attachment:

As stated l

)

1 DISTRIBUTION:

Docket File i PUBLIC (PDR) l WBeckner i TAlexion '

yg 00C. NAME: STP98912.N0T j l

\

4

' l 1

I j

4..

..na BC fu CENTER COPY 9706160234 970612 PDR P ADOCK 05000498 ppg I

~- ,

t l

? . e

- %aw Plant Operations Review Committee 3009M 99 PORC REVIEW COVER SHER 1

Originsting Document No. USOE 95-0044 _ Revision No. 0 l TITLE UFSAR CN-1990 Elimination of The Environmental Oualification of The Mechanical Components At STP The PORC has reviewed this item and has determined that (check as appropriate) : 1 It does oss E2I involve an UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

It does / oes d E2I adversely impact plant nuclear safety, l l

It does does E2I adversely impact the health and safety of' plant personnel or the public. .

l l

l It does does E2I require further review by the Plant Egr, the NSRB, or l other individutis/ groups.

M 1 ant Mgr # SRB N other, specify below.

U1 / U2 1 REMARKS M /I jT N e

8/1 S oho fLD Y /

I l

i The PORC recommendo this item for APPROVAL DISAPPROVAL OTHER PORC MEETING NO. N '60/

Complet,ed by O 87 4 DATE / 2 - 2 0 - 9 f" PORC Secretary -

This form, when completed, SHALL be retained in accordance with the retention j requirements of the originating document.

4 'gT I 96 00'00 H a A ATTACHMENT I l

l l

> e -

OPGP05 ZA-0002 Rev.3 '

Page 40 of 43 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Form 2 Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluation Form Page 1 of 4 Unrenewed Safety Question Evaluation e 95-0044 Revision No. o ORIGINATING DOCUMENT: FSAR CN 1993 REV.NO.ky n NOTE: A".ach 10CFR50.59 Screening Form or Ucense Comptiance review Form to this USOE. h[$g [ Jg g "

NOTE: Use addisonal sheets as necessary to provide the bases b~ -

W %)" <

A.1 1 Does the subject of this evaluatlon increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report? YES

{NO

Bases

The proposed change applies to safety related 'Actve' & ' Passive' mechanical components located in a harsh environment. These components are req; ired to mitgate the consequences of an accident, shutdown the reactor and ensure the integrity cf the reactor coo! ant boundary by maintaining it in a safe shutdown cond Son. These components also povide post accident monitoring end pressure boundary retention funct:ons. Elimination of MEO program will not after the equipment function or the physical configuration. 7he preventive maintenance, surveillance and periodic testing program currendy in place at STP ensure equipment operability, detects. equipment ag!ng mechanisms and inltates necessary corrective maintenance. The Pmurement Progmm has been enhanced to ensure new parts comply to GDC 4. Therefore, the probability of oocu'rence of an accident pre,iously evaluated in the SAR will not increase due to the elimination of j the MEO program.

1 i 11 Does the subject of this evaluation increase the consequonees of an accident previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report? YES X NO  ;

The proposed change applies to ' Active' & ' Passive' rnochanical components located in a harsh environment. Elimination of I Bases

MEO program will not alter the equipment function or the physical configuration. These camponents are required to mitgate the  ;

consequences of an accident, shutdown the reactor and ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant boundary by maintaining it in a sa'e )

shutdown condton. These components also provide post accident monitoring and presstre boundary retention functions. The preventive maintenance program, which includes maintenance, survemance and periodic testing in accordance with RG 1.33 current:y in place at STP i ensure the equipment operabity, detects aging mechanisms and initiates necessary corrective maintenance. The Procurement Program has been enhanced to ensure new parts comp!y to GDC-4. Therefore, the consequences of aa accident at STP previously eva!uated in the 1 SAR wtl not increase dae to the elimination of the MEO program.

lll Does the subject of this evaluation increase the probability cf occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety prev!ously eva!usted le. - -

i YES X NO l the Safety Analysis Report?

' Bases: The objective of the EO Program is to ensure equipment operabilty during normtl, accident and post accident environmental condtons and eliminate common rnode failures. Applicable design standards, preventive mantenance, periodic inspection, surveillance testing. procurernent control, trending and corrective action programs are adequate to maintan the mechanicat eqdoment in the best operating condton and thus the eqJlpment operabiht) and the p! ant safety is assured and ir, comptiance w!!h GDC- 4. Therefore, the p! ant safety is not compromised by the elimination of the environmental quahf. cation prog'am for mechanicat equipment.

l 4 The operability of mechanical equipment is primarily maintained by the metatlie parts which are una'fected by radiation and other

environmental aging condtons. Some of the encapsulated non metallic parts in the meenanical equipment are only exposed to the intemal process con 6tions which remain same during normal and DBE condit'ons Therefore, the induced failures du'ing normal and accident  !

extemal conditions remain the same for these non-metallic parts. The primary function of the non-meta 10c pa'ts in mechanical components is  !

to minimize wear and prwide lubricaton. Aging of rnechanical equipment is primarily due to operational wear, metal:ic corrosion and erosion I and secondari!y dae to be deyadation of non-meta!!ic parts (Refer to EPRI document ANP 3877). To comp!y with GDC-4, an evaluation of l non meta!!ie parts in mechanical equipment has been performed at STP based on fnermal and radiation effect analysis: !! concluded that l out of 2578 safety related mechanical components,2527 components do not require replacements or refurbishment during the 40 year hfe of i the piant and therefore do not reqJire any EO related maintenance activites. V&h the Preventive Maintenance and Surveillance programs in place at STP, operabilty and aging deyadarons are verti,ed for mechanical equipment through periodic surveillance testng and necessary maintenance is performed to keep the equipment in the best operat:ng cond! ton. In ad6 tion to the above, tren6ng and corre0tve action

. programs are also in place at STP to identify operational impacts and to prevent any recurrences of adverse condtons. Procurement

' contro!s are in place to address environment efiocts and design application for pa'ts replacementshefurbishment of mechanical equipment.

Therefore, the elimination of MEO progra'n will not increase the probability of a ma! function for an equipment important to safety more than previous!y evaluated under STP UFSAR.

i i OPGP05-ZA-0002 Rev.3 Page 41 of 43 100FR50.59 Ev:luations Form 2 Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluation Forrn Page 2 of 4 UnreAewed Safety Question Evatation s95-004 4 Revision No. O Originating Document No. FSAR CN 1990 Rev. No. O N Does the subject of this evaluation increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the _ _

YES X NO Safety Analysis Report?

Bases: The elimination of Mechanical Equipment Qualitcation program will not increase the consequences of a ma'! unction of equipment important to safety. (Refer to response for item A.1, Ill.)

A.2 1 Does the subject of the evaluation create the possibility of an accident of a 4

different type than any previously eva!usted in the Safety Analysts Report? RYES X NO Bases: The proposed change app!!es to ' Active' &

• Passive' mechanical components located in a harsh environment. These components are required to midgate the consequences of an accident, shutdown the reactor and ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant boundary by maintaining it in a safe shutdown conditon. These components also provide post accident monitoring and pressure boundary retention functions. Elimination of the MEO program w!!! not alter the equ!pment, its function and the plant physical con $guration.

. Therefore, an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in he SAR is not a possibility.

11 Does the subject of this evaluation create the possibility of a different type

cf malfunction than any previously evaluated in the Safety Ana!ysis Report? ,

X YES NO  !

Beses: The proposed change applies to ' Active' & ' Passive' mechanical components located in a harsh environment. These

! components are required to mitgate the consequences of an accident, shutdown the reactor and ensures the Integrity of the reactor cootant bounda'y by maintaining it in a sale shutdown cond; tion. These components also provide post accident monitoring and pressure boundary )

retention functions. Eliminaton of the MEO program w!!! not altec the equipment, its function and the plant physical configuration.

Therefore, a malft.nction of the safety related mechanical equipment, different from the type previously evaluated in the SAR vdll not be created.

A.3 1 Does the subject of this evaluation reduce the margin of safety as defined NO YES X In the basis for any Technical Speelfications?

Bases: The proposed changes in the STP EO Program will not reduce he margin of safety as de$ned in ETechnic based on the totlowing:

(a) All safety re!ated mechanical components have been verited to comply with 10CFR50, Apperdx A G00-4.

Safety Related MEQ components have been analyzed to ensure that these components are capable of w!!hstanding normal operating and postulated accident conditons.

STP Surveillance Program is in place to verify the operability of safety related mechanical equipment with non-(b) meta!!ic parts.

Environmental Equipment Qualification is not required for rnechanical components w!1h all metallic parts because (c) there is no age sensilve material.

(d)

Procurement controls are in place to ensure compliance w!!h design requirements for part rep!acements in l mechanleal components.

Under STP preventive rnaintenance program an in-service inspection of equipment is conducted to prevent (e) equipment failures by detecting age related degradation of the equipment / component.

Based on the above it is concluded that maintaining a MEO program at STP does not increase the safety rnargin as defined in the Technical Specification and therefore the MEO can be safely elirninated from the STP EQ program imammmes am

, , OPGP05oZA 0002 Rev.3 Page 42 of 43 l

10CFR50.59 Evaluations  !

Form 2 Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluation Form Page 3 of 4 Unteviewed Safety Question Evaliation 8 95-004 4 Revision No. O Originating Document No. FSAA CN - 1990 Rev. No. O SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

10CFR50 Appen6x A, GDC 1 & 4, requires, that ' Components important to safety shall be designed to accommodate the effects and be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with the postulated accidents, including loss of coolant accidents", )

To date STP has ma!ntained MEO database and continuously performs analysis to establish compliance with GDC-1 & 4. STP MEO database includes results of material ana'ysis quatincation documentation and EQ related maintenance requirements.

STP review of 'the MEO elimination programs' by other utilites has revealed that in order to assure compfiance with GDC 4, activities to l maintain the MEO program are no longer required The STP Procurement and Maintenance / Surveillance pograms have been greatly enhanced since the sme of original licensing and are adequate to justify operability and compliance of mechanical equipment with GDC 4.

i j

The proposed change affects the method described in the UFSAR regarding MEO. However, the UFSAR change retects comptiance of mechanical equipment with 100FR50 Append.x A, GDC- 4 through STP Procurement and Maintenance /Survetilance programs. This 10CFR50.59 evaluaUon wl:1 be used for UFSAR changes, i

the elimination of the Environmental quali6 cation program for Mechanical Equipment does not increase the probabiSty of an accident 1 previously evaluated in the UFSAR. Compliance with it e GDC 4 for Mechanical Active Components is established through non-metallic )

pads analysis. As a result of this proposed change in the STP EQ program, compilance with the GDC 4 requirements is established through the evaluation of non-metal lic parts in the mechanical components based on the FIT, FORM & FUNCTION methodology used in the item Equivalency Evalua00n and the Commercial Grade dedication process of the STP Procurement Program.

i Safety related ' Mechanical Passive components

• are only required to rnaintain pressure boundary. The failure of the pressure boundary has no detrimental ettects on the safety operaSon of these valves.

A Preventive Maintenance Program to include maintenance, survelliance and periode testing of mechanical equipment in accordance with RG 1.33, has been imp'emented at STP to preserve qualiScation. The STP PM program is designed to ensure best operaSng cond1ons of mechanical components by identifying and preventing signlicant age related deyattaSon of non metallic parts. Measures have been p'a0ed in the STP PM program to maintain the sa'ety integrity of parts in the mechanical components. Review of the vendor maintenance instn.ctions in conjuncGon with other ' Reference documents' are required to prepare a PM. Any PM deferral or cancellation requires engineering evaluation to determine life expectancy of the parts.

Review of the current MEQ documentation (EOCP-M,EO-1 & 2), EQ design criteria and other aging data on equipment degmdation due to temperature and ra$ation has been accomplished Results of this review ensured adequate rnargin exist in the design and operation of the mechanical components under normal, abnormal and accident conditons, to support the PM program and justify compliance to GDC-4.

l For a new mechanical component, vendor ceni5 cation (Certicate of Compliance) based on material aging will be obtained to ensure operability under speci6ed environmental condNons.

The results of the above evaluation have indicated hat the elim! nation of the Mechanical E0 program will not impact safety or intended function of the affected equipment and that no "Unreviewed SafMy Question (US0) exists". The allm1 nation of the Mechanical EO program will not alter any plant system, components and structures and comp!!ance with 100FR50 Appendix A, GDC-4,is maintained through other existing programs at STP.

I 1

1 l

l 1

OPGP05-ZA-0002 Rew 3 Page 43 of 43 100FR50.59 Evaluations Form 2 Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluation Form Page 4 of 4 Unreviewed Safety Question Evaliaton # 95-004 4- Revir, ion No. U 0:iginatng Document No. FSAR CN .1990 Rev.No. O B. 1. . All of the above questions were answered No; therefore, the originating document does D21 involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. .

2. One or rnore of the above questions was marked YES; therefore, the originating document involves an Unreviewed Safety Question. The originating document, as presented, shall NOT be implemented withot,1 j prior approval by the NRC. Provide a recommendation for dspositon of the Unreviewed Safety Question below. Refer to OPGP05 ZA 0004 for processing licensing amendments. Further processing of this form i

to the PORC, Plant Manager and NSRB is DQ1 required. Notify Procedure Control that the evaluation involved an Unreviewed Safety Question so that Procedure Control can close the USOE number.

i

! RECOMMENDED D:SPOSITION:

l l 1

l

)

! l

4 l l PREPARED BY

@ $ 0 Ep i

ORIG!NATOS' j

r Date i ),

REVIEWED BY: J, m __/A n g J r-l Date 7/ / ~ QUAUFIED REVIEWER i APP.".0VED BY: /A- //-Td'

DEPARTMEtR MANAGER Date .

I I

PORC MEETING NO. 9f- Olo/ /h-dD-9[

Date l

APPROVED BY

m $ d ///f,, , / Sp

' ~~~

Date

'T/.4NT MANAGER l REMARKS:

4 J

I l

l i

I *

• OPGP05 ZA 0002 Rev.2 1 Pano 37 ot 43 i 10CFR50.59 Evaluations '.

Form 1 10CFR50.59 Screening Form Page 1 of 3 UNIT st / UFSAR CN DESIGN CHANGE OTHER UNIT 82 Z ' '

/ BOTH ORGINATING DOCUMENT NO. UFSAR CHANGE NOTICE #CN 1990 REV.NO. 0 4

)

• j DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: To do!ete all requirements pertaining to Environmental Quali$ cation of Safety Related Mechanical Equipment from Sections 3.6. 3.9,3.11,3.11N. 6.2, and Table 3.113 & 4 of the UFSAR. l PREUMtNARY SCREENING 4.

YES NO l 1

l 1. Does the proposed change represent a change to the Plant Technical Speci5 cations? g / ,

1

} 2. Is an Unreviewed Safety Question known to be associated with the subject change? /  !

! 1 4

NOTE: If 'YES' to either questions 1 or 2 refer to OPGP05 2N4004. i i

Does the proposed change represent. .

3. A change to only correct a typographical, edtorial or drafting error? /

4. A change which is identical to and addressed in its entirety by an existing approved 10CFR50.59 i ScreeninpVSOE or NRC approved licensing submittal?  !

7 l

5. A spare or replacement part/ component change with an equivalent part/ component? ./

(See Section 2.3 for a definition of equivaient) l

6. A con 5paration change within existing design speci5 cations? , /

.. - 1 I

I

!! all answers to the above questions are *N0* perform 1he Enal screenirig and mark N/A in the approval blocks below.

If the answer to any question (3) through (6) is 'YES' a 6nal screening is not necessary. ,

1 Sign approval blocks below and dscard pages 2 and 3.

Provide a justification and references !! any of items (3) through (6) is answered ,'YES'. l i

Psepared by: N/A l Originator Date Approved by: N/A Oualified Reviewer Date

4 OPGP05 ZA-0002 Rev.2 Pago.as et 43 10CFR50.59 Evaluations ,

Form 1 10CFR50.59 Screening Form Page 2 of 3 FINAL SCREENING in response to the questions below,if the change involves something that is not described in the SAR and is not part of the licensing bas!s, the *fiQ* ls appropriate. However, this decision must be clearly documented with adequate technical justi6 cation for sach quesGon ar4 the secGons reviewed of app!!cabte documents and applicab!e attributes reviewed should be indicated. The ksting of attnbutes and documents for 10CFR50.59 screening can be found in Addendam 5. -

interdscipline Coordination Required? / YES NQ'

, ll 'yes', obtain appropriate concurrence. r ,

1

] R'sk and Reliab:lity Analysis ]Thermat Hydraulics ] Reactor Engr.

4 4

Ovil Mech

] Elect REQ / Other Ucensimg 3 YES NO

1. Does the subject of this review involve a change to the facility as described in the Safety Analysis Report?

{ ]

4 The crocosed change io the STP EO orocram imoarts the current methodotoov described in 15e UFSAR by wt9eh STP has gmm!!1ad to comotv v/th 10CFR50 Acoandix A. GDC 1 & 4. The methodo!oov is used to ensure that any safety retalad mechanica' ecutoment is canable of Wthstanding any costulated environmantaf condifons and oeriormino its intended safety

, function. .

2. Does the subject of this review involve a change to the procedures as described in the Safety Analysis Report? Refer to OPAP012A 0103.

] R This oroposed chance dws not hvolve a chanoo to the olant ooerational orocedures.

tince EO orocedu'es are not descr! bed in the SAR. ,

maammmmes sus-mmmmmmmmmmmmismmmmmmme um-

-. 4 m

l OPGP05 ZA 0002 Rev 2 Pago 38 of 4

, 10CFR50.59 Evaluations .

l

Form 1 100FR50.59 Screening Form Page 3 of 3 1 4

1

~

YES No 4

3. Does the subject of this review propose he conduct ollest or experiments not desaibed in Ine Safety Analysts Report ? ] { '

l 1

- I i ' The orocosM chance is to eliminate Mechanical EO orocram. The orocosed chance does . )

not involve any test or ernefiment that is not described or oreviousiv annivred in the SAR / ,

i  :

i i i

. I 1

) 4. Does the proposed change affect cond6ons or bases assumed in the Safety Analysis Report i or safety related fundons of equipment / systems, even though the proposed change does not ,/

entail any physical change in existing structures, systems, or procedures as described in the - -

l 1 SAR? , l l

l ,

1 j

The orocosed chance doas not n'fect the bases astumed in the SAR or safSv related function i of tha mechanical co& ment. The STP MEO orocram is dasioned to como!v with 10CFR50 i Accendix A. GDC-4 by vefvino the ability of the mechanical ecoloment to cedorm its It20 ired safety fumetions vAen exmsed to costutated environments. Throuch the orocosed chance. the verification for mechanical eeuloment comoliance W1h GDC 1 & 4

! Wii be shifted from fMO oroyam to the Procurement and Maintenance. Spe!!ance and occiod e testino otoarams in accordance Wth RG 1.33 l J

l I l

I if any answer is afkrmative, complete the screening form and periorm an Unreviewed Safety Ouestion Evaluation. -

j  !! al; answers are negative, no Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluation is required.

Prepare by: s L amar K. Mukherjee) 12/05/95

/ Orig!nator Date Approved by: //y jy jpg Jeffrey P.Carbone 12/05/95

//Y Oualified Reviewer Date l

i

x

. O i l OPGP05-ZN-0004 19ev. 2 i

Pagm 24 cI 2D Chang:s to Licensing Basis Docum:nts and Amendments to the Opgrating Licanes l Form 1 Licensing Document Change Request (Sample) Page 1 of 1 l Change Number: CN-1990 _ Date 12/05/95 30lA-3ISS Originator: SAMAR K. MUKHERJEE 4,Y Dept DED/EO ,

j h

e

! Change

Description:

Revise UFSAR Sections 8 39 3.11: 3.11N: 6.2 and Table 3.11-3 & 4 to delete aff

aq'Atg'nents li certainino to Environmental Qualification of Safety Refated Mechanical Ecoioment.

Initiating Documentation: (1) Refer to the attached "Encineerina Evaluation and Justification for the 2

deletion of the Environmental EO orocram for Safetv Related Mechanical Eculpnient at STP".

(2) 10CFFi50.59 Evaluation and USOE-95-0044 orovides a detaillustification.

i USOE Number: 95-0044 o?cPo3-24-oo 12.

1 Unit (s) Affected: Unit 1 */2*h5 Unit 2 idtb oPGPot-7 e -oc72, Rev.S Implementation Status: Unit 1 Completion Date ik2*hs Unit 2 Completion Date f,28It6 1%

CR %-tH25 Reviewed and Approved by 5M 8 f, l g Enginscr, Nuclear Licensing Date Reviewed and Approved by tJA (ER, UFSAR 2.1, 2.2, 2.3) Manager, Effluent and Waste Management Date Reviewed by rJA i (OOAP changes only) General Manager, Nuclear Assurance & Ucensing Date W Eaku C 4> c% M GbC-4 ,ep.we.h b' 3 wptten AL ste,sp> 9- y

• Aeu s. ge.fr 1ppn.-e,.,ta u. orse unc-%, m.4.413 ,g S.Ahku.$5 goP.g l

. _ . . _ <-._m - . - . - _.- _ . . _ _ _ _ -

. U.

([ tJ.199 0 STPECS UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

CHAPTER 3 DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT, AND SYSTEMS

• Section I,111g g ,

3.10N.3 Method and Procedures for Qualifying Supports

of Elactrical Equipment and Instrumentation 3.10N-4 '

3.10N.4 Operating Licanse Review 3.10N-4 .

3.11 ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 3.11-1 J 3.11.1 Equipment Identification and Environmental l Conditions 3.11-1 j 3.11.2 Qualification Tests and Analyses 3.11-2 3.11.2.1 Qualification Requirements to Vendor 3.11-3 3.11.3 Qualification Test Results 3.11 4

3.11.4 Loss of Ventilation 3.11-4 3.11.5 Estimated Chamical and Radiation Environment 3.11-4 3.11.5.1 Chemical Environment 3.11-4 3.11.5.2 Radiation Environment 3.11-5 1 3.11N ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN OF 6I"""""" "'h .

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT (NSSS) 3.11N-1 j 3.11N.1

• Equipment Identification and Environ-i mental Conditions 3.11N-1 j

3.11N.2 Qualification Test and Analysis 3.11N-1 3.11N.2.1 Environmental Qualification Criteria 3.11N-1 3.11N.2.2 Performance Requirements for Environ-3 mental Qualification 3.11N-2  ;

3.11N.2.3 Methods and Procedures for Environmental '

Qualification -

3.11N-2 i 3.11N.3 Qualification Program Results 3.11N-2

! 3.11N.4 Loss of Ventilation 3.11N-2 )

, 3.11N.5 Estimated' Chemical and Radiation  !

Environment 3.11N-2

-3.11M.5 - 2.. 1. . . t;1 Q ;11 iv.wivu  !...

L:nierl * - )

i Equiy ...t 3.11N-E-4L--

~

3.12 CONFORMANCE WITH NRC REGUIATORY CUIDES 3.12-1 3.12.1 Regulatory Guide 1.121 3.12 1 3.12.2 Regulatory Guide 1.2 3.12-2 TC 3-25 Revision y -

w w

STPEGS UFSAR-B Floodina High energy lines located inside the MAB are limited to auxiliary '

steam, liquid waste processing and CVCS piping. A break in these ,

ilnes will be detected by redundant temperature elements when a  ;

rise in area temperature occurs following the postulated event. __ ,i Break flow will be terminated by automatic isolation valves on

-~

these lines (see Sections 9.3.4.1.3.5 and 9.5.9.3 for additional -

- details). No essential components required for safe shutdown will be flooded as a result of an AS or liquid waste processing line break. In the case of a CVCS line break, damage as a result of flood!ng will be lirnited to equipment located in the vicinity of .

l the break. The redundant CVCS train would be available for safe shutdown. An evaluation has been performed that demonstrates that even if all of CVCS is assumed to be lost as.a result of the  :

event, safe shutdown can stin be achieved.  :

Flooding of both reactor makeup water pumps as a result of the failure of a nonseismic Category I pipe in the reactor makeup  !

water tank compartment has also been analyzed. Detaus are .

provided in Section 9.1.3.3.2.

C. Pressure / Temperature l

Subcompartment pressure and temperature analysis has been ,

performed for the high energy breaks postulated for the CVCS ,

letdown and the AS piping using conservative non-mechanistic or

' break everywhere" criteria. The methodology used is similar to l

~ the methodology used in the IVC subcompartment evaluation -

described in Appendix 3.6.A.The analysis for the MAB took credit for the safety-related high temperature detectors and associated isolation valve interlocks in the affected areas that Iltnit the mass and energy release.'

Pressure and temperature profiles for the letdown heat exchanger (HX) room (Figure 1.2-26) are presented in Figures 3.6.2-5 and 3.6.2-6. .

The result of the subcornpartment ainagis is used as the basis for the environmental qualification oIG.r.M r.d]plectrical equipment (Section 3.11) as well as factored into the design of affected structures.

3.6.B.3 Reactor Contalranent Buildina (RCB). .

Break Locations A. Partial stress summaries and break types for the Containment High Energy Piping Systems are presented in Table 3.6.2-1. ,

B. Break locations and types are shown for the Containment High Energy Piping Systems in Figure 3.6.1-1.

3.6.B-3 Revisio 5

i a t STPECS UFSAR i 3.9.3.2.1 Pumo and Valve Ooerability Assurance (NSSS Scoce):

Mechanical equipment classified as safety-related must be capable of

, performing its function under postulated plant conditions. Equipment with j faulted condition functional requirements includes active pumps and valves, in fluid systems such as the Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS), Safety Injection System (SIS), and Containment Spray System (CSS). While seismic ' '

l analysis demonstrates the structural integrity of the active pump and valve j . assembly, operability is assured by satisfying the requirements of the Westinghouse Pump and Valve Operability Program. Through this program,

) operability of the active mechanical equipment is demonstrated by testi or a

h(D combination of test and analysis where the analysis has been supported by lb testing. The tests have been performed on prototype equipment and similarity analysis is the.n used to justify applicability to plant specific equipment,

• j 4" fic: tion ef v.ipst i: Nr=t--tM for th; entire ee;stl7-"@ "

-- I 1 _ W ^r Of th: nee.mLly my ~oe qualified asp. m .17 ' . . s . , n i.1 v . . 17;  %

! _,, ean limic swicenes are quaianea Dy separai.. 6.. cing); ,

-h -

w M_ _ _ _ _erability of the entire assembly is demonstrated. Active pumps and

! valves within Westinghouse scope are identified in Tables 3.9-1.1 and i ,3.9-1.2A, respectively. Seismic analysis covering safety-related mechanical equipment is presented in Section 3.7. ISI. and testing are discussed in l

Sections 5.2.4 and 6.6.

3.9.3.2.1.1* Pume Ooerability Program (NSSS Scoce) -

All active pumps >

are qualified for operability by first undergoing rigid tests prior to and after installation in the plant. The in-shop tests include: (1) hydrostatic tests of pressure-retaining parts to 150 percent of the design pressure times the ratio of material allowable stress at room temperature to the allowable stress value at the design temperature; (2) seal leakage tests; and (3) ,

performance tests to determine total developed head, minim 6m and maximun head, net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements, and other pump parameters.

Also monitored during these operating tests are bearing temperatures and vibration levels. Bearing temperature limits are determined by the manufacturer based on the bearing material, clearances, oil type and rotational speed. These limits are approved by Westinghouse. After the pump is installed in the plant preservice and inservice testing further supplement the qualification process. After the pump is installed in the plant it undergoes preoperational and power ascension testing, and inservice testing and inspection to ensure operability during plant operation. These tests demonstrate that the pump will function as required during all normal

• operating conditions for the design life of the plant.

In addition to these tests, the safety-related active pumps are qualified for operability by assuring that they will start up, continue operating, and not be damaged during the faulted conditions. The pump manufacturer are required to show by analysis correlated by tests, prototype tests, or existing documented data that the pump will perform its safety function when subjected to loads imposed by the maximum seismic accelerations and the maximum faulted nozzle loads. 'It is required that testing or dynamic analy'is s be used to show that the lowest natural frequency of the pump is greater than 33 Hz. This frequency is sufficiently high to avoid problems with amplification between the component. and structure for all seismic areas. A pump with a natural frequency above 33 H: is considered essentially rigid. A static shaft deflection analysis of the rotor is performed with the conservative SSE accelerations of 2.lg in two orthogonal horizontal directions and of 2.18 in '

the vertical, acting simultaneously. The deflections determined from the 3.9-50 Revision [

i.y -w. -~ ,-.4 ,. , -- -

.e .- i -

m _- -_ _ _ - - - - - - - - _

Insert 1 .

Design integrity of the pump and valve is demonstrated by complying with the GDC-4 requirements for the mechanical portion of the equipment and the electrical portion of the assembly is qualified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49. ( e. g. , active valve appurtenances such as limit switches etc. are -

qualified by, separate testing)

Insert 2 For safety-related mechanical equipment, compliance with the GDC-4 requirements is established through the evaluation of non-metallic parts based on the FIT, FORM and FUNCTION methodology used in the item Equivalency Evaluation and the Commercial Grade Dedication process of the STP Procurement Program.

l

-e

. ~ . .. - - . . . . _ - - -- - . - . . . ~ . ~ . . . - - - - . . - - . .

1, .

. a STPEGS UFSAR 3.11 ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT l Safety-related " -"4--? :n $_ electrical equipment is designed to remain functional during and following design basis events. In addition, certain ,

4 post-accident monitoring equipment, is also designed to remain functional during or after specified design basis events, or to not fail in a manner which could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of the plant safety functions.

t

\ Design basis events consist of normal operation and plant shutdown, loss of

1. :

offsite power (LOOP) and design basis accidents (DBA) .

The following sections provide information to demonstrate acceptable perfor-mance of Non-Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) (i.e. balance of. plant) equipment ;; ell r "'00 ,___.. :r--__ ::. . g y....... under the specified l conditions. Environmental qualification for NSSS equipment is discussed in Section 3.11N. >

The programs for preventive maintenance, surveillance and periodic testing have been developed in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Rev. 2.

These programa are based on manufacturer reconsnendations, experience and the results of the project qualification programs. This will ensure that all safety-related equipment in mild and harsh areas will be operable and qualified throughout the life of the plant.

The programs provide for replacement of parts and equipment prior to the end of qualified life.

3.11.1 Equipment Identification and Environmental Conditions A complete list of safety-related electrical ,..._ __ x quipment -;i..elu C l

- ding - n 0 0 0 p_ _ J . ...e -:'- -- * --' -Wp;;.. -#~1 equired to be qualified is provided in the 10CFR50.49 submittal. A list of all Category 1 and 2 post-accident monitoring equipment (in response to RG 1.97, Rev. 2) that is included in the C Ir equipment qualification program is provided in Table *1.5-1. Worst case ]

%M expected environmental conditions for each area in which the subject equipment is installed are listed in Table 3.11-1. The conditions are based on the following: _

1

1. Normal parameters are those which will be maintained during i routine plant operation, shutdown, hot standby, and system  ;

testing. The range is based on the limiting conditions of peak  ;

outdoor temperature together with equipment design heat loads and i minimum outdoor temperature together with no heat loads.

2. Abnormal parameters are those which may be caused by such events as loss of nonsafety-related heating ventilation, and air con-ditioning (HVAC). The majority of qualified equipment areas are served by safety class BVAC, for which outages due to LOOP are not postulated.

I

3. Accident conditions are those plant conditions resulting from the most limiting pipe failure for that location during which safety-related equipment must operate to mitigate the consequences of,the accident. The length of time that each item of equipment is required to operate in the accident environment following accident initiation is provided in the 10CFR50.49 submittal.

3.11-1 Revision 5 . .t CHANGE ?10T!CE \0b.k. __

l l

l

w. , . - . - - , . - _ _ , _ _ . , - . _ -

y._ ,.., . _. _ . . _ _ . . . . . _ _ _. . . - _ . _ _ _ . .. . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ ._

, . a STPEGS 11FSAR

! 1 l' 4. Normal cumulative radiation doses are the totals projected for a

,40-year plant life, utilizing the shielding assumptions of Section , ,

12.3.2. Accident cumulative radiation doses are based on the l source terms of Section 3.11.5.2 and are totaled through the period of 180 days past initiation of the accident.

For pipe or line mounted electrical or electro-mechanical devices, the plant vibration effects are considered in accordance with the guidelines provided in Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 382-1972. For floor

and wall mounced equipment, the simulation of five Operating Basis Earthquak,es j (OBE) before a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) are considered to include the j vibration aging effects on equipment.

3.11.2 Qualification Tests and Analyses safety-related electrical equipment and components located in a harsh environ-ment are qualified by test or combination of test and analysis in accordance P with the requirements of 10CFR50.49 and NUREG-0588, Rev. 1. Qualification

/, testing is accomplished either by tests on the particular equipment or by type

@ tests performed on similar equipment under environmental conditions at least as severe as the specified conditions.

afety-related mechanical equipment including NSSS passive mechanical equip- i ment located in a harsh environment is qualified in accordance with General  !

Design Criteria (GDC) 4 The evaluation of mechanical equipment qualification i

includes the followin5:

1. Identification of the mechanical equipment including their required

• operating time

2. Identification of the non-metallic subcomponents

3. Identification of the environmental conditions to which the equipment must be qualified .

4. Identification of non-metallic material capabilities Evaluation of environmental effects on the non-mar =114 e mn e.2-< -' _

For safety-related electrical - - equipment located in a mild environment, the design / purchase specifications provide the documentation required to demonstrate qualification. The maintenance and surveillance program in conjunction with a trending program provide the assurance that equipment which meets the design / purchase specifications is maintained throughout its life. Documented operating experience may be utilized for j qualification of equipment located in a mild environment. l l

3.11-2 Revision [8

m r Insert 1 Design integrity of the pump and valve is demonstrated by complying with the GDC-4 requirements for the mechanical portion of the equipment and the electrical portion of the assembly is qualified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49. ( e. g. , activo valve appurtenances such as limit switches etc. are -

qualified by separate testing) -

Insert 2 For safety-related mechanical equipment, compliance with the GDC-4 requirements is established through the evaluation of non-metallic parts based on the FIT, FORM and FUNCTION methodology used in the item Equivalency Evaluation and the Commercial Grade Dedication process of the STP Procurement Program.

i 4

9 4

e l

l l

l f

en e.e.-

-p .

g __

~ -- . . . . .

.. _ . ~- _ - - .- . - - . .. - . - - _ - - . . -

, di .

4 4

q STPEGS UFSAR Class 1E cables, field splices, and terminations for use on the South Texas y

Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) with the exception of single conductor high temperature silicon insulated < ables meet the requirements of IEEE 383-1974 as modified by RG 1.131. ~ Single conductor high temperature I

silicon insulated cables when used in a class 1E circuit are installed in conduit only. Polyethylene cables used in safety-related applications are identified in Table 3.11-5.

3.11.3 Qualification Test Results i

LeLailed qualification results for electrical cnd ... '-- '::1 'i .:1;dir; "irr "

i p:.;;i.. . w ....is l?' equipment located in a harsh environment appears in the { r 10CFR50.49 submittal. Plant specific evaluations are performed to ensure that 4

the generic testing performed by vendors encompasses the plant specific environmental conditions. The qualified life of equipment is extended or i reduced based on specific plant variables such as environmental parameters, j operational cycles, performance characteristics and properties of the 4

materials used in construction of the equipment.  ;

l 3.11.4 Loss of Ventilation l

f The majority of qualified equipment areas are served by safety class EVAC.

These HVAC systems are designed to the single failure criteria and are i l supplied from the Onsite Standby Power System. Consequently, the normal  ;

i environmental conditions which they provide will be maintained during all j i plant modes. However, certain areas of the plant served by safety class EVAC .

may experience abnormal temperature conditions due to loss of offsite power ]

which would result from switchover to a different cooling medium. l A small amount of qualified equipment is in areens ' served only by nonsafety HVAC. For these areas, the abnormal ranges of environmental conditions are based on the loss of HVAC. -

Table 3.11-1 provides a listing of the worst-case environmental conditions for various areas in the plant. These conditions were determined by the criteria listed in Section 3.11.1.

3.11.5 Estimated Chemical and Radiation Environment 3.11.5.1 chemical Environment. Safety-related systems and components were originally designed to perform their functions on long-term contact with j acidic and basic solutions recirculated through the Emergency Core cooling i System and Containment spray System following a LOCA. An initial pH of 4.5 is k i due to the addition of 2000-4000 ppm boric acid. Thereafter, pH ranges from

'7.0-9.5 due<to addition of TSP. Spray flow is vertical and ranges from 0 to 0.5 gpm/f t'. Spray duration is 24 hrs in accordance with IEEE 323-1974 for the purpose of equipment qualification. ,

A plant modification has resulted in a change to the containment spray pH and the sump pH as described in Section 6.5.2. The new chemical environment is based on the de3etion of the additive (sodium hydroxide) to the containment Cg spray and the use of trisodium phosphate (TSP) to adjust the sump pH. 101 3.11-4 Revision 5 ok CHANGE NOTICE kN_ .

_ . . _ _ ~- - - ~

TABLE 3.11-3 i

SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT UNSIDE CONTAINMENTi OPERATIONAL AND QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS Equipment Purpose Qualification Reaulrements i

Class IE electric Supplypower, instrumentation, IEEE 383-1974, RG 1.131, i cables andcontrolof thosedevices and NUREG-0588, Rev.1 requirod to function during and afteran accident Electrical penetration Provide means of electrical IEEE 317-1978, RG 1.63, assemblies accessinto Contalrment without and NUREG-0588, Rev. l .

impairing Containmentintegrity I Safety-relat CaYumiru,.4 isolation and various IEEE 382-1972, RG 1.73, ^

valves #

other system-dependent safety- and NUREG-0588, Rev.1 related functions Reactor Containment Contaiment heat removal IEEd 334-1974, RG 1.40, fan cooler motors and NUREG-0588, Rev.1 ,

Containment Post. Accident IEEE 323-1974, RG 1.97, hi-range area radiation Monitoring and NUREG-0588,Rev.1  !

radiation monitors Containment Post-Accident IEEE 323-1974, RG 1.97, waterlevel Monitoring and NUREG-0588, Rev.1 instrumentation Reactor vessel water level Post Accident IEEE 3231974, RG 1.97, )

instrumentation Monitoring and NUREG-0588, Rev. I '

Post-Accident Post-Accident IEEE 323-1974. RG 1.97, monitoring Monitoring and NUREG-0588, Rev.1 transmitters / sensors (RG 1.97, Category 1 and Category 2) i

,m.

( (1) This includes only electrically operated valves contained in electrical EOCP's

_y 3.11-26 Revisionh es-imae ..

STPECS UFSAR ,

1 TABLE 3.11-4 l

SAFETY-REIATED EOUTPMENT (OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT JARSH ENVIRONMENT's OPERATIONAL AND OUALIFICATION REOUIREMENTS __l

, Equipment Purpose Qualification Requirements Class 1E electric Supply power, instru- IEEE 383-1974, IEEE 323-1974 cables mentation, and con- as modified by RG 1.131, and trol to those devices NUREG-0588, Rev. 1 required to function during and after an , i accident Motors Drive for pumps, fans, IEEE 334-1971, RG 1.40, and etc. NUREG-0588, Rev. 1 Containment isola- IEEE 382-1972, RG 1.73, and Safety*gelated valves b} (2) tion and various other NUREG-0588, Rev. 1 j system-dependent safety-related functions Hydrogen monitors Post-Accident Hydro- IEEE~323-1974 and gen Monitoring NUREG-0588. Rev. 1 Post-Accident Post-Accident IEEE 323-1974 and j Monitoring Monitoring NUREG-0588, Rev. 1 transmitters /

sensors (RG 1.97, Category 1 and Category 2)#(1) u 6 Radiation monitorz Post-Accident IEEE 323-1974. RG 1.97, and Class 1E and RG monitoring and NUREG-0588, Rev. 1 ,

Cate ventilation system 1.97,8 and 2 )U gory 1 control post-DBA *W l

Auxiliary shutdown Control of Class 1E IEEE 323-1974, Refer to Station panels equipment for shut- Section 3.11.2  !

down from outside i main control room 1

. l Safety-related Various system- IEEE 323-1974 and I instrumentationFO) dependent safety- NUREG-0588, Rev. I w related functions l

l

@ Some equiprr.ent may be located in a mild environmenc.

(~4%a hdudei ody c.k%J y *FM YdVes 'o6 bel, in E dC.,R EG cpi j j 3.11-27 Revision 0 l

l l

l

STPEGS UFSAR 3.11NENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN OFME5"N:lC/0. A LECTRICAL EQUIPMENT (NSSS)

This section presents information to demonstrate that the safety-related electrical equipmentN:' v =^5^"-^' w pm@f the Engineered Safety l Features (ESFs) and the Reactor Protection Systems (RPSs) are capable of performing their designated safety-related functions while exposed to applicable normal, abnormal, test, accident, and post accident environmenta! .

conditions. The information presented includes identification of the safety-related equipment that is within the scope of the Westinghouse Nuclear Steam

• Supply System (NSSS). For each item of equipment, the applicable environmental parameters and a description of ths qualification process employed to demonstrate the required environmental capability are provided.

The seismic qualitication of NSSS safety-related electrical equipment is presented in Section 3.10N. -

r  %.

P

{ch the methedcing p/cr H Cecticn 3.1t.ENOCO pc'aive mechanica! cau! rnent b qua: Icd b 3.11 N.1 Equipment identification and Environmental Conditions A complete list of safe'y-relateglectricalEd ccP/c mechaniebquipment wthin the NSSS scope of supply that is required to function during and subsequent to an accident is provided in the applicant's 10CFR50.49 submittal.

In addition, this submittal provides the equipment qualification environmental parameters for normal, abnormal, and accident condrtions and qualified life.

A list of all Category 1 and 2 post-accident monitoring equipment (in response to Regulatory Guide [RG) 1.97, Rev.2) that is included in the equipment qualification program is provided in Table 7.5-1.

3-11N2 Qualification Tests and Analysis 3.11N.2.1 Environmental Oualification Criteria. The methods of meeting the general requirements for environmental design and qualificatior) of safety-related equipment as described by General Design Criteria (GDC) 1,2,4, and 23 are described in Section 3.1. AJditional specific information conceming the implementation of GDC 23 !s provided in Section 7.2. The general methods of implementing the requirements of Appendix B to 10CFR Part SO are described in the Westinghouse Water Reactor Division Quality Assurance Plan (WCAP-8370).

Recommendations contained in RCs 1.40,1.73, and 1.89 conceming environmental qualification are met.

Westinghouse meets the institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)

Standstd 323-1974 by either type test, analysis, or an appropriate combination of these methods. Westinghouse meets this commitment employing the methodology described in WCAP-8587 (Ref. 3.11N 1). This WCAP was reviewed and accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) through the issuance of a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on November 10,1983.

Commensurate with the restrictions placed on time margin, plant specific accident conditions, maintenance and surveillance programs, and additional equipment specific supporting information as delineated by the SER, the NRC had concluded that WCAF-8587 complies with the NRC environmental requirements as codified by 10CFR50.49 and its subordinate RGs, NUREGs and IEEE Standards.

3.11 N-1 Revision 5

. - . . - . . . - . - . . - . . -. . - _ . . . . - - . - - - . - - ~ . - _ - - -

STPEGS UFSAR 3.11N.2.2 Performance Raouirernents for Environmen al Qualification. In

[ response to the NRC staff request for additional detailed information on the ,

i qualification program, Westinghouse submitted Supplement 1 to WCAP-8587. This l aupplement contains an equipment qualification data package (EODP) for every

Item of safety-related electrical equipment suppled by Westinghouse within

! - the NSSS scope of supply. Table 3.10N 1 identifies the equipment supplied by

• 4 Westinghouse for this application and identifes the applicable EQDP. .

1 Each EODP contains a section entitled, " Performance Requirements." This

specification establishes the safety-related functional requirements of the equipment to be demonstrated under normal, abnonnal, test, accident, and post-accident conditions. The environmental qualification parameters (e.g., .

y temperature, humidity, pressure, radiation, etc.) employed by Westinghouse for '

generic qualification purposes are also identified in the specification, as applicable.

1 2

} 3.11N.2.3 Methods and Procedures for Environmental Qualification.

j WCAP-8587 describes the methodology employed by Westinghouse for qualification of safety-related electrical equipment. Each EODP (Supplement 1, WCAP-8587) conntains a description of the qualification plan forits associated piece of j equipment. Qualification may ba demonstrated by either type test, operating j experience, analysis, or a combination of these methods.

3.11N.3 Qualification program Results t

Qualification program'results are summrized in the various EQDPS. These detailed results also appear in the applicant's 10CFR50.49 submittal.

i' 3.11 N.4 Loss of Ventilation

, Refer to Secti.n 3.11.4.

i .

^

- 3.11N.5 Estimated Chemical and Radiation Environment l The radiation and chemical environments for which the NSSS scope equipment is qualified are defined in the performance specification of the applicable EODP 1 contained in Supplement 1 WCAP-8587. As discussed in Sectl.n 3.11.5, the -

! spray pH design conditions have changed due to the spray additive deletion modification. WCAP-12477 discusses the suitability to the new spray pH

environment for materials of equipment previously qualified to the original pH i design conditions.

3.11 N.0 C.TJ...c..T;;1' 01^^'": "!: . Of '."; fan %; Equ'p. Tan:

[

0;bij m';%d ="l= x.;fank;! ;;;!;. Tan" b I::';ned ^/;hh ; h ;h depra ;f

= dant.=:: p;.t:Tann -:---2:::ti,  ; hse;=r;ndan.T2%! qu;T.';;;;= c'

, .  :'.*. ;;;:p;= T.;;; b; ;=:!d:sd d= 0; 'i; .aw'"M' un ;f as;;;"b

.T.,;;;;;.a. '.'.";h5 "h; NCOC

:;; ;l :r;;',, "hk .T;f.ak;l ;;;@T; ."

' q :" stb . p;;;; b ':T.::;d :: 20c; ps.T.p; =0 ^; fin =d th; :

':::d rat;; ;nd ra:;; :;;;;;;. ";%:ss 0.1".' 0 pani.:;"h; T; ;nT.s';lqc;::fb;"%;;fre conh;!;;;4.T;..";;; = k s me = = = I N-2 Revision ,[

i i

i

. -. .. . . . - - . ~ ~ ~ .

i j - -

_ . _ _ . _ _ m -- 4 * - - ' - * *'

y-5

[ STPEGS UFSAR \

m . _ .... _m _ ... ..-s...

yinv saswswaw ussw seswews wyk s ut v t w 4. ' w ng w

...w._m.w.,a,_,__ e ww i w w wrr is ws.rw r u 1._.-__m._

awwwwwww si e

c. - a t. _ n 4 4 m , n m .t: : .ar- or aL .

grhw siv a r w. t c a ses-e wswsmaassvuuws wa ni ew y_ mis. .a _

s iy_, mas ..t.,;;..--;L.,_

- _ s2us. ... t. ww ,, ,.wus wwwww wy ga

_1. e. ..:r- .e .t1 s.ftft. a?-- ...tm.

ysus s a wywvis aw u s euswe swi sg ww s n 's ww si va s a w u sw s . .Lt L 1J. .Mst. a L . - _ a 11:

J

..___._..a a*

v i rrwi s wwwi e eiww ss w v ows . a s sw 6uissO g .a?._ f a n_ ? . -..?__._s at _ a .__e_.n*

wyav y wwawIF L g[ ) w4LUwaf Vs ni a4imF

_ _ .: , _ _ _ _ a t V % w'ye5 WIe6g E4iwsa pyy a r%#%4 UVI Ig w6svedv6s .m t ? v : a ! .. . - J - _ _ P .. L t . - .:--- _ ~_a t _-_2:a*-- P. L e rws J hui bytawasseswV wi sw hayy4swuw sw w a s v us wa s a s sws a ths' vvs suieva sv. a_bawss

_-an.-_..___...a...t.._t.2-.i:..ta...sr..---.....t-a_-__e...t--.-_-_s...

u v u w w y ksa a vy me r sw. v us v w su su iwi r sww = ming wsawwwwww w ear sw ww e sw.wwsws ew us w ...

sa 4 =m v i s s

_ . . r_ a t . . - - . _ a L n:a . f a L ~ . . . . I: t * - s ? . _ "rL t s t-twgwr w a sg u ew eawwwyse awess sy we t a nw w wmav es swmmuwi s

, a s oew t._esw ss s _ .aas? w_ r-a sea e r

..a . .r t 1 s

.h . _ t . t P _ . . ?_ _ _ _ a m. . - t it* - - a * - - n-- a ff9 f n 4 o kt es A ys ve wa ssww sa a u s uswus seas erwws a_qwiys s aws in us wes4se rwsm68ws s 5 swyws a gu sws. weaasi vg. e s

_.m____ . .s J . . ? _ -, a L . .-...Lt:n..

yawgaoss a a siswws w eiwss ag as av wyws haw sassy va enwse

s. ar... _..__ -_s...t.- L.- .t--L-_

v v yksi s syw ens age w e.u v ww a s6mw usww e.rww i a t_ t _ _ a J 2 t. .a n.. :L - t t_ es - _a :

su r sysws u iw a ssww us sw sw wwwws ewww ee s wrw w si _s nw.v.w n

n n.m. 4se P . . t_ _ ~ _n - - .. a t- -

• e.gveys s swa n wyws umu sy

---..t_. _ ._a. - _ . . _ . t* . .J L . . a t . -- - -. L itra. . _a_ tt -a _ ; f. a L .

s wqu sa vi s iks s6eis sau w wywws s sw w n. y as sw wyva uwestsy a w3bsis u s ewi stw uswswss sustsuw meter /motef-eperator-EGOPG:

i 3.11 N-3 Re,ision 3 Mh p

"Js k-e i

4 e

o m-.

b STPEGS UFSAR Section 3.11N:

REFERENCES 3.11N 1 WCAP-8587, Revision 6-A,1983, Butterworth, G. and Miller, R. B., Methodology for Qualifying Westinghouse WRD Supplied NSSS Safety-Related Electricall Equipment".

3.11N-2 WCAP-8587, Supplemental 1, *Equiprnent Qualification Data Packages".

-EOOP .'/CO 1, tsp;r.dk U "'/!=0r.;h;;.;n NOOO !.*xh;r.:;;' Equ!;.T.=: Ou;':T.;;i!;y Q f:: M xt= Ughfr.; cr.d P;;;; 0;-h T;=: P .?n:". (".;p';;;d '//Ot.P 11024p. ) .

c]

3.11N[.3 Revision [6 l

• l l

l

\

e

. l 1

I

~

]

I i

l l

1 1

1 1

--e m -e.e

y . >

STPEGS UFSAR ,

6.2.1.1.3.3 Accident chronoloov - The accident chronology for the most severe RCs break is provided in Table 4.2.1.1-10. .It is assumed that time hp 2 l

equals zero at the start of the accident. [

6.2.1.1.3.4 Enerov Balance - For the most severe RCS pipe breaks, a detailed energy balance was performed to show the distribution of

• energy prior ,

to the accident, at the time of peak pressure, at the end of the blowdown phase, and at the end of the core reflood phase and steam generator energy release during the post-reflood phase. A similar energy balance was performed bp for the most severe MSLB. The detailed energy distribution prior to the d accident, at the time of peak pressure, and at the end.of calculation for DBA MSLB are given in Table 6.2.1.1-13.

6.2.1.1.3.5 Functional Canability of Containment Wormal Ventilation systems - Containment maximum and minimum design pressures are based on ,

conservative assumptions of initial atmospheric pressures and temperatures within the containment. The functional capability of the Containment normal ventilation systens to maintain initial containment atmospheric conditions within the range of temperature and pressure defined for normal plant  !

operation'is discussed in Section 9.4. The Technical specifications give the

. limiting conditions of Containment temperature and pressure for normal plant operation and describe the action that will be taken if these conditions are exceeded. '

6.2.1.1.3.6 Protection Aaainst Severe External Leadina - The DBA for Containment external pressure design has been determined to be inadvertent actuation of the CSS.' consideration was also given to misoperation of the  !

Containment Normal Purge System, i.e., operation of the exhaust train with the l supply train isolated, but the maximum feasible internal vacuum for this case l is limited to a few inches of water (gauge), based upon the exhaust fan -

operating curve.

The maximum external pressure that the Containment may be subjected to, l

assuming the inadvertent actuation of the CSS, has been conservatively calculated to be 3.08 psid. This pressure is based on an initial Containment ,

atmosphere at 120*F, 14.7 psia, and 100 percent relative humidity. Spray water at a minimum temperature of 50*F then cools the Containment atmosphere to 50*F and 100 percent relative humidity. The Containnaent external design pressure is 3.5 psid. l 6.2.1.1.3.7 Postaccident containment Monitorine - Containment pressure )

and sump water level are indicated and recorded in the main control room.

Section 7.5 contains a detailed discussion of the Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 ,

instrumentation, including equipment qualification requirements. l W l 6.7.'s.l.3.B Eculoment Oualification - k b 1 ;; ectrical (

componerts of safety-related equipment were qualified for their potential normal operational environment and worst-case accident (DBA) environment. The i two gene.al categories of postulated accidents considered in equipment l qualification for equipment in the Reactor Containment Building (RCB) were j loCA and MSLB. A spectrum of break sises was considered in equipment 1 qualification. The MSLB provides the highest RCB atmosphere temperatures the LOCA provides the highest RCB atmosphere pressure. Combined MSLB/LOCA l pressure and temperature profiles have been used for qualification of the i equipment. I i

6.2-8 Revision 5 l CSUCE i!OT!CE . .

~ -- .

j

q +. 1

&

• f) o STPEGS UFSAR 6 1 4.2.2 Basis for Containtnant isolation Vaive Closure Time: Closure times for Containment isolation valves are chosen to limit radiological impact to the environs or for ECCS performance considerations. The maximum valve '

closure times are listed in Table 16.1-1 and Figure 6.2.4-1. (Table 16.1-1 -

does not list the 2-in. or smaller manual valves associated with test connections, vents, and drains.) - -

~ ~ ~ ^

6.2.4.2.3 3 -Environmentalcualificatinns: Environmentalqualification of electncalf x' .nr.6.::Ehequipment is Marocaed in Seebon 3.11.

gj 6.2.4.3 Desion Evaluation. CG4.di,,Ti6nt isolation valves, actuators, And controls are protected from the effects of missiles and the dynamic effects associated with the postulated failure of pipes as described in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. Containment isolation valves, actuators, and controls outside the Containment are located in seismic Category 1 structures as close to the RCB as practicable.

To assure the operability of the CIS in an accident environment, provisions

+

are rnade to satisfy the redndancy, reliability, and performance capability requirements of GDC 54.. The system is designed to withstand SSE loads, as well as temperature, pressure, humidity, and radiation conditions which are those expected to be present in the equipment location. This is discussed h  !

Sections 3.9,3.10, and 3.11.

1 The redundancy requirement is satisfied by having two isolation valves in _

series, one on each ride of type A and type B penetrations. ForType C l penetrations, the redundancy requirement may be achieved by two isolation '

valves in series on eitherside of the Containment penetration. Reliability ,  ;

is assured by conducting periodic tests to check the operability of the '

isolation valves, actuators, and controls. Furthermore, a ' fall-safe' feature '

is incorporated into solenoid and air operated isolation valve design so that in the event actuating power is lost, the valve assumes the position which assures safety. ,

The isolation valves may be operated remote-manually from the control-room to provide a secondary means of actuation. Performance capabilities, such as closing time and valve status (open or closed) indicator lights, are checked and observed during the periodic testing. . 6 Analyses are performed to assure the integrity of the CIS and connecting piping under the application of dynamic forces which would result from inadvertent closure of a valve during operating conditions; e.g., closure of a s1eam line isolation valve under full steaming rate. These analyses examined the pressure transients which would develop in such situations. The forces and stresses resulting from these pressure transients are calculated, and '

displacements and support smactions are determined. The piping system, along

-whh the support system, is analyzed for the above forces, and assurance is provided that the Containment isolation Valve System piping stresses are within allowable limits.

Regular functional testing of the CIS during shutdown periods assures J operability of allisolation valves. I.eakage rate testing during the same periods assures that leakage through isolation valves and piping penetrations does not exceed Technical Specification values. The use of double isolation barriers assures that no single failure of any active or passive component 6.2-40 Revision /6 f

e w

%- - - w w w- +- -

w- w m ,, ,,y- r m 9- --

ma s

b

, . *2 -

OPGP05 ZA-0002 Rev.2 Page 37 of 40 10CFR50.59 Evaluations

Form 1 10CFR50.59 Screening Form Page 1 of 3 ,

UNIT #1

{r UFSAR CN DESIGN CHANGE OTHER i UNIT #2

_/ BOTH

] ORIGINATING DOCUMENT NO. UFSAR CHANGE NOTICE #CN-1930 REV.NO. O i

i

! DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE- To delete all requirernents pertaining to Environrnental Qualification of Safety Related Mechanical Equiprnent frorn Sections 3.6,3.9,3.11,3.11N,6.2, and Table 3.11-3 & 4 of tie UFSAR.

1 i

PRELIMINARY SCREENING

?

YES NO l

] 1. Does the proposed change repsent a change to the l'W.t Technical SpeciEcations?

]

j 2. is an Unreviewed Safety Question known to be Lssociated with the subject change? /  !

! NOTE: If "YES' to either questions 1 or 2 refer to OPGP05-ZN4004.

Does the proposed change represent

{ _

j 4

3. A change to only correct a typographical, editorial or drafting e tr

- _/ l

( 4. A change which is identical to and addressed in its entrety by an exis5ng approved 10CFR50.59 NreeningtSQE or NRC appioved Icensing submit:al?

j y

5. A spare or replacernent part/ component change with an equivalent part/ component?

(See Section 2.3 for a defirstion of equivalent) 7 l

3 I

6. A configura5cn change within existing design spec!Ecations? /

I I

ll all answers to the above questions are *NO' perform the inal screening and mark N/A in the approval blocks below.

!! the answer to any questio;' (3) through (6) is 'YES' a inal screening is not necessary. l Sign approva! blocks below ad dscard pages 2 and 3. c l

Provide a justitca50n and referexes if any of items (3) through (6) is answered 'YES*. l l

Prepared by; WA Originator Date Approved by- N/A

} _

3 Qualified Reviewer Date

. .h _n OPGP05-ZA-0002 Rev.2 Page 38 of 43 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Form 1 10CFR50.59 Screening Form Page 2 of 3 FINAL SCREENING -

5 in response to the quesGons below, if the change involves something that is not described in the SAR and is not pirt of the Ecensing basis, the 2L7 is appropnate. However, tNs decision must be dearly documented with adequate technical JusL0 cation be each question and the sections reviewed of applicable documents and applicable attributes reviewed should be indcated. The lis5ng of attributes and documents for 10CFR50.59 screening can be found in Addendum 5.

i l Inter dscip!!ne Coonination Muired? / YES NO l if 'yes', obtain appro;,riate concurrence.

I i

] Risk and Reliability Analysis l l Thermal Hydraulics

] Reactor Engr.

J

@vil Mech l l Elect l lEQ {0ther Licensimg l \

i l 1

YES NO l j

i

1. Does the subject of tNs review involve a change to the farsj is described in the Safety Analysis Report? l/ l ]l l

The orcoosed chance to the STP EO erocram imonds the current methodotoov described in the UFSAR hv which S1P ha

)

committed to como!v v/th 10CFR50 Accendix A. GDC-1 & A The methodolocv is used to_gosure that any safeN 1afated mechanical ecuicment is cacable of withstandino env oostulated environmental conditons and Eedefiita its intended saf j function.

J 4

2.

Does the subject of this review involve a change to the procedures as described in the Safety V

Analysis Report? Refer to OPAP01 ZA 0103. ] /

This nrecosed chance does not hvofve a chance to the ntant eners5cnat erocedures.

since EO erecedures are not described in the SAR.

l mummmme summmmmmmmmmuum - ummmmmen mmmmmmmum umummmme summmmmmmmmmmme summmeur amm s

~ . . _ _ __

,, g 3 OPGP05-ZA-0002 Rev.2 Ptge 36 of 43

100FR50.59 Evaluations Form 1 10CFR50.59 Screening Form Page 3 of 3 YES - No I

3. Does the subject of this review propose the conduct of test or experirnents not described in /

l the Safety Analysis Report ? .

l The orocosed chance is to eliminate Mechanical EO orocram. The omoosed chance does not involve any test or exeeriment that is not described or oreviousiv ana!vred in the SAR J .

)

, 4. Does the proposed change affect conditons or bases assumed in the Safety Analysis Report l or safety-related functions of equipment /sy.,tems, even though the proposed change does not y entail any physical change in existing structures, systems, or procedures as described in the i SAR?

i The oro osed chance does not a4ect the bases assumed in the SAR or safe +v related function 2

of the mecharical eauiement The STP MEO orocram is desioned to comotv w'th 10CFR50 j

Accendir A GDC-4 by verifyino the ability of the mechanica! ecuioment to cerform its reovired safety func9ons when exoosed to costula*ed environments. Throuch the ._

i omoosed chance. the verification for mechanical ectfoment cGEDilarice wPh GDC-1 & 4 win be sh!!!ed f om MEO orocram to the Procurement and Maintenance. Su ve!!!ance and eeM4jg ino oroornms in accordarice with RG 1.33 i

if any answer is affirmative, complete the screening form and perform an Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluation.

If all answers are negativa, no Unteviewed Safety Question Evaluation is required. ,

Prepare by* amar K Mekherjee) 12/05/05

/ Originator Date Approved by: f/f jf fpf, Jeffrey P. Carbone 12/05/95 Ouallfied Reviewer Date

//

G M MN M. ,