ML20140C328
| ML20140C328 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/1986 |
| From: | Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Daltroff S PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19302H276 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8601270319 | |
| Download: ML20140C328 (2) | |
See also: IR 05000352/1986001
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IGSIGNATED ORIGINAL
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certitta sn.h YhchAn
,
JAN 171986
Docket No. 50-352
License No. NPF-27
Philadelphia Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. S. L. Daltroff
Vice President, Electric Production
2301 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101
Gentlemen:
Subject:
Inspection No. 50-352/86-01
This refers to the special safeguards inspection conducted by Mr. G. C. Smith
of this office on January 2-4 and 8-9, 1986, of activities authorized by NRC
License No. NPF-27 at the Limerick Generating Station and to t
of our findings held by Mr. Smith with Mr. G. Leitch of your y$e discussions
taff on
January 8,1986.
The inspection findings were also discussed on January 16,
1986 during a telephone conversation between Mr. M. J. Cooney and Messrs.
S. Collins and J. Joyner of this officu.
The purpose of this inspection was
to review the circumstances surrounding the identification, by members of the
plant security staff, of openings and degradations of protected area / vital area
barriers and to review allegations relative to security officers leaving their
po:ts without being relieved. Our findings are described in the Region I
Inspection Report which is enclosed with this letter.
The inspection consisted
of interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.
Our inspection identified three apparent violations of NRC requirements involv-
ing degraded protected area / vital area barriers, failure to meet security plan
posting commitments and failure to report a loss of security effectiveness.
We are concerned about these apparent violations, especially because barrier
deficiencies were identified in the past and reported to the NRC, but the
previous barriers surveys were inadequate as evidenced by the most recent
discoveries. For this reason, we have scheduled an enforcement conference in
our offices in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, at 11:00 a.m. on
February 7,1986 to discuss the causal factors which led to the apparent
violations, as well as the measures you have taken or plan to take to ensure
the adequacy and completeness of your corrective actions when violations of
NRC requirements are identified. Our decision concerning the appropriate
enforcement action concerning this matter will be communicated to you
following the conference by separate correspondence.
Paragraphs in the enclosed inspection report contain details of your security
program that have been determined to be exempt from public disclosure in
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accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 (Safeguards Information).
Therefore, the para-
graphs so identified in the inspection report will not be placed in the NRC
Public Document Room and will receive limited distribution. The inspection
report cover sheet and the remaining portions of the inspection report will
be placed in the Public Document Room, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a).
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IR LIMERICK 8601 - 0001.0.0
01/14/86
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Philadelphia Electric Company
2
JAN 171986
Your cooperation with us in this matter is appreciated.
Sincerely,
Original Signed B71
Jaces H. Joyner
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards
Enclosure: NRC Region I Inspection Report No. 50-352/86-01
(Contains Safeguards Information (SGI))
cc w/ encl (w/o portions of Paragraphs 3 and 4 that contain SGI):
G. Leitch, Station Superintendent
J. D. McGoldrick, Manager, Claims Division, Legal Department
John S. Kemper, Vice President, Engineering and Research
Troy B. Conner, Jr. , Esquire
V. S. Boyer, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power
Eugene J. Bradley, Esquire, Assistant General Counsel
W. M. Alden, Engineer in Charge, Licensing Section
Limerick Hearing Service List
Public Document Room (PDR)
local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector
Connonwealth of Pennsylvania
bec w/ encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o encl)
Section Chief, DRP
Shoreham, SRI
Section Chief, TPS, DRS
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION
REGION I
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Report No.
50-352/86-01
Docket No.
50-552
License No.
Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company
23C1 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101
Facility Name:
Limerick Generating Station
Inspection At:
Limerick, Pennsylvania
Inspection Conducted:
January 2-4 and 8-9,1986
Date of Last Physical Security Inspection:
November 19, 1985
Type of Inspection:
Special Physical Security
Inspector:
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Approved by:
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feguards Section
date
Inspection Summary: Special Physical Security Inspection on January 2-4 and
8-9, 1986 (Inspection No. 50-352/86-01)
Areas Inspected: Special inspection to review licensee's action relative to a
iicensee identified degraded protected area / vital area barrier and to follow
up on an allegation regarding two security guards leaving their posts. The
inspection involved 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> onsite and one hour offsite by a region-based
inspector.
Results: The following apparent violations were identified:
1.
Failure to maintain protected area / vital area barrier in
accordance with the security plan.
2.
Failure to maintain NRC approved compensatory measures for
an unalarmed vital area barrier.
3.
Failure to report a security violation in accordance with
security plan and NRC regulatory requirements.
8601270324 860117
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1.
Key Persons Contacted
G. Leitch, Plant Manager
J. Basilio, Administrative Engineer
R. Weindorfer, Assistant Director of Security
D. Clohecy, Quality Assurance Engineer
R. Hennessey, Quality Control Supervisor
C. Endriss, Regulatory Engineer
J. Spinelli, Project Engineer
J. Nagle, Licensing Engineer
P. Supplee, Administrative Assistant, Security
F. Larkin, Nuclear Security Specialist
J. McElwain, Quality Assurance Auditor
M. Berner, Y0H Security, Captain
The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees, current YOH
Security employees and a former Y0H employee.
2.
MC 30703 - Exit Interview
The inspector met with the licensee representatives listed in paragraph 1
on January 8, 1986, and discussed with them the scope and results of the
inspection.
No written material was provided to the licensee during the inspection.
3.
MC 92700 - Onsite Followup of a Nonroutine Event
a.
Background
THIS PARAGRAPil CONTAlHS SAFEGUAR05
lHF02 MAT!Gil AND IS NOT FOR PUBilC
DISCLOSURE,liIS INTENTIONALLY
LEFT BLANK.
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THIS PARAGRAPil CONTAINS SAFEGUAR05
INFORf3AI!GM AND 15 HOT FOR PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE, ITIS INTENTIONALLY
LEFT 8 LANK.
THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUAR0g
INF09MATION AND IS NOT FOR PURIC
DISCLOSURE, ITIS INTENTIONALLY
LEFT BLANK.
b.
NRC Inspection Findings
On January 2,1986, NRC Region I inspected the licensee's actions
relative to the barrier problems.
The inspector, accompanied by
security management, observed the areas in the Unit 1/ Unit 2 inter-
face where the openings and degradations were found.
The inspector determined that the openings did not result from
recent work, but rather were the result of incomplete construction
on the Unit 2 side of the interface, which apparently had not been
detected by the licensee when barriers were installed at the
interface. The inspector also determined that the licensee had con-
ducted additional inspections of the interface on January 1 and 2,
and that no additional problems were identified. On January 4,1986,
another interface inspection was conducted in which licensee Quality
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Assurance and Construction Engineering personnel participated.
Por-
tions of that. inspection were observed by the NRC inspector. That
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inspection icentified two additional degraded barriers and two
openings that could have afforded access to the Unit I cable spread-
ing room.
THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS
INFORMATION AND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC
UlSCLOSURE, ITIS INTENil0NALLY
LEFT BLANK.
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Failure to insure that all openings which penetrate the protected
area and vital area boundaries are alarmed and blocked with two
physical barriers to prevent access to these areas is an apparent
violation of the licensee's NRC-approved physical security plan and
4.
MC 93700 - Inspector Dispatched to Site
a.
Background
During this special inspection, the inspector reviewed an anonynous
allegation received by NRC Region I on December 11, 1985 regarding a
violation of the licensee's security plan and implementing procedures
which was not documented and not reported to NRC. Specifically, it
was alleged that on December 8, 1985, two security personnel left
their posts at a vital area barrier, without being relieved, and held
conversations with another security force member at another post. A
corporal in the security force noted the absence of these personnel
and reported the incident to the shift sergeant.
The shift sergeant
allegedly decided not to document or report the incident to higher
supervision.
b.
NRC Inspection Finding
The inspector interviewed the involved corporal and the sergeant (who
had since been terminated by the security contractor for an unrelated
reason) on January 3,1986, and January 9,1986, respectively.
THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS
INFORMAT;0H AND IS NOT FOR PU9 tlc
DISCLOSilRE, ITIS INTENTIONALLY
LEFT BLANK.
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Failure to maintain.these posts in accordance with the NRC approved
security plan, Chapter 10, and its implementing procedures is an
apparent violation of NRC requirements.
(50-353/86-01-02)
The inspector's interviews of the corporal and the terminated
sergeant also disclosed that the corporal immediately directed the
security personnel to return to their posts, which they did. Both
the corporal and the sergeant stated that they had counseled the
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involved security personnel at some time later in the shift. However,
the sergeant stated that it was a personal decision not to document
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and report the incident to higher security force supervision, contrary
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to the licensee's security procedures. The sergeant provided no
further reason for failing to follow procedures.
The inspector determined that the incident constituted a moderate
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loss of physical security effectiveness in that a major loss of
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effectiveness occurred but it was properly compensated within ten
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minutes by manning the posts. The licensee's NRC approved Contin-
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gency Plan (Events 11 and 20) and NRC regulation 10 CFR 73.71(c)
require reporting such matters to the NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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Failure to report this incident is an apparent violation of the
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licensee's NRC-approved Contingency Plan and NRC regulations.
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(50-353-86-01-03)
Based on interviews with the corporal and sergeant involved in this
incident, other members of the security force and a review, by the
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ir.spector, of documented security incidents, there was no indication
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that the failure to document and report this security violation is
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a common or widespread practice. All personnel interviewed, including
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those involved in this incident, stated that both contractor and
licensee management encouraged reporting of all incidents. The review
of the security reports, conducted by the inspector for the period
of October 1,1985, through January 8,1986, disclosed a number of
incidents, ranging from insignificant to significant, that, when
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appropriate, had been reported to the NRC in accordance with the
requirements of the Security / Contingency Plan and in compliance with
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The inspector also noted that when he apprised the licensee of the
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incident, the licensee, who was previously unaware of the incident,
immediately initiated an investigation.
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