ML20140B665
| ML20140B665 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 03/07/1986 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8603240263 | |
| Download: ML20140B665 (2) | |
Text
w-
,l'
- A r
.~
DUKE POWER GOMPANY l'.O. HOX 33180 CitAHLOTTE, N.O. 28242 HALB. TUCKER
== ;ry"
js M Olb !p m zenosz
(' * "'" 8
- March 7, 1986
,,-.,,.,,.-,.,n:,,_,
i.prj J.;WelsongGrace',lRegional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30302
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-369, 50-370
Reference:
RII:REW NRC/0IE Inspection Report 50-369/85-41, 50-370/85-42
Dear Dr. Gr. ace:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, please find attached a response to violation which was identified in the above referenced Inspection Report.
Very truly yours, Hal B. Tucker JBD/jgm Attachment xc:
Mr. W.T. Orders Senior NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station 8603240263 a6 369 PDR ADOCK PDR O
t L
. ],~800 s.
d h
c.
.. e DUKE POWER COMPANY MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION RESPONSE TO VIOLATION IN INSPECTION REPORT 50-369/85-41 AND 50-370/85-42 Viciation 369/85-41-02, Severity Level IV Technical Specification 6.8.1(a) requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering in part, the surveillance testing of emergency power systems and emergency core cooling systems.
Contrary to the above, on December 10, 1985, procedure PT-1-A-4200-28, Slave Relay Test was not followed, in that performance technicians energized the train "A" sequencer instead of the train "B" sequencer, as specified by procedure and located in a different electrical cabinet. This action resulted in an inadvertent ESF actuation.
Response
1.
Admission or denial of the alleged violation:
Duke Power agrees that the violation occurred as stated in LER 369/85-37, dated January 7, 1986.
2 2.
Reasons for violation:
The violation occurred due to personnel error when two technicians failed to properly identify and verify the component being actuated and to properly follow procedure steps.
3.
Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:
Documented retraining regarding this incident has been given to all appropriate technicians. There has been no recurrence of this type of incident to date.
4.
Corrective as'ps which will be taken to avoid further violations:
An evaluation of different means of identifying components of separate trains in the Safeguards Test Cabinets with improved Human Factors / Human-Engineering features will be made. Consideration will be given to an apparent paradox of philosophies; i.e. a philosophy which calls'for standardization of controls, markings, and configurations to aid in operating, versus a philosophy of uniquely identifying. controls to prevent actuating the wrong train of two' identical systems.
5.
Date when full compliance will be achieved:
Full. compliance will be achieved by July 1, 1986.
...,