ML20138S105
| ML20138S105 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1985 |
| From: | Siegel B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8511190536 | |
| Download: ML20138S105 (170) | |
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# 'o,, UNITED STATES
' E o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 : E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
\,+...+/ fi3V 1 3 1985 Docket No. 50-461 APPLICANT: Illinois Power Company FACILITY: Clinton Power Station
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING WITH ILLIN0IS POWER COMPANY RELATED TO FIRE PROTECTION FOR CLINTON POWER STATION A working meeting among representatives of the Illinois Power Company (IP), Sargent and Lundy (S&L) and the NRC staff was held on November 6 and 7, 1985, in Bethesda, Maryland. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the following: Fire protection design, canstruction, and testing status; Deviation requests contained in IP's recently submitted (9/6/85) revised fire protection evaluation report and safe shutdown analysis; Concerns identified in a letter from the NRC staff to IP, dated October 18, 1985 resulting from the staff's September audit of Clinton Power Station; and SER open issues. Enclosure 1 identifies the meeting attendees and enclosure 2 contains the meeting agenda. Enclosures 3 and 4 address the staff's concerns and IP's deviation requests respectively, as identified in the agenda. Following is a sumary of the issues discussed, the staff's positions and recomendations, and IP's commitments. I. Revisions of safe shutdown analysis deviation requests were discussed. A. IP was advised that the following deviation requests were evaluated and found acceptable in our recent SSER input:
- 1. Water tight doors;
- 2. Partial detection in some fire areas;
- 3. Partial detection in air intake structures; and
- 4. Lack of automatic fire suppression in diesel air intake suppression.
B. IP was advised that the lack of area wide automatic fire detection in the diesel generator fuel oil storage tank rooms and day tank B511190536 DR ADOCK O 85p g ,1 l l
rooms is not acceptable. IP infomed the staff that they would advise their management of our decision and proceed from there. C. IP was advised that the following deviation requests would most likely be found acceptable following submittal of minor clarifying infomation:
- 1. Steel wall A-2/T-1;
- 2. Steel wall A-1/A-2;
- 3. Standby gas treatment; and
- 4. Circulating screenhouse ventilation penetration.
i D. IP was advised that adequate infomation/ justification had been submitted on the following deviation requests and that they would probably be approved in a future SSER:
- 1. Unprotected steel in stairways; and 1 2. Containment wall airlock door and electric & mechanical
- penetrations.
E. IP was advised that additional information, drawings, and/or justification was required before the staff could complete its review of the following deviation requests:
- 1. Floor slab;
- 2. Security airlock;
- 3. Bus duct penetration;
- 4. Additional partial detection deviations;
- 5. Drywell ;-
- 6. Control Room;
- 7. Partial Suppression in Fire Area A-1;
- 8. Partial Suppression in Fire Area CB-1;
- 9. Partial Suppression in Fire Area CB-5; and
- 10. Partial Suppression in Fire Area F-1.
The staff's review of these deviation requests can not be completed until this additional information is provided.
- II. Concerns from NRR/CMEB audit were discussed.
A. The following items have been adequately addressed by IP, but a formal submittal is required:
- 1. 2-hour rating of block walls;
- 2. Reactor building air lock doors;
- 3. Unprotected steel D/G rooms;
- 4. Ventilation duct fire dampers;
- 5. Fire damper assemblies dirty & "S" heck installation;
- 6. Location of fire pump flow meter discharge;
- 7. Control room protection;
- 8. Fire hydrant spacing;
- 9. Accessbility with 75 feet of fire hose; and
- 10. Turbine building safety-related conduits.
1
- O During the neeting, the applicant agreed to provide the additional clarifying information in their formal submittal to resolve these issues.
B. The following audit concerns require additional justification by - the applicant:
- 1. Cable trays unprotected by automatic sprinkler systers; and
- 2. Fire protection for the containment and drywell III. Additional topics of discussion were:
A. Gas bottle storage in rad-chen laboratory. The applicant has agreed to submit their plans for gas storage /use in the control building. B. Functional testing of fire dampers. The staff requested that IP consider development of a technical specificatien covering functional testing of the fire darpers. Alternatively, the staff suggested that IP consider development of an administrative precedure to cover functional testing of fire dampers. IP agreed to consider the staff's request and to provide a written response containing their decision. C. IP's cenpliance with the staff's guidelines to Appendix A of BTP APCSB 9.5.1 was discussed. IP agreed to review their ccepliance with these guidelines to ensure that any and all deviations are identified and justified. At the conclusion of the meeting, IP stated they intended to address those concerns where plant modifications may be required to meet Appendix A or Appendix R and which have a potential impact on fuel load immediately and will inform the staff regarding the results of their evaluationi and their commitments. Original Signed by Byron L. Siegel, Project flanager Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated DISTRIBUTION cc w/o enclosures 3 & 4: : Docket. Fi.le; iteeting Attendees NRC PDR ' Local PDR PRC System NSIC LB#2 Reading Goddard, OELD LB# LB#2/DL/BC WButler BSie :, WButler BSiegel 11/g85 EHylton 11/f' 85'
1 During the meeting, the applicant agreed to provide the additional clarifying information in their formal submittal to resolve these issues. B. The following audit concerns require additional justification by the applicant:
- 1. Cable trays unprotected by automatic sprinkler systems; and
- 2. Fire protection for the containment and drywell.
III. Additional topics of discussion were: A. Gas bottle storage in rad-chem laboratory. The applicant has agreed to submit their plans for gas storage /use in the control building. B. Functional testing of fire dampers. The staff requested that IP consider development of a technical specification covering functional testing of the fire dampers. Alternatively, the staff suggested that IP consider development of an administrative procedure to. cover functional testing of fire dampers. IP agreed to consider the staff's request and to provide a written response containing their decisio'n. C. IP's compliance with the staff's guidelines to Appendix A of BTP AFCSB 9.5.1 was discussed. IP agreed to review their compliance with these guidelines to ensure that any and all deviations are ioentificd and justitieo. At the conclusion of the neeting, IP stated they intended to address those concerns where plant modifications may be required to meet Appendix A or Appendix R end which have a potential impact on fuel load imediately and will inform the staff regarding the results of their evaluation and their cornitments.
.'hi,A , efN Byron L. Siegel, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/o enclosures 3 & 4: Meeting Attendees
+. _
Mr. Frank A. Spangenberg Clinton Power Station Illinois Power Company Unit 1 cc: Mark Jason Jean Foy, Esquire Assistant Attorney General 511 W. Nevada
< Public Utilities Division Urbana, Illinois 61801 Office of the Attorney General State of Illinois Center Richard B. Hubbard 100 West Randolph Street - 12th Floor Vice President Chicago, Illinois 60601 Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue - Suite K Mr. D. P. Hall San Jose, California 95125 Vice President Clinton Power Station P. O. Box 678 Clinton, Illinois, 61727 Mr. H. R. Victor Manager-Nuclear Station Engineering Dpt.
Clinton Power Station P. 0. Box 678 Clinton, Illinois 61727 Sheldon Zabel, Escuire Schiff, Hardin & Waite 7200 Sears Tower 233 Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60606 Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccnnission RR 3, Box 229 A Clinton, Illinois- 61727 - Mr. R. C. Heider Projectf*anager c argent & Lundy Engineers 55 East Monroe Street Chicago, Illinois 60603 g Mr. L. Larson Project Manager , General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue, N/C 395 San Jose, California 95125 i Regional Administrator, Region III ! 799 Roosevelt Road
- Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 ,
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O Enclosure 1 Meeting with Illinois Power Company to Discuss Fire Protection Issues November 6 arid 7, 1985 Name Affiliation K. Steven West
- NRC/NRR/DE/CMEB R. L. Ferguson* hRC/NRR/DE/CMEB R. A. Parson
- Sargent & Lundy J. D. Behn
- Sargent & Lundy R. P. Bhat* Illinois Power Co.
R. T. Kerestes* Illinois Power Co. D. W. Wilson
- Illinois Power Co.
F. A. Spangenberg Mgr. Licensing & Safety, IPC L. Langenberg Sargent and Lundy S. Perry Illinois Power Company P. Hearns NRC/NRR/DSI/ASB V. Benarcya* NRC/NRR/DE/CMEB P. Telhorst Illinois Power Co. B. Siegel* NRC/NRR/DL/LB-2 s
- Attended November 7,1985 meeting also
.. . g
. t Enclosure 2
'e Agenda for November 6, 1985 g Meeting on Fire Protection '
A. Fire Protection Design, Construction, and Testing Status B. Deviation Requests
- 1. Floor Slabs
- 2. Steel Walls
- 3. Water Tight Doors
- 4. Security Air Locks
- 5. Unprotected Steel in Stairways
- 6. Circulating Screen House Ventilation Penetration
- 7. Fire Detection by k'ater Flow
- 8. Dryvell Suppression in Fire Area C-1
- 9. Control Room Complex
- 10. Partial Suppression in Fire Area CB-1
- 11. Suppression Systems in Fire Area F-1 C. Concerns from NRC 10/18/85 letter
- 1. 2-hour rating of block walls
- 2. Reactor Building air lock doors
- 3. Electrical bus duct penetration sealing
- 4. Unprotected structural steel in D/G Rooms
- 5. Ventilation duct fire dampers 6 Fire damper assemblies dirty /"S" hook installation
- 7. Cable trays unprotected by automatic sprinkler systems
- 8. Location of fire pump flow meter discharge
- 9. Fire hydrant spacing
-10. Accessibility with 75 feet of fire hose
- 11. Control Room protection
- 12. Turbine Building safety related conduits u
- 13. Fire protection for containment and drywell D. SER Issues
- 1. Gas storage bottles in the rad-chem laboratory
- 2. Deviations from III.F of Appendix R for fire detection
- 3. New justifications for fire zones with changes since SER 3.
- 4. Deviations from III.G of Appendix R for Fire Protection C
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'. Enclosure 3 i .
Page 1 of 4 ATTACHMENT (1) CLARIFICATIONS
- 1. No justification was provided for the 2-hour fire resistance rating attributed to the eight-inch thick hollow concrete block walls serving as fire barriers.
Response
Illinois Power's investigation of this issue as a 10CFR50.55(e) is now complete and we have determined that the condition is not safety sipificant. Justification is provided with the final report for 10CFR50.55(e) (Attachment 3) and the corresponding test report. i
- 2. Structural steel forming a part of the fire barrier in the diesel generator day tank room is not protected.
(Section D.l.(j) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
We are providing a design clarification, as Attachment (4), for the unprotected steel in this area. Basically, the L4x4 member provided temporary support for the wet concrete of the roof slab and added shear resistance to the joint detail. The angle is welded to an embedment plate and is not required to maintain the integrity of the roof slab. The concrete wall which < has the embedment plate is continuous and has no gaps j and, therefore, provides a continuous fire barrier. ! 3. Some ventilation ducts penetrating fire barriers are . not equipped with fire rated dampers. (Section D.I. (j) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB'9.5-1)
Response
Illinois Power has completed a review of all HVAC duct penetrations through fire rated barriers. Based on
'this review, design modifications are being implemented to install fire dampers in duct penetrations located in safe shutdown areas of the plant.
l 4. The tracks and blades of fire damper assemblies are ! loaded with dirt and debris and '.'S" hooks are installed
- backwards. (Section C.8 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
To establish a standard method for testing and
~
- documenting the functional ability of fire dampers, we have developed a C&IO Phase Test Procedure (GTP-38)..
, This procedure ensures that fire dampers are: } l i _ . . . , . . - - - - r .-, _,-.n,_,, _ . - - - - . . - , . , - . . . . - _ , . , .r.,.n .-,n- ..-.y__,..- , ,,,m..--3-- . ,w-um,_.,-gne,.
4 __. . .. e Page 2 of 4 ATTACHMENT (1) CLARIFICATIONS a) tested and inspected in accordance with manufacturers instructions. i b) free of corrosion and dirt. I c) verified to have the proper "S" hook installation.
- 5. Cable trays outside of the cable spreading room are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems. (Section D.3.(c) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
We are providing a design clarification, as Attachment (5), for the fire hazard associated with cable tray loading. In retrospect, we cover the overall philosophy for determining fire loads in each zone. The purpose of adopting a conservative approach i
- philosophy was to ensure that as new cables were added, they would not invalidate the fire loading calculation presented in the FPER. This approach would eliminate the need to amend the fire loadings associated with the cable trays. The calculated values were based on 150%
of design fill for cable trays, which is never exceeded in plant design. Also, the average Btu's of energy 4 available per pound of cable insulation was conservatively used at 8200 Btu /lb.
- 6. The location of the fire pump flow meter discharge outlet relative to the pump intake may adversely affect the fire flow test results. (Section E.2.(c) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1) l Response The vertical fire pump has a 12" diameter intake that is located 34'-4" down the well from the top of the concrete. The water level is 25'-4" above the bottom of the pump screen inlet. The fire pump flow meter discharge outlet has a 10" diameter that is located 3'-6" down the well from the top of the concrete.The
, water level is 5'-6" below the bottom of the discharge outlet. This equates to a vertical distance difference of 30'-10" between the pump intake and discharge outlet. The horizontal distance is 5'-8\" between the intake and outlet. Considering the difference in ' , elevation between the inlet and outlet, we feel that this will not adversely affect the flow test results. In addition, this recirculation line will be utilized as part of the preoperational test and the results i obtained will be checked against the baseline to determine if there are any adverse effects. L
Page 3 of 4 ATTACHMENT (1) CLARIFICATIONS
- 7. Fire hydrant spacing exceeds 250 feet within the Power i Block. (Section E.2.(g) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
Illinois Power Company has reviewed the spacing of fire hydrants that does not meet the "approximately 250 feet" guideline of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. We are planning to equip some hydrant hose houses with supplemental lengths of 1%" and 2%" hose to provide an acceptable coverage in accordance with the intent of Appendix A and meet the requirements of NFPA-24.
- 8. In many safety-related areas it may not be possible to reach all locations with 75 feet of fire hose due to congestion and changes in elevation. (Section E.3.(d) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
We have been conducting a hose stretch test of all fire hoses throughout the fire zones. The hose stations have been desiped to provide accessibility and '; coverage to all zones. All areas in the plant can be reached by at least one effective hose stream. The 100 feet maximum of 1% inch hose per Section C.6.c(4) of CMEB 9.5-1 and its associated standpipe system will conform to NFPA-14. Any findings resulting from the hose stretch test will be addressed and modifications will be made as required.
- 9. The Control Room is not ad'equately separated from its peripheral rooms by fire rated construction and automatic sprinkler protection is not provided in the peripheral rooms. (Section F.2 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
We are providing, as Attachment (6), a design clarification for the Control Room peripheral walls. The Control Room and its peripheral. rooms are protected by 1.9 hour fire rated walls, a complete ionization type smoke detection system, portable fire extinguishers and manual hose stations and 3-hour fire-rated floor and ceilings with all openings properly protected. The fire zones have combustible loadings of less than an hour. Therefore, upgrading the peripheral room walls to a 3 hour fire rating does not enhance the level of fire safety above that provided by the existing construction.
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Page 4 of 4 I ATTACHMENT (1) CLARIFICATIONS
- 10. The Turbine Building contains conduits identified as being safety-related. (Various sections of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and Appendix R to 10CFR50 that apply to areas containing safety-related equipment).
l Response i Some Class IE electrical cables (in conduits) as well 4 as instrumentation devices that provide inputs to the solid state protection system (SSPS) are housed in the
. _ _ _ Turbine Building. The principal function of these devices is to provide anticipatory trip for the reactor based upon secondary system parameters. If these cables and/or devices failed, other parameters not
. measured in the Turbine Building would provide the necessary shutdown signals. Thus, no credit has been taken in the SSA for the parameters measurements. On this basis, all equipment and systems in the Turbine Building are considered non-essential for the safe shutdown of the plant. 4 i . 1 'l
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Page 1 of 1 ATTACHMENT (2) DEVIATIONS
- 1. The Reactor Building air lock doors are not fire rated.
(Section D.1(j) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
Deviation 4.2.2.14.1 has been written, and is I Attachment (7). This concern will be incorporated into i the Safe Shutdown Analysis. The personnel hatch has j both an outside and an inside door in the containment. ; Acceptance testing of these doors was done in accordance with NFPA-252. The hinges and latches of the doors are significantly stronger than those of a metal fire door and will not allow the doors to warp away from the openings in the fire barrier. Based on the substantial construction of these containment hatches, they are at least equivalent to 3-hour rated fire doors.
- 2. Electrical bus duct penetrations through fire barriers are not sealed. (Section D.l(j) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
i Deviation 4.2.2.15 has been written, and is Attachment (8). As described in the SSA, in the event of a fire in any of the zones containing these bus duct penetrations, the reactor can be brought to a safe shutdown condition. Thus, the performance goals for the safe shutdown functions are assured. ! 3. Fire protection means for have not been provided in ,the accordancecontainment with our and drywell guidelines. (Section III.G of Appendix R to 10CFR50 and Section F.1 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1)
Response
Deviation 4.2.4.1 has been written, and is Attachment (9). An' adequate level of protection is provided to ensure safe shutdown-when you consider the minimal combustibles in the area, detection for the reactor recirculation pumps, and spatial separation of safe shutdown cables in conduit. Therefore, an automatic suppression system is not necessary. l - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - , , . , , . . - . ,- n.- . . . , . , , _ . - , , - - , n.-, , . . , , , - . , ,,,n- n,. , ._,m- ,-, n..,_
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ATTACHMENT 3
. U-600222 I.14 - 3 5 (09- 19 )-r.
lA.120
/LLIN0/S POWER COMPANY :9g 0amf0N # Cat 4 37AT'Ch. P Q 4Ca sig. O'apeTC4, swNCi$ 41727 Docket No. 50-461 Septemcer 19, 1981 Mr. James G. Keppler Regicnal Administrator Regica III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
. 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
SUBJECT:
Potential 10CFR50.55(e) Deficiency 55-85-03 Firewall Structures Fabricated Using Uncualified Material
Dear Mr. Keppler:
On April 4, 1985, Illinois Fo F. Jablonski, NRC Region III (Ref'ggrIPCompany
. memorandum notified Y-26230 Mr.
dated April 4,1985) of a potentially reportable deficiency involving firewalls constructed with 8 inch hollow core concrete masonry units (CMUs) that may not meet the three (3) hour fire resistance rating stated in the Clinton Power - Station (CPS) Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER-1978). This initial notification was followed by one (1) interim report (Ref: IP letter U-10273. D. P. Hall to J. G. Keppler, dated May 3, 1985). Illinois Power's investigation of this issue is complete. Our investigation into this matter has determined that this issue does not represent a reportable deficiency under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). This letter is submitted as a final re with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e) port in accordance
. Attachment A provides the details of our investigation.
We trust that this final report provides you sufficient background information to perform a general assessment of this potentially reportable deficiency and adequately 1 describes our overall. approach to resolve this issue. Sincerely yours,
/
. D. . Hall i
Vice President RLC/ lab Attachment cc: NRC Resident Office Director, Office of I&E, US NRC, Washington, DC 20555 Illinois De arecent of Nuclear Safety INPO Recorc. Center *
. q,%LbhLY Y M
ATTACFM ST A Illinois Power Company Clinton Power Station Docket No. 50-461 Potential 10CFR50.55(e) Deficiency 55-85-03 Firewall Structures Fabricated Using Uncualified Material Final Reoort Statement of Potentially Recortable Deficiency /Backaround i During the Clinton Independent Desip Review (IDR) Fire Protection Walkdown, performed by Bechtel, questions were i raised regarding the existing documentation for the fire resistance rating of the hollow core concrete masonry walls constructed at the Clinton Power Station. Subsequent to the questions raised by the IDR personnel, Sargent & Lundy (S&L) i and Illinois Power personnel, performing a similar walkdown during December 1984, requested Baldwin Associates to supply documentation regarding the fire resistance rating of the subject block walls. Baldwin Associates (BA) was unable to supply the requested documentation that would support the , required fire resistance racing indicated on the S&L Architectural Drawings. i Investigation Results Illinois' Power prepared and implemented an
- investigation plan to determine the extent of this deficiency at CPS. The investigation plan included the following actions
4 1. A review of documentation was performed to
,* determine the possible cause for purchasing ~
. unqualified material.
- 2. A review of documentation was performed to determine the quantity of material that was L supplied by vendors other than the pri=e supplier.
The physical properties of the material were also l investigated. i s , 3 ~. Sargent & Lundy evaluated'the material to ! ' determine the fire resistance rating. A review of the BA purchase orders indicates that the blocks were purchased to minicum. strength requirements in accordance with Specification K-2944 Page 1 of 3
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a ATTAC10fENT A (cont'd) The Purchase Orders for the hollow masenry units were , reviewed to deter =ine the amount of material purchased from each supplier. There were four suppliers: however, Bloomington Builders Supolies Bloomington, Illinois, trovidec approximately 91% of the hollow masonry units. 1 Information supplied by Bloomington Builders Supplies ! indicated that the 8-inch hollow masonry units would have a two hour fire resistance rating. a l Corrective Action 4 Sargent & Lundy reviewed the fire resistance rating of the ; I firewalls, and in letters SLS-I-5092, dated April 29, 1985, and SLS-I-5102, dated May 3,1985, made the following recommendations: i 1) Revise the Control Room Fire Walls to two hour barriers. 1 2) Include the Diesel Day Tank Rooms within the Diesel l Generator Fire Areas.
- 3) Add a suppression system to the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room at elevation 781 in the Control i
Building. ' Illinois Power, in letter S-5418, dated May 14, 1985, concurred, and the recommendations were implemented in the update of the Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER) and i Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA). - To confirm the manufacturer's test' documentation, physical tests were performed on five blocks selected at random, to verify the two hour fire resistant rating. The blocks were tested in accordance with ASTM C140, Sampling. ! and Testing of Concrete Masonry Units, and ASTM C856, Petro- ! graphic Examination of Hardened Concrete. The test results 4 of the blocks indicated that the blocks were made of
' calcareous gravel with a fire resistant rating of approxi-
. mately 1.9 hours. The fire resistance rating of 1.9 hours has been used in the update of the FPER and SSA.
~
I i . , l The twelve inch hollow masonry was not investigated ! because the estimated effective thickness will provide the ' required fire resistance rating regardless of the type of aggregate used. Page 2 of 3
l l 1 ATTAC*-2ENT A (centinued) In the future all new construction or changes in the ccmbustibles in an area will be reviewed for fire proteccion concerns in accordance with the ??ER to assure that the proper fire barriers are provided. NSED Procedure D.20, Processine of Plant Modificaciens (Nor=al), D.21, Processing of Plant Mocifications (Minor) anc D.22,. Engineering Intercisc olinary Review of Plant Modificac ens provide for tais review. Although no additional firewalls are planned for CPS, Field Engineering Change Notice (FECN) No. 11762 was written against S&L Specification K-2944 to require documentation of the fire resistance rating of the concrete masonry used to construct firewalls. Root Cause The findings of this investigation were reviewed to determine the root cause. Based on this review it was determined that although the design drawings did specify a 3 hour firewall, BA purchased the masonry units to the minimum strength requirements only, since there was no specification i requirement to submit documentation to support the fire resistance rating of the hollow masonry units.
. Safety Imelications/Sirnificance Illinois Power's investigation of this issue is ccmplete. S&L has evaluated the findings regarding the fire resistance rating of hollow core concrete masonry units used to construct firewalls at CPS and has determined that the condition is not safety sipificant within the scope of
. 10CFR50.55(e) reporting, nis evaluation and determination was based on the latest update of the Fire Protection Evaluation Report, the Safe Shutdown Analysis, and was independent of the suppression system added to meet Appendix s R requirements. .
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P.O. Eox 675 Clir. ten, IL 61727 Attn. R.E. Alsop Re: 1985 . Miscellaneous Tests I RE007.T OF TESTS Subject : Investigative Ar.alysis of Masonry Block Pethod : A5T.M C-11* & C-145 Specificaticn : ASTI: C-90 ,
) _ TEST DATA _
Sample Sample Block fio . 1.D. Co npcsi tion 1 Block 1
- Calcareous Gravel 2 Block 2 Calcareous Gravel .
3 Block 3 Calcareous Gravei 4 Block 4 Calcareous Gravel 5 Block 5 Calcareous Gravel F.eipectfully sub.itted. k . f,h ' s I 0(k.m . Richard E fielser., Jr.
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United States Testing Company, Inc. fp s M. f 9, b ,,.. .; ~ = 6.,:,<-w.r.c 2 2 : : ,m.,... " lt .i ...c T s:: :r .e .~ ; . u.e c. .
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-05Cr.E's. *.E.v .E:SEv 7.30 20-);32 :PA .2!2. 943-964 Kc;c : 3sta 3-30 ~3 REPCRT OF TESTS CLIENT: ILLINOIS PO'4ER CO. ,
PROJECT: CLINTON PO'4ER STATION CIIT I LCCA!!ON: CLINICN, ILLINOIS SGJECT: Equivalent thickness and cc npositional classificatien METECD: ASTM C-140 Sa:::pling and testing concrete casenry units. TYPE: Manufactured concrete casonry units, 6 inch. T
./ Eculptent ID Cal. Date Ex;. Date SC-23 5-14-55 11-14-85 S0-1 5-14-85 11-14-85 DIE-1 4-24-55 . 10-24-55 ,
~r r Tested By:
$ ?*A G. Miller te - s .,tr- '
As dn.n'e w - * . a c-Reviewed By: R.J. Eenudet , P
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ATTACHMENT 4 U' t *"' / 53~' ***
- 22) .
n Provida justificatien why the u .pretected steel *in t..e ' Diesel Generator Day Tank Rec.ts does not derate the - fire barriers. The L4x4 member in the Diesel Generater Day Tan.k Rcom, as shown
~~-' reRe WetT5nerWte c:on theene following roo: sJ.ao Detail _A21 M O-12,_previded sces_cp:etemperarl-to the joint detail. anc adcs shear resistance similar to other attachments to concrete firewalls.The angle is welded to an,i em This an is not required to maintain the integrity of the roof slab. gle i.-[.,Q .
;g Additicnally, the concrete wall which has the embedment plate for the angle is continuous and has no gaps and therefore " ~ '%
provides a continuous fire barrier. .
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ATTACHMENT 5 Design Clarification Automatic Suppression for Safety-Related Cable Trays Reference APCSB Appendix A Section D.3(c)
" Automatic water sprinkler systems should be provided for cable trays outside the cable spreading room. .."
NRC Concern Not all safety-related cable trays are protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by automatic water suppression systems. , , , , Fire Areas Involved All fire areas outside the cable spreading room. Description of SSD Equipment and Cables See the Safe Shutdown Analysis Cable Tray Figures 1 through 22. i Engineering Justification The design bas'es for electrical cable trays at the Clinton Nuclear Plant are described in subsection 3.1.2.3 FPER. Fire protection for electrical cable tray includes the following j passive and active measures: i .
- 1. Cable Materials: The EPR/Hypolon cables used at Clinton
, were selected for their ignition resistance and low flame spread and heat' release rates. These cables pass the flame spread screening test of IEEE-383. Large scale fire tests (NUREG/CR-0381 September 1978) verified the fire
- protection feature built into the cable insulation and jacketing materials.., .,
2 Cable Tray Construction: Clinton u$es solid bottom stoel i
' cable trays except for a few ladder trays directly over equipment to facilitate access to the equipment. Solid l bottom trays have been shown by tests conducted by Sandia Laboratories for the USNRC and also tests conducted by
- Toledo Edison, docketed in the Davis-Besse fire hazard analysis,to' provide additional ignition resistance and retard fire propagation between trays. .
i i l " Page 1 of 2
Design Clarification Automatic Suppression for I Safety-Related Cable Trays l A solid bottom tray provides a barrier to direct flame impingement, piloted ignition, which in turn requires the EPR (Hypolon) cables to be heated to a higher temperature auto ignition in order to ignite. For the EPR/Hypolon cables, the auto ignition temperature is greater than 1000*F.
- 3. Automatic Fire Protection: In most areas containing safety-related cable trays and in all areas containing
~
high concentrations of safety-related cables, automatic ionization fire detectors are provided which alarm in the Control Room in the event of a fire. The ionization detectors will provide early warning of exposure fires.
- 4. Manual Fire Suppression: Throughout the plant, portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are provided to facilitate manual fire suppression.
- 5. Automatic Fire Suppression Systems: Automatic sprinkler protection is provided for areas in the plant as described in the FPER and SSA. These include areas in the Control, Diesel Generator #. and Auxiliary Buildings.
t i , l Page 2 of 2 '
. . i ATTACHMENT 6 i
i
- Design Clarification i'
Control Room Peripheral Walls i I . f ) References I
- 1. BTP 9.5-1 Appendix A, Section F.2, stated that the control room should be separated from other areas of the plant by i floors, walls, and roofs having_a_!ainiatum fire resistance j rating of~~3 hours.
- 2. NUREG 0853, SER Section 9.5.4.1, February 1982 j NRC Concern i
i The control room is not adequately protected from its periph-eral rooms by walls having a fire resistance rating of 3 hours. Fire Area Involved i Fire Zone CB-6a, c, d - Elevation 800 feet 0 inch (see Figures 14a and b and Cable Tray Figure 12) i I Engineering Justification J l 1 The control room is located on the 800 foot elevation of the control building. As shown in Figure FP-14b, the peripheral I rooms adjacent to the main control room include the technical support center, 'shif t supervisor's office, planning and sched-1 uling room, results records room, and emergency food storage room. These rooms, except the technical support center, will i be separated from the~ main control room by a 1.9 hour fire-rated fire barrier. The technical support center will be separated from the main control room by a directional 1.9 hour ' " fire-rated wall as shown in Figure 14b. The floor'and ceiling of elevation 800 feet 0 inch are 3 hour fire-rated with all openings properly protected. The control room and peripheral rooms are protected by a complete j ionization type smoke detec,tio'n system. Portable fire extin-guishers and manual hose stations are also provided in the ; i vicinity of the rooms. These fire zones are low hazard zones l j with combustible loadings of less than 1 hour. In the event i of a fire in the peripheral rooms, the reactor can be brought i to a safe shutdown condition utilizing - the remote shutdown i ! panel located in the Division 1 switchgear room of the auxiliary ! building at elevation 781 feet 0 inch. Safe shutdown capability < is described in Subsection 3.3.6.2 of the Safe Shutdown Analysis. l j . l i, . l ! Page 1 of 2 " I t
.. l Design Clarification Control Room Peripheral Walls J
Therefore, upgrading the peripheral room walls to a 3 hour fire rating does not enhance the level of fire safety above that provided by the existing construction. i i m eumy .
- l 1
t 6 I Page 2 of 2 , 3 I
. . , - _ _ __ _ - . . . _ _ _ . _ . . . _ . . _ . _ . . . _ , . . , _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ . - . _ _ . ~ . . _ _ . , _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ ___
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. ATTACHMENT 7 Deviation 4.2.2.14.1 Page 1
{ 4.2.2.14.1 Containment Airlocks Descriotion of Deviation The airlock doors (hatches) provided in the containment *and drywell boundaries are not tested or labeled as 3-hour fire doors.
--- Reference -
NUREG-0853, SER, Section 9.5.2.2 Door openings should be protected with equipment rated doors, frames, and hardware that h' ave been tested and approved by a nationally recognized testing laboratory. Such doors should be normally closed and locked or alarmed with alarm and annunciation in the control room. (, Fire Areas Involved The following fire areas and zones are involved in this deviation: Door Loce. tion Fire Areas / Zones Sooarated Elevation 737'-0" SW Quadrant , F-im/C-2/C-1 Equipment Hatch .
\
Elevation 737'-0" Column / Row-AD East C-2/C-1 Personnel Hatch - Elevation 737'-0" NE Quadrant A-2d/C-2
~.
Personnel Hatch Elevatio.n 828'-3" NE Quadrant C-2/CD-li Personnel Lock / Walkway L e s
Deviation 4.2.2.14.1 , Page 2 Description of Safe Shutdown Cables and Equipment Fire Area C-2 separates the containment from the fuel and auxiliary buildings. The containment walls are not used to separate redundant safe shutdown divisions. Safe shutdown cables are shown on Figures through . Engineering Justification The airlock doors (hatches) provided in the containment and drywell boundaries are not tested or labeled as 3-hour fire doors. The 4 containment boundarf, including penetrations (i.e. , doors and cable penetrations), is designed for worst case accident parameters as described in CPS-FSAR Subsection 6.2.1.1.3. Each of the airlock type doors addressed in this deviation is designed to withstand { the pressures and temperatures associated with design-basis accidents. Each opening is protected by massive steel hatches with multiple-point latches on both ends of the airlock. Each airlock consists of two doors. The space between the doors is devoid of any combustibles. Acceptance testing of f, ire doors in accordance with NFPA 252 " Fire Test of Door Assembles" (ASTM E-152) identifies the most important condition of acceptance as the' ability of the. door to " remain in place during both the fire test and t'he hose stream test." The hinges and the latches of the airlock doors are significantly stronger than those on a metal fire door and would not allow the doors to significantly warp away from the openings in tho firo (. barrier in the event of a fire. b ie+s 5
. - . . . _ . .. ._ . _ - ~ . - . - . - .. - .. . . ..
1 i, . - ,- l .. Deviation 4.2.2.14.1 l Page 3 i i
; There is no temperature restriction (as in penetration seals) to '
the temperature rise or limitation on the unexposed side of the t } fire door. Doors usually fail a fire test due to the door being i j " bowed" into the test furnace in addition to the possible failure ! of the hardware holding the door in place. ? . There is no exposure to the doors from inside the containment since all the cable trays (only in Fire Area C-2, all cables are in I conduit in Fire Area C-1) are located on the elevation above the l i equipment and personnel hatches. No combustibles are located in f j the immediate area outside of these hatches. Even an exposure ' fire adjacent to one of these doors would not void the integrity 4 1 of these doors due to the massive heat sink of the door itself. i k ] Based on the design and construction of the doors, the structural i ] integrity imposed on the doors, and the lack of combustibles inside the containment, the airlock doors are equivalent to 3-hour fire j doors. 1 , t i b o s i < (, ' i I I l . I i
ATTACHMENT 8 Deviation 4.2.2.15 Page 1 4.2.2.15 Unsealed Bus Ducts Throuch Fire Barriers Descriction of Deviation Three-hour fire barriers in which bus ducts penetrate are unsealed on the inside of the duct. ne forenca . _ _ _ _ - NUREG-0853, SER, Section 9.5.2.1 Floors, walls, and ceilings enclo; sing separate fire areas should have minimum fire rating of three hours. Penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itsel f. ( Fire Areas Involved The fire areas involved in this deviation are listed on Table 4.2. 2.15-1 and the locations of the 480-volt bus duct openings are listed on Table 4.2.2.15-2. Descrintion of Safe Shutdown Eculement and Cables , The description of safe shutdown equipment and cables is given 1.- the appropriate section of the Clinton FPER and SSA. Enoineerina Justification " 4.16-kV and 6.9-kV Bus Duete There are twenty-two 4.16-kV and 6.9-kV bus duct penotrations unsealed on the inbide in 3-hour fire-rated barriers. None of k- these barriers are necessary to ensure safe shutdown. The bus
Deviation 4.2.2.15
, Page 2 a
duct penetrations are constructed entirely of approximately 11 gauge (.125 inch thickness) metal construction that is bolted to the barrier on each side of the penetration. As evaluated by a fire protection engineer, the construction of the duct assembly, as well as the bolted attachment of the duct to the wall on both sides of the floor / wall, proyides pro.tection_. equivalent to that provided by a fire door or damper. Thus, the sealing of the 1 inside of the 4.16-kV and 6.9-kV bus ducts is not necessary. ) 480-Volt Bus Ducts There are four 480-volt bus duct penetrations unsealed on the inside in 3-hour fire-rated barriers. The bus duct penetrations consist entirely of heavy metal construction that are seismically ] supported and bolted to the barrier on each side of the penetra- ! tions. ) The sheet metal enclosure around the bus duct is approximately six inches by eight inches. The gap between the sheet metal enclosure and the 3-hour fire-rated barrier is sealed with a three-hour fire-rated seal. As evaluated by a fire protection engineer, the bus duct penetrations (based on their substantial construction) are equivalent to a 3-hour barrier. All the fire, zones affected by the 480-volt bus duct penetrations have ionization fire detection installed throughout the :one on both sides of the' penetration. In addition, the duct at S-119 (, at elevation 762 feet 0 inch (Firo Zone A-2k to A-lb) is protected by an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system in Fire Zone A-lb.
y ._ .. . .
~
e ( s i .' Deviation 4.2.2.15 Page 3 i , Based on the construction of the bus ducts, a fire protection { engineer's evaluation of the bus ducts, and the fire detection l .
's
.'and suppression systems provided, the sealing of the inside of the 480-volt bus ducts is not necessary.
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ATTACHMENT 9 1 CPS
- 2 4'
Deviation a.2.4.1 Page 1 of 2 4.2.4.1 DRYWELL SUPPRESSION IN FIRE AREA C-1 l 4 1 Description of Deviation j An automatic suppression system is not provided in Fire Area Cl. Cables associated with safe shutdown pass within 20 feet of their redundant counterparts, i a . A deviation concernirig tre partial fire detection system for this area is discussed in J' Subsection 4.2.3.1. < t 3
, Reference t
i 10 CFR 30, Appendix F., Sections III.G.2.d and e states that cables and equipment of redundant trains must 1,e separated by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no i intervening combustibits or the applicant will install fire detectors and an automatic
] suppression system in the fire area.
Fire Area (s) Involved 4 j Fire Area C-1 - Elevations 707 feet 0 inch through 828 feet O inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b through l FP-7a and 7b and Cable Tray Figures 2 i j , through 6). Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables [i Cables and equipment required for safe shutdown are listed on Table and shown on Figures - through .
~
j Engineerina Justification ..
- All cables, except those attached beneath the reactor, are in' conduit. Separation of safe
" i shutdown conduits is greater than 20 feet except at elevatior) 764 feet 0 inch, where they ' cross over each other and run parallel within 1 foot of each other. Each SRV is powered by both Division 1 and 7. A sufficient number of SRVs would be available assuming that
' all cabling and equipment were disabled within any 20-foot horizontal portion of the drywell. It should be noted that the SRVs also have extensive vertical separation from j g the only in situ fire hazard in this fire area, which is the lubricating oil contained within the two reactor recirculation pump motors. Each reactor recirculation pump motor utllizes self-lubricated bearings with lubricating oil cooled by cooling coils installed within the reservoirs. A pressurized oil system is not j utilized. This design minimizes piping connectiiins to the oil reservoir. The heavy construction and the nonpressurized design of this lubricating system minimize j susceptibility to leakage. Thus, a fire due to the spray of the recirculation pump lubricating oil is not credible. If a fire occurred at the recirculation pump motors, it j would be detected by the ultraviolet fire detection systems. ' ! , (- .
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CPS Deviation 4.2.4.1 Page 2 of 2 The drywell is inaccessible during operation, and when opened, stringent administrative controls are implemented to monitor personnel and equipment ingress and egress. Therefore, an exposure fire from transient combustibles is not credible. Based on the minimal combustibles in the area, detection for the reactor recirculation pumps, and spatial separation of safe shutdown cables in conduit, an adequate level of protection is provided to ensure safe shutdown. Therefore, an automatic suppression 2 system in this fire area is not necessary. 4
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; y CPS T S Deviation 4.2.2.1 T' Page 1 of 2
~ . Shnyn 4.2.2.1 FLOOR SLABS (A-1/A-3) . ,[
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35h Description of Deviation The floor slabs at elevation 737 feet 0 inch and 762 feet 0 inch where they meet theM$[ containment from A-3. The air wall gaphave an unsealed is required 2-inch for post-LOCA air gap. accident These slabs separate Fire Area ventilation. - References .9
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- 1. BTP 9.5-1 Appendix A, Section D.I.j. V.
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- 2. NUREG-0853 SER Section 9.5.2.1, February 1982. g
- 3. NUREG-0853 Supplement No.1, SER Section 9.5.2.1, July 1982, references that ff .
floors, walls, and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have a minimum ',Y fire rating of 3 hours and penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself. Fire Areas involved Fire Zone A-3a, - Elevation 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and . A-3c Cable Tray Figure 2) Fire Zone A-1.e - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3) Fire Zone A-3e - Elevation 762 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-4a and 4b and Cable Tray Figure 4) Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cable Fire Zone A-3c contains a Division 2/ Method 2 safe shutdown valve IE12-F021 and auxiliary building floor drain tank and pumps. The Division 2 cable that services valve IE12-F021 (col./ row 102/AC-AD) enters from Fire Zone A-3b in the east corridor. Fire Zone A-le contains a Division 2/ Method 2 safe shutdown valve IE12-F042C and is located over the containment equipment maintenance area. Fire Area A-3e does not contain any Division 1 or 2 safe shutdown cable or equipment. Engineering Justification The 2-inch air gap between the 3-hour fire-rated floor slabs separating Fire Areas A-1 and A-3 and the containment building wall at elevation 737 feet 0 inch is required for ventilation and seismic criteria. The concern is that a fire propagates from the lower elevation up through the gap to the next elevation. The fire load in the immediate vicinity of the air gap is low.
6 D CPS Deviation 4.2.2.1 Page 2 of 2 Fire Zone A-3c, whi h contains the auxiliary building floor drain tank pump, has a fire load of 16,000 Btu /ft Fire Zone A-le, the next elevation up, does not have fixed combustibles. As a contaminated equipment maintenance area only, transient combustibles would be located in this zone. The next fire zone up (A-3e) at elevation 762 feet 0 inch contains 24,000 Btu /f2t of cable insulation. The floor slabs are a minimum of 14 inches of reinforced concrete and are 3-hour fire-
- rated with the exception of the air gap. All other electrical and mechanical penetrations are sealed with a 3-hour fire-rated seal.
All zones have fire extinguishers and hose stations. Fire Zone A-3e also has a complete ionization fire detection system with alarm and annunciation in the control room. Due to the narrow width of Fire Zone A-3e, the smoke generated from the elevations below will be picked up and alarmed by the ionization detection in Fire Zone A-3e. Based on the safe shutdown analysis and the low fire loading in these zones, a fire in these three fire zones will not affect the plant's ability to safely shut down using the
- Method I safe shutdown systems.
1 e 9
CPS Deviation 4.2.2.2 Page 1 of 2 4.2.2.2 STEEL WALL (A-2/T-1) Description of Deviation The steel wall separating the auxiliary building (Fire Area A-2) and the turbine building (Fire Area T-1)in the main steam tunnel at elevation 755 feet 0 inch is not fire rated. Reference NUREG-0853, SER, Section 9.5.2.1 references that floors, walls, and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have a minimum fire rating of 3 hours and penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself. Fire Areas Involved Fire Zone A-2f - Elevation 755 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a,3b,4a,4b, Sa, and $b) Fire Zone T-le - Elevation 755 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-21a, 21b, 22a, 22b, 23a, and 23b) Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables Fire Zone A-2f is the auxiliary building side of the main steam tunnel. The safe shutdown equipment in this zone consists of a shutdown cooling outboard suction isolation valve (IE12-F008), an RCIC injection shutoff valve (IE51-F013), and RHR and RCIC steam supply line outboard valve (IE51-F064). All three of these valves are Division 1 operated valves. This fire zone is not accessible during plant operations. Fire Zone T-le is the turbine building side of the main steam tunnel. The main steam and feedwater lines from Fire Zone T-le pass through Fire Zone A-2f and service equipment in the containment building. Fire Zone T-le does not contain any safe shutdown equipment or cables; however, Electrical Division IE cable and equipment are located in this fire zone. This fire zone has a partial automatic wet pipe sprinkler system and an automatic fire detection system (see Figure FP-21b). Engineering Justification , The steel wall and its associated penetrations are not fire rated. There are no fixed j combustibles within 40 feet of the steel wall in Fire Zone A-2f except for the gasketing
- and ductwork associated with HVAC area coolers. In addition, the presence of transient combustibles is unlikely, since this zone is not accessible during normal plant operation.
In Fire Zone T-le, the primary hazard would be a turbine oil fire from oil piping located beneath the turbine. The plant is protected from this hazard by a partial wet-pipe sprinkler system in the entrance to the steam tunnel. If a fire occurs in Fire Zone A-2f, safe shutdown can be achieved by using the redundant Method 2 shutdown flow path as shown in Figure 1.8-7.
CPS Deviation 4.2.2.2 Page 2 of 2 Based on the partial suppression system, the negligible combustibles in the immediate area, and the plant's ability to safely shut down with a fire in this plant area, the steel wall and its associated penetrations do not need to be fire rated. 4 l 1-i l4 . 1 1 1 e e e e g
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CPS Deviation 4.2.2.3 Page 1 of 2 4.2.2.3 STEEL WALL (A-1/A-2) Description of Deviation The steel air lock walls that separate Fire Area A-1 (Fire Zone A-lb) from Fire Area A-2 (Fire Zone A-2d) are not 3-hour fire-rated barriers. Reference NUREG-0853 SER, Section 9.5.2.1 references that floors, walls and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have minimum fire rating of 3 hours and penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself. Fire Areas involved Fire Zone A-lb - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3) Fire Zone A-2d - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3) Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables Fire Zone A-lb is a general access area in the auxiliary building. Division I safe shutdown. cables are located on the east side of the zone from Columns 121 to 124 and Division 2 safe shutdown cables are located on the west side of the zone from Columns 102 to 104. The fire zone is protected by complete ionization fire detection and a partial wet-pipe sp-inkler system between column / row Il4-124/S-T. Fire Zone A-2d is a general hallway and containment building personnel hatch area. Division I safe shutdown cables pass through this fire zone from Fire Zone A-lb to the fuel building (see Cable Tray Figure 3).
~
Engineering Justification ~ The steel air lock walls that separate Fire Zone A-lb from Fire Zone A-2d are not 3-hour fire rated barriers. A fire in Fire Zone A-2d could affect the Division I safe shutdown cables in this zone. Division 2/ Method 2 systems would be available to safely shut down the plant. In the event of a fire in Fire Zone A-lb, the same Division I safe shutdown cables which are routed through Zone A-2d could be affected. The Division 2 safe shutdown cables located on the opposite side of the fire zone are more than 130 feet away and are separated by an automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system located between column / row 114-124/S-T. Thus, there is adequate separation between Division 2/ Method 2 and Division 1/ Method I cables in Fire Zone A-lb, and the plant can be safely shut down. i
J CPS Deviation 4.2.2.3 I Page 2 of 2 Based on the. adequate separation between safe shutdown divisions, partial suppression, and the plant's ability to safely shut down with a fire in the vicinity of the steel wall, the steel air lock walls will not need to be fire rated. I 4 l i - e i O 1 1 e I e 4
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CPS Deviation 4.2.2.4 Page 1 of 3 4.2.2.4 WATERTIGHT DOORS (A-1/A-2/A-3/F-1/M-1/M-2) Description of Deviation Watertight doors are not tested or labeled as 3-hour rated fire doors. The doors are part of the plant's fire area boundaries in the auxiliary, fuel and circulating water screen-house. Reference NUREG-0853, SER, Section 9.5.2.2 references that door openings should be protected with equivalent rated doors, frames, and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory. Such doors should be normally closed and locked or alarmed with alarm and annunciation in the control room. Fire Areas Involved Fire Zone A-la - Elevation 701 feet 6 inches (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2) Fire Zones A-2a, - Elevation 707 feet 6 inches (see Figures FP-2a and Cable Tray A-2b, Figure 2) A-2c Fire Zones A-3a, - Elevation 707 feet 6 indies (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable A-3b, Tray Figure 2) A-3c Fire Zones F-la, - Elevation 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable F-lb Tray Figure 2) Fire Area M-1 - Elevation 699 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-25 and 25b and Cable Tray Figure 22) Fire Zone M-2b - Elevation 699 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-25a and 25b and Cable Tray Figure 22) Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables Fire Zone A-la is a general access corridor at elevation 707 feet 6 inches. This zone contains Division 1/ Method I safe shutdown cables and instrument panels. These cables terminate in or pass through Fire Zones A-2a, A-2b, and A-2c. . Fire Zone A-la also contains Division 2/ Method 2 safe shutdown cables and instrument panels. These cables terminate in or pass through Fire Zones A-3a and A-3b. There is a partial ionization fire detection system and a hose station in this zone, i . Fire Zone A-2a is the RCIC pump room and is at elevation 707 feet 6 inches. This zone contains the RCIC pump. and supporting equipment, as well as Division 1 and -2 I
CPS Deviation 4.2.2.4 Page 2 of 3 instruments and valves. Fire Zone A-2a also contains Method I safe shutdown equipment. A partial ionization fire detection system and a hose station are located in this zone. Fire Zone A-2b begins at elevation 707 feet 6 inches. This zone contains RHR pump 1-A and heat exchanger A, as well as Division 1 and 2 instruments and valves. Fire Zone A-2b also contains Method I safe shutdown equipment. A partial ionization fire detection system and a hose station are located in this zone. Fire Zone A-2c is an LPCS pump room and is at elevation 707 feet 6 inches. This zone contains safe shutdown cables in conduit routed to Fire Zone A-2b for valve IE12-F024A, Method I safe shutdown. The equipment located within this zone is not necessary for safe shutdown. There is an ionization fire detection system and a hose station in Fire Zone A-2c. Fire Zone A-3a begins at elevation 707 feet 6 inches. This zone centains RHR pump 1-B, heat exchanger B, and Division 2 instrument panel and valves. Method 2 safe shutdown equipment is also located in this fire zone. A partial ionization fire detection system and hose station is located in this zone. Fire Zone A-3b is the RHR pump 1-C room and is at elevation 707 feet 6 inches. RHR pump 1-C and Division 2 valves and instruments are located in the zone. Fire Zone A-3b contains Method 2 safe shutdown equipment. This fire zone has a partial ionization fire detection system and a hose station. Fire Zone A-3c on elevation 712 feet 0 inch consists of a general hallway and the auxiliary building floor drain pumps and tank. Division 2 safe shutdown cable in conduit to valve IE12-F021 is located within this zone. Fire Zone A-3c has portable fire extinguisher. , Fire Zone F-la (at elevation 712 feet 0 inch) consists of the drywell chillers, drywell l water chiller pumps, and the gamma scanner room. No safe shutdown cables or equipment are located within 30 feet of the watertight door. Fire Zone F-la is equipped with portable fire extinguishers and hose stations. Fire Zone F-lb (at elevation 712 feet 0 inch) contains the HPCS pump and supporting equipment. This equipment is needed in case of a fire in Fire Zone A-3f (elevation 781 feet 0 inch). Division 3 cable trays and Division 2 instrumentation are also located in Zone F-lb. An ionization fire detection system and a portable fire extinguisher are located within this zone. Fire Area M-1 consists of a room containing Division 1/ Method I shutdown service water system safe shutdown cable and equipment and is located at elevation 699 feet 0 inch. There is an ionization fire detection system in Fire Area M-1. Fire Zone M-2b contains Division 2/ Method 2 shutdown service water system safe shutdown cables and equipment and is located at elevation 699 feet 0 inch. Fire Zone M-2b has an ionization fire detection system.
l 0 a CPS Deviation 4.2.2.4 Page 3 of 3 l Engineering Justification , There are seven watertight doors installed in 3-hour fire rated barriers in the auxiliary ' building and two watertight doors installed in 3-hour fire rated barriers in the circulating water screen house. Doors requiring a deviation are shown on Figures FP-2b and 25b. The doors have been evaluated by a fire protection engineer to be equivalent to 3-hour rated fire doors based upon the following: o The acceptance testing of fire doors in accordance with NFPA 252," Fire Test of Door Assemblies" (ASTM-152), identifies the most important condition of acceptance as the ability of the door to " remain in place
. during both the fire test and the hose stream test."
o These substantial steel doors are equipped with multiple (4-point) latching. The hinge shaft is 2.75-inch-diameter steel. The latch pins are 1-inc:i-diameter steel; two are located on each side. o The hinges and the latches of the watertight doors are significantly stronger than those of a metal fire door and would not allow the door to warp away from the opening in the fire barrier. , Based on the substantial construction of the watertight doors, they are at least equivalent to 3-hour rated fire doors. e 4 l' i 't i l . 1-
,_. . - , _ . _ . . . . ~ . . _ . . - _ _ . . - . . - - - , , , , , - - , - - , , . _ , _ _ _ _ _ . . . . . . _ _ _ . . - - . _ , . . . _ _ . , , _ . . - _ - .
CPS Deviation 4.2.2.5 Page 1 of 2 4.2.2.5 SECURITY AIR LOCK CB-6/CB-7, CB-6/CB-1 Description of Deviation The security airlock doors in the 3-hour rated fire barrier around the control room complex are not tested or labeled as 3-hour fire-rated doors. References NUREG-0853, SER Section 9.5.2.2 references that door openings should be protected with equivalent rated doors, frames and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory. Such doors should be normally closed and locked or alarmed with alarm and annunciation in the control room. Fire Areas Involved Fire Zone CB-lh - Elevation 800 feet 0 inch (See Figures FP-14a and 14b and Cable Tray Figure 12) Fire Zone CB-6d - Elevation 800 feet 0 inch (See Figures FP-14a and 14b and Cable Tray Figure 12) Fire Area CB-7 - Elevation 800 feet 0 inch (See Figures FP-14a and 14b and Cable Tray Figure 12) Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables - Fire Zone CB-lh is a stairwell tower that passes through the control building from elevation 702 feet 0 inch through elevation 825 feet 0 inch. At elevation 800 feet 0 inch, Fire Zone CB-lh contains a janitor's closet. No safe shutdown cables are located in the fire zone. Fire Zone CB-lh contains portable fire extinguishers and hose stations for manual fire fighting. Fire Zone CB-6d is the entry point to the control room complex and is located at elevation 800 feet 0 inch. This fire zone contains Division 1/ Method I and Division 2/ Method 2 safe shutdown cable and equipment. An ionization detection system is provided in Fire Zone CB-6d as well as portable fire extinguishers and hose stations. Fire Zone CB-7 is a stairwell tower that passes through the control building from elevation 702 feet 0 inch through elevation 825 feet 0 inch. At elevation 800 feet 0 inch, Zone CB-7 includes a hallway that extends over the auxiliary building. This area does not contain any Division 1/ Method 1 or Division 2/ Method 2 safe shutdown cables or equipment. An ionization detection system is located in Fire Zone CB-7 at this elevation. Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are provided for manual fire fighting. Engineering Justification The three security air lock doors in the south corridor, which separate the control room complex from the access stairwells by 3-hour fire barriers, are not fire-rated doors. e g ,- -+ m.3, ;_,.,
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l . . 5 l CPS i Deviation 4.2.2.5 Page 2 of 2 The east door separates Fire Zone CB-lh from CB-6d. The nearest fire load in the vicinity of the door is located in the janitor's closet, with a fire load of approximately 100 Btu /ft2 . The air lock contains no in situ combustibles. The exit door of the air lock i is a 3-hour fire-rated fire door in a 2-hour fire-rated wall. Based on the substantial construction of the security door, the presence of the air lock barriers, and the absence i. of combustibles, the door provides adequate fire resistance. ', There are two air locks that separate Fire Area CB-7 from the control room complex, i Fire Area CB-6. . The nearest combustibles to the air lock doors are in the corridor of , Fire gea CB-7. The average fire loading in this hallway is approximately 123,000
! Btu /ft . The landing of Fire Area CB-7 in front of the doors contains no in situ combustibles.
5 The air locks contain no in situ combustibles. The exit door of each air lock is a 3-hour rated fire door in a 2-hour rated wall. The floor and ceiling of the air locks have fire ratings of 3 hours. Based on the substantial construction of these security doors, the i presence of the air lock barriers, and the minimum 2-hour fire resistance of the doors and walls between these doors and adjacent zones, the doors provide adequate fire resistance. j l t 4 4 I i l l i 2 i 4 i )
CPS Deviation 4.2.2.9 Page1of5 4.2.2.9 VENTILATION PIPING Description of Deviation Ventilation piping that penetrate 3-hour fire-rated walls and floors do not have fire dampers. Reference NUREG-0853, SER Section 9.5.2.1, references that floors, walls, and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have a minimum 3-hour fire rating. Penetrations in these barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself. Fire Areas involved: Fire Zone A-le - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Fire Zone A-2a - Elevations 707 feet 6 inches through 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2). Fire Zone A-2b - Elevations 707 feet 6 inches through 781 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b through Sa and 5b and Cable Tray Figures 2 and 3). Fire Zone A-2c - Elevations 707 feet 6 inches through 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2). Fire Zone A-2d - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Fire Zone A-2g - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Fire Zone A-2h - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Fire Zone A-2i - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Fire Zone A-2j - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Fire Zone A-2k - Elevation 762 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-4a and 4b and Cable Tray Figure 4). Fire Zone A-2n - Elevation 781 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-Sa and $b and Cable Tray Figure 5).
CPS Deviation 4.2.2.9 Page 2 of 5 Fire Zone A-3a - Elevations 707 feet 6 inches through 762 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b through Sa and 3b and Cable Tray Figures 2 and 3). Fire Zone A-3b - Elevations 707 feet 6 inches through 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures t FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2). Fire Zone A-3c - Elevations 707 feet 6 inches through 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2). Fire Zone A-3d - Elevation 762 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-4a and 4b and Cable Tray Figure 4). Fire Zone A-3f - Elevation 781 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-Sa and $b and Cable Tray Figure 5). Fire Zone CB-Ic - Elevation 719 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-9a and 9b and Cable Tray Figure 8). 4 Fire Zone F-la - Elevation 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2). Fire Zone F-lb - Elevation 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2). Fire Zone F-lp - Elevations 712 feet 0 inch through 781 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b through 5a and 5b and Cable Tray Figures 4 and 5). 1 Description of Safe Shutdown or Safety-Related Equipment and/or Cables Safe Shutdown Fire Zone Equipment and/or Cables A-le Yes A-2a Yes A-2b Yes A-2c Yes A-2d Yes A-2g No A-2h No , A-21 No A-2j No
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CPS Deviation 4.2.2.9 Page 3 of 5 Safe Shutdown Fire Zone Equipment and/or Cables A-2k Yes A-2n Yes A-3a Yes A-3b Yes A-3c Yes A-3d Yes A-3f Yes CB-Ic Yes - F-la Yes F-lb Yes F-lp Yes ] Engineering Justification Various 3-hour rated floors and walls are penetrated by the standby gas treatment system ventilation piping (VG). The annular space between the pipe and the barrier is sealed with an approved and tested penetration seal. The VG system piping exhaust is routed through various fire zones and has exhaust ventilation openings in the fire zones (located away from the fire barrier). The primary concern is that the lack of fire dampers would allow a fire to propagate from one side of the barrier to the other side. The off-gas treatment ventilation system main header is constructed of 14-inch welded steel pipe that is seismically supported. Two basic piping loops are provided. Piping Loop No. I !. Piping loop No.1 is routed through elevation 712 feet of the fuel building and elevations
-712 feet and 737 feet of the control building. The VG system provides exhaust via a 6-inch stub into the main loop, from the RHR pump room, HPCS and LPCS sump room, RWCU pump room, and the radwaste pipe tunnel. Exhaust from each pipe opening is between 300 and 400 cim.
All the fire zones through which piping loop No.1 is routed contain ionization fire detection that alarm and annunciate in the control room except Fire Zones F-la, A-2g, A-2h, A-2i, and A-2j. Piping loop No.1 is rated through fire zones with low combustible loadings as follows: l . t
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' CPS Deviation 4.2.2.9 l Page 4 of 5 l l
Fire Zone Combustible Loading A-2a 18,000 Btu /ft 2 A-2b 30,000 Btu /ft 2 A-2c 19,000 Btu /ft 2 A-2g 25,000 Btu /ft 2 A-2h 26,000 Btu /f t 2 A-2i 27,000 Btu /f t 2 A-2j 15,000 Btu /ft 2 A-3a 30,000 Btu /f t 2 22,000 Btu /ft 2
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A-3b A-3c 16,000 Etu/f t 2 F-la 29,000 Btu /ft 2 F-lb 35,100 Btu /f t 2 Around the containment building where it would abut the auxiliary building, a 2-inch ventilation and seismic gap is provided (see Deviation 4.2.2.1). Even if a fire did develop
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on any of the elevations of the auxiliary building, it would not create sufficient pressure to penetrate the VG system pipe, propagate down the pipe, and discharge into another fire area due to the seismic gap. Piping Loop No. 2 Piping loop No. 2 is routed vertically up the east and west sides of the auxiliary building (elevations 737 feet, 761 feet, and 781 feet) and contains a 6-inch ventilation stub on each elevation. These two risers are cross-connected by a pipe running through the fuel building (Zone F-lp) with a 10-inch ventilation stub. All the fire zones through which piping loop No. 2 is routed contain ionization fire detection that alarms and annunciates in the control room except Fire Zones A-2d and A-le. - Safe. shutdown Method 1 - equipment and cables are located on the east side of the auxiliary building; safe shutdown Method 2 equipment and cables are located on the west side of the auxiliary building. The vertical risers of the VG ystem that penetrate the various elevations communicate only with the same methoo of safe shutdown. The opposite method of safe shutdown is separated by 3-hour fire walls except for the piping routed through Zone F-lp that cross connects the two risers. This cross connection is located in a zone that consists of two full elevations' of the fuel building with negligible combustible loading. There is also a 2-inch ventilation and seismic gap where the fuel building wall abuts the south side of the containment building. The distance the piping loop is routed in the zone is approximately 300 feet, with one stub opening. Due to the 9
o- s CPS Deviation 4.2.2.9 Page5 of5 m volume of the zone with negligible combustibles, it is not credible for a fire to penetrate the VG loop, travel down the cross connection loop, and discharge into opposite shutdown method zones. Therefore, based on the low combustibles, the detection provided, the construction of the penetration, and the pressure of the seismic gap, fire dampers are not required. I No,6 9 9
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+ I CPS i i Deviation 4.2.2.11 Page 1ofI l l '4.2.2.11 UNPROTECTED STEEL IN STAIRWAYS i -
' Description of Deviation Enclosed stairwells are constructed of 1.9-hour hollow concrete blocks with openings '
- protected by fire-rated doors and labeled frames. Steel columns framed into these walls i on the stairwell side are not protected.
, i 1 Reference J
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a requires separation of cables and equipment and i, associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour , ! rating. Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be ! protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier. Fire Area (s) Involved: t i Fire Zone CB-lh - Elevations 702 feet 0 inch through elevation 825 feet 0 inch (see
. Figures FP-8 through FP15a and 13b and Cable Tray Figures 7 l through 13) i
- Fire Area CB-7 - Elevations 702 feet 0 inch through 825 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-8 through FP-15a and 13b and Cable Tray Figures 7 through 13)
! Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cable Fire Area CB-7 and Fire Zone CB-lh do not contain any safe shutdown related cable or ! equipment associated with Method 1 or 2 safe shutdown systems. Both are stairways that communicate from elevation 702 feet through elevation 825 feet. . Engineering Justification
- The enclosed stairwells are constructed of 1.9-hour fire-rated hollow concrete blocks j with all door openings protected by fire-rated d6 ors. Unprotected steel columns are i framed into these walls on the stairway side only. Since the function of the stairway is *
- to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire, as well as to provide quick access to a i building's various elevations by the fire brigade, having exposed steel on the inside does ,
j not degrade the function of the stairwell.
- Since the stairwells are devoid of combustibles, the existing fire barriers provide
! sufficient protection and are adequate.
i ! Since no safe shutdown equipment or cable listed for safe shutdown Method I and 2 are i located in these fire areas, safe shutdown of the plant can be achieved. i I i i (
CPS Deviation 4.2.2.13 Pag? I of 2 4.2.2.13 CIRCULATING SCREEN HOUSE VENTILATION PENETRATION Description of Deviation Building ventilation is ducted through Fire Area M-1. The duct has a transition at the ceiling of Fire Area M-1 to a 12-inch pipe and then penetrates the floor to the lower elevation of Fire Zone M-2c. This penetration is not provided with a fire damper. Reference NUREG-0853, SER Section 9.5.2.1, February 1982 references that floors, walls, and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have minimum fire rating of 3 hours and penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself. Fire Areas Involved Fire Zone M-1 - Elevation 699 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-25a and 25b and FP-26a and Cable Tray Figure 22) Fire Zone M-2b - Elevation 699 feet 0 inch and elevation 657 feet 6 inches (see Figures FP-25a and 25b and Cable Tray Figure 22) Fire Zone M-2c - Elevation 600 feet 0 inch and elevation 657 feet 6 inches (see Figures FP-25a and 25b and Cable Tray Figure 22) Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cable Fire Area M-1 consists of the Division 1/ Method I shutdown service water pump, strainer, cooling unit, and motor control center. Fire Zone M-2b contains the Division 2 shutdown service water pump, strainer, cooling unit, and motor control center. Fire Zone M-2c consists of the circulating water screen house and below grade pipe tunnel at elevation 657 feet 6 inches. Fire Zone M-2c contains the shutdown service water cables that serve valves ISXOll A and ISX0llB. Engineering Justification The 3-hour fire rated floor between Fire Area M-1 and Fire Zone M-2c contains a ventilation penetration without a 3-hour fire damper. The concern is the propagation of fire from the underside (Fire Zone M-2c)into Fire Area M-1. Fire Area M l contains no cable trays and has an average combustible loading of 20,000 Btu /f t;. All other electrical and mechanical penetrations in the floor are sealed to provide a 3-hour fire rating. The power and control cables that serve the normally closed valves (ISXOll A and ISXOllB) located in Fire Zone M-2c are required for safe shutdown. Since the valves do not need to change position, loss of power cables will not present a problem. Control cables are connected to a limit switch. A hot short of the limit switch will not change the position of a valve since the control switch contacts are open. Both Fire Area M-1 and Fire Zone Ma2c contain low combustible loadings. Automatic i
4 CPS i Deviation 4.2.2.13 Page 2 of 2 i ionization detection is provided in Fire Area M-1 and Fire Zone M-2b in addition to extinguishers and . hose stations. Based on the protection provided and the low combustible loading, the floor slabs provide an adequate barrier without providing a fire damper. i 1 E 4 e 1 t b r
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CPS Deviation 4.2.2.14.1 Page 1 of 2 4.2.2.14.1 CONTAINMENT AIRLOCKS Description of Deviation The airlock doors (hatches) provided in the containment and the drywell boundaries are - not tested or labeled as 3-hour fire doors. ; Reference NUREG-0853, SER, Section 9.5.2.2 references that door openings should be protected with equipment-rated doors, frames, and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized testing laboratory. Such doors should be normally closed and locked or alarmed with alarm and annunciation in the control room. Fire Areas Involved , The following fire areas and zones are involved in this deviation: Door Location Fire Areas / Zones Separated Elevation 737 feet 0 inch SW Quadrant F-Im/C-2/C-1 Equipment Hatch Elevation 737 feet 0 inch Column / Row-AD East C-2/C-1 Personnel Hatch Elevation 737 feet 0 inch NE Quadrant A-2d/C-2 Personnel Hatch Elevation 828 feet 3 inches NE Quadrant C-2/CB-li Personnel Lock / Walkway Description of Safe Shutdown Cables and Equipment Fire Area C-2 separates the containment from the fuel and auxiliary buildings. The containment walls are not used to separate redundant safe shutdown divisions. Safety-related cables / trays are shown on Cable Tray Figures 2 through 5. Engineering Justification The airlock doors (hatches) provided in the containment and drywell boundaries are not tested or labeled as 3-hour fire doers. The containment boundary, including penetrations (i.e., doors and cable penetrations), is designed for worst-case accident parameters as described in CPS-FSAR, Subsection 6.2.1.1.3. Each of the airlock-type doors addressed in this deviation is designed to withstand the pressures and temperatures associated with design-basis accidents. Each opening is protected by massive steel hatches with i l
CPS - Deviation 4.2.2.14.1 Page 2 of 2 1 multiple-point latches on both ends of the airlock. Each airlock consists of two doors. The space between the doors is devoid of combustibles. NFPA 252 " Fire Test of Door Assemblies"(ASTM E-152) identifies the most important condition of acceptance testing as the ability of the door to " remain in place during both the fire test and the hose stream test." The hinges and the latches of the airlock doors are significantly stronger than those on a metal fire door and would not allow the doors to significantly warp away from the openings in the fire barrier in the event of a fire. There is no temperature restriction (as in penetration seals) to the temperature rise or limitation on the unexposed side of the fire door. Doors usually fail a fire test due to the door being " bowed" into the test furnace in addition to the possible failure of the hard-ware holding the door in place. An exposure fire adjacent to one of these doors would not void the integrity of these doors because of the massive heat sink of the door itself. Based on the design and construction of the doors, the airlock doors are equivalent to 3-hour fire doors. i i e e
, . , - -- - - . . - . ~
o . CPS Deviation 4.2.2.14.2 Page 1 of 2 4.2.2.14.2 CONTAINMENT ELECTRICAL PENETRATION SEALS Description of Deviation Containment and drywell electrical penetration seals have not been tested or labeled as 3-hour fire rated seals. Reference NUREG-0853, SER, Section 9.5.2.1 references that floors, walls, and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have a minimum fire rating of 3 hours. Penetrations in these barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire-
! resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself. ! Fire Areas involved Penetration Location Fire Area 1
Floor Elevation 762 feet 0 inch Northeast Quadrant A-2m/C-2 Floor Elevation 762 feet 0 inch Northeast Quadrant A-2o/C-2 i Floor Elevation 762 feet 0 inch Northwest Quadrant A-3e/C-2 . Floor Elevation 781 feet 0 inch Northwest Quadrant A-3g/C-2 l Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables Electrical penetrations at elevations 771 feet 0 inch and 773 feet 0 inch from Fire Area A-2 (Zone A-2m) to Fire Area C-2 contain no safe shutdown cables. Electrical penetra-tions at elevations 771 feet 0 inch and 773 feet 0 inch from Fire Area A-3 (Zone A-3e) to Fire Area C-2 contain no safe shutdown cables. Electrical penetrations at elevations 792 feet 0 inch,794 feet 0 inch, and 796 feet 0 inch
- i from Fire Area A-2 (Zone A-2o) to Fire Area C-2 contain safe shutdown cables associ-ated only with shutdown Method 1 (Division 1). Electrical penetrations at elevatioris 792 feet 0 inch and 796 feet 0 inch from Fire Area A-3 (Zone A-3g) to Fire Area C-2 contain safe shutdown cables associated only with shutdown Method 2 (Division 2). These pene-tration areas are separated by the steam tunnel (3-hour rated barriers) in both auxiliary and containment buildings.
The horizontal (circumferential) distance of open space between the Division I and 2 electrical penetration areas is in excess of 250 feet (270* angular separation). I Engineering Justification , The containment boundary, including electrical penetrations, is designed for worst-case accident parameters as described.in CPS-FSAR, Subsection 6.2.1.1.3. Each of the elec- . trical penetrations outlined in FSAR Section 3.8, Table 3.8-5, is designed to withstand the pressures and temperatures associated with design-basis accidents. Although they l l
s'- . L
- Deviation 4.2.2.I'#.2 Page 2 of 2 have not been subjected to the ASTM E-Il9 fire test, their construction will prevent the 5
propagation of a fire through the containment boundary. The most significant fire hazards .in the vicinity of the electrical penetrations are unprotected cables. The EPR-insulated hypolon Jacketed cables, however, are inherently i' flame-retardant cables in which vertical or horizontal fire propagation is extremely difficult. The separation of Division 1 and Division 2 electrical penetrations
- within the contain-ment wall is such that, even in the unlikely event that a penetration seal failed, only one division of safe shutdown cables would be affected. Thus in the event of a fire, safe shutdown is assured.
i
*As shown on Cable Tray Figures 4 and 5 1
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o- . CPS Deviation 4.2.2.14.3 Page1of1 4.2.2.14.3 CONTAINMENT PIPING PENETRATIONS Description of Deviation Piping that penetrates the 3-hour fire-rated wall of the containment is not externally sealed to provide a fire-resistance rating at least equal to that of the containment wall itself. Reference NUREG-0853, SER, Section 9.5.2.1 references that floors, walls, and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have a minimum fire rating of 3 hours. Penetrations in these barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire-resist-ance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself. Fire Areas Involved All fire areas adjacent to the containment wall are involved. Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables The description of safe shutdown equipment and cables is given in the appropriate sec-m tions of the Clinton FPER and SSA.
~
Engineering Justification The containment wall, including the piping penetrations, is designed for worst-case accident parameters as described in CPS-FSAR Subsection 6.2.1.1.3. Each of the pene-trations listed in FSAR Section 3.8, Table 3.8-5, has been designed to withstand the pressures and temperatures associated with design-basis accidents. All piping that penetrates the containment wall has a penetration headfitting assembly. A typical headfitting assembly is shown on Figure 4.2.2.14.3-1. The headfitting assembly consists of a minimum 0.28-inch-thick steel sleeve embedded in the containment wall that extends beyond the face of the wall on both sides. A minimum 0.375-inch-thick steel headfitting plate is welded to the sleeve and to the pipe passing through t,he pene-tration, forming an airtight seal. The headfitting assemblies have been evaluated by a fire protection engineer as providing protection equivalent to that provided by a fire door or damper. Based on the substantial construction of the piping penetration headfitting assemblies, the piping penetrations in the containment wall do not need to have a rated external seal. 1 i l
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) -< CPS Deviation 4.2.2.15 Page 1of1 4.2.2.15 UNShALED BUS DUCTS THROUGH FIRE BARRIERS Description of Deviation Bus duct penetrations have not been tested or labeled as 3-hour fire rated penetrations.
4 Reference , NUREG-0853, SER, Section 9.5.2.1 references that floors, walls and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have minimum fire rating of three hours. Penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself. Fire Areas Involved The fire areas involved in this deviation are listed on Table 4.2.2.15-1, and the locations of the 430-volt bus duct openings are listed on Table 4.2.2.15-2. Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables The description of safe shutdown equipment and cables is given in the appropriate sections of the Clinton FPER and SSA. Engineering Justification - 4.16-kV and 6.9-kV Bus Ducts There are twenty 4.16-kV and 6.9-kV bus duct penetrations in 3-hour fire rated barriers. The bus duct penetrations are constructed df 0.125-inch thick steel construction that is bolted to the barrier on each side of the penetration. As evaluated by a fire protection engineer, the construction of the duct assembly, as well as the bolted attachment of the duct to the wall on both sides of the floor / wall, provides protection equivalent to that provided by a fire d?or or damper. Engineering Justification - 480-Volt Bus Ducts There are four 480-volt bus duct penetrations in 3-hour fire rated barriers. The bus duct penetrations consist of 0.125-inch thick steel construction and are seismically supported and bolted to the barrier on each side of the penetrations. The steel enclosure around the bus' duct is approximately 6 inches by 8 inches. The gap between the steel enclosure and the 3-hour fire rated barrier is sealed with a 3-hour fire-rated material. All the fire zones affected by the 480-volt bus duct penetrations have ionization fire detection installed throughout the zone on both sides of the penetration. , As evaluated by a fire protection engineer, the construction of the bus ducts, the 3-hour fire rated seals on the outside of the penetrations, and the local fire detection provide protection equivalent to that provided by a fire door or damper. .
. . - - - _ . . . . - ._. .=.__
CPS Table 4.2.2.15-1 Locations of 4.16-kV and 6.9-kV Bus Ducts Fire Zones on Both Number of Number of Sides of Barrier Elevation (f t) Openings Bus Ducts Location R-li and A-lb 737 1 1 5-122 CB-le and A-lb ,751/737* 1 1 5-124 T-If and A-lb 737 3 3 S-102 S-107 5-117 A-Ib and Exterior Wall 737 1 3 U-102 A-lb and A-3d 737 and 762 5 5 S-102 (Floor) U-105 g V-105 w U-105
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U-105 A-lb and A-2k 762 4 4 U-121 (Floor) U-121 U-121 U-121 R-lp and A-2k - 762 1 1 5-122 CB-if and A-2k 762 1 1 T-124 T-lh and A-3d 762 1 1 5-102 R-lp and CB-if 762 2 2 S-128 S-133
*CB-la is at elevation 751 and A-lb is at elevation 737.
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o . . CPS Table 4.2.2.13-2 Locations of 480-Volt Bus Ducts Number of Number of Fire Zones Elevation (f t) Openings Bus Ducts Location A-3d and A-lb 762 1- 1 5-104 A-2k and A-lb 762 1 1 5-119 A-3f and A-2k 781- 1 1 5-119 CB-7 and CB-7 800 1 1 AB-124 4 O D 4
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- CPS
- Deviation 4.2.3.1.1 ,
j Page 1 of 2 4.2.3.1.1 FIRE AREA A-1
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l Description of Deviation I Complete area fire detection is not provided in Fire Area A-1. Fire detection is not i provided in Fire Zones A-Ic, A-Id, and A-le.
- Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.F references that automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard
- to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components.
- l Fire Area Involved Fire Zone A-Ic - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3).
Fire Zone A-Id - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures .FP-3a and 3b and Cable
- Tray Figure 3).
Fire Zone A-le - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable J_ _ Tray Figure 3). l 1 Description of Safe Shutdown or Safety-Related Equipment and/or Cables 1 4 Safe Shutdown Safety-Related i Fire Area Equipment and/or Cables Equipment and/or Cables A-Ic No No , A-Id No No Yes. A-le- Yes Engineering Justification Fire detection is not provided in Fire Zones A-Ic, A-Id, and A-le. Fire Zone A-Ic is a- 6 i health physics instrument storage room and Fire Zone A-Id is an anticontamination 4 clothing, storage room. : These two zones do not contain any safety-related cables or j equipment and both zones are surrounded by Fire Zone A-lb, which has a complete ionization detection system.' Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are provided in - the vicinity of these zones. In the event of a fire in either of these zones, safe shutdown
- can be achieved. Thus, fire detection in Fire Zones A-Ic and A-id is not necessary.
Fire Zone A-le is the contaminated equipment nyintenance area. The in situ combus-i tible loading in this zone is less than 1000 Btu /ft . The Division 2 safe shutdown valve, IE12-F042C, and.its associated cables are located over 75 feet away from its redundant i i'
- wr--t -g 1pwv'y-T -*-y-Meame,e--e y Tyv,w- 7-w- M---t--e r go w*gT*"" "-guev'e,--g-g- f 9- "y-y * --e-y----9y-*ewy-'w-TwdW"UN *P9* *'9"'-**W'W*'9""Y"'*""'*F"'T -**'TT"N
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. CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.1 Page 2 of 2 safe shutdown cables in Fire Zone A-lb and a wet-pipe suppression system separates the redundant cables (for coverage, see Figure FP-3b). Fire Zone A-lb, which surrounds Fire Zone A-le, has a complete ionization detection system. Based on this zone's low com-bustible loading, spatial separation, partial suppression, and the fire detection system in the adjacent fire zone, fire detection for Fire Zone A-le is not necessary.
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.. . - . . . . - . . ~ .
O D CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.2 Page 1 of 3 4.2.3.1.2 FIRE AREA A-2 Description of Deviation Complete area fire detection is not provided in Fire Area A-2. Fire detection is not provided in Fire Zones A-2b, A-2d, A-2e, A-2f, A-2g, A-2h, A-2i, and A-2j. Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.F references that automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. Fire Area Involved Fire Zone A-2b - Elevation 707 feet 6 inches through 781 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b through Sa and $b and Cable Tray Figures 2 through 5). Fire Zone A-2d - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Fire Zone A-2e - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Fire Zone A-2f - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch through 762 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a,3b,4a, and 4b and Cable Tray Figures 3 and 4). Fire Zone A-2g - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Fire Zone A-2h - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). j Fire Zone A-2i - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Fire Zone A-2j - Elevation 750 feet 6 inches (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Description of Safe Shutdown or Safety-Related Equipment and/or Cables Safe Shutdown Safety-Related Fire Zone Equipment and/or Cables Equipment and/or Cables A-2b Yes Ye's f A-2d Yes Yes . 3 i
, CPS ,
4 Deviation 4.2.3.1.2 Page 2 of 3 Safe Shutdown Safety-Related Fire Zone Equipment and/or Cables Equipment and/or Cables A-2e Yes Yes A-2f Yes Yes A-2g No Yes A-2h No Yes A-2i No Yes A-2j No Yes Engineering 3ustification Fire detection is not provided in Fire Zones A-2b, A-2d, A-2e, A-2f, A-2g, A-2h, A-21, and A-2). Fire Zone A-2b is the Division 1 RHR pump and heat exchanger room. The zone is open, between column / row Il4-il7/U-containment, from elevation 707 feet 6 inches through 781 feet 0 inch through which the RHR heat exchanger extends. Ionization fire detection is provided at elevation 707 feet 6 inches between column / row ll7-121/U-containment. Since the majority of the combustibles in this fire zone are located at elevation 707 feet 6 inches, additional detection for the upper elevations will not significantly increase the level of fire protection in the fire zone. Therefore, providing additional fire detection in Fire Zone A-2b is not necessary. I Fire Zone A-2d consists of a general hallway and containment building personnel hatch area and contains a Division I safe shutdown cable tray and Division i safety-related instruments. Cable insulatiop is the primary combustible in this fire zone, resulting in a fire loading of 30,000 Btu /ft . Based on the ignition resistance of these cables (IEEE-383 qualified) and their low concentration in this fire zone, fire detection is not necessary in Fire Zone A-2d. Fire Zone A-2e consists of the MSIV leakage control system room. The Division 1 and 2 safe shutdown cables and conduits have been analyzed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis,
' subsection 3.1.2.2, for a fire. HVAC ductwork insulatiorgis the primary combustible in this fire zone, resulting in a fire loading of 15,100 Btu /ft . In the event of a fire in this fire zone, failure of these cables will not prevent a safe shutdown by Method 2 safe shutdown systems. Due to minimal combustible loading in this zone and the ability to achieve safe shutdown, fire detection is not necessary in Fire Zone A-2e.
Fire Zone A-2f is the main steam pipe tunnel, and contains Division I safe shutdown cables and equipment. The associated circuits / spurious operation analysis has demonstrated the ability of the MSIVs to close in the event of a fire (Safe Shytdown Analysis, Appendix A). The fire loading in this fire zone is less than 1000 Btu /ft and in 1 the event of a fire in this fire zone, safe shutdown can be achieved. Based on the ability I of the MSIVs to close in the event of a fire and the ability to achieve safe shutdown, fire detection is not necessary in Fire Zone A-2f.
i CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.2 Page 3 of 3
- Fire Zones A-2g, A-2h, A-21, and A-2j, which contain safety-related equipment and cables, do not contain any cables or equipment required for safe shutdown. In the event of a fire in any of these fire zones, safe shutdown can be achieved. Based on the ability to achieve safe shutdown in the case of a fire and the lack of safe shutdown cables or equipment in these fire zones, fire detection is not necessary in Fire Zones A-2g, A-2h, A-21, and A-2).
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-- - .- -. . -. .._. - . . . . . . . - . . _ - - _ - _ _ = -
CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.3 Page1of1 4.2.3.1.3 FIRE AREA A-3 Description of Deviation Complete area fire detection is not provided in Fire Area A-3. Fire detection is not provided in Fire Zones A-3a and A-3c. Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section llI.F references that automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. Fire Area Involved Fire Zone A-3a - Elevation 707 feet 6 inches through 762 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b through 3a and 5b and Cable Tray Figures, 2, 3, and 4). Fire Zone A-3c - Elevation 707 feet 6 inches through 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2). Description of Safe Shutdown or Safety-Related Equipment and/or Cables Safe Shutdown Safety-Related Fire Zone Equipment and/or Cables Equipment and/or Cables A-3a Yes Yes A-3c Yes Yes Engineering Justification Fire Zone A-3a is open to elevation 707 feet 6 inches through 762 feet 0 inch and consists of the RHR heat exchanger B room at elevation 737 feet 0 inch. lonization fire detection is provided at elevation 707 feet 6 inches. Since the majority of the combustibles in this fire zone are located at elevation 707 feet 6 inches, additional detection for the upper elevations will not significantly increase the level of fire protection in the fire zone. Therefore, providing additional fire detection in Fire Zone A-3a is not necessary. Fire Zone A-3c consists of a general pallway and floor drain pump rooms. The fire loading in this zone is 16,000 Btu /ft . In case of a fire -in this fire zone, Divi-sion 1/ Method I systems can be used to safely shut down the plant. Based on the low fire loading in this zone and availability of a redundant safe shutdown train, fire detection is not necessary in Fire Zone A-3c. I
CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.4 Page1of1 4.2.3.1.4 FIRE AREA C-1 Description of Deviation A complete fire detection system is not provided in the drywell area, Fire Area C-1. ' A i fire detection system has been provided only for the reactor recirculation pumps / motors. Reference , 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.F references that automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. Fire Area Involved Fire Area C-1 - Elevation 723 feet 1-3/4 inches (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2). - Description of Safe Shutdown or Safety-Related Equipment and/or Cables Safe Shutdown Safety-Related i Fire Zone Equipment and/or Cables Equipment and/or Cables C-1 - Yes Yes 4 Engineering Justification Fire Area C-1 consists of the drywell volume of the containment building at elevation 723 feet 1-3/4 inches. The reactor vessel is located within the area. The principal potential fire hazard in this fire area is the lubricating oil contained within the two reactor recirculation pump motors. Each motor utilizes self-lubricated bearings with lubricating oil cooled by cooling coils installed within the reservoirs. Therefore, a pressurized oil system is not utilized. This design minimizes piping connections to the oil , reservoir. The heavy construction and the nonpressurized design of this lubricating sys-tem minimizes susceptibility to leakage. If leakage were to occur, ignition enhancing spray would be unlikely.
- An ultraviolet fire detection system has been provided for the reactor recirculation pump motors. Based on the low potential for a fire in this fire area, the fire detection system that is installed is sufficient ar.Jadditional fire detection coverage is not necessary in Fire Area C-1.
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_ . . . _ . _ . -_ .. ._. - ~ . _ . _ . . ._._. _. .. _ . - _ _ . - l CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.5 Page 1 of 2 4.2.3.1.5 FIRE AREA CB-1 Description of Deviation Complete area fire detection is not provided in Fire Area CB-1. Fire detection is not provided in Fire Zones CB-la, CB-lb, CB-Id, CB-lh, and CB-li. Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.F references that automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. Fire Area Involved Fire Zone CB-la - Elevation 702 feet 0 inch through 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-Sa and 8b and Cable Tray Figure 7). Fire Zone CB-lb - Elevation 702 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-8a and 8b and Cable Tray Figure 7). Fire Zone CB-Id - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-10a and 10b and Cable Tray Figure 9). Fire Zone CB-lh - Elevations 702 feet 0 inch through 825 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-8a and 8b through 15a and b and Cable Tray Figures 8 through 11 and 13). Fire Zone CB-li - Elevation 825 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP.-15a and 13b and Cable Tray Figure 13). Description of Safe Shutdown or Safety-Related Eculpment and/or Cables Safe Shutdown Safety-Related Fire Zone Equipment and/or Cables Equipment and/or Cables CB-la Yes Yes CB-lb No Yes CB-Id Yes Yes CB-lh No No ! CB-li No No Engineering Justification Fire Zone CB-la was originally intended for Unit 2 diesel generators and fue' storage. It includes a general access corridor at elevation 719 feet 0 inch. The fire loading in tv -
i
)
1 CPS , Deviation 4.2.3.1.5 Page 2 of 2 fire zone is 300 Btu /ft2. In the event of a fire, the plant can be shut down using Divi-sion 1/ Method i equipment. Based on the ability to achieve safe shutdown and the low
. fire loading in this fire zone, fire detection is not necessary in Fire Zone CB-la.
Fire Zone CB-lb is the general access area at elevation 702 feet 0 inch of the control building, and it includes the hydrogen recombiner rooms and the drywell purge filter units room. The floor is 9-foot reinforced concrete. The walls are 12-inch minimum reinforced concrete or ll-5/8-inch minimum solid concrete block. The north and west walls are 3-hour fire rated. The ceiling p 12-inch minimum reinforced concrfte and is ; not fire rated. The floor area is 25,295 f t with a fire loading of 44,000 Btu /ft Each of the three drywell purge filter units is protected by a manual deluge fire l suppression system; therefore, fire detection has not been provided. For a fire occurring in Fire Zone CB-lb, hot and cold shutdown can be achieved from the appropriate safe shutdown system. Fire Zone CB-Id consists of the rad-chem laboratory area. Partial detection is located in the rad-chem office and the rad-chem hot lab and cold lab, as shown in Figure FP-10b. The fire loading in this fire zone is 17,000 Btu /ft2 . In the event of a fire, the plant can be shut down using Division 1/ Method i equipment. Based on the low fire loading and the ability to achieve safe shutdown, fire detection is not necessary in Fire Zone CB-id. Fire Zone CB-li contains the air handling equipment for the control room and auxiliary building. The primary combustible sources in this fire zone, the control room air filter packages, are protected by manu.al deluge sprinkler systems and a partial ionization detection system as shown on Figure FP-13b. In the event of a fire in this fire zone, safe shutdown can be achieved. Based on the detection system provided for the primary combustibles 'in this zone and the ability to achieve safe shutdown, additional fire detection in Fire Zone CB-li is not necessary. Fire Zone CB-lh is a stairwell tower. The zone contains no safety-related cable or equipment. A fire in this zone will not prevent a safe plant shutdown. Therefore, fire detection in Fire Zone CB-lh is not necessary. u ... _ . _ _ . _ , . . _ . - _ . _ _ . _ . - . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ . _ _
CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.6 Page1of1 4.2.3.1.6 FIRE AREA CB-5 Description of Deviation Fire detection is not provided in Fire Zone CB-5b. Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.F references that automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. Fire Area involved Fire Zone CB-5b - Elevation 781 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-13a and 13b and Cable Tray Figure 11). Description of Safe Shutdown or Safetv-Related Equipment and/or Cables
. Safe Shutdown Safety-Related Fire Zone Equipment and/or Cables Equipment and/or Cables . CB-5b No Yes Engineering Justification Fire Zone CB-5b is the Division 3 battery room at elevation 781 feet 0 inch. This fire zone contains the Division 3 batteries and battery room exhaust fan, goth of which are safety related. The fire loading in this fire zone is 29,000 Btu /ft , mainly due to combustible battery materials. In the event of a fire, safe shutdown can be achieved.
Based on the low combustible loading for this fire zone and the ability to safely shut down the plant in the event of a fire, no fire detection is necessary in Fire Zone CB-5b. [
CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.7 Page 1 of 4 4.2.3.1.7 FIRE AREA F-1 Description of Deviation Complete area fire detection is not provided in Fire Area F-1. Fire detection is not provided in Fire Zones F-la, F-Id, F-le, F-If, F-Ig, F-lh, F-li, F-lj, F-Ik, F-Im, F-In, and F-lo. Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.F references that automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. i Fire Area Involved Fire Zone F-la - Elevation 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable ! Tray Figure 2). Fire Zone F-Ic - Elevation 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable i Tray Figure 2). Fire Zone F-Id - Elevation 707 feet 6 inches (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2).
. Fire Zone F-le - Elevation 707 feet 6 inches (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2).
Fire Zone F-!f - Elevation 707 feet 6 inches (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable ! Tray Figure 2). Fire Zone F-Ig - Elevation 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable
; Tray Figure 2).
j Fire Zone F-lh - Elevation 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2). Fire Zone F-li - Elevation 707 feet 6 inches (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2). Fire Zone F-lj - E!evation 735 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Fire Zone F-ik - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). , Fire Zone F-tm - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). b
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CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.7 Page 2 of 4 Fire Zone F-In - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). . Fire Zone F-lo - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch through 748 feet 6 inches (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Description of Safe Shutdown or Safety-Related Equipment and/or Cables Safe Shutdown Safety-Related Fire Zone Equipment and/or Cables Equipment and/or Cables F-la Yes Yes F-Ic No No F-Id No No F-le No No F-If No No F-Ig No No F-lh No Yes F-li - No Yes F-1j No No F-Ik No Yes F-Im Yes Yes F-In Yes Yes F-lo No No Engineering Justification Fire Zone F-la consists of the drywell chillers, drywell water chiller pumps, and the
- gamma room. The floor is 9-foot 8-inch minimum concrete and is not fire rated. The walls are 36-inch minimum concrete. The walls adjacent to the containment building, service building, auxiliary building, and diesel-generator building are 3-hour fire rated. >
The remaining walls are not fire ratedi The ceiling is 12-inch minimum concrete and is not fire rated. There are two stair systems in this zone: one encjosed stair and one open stair up to elgvation 737 feet 0 inch. The floor area is 8639 ft with a fire loading of 29,000 Btu /ft . . Solid bottom BOP cable trays are routed between the Division 1 and 2 cables such that these trays are horizontally' separated from the Division 1 and 2 cables by distances in i 1
CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.7 Page 3 of 4 excess of 15 feet and 6 feet, respectively. An exposure fire in the vicinity of the Division I conduits would have to ignite the BOP cables located a horizontal distance of approximately 15 feet away, propagate at least 75 feet along the BOP cable trays, and then ignite the Division 2 cables located at a horizontal distance of 6 feet. Such a scenario is highly unlikely due to the ignition resistance of the cables (IEEE 383 qualified) in the BOP trays in conjunction with the low heat release and flame spread rates for these cables. In the event of a fire in the zone, at least one shutdown method will be available. The performance goal for the safe shutdown functions is assured by Method I or 2. Therefore, no fire detection is necessary. Fire Zone F-Ic consists of the fuel building floor drain pumps. The floor is 9-foot 9-inch minimum concrete and is not fire rated. The walls are 24-inch concrete or 27-5/8-inch solid concrete block. The walls are not fire rated. Tge ceiling is 12-inch minimum concreje and is not fire rated. The floor area is 195 ft with a fire loading of 35,100 Btu /ft . There is an ionization fire detection system located in the zone. Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are provided for manual fire fighting. In the event of a fire in this fire zone, safe shutdown can be achieved as discussed in Subsection 3.5.1 of the Safe Shutdown Analysis. Fire Zone F-Id consists of the fuel building floor drain pumps. The floor is 9-foot 9-inch minimum concrete and is not fire rated. The walls are 24-inch concrete or 27-5/8-inch solid concrete block. The walls are not fire rated. 2The ceiling is 12-inch minimum concreje and is not fire rated. The floor is 195 ft with a fire loading of 39,400 Btu /ft. Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are provided for manual fire fighting. In the event of a fire in this fire zone, safe shutdown can be achieved as discussed in Subsection 3.5.1 of the Safe Shutdown Analysis. Fire Zone F-le consists of the fuel building equipment drain tank. The floor is 9-foot 3-inch minimum concrete and is not fire rated. The walls are 24-inch minimum concrete or 27-5/8-inch solid concrete block. The containment wall is a 3-hour fire rated wall. The remaining walls are not fire rated. The ceiling is 24-1 ch minimum concrete with an 3 open hptch and is not fire rated. The floor area is 295 ft with a fire loading of 15,000 Btu /f t . Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are provided for manual fire fighting. In the event of a fire in this zone, safe shutdown can be achieved as discussed in Subsection 3.5.1 of the Safe Shutdown Analysis. Fire Zone F-if consists of the fuel building equipment drain pumps. The floor is 9-foot 8-inch minimum concrete and is not fire rated. The wall is 24-inch minimum concrete or 28-inch solid concrete block. The north wall and the containment building wall are 3-hour fire rated. The remaining walls are not fire rated. Jhe ceiling is 24-inch minimum 17,000 Btuconcf.ete
/ft and isfire Portable notextinguishers fire rated. The floor and area hose is 168are stations ft with a firefor provided loading of manual fire fighting. In the event of a fire in this fire zone, safe shutdown can be achieved as discussed in Subsection 3.5.1 of the Safe Shutdown Analysis.
Fire Zone F-Ig consists of the fuel cask pump area. The floor is 9-foot 8-inch minimum concrete and is not fire rated. The wall is 24-inch minimum concrete or 19-5/8-inch solid concrete block. The walls are not fire rated. Tge ceiling is 24-inch minimum concreje and is not fire rated. The floor area is 356 f t with a fire loading of 15,500 Btu /ft. Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are provided for manual fire
CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.7 Page 4 of 4 fighting. In the event of a fire in this zone, safe shutdown can be achieved as discussed in Subsection 3.5.1 of the Safe Shutdown Analysis. Fire Zone F-lh consists of a valve room that contains a safety-related Division 1 valve. Loss of the Division 1 valve would not prohibit safe shutdown of the plant as the valve is not required for safe shutdown. In the event of a fire in Fire Zone F-lh, at lea:t one shutdown method will be available. Based on the ability to achieve safe shutdown, fire detection is not necessary in Fire Zone F-lh. Fire Zone F-li consists of the fuel pool cooling and cleanup pump rooms, and contains safety-related Division 1 and Division 2 instruments. Division 1 and Division 2 area coolers, and Division 1 and Division 2 fuel pool cooling and makeup pumps. None of this equipment is necessary for safe shutdown. In the event of a fire, safe shutdown can be achieved. Based on the ability to achieve safe shutdown, fire detection is not necessary in Fire Zone F-li. Fire Zone F-Im consists of the general area of elevation 737 feet 0 inch of the fuel building and contains the RCIC storage tank instrument panels, the fuel building motor control centers, and the railroad track. An automatic detection system that activates an automatic preaction sprinkler system is provided in the railroad bay. In the event of a fire in this fire zone, at least one shutdown method will be available. Based on the ability to achieve safe shutdown and partial detection, additional fire detection is not necessary in Fire Zone F-tm. Fire Zone F-In consists of jhe fuel pool heat exchangers A and B. The fire loading in this fire zone is 15,000 Btu /ft . In the event of a fire in this zone, at least one shutdown method will be available. Based on the low fire loading and the ability to achieve safe shutdown, fire detection is not necessary in Fire Zone F-In. Fire Zone F-lo consists of the pipe tunnel. The floor is 24-inch concrete and is not fire rated. There are six 4-inch floor drains. The walls are either 36-inch reinforced concrete or ll-5/8-inch minimum solid concrete block. The walls adjacent to the diesel and auxiliary buildings are 3-hour fire rated. The remaining walls are not fire ratedy The ceiling is 12-inch minimum concrgte and is not fire rated. The floor area is 842 f t with a fire loading of 15,000 Btu /f t . Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are provided for manual fire fighting. In the event of a fire in this fire zone, safe shutdown can be achieved as discussed in Subsection 3.5.1 of the Safe Shutdown Analysis.
l CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.8 Page1of1 4.2.3.1.8 FIRE AREA M-2 Description of Deviation Fire detection is not provided in Fire Zone M-2c. Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.F references that automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. Fire Area Involved .; Fire Zone M-2c - Elevation 699 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-25a and 25b and Cable Tray Figure 22). Description of Safe Shutdown or Safety-Related Eculpment and/or Cables Safe Shutdown Safety-Related Fire Zone Equipment and/or Cables Eculpment and/or Cables M-2c Yes Yes Engineering Justification , Fire Zone M-2c consists of the circulating water screen house and the below-grade pipe l tunnel. In the event of a loss of power, the two safe shutdown valves in this fire zone are
- not a concern since the valves are normally closed. A hot short of the valve control cable will not open the valves since the limit switch contacts are open and Method I systems can be utilized to bring the plant to safe shutdown. Based on the ability to achieve safe shutdown, fire detection is not necessary in Fire Zone M-2c.
i 1 [ i
. o CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.9 Page 1of1 4.2.3.1.9 FIRE AREA CB-7 Description of Deviation Complete area fire detection is not provided in Fire Area CB-7.
Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Secp III.F references that automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. Fire Area Involved Fire Area CB-7 - Elevation 702 feet 0 inch through 825 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-15a and 15b and Cable Tray Figure 12). Description of Safe Shutdown or Safety-Related Equipment and/or Cables Safe Shutdown Safety-Related Fire Area Equipment and/or Cables Equipment and/or Cables CB-7 No Yes Engineering Justification Fire Area CB-7 includes a stairwell tower that is enclosed by 2-hour fire rated walls and a corridor at elevation 800 feet 0 inch where the walls are 3-hour fire rated and an ionization detection system is installed. None of the safety-related equipment in this area is required for safe shutdown. In the event of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown can be achieved. Based on the ability to achieve safe shutdown, additional fire detection is not necessary in Fire Area CB-7.
CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.10 Page 1 of 2 4.2.3.1.10 FIRE AREA C-2 Description of Deviation Complete area fire detection is not provided in Fire Area C-2. Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.F references that automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that,contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. Fire Areas Involved Fire Area C-2 - Elevations 712 feet 0 inch through 828 feet 3 inches (see Figures FP-2a and 2b through 7a and 7b and Cable Tray Figures 4,3, and 6). Description of Safe Shutdown or Safety-Related Eculpment and/or Cables Safe Shutdown Safety-Related Fire Area Eouipment and/or Cables Equipment and/or Cables C-2 Yes Yes Engineering Justification Con 5plete area fire detection is not provided in Fire Area C-2. Linear thermal detectors are provided for all cable trays containing safe shutdown cables. Also, all safety-related cable trays approximate;y greater than 35% full are provided with linear thermal detectors. Based on the ability to achieve safe shutdown and partial detection, additional detection is not necessary in Fire Area C-2. The safe shutdown cables and equipment located in this fire area belong to both methods of safe shutdown systems as shown on Figures 4.2.3.1.10-1 through 4.2.3.1.10-6. Cables associated with each method of safe shutdown have been evaluated. The remote shutdown system cables are important only when shutdown is controlled from the remote shutdown panel, in the event of a fire inside the containment building, shutdown operations will be controlled from the main control room. The Division 1 and 2 RHR cables serve safe shutdown valves IE12-F042A, IE12-F042B, IE12-F037A, IE12-F037B, IE12-F027A, IE12-F027B, IE12-F028A, IE12-F028B, and IE12-F009. Division 1 and 2 nuclear boiler cables designated safe shutdown serve ADS valves IB21-F041B, C, D, and F,1B21-F047A and C, and IB21-F051G; SRV valves IB21-F051C and D; and instruments IB21N081 A and B and IB21N078A and B. Although Division 1 and 2 shutdown cables and equipment occupy the same fire area, the divisions are separated by a distance of at least 60 feet, and with the exception of the south end at elevation 303 feet, there are no intervening combustibles between the Division 1 and 2 systems.
CPS Deviation 4.2.3.1.10 Page 2 of 2 w Above floor elevation 803 feet, Division 2 cable trays are routed within 6 feet of Division 1 trays. The Division i trays contain Division i safe shutdown cables IRH61C and IRH61D. At that point, however, there are no Division 2 safe shutdown cables. Division 2 safe shutdown cables enter the Division 2 trays at a point where the separation from the Division 1 trays is 80 feet. The concern here is a fire in the Division I trays spreading to the Division 2 trays and then propagating down the tray and damaging Division 2 safe shutdown cable. This will be prevented by placing a fire break in the - Division 2 trays. At elevation 737 feet there are the Division 2 cables serving temperature elements ITE-CM004,1TE-CM006, and 1TE-CM008 (cables 1CM80K,1CM80L, and ICM80M). These cables feed indicators in the main control room. These cables are located on the Division I side of the containment annulus. A fire would not disable these cables since they are routed in conduit only 2 feet above the normal suppression pool level (elevation 731 feet 5 inches) and below the lowest floor, which is at elevation 737 feet 0 inch. Even though the Division 1 and 2 cables are separated, operation of some Division 2 valves (IE12-F009, IE51-F063, and IE12-F076) is required by Division I shutdown systems. Valve IE12-F009 must be opened to proceed from hot to cold shutdown using RHR in the shutdown cooling mode, or an alternate method can be used (see Figure 1.8-4 or 1.8-7). Valve IE51-F063 is the RCIC steam supply line isolation inboard valve and thus is required to remain open until the cold shutdown systems are brought into operation. The valve is normally open; therefore damage to power cable IRIOIC will not prevent shutdown. Cable IRIO2D is connected to a limit switch. A hot short of a limit switch will not close the valve since the control switch contacts are open. Finally, valve IE51-F076, the RCIC steam line warmup line, will not disable the RCIC system if it spuriously operates. Based on. the above discussion and with the installation of the fire break, a fire in this area could only damage one division of safe shutdown cables and equipment. n
33E : ' E .E 4.2.3.:.!f-: C GLE NO. UJTE PT. IONE SE3 CODE G5 SCC. E I!D.
==========-======================
it*775 C73647 C-2 K1E l'E-040:
- Cv77T C73647 C-2 K1E ITE-C'et!
;C77U C73647 C-2 41E lie-CNf3 1007d C73847 C-2 K:E 1TE-C407 1C'77X C73647 C-2 K1E 1TE-CM007
- C*764 C73847 C-2 K1E ITE-C'N3 10*77d C73649 C-2 K1E lie-C5M3 1C6 C73849 C-2 K1E ITE-C*N3 1Cv774 C7385: C-2 K1E l'E-CMt7 1CM77X C73851 C-2 K!E ITE-C997 1Cw774 - C73854 C-2 K!E l'E-Cuef7
- CW77X C73854 C-2 K!E l'E-C907 1CP77W C73s56 C-2 KIE ITE-C*007 r ICM77X C73856 C-2 KE !?E-CMN7 1Cw775 C73865 C-2 KE 1TE-CNel IC577- C73865 C-2 K1E l'E-C'N IC1775 C73666 C-2 K!E ITE-C*il; icv 77- C736E6 C-2 K1E lie-CrN ICV 8tJ C73669 C-2 K2E ITE-CPic2 10*.6N C73669 C-2 K2E '1TE-CMN4 1CP80. C73669 C-2 K2E l'E-CM006
. 1CM80M C73869 C-2 K2E ITE-CW98 tC 60% C73869 C-2 E lie-CPO.9 1CMG C73869 C-2 E ITE-C'e:2
;Cv6N C736E9 C-2 K2E l'E-CP0:4 1C4849 C73869 C-2 K2E ITE-C'e:6
- 1;561C C73669 C-2 E 1*E-C5008 19581E C73669 C-2 K25 ITE-C5N4 1Cr8?N C73672 C-2 42E ITE-C"010
!CPa4D C73872 C-2 E l'E-C'2:2 1 ~8M C7367f C-2 E 1*E-04:4 1Cr.624 C73872 C-2 E ITE-C'216 1CP80N C73872 C-2 K2E 1'E-CP412 1CM64P C73873 C-2 K2E ITE-C't!2 .
LC*A00 C73873 C-2 K2E ltE-CN14 it'a@R C73673 C-2 E ITE-C*i 6 LCM 890 C73874 C-2 E 1TE-Cae:2 1CM C73876 C-2 K2E 1TE-CW:4 iCP64R C73876 C-2 E ITE-CM0 6 1C6 C73877 C-2 K2E !TE-C4014 105884 C73678 C-2 K2E 1*E-CP0;6
!CM804 C73879 C-2 K2E ITE-CMt16 1Cw60J C73884 C-2 K2E 1TE-CP962 1CM80J C73881 C-2 K2E ITE-CM002 1C404 C73883 C-2 K2E 1TE-CM004 1R581E C73883 C-2 K2E 1TE-CM004 1C562J C73885 C-2 K2E ITE-CPDC2
- C=8N C73885 C-2 K2E ITE-CM004 1R581E C73885 C-2 K2E ITE-CM004 1C49. C73686 C-2 K2E ITE-CM006 1Cm80J C73667 C-2 E l'E-CM002 1C48N C73847 C-2 K2E 17E-C*004 l
- m s.
- . : '2 TAP E 4.2.3.:,1e-:
N. C73687. c.2 E 17E-te 1%51,: C736a7 C-2 E !?E-C T 4 10 6 C73ei9 C-2 M2E . 1E-tm
!%i!C C73669 C-2 E 37E-CMOC8 !C% C73ag g.2 N2E 14-C 2 2 ;C56N C736W t2 g ggg 1CW. C73898 C-2 K2E Iq.C 6 6 IN C736W c.2 E iiE-CM0'8 14561C C738W C-2 K2E 14-C 2 6 1958!E C738W C-2 E lie-CMOC4 4
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IC;775 C73846 C-2 41E ITE-CMit; 1Cv777 C73646 C-2 41E ITE-CM001 ICR77U C736% C-2 K1E 1TE-CM003 CW7W C73646 C-2 KIE !TE-CM007
- Cw.771 C73646 C-2 K1E ITE-CM007
- Cv78A C73846 C-2 K!E ITE-C983 1C775 C73647 C-2 ME ITE-CM401 1CW7' C73647 C-2 K1E ITE-C W :
ICw77U C73647 C-2 K!E ITE-CM003
!CW74 C73647 C-2 K1E :TE-C W 7
;C*771 C73647 C-2 K!E 1TE-Cuef7
- C*76A C73847 C-2 CE iTE-CM603
;C564.t . C73669 C-2 (2E 1TE-C'002 iCM604 C73669 C-2 K2E ITE-CM004 1C % C73669 C-2 GE ltE-C W 6 -
- C*St'. C73669 C-2 GE ITE-C928
- C*64N C73669 C-2 GE 1TE-CP3:e t
- C*603 C73269 C-2 GE :TE-CN12 1t 643 C73669 C-2 M2E l'E-CP2:4
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- C4649 17474 C-2 E 17E-C*t46
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;4:220 17R71 C-2 C2E 1E51-F463 1911!D 17971 C-2 C2E 1E51-F076 IF17C 17R72 C-2 P2E 1E12-Fee 9 iMO 17U2 C-2 P2E 1E12-F0429 1 % 2C 17972 C-2 P2E 1E1240269 1%4C 17472 C-2 P2E 1E12-Ff379 1R*02C 17R72 C-2 P2E 1E51-F-63 1RI15C 17U2 C-2 D2E 1E51-Ft76 F26E C71151 C-2 C2E !E12-F2279,1E124242 14i283 C7:!)2 C-2 D2E !!!2 :f42B .
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e . CPS' Deviation 4.2.3.2 Page 1 of 2 4.2.3.2 FIRE DETECTION BY WATER FLOW Description of Deviation An automatic fire detection system is not provided for Fire Areas D-1, D-2, and D-3, and Fire Zones D-4b, D-5b, and D-6b. All of these areas and zones contain safe shutdown cable and equipment. Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.F - Automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. Fire Areas Involved Fire Area D-1 - Elevations 702 feet 0 inch and 719 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-8a, 8b,9a, and 9b) Fire Area D-2 - Elevations 702 feet 0 inch and 719 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-8a, 8b,9a, and 9b) Fire Area D-3 - Elevations 702 feet 0 inch and 719 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-8a, 8b,9a, and 9b) Fire Area D-4b - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-10a and 10b) Fire Zone D 'b - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-10a and 10b) Fire Zone D-6b - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-10a and 10b) Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables Fire Areas D-1, D-2, and D-3 consist of the diesel generator fuel oil storage tank for the Division 3,1, and 2 diesel generators, respectively. Each of these rooms contains its respective electrical division and support equipment and is protected by an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system. Fire Zones D-4b, D-5b, and D-6b contain the fuel oil day tanks for the Divisions 3,1, and 2 diesel generators, respectively. Each of these zones is protected by an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system. Engineering Justification An automatic fire detection system is not provided for Fire Areas D-1, D-2, and D-3, and Fire Zones D-4b, D-5b, and D-6b. Each of the automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems alarms locally and in the main control room upon water flow initiation. The walls, ceilings, and floors are 3-hour. fire rated (with the exception of the walls around Fire Zones D-4b, .D-5b, and D-6b, which are 1.9-hour fire rated. As discussed in the Safe l l l
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a e CPS Deviation 4.2.3.2 Page 2 of 2 4 Shutdown Analysis, a fire in any area of these fire areas will not disable its adjacent fire area. Based upon the alarm functions of the suppression systems, the fire barriers, and the ability to assure safe shutdown with a fire in any one of these fire areas, a separate fire detection system is not needed in these areas.
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a . CPS Deviation 4.2.3.3 Page 1 of 2 4.2.3.3 DIESEL AIR INTAKE STRUCTURES (D-7, D-8, D-9) Description of Deviation 4 Fire Areas D-7 and D-9 do not have a fire detection system. Fire Area D-8 does not have a complete fire detection system. . Reference 1 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.F references that automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components.
! Fire Area Involved Fire Area D Elevation 762 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-12a and 12b and Cable Tray
,. Figure 10). Fire Area D Elevation 762 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-12a and 12b and Cable Tray Figure 10). Fire Area D Elevation 762 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-12a and 12b and Cable Tray Figure 10). Description of Safe Shutdown or Safety-Related Equipment and/or Cables Safe Shutdown Safety-Related Fire Area Equipment and/or Cables Equipment and/or Cables D-7 Yes Yes D-8 Yes Yes D-9 Yes Yes Division I cables (in conduit) and Division 2 cables, IDG31 A and IDG31B, are in Fire Area D-8 (see Figure 4.2.3.3-1). Engineering Justification j Fire Areas D-7, D-8, and D-9 are the Division 3,1, and 2 diesel generator air intake structures, respectively. Fire Areas D-7 and D-9 do not have a. fire detection system. Both of these fire areas contain no cable trays. The only combustibles that are not in conduit are the electrical
' insulation within cabinets j and HVAC duct insulation materials resulting in fire loading of 17,000 and 23,400 Btu /ft for Fire Area D-7 and Fire Area D-9, respectively. The rapid air movement in these fire areas when the diesel generator room cooling fans are running se.erely limits the ability of a smoke detection system and increases the likelihood of falsa alarms. In the event of a fire in either Fire Area D-7 or D-9, safe shutdown can be 4
- e CPS Deviation 4.2.3.3 Page 2 of 2 achieved by the use of Division 1/ Method I safe shutdown systems. Therefore, based on these fire areas' low combustible fire loading, operational limitations of a fire detection system, and the ability to achieve safe shutdown, a fire detection system is not necessary in Fire Areas D-7 and D-9.
Fire Area D-8 does not have a complete fire detection system. The Division 2 diesel generator cables, IDG31 A and IDG31B (see Figure 4.2.3.3-1), are in conduit and are protected by 1-hour fire rated material and local thermal fire detection as shpwn in Figure FP-12b. The fire loading in this fire area is approximately 19,500 Btu /ft . The Division 2 cables are separated from the combustibles in the area by a missile wall and a reinforced concrete wall with two HVAC ventilation openings. Based on the partial fire detection provided, low combustible fire loading, and separation from combustibles, additional fire detection is not necessary in Fire Area D-8. e i l l
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CPS Deviation 4a.4.1 Page 1 of 2 4.2.4.1 DRYWELL SUPPRESSION IN FIRE AREA C-1 Description of Deviation An automatic suppression system is not provided in Fire Area C1. Cables associated with safe shutdown pass within 20 feet of their redundant counterparts. A deviation concerning the partial fire detection system for this area is discussed in Subsection 4.2.3.1. Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections Ill.G.2.d and e states that cables and equipment of redundant trains must be separated by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or the applicant will install fire detectors ano an automatic suppression system in the fire area. Fire Area (s) Involved Fire Area C-1 - Elevations 707 feet 0 inch through S28 feet 0 inch (se Figures FP-2a and 2b through FP-7a and 7b and Cable Tray Figures 2 through 6). Description of Safe Shutdown Eculpment 2nd Cables Cables and equipment required for safe shutdown are listed on Tables 4.2.4.1-1 through 4.2.4.1-3 and shown on Figures 4.2.4.1-1 through 4.2.4.1-3, respectively. Engineering Justification All cables, except those attached beneath the reactor, are in conduit. Separation of safe shutdown conduits is greater than 20 feet except at elevation 764 feet 0 inch, where they cross over each other and run parallel within I foot of each other. Each SRV is powered by both Division 1 and 2. A sufficient number of SRVs would be available assuming that all cabling and equipment were disabled within any 20-foot horizontal portion of the drywell. It should be noted that the SRVs also have extensive vertical separation from the only in situ fire hazard in this fire area, which is the lubricating oil contained v ithin the two reactor recirculation pump motors. Each reactor recirculation pump motor utilizes self-lubricated bearings with lubricating oil cooled by cooling coils installed within the reservoirs. A pressurized oil system is not utilized. This design minimizes piping connections to the oil reservoir. The heavy construction and the nonpressurized design of this 'ubricating system minimize susceptibility to leakage. Thus, a fire due to the spray of the recirculation pump lubricating oil is not credible. If a fire occurred at the recirculation pump motors, it would be detected by the ultraviolet fire detection systems.
CPS Deviation 4.2.4.1 Page 2 of 2
- The drywell is inaccessible during operation, and when opened, stringent administrative controls are implemented to monitor personnel and equipment ingress and egress.
Therefore, an exposure fire from transient combustibles is not credible. Based on the minimal combustibles in the area, detection for the reactor recirculation pumps, and spatial separation of safe shutdown cables in conduit, an adequate level of protection is provided to ensure safe shutdown. Therefore, an automatic suppression system in this fire area is not necessary.
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CPS Deviation 4.2.4.2 Page 1 of 2 4.2.4.2 CONTROL ROOM COMPLEX (CB-6) Description of Deviation: Fire Area CB-6 is not provided with a complete automatic fire suppression system.
Reference:
10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.3: 3. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration, shall be provided. . . . In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under consideration. Fire Area (s) Involved Fire Area CB-6 - Elevation 800 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-14a and 14b and Cable Tray Figure 12) Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables Fire Zone CB-6a is the main control room and four peripheral rooms. The main control room contains Division 1/ Method I and Division 2/ Method 2 cables and controis for safe shutdown equipment. Fire Zone CB-6b Operation / Support Center and TMI Panet Room contains Division I and 2 safe shutdown instrument cables. Fire Zone CB-6c is the technical support center and contains Division 1 and 2 safe shutdown cables for the control room ventilation system. Fire Zone CB-6d contains an access corridor, locker room, kitchen, a sleeping area, etc. Division I and 2 safe shutdown cables are in this zone. Engineering Justification
- Fire Area CB-6 is provided with partial automatic fire suppression systems. This partial system protects the underfloor space of the main control room in Fire Zone CB-6a as part of the PGCC design. The remaining zones do not have any automatic fire suppression systems.
The remaining zones are provided with complete ionization detection coverage and are separated from one another by 2-hour rated walls and/or noncombustible partitions. Manual firefighting equipment is readily accessible, and response to a fire would be prompt, since the continuously manned main control room is adjacent to these zones. The safe shutdown analysis has demonstrated that in case of a fire anywhere within this fire area, safe shutdown can be achieved. l l l
I CPS Deviation 6.2.4.2 Page 2 of 2 Based upon the fire detection coverage, manual fire suppression capabilities, and the ability to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition, complete fire area suppression is not warranted for Fire Area CB-6. l ) i i i O e a h 5 6 I
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i CPS Deviation 4.2.4.3 Page1of1 4.2.4.3 DIESEL AIR INTAKE STRUCTURE (D-8) l Description of Deviation 4 Fire Area D-8 is not protected by an automatic suppression system. Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.c references that cable and equipment and asso-ciated nonsafety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating shall be enclosed. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area. Fire Area Involved Fire Area D Elevation 762 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-12a and 12b and Cable Tray Figure 10). Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables Fire Area D-8 consists of the Division I diesel generator air intake structure. Division I cables (in conduit) and Division 2 cables (in conduit), IDG31 A and IDG31B, are in this fire area. Engineering Justification The Disision 2 power feed cables, IDG31 A and IDG31B (as shown on Figure 4.2.4.3-1), that run along the south wall of this fire area are separated from the Division I diesel generator ventilation system by a missile shield and a partial concrete wall. The Division 2 cables will be protected with a 1-hour fire rated material and local thermal detectors. The only combustibles in the area are electrical insulation ip cabinets and HVAC duct insulation materials, resulting in fire loading of 19,500 Btu /f t . In the event of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown can be achieved by the use of Division 2/ Method 2 systems. Basec on the provision of a 1-hour fire rated barrier and a detection system, low fire loading, and the ability to achieve safe shutdown, an automatic suppression system is not necessary in Fire Area D-8. I _ _ _ _ _
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4.2.4.4 PARTIAL SUPPRESSION IN FIRE AREA A-1
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A complete automatic suppression system ha,s not been provided in Fire Zone A-lb. s Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b references that cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards shall be separated. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area. Fire Area Involved Fire Zone A-lb - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figares FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3). Description of Safe Shutdos.a Eculpment and Cables Fire Area A-lb contains Division 1 and 2 safe shutdown cables. Division I cables are located on the east side of the fire zone and Division 2 cables are located on the west side of the fire zone (see Cable Tray Figure 3). Engineering Justification A complete automatic suppression system has not been provided in Fire Zone A-lb. An automatic wet-pipe spr'ir*kr system is installed between column / rows ll4-124/S-T ensuring that a fire in one safe shutdown division will not propagate to the other. A scomplete ionization fire protection system is provided for this zone. In addition, the two divisions of cabling in this fire zone are separated by a horizontal distance in excess of 135 feet. Based on the partial automatic suppression system, the spatial separation between safe shutdowit-divisior.;, and the ionization system, additional automatic sup-pression systems are not necessary in Fire Zone A-lb. w l 1
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i 1 CPS Deviation 4.2.4.5 Page 1 of 6 4.2.4.5 PARTIAL SUPPRESSION IN FIRE AREA CB-1 Description of Deviation Fire Area CB-1 is not protected by complete automatic fire suppression. A deviation for not providing fire detection throughout this fire area is discussed in Subsection 4.2.3.1. Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.2.b and Ill.G.3: b. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards, in addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or . . .
- 3. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits independent of cables, systems, or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration, shall be provided . . .
In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under consideration. Fire Area Involved Fire Zone CB-la - Elevations 702 feet 0 inch,712 feet 0 inch,719 feet 0 inch, and 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-Sa, 8b,9a,9b,10a, and 10b and Cable Tray Figures 7,8, and 9). Fire Zone CB-lb - Elevations 702 feet 0 inch and 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-8a and 9b and Cable Tray Figure 7). Fire Zone CB-Ic - Elevation 719 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-9a and 9b and Cable Tray Figure 8). Fire Zone CB-Id - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-10a and 10b and Cable Tray Figure 9). Fire Zone CB-le - Elevations 737 feet 0 inch and 751 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-10a,100, lla, and lib and Cable Tray Figure 9). Fire Zone CB-if - Elevation 762 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-12a and 12b and Cable Tray Figure 10). Fire Zone CB-Ig - Elevation 781 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-13a and 13b and Cable Tray Figure 11). Fire Zone CB-lh - Elevations 702 feet 0 inch through 825 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-8a and 8b through 15a and 15b and Cable Tray Figures 7 through 13).
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CPS Deviation 4.2.4.5 Page 2 of 6 Fire Zone CB-li - Elevation 825 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-15a and 13b and Cable Tray Figure 13). Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables Safe shutdown cables and equipment in the zones are listed in Tables 4.2.4.5-1 through 4.2.4.5-6 and are shown on Figures 4.2.4.5-1 through 4.2.4.5-6, respectively. Engineering Justification An automatic suppression system is not utilized throughout Fire Area CB-1. A combination of partial suppression systems, partial fire detection, and fire-rated barriers are used to provide adequate fire protection to satisfy the intent of Appendix R requirements. This deviation is discussed by elevation and zone. i Elevation 702 Feet 0 Inch - Fire Zone CB-la i This zone was originally intended for the Unit 2 diesel-generators and fuel oil storage. It includes a general access corridor at elevation 711 feet 0 inch. 1 The walls of Fire Zone CB-la are 12-inch minimum reinforced concrete. The west wall and the south corridor wall, common to Fire Areas D-1, D-2, and D-3, are 3-hour fire rated. The remaining walls are not fire rated. The ceiling, which is 12-inch minimum reinforced concrete, is 3-hour fire rated and is the floor of elevation 762 feet 0 inch. Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided throughout this zone. The .only cable associated with safe shutdown belongs to the Division 2 fuel oil storage tank level indication. This cable is separated from its redundant counterpart, the Division I fuel oil storage tank level indication, by a 3-hour fire barrier. Based on the fire barrier, no suppression is necessary in this fire zone. Elevation 702 Feet 0 Inch - Fire Zone CB-lb The walls of Fire Zone CB-lb are at least 12-inch reinforced concrete or ll-5/8-inch solid concrete block. The north and west walls are 3-hour fire rated. The ceiling is at least 12-inch reinforced concrete and is not fire rated. Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided throughout thjs zone. Fire Zone CB-lb has an approximately uniform fire loading of 44,000 Btu /ft . No safe shutdown cables or equipment are in this zone. Therefore, no automatic fire suppression system is necessary in this fire zone. Elevation 719 Feet 0 Inch - Fire Zone CB-Ic This zone is a general access area and a heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning equipment area. Also, the standby gas treatment Systems A and B are locateg in the , zone. The fire load in Fire Zone CB-Ic is approximately uniform at 36,000 Btu /f t . l l e
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i j CPS l Deviation 4.2.4.5 > Page 3 of 6 l l The walls of CB-Ic are 36-inch reinforced concrete,15-5/8-inch solid concrete block, or ll-5/8-inch hollow concrete block. The north and west walls are 3-hour rated and the remaining walls are not fire rated. The ceiling is 20-inch reinforced concrete and is 3-hour fire rated from Columns / Rows' AC-AE and 124-130. The remainder of the ceiling is unrated. There are four stairways in this zone: two are open and two are enclosed. Area fire detection and manual hose stations and extinguishers are provided in this zone. A fire in Fire Zone CB-Ic will affect only Division 2/ Method 2 SSD cables and equipment (see Figure 4.2.4.5-1 and Table 4.2.4.5-1). A safe shutdown using Method 1 is assured. Therefore, no automatic suppression system is necessary. Elevations 737 Feet 0 inch and 751 Feet 0 Inch - Fire Zones CB-Id and CB-le Cables and equipment are shown on Figures 4.2.4.5-2 and 4.2.4.5-3. Tabulations of affected cables are listed in Tables 4.2.4.5-2 and 4.2.4.5-3. The walls in Fire Zone CB-Id are 7-5/8-inch minimum solid or hollow concrete block or 24-inch minimum reinforced concrete. The north and west walls have a 3-hour fire rating. The remaining internal walls and wall adjacent to Fire Zone CB-le are not fire rated. The ceiling is 12-inch reinforced concrete at elevation 751 feet 0 inch and is not fire rated. Portable extinguishers, manual hose stations, and partial fire detection are provided (see Figure FP-10b). es.a e Fire Zone CB-le is a general access area at elevation 737 feet 0 inch and it includes a mezzanine above Fire Zone CB-Id. The floor of the general access area of Fire Zone CB-le is 8-inch minimum reinforced concrete and is not fire rated. The floor of the mezzanine level, which is the roof of Fire Zone CB-Id, is 12-inch reinforced concrete and it is not fire rated. The walls of Fire Zone CB-le are 36-inch reinforced concrete,15-5/8-inch solid concrete block, or 7-5/8-inch minimum hollow concrete block. The portion of the south wall adjacent to the diesel-generator rooms (Fire Zones D-4a, D-Sa, and D-6a) and the north wall adjacent to the radwaste building above elevation 751 feet 0 inch and the west wall adjacent to the auxiliary building are 3-hour fire rated. The remaining walls are not fire rated. The ceiling of Fire Zone CB-le is 8-inch minimum reinforced concrete with open pipe and equipment removal hatches. The ceiling is not fire rated. A partial wet-pipe suppression system and portable fire extinguishers are provided for Fire Zone CB-le as shown on Figures FP-10b and lib. Complete fire detection is provided throughout Fire Zone CB-le. Automatic suppression is not necessary in Fire Zone CB-id since only Division 2 safe shutdown cables are located in this zone (see Figure 4.5.4.5-2). These cables penetrate j the ceiling of Fire Zone CB-Id and enter l? ire Zone CB-le, which also contains Division 1 safe shutdown cable. A partial suppression system is provided in Fire Zone CB-le to l
CPS Deviation 4.2.4.5 Page 4 of 6 protect Division I safe shutdown cables (see Figure 4.5.4.5-3). A fire in Fire Zone CB-Id would not affect the Division I cables. An exposure fire originating in Fire Zone CB-Ic would affect only Division 2/ Method 2 safe shutdown cables and equipment at elevation 719 feet 0 inch. The Division 1/Methud 1 safe shutdown cables located in Fire Zone CB-le two floors up are protected by a partial wet-pipe sprinkler system (see Figures FP-10b and lib) which was installed to protect the pipe hatch at the ceiling of Fire Zone CB-Ic (located at Column / Row 125/AC, elevation 737 feet 0 inch - see Figure FP-9b). This will cool any hot gases rising up near Division 1/ Method I safe shutdown cables. This partial suppression system combined with the 14-foot horizontal separation of the Division 2 cable trays in Fire Zone CB-1c from the hatch and the lack of intervening combustibles, will assure safe shutdown by Method 1. An automatic suppression system extends over the Division 1/ Method I safe shutdown cables (see Figures FP-10b and Ilb and Cable Tray Figure 9) in Fire Zone CB-le. One-hour barriers are provided for Division 2 cables and conduits within 20 feet of the nearest Division I cable, conduit, or equipment. Automatic detection is installed throughout Fire Zone CB-le. 2 The westfire load side of inFire Zone CB-le Zone is average CB-le. at 70,000 The fire load inBtu Fire/f Zone t . Cables CB-Idareisconcentrated 20,000 Btu at
/ft thf.
Higher cable tray concentrations are located in the riser sections by Row 5 (see Figure 4.5.4.5-2). These risers are sealed at elevations 737 feet 0 inch,751 feet 0 inch, and 762 feet 0 inch by 3-hour fire rated seals. The only other hazards are the gases stored in the compressed gps storage room. The average' fire loading in this small room is about 30,000 Btu /ft . The Division 1 and 2 cables in proximity of this room are shown on Cable Tray Figure 9. Safe shutdown is assured due to the automatic wet-pipe sprinkler, fire wrap of safe shutdown cables, and spatial separation of the safe shutdown cables. Elevation 762 Feet 0 Inch - Fire Zone CB-if The floor is 12-inch reinforced concrete with open areas for piping and equipment removal. The floor is not fire rated. The zone walls are 24-inch minimum concrete and are 3-hour fire rated, except for the east wall, which is not fire rated. The ceiling is 12-inch minimum reinforced concrete and is 3-hour fire rated between Column Rows 124-130 and Column Lines S-AC. Manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are provided as shown on Figure FP-12b. Area fire detection is provided in this fire zone. At elevation 762 feet 0 inch, Fire Zone CB-If, all Division 2 safe shutdown cables are protected by a 3-hour fire rated material (see Figure 4.2.4.5-4). Automatic sprinkler protection is provided at the ceiling of elevation 737 feet 0 inch (Fire Zone CB-le) around the HVAC shaft at Column Row 125-AC and the equipment hatch at Column Row 132-AA (see Figure FP-10b). I
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CPS Deviation 4.2.4.5 Page 5 of 6 Based on providing water protection of hatches and sealing of cable risers penetrating at the floor, the concrete floor slab will prevent a fire from spreading from Fire Zone CB-le to Fire Zone CB-If. Automatic fire suppression is therefore not necessary. Elevation 781 Feet 0 Inch - Fire Zone CB-Ig This zone is a general access for the cable spreading rooms. This space was originally intended for the Unit 2 cable spreadin rooms. The fire loading in Fire Zone CB-Ig is approximately uniform at 40,000 Btu /f t The floor is 12-inch reinforced concrete and is not fire rated. The walls are 24-inch reinforced concrete or 7-5/8-inch hollow concrete block. The north and south walls are 3-hour fire rated, and the west wall and stair / elevator enclosure are 1.9-hour fire rated. The remaining walls are not fire rated. The ceiling is 23-inch reinforced concrete and is 3-hour fire rated. Portable fire extinguishers and manual hose statier.s are provided as shown on Figure FP-13b. Area fire detection is also provided throughout this fire zone. Division 2 cables in conduit associated with safe shutdown are protected by a 3-hour fire-rated material in this fire zone. The fire zone below Fire Zone CB-!g (Fire Zone CB-If) also has Division 2/ Method 2 safe shutdown cables protected with a 3-hour fire rated material. The separation criteria of 10 CFR 50, Section III.G.2a are therefore met. No automatic fire suppression system is necessary.
- Elevation 825 Feet 0 Inch - Fire Zone CB-li .
This zone contains the air handling equipment for the control room and auxiliary building. The floor is 12-inch minimum concrete on steel decking and is 3-hour fire rdted. The walls are 24-inch reinforced concrete, ll-5/8-inch hollow concrete block, or 7-5/8-inch hollow concrete block. The walls at the stair / elevator enclosures are 1.9-hour fire rated. The remaining walls are not fire rated. The ceiling is 24-inch concrete on steel decking and is not rated. The dividing wall at Column 130 between the missile wall and Row AC has a 3-hcur fire rating. Portable fire extinguishdrs and manual hose stations are provided as.shown on Figure FP-15b. Fire detection is provided between Columns 128 and 133. Division 1 and 2 cables required for safe shutdown are located in this fire zone and are shown on Figures 4.2.4.5-5 and 4.2.4.5-6. There is an open hatch on the east side of Fire Zone CB-li, a,t Column / Row 135/AC, that communicates to Fire Zone CB-If at elevation 762 feet 0 inch. This hatch is enclosed by 3-hour fire-rated construction through to the intermediate floor levels. A fire on the east side of Fire Zone CB-If at elevation 762 feet 0 inch would not affect Division 2/ Method 2 safe shutdown cables or equipment since the Method 2 safe shutdown cables in Fire Zone CB-If are protected by a 3-hour rated material. No Division 2 cables exist in Fire Zone CB-li on the east side of the Column 130 fire wall. Therefore, automatic suppression on the east side of Fire Zone CB-li is not necessary. On the west side of Fire Zone CB-li, there is an open hatch at Column / Row 125/AC that communicates to Fire Zone CB-If at elevation 762 feet 0 inch. The chase is enclosed
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ma CPS Deviation 4.2.4.5 Page 6 of 6 with 3-hour fire-rated construction at the two intermediate floor levels. A fire on the west side of Fire Zone CB-If at elevation 762 feet 0 inch would affect only Division 1/ Method I safe shutdown cables. A wet-pipe suppression system will be installed around the hatch at the ceiling of Fire Zone CB-If to cool hot gases and prevent damage to the redundant Division 2 cable in Fire Zone CB-li. A partial fire detection system will be installed in the vicinity of the open hatch. An automatic suppression system in the west side of Fire Zone CB-li is not necessary. If a fire occurred on the west side of Fire Zone CB-li, safe shutdown is provided from the remote shutdown panel. In conclusion, safe shutdown in Fire Area CB-1 is assured by a combination of passive fire barriers, detection, and partial automatic suppression systems. Therefore, complete automatic fire suppression is not necessary. 4 4
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. s CPS Deviation 4.2.4.6 Page 1 of 2 4.2.4.6 PARTIAL SUPPRESSION IN FIRE AREA CB-5 Description of Deviation A complete fire suppression system is not installed throughout Fire Area CB-5.
Reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section I!!.G.3.b references that alternative or dedicated shut-down capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems, or compo-nents in the area, room, or zone under consideration shall be provided . . . where redun-dant trains of systems required for hot shutdown located in the sarae fire area may be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire sup-pression system shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under consideration. Fire Area Involved
, Fire Zone CB-Sa - Elevation 781 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-13a and 13b and Cable Tray Figure 11).
Fire Zone CB-5b - Elevation 781 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-13a and 13b and Cable Tray Figure 11). j Fire Zone CB-Sc - Elevation 781 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-13a and 13b and Cable Tray Figure 11). Description of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables Fire Zone CB-$a contains the Division 3 4.16-kV switchgear unit,480-volt transformer, , battery charger for the Division 3 battery, motor control centers, and associated i supporting equipment. This equipment is not required for safe shutdown except for a fire j in Eire Zone A-3f (see Subsection 3.1.3). Fire Zone CB-Sa also contains Division I and 2 ' 4 NSPS safe shutdown cables (in conduit) 1RP01C, IRP02C, IRP0lH, IRP02H (see Figure 4.2.4.6-1). ! Fire Zone CB-5b contains the Division 3 batteries and battery ractn exhaust fan. This equipment is not required for safe shutdown except for a fire in Fire Zone A-3f (see Subsection 3.1.3). 1
- Fire Zone CB-Sc contains Division 1 and 2 safe shutdown cable risers.
Engineering Justification In Fire Zone CB-Sa, the Division i NSPS safe shutdown cables (in conduit) are protected by a 3-hour fire rated material. In the event of a fire in this fire zone, Method 1/ Divi-sion 1 equipment from the main control room can be used to safely shut down the plant. The protection provided for the Division I cables satisfies separation criteria. There-i fore, a fixed fire suppression system is not necessary in Fire Zone CB-$a. I
.. . . . - .. . ~ . -- - . . _ = _ -
, i
! 4 . ! CPS Deviation 4.2.4.6 Page 2 cf 2 i In the event of a fire in Fire Zone CB-Sb, the plant can be safely shut down by either Division 1/ Method 1 or Division 2/ Method 2 systems. Therefore, a fixed fire suppression system is not necessary in Fire Zone CB-5b.
j In the event of fire in Fire Zone CB-Sc, the plant can be safely shut down from the remote shutdown panel with Division 1/ Method 1 systems. An ionization detection ! system and an automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system will be installed in this zone. In
- conclusion, safe shutdown in Fire Area CB-1 is assured by a combination of passive fire i barriers, detection, and partial automatic suppression systems. Therefore, complete !
automatic fire suppression is not necessary. i l i J i i
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- Deviation 4.2.4.7 i Page 1 of 6 i
4.2.4.7 SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS IN FIRE AREA F-1 i Description of Deviation i Division I and Division 2 safe shutdown cables and equipment are routed through or i located in Fire Area F-1. An automatic suppression system has not been provided in this
; fire area. Deviations for not providing full area detection are provided in Subsection
- 4.2.3.1.
Reference , j 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section !!!.G.2.b. To ensure redundant trains will be free of fire i damage, there will be: b. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety j circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no inter-
! vening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire l suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.
Fire Area (s) Involved ) l Fire Zone F-la - Elevation 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray ; j Figure 2) l Fire Zone F-lb - Elevation 712 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-2a and 2b and Cable Tray Figure 2) ] i Fire Zone F-Im - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray Figure 3) l Fire Zone F-In - Elevation 737 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-3a and 3b and Cable Tray
! Figure 3) ,
Fire Zone F-lp - Elevations 751 feet 0 inch and 781 feet 0 inch (see Figures FP-4a,4b, Sa, and $b and Cable Tray Figures 4 and 5) Descristion of Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cables l l I Cables and equipment required for safe shutdown are listed on Tables 4.2.4.7-1 through l 1 4.2.4.7 L. Figures 4.2.4.7-1 through 4.2.4.7-4 show the routing of divisional safe
- shutdown cables in this fire area. j 1
I Engineering Justification ! l Although Division 1 and 2 safe shutdown cables and equipment are located in Fire Area i F-1, an automatic su)pression system has not been provided. The routing of the safe ! shutdown cables with n this fire area has c!!minated the need for an automatic suppres-sion system. l, l . I - f , l 1
~. - ._ _ __ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ -- . _ _ .
l-. . . CPS 1 Deviation 4.I.4.7 li Page 2 of 6
- In Fire Zone F-la, the Division I safe shutdown cables (in conduit) in the southeast
! corner of the zone are separated from the Division 2 cable trays by a horizontal distance i j in excess of 75 feet. l 1
- Solid bottom BOP cable trays are routed between the Division 1 and 2 cables such that 4 these trays are horizontally separated from the Division I and 2 cables by distances in excess of 15 feet and 6 feet, respectively. An exposure fire in the vicinity of the Divi-
] sion I conduits would have to ignite the BOP cables located a horizontal distance of i approximately 15 feet away, propagate at least 75 feet along the BOP cable trays, and i then ignite the Division 2 cables located at a horizontal distance of 6 feet. Such a i scenario is highly unlikely due to the ignition resistance of the cables (IEEE 383 qualified) i in the BOP trays in conjunction with the low heat release and flame spread rates for i these cables. 4 > Fire Zone F-Ib, contains only one cable and instrument required for safe shutdown. As > j shown on Figure 4.2.4.7-1, the spatial separation of this cable and instrument from its redundant counterpart located in Fire Zone F-la is sufficient to ensure a safe shutdown. I In Fire Zone F-tm, Division I cable trays along the east wall are separated from Division ; l 2 cable risers along the west wall by a distance in excess of 140 feet with no intervening . j combustibles. The water suppression system provided for the railroad bay (see Figure
- FP-3b) provides additional protection between the Division 1 and 2 cables. Division 1 j cables (in conduit) along the south wall are routed in Fire Zones F-tm and F-In within 20 j feet of Division 2 cables (in conduit)(see Figure 4.2.4.7-2) and in excess of 60 feet from ,
! the Division 2 cable risers. The function of the cables in conduit is discussed in Tabic 4.2.4.7-5. Based on the cable functions, spatial separation, the railroad bay suppression system, and the absence of intervening combustibles, safe shutdown is assured. j i
j For Fire Zone F-lp, the deviation concerning full area suppression for safe shutdown cables (see Figure 4.2.4.7-4) in this zone has been previously approved by the NRC. ,
- Refer to Clinton SSER 3, page 3, Fire Zone F.3.1 for details. ;
j In conclusion, based upon combinations of spatial separation, cable functions, lack of j intervening combustibles, and provision of a partial suppression system, a complete j automatic suppression system is not necessary for Fire Area F-1. i ! l l , j i i
CPS Deviation 4.2.4.7 Page 3 of 6 Table 4.2.4.7-5 Fire Area F-1 Associated Eculpment Beginning Ending Associated Fire Cable Equipment Equipment Seg. Equipment Area Number No. No. Code No. Justification
- F-1 1AP40A 1 APilE l AP29E PIE 1AP29E 1AP40B 1APl!E 1AP29E PIE LAP 29E D2 1AP41A l AP12E 1AP30E P2E l AP30E D1 ICC04B 1AP73E ICC075A CIE ISX012A ISXO62A ICC05B 1AP73E ICC076A CIE ISX012A ISXO62A ICC06B 1AP76E ICC075B C2E ISX012B A2 ISXO62B ICC07B 1AP76E ICC076B C2E ISX012B ISXO62B ICM76A IH13-P742B ILT - CM031 K2E ILT-CM031 D1
" NOTES DI Closest Division I cable > 50 feet from Division 2.
D2 Closest Division 2 cable 45 feet vertical (IDG31 A&B) and intervening floor at elevation 755 feet 0 inch. Closest redundant cable > 50 feet. D3 Previously approved deviation, Clinton SSER 3, p. 3, Fire Zone F.3.1. Al Analyzed. Valve in nortnal position, hot short or ground will not change associated equipment position. A2 Analyzed. Interlock cable associated with associated equipment will not move valve from normal shutdown position.
CPS Deviation 4.2.4.7 Page 4 of 6 Table 4.2.4.7-5 (Cont.) Beginning Ending Associated Fire Cable Equipment Equipment Seg. Equipment Area Number No. No. Code No. Justification F-1 IDG11 A LAP 07EC IDG0lKA PIE IDG0lKA IDGilB 1AP07EC IDG0lKA PIE IDG0lKA IDG31 A LAP 09EH IDG01]B P2E IDG0!KB IDG31B IAP09EH IDG01]B P2E IDG0!KB D3 IRISI A lE51-N035 A IH13-P706E K!E lE51-NO35A 1Rl81B IE51-NO35 E 1H13-P706E KlE lE51-NO35E D2 1RS77A IC61-N503 1C61-P001E KIE IC61-N503 1RS77C IC61-N505 1C61-P00!E KlE IC61-N505 A . ISX01A 1AP07ED ISX0lPA PIE ISXOlPB ISX01F LAP 07ED 1 AP29E CIE ISX014 A ISX0!K 1AP07ED ISX0lPA CIE ISX0lPA D2 ISX02A LAP 09EG ISXOlPB P2E ISX0!PB ISX02F IAP09EG 1AP30E C2E ISX014B ISX02J IAP09EC ISX0lPB C2E ISX0lPB D1 ISXO4C 1AP29E IH13-P741E CIE IPDS-SX022 ISXO4D 1AP29E IC61-P001E CIE iPDS-SX022 D2 ISX10A LAP 73E ISX012A PIE ISX012A ISX10B 1AP73E ISX012A CIE ISX012A ISXilA 1AP73E ISX062A PIE ISXO62A ISXilB 1AP73E ISXO62A CIE ISXO62A ISX12A LAP 76E ISX012B P2E 15X012B A s 4
,. ., - - _ . - _ - - - = - _ _ - . - - . --.
1 CPS Deviation 4.2.4.7 j Page 3 of 6 j Table 4.2.4.7-5 (Cont.) . i l Beginning Ending Associated Fire Cable Equipment Equipment Seg. Equipment i Area Number No. No. Code No. Justification F-1 ISX12B 1AP76E ISX012B C2E ISX0128 ! ) ISX13A 1 AP76E ISXO62B P2E ISXO62B i ISX13B 1AP76E ISXO62B C2E ISXO62B i ISX14K 1AP29E IC61-P001E CIE ISX003A i i ISX14L 1AP29E IC61-P00!E CIE ISX004A i ISX14M 1AP29E IC61-P00!E CIE ISX003A D2 i l ISXISC 1AP30E IH13-P702B C2E ISX003B Di ; 1, i ISXISC 1AP30E IH13-P702B C2E ISX003B I j ISX15F 1,AP30E 1H13-P702B C2E ISX004B l i ISX153 1AP30E lH13-P702B C2E ISX008B Di l I i l ISX17D 1AP29E IC61-P001E CIE ISX014A D2 ! l ISXISC 1AP30E IH13-P702B C2E 15X014B Di ; i < } ISX33D 1AP29E IC61-P00!E CIE ISXOllA D2 i 1 , i t I j - ISX34C 1AP30E IH13-P702B C2E ISX0llB Di ![ ISX37A LAP 73E ISX016A PIE ISX016A !
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CPS Deviation 4.2.4.7 Page 6 of 6 Table 4.2.4.7-5 (Cont.) Beginning Ending Associated Fire Cable Equipment Equipment Seg. Equipment Area Number No. No. Code No. Justification F-1 ISX34D 1AP94E 1AP30E C2E ISXOOSB D1 15X75A IPT - SX023 IH13-P741E KIE IPT-SX028 ISX0lPp D2 ISX75B IPT - SX030 IH13-P742F K2E IPT-SXO30 ISXOlPB D1 IVH07E IPL533A IH13-P711 A CIE IVH01CA IVH07F 1AP29E 1C61-P001E CIE ITY-VH001 IVH01CA 1 IVH07H I AP29E IC61-P001E CIE IVHotCA D2 IVHOSB 1AP30E 1H13-P742E C2E IVH01CB IVHOSE IPL53]B lH13-P742E C2E IVHOICB D1 1
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