ML20138R869

Forwards Response to 850607 Request for Addl Confirmatory Info Re SPDS Isolation Devices Used at Facility Per Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737.Revs to Listed Signals & Respective Isolation Devices Provided

ML20138R869
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	11/08/1985
From:	Andrews R OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	Butcher E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 LIC-85-494, NUDOCS 8511190167
Download: ML20138R869 (20)

Text

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Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102 2247 402/536-4000 November 8,1985 L IC-85-494 Mr. Edward J. Butcher, Acting Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

References:

(1) Docket No. 50-285 (2) Letter fran OPPD ( Andrews) to NRC (Miller) dated Decenber 7, 1984 (LIC-84-327)

(3) Letter fran NRC (Butcher) to OPPD ( Andrews) dated June 7, 1985

Dear Mr. Butcher:

Safety Paraneter Display Systen (SPDS)

Isolation Devices OPPD received your letter dated June 7,1985, Reference (3), reauesting addi-tional confirmatory information pertaining to the SPDS isolation devices used at the Fort Calhoun Station. The isolation devices were identified in attach-ments provided in Reference (2). Several telephone conversations have been held between OPPD personnel and members of your staff. Based on those phone calls, the enclosed revisions to the attachments of Reference (2) are provided to respond to your requests.

Specifically, revisions which pertain to signals P783, P784, P785, and P786, Containment Wide and Narrow Range Pressure are provided. The original submit-tal indicated that a Foxboro Model #N-2A0-V21 was used; the correct model num- ,

ber i s N-2A0-VAI. (

l Also enclosed are revisions for the following signals and their respective iso.-

lation devices:

T123, F0114A Y3286A/B/C/D L387, L388 A/B/C/DR001 L599, L600 R0003X,Y R0004X,Y HR81A/B Digital Inputs I

hok boK DN F 1  :

_=_

i

. l Mr. Edward J. Butcher L IC-85-494  !

Page Two Enclosure 12, Calculations Involving KTN Fuses Between Vital Instrument Invert-ers and Scientific Columbus VT 110 A2 Transducers, was prepared for submittal with this revision. However, because of recent infonnation received fran the inverter manufacturer while the internal independent review of the calculations was in progress, Enclosure 12 has been withheld. OPPD's goal for fomarding 1 these calculations is November 29, 1985. l OPPD has made a good faith effort to meet the requirenents outlined in the pro-visions of NUREG-0737, Supp.1, Section 3.7, and guidance provided in NUREG-0696, Section 5.6. However, we have only recently becane aware that several of the isolation devices previously installed by 0 PPD are not acceptable to the NRC. OPPD proposes to replace these devices with devices which have been found acceptable to the NRC. The engineering, design, and procurement will occur during Cycle 10 operation with the modi fication being perfonned during the 1987 refueling outage. OPPD, therefore, will have this one item remaining to be com-pleted af ter declaration of SPDS operability, 30 days af ter the current refuel-ing outage. If you have further questions, please contact us.

Sin erely, 4/ W R. L. Andrews Division Manager Nuclear Production RLA/rh Attachments cc: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036 Mr. E. G. Tourigny, NRC Project Manager Mr. P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

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Revised Attachment 4

v. Y3286A Static Inverter A volts

' w. Y32868 Static Inverter B volts 1 x. Y3286C Static ' Inverter C volts

y. Y32860 Static Inverter D volts

z. Digital Inputs Representing Status of Engineered Safety Function (ESF) Systems 1

The above signals are/will be

• connected to the ERFCS ' via isolating devices as described below:

1. T113: Technology for Energy Corporation, Model 156E Isolator.

2. T123, F0114A: Technology for Energy Corporation, Model 156K Isolator. l

3. L387, L388: Technology for Energy Corporation, Model 156D Isolator.  !

L599, L600: Technology for Energy Corporation, Model 156D Isolator.  !

- 4. HR81A/B

Technology for Energy Corporation, Model 156D Isolator. l

5. P783, P784: _ Foxboro, Model N-2A0-VAI.

P785, 0786: Foxboro, Model N-2AO-VAI . i

6. A/B/C. DP,001: Reactor Protective System Buf fered Voltage Outputs.

R0003X,Y R0004X,Y: Reactor Protective Sys tem Buffered Voltage Outputs.

- 7. Y3286A/B/C/D: Bussmann KTN Limi tron Fast-Acting Fuses (1 amp).

8. Digital Inputs: Relay Contacts, Coil-to-Contact Isolation.

In our Engineeri ng j udgement, these devices provide adequate i solation fo r 2

sa fe ty systems from noi se generated in the ERF computer system. For a ' more deta iled response to i n formation request items a.-f. for these devices see attachment 4.1.

Signals which will be connected to the ERFCS using di f ferent isola tion

, devices (i.e. , TEC Model 156 i solators) are listed:

T123, F0114A L387, L388 L599, L600 HR81A/B i

i r

l LIST & ENCLOSURES IDENTIFIED IN ATTACHMENT 4.1 Enclosure Description 1 Electromagnetic Interference Test for TEC Model 156 Analog Signal Isolator 2 (Deleted) 3 (Deleted) 4 (Deleted)

5 (Deleted) l 6 (Deleted) 7 (Deleted) 8- Product Application Data Sheet No. PAD  ;

P4400-006  !

9 (Deleted) See Foxboro Quali fication Report Q0AAA20-1 i Pages 11,12, 27, 28, 59, 72,117,118,119.

This report is very large, therefore it is not enclosed, however the specific pages

-' which apply are li sted above. It is OPPD's understanding that the device tested is considered to be a suitable isolation device.

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! 10 General Atomic Company Specification Sheet for Buf fer Ampli fier, Model BA-1 A 11 (Deleted) l 12  ! Calculations involving KTN fuses and between f

Vital Instrument Inverters and Scientific Colunt)us VT110A2 Transducers (later) i k

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PROPOSED METHOD OF ISOLATION FROM SAFETY SYSTEMS Signal: T123 Loop 2B Cold Leg Temp. - Wide Range F0114A Primary Coolant loop Flow - Channel A Device- Technology for Enenjy Corp. (TEC) Model 156K

a. Describe specific testing perfonned to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for its application:

Same as T113 (re,ponse previously submitted).

It is OPPD's understanding as a result of several telephone confer-ence calls with NRC personnel that the TEC 156 device is considered to bej a suitable isolation device.

a. (cont'd) Elementary diagrams indicating test configuration and how maximum credible faults were applied to the devices:

Same as T113

b. Data verifying that the maximum credible faults applied during the test were maximum voltage / current to which the device could be exposed, and define how maximum voltage / current was determined:

Same as T113

i

c. Data verifying that the maximum credible fault was applied to the output of the device in the transverse mode and other faults were considered.

Same T113

d. Pass / fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.

Same as T113

e. Commitment that the isolation devices comply with environmental qualiff-cation (10 CFR 50.49) and seismic qualifications which were the basis for plant licensing.

This device is installed in the control roan, a mil d environment, there fore, 10 CFR 50.49 environment quali fication is not required.

Seismic testing for this device was in accordance with IEEE 344-1975.

f. Description of measures taken to protect the safety systems from elec-trical interference that may be generated by the SPDS:

Same as T113 I

E

PROPOSED ETHOD OF ISOLATION FROM SAFETY SYSTEMS Signal: L387, L388 Containment Water Level L599, L600 Containment Sump Level Device: Technology for Energy Com. (TEC) Model 1560

a. Describe specific testing performed to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for its application:

Same as T113 (Response previously submitted).

It is OPPD's understanding as a result of several telephone confer-ence calls with NRC personnel that the TEC 156 device is considered to be a suitable isolation device.

a. (cont'd) Elementary diagrams indicating test configuration and how maximum credible faults were applied to the devices:

Same as T113

b. Data verifying that the maximum credible faults applied during the test were maximum voltage / current to which the device could be exposed, and define how maximum voltage / current was determined:

Same as T113

~

c. Data verifying that the maximum credible fault was applied to the output of the device in the transverse mode and other faults were considered.

SamegasT113

d. Pass / fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.

Same as T113

e. Commitment that the isolation devices comply with environmental qualifi-cation (10 CFR 50.49) and seismic qualifications which were the basis for plant licensing.

This device is installed in the control roan, a mil d environment, therefore , 10 CFR 50.49 environment qualification is not required.

Seismic testing for this device was in accordance with IEEE 344-1975.

f. Description of measures taken to protect the safety systems from elec-trical interference that may be generated by the SPDS:

Same as T113.

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.-..,c. ._..,___._y. _ , _,,__.-_,__m ,.____ . . . _ _ _ _ - _ . . _ _ _ _ , _ , , . . ._-___-.,,._,__,m._.__y___,., , , , ..._,m. __ - .

PROPOSED METHOD OF ISOLATION FROM SAFETY SYSTEMS Signal: HR/81A/B Containment Hydrogen Concentration Device: Technology for Enenjy Corp. (TEC) Model 1560

a. Describe specific testing performed to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for its application:

Same as T113 (Response previously submitted).

It is OPPD's understanding as a result of several telephone confer-ence calls with NRC personnel that the TEC 156 device is considered to be a suitable isolation device.

a. (cont'd) Elementary diagrams indicating test configuration and how maximum credible faults were applied to the devices:

Same as T113

b. Data verifying that the maximum credible faults applied during the test were maximum voltage / current to which the device could be exposed, and define how maximum voltage / current was determined: ,

Same as T113 4

---.______-y-,,,,__w__-__y____ -_..my - , - _ _ , , - - - -

+- - y . - - . . , - , - - ,.-,.-,,-,.-r.--.---..we-.....,, ,_--__.7-,my

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c. Data verifying that the maximu= credible fault was applied to the output of the device in the transverse mode and other faults were considered.

Same as T113 i

d. Pass / fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.

Same as T113 4

e. Comitment that the isolation devices comply with environmental qualifi-cation (10 CFR 50.49) and seismic qualifications which were the besis for plant licensing.

This device is installed in the control roon, a mild environment, there fore , 10 CFR 50.49 environment quali fica tion is not required.

Seismic testing for this device was in accordance with IEEE 344-1975.

f. Description of measures taken to protect the safety systems from elec-trical interference that may be generated by the SPDS:

Same as T113.

PROPOSED ETHOD OF ISOLATION FROM SAFETY SYSTEMS Signal: P783, P784, P785, P786 Containment Wide and Narrow Range Pressure Device: Foxboro Model #N-2AO-VAI (see enclosure 8) [

I

a. Described specific testing perfonsed to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for its application:

Output terminals grounded, 600 VAC between output and ground, and 600 VAC I across the output leads.

I't is OPPD's unders tanding as a resul t of several telephone conference calls with NRC personnel that the Foxboro N-2A0-VAI is considered to be a sutiable isolation &vice.

a. (dont'd) Elementary diagrams indicating test configuration and how maximum credible faults were applied to the devices:

See Q0AAA20-1, Page 72

b. Data verifying that the maximum credible faults applied during the test were maximum voltage / current to which the device could be exposed, and define how maximum voltage / current was detenmined:

The maximum credible voltage to which the device cc,ald be exposed is either 120 VAC or 125-140 VDC. These are the maximum voltages located within the Foxboro Spec. 200 equipment racks a nd control room panels through which these signals pa s s. The cables that carry these signal s from the Foxboro racks to the control roon are routed with other low energy instrument and control cables which consist of 120 VAC,125 DC, or low energy signal and computer control circuits. There are no 4160 VAC ,

or 480 VAC power cables installed in raceways containing these cables, i

I

c. Data verifying that the maximum credible fault was applied to the output of the device in the transverse mode and other faults were considered.

I l See Q0AAA20-1, Page 27 and 28.

i

d. Pass / fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.

See Q0AAA20-1, Page 11,12, 27 and 28.

e. Commitment that the isolation devices comply with environmental qualifi-cation (10 CFR 50.49) and seismic qualifications which were the basis for plant licensing.

The devices are installed in the switchgear roon and electrical pe netra-tion room, both rooms are considered mild environment areas, therefore, 10 CFR 50.49 envi ronmental quali fica tion is not req ui red . Devices are seismically qualified to IEEE 344-1975.

f. Description of measures taken to protect the safety systems from elec-trical interference that may be generated by the SPDS:

i The measures are the same as described in the response for signal T113.

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l PROPOSED ETH00 0F ISOLATION FROM SAFETY SYSTEMS Signal: Y3286A/B/C/0 Static Inverter Volts i

,I I

(

i Device: Fuses installed on the input leads to the voltage tranducers. l (detailed information and analysis to be submitted later.)

a. Describe specific testing perforised to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for its application:

1 See enclosure 12 for analysis of fuses used. (later)

a. (cont'd) Elementary diagrams indicating test configuration and how maximum credible faults were applied to the devices:

See enclosure 12 for analysis of fuses used. (later)

b. Data verifying that the maximum credible faults applied during the te:t were maximum voltage / current to which the device could be exposed, and define how maximum voltage / current was determined:

See enclosure 12 for analysis of fuses used. (later) i i.

- j

c. Data verifying that the maximum credible fault was applied to the output of the device in the transverse mode and other faults were considered.

See enclosure 12 for analysis of fuses used. (later)

d. Pass / fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.

See enclosure 12 for analysis of fuses used. (later) l l

e. Commitment that the isolation devices comply with environmental qualifi-cation (10 CFR 50.49) and seismic sysalifications which were the basis for plant licensing.

These fuses are installed in the control roon , a mild environment, l

therefore,10 CFR 50.49 environmental qualification is not required.

Cons truction of these fuses and fuse blocks (Bussman #1B0002) is similar to the ones installed in the alternate shutdown panel which was qualified per IEEE 344-1974.

l

f. Description of measures taken to protect the safety systems from elec-trical interference that may be generated by the SPDS:

The measures are the same as described in the response for signal T113.

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PROPOSED ETH00 0F ISOLATION FROM SAFETY SYSTEMS Signal: A/B/C/DR001 Wide Range Log Power Channels R0003X,Y R0004X,Y Power Range Control Channels Device: Wide range and power range drawers of the Reactor Protective System, i buf fered voltage outputs from model BA-1A buf fer amplifiers.

a. Desc ribe specific testing perfomed to demonstrate that the device is accr.ptable for its application:

It is OPPD's understanding as a result of several telephone confer-ence calls with NRC personnel that these devices are considered to be suitable isolation devices,

a. (cont'd) Elementary diagrams indicating test configuration and how maximum credible faults were applied to the devices:

Test configuration diagrams for the BA-1A buf fer amplifiers were not furnished by the vendor.

b. Data verifying that the maximum credible faults applied during the test were maximum voltage / current to which the device could be exposed, and define how maximum voltage / current was detemined:

See specifications (enclosure 10) for the BA-1A buf fer amplifiers.

Test procedures desc ribi ng isola tion testing were not provided by the vendor.

The maximum credible voltage to which the device could be exposed to is either 120 VAC or 500-1000 VDC (high voltage power supplies for the ex-core detectors). These are the maximum voltages to which the buf fered outputs could be exposed to. A 1000 VDC output fault will not perturb buffer input signals (enclosure 10). The cables wh';h carry these signals to the ERFCS are routed through the cable spreadi ng room. The cables in this room consist mainly of instrument and control c ables, basically 120 VAC, 125 VDC, or low energy signal and conputer control circui ts. There are no 4160 VAC or 480 VAC power cables i nstalled in cable trays in the cable spreadi ng room.

L )

c. Data verifying that the maximum credible fault was applied to the output j of the device in the transverse mode and other faults were considered. -

Refer to the response to item a. and b. (above.

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d. Pass / fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.

Refer to the response to item a. and b. (above).

f -

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e. Commitment that the isolation devices comply with environmental qualiff-cation (10 CFR 50.49) and seismic qualifications which were the basis for

, plant licensing.

The RPS is loca ted in the control room, a mil d environment, therefore,10 CFR 50.49 environmental qualification is not required.

The components of the RPS were seismical ly quali fied prior to operation. Qualification was done by test and/or analysis. See Section 2.2.2 in Appendix F of the USAR for the detailed analysis.

f. Description of measures taken to protect the safety systems from elec-trical interference that s4y be generated by the SPDS: '

The measures are the same as described in the response for signal T113.

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l PROPOSED ETH00 0F ISOLATION FROM SAFETY SYSTEMS Signal: Digital inputs frc:: ESF systems and the RPS.

I i Device: Various relays,

a. Describe specific testing performed to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for its application:

It is OPPD's understanding as a result of several telephone confer-ence calls wi th NRC pe rsonnel that coil-to-contact i solation is sui table .

a. (cont'd) Elementary diagrams indicating test configuration and how maximum credible faults were applied to the devices:

N/A

b. Data verifying that the maximum credible faults applied during the test were maximia voltage / current to which the device could be exposed, and define how maximum voltage / current was determined:

N/A L

l

~ .

c. Data verifying that the maximum credible fault was applied to the output of the device in the transverse mode and other faults were considered.

N/A

d. Pass / fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.

I solation is provided by the coil-to-contact method which is considered acceptable based upon IEEE 384-1977.

e. Commitment that the isolation devices comply with environmental qualift-cation (10 CFR 50.49) and seismic qualifications which were the basis for plant licensing.

These systems are located in the control rom, a mild environment.

Cmponents were sei smically quali fi ed prior to operation .

Qualification was done by test and/or analysis. See Section 2.2.2 in Appendix F of the USAR for the detailed analysis,

f. Description of measures taken to protect the safety systems from elec-trical interference that may be generated by the SPDS:

Shi el ds for these digital signals are grounded at a point close to the ERFCS tennination cabinets. These signal s are carried to the ERFCS via twisted shielded pairs of wires.

• Enelosure b Product Application Data p3o p4400 000 1

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f' 'i SPEC 200 NEST SPEC 200 RACK l

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SPEC 200 SYSTEM l ELECTRICAL ISOLATION SYSTEM For Nuclear Power Plants SPEC 200 modular packaged electronic Instrumentation provides physical and electrical separation between safety grade and non safety grade control signals. it maintains isolation and independance of Class 1E control circuits.

The nuclear power industry requires specialized systems SYSTEM ISOLATION designed to insure strict operating safety during both nor.

mal and acnormal p! ant operation. This requires strict The system isolation provided by N SPEC 200 equipment adherance to testing procedures in order to meet their utilizes nested modular arrangements of control circuit high-quality control and safety standards' cards and input / output card functions packaged to sim.

phty loop interconnect:ons. The standardized signal level j The N SPEC 200Contro: Modules and their nest / rack cabi- between nested functions and operating displays is 0 to 10 nets have been type tested for cuahfication per IEEE Stan- volts dc. The N-SPEC 200 input / Output Converters accept dards 3231974 and IEEE 344 1975. These type-tests safety grade analog de signals such as 4 to 20 milliam-estao:ish inat the ecu oment can procerly continue to cer- peres.10 to 50 milliamperes, millivolt, thermocouple, form its safety related functions before, dur,ng, and at:er RTD, and contact input signals. All instruments are wired seismic c;sturbances tnat are considered by Foxboro to in paral'el to simphfy loco interconnections and to permit represent tne most severe that would be anticipated at tne addition or remcval of components without interrupt-most nuclear power p! ant locations. as well as postuta'ed ing the loop ooe ration. The N-SPEC 200 Output Converters changes to environmental condttrens at tne eaucment SRegistered Trademark POXBORQ" I 1980 by Tr'e Fontoro Company & M

Enc l0.s'o(c:. [$

PAD P4400408 Page 2 Convey information to nonCass 1E control circuits via a All individual modules of N. SPEC 200 Cards can be family of isolated output signals including 4 to 20 milliam- mounted in a nest unit. The nests are designed to fit into a peres,0 to 10 volts de, and relay switching. 19 in (483 mm) SPEC 200 Seismically Oualified Rack. The Tne electricalisolation system receives inputs from Class capacity of a nest is 10 modules plus a power distribution 1E control instrumentation. After the signals are con. module.

verted to the O to 10 volt de system level signal by the appropriate input converter, the signals can be further A typical system providing isolation for 80 signals will con-conditioned (souare-root extraction, signal characteriza- sistof 4 nests of Class 1E input converters and 4 nests of output consters.

tion, and alarm), or can be forwa rded directly to the output

- isotation converter. Provisions are available for Class 1E For additionalinformation concerning product specifica-to non Class 1E isolation for up to 80 analog or contact tions, refer to the following Product Specifications Sheet signals per rack.The isolation converters (analog and con . (PSS).

tact) have the tested capability to isolate shorts, grounds,'

and open faults to allow up to 600 volts ac to be applied to PSS9-7A1 A SPEC 200 Seismic Racks and Rack-Mounted Equipment the isolation converter without degradation of the Class 1 E circuits connected to the input.

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- SPEC 200 is a tracemark of The Foxboro Company. '

MB odo Printed in U.S A 0980

, - _ _ . . . _ , . . . , . - . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ . . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ,_ ._ . , _ . , _ _ ~ . ,