ML20138M433
| ML20138M433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/31/1985 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0750, NUREG-0750-V22-N02, NUREG-750, NUREG-750-V22-N2, NUDOCS 8511010269 | |
| Download: ML20138M433 (286) | |
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i l l 8511010269 851031 PDR NUREG 0750 R PDR
l l l Available from Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office Po:t Office Box 37082 , Washington, D.C. 20013-7082 A year's subscription consists of 12 softbound issues, ,. 4 indexes, and 4 hardbound editions for this publication. Single copies of this publication are available from National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 i e Errors in this publication may be reported to the Division of Technical Information and Document Control, Office of Administration, t U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555 '! (301/492 8925) or (301/492-7566) l 1
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_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _+ '& f ; < . 3 NUR EG-0750
! Vol. 22, No. 2
, j Pages 177-457 I
i r NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO VIMISSION ISSUANCES August 1985 I This report includes the issuances received during the specified period from the Commission (CLI), the Atomic Safety and Ucensing Appeal Boards (ALAB), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (LBP), the
. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the Directors' Decisions (DD), and I
the Denials of Petitions for Rulemaking (DPRM). t The summaries and headnotes preceding the opinions reported herein 1
- r. . .id%,5 a,'d p are not to be deemed a part of those opinions or to have any indepen-
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dent legal significance. l l l
) Prepared by the Division of Technical Information and Document Control, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555 (301/492 8925)
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-@ . ;tp g h.. h;$.P.;7 COMMISSIONERS Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Thomas M. Roberts James K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthal Lando W. Zech, Jr.
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. t Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman, Atomic Safety and Uconsing Appeal Panel B. Paul Cotter, ChMrman, Atomic Safety and Ucensing Board Panel
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CONTENTS
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Issuances of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COh1PANY
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. - _ . . :. : (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2)
J '. ' [? lT N. Dockets 50-275 OL,50 323 OL hlEh10RANDUh1 AND ORDER. , CLI 8514, August 1.1985 .. .... . . ......... 177 : t i PillLADELPillA ELECTRIC COhlPANY (Limerick Generating Station. Umts I and 2) Dockets 50 352 0L,50 353-OL
$1EhlORANDUhl AND ORDER.
, CLI-8515, August 8,1985 ... . . ... .... .. . .... 184 !
Issuances of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards hlETROPOLITAN EDISON COhlPANY, et al. l (Three hiite Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1) Docket 50 289-SP (hlanagement Phase) l STEN 10RANDUh! AND ORDER, ' ALAB 815. August 29, 19 8 5 . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 198 PillLADELPillA ELECTRIC COhlPANY (Limerick Generating Station, Units I and 2)
, Dockets 50 352-OL,50 353 0L
. e_ .. .. ...' StEhlORANDUh1 AND ORDER, -
- N c :*'. , j? . . . e j} ALAB-814, August 13, 19 8 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 ,
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. . .t W Issuances of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards !
CAROLINA POWER & LIGilT CONtPANY and NORTil I
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CAROLINA EASTERN N1UNICIPAL POWER AGENCY l (Shearon liarris Nuclear Power Plant) l Docket 50-400 OL (ASLBP No. 32 472 03 OL) t
. c REASONS SUPPORTING Stalh!ARY DISPOSITION [
OF EhlERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS, LBP 85 27A, August 14, 19 8 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 01
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I~ ; CAROLINA POWER & LIGilT COMPANY and NORTil Ie ! CAROLINA EASTERN MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY O.*c.1.-vgygw.de.~- W*M Y W.51 fd (Shearon liarris Nuclear Power Plant) Docket 50-400 OL (ASLBP No. 82 472-03 OL) Q ? p Q@ns7'T $::.p PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON SAFETY E %t.'/: Gh@Qddgi,kt;*M 04 .; y;; CONTENTIONS, LBP-85 28, August 20,1985. . . . . . . . . . 23 2 YlWM.%((jlpykfQM&p@.A@h sp
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.'f CLEVELAND#j ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, et al.
, ,. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2)
Dockets 50-440-OL, 50-441-OL ( ASLBP No. 81 457-04-O L) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER,
' LBP-85 33, August 30, 1985 . .. . . 442 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGitT COMPANY
; (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4)
, . Dockets 50-250 OLA 1, 50 251 OLA-1
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(ASLBP No. 84-496-03-LA) (Vessel Flux Reduction)
+ s . . . .S . ORDER, LBP 85 29, August 16, 198 5. . . . . . . . . . . .... 300
- $' . Y;.7 SEb hki LONG ISLAND LIGIITING COMPANY
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(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) y e
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Docket 50 322 OL 3 (Emergency Planning) CONCLUDING PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON EMERGENCY PLANNING, LBP-85 31, August 26,198 5 . . . . . . . . .. . . 410 4 i METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, et al. i (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1) Docket 50 289 SP (Restart Remand on Management)
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a4M # (ASLBP No. 79-429 09 SP) i PR* T -# PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON Ti1E 1 t % _ 1*'" REMANDED ISSUE OF TiiE DIECKAMP q MAILGRAM, LBP 85 30, August 19,1985 ... . .. . 332 i
.. TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al.
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units I and 2) Ws ih.$' w[hM*, o. $'L[,h2g,Ei'W dM . s Dockets 50 445-OL&OL 2,50-446 OL&OL 2 (ASLBP No. 79-430 06-OL)
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER,
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31 .s . y LBP 85 32, August 2 9, 19 8 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4
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Issuances of Director's Decisions l ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CONIPANY, et al.
' ' - ' - ' ; - - 1 (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1)
Docket 50 528 DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 C.F.R. ( 2.206 DD-8512, August 9,1985. . . ...... .. . . . . . . . . 449
. 2 .~
THE DETROIT EDISON CONIPANY, et al.
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(Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2) Docket 50-341 DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 C.F.R. ( 2.206 DD-8513, August 12, 1985. .. . . . . . 454 i t I
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l l 4 l I I I Commission l l ! Issuances , I 1 O _ l l CD s l o O ! f I k t A 1 1 I i I
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y 7 n. , J ; , ggy.y Cite as 22 NRC 177 (1985) CLl 85-14 s
- ^ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~ - COMMISSIONERS:
.j Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Thomas M. Roberts James K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthal Lando W. Zech, Jr.
f in the Matter of Docket Nos. 50 275 OL 50 323 OL l PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) August 1,1985 The Commission authorizes the issuance of a full-power operating license for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 upon finding i that all matters have been adequately resolved and denies the Joint in-tervenors' request to stay the effectiveness of such authorization for fail. 91 ure to meet the stay criteria in 10 C.F.R. l 2.788(e). 4 8 . eMrN.k[n?py'9h )
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- i MEMORANDUM AND ORDER INTRODUCTION This Order concludes the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("NRC"
~4. .t or " Commission") consideration of whether to authorize the issuance to
{ Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E") of a full-power operating
'; license for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 ("Diablo Canyon Unit 2"). This consideration includes a conclusion of the formal
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proceeding on contested issues regarding Diablo Canyon Unit 2 as well
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as affirmative Gndings on the successful resolution of uncontested
- issues. The Commission, for the reasons discussed below, Gnds that all c/c:('v. C. -5 .w. , 45 .,u, M*., ~.,- ,j ,? ', ;..'.~.. .
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matters have been resolved adequately to authonze the issuance of a 2 N 2 2 k N l. % ) [; , N 9 3 full power operating license for Diablo Canyon Unit 2. ..: yti.. m_.M'-92-DM'.g M-y 3~ . . . DieCUeeles
. ALAB-811 in ALAB-811 (21 NRC 1622 (1985)), the Appeal Board determined l
[ that no further hearings were necessary to resolve the design issues with
, respect to Unit 2 and found that the Unit 2 veriGeation program was suf-i ficient to establish that the design of Unit 2 was satisfactory and that therefore there was reasonable assurance that Unit 2 could be operated m
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*a j ',c p .' without endangering the health and safety of the public. A petition for Commission review of that decision was then filed. The Commission I
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has reviewed this petition but finds it to be without merit. Accordingly,
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it is denied.
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r $ etsy Request By letter dated July 24,1985, the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, et al. (" Joint Intervenors") applied to the Commission for an order stay-
; ing the effectiveness of any authorization by the Commission of the is-
' suance of a license for full-power operation of Diablo Canyon Unit 2. In
. attempting to meet the stay criteria,' the Joint Intervenors advance three arguments in support of their likelihood of prevailing on the
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merits: (1) the failure of the Commission to permit consideration of N..,$$ G seismic effects on emergency planning; (2) the refusal of the Appeal 06$f, j._ --
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Board, in ALAB-782 (20 NRC 838 (1984)), to reopen the record to con-sider new information which allegedly undermines the Appeal Board's l Gndings in ALAB-644,13 NRC 903 (1981); and (3) an allegation that
~ the Appeal Board's decision in ALAB-811, approving the design adequa-cy of Unit 2, is not supported by substantial evidence.
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. f:r" '542.' The Commission has already fully considered the question of whether its regulations or special circumstances require consideration of the
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g[. M j i[* ^s+, 3 The factors prescnbed by 10 C.F.R. $ 2.788(e) to be considered in connection with a request for stay
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i [ are: (1) whether the moving party has made a strong showing that it is hkely to presail on the ments. (2) Whether the party will be irreparably injured unless a stay is grantet
> 0) % hether the granting ora stay would h. mi other parties. and e
(4) Where the public interest lies.
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s l elTect of seismic events on emergency planning at Diablo Canyon in the ) context of the full-power licensing of Unit 1. See CLI-84-12, 20 NRC
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249 (1984). This matter was the subject of a petition for review to the
- United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and is scheduled for rehearing en banc.2 Under 28 U.S.C s 2347(c) the Com-mission should not, without judicial approval, reconsider a decision after the filing of a petition for judicial review.2 Moreover, the Court, in the same Order, explicitly declined to stay the operating license pending the rehearing en banc. Thus the full Court did not regard the reopening of l this issue as warranting a stay of the license.
The Joirt Intervenors assert that new seismic informatica calls into question the Appeal Board's conclusion, in ALAB-644, that the seismic design criteria for Diablo Canyon are adequate. The Joint Intervenors moved the Appeal Board to reopen the record to consider this informa-tion but a majority of the Board ruled m ALAB-782 that the motion could not be considered for lack ofjurisdiction. The Commission has de-i clined to review that decision. The fact that the adjudicatory record was i j not reopened does not mean that this information has been ignored by
- the Commission. On the contrary, the Commission, in its order author-I izing a full-power license for Diablo Canyon Unit 1, CLI-84-13,20 NRC l 267, 275-78 (1984), itself reviewed the same new geologicalinformation l presented in the reopening motion and found that it did not undermine
! ALAB-644. Consequently, had the Joint Intervenors submitted their motion to the Commission, the Commission would have found that the reopening standard was not met. Finally, the Commission has included a condition in the license for Unit I requiring that the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) conduct a seismic reevaluation, thus assuring that the seismic design of Diablo Canyon will be subject to continued scrutiny.
c. Finally, the Joint Intervenors allege that the Appeal Board's decision
; S. D,W.. ,% [7 f; _j. y - A(:h;j Q.[ in ALAB-811, approving the adeguacy of design of Unit 2, is not based m - . -g. s .,-.y.@ on substantial evidence and thus the Commission can have no reasona-ble assurance that Unit 2's design is consistent with Commission regula-tions. The scope of the Unit 2 verification program had been placed on the record at the hearings leading to the Board's decision in ALAB-763,
. j 19 NRC 571 (1984). The results of that program, howeser, were not ad-
^
[ .. , j dressed because it was yet ongoing at that time. In ALAB-811, the , j Board rejected the Joint Intervenors' position that this reason alone necessitated further hearings. In addition to the evidence on the scope
~. s 1 San Lws Obapo \fathersfor Peme v. .%RC. No. 84-l4l0 tMay I. l985 L 3See. e g., .Nerran Fam f.mes s. 8 mk Bad Fre.sht Senne. 397 t.:.s. 532. 540 (19'OL I
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' , .ga }%.f ;& % /_ - s _ l 1 of the Unit 2 verification program, the record contained detailed ai-dence of the extent and the results of the Unit I serilication program.
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Thus there was sufficient evidence in the record to make findings as to the adequacy of the design of Unit 2 given the sirtual identity of design
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; .' of the two units.
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& ;W.y Q&s m.i 9g@g, T In sum, the Joint Intervenors have not established that they are likely to demonstrate a lack of reasonable assurance that the seismic design is '};6F .7 g,,$$ j adequate. With respect to the other factors of the stay criteria, Joint In-
_ W,f G , ' tervenors assert that they will suffer irreparable injury because they are put at risk by full-power operation and because it may become more dif-ficult or more costly to adopt any necessary modifications to the plant. Niere exposure to risk, however, does not constitute irreparable injury if the risk, as here, is so low as to be remote and speculative and any diffi-culty or expense in adopting necessary moddications is not an injury to Joint Intervenors. N!oreover, the harm to others posed by even a short
.; .; j delay in permitting operation of a fully constructed and tested nuclear
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, " %%{; . power plant is not de minimis in terms of its economic efTect on the
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licensee and its ratepayers. The Commission has determined that there
.e M 4'sfgg![ig; . is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the operating
~, license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of y *$,Q fEEYf the public, and that such activities will be conducted in compliance with
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Commission regulations and the license. In these circumstances, the public interest lies in the use of this plant and in the orderly functioning of the regulatory process. Accordingly, the request for a stay is denied. Allegations Since 1983, the Commission has received numerous allegations
$ regarding alleged deficiencies in the desigt., construction and operation
'5-JQMit 'j . j of both units of the Diablo Canyon facility and the licensee's manage- i %?$;d - pp , 'g I ment of those activities. All allegations have been handled by the Diablo Canyon Allegation Management Program ("DCAMP") which is de-scribed in Supplements 21 and 22 to the Safety Evaluation Report ("SSER" 21 and 22). See CLI-84-13, supra 20 NRC at 273. The status
.. of allegation resolution as of July 8,1984, was reviewed in SSER 26 and a"..~ ~ ~ ^f9.15't-4 considered by the Commission prior to its authorizing the issuance of a
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full-power operating license for Diablo Canyon Unit 1. 20 NRC at 273-74. j~ cf.'~ glg;;)
. Since then DCAMP has made substantial additional progress in resolv-
?;f ing allegations. In SSER 28, the Staff reported on the status of allegations received through March 1,1985, and discussed the Staffs review of h%
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i these allegations through March 31, 1985.* The Staff's preliminary (" screening") review of all of those allegations indicated that none of
, them is of sufficient safety significance to preclude the continued opera-l tion of Diablo Canyon Unit 1 or the full-power operation of Diablo 1
Canyon Unit 2. The StafT has evaluated the allegations in sufficient
. M detail to determine that even if they ultimately prove correct, failure to
'. T.
~ ,
resolve them would not significantly affect public health and safety. SSER 28 at 4-1.5 Since making that report, the Staff, at the Commission
, meeting of August 1,1985, has updated the status of the resolution of
; pending allegations and reaffirmed its previous conclusions. Under these circumstances, the Commission finds no reason to defer full-power oper-ation of Diablo Canyon Unit 2 pending the formal resolution of the re-maining outstanding allegations.
Internal Review Program l PG&E initiated an Internal Review Program (IRP) for Diablo Canyon i UrJt 2 to determine whether concerns raised regarding Diablo Canyon
. j Unit I were applicable to Unit 2 and whether the concerns identified as being applicable to Unit 2 were resolved adequately. These concerns included all matters considered by the Independent Design Verification Program ("IDVP"), the PG&E Internal Technical Program ("ITP")
and issues raised by the NRC StafT for Unit 1. The NRC Staff has eval-usted the programmatic and technical aspects of the IRP. In addition, the StalT has independently audited and evaluated the seismic design of
; certain civil structures and systems for Diablo Canyon Unit 2.
The Staff reported the results of these evaluations in SSER 29. All but
; two items were found to have been satisfactorily completed for full-
,.- - 2 . power operation. Those two items, analysis of the shear friction along a hh, .k. bM$;dhhh.
- . (..., construction joint in the turbine building and the seismic analysis of the
~ '
, c'J,g4g pipeway, have now been completed satisfactorily.
Piping Systems and Pipe Supports The NRC has conducted a broad-based technical review and evalua-
$ " b, ;1_ , ,
tion of the design and analysis of piping systems in Diablo Canyon Unit i 4 DCAMP has been modiried to include the referra: of some alleganons to PG&E for resoluuon. The g
. 'a staffs allegauon Reuew Board reuewed PGAE's responses and has audited PGAE's resoluuons. They
.I were found to be adequate. ssER 28 at 31.
! $ of the 1665 alleganons reuewed.1407 eere found apphcable to (Jnit 2. Of those,1147 have been found rewived. Add:uonal alleganons submined by letter dated March 14. 1985, are currently being screened in accordance eith the cntena set out in the Commisuon's Pohey statement of March 19, 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. Il.030.
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, 2. The review was conducted by a special Review Team composed of
_ members of the NRC Staff and consultants from national laboratories !
;{ 1. r , 3;,,- f' V. .O ,; _ ;,.h and private companies. The purpose of this effort was: (1) to determine
- g. m.-' r M F whether safety-related piping and supports in Unit 2 had been properly by. ;e.j D.fugge g.a evaluated; and (2) whether the piping and support issues raised by Unit
. g.f A n', Mu ie p;9 cj .b,..
w I found applicable to Unit 2 had been considered and resolved.
- g. . +w..., - ,
w m s,. q 7- u. m.. The NRC Staff has reported the results of the review and evaluation 95~ y% ! yd in SSER 30. Some concerns were identified during the evaluation. All hf(}7.g"?-.Z-Q'f "J have been resolved or determined not to be of safety significance. The Review Team determined that issues which pertained to Unit I piping and pipe supports and were applicable to Unit 2 hase been satisfactorily addressed and resolved for Unit 2. Based on this evaluation, the Staff has concluded that Unit 2 meets all applicable licensing criteria in this area. C
- 1
-y ., u. . M, w. N -. Miscellaneous Matters
. m... .
, .s l';' _;.ste-4,:q in addition to the specific issues discussed above, the NRC Staff has addressed in SSER 31 twenty-one items or classes of items which were cN -egem 4 -1.a.2 W W c- n . 1:-W W & . . .
-c. h.
pertment to the low-power licensing decision on Diablo Canyon Unit 2. N .c , f! Y',?k?@h> WON As a result of that review, the Staff identified eleven items or classes of
. .s _ f3 e;g;gg6 h items requiring further action prior to a full-power operating license for
! Unit 2. The Staff now has reported that all of these items have been ad-dressed satisfactorily for the purposes of full-power operation.
Operating Experience The Staff has reported that Diablo Canyon Unit 2 for the first 2 months of operation at low power had a more favorable operating record M'M ~
~
4.
~
A g? than any other recently licensed plant operated at low power. In particu- ,
.,m lar, there were no events reportable under 10 C.F.R. { 50.72 nor was
. - n. , r m . t . ~ p , , a%t any Licensee Event Report ("LER") issued. This is to be compared with an average of eight reports under { 50.72 and seven LERs for seven recently licensed pressurized water reactors. In the last month, only two minor reportable events occurred. While this may be explained.
. . , .. 1 in part, by the fact that Unit 2 did not reach criticality during this period,
~ cc. < -n.b~
and some improvement in attention to detail may be warranted, the ex-perience to date is still excellent.
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4 333 i I ' _ _ _ b
s CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, the Commission has determined that l the full power license for Diablo Canyon Unit 2 may be issued by the Director, NRR. Joint Intervenors have requested a brief stay of the ef-fectiveness of this Order to permit the orderly processing of a request
- e. :- . o c '
for judicial review. However, PG&E has informed us by letter of July 26, 1985, that the low-power test program will not be completed until August 16, 1985. Thus, there is no need for a stay in order to assure orderly judicial review, and, accordingly, we decline to stay the effective-3 ness of this licensing decision. It is so ORDERED. For the Commiwion l
! S A51UEL J. CHILK Secretary of the Commission Dated at Washington, D.C.,
this ist day of August 1985. SEPARATE VIEWS OF CO31N11SSIONER ASSELSTINE I dissent from this Order. I would not grant PG&E a license to operate Diablo Canyon Unit 2. Sly reasons for voting against issuance of the license are the same reasons I voted against the issuance of an operating f'.:g-da;ffer Q)j license for Diablo Canyon Unit 1. Those reasons have been set out in
- ,;.t g .3 <*,c:l .j detail in CLI-84-12 and CLI 84-13 so I will not repeat them here. See i Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC 249 (1984); CLI-84-13, 20 NRC 267 (1984).
i t 183 l
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fi . , . - b _ I Cite as 22 NRC 184 (1985) C L1 85-15 tr . . . .. .;-.
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l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [ 1, . ' , e' s.J' ~ _ , [ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Wf.NL. n:...< /f-xN n ~ g'.; .
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- ~ c.~.y Ri$k -::.;-:.-*. -: g:% ..- -b
'.~~#" ^! - ! Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Tfiomas M. Roberts James K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthal Lando W. Zech, Jr.
n" .
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~
- In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-352 OL a'{e -
l
, M +.<- 50-353 OL -: s" p"; w'~-~ sw : .- .. .-
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
- Yj gr q.9 gi.g.O;g4 -
, r. _ J (Limerick Generating Station, 2, ff:NHl-,.:.4 -
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Units 1 and 2) August 8,1985 The Commission addressed all the comments raised by the Graterford inmates and found that neither these comments nor the Staff briefing raised any issues which warranted staying effectiveness of the Licensing Board's authorization for issuance of a full-power license for Limerick A-r ' *'g . Generating Station, Unit 1. Accordingly, the Commission made the au. d;%,5 jig g g@gd @ E Sa g thorization immediately effective. I
~ - ' ;wn. ~c.5.g-p ra s MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
~
e , j On July 22,1985, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Licensing Board") issued its Fourth Partial Initial Decision PPID") which re-
, solved all remaining contested issues in favor of the Licensee, Philadel-
. ,_ - j phia Electric Company ("PECo"), and authorized the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (" Director") to issue PECo a full power E
o lg 184 i l N'Y*$-N bY hE5 * ? *E
'W Y SYN
m 7 , operating license for the Limerick Generating Station Flimerick").* Comments on that PID were submitted by the inmates of the State Cor-rectional Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania (" inmates"). The Com-mission has reviewed the PID and the inmates' comments on it in ac-cordance with the criteria in 10 C.F.R. s 2.764(0(2).2 For the reasons i._ , stated below, the Commission finds no reason to stay the efTectiveness
. .a : ,.d p r of the PID.
r Q. The inmates raised both procedural and substantive concerns. First, the inmates contend that their hearing rights were infringed. They sup-port this assertion with a recitation of presious procedural rulings by the Licensing Board. The inmates' concerns in these areas were addressed by the Commission in CL1-85-ll, 21 NRC 1585 (1985), and by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board in the course of appellate resiew, ALAB-809, 21 NRC 1605 (1985). Remedial actions were taken in these decisions to protect the inmates' rights. Accordingly, the actions complained of do not serve as a basis for delaying etTectiseness. i The inmates also asserted that the expedited schedule for discovery and filing proposed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw in the recent {
, hearing violated their rights unde the NRC regulations. However, the record shows that the inmates agreed to this schedule in a telephone ,
conference before commencement of discovery (Tr. 20,722-47) and did not express any objections until the hearings were under way (Tr. 20,902). Therefore, we believe they have waived any objection on this issue.3 The inmates also contended that the Licensing Board erred in rejecting seseral of the bases supporting their contention. The inmates submitted one general contention with eight bases. The Licensing Board admitted the contention but limited the hearing to two of the stated bases. The ,~C . c s ' Tb"-{ y'.
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i By a previo s Memorandum. CLI-85-13,22 NRC i (1985). the Commission addressed the Licenuns Board's second and Third PIDs and determmed that nothing m the decimons or the comments of Limer-3
" "
- ick Leology Action marra'ited staymg the effectiseness of those deciuons. Nothing m this Order modifies
! those conctuuons.
2 The cr:teria m 6 2 '64f fH 2HO are a the gravity of the substanuse mue
- b. the hkel. hood that it was decided in.orrectly below.
- c. the degree to which correct resoluuon of the nsue would be prefudned by operanon pendmg j review, arid i J other relevant public mierest factors.
3 Inmates also alleged that these ruhngs, taken as a group, demonstrate that tre Licenung Board was m. herent!y preJudased and. therefore, demed the mmates a faer and impartial hearms pursuant to 10
; C.F R. ) 2.718 If a party deems a member of a licensms board to be disquahfied, the party may mose i that member to dnquahfy h:mself.10 C F.R. ( 2.704(ct such a motion must be supported by atTidavits settmg forth the alleged grounds for disquahficauon / bid These requirements are necessarv because of the seriouwen of such al!cgations The inrnates have not indicated which member or members they be.
bese are pren. diced have not mosed the member or mem%ers to disquahfy themselves and hase not surmrted their aueganons with alTidauts Therefore, this mue is not prcperty before the Commiwon i 185 CL % d S EUElbEMh 3 N hhk2bbSINIUdMMA. e : 4_ # . w i i o-
1 3 , .o . other bases were rejected during the prehearing process for failure to satisfy the requirements in 10 C.F.R. s 2.714.* We have reviewed the j N , Licensing Board's decision on these matters and, for the reasons stated below, find no reason to stay effectiveness.
. The inmates contended that the commercial telephone system might be overloaded during an emergency, and, therefore, would be unavaila-t ;
' N.[ ; O A.j ; -
-> ble to call up oft-duty guards needed to etTect evacuation of the prison.
Accordingly, the inmates asserted that a backup system was required. This argument was rejected during the prehearing process as not raising
, a material safety issue suitable for evidentiary hearing. Our review of the
, RERP indicates that the Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections (Bureau) has the capability of sending guards to Graterford from other correctional institutions. Such guards could be transported in the same buses which will be used to effect evacuation. It therefore appears that even if the off-i duty guards from Graterford cannot be mobilized, other guards will be available to aid in any evacuation. Therefore, while we express no opin-
. ion regarding the suitability of this issue for hearing, the issue is not suf-ficiently grave to warrant delay in efTectiveness.
The inmates also asserted that the medical arrangements in the event of an accident were inadequate. The Board provided an extensive expla-nation to indicate why the inmates' assertion lacked basis. Under the Commission's Emergency Planning Policy Statement, 50 Fed. Reg. 20.892 (1985) the Commission can find that it was sufficient for the Licensee to prepare a list of area hospitals capable of treating contaminat-ed injured individuals, and for the Licensee to commit itself to comply with the Commission's upcoming response to the decision in Guard v. NRC 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir.1985). The Commission so finds. The i Bureau has a list of hospitals and has agreements with a number of hospitals which are accredited. Such accreditation requires a capability of
@$ @ treating contaminated injured individuals. Under these circumstances, G5.@hMM~O ~
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~
the Board's treatment of this issue does not raise a substantive issue of sufficient gravity to warrant a delay in effectiveness. The inmates contended that the Licensing Board applied the wrong burden of proofin rejecting several issues for hearing. In particular, the inmates cite the handling of their contention that there is no reasonable 4 These bases were' IIl the telephone system would be overburdened dunns an emergency, impairing the ability to recall ofr-duty guards to efrect evacuation; O) the Correctional OfGcers Union did not pro-vide input into the Radiological Emergency Response Plan iRERP); O) the medical arrangements were denczent; (4) the laboratenes which will assist m monitonns the plume were not identiGed m the e R ERP; f D the cierase of the Graterford RER P did not test required scenanos and did not identify the Graterford officia:s by name. and to# he RER P will not present the spontaneous evacuation of the guards or inmates. 1
-l' 186 i
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assurance that the emergency plan for Graterford will prevent a sponta-neous evacuation of the guards or inmates. The inmates object to the Board's assumption that the guards would do their duty and that the in-4 mates would be restrained from evacuating spontaneously. Ilowever, we
,- do not read this " assumption" as necessarily the sole reason for the Board's rejecting the issue for hearing. The basis proffered by the in-
- ' r[ , mates for hearing this issue consisted of a list of past incidents at Grater-ford prison. However, none of the incidents contained any indication l
that the guards deserted or the inmates spontaneously evacuated. Ac-
' cordingly, in our preliminary view, the inmates did not appear to otter adequate support for the issue that they sought to litigate. Under our rules, intervenors have the burden of providing reasonably specific issues and bases for litigating those issues.10 C.F R. t 2.714(b). Based on our prelimmary reuew we cannot conclude that the Licensing Board erred in rejecting this i3 sue.
We have also reviewed the Licensing Board's decision on the two i bases which were admitted for adjudication. These were claims that: (1) there was not reasonable assurance that civilian bus and ambulance
, drivers would be otTered training; and (2) the estimated time for evacua-tion of the Graterford Institution is unrealistically low. For the reasons l discussed below, we find that the Licensing Board's decision on these
; matters does not present issues which warrant a stay of etTectiveness.
- In their efTectiveness comments, the inmates do not challenge the ade-quacy of the offer of training, but now state that because no bus compa-nies hase responded to the Pennsyhania Emergency Management Au-thoritis ("PEM A") April 4,1985 letter offering to train their employ-ees, the Licensing Board was wrong in linding reasonable assurance that such training will, in fact, occur. Inmates could have raised this issue in a timely manner before the Licensing Board. Having failed to do so, we also consider whether this information would warrant reopening the
~ E!M28DN f 52$4j$M record. It would not. As the inmates note in their comments, PEM A has ED ' E. N ;f,T @ ]
' :ommitted to visit personally all the bus and ambulance companies to
' encourage their drivers to accept the training. In addition, the RERP states that there will be trained Bureau personrel on each bus, so the sole function of the civilian drivers is to drive, which is their normal
- occupation. Accordingly, this matter does not warrant a stay of efTectiveness.
As for the estimated time for evacuation, the inmates contend that methodology used in compiling the estimate was inaccurate. In support of this assertion the inmates' expert, Major John Case, testified that the evacuation could just as easily be 12 to 20 hours instead of the 8 to 10 hours derised by the Bureau of Corrections, but that if the Bureau 187
'N 6b Y?$!] $hh S. e, ' _- , _ _ _ _ _ __
. c i.. _ ,
included a description of the esents during a radiolog. cal emergency in the inmate handbook, the Bureau's estimate was as good as any. Tr.
, 20,9h. The Bureau has committed itself to providing this description.'
The inmates' other major basis for asserting that the ETE is inaccurate is that it does not consider a combination of the etTects of a general
~
panic, severe weather conditions and radiological contamination due to
, ;,- adverse wind direction, and instead assumes ideal conditions. An NRC StatT consultant who participated in preparation of NUREG-0654 testi-
~ .)i fied as a Staff witness that no such worst-case estimate was intended to be met for the ETE. He further explained that the ETE is used to assist decisionmakers in choosing appropriate action. Therefore, an estimate based on a rare combination of conditions would not accomplish this purpose and, in fact, could lead to an erroneous protective action deci-sion. The record also retlects that the ETE was derned from the actual time it took transportation vehicles to trasel the same routes in a sariety
, of conditions, including ram and snow. Therefore, based on our prelimi-
~
) nary review we cannot conclude that the Licensing Board erred as to ap-
; prosal of the 8- to 10-hour estimate. Howeser, the NRC Staff should ensure that the ETE is inserted in the emergency plan.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission believes that a stay of the
! effectiveness of the Licensing Board's Fourth PID is not warranted. This conclusion is based on a preliminary review, and is without prejudice to the Appeal Board's review of any of the issues pending before it, or to any further review by the Commission itself.
The Commission has also been briefed by the NRC StatT on the resiew of the uncontested issues for Unit 1 and is satisfied that the ac-tivities to be authorized by the operating license for Unit I can be con-ducted without endangering the health and safety of the public and that
..; . . the actisities will be conducted in compliance with NRC regulations and
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'F3 q the terms of the license. Accordingly, the Commission authorizes the
. Director to issue to PECo a full-power operating license for the Limerick
.a. ...a. rg, -c - -
Generating Station, Unit 1. At the Commission's meeting today, August 8,1985, Limerick Ecolo-gy Action, an intersenor in this proceeding, orally requested the Com-mission to stay the issuance of the operating license for 14 days to allow time forjudicial review. PECo has had a low power license to operate up to 5% of rated power since October 1984. To increase operation to the 5 The inmates hase nserted that this dewriptwn would not be adequate became 60% of the pnpulation
. 3 1s ilhierate and another 10% only speaks spannh The inmates did nni raise this issue before the Lwens.
ing Board despite the opportunity to do so. Therefore, raising tNs new nsenion at this time invokes the NRC's reopenirg trtena They do not appe.r to oc rnet here stereoser. inere is nothing offered to sug. gest why :se inmaro cannot get wmeone to read the mformanen to them or retene the informat.on in thC esem flan e'PergeDiy Wa the Instituhon's pubhc addren Wem and dosed-circutt teloismn 188
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I l 4 1 i 1 ! rate of full power authorized by today's Order will entail a gradual proc- l ess of power ascension and testing over a period of months, and the ex- ,
., y ' , ' .
-f pectation is that to complete the testing to exceed 20% of rated power will take approximately 11 days. The public health and safety risks of these low levels of power are far less than the theoretical risks of full- l
. . .. A.- $ .. _, . c .
power operation. Nor is the level of contamination which results from
~~
.- ca l?. :c i f such levels of operation signi0cantly different than those associated
"' with, and already reached as a result of, Lic.erick's low-power operation.
Aforeover, in the event that a stay is sought and ordered by a court, the utility can reverse this process and reduce power levels to below the 5% j i level. LEA has ofTered nothing to balance against these facts. Storeover, I I LEA has not provided any legal arguments which would support a stay or made us aware of any signincant legal issues that a reviewing court . j _ might have to resolve with regard to any judicially requested stay. I r Accordingly, this Order is being made immediately effective by the
! l' Commission.
i Commissioner Asselstine's separate views, concurring in the result, j are attached. .i - It is so ORDERED. , l For the Commission * ! 4 1 4 i S AhlUEL J. CHILK Secretary of the Commission l i Dated at Washington, D.C., t y August M81 b;;J.$.$392KM E db2.N.% g DC h; ..x-W 8: . .w n.w n:GrQ9 TCd2.Qe . 4 %C9 SEPARATE VIEWS OF COhlallSSIONER ASSELSTINE i f ! t f i concur in the result of the Commission's order, but not in the sub- ' I stance. I do not agree with some of the Commission's reasoning which is intended to bolster a less than perfect Licensing Board decision. flow-i ever, none of the issues is signiGcant enough that I would vote to pre- ! - i vent the issuance of a license pending completion of the merits review I ! ! 1 i i 6 Chairman Palladino mas not present to vote on this Memorandum and order. ! e i ,1
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of the initial decision. Further, I would have included in the order a brief " housekeeping" stay to permit an orderly application for judicial
, ~ '
I review of the Commission's decision. 4
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! l l l l i s Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal ' l, Boards issuances ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL PANEL 1 AJan S. Rosenthat. Chairman Dr. W. Reed Johnson , s c. ~e Chnstine N. Kohl l Gary J. Edies [ l or. R, nae t. coteny Howard A. WWber 1 i ca J g 's u; i 0-1 Q. 4 i . i I '
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Cite as 22 NRC 191 (1985) ALAB 814
.., ~ . . , -.
-_'..' ,i. , . . c g. , - ;,7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
,, l 2 .' , J -d u,-.
_. u, y :e. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 44 -s v 0 [MpyB'if lQ. I7,,:.g,.3.. u ; I'%?fd}hh2
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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD Administrative Judges: Christine N. Kohl, Chairman Gary J. Edles Dr. Reginald L Gotchy
, in the Matter of Docket Nos. 50 352 0L
. -v. 50 353 0L
, j , . 9 ;p .u . .c. - , c ,
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PHILADELPHI A ELECTRIC COMPANY
^ 4. 'O - ' '
(Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2) August 13,1985 The Appeal Board denies intersenors' motion for a stay of the Licens.
; ing Board's partial initial decision resolving the last contested issues in this operating license proceeding and authorizing the Director of Nuclear
. ,. . . . . .:- ..3 .. .; .. Reactor Regulation to issue a full power license for the Limerick facility.
,n . y - , ic c ,. , . r. , 0
.) {
RULES OF PRACTICE: STAY OF AGENCY ACTION (CRITERIA) The first criterion for a stay is a strong showing that the moving party
; is likely to prevail on the merits. A stay motion must also address three j other factors: whether the movant will be irreparably harmed in the ab-sence of a stay; whether the grant of a stay would harm any other party; and where the public interest lies.10 C.F.R. ( 2.788(e).
4 191
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RULES OF PRACTICE: STAY OF AGENCY ACTION s (CRITERIA)
, , g...,
A party's failure to address the stay criteria set out in 10 C.F.R.
' , - { 2.788(e) may result in summary denial of a stay motion. See Public
- r. .s , '
N, Service Co. of /ndiana (Marble liill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 ,
~- and 2), ALAB-493,8 NRC 253,270 71 (1978).
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. i
)
l RULES OF PRACTICE: IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS OF
! DECISION DIRECTING ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LICENSE i Under the "immediate effectiveness" rule, unless the Commission otherwise directs, an immediate effectiveness determination by the Commission is without prejudice to the Appeal Board's determination of a stay motion pursuant to 10 C.F.R. ) 2.788(e), or an appeal on the merits pursuant to (( 2.762 and 2.785, or in any subsequent proceeding.
10 C.F.R. { 2.764(g). RULES OF PRACTICEt STAY OF AGENCY ACTION (TIMELINESS OF REQUEST) An application for a stay must be Oled within ten days of service of the decision for which a stay is requested.10 C.F.R. j 2.788(a). i RULES OF PRACTICE: STAY OF AGENCY ACTION
; (CRITERIA) i _ . . . _ . - . In a motion for a stay, when attempting to show likelihood of prevail- 'JGrMG?4p_
i ' ing on the merits, it is not sufncient simply to state confidence or an ex- i d N h.e.6 M..N- (:f-{Y..
~, , . -
if qwn M M.pectation of ultimate success. Metropohtan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit I), CLI 3417,20 NRC 801,804 05 (1984). i RULES OF PRACTICE: STAY OF AGENCY ACTION
., (CRITERIA)
. . . ....s.
- ~-l ' * ~ ~.,l ~
irreparable harm is often the most important factor in determining the
; need for a stay; a party must reasonably demonstrate, not merely allege, such harm. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I and 2),
4- * - " 4 ALAB-794,20 NRC 1630,1633 35 (1984).
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A PPE AR ANCES
,! Robert L. Anthony, Stoylan, Pennsylvania,intervenor pro se and for in-
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J tervenor Friends of the Earth.
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, ' ~ ';*; t#?f Troy B. Conner, Jr., and Robert 31. Rader, Washington, D.C., for ap-
^- plicant Philadelphia Electric Company.
Benjamin II. Vogler for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
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_ ., i - $'/-7:2{ . By petition filed August 1,1985, intervenors Robert L. Anthony / vf
.1 rW %i Friends of the Earth (Anthony / FOE) seek a stay of the Licensing
*<m+.67.di$ Board's fourth partial initial decision (PID), LBP 85 25, 22 NRC 101
_ ,, y .F M , p f g g . (1985). That decision, which addresses the last two contested issues in a this proceeding (relating to the emergency plan for the State Correctional
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Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania), authorizes the Directer of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to issue a full power operating license for the Limerick facility to applicant Philadelphia Electric Compa-ny (PECo). Intervenor Air and Water Pollution Patrol supports the stay request while PECo and the NRC staff oppose it. As explained below, l we deny the stay.I l
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; The first criterion for a stay is a strong showing that the moving party is likely to prevail on the merits.10 C.F.R. % 2.788(e)(1). In an attempt to show this, Anthony / FOE claim that the Licensing Board could not properly authorize the Director of NRR to issue an operating license for
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Limerick because several matters that require Board findings prior to -
. .,y Y. [.. N 7,Y...'.? .' r . I The Graierford inmates. also intersenors in this proceeding. pressously sought a stay or the Board's
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rourth PID Because they failed to address the stay criteria set forth in the Commission's Rules or Prac.
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tice.10 C F R. t 2 788(e). me summarily denied that motion in .n unpublished order issued August 1. 1945 See fuNu sense Ca of Im/,ana (Marcie itill Nuclear Generating stavon. l.!niis I and 21
. AL AB-M). 8 SRC 25). 270.?l (1978L
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license issuance remain outstanding. In this regard, intervenors identify
, ,, four matters.
x, .s y:- - '; First, they argue that both the fourth (LBP-85 25) and third 1 (LBP 85-14,21 NRC 1219 (1985)) PIDs are legally flawed because they
! do not consider 44 C.F.R. 6 350.7(b). The pertinent portion of this regu-3-
. d lation, promulgated by the Federal Emergency Stanagement Agency
. , ', .- .-i. 1 (FE5fA), requires the exact size and configuration of the emergency
,7 '
?j planning zone (EPZ) around a nuclear power plant to be determined by i state and local governments in consultation with FEhlA and the NRC.
Second, Anthony / FOE direct our attention to an appeal they now have pending before FEhtA. They express confidence that FENIA will agree with their arguments and withdraw its previous approval of the entire emergency plan for Limerick, including the portion involving the Grater-ford facility. They contend that the withdrawal of FENI A's approval would significantly undercut the Licensing Board's fourth PID. Third, 4 Anthony / FOE believe that they will also succeed on another appeal j pending before us - that involving the Licensing Board's June 4,1985, denial of Anthony / FOE's motion to reopen the record on a recent PECo effluent release report. Fourth, intervenors refer to three appeals they assertedly have pending before the Commissicn concerning a variety of topics. Again, they are confident about their likelihood of prevailing on l
, these matters and contend that no license can issue until they are resolved.
A stay motion must also address three other factors: whether the movant will be irreparably harmed in the absence of a stay; whether the grant of a stay would harm any other party; and where the public interest lies.10 C.F.R. ( 2.788(e)(2), (3), (4). Anthony / FOE argue generally that they will be harmed by the danger of accidents, routine releases,
. radioactive waste, and economic losses if Limerick is licensed. They also NINhi$hidN@fh[M)g , 9 7qmq pr.
Mj claim that PECo's stockholders would be harmed in the short rt n by a 3 WJ stay, but would benefit eventually. Lastly, they assert that a stay would e ' v we q. orgy.G:c,. serve the public interest by avoiding rate increases that allegedly would result from the licensing of the facility. j B.
- 1. As a threshold argument, PECo contends that we do not have the l .
authority even to consider Anthony / FOE's petition for stay, in light of
- '.; ', .q. _ . , _,.c the Commission's recent decision to make effective immediately th
i RN #- fourth PID and to issue the full power license for Limerick Unit 1. { Licensee's Opposition to Petition by Friends of the Earth (August 9, i 1985) at 2,5. See CLI.8515,22 NRC 184 (1985). PECo's argument is 1 . .M@% BENVil2.' }.' .!' M D N-M M
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without merit. The Commission's action in CL1-85-15 was espheitly pur-suant to its so called "immediate effectis en ess" rule, 10 C F.R. j s 2.764(f)(2). See CLI 85-15,22 NRC at 185. Under this regulation, [ulnless the Commission otherwise espiscitly so directs in its immediate cif ectne-
' ' ^
2 .
, ness determination, no comment made in the course of the opinien or statement re-s ,s decting that determination is to be gnen any weight by the . . Appeal Board m its
, ' gi y4C conuderation of either a stay motion pursuant to ( 2.788(ep or an appeal on the
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,, . ;c ; ., x yf l' EQ ments pursuant to 99 2.762 and 2.785, or in any subsequent formal adrudication The Commission's e:Tectneness determination n enorelv without prejudice to such consideration in subsequent proceedings. 10 C F R. s 2.764(g). The Commission reiterates this mandate in CLI-85-15 itself,22 NRC at 186. The particular cases upon wh ch PLCo rehe3 to support its siew are inapposite. Indeed, seseral months ago in one of the proceedings etted i (Shoreham), the Commissmn authorized a Licensing Board decision to
. become immediately effectise, but nine days later the Appeal Board -
resiewing an appeal from the same Licensing Board decision on the merits - reversed and sacated that decision in part, as well as the corre-h
'u; sponding hcense authorization. See Lonx /5/and Lichtme Co. (Shoreham i . , . . .
q Nuclear Power Station), CLi-85-1, 21 NRC 275 (1985); Lonx Island l .fS Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), AL AB-800, 21 NRC 386. 392 98 (1985). Thus, there is no impediment to our consider-i ation of Anthony / FOE's petition for stay.
- 2. None of the reasons Anthony / FOE adsance in support of their stay reque3t has merit. In the Grst place. arguments concerning the
. Licensing Board's third PID (for example, those relating to FEM A's comphance with 44 C.F.R. s 350 7(b)4 and June 4 denial of reopening l on the effluent release report are far too late. Under 10 C.F.R.
s 2.788(a), an application for a stay must be filed within 10 days of serv-9-).M., . -$ . . ..@,. .I gN y;, .7.pqN uI
" M' ice of the decision for which a stay is requested. Anthony / FOE hase !
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. . , .t r p, , provided no good cause for their tardiness and no compelhng reason for our scrutiny of either decision in connection with this request to stay the I
Board's fourth PID.6 l
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erg the GraiertorJ faulay rhus, snthenn/f(4 i argur eni about i E sl s regwation session 3(il 'f 5s Can IOgicdely be rJWed Only in Cofi)untilon eith the lac 0 Mfg Omrd 4 mOf L0mpff hf %n f Of f1HC
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! PID n dnoted prmersdv io this mue ser semon,if ()E Br>ci f kne 6. iq $1, pawm
) Trmer prn. i.erend La av huon. aid omdv sceit a sta. of the Hwns s third PiO *hnh was i hwed sin 2. lW we dented tha moUon m sl % H.M 21 NPC i W e iH(I i
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t As for the three matters Anthony / FOE claim to hase pending before 1 the Commission and on which they expect to prevail, none concerns
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any matter now before us on appeal. We are only generally aware of their content and cannot properly speculate as to how they might ulti-mately be decided.' Anthony / FOE's argument that an operating license
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for Limerick cannot be issued until these matters are disposed ofis thus
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more properly directed to either the Commission itself or the Director of NRR. 1 Anthony / FOE's remainmg argument is only peripherally related to the discrete emergency planning issues addressed in the Licensing Board's fourth PID (i.e., the training for Graterford's civilian emergency evacuation personnel and the esacuation time estimate for the Grater-ford facility).' This claim - that FENI A will withdraw its approval of the entire Limerick offsite emergency plan - is highly speculatise and thus
; cannot serve as a basis for a stay. If FESIA were to take such action, however, this would be a signiGcant new development that would likely warrant further action by the appropriate NRC olGcials at that time.
Anthony / FOE have therefore failed to make the required strong show. ing that they are likely to prevail on the merits of their appeal. See also note 5, supra. It is not enough simply to state confidence or an expecta-tion of success before this or any other forum. Metropohtan Edison Co. (Three Slite Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI 84-17s 20 NRC 801, 804-05 (1984). Intervenors' arguments on the other three stay factors are similarly generalized and unconvincing. Especially insofar as irrepara-ble harm - often the factor accorded the greatest weight - is con. i cerned, a party must reasonably demonstrate, not merely allege, such harm. See Duac Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I and 2), ALAB-794. 20 NRC 1630,1633 35 (1984L Anthony / FOE have failed
. ~eer, to meet their burden of proving that a stay of the Board's fourth PID is A *- 'QdhMW,-g s,?.;[g y M D ' M Q [G58 d j y ywarranted.
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- The Commimon has referred t n of these matters (concermos PECo's request for various esemp.
I tionst to NR R for initial dispownon Sn Order of July 24. 1995 f unpuhinhedi, Order of August 8,
, 1985 (unpublisheds. The third siem. relaung to Anthony / FOE's requeu for revocation of PECo's inw.
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- Power operating imense, was recently denied in a lengthy decision by the Detector of SRR and is pend.
ins Comrnission reuew Sn D0 4511,22 NRC 149 (1945p 8 f t does not art, car that Anthony / FOE were partwirants in this : art of the proseedans Thus there is a QJt%Ilon as to .4f*ihonv/ ROE's right to arecat arid to seen a star of the fourth PID w e need not decide that issue noe. homeber, but me enpett all the Farbes sonterned to address 'his matter in their brief s on the rnerits
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w , Anthony / FOE's motion 'or a st f of LBP 85 25 is denied. It is so ORDERED. Ji'[,,,[k.I.f.'.[NI.5f.5[
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FOR Tile APPEAL B0ARD
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Cite as 22 NRC 198 (1985) ALAB.815
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
't NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. l
, , ATOMlC SAPETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD
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Adminletrative Judges: Gary J. Edles, Chairman Dr. W. Reed Johnson Christine N. Kohl in the Matter of Docket No. 60 289.SP (Management Phase) METROPOLITAN EDISON COMP ANY, .
, et al.
(Three Mile leland Nucleet Station, Unit No.1) August 29,1985 The Appeal floard dentes intervenor's motion to reopen the record
, for further hearing in the management phase of this restart proceeding, concluding that the motion is not timely and does not demonstrate that
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.N.. been considered initially, i RULES OF PRACTICEt REOPENING OF RECORD in order to succeed, a motion to reopen a record must be timely .ind
,', address a significant safety or environmental issue, it must also show l that a different result might have been reached had the newly proffered material been considered initially. l.oualana foarr a 1.teht Co. (Water.
ford Steam Electric Station, Unit J), ALAll.786, 20 NRc inet invo (l980.
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o ;j , . g ., pey ,,4 ..s . - l l RULES OF PRACTICE: REOPENING OF RECORD i A year delay between the time information was made asailable to the
, . . i o y, . , - parties and the time of filing a motion to reopen ordinanly renders such ;
i :- - - a motion untimely. See, e.g., Pacyle Gas and Electric Co (Diablo Canyon
* ' - Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2), ALAll 775,19 NRC 1361,1369, n,N,i.
aff'J sub nom. San Luis Obispo .\fothersfor Peace v. NRC, 75l F.2d 1287
. g. ~ F .; u .( .. (D.C. Cir.1984), vacatcJ in part and reh*g en banc granted on other Q ;. l9.'.
- -?, ~'; y, _j.- grounds, 760 F.2d 1320 (l985); Loutstana Poner and Light Co. (Water-ford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB 753,18 NRC 1321,1325 i
n.3(1983). I i
; i RULES OF PRACTICE: REOPENING OF RECORD in assessing the timeliness requirement of a motion to recren the !
record, the question is not whet;ter a licensing board is still receiving est-dence on an issue to which the new information relates at the time the information comes to the movet's attention, but rather, whether the in-
' - formation could have been submitted earlier. .tictropohtan Edison Co.
, (Three Stile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), CLI 85 8, 21 NRC lill,1114 & n 3 (1985); l'ermont ranAce Nuclear Poner Corp. (Ver.
y s' 5 ~ ' , ,' ' mont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB 138,6 AEC 520,523 n.12 (1973). APPEARANCES i Louise Hradford, llarrisburg, Pennsylvania, for intersenor Three Stile
!sland Alert,Inc.
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Deborah B. Hauser, Washington, D.C., for licensee hietropolitan ;
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j , .. Edison Company. I Lois R. Finkelstein and Stary E. Wagner for the Nuclear Regulatory ! Commmion staf f. l SIEMORANDU51 AND ORDER
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We have before us a motion filed by intersenor Three Stile Island Alert, Inc. (TNllA), to reopen the record for further hoaring in the I i
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.u management phase of thn restart proseeding ' The motion rehes on sescral pieces of awertedly new information said to bear on the central issue of management competence and integrity.'
First, D11 A cites to both a draft and the final scruon of an August 1979 !ctter to the NRC from former Three Nide Island (Thil) Station Slanager Gary \liller, certifying that a keensee employee, James it Floyd (designated "VV"), had succcufully completed the requalification program; the draft letter is accompamed by a memorandum from Stdier askmg the licensee's counsel to reuew the draft. TNilA aho presents a copy of a Nosember 1979 apphcation filed by VV for renewal of his l senior reactor operator's beense, with an accompan> lng certificate of competence ugned by Stiller VV's templetion of the requahtication pro-gram .md subsequent certificatioa to the NRC were the sublect of con. uderable attennon before the Licensing floard. INil \ awerts that VVN Sosember 1979.ippheation for hcense renewal and the letter and memo-tandum relating to the requahlication were releaseJ to the parties for the first time in $1 arch of thn year as attachments to an Ofike of Insestiga-tions (01) report. It argues that this information shows that the beensee failed tc take appropriate action msofar as VV was concerned. Sccond, ThilA prosides copics of an emergency procedures reuew esamination taken by VV and another employee deugnated "O"in Stay 1979. These purportedly rescal an additional instance of cheating, not
, made pubhe untd June 1984, when the hcensee released the tests to a grand jury. TNil A contends that the beensee's carher " withholding" of this information is esidense of the hcensee's lask ofintegrits.
Under the of t stated test for reoremng a record, a motion fMutt be timely alkl ddJrett 4 sign lhant 5)lely of entif onfMental attut h mJetalH1 show 'hst a different f(tutt fn ght have been fra hc.j had the niety profferti mate-f14] Df th tonskjf f td initidily 8
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, id'dJ 't MI A e Nnet in brimet of og M.nmn in fisopen the p ts nej fof tog Nernge of pe,tmeg Ad.le IpsM41 l Afyrfrielis 4 ' liolft aff daigJ and efft gerged May ]), l'it) and egnh(t is peg.Ratta $ of toft wea4the. es refer la the dosumen't at " r Mi s 4 M. hoa ' ani " r Ml % s Rnef" en.1 surri, me me"4 fed ( Piem bf f 9 E ruf t h$ l'les k gf 9edPd trf IIIS fhandif Mf M t [*hil4 8 tf IPh4 tl% s el lt**% f f.l#g e#F f r 9f 6f i!> ( t t II 'O ll SB C tilt. 41. A BEJ,19 Npr liC f l*t48, ser.t e twe ( ll 4 9 2. Il SPC 2011198 4, L DP e) %
le N RC Ill 1198]l. ! NP tl ll,14 NMC 18111981) 8 see A L A R ? '1.19 % p C at 12 3d 8 I < , ,e# N e* .0 ( .e dit ( is a w 4ev,r ., i Osam l wim si in a l u j i, g [ g in 'n ] N il( toq' lut9 g l gen M l
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9 We conclude that the motion is not timely and. 'n addition, does not demonstrate that a ddTerent result might hase been reached had the 3 .
. d e4 i N: proffered material been considered initially. That bems so, we deny the
;~. '. request to reopen the record.'
lhllA's motion is substantially out of time. As the bcensee s , A,
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-. t, P , points out, the documents (or, in one case, a handwritten version) included in the 01 Report and relied upon here by TNilA were part of b V % gg ,M y $.n,;fy,il4
- v. y ;.s, h, the so called Speaker Report, which the licensee released to the parties sy
' over two years ago in hlarch 1983.6 Indeed, drafts of the August 1979 ,
letter to the NRC from Gary Stiller and the memorandum from hiiller to licensee's counsel, far from being newly rescaled mformation, werc
! actually introduced into evidence in Nosember*1931 by T.tf/A as its Ex-hibit 73 and were the subject of TNil A's crowesamination during the course of the earlier proceedmg.' Thus, the material contained m the 01 Report could easily hne been submitted - and,in one instance, was ae.
tually submitted - durinit the course of the hearing.
- > With respect to the 1979 emergency procedures tests. Thil A concedes that they were made available to the parties by the licensee in June
; ' ,, s . . . 1984, almost a year before this motion was filed.' Such delay in tender.
Ing new information ordinarily renders a motion to reopen untimely.'
, g~ f ,, , , '. TMIA attempts to justify its tardiness in submitting this information by noting simply that the Licensing floard was no longer receiving evidence
- 4 e noio .ee,e me monon re . in p.,i en .nr4,m. ,,.a werwa.a. u are', . s . ..e io?+ teii.e en ne c.mm,u,va ,eno ,, w. .-riem a a me re c.cawn r*er m ain esia'n no ih' m.ner ini-ti.ly. iH Laeneans llo.tJ tonsl aea tP.i uset = .t'i. Pense. ine snee . = h.a mde . rn.iene
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from t r9.t L s!..e, Jr e M arsn 14. let)s na r n.innre thernnet. "lne.et Repe et1 rne see..er seco,i ... prep.,n o t ra sense .n anwaer .on me n.,n.M co. reann,i..e . .ir e or
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e s,, Tr 24,412 61 e tuwe won o 2 su Name m me hmmm.<>n. Arn i to.ed, t.ea s enca .na r.<w. it u t. lessi .no si,eciemeni ie is.n. i, ine soine m me femi.mn. An.a no.,a, Laen. ins m Sn.td ena rathe. il.no I,19 48
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on cheatmg at the time TMI A obtained the mlormation '" ilut ThilA muconce'ses the timchnew requirement. The question is not whether a board is still recessing esidence on an issue to which the new informa-tion relates at the time the information comes to the movant's attention.
- (Indeed, motions to reopen the record willinvariably insolse the prolTer i of information that would hase been considered at an earlier stage of a
, l proecedmg.) The critical question is whether the information could have been submitted cather." In this case the answer is yes. TMI A's justifica-
,].
tion for having faded to tender the O and VV emergency procedures tests for almost a year is thus insufficient "
- 11. The Licenung lloard and the Special Master resiewed scores of allegations as part of a wide ranging eumination of management compe.
tence and integrity. Among the matters esprenly conudered during the course of the proceeding were Miller's August 19N certification of VV's succeuful completion of the requahtie.ition program'" cheatmg on , hcensee .idministered cuminations, including the collaboration of O and VV (although not their collaboration on the particular examin.ition attached to TMl A's motion)4'8 and management's response to the cheat-ing incidents, including its response to VV's cheaung." We are fully utisfied that the information tendered by TMI A, even if timely present.
; ed, would not have produced a different result in the Board's resolution i of these matters.
I. TMI A anerts that despite its earlier request for all documents t related to cheating, the hcensee withheld the 19M emergency procc-dures resiew cuminations until forced to release them to . grand jury. It argues that the tests were graded m 19N, so the tr.iining department
.s... l' f Mt A e stoima u 2 iMis ei.o uces m. 01... intec s une e ice' thecine inodens intohias o
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'I W e no*e in a4: non. that in lu re 144 4*l asa a en ser'e+>er itte, se Part of ist jel heranont bei t in$ loetr 14 f.ndi residfl detitio8% the ( serp *ittm89 e trinitly 18ttlie.l lhe peri et l in hhPg til all ellerI8 sort S ft y b4f ett*49ed Pnellert lhel needed (d be elf kired befof e 4 fenol detttson LOuld be tr)4Je see j L LI 84-18. 2t) %RC qu418944s, Oriter of jwne 1,1944 f ueputibiheJe et 2 rMi g tutirmited tomments I
In fenprings la heitti of the rumtmessun't tarief t hut &J mot refef in the fnettert now intludeti ' A lit rri r>t ion IMt 4 Rete => rite en June : (pr<ter f July 2A ie84p. rMig pensente to Cornemstion ()rder of sersemher ll. l944 ((htoher 9.1994) Osten the romfmet.<*n t esprett tabt stelmn of %te el de id what fetadert femeined for fetesivison. {Ml( h4J g heighte8 tea DN'gshon to tal'Ivett til felet $rld preteni afiy 4 Mee metter$ that migstq heaf on the gotterg igwettson
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must hase known about this additional incident of cheatingT The licen-
' see indicates, howeser, that the tests were not reviewed earlier because of an agreement with ThllA not to proside exams prior ta 1980 unless
' , ' ' " , - { ,j 4l.y?M E' ' they insolved a known incident of misconduct. It maintains that the tests here at issue were discosered only when it began a document
^
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2?/m- ;- y review in connection with the later grand jury investigation of VV.i8 1,; 3 ,'., ,,, g . , 7
,# . - This added illustration of cheating by 0 and VV on a licensee-administered test would not have alTected any pertinent Licensing Board e Av 4'Mt 3DNM.5.; ,
- y: -
pi *. conclusion on the cheating itself. In reaching its determination regarding management integrity, the Board explicitly decthed to conclude that all possible cheating had been revealed.8'It was fully aware, moreover, that the licensee's training department was not entirely an innocent bystand-er; that department, after all, had assigned VV a passing score on a por. tion of his requal:Geation cum although Supersisor of Training Richard Zechman was aware thal O had contributed to VV's cum and had dis-
! cussed the matter with Stiller." What was clear - and what was deci-sionally signi0 cant - was that the administration of the licensce's testing program was quite lax.25 Any further esidence of cheating, including the training department's possible knowledge and concealment of such s cheating, would not hase materially altered that conclusion.22 insofar as ThllA contends that the licensee improperly withheld this information and did not fully respond to its discovery request, we cannot de0nitively determine why the additionalincident of cheating by 0 and VV was not brought to public attention earlier. The discovery papers and licensee's argument here are ambiguous.D Other factors, however, lead us to conclude that the twensee's failure to produce the tests earlier was likely inadsertent and, in any esent, would not hase al-tered any previous lloard Ondings.
l'or one thing, as the Licensing Board cr.iphasized, the involvement
, . , of O and VV in cheating was first brought to the Commission's attention
%. D, fd ~ 'A N N ; $ ~ 3.j# 4 by Robert Arnold, licensee's former president.2* In due course O's em- '
' ~ y%"g 2 y *NI
(.,7 ployment was terminated due to other cheating, and VV resigned.2$ l' r%fl A s Snef ai 6
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(4t Modir.ed er Agreementi Hktober 2.194it. rMl A e first set or laterrogatones Addreiwd to Luenwe axioner s. isto ei n, onenwe . An..er ei ) n j
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2 i i 4 t [ There appears to be no incentive, therefore, for licensee to have con-cealed an additional incident of cheating by these individuals. Further, P.. s ,. ' . .,...'s m , l
^ 3; .. .
TMIA has provided no basis on which we could conclude that licensee 1 routinely and intentionally withheld discoverable material pertinent to i
. ~.
; ,;- > jr. I the hearing. Nor has TMIA given us cause to reconsider our own earlier 7' t
j ~- '
.' ,, , , . .Q., . c. conclusion that licensee's investigation of various cheating incidents was
,,q".j p y g n f! M d;.g.
adequate.2* Finally, the principal managers that might have been in-
'~
4 . volved in any deliberate effort to conceal are no longer licensee officials. ) The significance of the additional incident of cheating by O and VV to i the outcome of this proceeding is thus de minimis.
! ! 2. TMIA continues to challenge the propriety of the sanctions im- ,
I posed against VV by the licensee's top management. The Special Master j did not believe that VV's reassignment to the Accident Investigation j ; I)ocumentation Group following discosery of his cheating was a demo. , tion or sufficiently punitive to serve as a deterrent. As a consequence, [ he believed that the licensee had failed to declare a clear policy against what VV did.2' The Licensing Board took a somewhat different view. It l - was less critical of the licensee's motives, believing that VV's peers i .. most likely viewed the reassignment as a demotion. The Board conclud. 1
, , ed that Arnold's reassignment of VV was a proper reallocation of the j company's personnel resources.28 TMI A now submits a copy of VV's senior operator license renewal ap- 1
- plication, which was filed after he had been reassigned but nevertheless j ,
lists him as Supervisor of Station Operations. TMIA aho points to the ! j l certificate of competence, which was signed by Miller in connection with j : the application but does not indicate VV's reassignment." TMIA con- ! ! cludes that this represents further evidence that the Special Master was ; right and the Licensing Board was wrong." s y;,g a * We cannot conclude that this information would have affected the ,!
., Board's determination regarding the adequacy of management's response L c ' :e
- 4 qv,g~ .ygg
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to VV's cheating. The Board fully evaluated the circumstances surround-l. ing VV's reassignment.H lt was aware that neither Miller nor VV ap. j . ~ l I 4 a , i,. * [.,h N%h j , _ . m%r 4 } . 26 S# al at 1229 30
, s 1 21L8P 82 348, l$ NRC si 1009.I).
j
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' K'.S ~'36 '. 9'( . y , J. ,I(o 28 L8P 82.$6.16 SRC at 347 48.
D TMIA*$ Motion at 4 The certificate or competence stated thei Yv had " discharged his lwenie respe n. < j sibilities in a competent erhi tafe manner during his current tecente period
- M, E th C (ol Reporti. At. [
1 tachment 2?. l M TMICs ener at 2 il L8P.82 56.16 NRC at 341-48 [
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.s peared to view the cheating incident as particularly troubling." TMIA's
, ,f, ,
"new" information would, at most, supply additional confirmation of this. For the purpose of evaluating management integrity, however, the Board focused its attention on Arnold's response." It found that re-sponse appropriate, noting as well that VV's Unit I license had been voided and that the licensee did not plan to recertify VV for Unit 2
.. ..v
' .R . . . . -a licensing.)* Nothing in TMIA's presentation here undermines that u'.i-
- - mate Board assessment so as to warrant reopening.
TMIA's motion to reopen the record for further hearing is denirl. It is so ORDERED. FOR THE APPEAL BOARD I C. Jean Shoemaker
. Secretary to the a Appeal Board n
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' . 5,i M// at 345-46 ft is not clear why the license renewat apphcanon referred to VV as Supervisor of Sanoa
.y ;. Operations. In answer to quesuons from speaker during his investigation of the incident. Miller suggest-
. . ; , , , .1"~, y s . :' ed that the apphcation and accompanying certificate were probably prepared t'y the training department.
- which simply rehed on an outdated computer printout of names and titles. The language of the certificate or competence was said to be a standard format used by the trainir.g department. Speaker Report, in-vestiganon of VV's Quahfkauons 1979 1982. Deposioon of Gary Miller (Decemter 17,1982) at 18 21
. U LBP 82.$0.16 NRC at 346-48.
, '} 34 IJ at 348. 355
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i l Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards issuances 1, ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL B. Paul Cotter, ' Chairman Robert M. Lazo, 'Vice Chairman (Executive) Frederick J. Shon, 'Vice Chairman (Technical) < Members t Dr. George C. Anderson James P. Gleason Dr. Unda W. Uttle Andrew C. Goodhope Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke' f Chartes Bechhoefer* Peter B. Bloch* Hertert Grossman* Dr. Kennth A. McCollom Lawrence Brenner* Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr. Morton B. Margulies* G;enn O. Bright
- Jerry Harbour
- Gary L. Melhollin Dr. A. Dixon Callihan Dr. David L. Hetrick Marshall E. Miller l
James H. Carpenter
- Emest E. Hill Dr. Peter A. Moms * '
Hugh K. Clark Dr. Frank F. Hooper Dr. Oscar H. Paris' Dr. Richard F. Co6e* Helen F. Hoyt* Dr. Paul W. Purdom
- Dr. Fredenck R. Cowen Elizabeth B. Johnson Dr. David R. Schink Dr. Michael A. Duggan Dr. Walter H. Jordan Ivan W. Smith
- Dr. George A. Ferguson James L. Tolley* Dr. Martin J. Steindler Dr. Harry Foreman Jerry R. Kline* Dr. Quentin J. Stober Richard F. Foster Dr. James C. Lamb lli Seymour Wenner John H Frye Ill* Gustave A. Unenberger* Sheldon J. Wotfe*
- Permanent panel members l
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Cite as 22 NRC 207 (1985) LBP 85 27 A j' -
; -8 . . . -
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~
v.. L ' - I : -;. ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD N
.s Before Administrative Judges:
,I James L Kelley, Chairman Dr. James H. Carpenter Glenn O. Bright in the Matter of Docket No. 50 400 OL I (ASLBP No. 82 472 03 OL)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY and NORTH CAROLIN A EASTERN MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant) August 14,1985 1 (' This Memorandum supplies the reasons supporting the Licensing Board's earlier grant of several motions for summary disposition on
+* a.a men. .cs_. ,,;t, . . W. : ,0.. e . . ,ig -.m ,
emergency planning contentions. 3., ;g ,
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REASONS SUPPORTING SUSINIARY DISPOSITION OF EAIERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS in memoranda and orders dated February 27, 1985, and April 24,
'l _ '; 1985 (both unpublished), we ruled on several motions from the Appli-cants for summary disposition on emergency planning contentions. In i those orders, we provided explanations of our rulings only when we denied a motion. We hoped thereby to help the parties plan for litigation e
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1 and to speed the start of that litigation. In both orders we said we would l provide explanations of the other rulings at a later date. We now provide
~
,My-Q %M.> '-fld explanations for our rulings in every instance in which we granted a
.' : A.'VW:;c4g-}.fTDDd
- 7g. motion that was opposed by one or more intervenor, and we impose one NEri:N$khcN/
'~;,,iMS h$h;Ik.(M,f M!U-
< condition on the issuance of a full-power license. See our discussion of Contention 213a, igra. About half the motions for summary disposition yf 46t& .y were unopposed. We are mindful that the failure of the party opposing N' M$
f.TOk .W-NEQ' g ~ 'yh,77.' 3: summary disposition to submit evidence against the disposition does not 1 i, (.' require that the motion be granted. The movant must still meet his a burden of proof to establish the absence of any genuine issue of material
'i fact. Cleveland Electric //luminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2), ALAB-443,6 NRC 741,753 54 (1977). We have judged that in every instance in which the motion was unopposed, the Appli-cants did indeed meet their burden of proof, but in light of the lack of opposition, we have not thought it necesary or useful to repeat argu-
,_ ments of the parties who supported the motion.
By and large, licensing boards, when considering motions for summary
.. f' . . ..%.Nc, s @.& .,y disposition under 10 C.F.R. } 2.749, will apply the standards established
" C.c5ih. jh'ily.ig'
~ ' ' ' '
by the courts for considering motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alabama Power Co. g%.~ t :J (Joseph 31. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units I and 2), ALAB-182, 7 AEC
- V9^> 210, 217 (1974). A motion for summary disposition will be granted when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a favorable decision as a matter of law.10 C.F.R. } 2.749(d). The record must be viewed in the
, light most fasorable to the party opposing the motion. See Public Service
; Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units I and 2), LBP-74-36,7 i AEC 877,897 (1974) (citing federal court cases).
h
, ONSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING -
- ' ~
' We admitted two contentions on onsite emergency planning, Conten-tions 144 and 154, in our Alemorandum and Order, November 1,1983, at 11 12,5, respectively. The Applicants filed a motion for summary dis-m a 4;g ; pg ' m ~ ',
~
position of the contentions on October 8,1984. Accompanying the Mkn %WWWw-J.dk h
- hj -
motion was an affidavit from Robert G. Black, Jr., Director of Emergen-cy Preparedness for the Applicant. The Staff replied on November 8, Jy '! 1984, in support of the motion. Accompanying the Staff's reply was an
'G1.f ; :-fq}Mct(( j@@Cg.y.y;hj{3% ' affidavit from Gerald E. Simonds of the Office of Inspection and En-forcement, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Re-i sponse, Emergency Preparedness Branch, in the NRC. Str. Simonds is a A
technical reviewer of work at the Shearon Harris plant and is responsible _ .. n . Y . 208 i [ _- I hh *
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} l for assessing onsite emergency plans and preparedness. The Intervenor, ; Mr. Wells Eddleman, replied in opposition to the motion on November !
, .p ' ,
- 19, 1984. We granted the motion in our Memorandum and Order, l5 *-~
4 February 27,1985, at 1. ;
, . i s.-
- c .J n
Contention 144 m '. ' '; ' ? *-y.e. .C- The text of Contention 144 is as follows: CPAL's emergency personnel lesels do not meet the requirements of ,
, NtJREG-0737, REV 1 Isic Supp. Il Table 2 The Table sets out what the Staff thinks to be the minimum staffing a <
l licensee should have during an emergency at a nuclear power plant. One l issue raised by the contention in its original form, when the Applicants i were still planning to complete a second unit, was whether the staffing levels would be sufficient to deal with a damaged reactor and an undam-i l ' i aged one at the same time. See " Wells Eddleman's Motion Concerning DCRDR Information," January 8,1983. This issue has since been mooted by the Applicants' decision to cancel plans for the construction of a second unit. The Commission's emergency planning regulations require, among other things, that adequate staffing to provide initial facihty acadent response in key functional areas j is maintamed at all times. Iand that] timely augmentation of responw capabihties is available . r 10 C.F.R. } 50.47(b)(2). This standard is elaborated by evaluation crite-c_ - . ..>-.o....a
- ria in NUREG-0654, which sets out guidelines for assembling and y$[fhh reviewing emergency plans for nuclear power plants. Evaluation Criteri- .
0 l YM.%[?-Y$ _M -[-}}:.QL-Eig."h,3 on B.5 provides, in relevant part: i Each licensee shall specify the positions or title and major tasks to be performed by the persons to be assrgned to the functional areas of emergency actisity. For emergency situations, speci0c assignments shall be made for all shifts and for plant
; I staff members, both onsite and away from the site. These assignments shall cover ' ^^
4 the emergency functions in Table B-1 entitled, "Mmimum Staffing Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Emergences." Tne minimum on shift staffing tevels shall
- be as mdicated in Table B-1. The licensee must be able to augment on-shift capabih-
- - ties withm a short period after declaration of an emergency. This capabihty shall be
~ '
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as indicated in Table B-l. l
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! Table B-1, to which this evaluation criterion refers, is the same as the
.m. table referred to in the contention, Table 2 of NUREG-0737. Compli- '
N'N. e M:n; y ,
. T .NNhf/kk'$b,,h,p. s df .o . 4 ance with Evaluation Criterion B.5, or any other evaluation criterion in
.. ,. ? - NUREG-0654, is not necessarily required by the Commission's
, ,[ A%MED, d,',s,D.@iie emergency planning regulations. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), ALAB-698,16 NRC 1290,1299
- 5. 'g Qit' 2.N Q @.; g j.p . wjd3jfM 9Mgh.Y@pN:
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(1982), rev'd in part on other grounds. CLI-83-22,18 NRC 299 (1983). Like the Commission's Regulatory Guides, NUREG-0654 has never ng ' 2 C"' been the subject of rulemaking. Methods and solutions different from those set out in the guides are acceptable if they proside a basis for l'md-ings which must be made before a license or permit can be issued or con-tinued. ALAB-698, supra. 8 NRC at 1298-99. The numbers in Tables 2.2-1 m-d 2.2-2 in the emergency plans for Shearon llarris represent the stamng levels the Applicants would adhere
, to in an emergency. It is no longer in dispute in this proceeding that,
.'( .; a ~ during an emergency, the Applicants would have an adequate number
% " g.yg& y .v y Xyj, ,J ,, of people with the skills needed to meet the emergency.
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. .,' , VNA dWjgg- uf 9 The Intervenor argues, however, that the current plans do not make several of the people available soon enough. Intervenor's Reply at 1-3.
The two just-mentioned tables in the plans reveal that the Applicants
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.c . , ~ gyp [fpgg would have certain emergency stations manned within 30 to 45 minutes of the start of an emergency, and certain other stations within 60 to 75 minutes. However, the analogous table referred to by Evaluation Criteri-
. on B.5 Table B-1 at 37-38 in NUREG-Oo54, would have the same sta-j tions manned within exactly 30 and 60 minutes, respectively. The Inter-venor argues that since a footnote to the emergency planning regulations l in 10 C.F.R. j 50.47(b) says that the planning regulations are "ad-
' dressed" by the evaluation criteria in NUREG-0654, the criteria have
. < ' u g,.g., . -q. ;;g ; # the legal force of regulations. Intervenor's Reply at 1.
As we have shown above, Commission case law is to the contrary: i.
~
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~ 3 - . , - .. The Staff will accept, and claims to have accepted in this case, reasonable deviations from the evaluation criteria. StafT Reply at 6-8. It is arguable f
, that it remains then to be determined by us whether in this case the
- Staff and the Applicants are being reasonable. The Applicants cite possi-
- m. w. , .
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., ble adverse weather as a reason for extendmg by at most 15 minutes the MW ,6. ,.p.dq . m. c.3.$'
6MQW wr Pp.S. -: '. 'm time within which certain stations would be manned in an emergency. Motion at 6. The Intervenor in effect argues that such weather would be
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good reason to man those stations 15 minutes earlier. These trivial dif-ferences do not rise to the level of a disputed material fact. By way of cAj ..ggy..pWh g SU P 6J4 fig.3]MC.$ p;g .., contrast, the two cases we cited earlier involved one time limit embodied in Table B-1 in NUREG-0654 and at issue here. The Table calls for one of a licensee's senior managers to be in command of a licensee's a ~.. S' h ' On .k Y be. ,.$ p y '4.
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Emergency Operations Facility within one hour, but the licensee in that
- case proposedfour hours. See CL183-22, supra. We find that the Appli- "
J. , ,- '5 V - ?, cants' proposed response times satisfy 10 C.F.R. f 50.47(b)(2). P Contention 154 l.. : . . , . .a
.' :- ,~d.: The text of the contention is as follows:
, . y;< a Plant operators are assigned to make the dose assessments (see Table 2.2.3, page 2)
(m the Site Emergency Plan (SEP) Rev. 21. These personnel are unquah6ed to = 7 make the detailed Judgments that may be required by the procedures fer dose es-timating, given in A anex B of the SEP. in an emergency, projections of offsite dose would be crucial determi-nants of what protectise actions were taken. According to Annex B. plant operators would perform dose assessments until the health physics , g i staff had arrived. The intervenor, hir. Eddleman, asserts that - i Idhe complexity of judgment required m Annex B is beyond the training, as far as the SEP estabhshes, of ordinary reactor operators. Storeover, there are no educa-p tional or other requirements for operators that assure they will exercise good judg- # rnent in deahng with this complex task under the pressure of accident conditions I The Applicants' main argument is that, in an emergency, operators would follow not Annex B but the Plant Emergency Procedures (PEPS) contained in the Plant Operating N1anual, Vol. 2 Bk. 5, that Annex B contains the technical background and justitication for those procedures, but not the procedures themselves. Slotion at 7. The Applicants also argue that since the contention is directed to Annex B under the misim-www&pg .- .s., pression that the contents of Annex B were to be construed as proce-
.i-dures, the Applicants have, strictly speaking, met their burden on sum-
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.+ mary disposition simply by pointing out that Annex B contains no procedures.
]
i Nonetheless. the Applicants willingly assume, for the sake of argu-i ment, that the contention is directed to the procedures, and go on to
~
3 ". ,c ,. . "'. argue that, between llow charts and " cookbook" descriptions of calcula-tions, the procedures leave little room for judgment (Black Affidavit, [~ 4. T 115-10), and that, in accordance with the Commission's regulations and guidance on emergency planning, there are training programs, drills, and federally evaluated, full scale exercises planned which will u .. -. _ , ,p, ,/; , < ' , prepare the plant operators sufficiently to perform dose assessment
' under emergency conditions. Black Affidavit, 11 12-17. The Applicants report that the Staff has approved their training program. Id.1 17.
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The Intervenor replies principally that the Applicants nowhere in their motion argue that the operators are now - on the date the Intervenor
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filed his reply - trained to perform dose assessments (Intervenor's Reply at 3-4), and secondarily, that the PEPS, though they may be sim-
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pler than Annex B, still leave too much room for judgment. The Interve-
,r a - 4i, - ;. nor cites as examples several details in one PEP. See id., " List of Facts C,2; /J.b - fe.1 ,%$ h; g. ~
g% S+hk!d.F_', in Dispute - Contention 154." Both of the Intervenor's arguments clearly amount to new conten-tions. The argument concerning the PEPS is new because the text of the
-l contention is directed quite concretely to the form and substance of Annex B. That text, the contention says, is beyond the operators' competence.'
The Intersenor's principal argument is ambiguous, but, no matter which way it is read, it also is new. At first glance it appears to mean
, merely that operators should have been competent in dose assessment J before the Applicants moved for summary disposition. The text of the
~
N- < contention, though, is about the complexity of Annex B, not the state of
, preparedness of the operators during litigation of the contention. More-r[ --
over, there is no reason in law, or from good sense, for someone to be
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, j competent in dose assessment before that person needs to be, namely
, c ; ,.-c; ,. ,_f before the various scheduled tests of that competence.
By the argument that the motion must fail because the operators are not now trained, the Intervenor may intend something not apparent on the face of the argument, namely, that only health physics staff persons should do dose assessment, for only they would have had the longstand-ing, professional, specialized training which would enable them to per-i form dose assessments reliably in times of stress. This claim is far broad-er than the claim in the contention, which was simply that operators
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t y?t[d Annex B, not that the operators could not reliably perform for a short.2 though stressful, time any conceivably adequate set of dose assessment procedures, no matter what the operators' training. 1 l
?
.'-. 3 Given the bar in Loursea Power and Lvier Co. (w aterford steam Electnc station. Unit D,
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'l ALAB-732,17 SRC 1076. Il07 (198D against husanns the mynad. often-changing, details of imple-
+ mentirig procedures. a contennon on the PEPS might not have been admissible.
2 Table B-1 at 37 in SUREG-0654, wh2ch. as we reported in our dacussion of Contenuon 144, Mr Edd'e un would have us treat as law, calis for senior health rhysics eumrtise to be available within 30 minutes of the surt of an accident
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212
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i OFFSITE EMERGENCY Pl.ANNING
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i ' '[- Eddleman Contentions 215(1) and 215(3)
- . _ Tb texts of the contentions are as follows:
- - .; ~ l ' '. - k J s',A In violation of 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(10) CPat 's evacuation time study does not con-
* ~- &.N . ~ _ . form to NUREG-0654 Appendix 4 and will not provide accurate and useful guide-lines for the choice of protectise actions during an emergency because the study con-tains numerous so-called "conservatisms" including those referrmg to recreational populations and vehicle capacity factors (see e 3. sections 3 3 and 3-6) which may force evacuation time estimates upwards and provide inaccurate estimates for deci-sionmakers during an emergency, m the opinion of expert Paullioimbeck. Potential hazards of such conservatisms" are discussed in the 1984 Beme partialinitial deci-i sion under emergency plannmg.
' l. T he assumption of evacuation from home. For certain times of day. this as-sumption is unrealistic for many persons who will not be at home. but be at I J work. school, shoppmg. doctor's omce, etc. This could also result m double l counting of evacuees for persons who both live and work withm the EPZ j
(6/14/84 Order at 31),
! 3. The apparent,.ssumption that those households without vehicles will auto-matica!!y evacuate Nth orighbors (or can) at the rate of one vehicle per household.
We admitted Contentbn ~, 5 in our "Further Rulings on Admissibility
- of Offsite Emergency Planning Contentions . ,
June 14,1984 (un-published), at 24. Howeser, we ordered that before the contention could be litigated, h!r. Eddleman would have to make it more specific. i He did so on June 29, 1984, and we ruled on the specified contention. and the replies to it, on October 4,1984, admitting parts (1) and (3) of _ o _ the specified contention.
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a' The Applicants filed for summary disposition of Contention 215(1)
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on January 7,1985, and for summary disposition of Contention 215(3) on January 14, 1985. Accompanying each motion was an affidavit from Robert D. Klimm and one from Dr. Dennis S. Mileti.3 Str. Klimm is an i Associate of HN!51 Associates, Inc., which has been under contract to
, the Applicants to perform the evacuation time study. Str. Klimm's work 4 , includes management and supervision of such studies, and he was the Principal Transportation Engineer of the study for the Shearon Harris
~
facility. He was also involved in the system development of the
.c7 NETVAC computer model, which has been used in evacuation time
~ V studies at several nuclear power plants. Dr. Stiletiis Associate Professor
} i s
l .. 3Dr. Mden's adidavit on Contention 215(l) was filed on January 10.1985.
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in the Department of Sociology at Colorado State University and Direc-gcf . _ . . .. .
.~ .. . tor of the llazards Assessment Laboratory at the University.
G,.4 (J2Q7j;>f M .. -Y The Staff replied in support of the motions on February 6,1985 (on PJ" - 'i*;'.:
. . . Contention 215(1)) and February 27,1985 (on Contention 215(3)). Ac-cg-l% & l-J L, & 7 f ; ZM. '
companying each of the Stafi's replies was an alTidavit from Dr. Thomas N f.@ Qf.'N.@"f>M dh Urbanik II, Associate Research Engineer and Program 51anager at the @Nz MUY P'%DMD n.,% Texas Transportation Institute, part of the Texas A&ht University e _- p ng w.dMfT..~.~.diNylw,
.;-wm ^ 3 r System. Dr. Urbam.k is also Lecturer m the Civil Engineering Depart-
-- " ment at the University. He subcontracts to Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories to assist them in their review for the NRC of evacuation time estimates for nuclear power plants. lie was principal author of
, NUREG/CR-1745, " Analysis of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning Zones," Nosember 1980, and he has reviewed the initial evacuation time estimates for over fifty nuclear power plants. The results of his reviews appear in NUREG/CR-1856, l - ;. . .
.S -
.. .m f . _ . " Analysis of Evacuation Time Estimates Around 52 Nuclear Power
' , f . / ~ m ~ :[ @ '-
Plant Sites," hiay 1981.
. . ' ./ ~ The Intervenor, hir. Wells Eddleman, replied in opposition to the Ap-y~2@,ym g.-j.ydfMsk f pi cants' motions for summary disposition on February 15,1985 (on 1::. c J p f p - y p u g g /.; Contention 215(1)) and on Starch 11,1985 (on Contention 215(3)).
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Contention 215(D The Commission's regulations require applicants to make. and keep
; current, evacuation time estimates for use in an emergency, and NUREG-0654 contains quite detailed guidance for constructing such es-timates. Part 50, Appendix E, j IV, the introductory paragraph, of 10 C.F.R., says, among other things, that "[tlhe nuclear power reactor Nr ,W g . M w; m e '
operating license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time re-
-- quired to evacuate at'd for taking other protective actions for various sec-g $,. , ,, ,,.:n.qMOSf..% r. ,y, , tors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient 7
t and permanent populations." The requirement for such estimates stems ultimately from 10 C.F.R. ( 50.47(b)(10), which says, in relevant part,
, that "[g]uidelines for the choice of protectise actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in
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place . . . Evacuation time estimates are such guidelines, since, in a
+ -
particular emergency, they would help determine whether evacuation
, were a practical alternative to sheltering. The Federal guidance men-N. , _ Q Q1 * ,
tioned by the just-quoted regulation appears in NUREG-0654. There, J; the evaluation criteria which address the regulation say that the estimates
, shall be in accordance with Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654. See Evaluation Criteria J.8 and J.10.1. Though, as we have held elsewhere in this Deci-
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> - _.g w sion, NUREG-0654 generally does not have the legal force of regula-tions, the language of s 50.47(b)(10) that the guidehnes shall be " con-
~ sistent with Federal guidance," gises special force to the guidance on
~'q evacuation time estimates. No party to the litigation of these two conten-tions disputes that Appendix 4 to NUREG-0654 should govern our ruling on these two contentions. Indeed, both Intervenor and Applicants appeal to the guidance.
These evacuation time estimates are to be as realistic as is reasonably
; achievable. Although generally, when making estimates having to do with nuclear safety, it is prudent to incorporate conservatisms wherever the calculations are uncertain, it would be imprudent to be unnecessarily conservative in making an estimate of evacuation time, for an overesti-mate of sufGeient magnitude could, in an emergency, lead those who must choose protectise actions to asoid evacuation because they thought it would take too long when, in fact, it would base resulted in l less exposure to radiation than sheltering would have. See Commonweahh j Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units I and 2), LBP-84-2,19 l
NRC 36,262-63 (1984). i The Applicants' motion for summary disposition of Contention I 215(1) stresses what they claim to be the reasonableness and realism of the disputed assumption in the time estimates that every resident of the plume EPZ would evacuate from home. The Applicants' afGants report that experience with emergency evacuations and the literature on such evacuations support the assumption that residents of the plume EPZ will return home before esacuating. Klimm Af0 davit, T 6; Mileti AfGdasit.
?! 4, 7. Residents would return home principally, according to the afG-ants, to form families and other groups for mutual aid and protection.
Id. The time estimates allot up to 2 hours for " preparation" for evacua-tion, and this Ggure, based on discussions with local ofHeials, allows for h NIX.p-h5b,?%MiA-2.W,"Uhr 43.nd5 k returns home. Klimm Afndavit,17. More than twenty evacuation time estimates use this assumption, most of these have been approved by the
+ p ~wipc ,.;w Staff, and the rest are under review. Id.14. Indeed, the Applicants point out, the guidance in Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654 requires that the populations at recreational facilities, industrial facilities, and the like, be treated as separate from the permanent population of the EPZ.
,. ; Klimm AfGdavit,15. See NUREG-0654, Appendix 4, at 4-2 to 4-3.
't '
l The Applicants argue that to the extent the assumption leads to 5 double-counting at all, it makes the estimates not consc.vative but more realistic. Although many children who attend schoolin the EPZ also live q y ; there, their evacuating from school instead of from home would have an
~! effect not on the number of cars used by those who evacuate from home, but only on the number of passengers in the cars, for parents, at
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least, would still be leaving from home, and - goes the assumption which is the subject of Contention 215(3) - would still be using one _,_-sS..[,f- -g O car. Klimm Amdavit,19. Thus the double-counting of some schoolchil-
- dren does not entail a double-counting of cars, and smce it is the count of cars which is a crucial factor in time estimates, the double-counting of
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- 7.j schoolchildren cannot lead to an overestimation of evacuation time.
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. W,,c. Some double-counting of cars does occur in the time estimates in rela-
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. tion to permanent residents who also work within the EPZ or who would
- be in one of the recreation areas in the EPZ at the time of the accident.
. The estimates do count the cars of such residents twice, once as leaving
! from the place of employment or recreation, and once as leaving from home. Howeser, although the cars are counted twice, the departures are not. Under the assumption that permanent residents, except for the schoolchildren among them, will evacuate from home, residents who
; before evacuating return home from employment, recreation, shopping,
' and the like, would be leaving both home and those places. Id. The as-
~
sumption thus leads, the Applicants argue, to greater accuracy because it simulates, to a degree, the tramc " friction" (as the Applicant.; call it) 1 ,
, sid; , . .s ; caused by these departures toward home. Id.
_ .,c The Staff agrees that the assumption of return home is supported by _TW
^
9 experience and the relevant literature, that Appendix 4 of NUREG-n m.!:a.
, 0654 says that the estimates are to treat residential populations separately from factory populations and the like, and that double-counting school-children who hve in the plume EPZ cannot lead to an overestimation of the number of cars that would be on the road. However, as to permanent residents who work in the EPZ or are otherwise away from home at the time of an accident, the Staff does not claim, or argue against the claim, that such double-counting simulates trame "frictio1." The Staff is con-
.c - . . tent to say that no data exist which would enable the estimates to avoid
. gN?.A_ ,4. r" - .W % k, such double-countmg. Urbanik Amdavit at 2.
b % erkyggfjd ' As happens too often with Intervenor Eddleman's replies to motions for summary disposition, his reply to this motion appears to be in fact a new contention, at least to the extent we are able to construe its aim. lie no longer charges that there is anything unreasonable or conservative about the assumption of evacuation from home.' Rather he tries to raise i 4 It was unusual to have an miersenor arguing apinst such an aswmption. since it is sery like the claim so often advanced ey intervenors m these proceedmgs, and adsarked in Contention 4(d) in this proceed-
*
- mg, that parents with children m school would pick them up before evacuatmg intersenors don't orten l'
. ' claim that evacuation times have been overestimated either. In fact it was also odd to have Apphcants 1 argumg such an assamption, smce they usua!!y claim that parefits would not try to pKk up their school-children before esacaating The Apphcants here avoid contrad.ctmg this usual claim by sayms that fami-hes would unite - unless they received sound rublic mformation to the t.ontrary See Wet Affidaut.
T 7. see aan our discussion of Contention 41d7
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l l new issues about the accuracy of the time estimates' " simulation" of the trame " friction" caused by return home before evruation. lie claims
, ; that neither the estimates' double-counting nor the 2-hour preparation I time they allot can accurately represent the trame home before evacua-
; i
, tion: The double counting assumes that all cars counted would be leav-
! ing the plume EPZ, but at least some of the trame home before evacua-
.] tion would be against the flow of the trame leaving the EPZ; and the number of hours alloted for preparation is apparently only based on un-documented discussions with local officials, not on the trame densities caused by trips home. Eddleman Reply at 1-2.
The closest the Intervenor comes to maintaining the charge that double-counting leads to an overestimation of evacuation times is to assert that since the Staff claims that no data exist which could be used to asoid this double-counting, there is no way of telling how large it may be. However, this assertion fails to raise a litigable issue because it, as the rest of the reply, concerns the accuracy of the estimates' ways of ac-j counting for trame home, not any conservatism caused by an allegedly l unreasonable assumption. i Moreover, even if the assertion that the double-counting may be
! quite large is construed as a claim that the double-counting leads to an overly conservative estimate, the assertion still fails to raise a genuine issue about a material fact, for the absolute size of the double-counting i is irrelevant. Rather, what matters is the size of such double-counting relative to the traffic " friction" the Applicants claim to be simulating, and it might be expected that the larger the number of cars double-counted, the greater the " friction" to be simulated, since a larger number of permanent residents would be going home before evacuating.
Of course, as we have noted above, the failure of an opponent of a
, motion for summary disposition to show that there is a genuine issue of
-E, y s material fact does not, especially in proceedings involving health and
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safety questions, relieve the proponent of the motion of the burden to . show that there is no such issue. However, we believe that the Appli-cants have carried that burden here. The reasonableness of the assump-tion that permanent residents will evacuate from home is no longer at issue among the parties, and we see no reason that it should be. More-j over, the Applicants are, in this case, entitled to a favorable decision as 5 i a ma:ter oflaw, for even if the assumption of evacuation from home re-suits in some overestimation of the evacuation time,5 the conservatism is hardly out of line with the law on this subject, Appendix 4 of I Arguably a possibiinty when some accommodation to thow tnps home is already made by the 2 hour ai;otment for preparation time. i p
-' 217
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1 1 NUREG-0654, which, though it cautions against overcounting (see Ap-
- c. q pendix 4 at 4-2), clearly permits a considerable oserestimation of the
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]
total evacuation time by permitting the assumption that each stage of
, the evacuation is wholly complete before the next stage begins, for in-Qy [ -
. stance, that no one begins to evacuate until everyone is prepared to do so. The authors of Appendix 4 acknowledge that this assumption, which W.h # y.. .k [ .. _ .1--
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was not used in the SHNPP time estimates, "tends to overestimate the
~ '
evacuation time." /d. at 4-7. There is no indication that the double-counting in the SHNPP time estimates, which, as we have argued i abose, is a double-counting of cars, but not of departures, would lead to as high a degree of overestimation as the assumption that each stage of the evacuation is complete before the next one begins? Contention 2150) Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654 says that the time estimates, in determining how long it might take the permanent residents of the plume EPZ to evacuate, should divide the class of households of perma-M A. " ~ nent residents into two subclasses, one consisting of households with au-
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tomobiles, and the other consisting of those without. The Appendix stresses that special attention must be given to those households not having automobiles. See NUREG-0654, Appendix 4 at 4-2 to 4-3, 4-9. The time estimates assume that the some 600 households without auto-mobiles will evacuate at the rate of one schicle per household, the same rate at which households with automobiles are assumed by the estimates to evacuate.
. The Applicants argue that this assumption is not a conservatism at a'1, but rather a practical means of simulating the trafTic which would be 9.pyJwin:7 generated by the friends, neighbors, or emergency workers who would
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%-a m. ..$.. m;d " g~ 44.-t' ^ 6iQ, g provide transportation to those without automobiles. Applicants' '
.s.;..;_ %w -. e.y @a '
Motion at 9; Mileti Afridavit,12. Aga.in as with the double-counting considered in Contention 215(l), cars might be double-counted, but departures might not be. The Applicants report that the assumption was 6 Moreover, it appears that the law could not be othe wne on tha inue, for the reason the statT g ves, that there are no data with which to avoid the double-counung here (Urbamh Afredavit.158, by which, we take it, the statimeans not merely that the authors or the estimates have not gaihered the data. but that they cannot be gathered In theory it might be powbie first to determme for every industry and office in the plume EPZ which employees live in the plume EPZ tinJeed, NL R EG.0654. at 4 2 to 4-3. j) says to so determme, usmg employment data ) and how far they would have to go to get home, and then model both this preevacuauon evacuation of residents and its mteraction with the evacuation of
! nonreudents and reudents at home at the start of an accident flut. clearly. no comparable method n pouib'e, esen so theory for recreational areas, shoppmg centers, and the like, for the modeler cannot know *hich patrons of these places at the trn e of an accident hved in the plume LP/ and how far they were from their homes This same argument of the si,,ff's aho runs agamst the Intervenor's call for greater accuracy in the simulation of the -fricuen" generated by trips home before evacuation 218 m.n.4sww&si@a&%W%&w.M& Mea 1
reviewed with local unergency preparedness officials and "was deter- . s. mined" to be the most realistic means of simulating the traf0c generated
'~'
by people going to households which have no automobiles. Klimm Af-l Odavit,17. The Applicants also report that HN151 Associates has used l
- this assumption in the many estimates it has done for other nuclear
;, ' , 1 -
power plants, and that the NRC Staff has thus far always accepted the as-1.
-f' . sumption. Id.113,10. Afliant Klimm estimates that even if it were as-
- sumed that no vehicles were used in evacuating households which have no automobiles, there would be only at most 655 fewer automobiles evacuating and the evacuation time estimates would be reduced by no more than 10 minutes. Id. t 9.
The Staff argues that the assumption at issue here is not the most realist e that could be made, since it amounts to an assumption that for each household without an automobile, one car will travel some distance to evacuate that household, that, in etTect, each such household will be evacuated by taxi. Ilowever, the emergency plans contemplate more effi-cient means of providing transportation for these households. Urbanik j Affidavit at 3. In any event, the Staffs affiant Dr. Urbanik concludes j that any more realistic assumption would reduce the estimates by only 5 to 10 minutes, and that the present overestimation in the time estimates would not lessen the usefulness of the estimates in an emergency. Id. In reply, the Intervenor, hir. Wells Eddleman, attacks both the logic of the assumption and the Staffs conclusion that whatever overestima-tion the assumption entails is not significant and would not lessen the us: fulness of the estimates. In regard to logic, the Intervenor argues that the assumption is not consistent with aftiant Stileti's claim that transportation for some of these households would be provided by neigh-i bors, for, in this case, there is no extra trailic to be simulated. In regard to the significance of any overestimation the assumption may entail, the
. f M. 70Lyfu: Y jg Intervenor argues that the Staff has not proved that the overestimation " ' j_'
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; q ., 7
- c. is not significant, or that it would not lessen the usefulness of the esti-mates in an emergency.
As with Contention 144, the Intervenor would have us go to hearing over a matter of a few minutes. He does not dispute that the minutes in-volved are no more than 10, yet he appears to think that the level of pre-cision in evacuation time estimates is such that 10 minutes could be sig-nificant. Storeover, as with Contention 215(1), there may not be the data which would permit a less conservative assumption, for although a survey has been conducted which gave households without automobiles an opportunity to make their emergency transportation needs known, there is no sure way of knowing in advance of an emergency how many 219
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2 r. , ' of those households would evacuate with nearby persons such as neigh-bors and how many might require help from further away. Perhaps a
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,. .g.] range of possibilities might be set out, and some probabilities assigned within that range, but any possible gain in accuracy does not require an
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,, ,:jl evidentiary hearing.
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Contention 213a WifkMfME<:
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The text is as follows: Either each off site ERP should contain an appendix which conforms to evaluation cnterion II.P.7 of NUREG.0654 or it should be demonstrated that such an appendix is unnecessary because its functions are performed in some other way by the present form of the plans. The average emergency plan "should consist of perhaps hundreds of pages, not thousands." NUREG-0654. Appendix 1, at 129. The plan _ ,. should be such a length as to permit the whole planning scheme to be grasped in one view, and to permit a sound judgment on whether the
. . _ _ . , rf. plan can be implemented in an emergency. But a document of such rela-
, tively short length will not contain enough information for implementing the plan. The plan must therefore be supplemented with implementing
; procedures of often changing detail - step-by step procedures, lists of names and numbers and the like - detail not suitable for inclusion in the plan itself, and seldom suitable for litigation before licensing boards (see Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732,17 NRC 1076,1106-07 (1983)). Such detail gener-ally cannot be achieved until late in the planning. The implementing j procedures for the onsite plan, for instance, can be submitted to the
, .; .2 m A34MhM NRC as late as 180 days before the issuance of an operating license.10 3'25.Q%gy..m C m -
C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, f V. SNNhn/phnq Evaluation Criterion II.P.7 of NUREG-0654 says, Each plan shall contain as an appendix listing, by title procedures required to imple. ment the rian. The listing shall include the section(s) of the plan to be implemented by each procedure. _. 'j{ . When we admitted the contention, we said, "[p]resumably the goal of
-t P.7 is to assure not only that the implementing procedures are prepared g in advance of plant operation above 5% of rated power, but also to
~ . Tj assure coordination between the plans and the implementing proce-j i dures." And .we might have added that the list P.7 calls for would also aid development and review (including periodic review) of the plan.
Indeed, this'gtter consideration was very likely uppermost in the minds 220 i i k_.a. o '5 l *:' 'N '
m I i of the drafters of P.7, for the ultimate authority for the requirement for such an appendix is the planning standard on plan development and
~ '
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.j review,10 C.F.R. } 50.47(b)(16): " Responsibilities for plan develop-ment and review and for distribution of emergency plans are established,
~
and planners are properly trained." l In August 1984, no appendix as called for by Evaluation Criterion P.7 _[ . C. DN.f. ,NN was in either the State plan or any of the four county plans. Nor was it
. s :. , '
M.%g t 7 clear that the Applicants understood that such a plan might be required. For instance, Annex H of the plans, the Plan Cross-Reference, cited as fulfilling P.7 either very general sections of the plan, such as " Concept i of Operations," or other annexes dealing only with notification. We therefore admitted the contention in our order, LBP-84-298, 20 NRC 389, 408-09 (1984). The Applicants moved for summary disposi-tion on January 14, 1985. Accompanying the motion was an affidavit from Jesse T. Pugh, Ill, Director of the Division of Emergency Manage-ment, in the North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public
, Safety. Mr. Pugh is responsible for North Carolina's emergency planning and emergency response preparedness, for both nuclear and nonnuclear emergencies. The Staff filed in support of the motion on February 27, 1985. Accompanying the Staff's filing was an affidavit from Thomas I.
Hawkins, Emergency Management Program Specialist for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and FEMA Region IV Liai-son with both South and North Carolina. The Intervenor, Wells Eddle-man, replied in opposition to the motion on March 11,1985. The Applicants argued that the level of detail in the plans, together with the existence of standard operating procedures at the State and county levels, made an appendix linking the implementing procedures and the plans unnecessary. See LBP-84-298, supra. 20 NRC at 409. But the Applicants' principal argument, with which the Staff agrees, is ,
-< that Attachment 2 to each of the five plans meets the requirement of
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g@ g Evaluation Criterion P.7. Attachment 2 to the State plan may be taken
- er W as typical of the other four such attachments. It lists by title five emergency plans and their sources - as, for instance, " Southern I
Mutual Radiation Assistance Plan," the source of which is the Southern States Energy Board. The attachment also lists three sets of Standing i Operating Procedures (SOPS) and their sources - as, for instance, 1 " State Emergency Response Team Standing Operating Procedures," the
. source of which is the North Carolina Division of Emergency Manage-ment, DCCPS. The Applicants concede that, as presently constituted,
; these attachments do not, as P.7 would have them do, list the plan sec-tions being implemented by the listed plans and SOPS, but the Appli-cants nonetheless argue that P.7 is satisfied oy the fact that the titles of j
! 221 l
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i .- 3 31. y. , _ - i .~ s ' ' ;,-'~ ' ' ?. ' the plans and SOPS indicate the plan sections they implement. For in-stance, the Emergency Operating Center SOPS cleaQy l indicate the part f.6 - .
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.. of the State plan which has to do with the functions orthe Emergency E Operating Center.
_; ,.3,, , , We believe that the listings in the various Attachment 2s are much
~pa,2.s. .,y too general to be of much use as cross-references between the plans and
- f y i.?CJ..J m'y 4; the implementing procedures. Rather, those Attachments are clearly in-
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, tended to satisfy Evaluation Criterion P.6, which says, "[elach plan shall contam a detailed listing on supporting plans and their source." Indeed, ,
Annex H, the Plan Cross-Reference, explicitly identifies the various At-tachment 2s as satisfying P.6, not P.7. In response to the Applicants' argument, the Intervenor quite rightly says that the assumption upon which the contention is based - that P.7 has not yet been satisfied - is true. Nonetheless, we are granting the motion for summary disposition, but we are also imposing a condition
- to be set out in a moment - on the issuance of the full-power license. Despite the Applicants', the Staft's, and FEMA's attempts to persuade us that the various Attachment 2s satisfy Evaluation Criterion P.7, we believe that the Applicants grasp the meaning of P.7 and under-stand that each Attachment 2 falls short of what P.7 calls for, not only in the amount of detail in the lists in the attachment, but also in not explic-itly citing sections of the plan. The Applicants do not argue that such cross-references as P.7 calls for would not be useful, or that the goals of P.7 are met by some alternative comparable in the amount of detail and degree of explicitness to what P.7 calls for. Indeed, the Applicants explic-itly commit, in the course of the motion (see Motion at 10; Pugh Af-i fidavit,17), to satisfying P.7 fully by the time of the full-scale exercise of the emergency plans, which, at the time of the motion, was scheduled
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for May of this year. N M,(m.=p,h. . ,62 We secure this commitment by imposing its fulfillment as a condition ( $iT$gfg{g
- g'h6:$ ' g~ of the issuance of a full-power license. The StafT is charged with determ,mmg that before the issuance of a full-power license there has been added to the State plan and each of the county plans an appendix listing the implementation procedures for that plan. The listing must be in at least as much detail as the list of titles of Corporate Emergency
. - : Plan Implementation Procedures (CEPIP) in the October 1984 onsite plan, but each appendix must also cite by section, or sections, the parts of the plan the listed procedures implement. This condition is clear and straightforward and thus we believe we can assign oversight of its com-pletion to the Staff, without running afoul of the delegation doctrine as f
developed in NRC case law. See Southern Cahfornia Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-39,15 NRC i
.. I 222 f.; $ 6055 k h~& b h!$hnhkb Y hh Ykkkb Y & f.1, & l.__,e r ; atr3 & _-E X d
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1163, 1216-17 (1982); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power
.. . .. . . g;
..,..;. Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-2,19 NRC 36,209-13 (1984). There.
N V' ? W- fore there is nothing left to litigate t nder this contention.7 z j,,. . , w-c . 9@ - . e i.e Contention 30
.:: i' %.f The text of the contention is as follows:
The plan's provisions (Part I pp. 49 50) for Potassium Iodide do not comply with { the requirements of NtJREG-0654 II.J.10 e Irg. 63) that the plans must include
" quantities" for persons u hose "esacuation may be mfeasible or sery difTicult' who are m the plume EPL The full text of the evaluation criterion the contention cites is as follows:
- 10. The organization's plans to implement protective measures for the plume expo-sure pathway shall melude:
- e. Provisions for the use of radioprotective drugs, particularly for emergency work-ers and mstitutionalized persons withm the plume exposure EPZ whose immediate evacuation may be infeasible or very duTicult, includmg quantities, storage, and means of distribution.
The authority for this criterion is the planning standard in 10 C.F.R. s 50.47(b)(10), which says, among other things, that "[a] range of pro-i tective actions have [ sic} been developed for the plume exposure path-way EPZ for emergency workers and the public." Section IV.E.6 of the State plan assigns to the Division of Health Serv-
. . . . . _ . . - . . . -1 ices the task of determining how much potassium iodide (KI) would be N
- y h [e % 1 b l G @' .
N,i h7tddhh required in an emergency, but no provision in the plan says what ,
' ' "~ M,ffZ amount of KI would be enough. We admitted the contention because we '
~ ".I wondered whether the evaluation criterion in question shouldn't be read more literally, since NUREG-0654 often calls for definite quantities to be included in the plans. Presumably, the purpose of such calls is to make sure that the quantities are determined during, not after, the plan-ning process. "Further Rulings on Admissibility of Offsite Emergency i, Planning Contentions," June 14,1984, at 21-22.
i 7 l The tntervenor complains in his reply that it is clear that some implementing procedures are not in the plans, and that some sections or the plans which require implementmg procedures may not yet have them. As we said when me admitted this contention, there is no requiremefit that the implemeniing procedares be m the plans. To the contrary, see LBP.84-298. 20 SRC at 408. Nor is there any deadline for the draturig or procedures other than the natural deadline imposed by the rull-scale esercise or the t plans. % hat we seek is reasonable assurance that P.7 will be satts6ed.
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[ n. 7 ,, g,, -- - ' Y ' g, The Applicants filed for summary disposition on January 14,1985. Ac-A .. . .
.- companying the motion was an affidavit from Charles D. Reed, Pharma-
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1 e st in the Adult Ilealth Services Section of the Division ofliealth Serv-ices of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources. hir. Reed N ~ 1-c e;
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, ment, storage, and distribution of K1 for use in an emergency. The Staff f C
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responded in support of the motion on February 2,1985. Accompanying the StafT's response was an affidavit from Thomas I. Hawkins, who, as we have reported before, is Emergency hfanagement Program Specialist
?
for the Federal Emergency Slanagement Agency (FEh1A) and the FEh! A Region IV Liaison to South and North Carolina. The Intervenor. Alr. Wells Eddleman, replied in opposition to the motion on hfarch 11, 1985. The Applicants argue that it is cumbersome to keep the plans up to date on the quantities of K! required and stored, that these quantities
; are, for a number of reasons, among them changes in population density, J subject to frequent change. Reed Aflidavit,16. The Applicants are, in f efTect, arguing that the information called for by J.10.e belongs in an im-i plementing procedure, not in a plan. And, in fact, the State appears to
, treat this information, and related information, very much in the manner in which it treats implementing procedures: AfTiant Reed reports that the Division of IIealth Services frequently distributes to State-and local officials updated names of the locations where KI is stored the quantities of KI stored at each location, and the names, ad-dresses, and telephone numbers of the persons with access to the K1 stored at each location. Reed Affidavit,16.
The Applicants argue in the alternative that the quantities of KI which would be needed in an emergency have, in fact, been determined. Reed M '#'+ 1'a Affidavit,12. As we said above, to assure that such a determination was
*Mh.D.c$.g-y;,g,cq,gg,yghg~ij 7A M* y- 3 ,d made early on in the planning was the point of Evaluation Criterion J.10.e. No party to this proceeding has argued otherwise. When dealing l
! with an evaluation criterion, the aim of the criterion is more important than the letter, since an applicant's compliance with a criterion is not re-quired if the applicant can show that there is another way to satisfy the aim of the criterion. See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three hiite Island d Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-698,16 NRC 1290,1298-99 (1983).
The Intervenor now proposes that we litigate the adequacy of the quantity the State has determined it would need in an emergency. Inter-
,j venor's Reply at 5. Again, the Intervenor is proposing a new contention, one which could have been timely filed and a basis for it proffered. The Intervenor profTers none now.
l 224 4
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. ,. .. , u .s, heard in the Fall of 1984. It resches those contentions in favor of the Applicants and adversely to the Imervenors. The Decision also has the j effect of making other dispositise Board rulings on 3afety contentions -
~
i.e., rulings granting summary disposition motions or rejecting proposed
,j contentions - ripe for appellate review.
. -1 Hearings were held on certain emergency planning contentions in
. ?! June 1985 and the remaining emergency planning contention is sched.
.l uled to be heard in September. The Board anticipates that a final partial initial decision will issue late this year and resolve emergency planning and all other remaining contentions.
II. 31ANAGDIENT CAPABILITY A. Backttround The ability of Carolina Power & Light Company to manage the Shea-ron Harris facility - often referred to as " management capability" - had been a principal area of controversy at the construction permit l stage. Although the construction permit Licensing Board found that CP&L management could construct Shearon Harris safely, it was not then in a position to determine management capability to operate the facility. However, that Board, the Appeal Board, and, ultimately, the Commission adopted somewhat different approaches to the same end - that management capability would receive more than rnutine Staff resiew at the operating license 3tage.2 In re3pon3e to the Commission's direction, the NRC Staff performed a special " preliminary assessment" l of CP&L's management capability to operate the liarris facility. This as-l sessment was published in the federalRegister prior to the Notice of Op-portunity for Hearing on the operating license application. See JI Exh.
,y 38.
%9/;2OdQ@tc;51
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Possibly in response to the Staft's published assessment, several of l g the petitioners for intervention proposed sixteen relatively detailed
" management" contentions at the initial stage of this proceeding. LBP-82 Il9A,16 NRC 2069,2075 (1982L in order to simplify and consoli-date these contentions, the Board encouraged the petitioners, the Appli-cants and the NRC Staff to negotiate stipulated management conten-8The Licensing Board conditioned the construction permit on a demonsiration b> the Appbcaats or
! their management capabikty in a hearing at the operatir's .Kenw stage. ser LBP 79-19.10 NRC 37. 99 l (19798. The Appeal Board invahdated that condition. but directed the staff to prepare a prehminary as-scument or management capability at thai siege AL AB 5".11 NRC it. 36 #1M01 The Commiwon reversed that Appeat Board order as beyond that Board s delegated authonts. Nt adopted that Board's reher as its own CLi-8012. Il S RC 51411990s 235
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T . y must choose an adverse condition which is both sesere and not too infre-
,.y 7 quent in the plume EPZ under consideration. /J. The requirement for
, &- ,. c . - ^- such estimates is in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E,6 IV, the introduc-
,1 tory paragraph, and the ultimate source for the requirement is 10 C.F.R.
f ~ f 50.47(b)(10), which says, in relevant part, "[a] range of protective ac.
, ' . . ' . .i- - { '~, :,? 'M A .i tions [hasl been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ . . . ."
~ . "f p f Q ( W.O' ' ,The adverse weather assumed in the Applicants' time estimates is a
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severe rainstorm. Snowstorms are too infrequent around Shearon Harris to be usefully assumed in a time estimate. On average, each year only 7.5 inches of snow falls in that area of North Carolina, 2.5 of those
. inches in January, and 2.4 inches in February. McFeaters Amdavit at 2.
I Moreover, on average each year there are only 4 days in which there is any freezing rain. /J. at 3. Ilowever, the population of the plume EPZ is at its highest in the Fall, when adverse weather of any seserity is likely to be in the form of rain. Urbanik Affidasit,14. Nonetheless, the State is well-prepared to clear the roads for evacua. tion in a snowstorm, if evacuation were to be the dose-saving protective
. action under such circumstances. The North Carolina Department of Transportation maintains close communication with the National Weath-er Service and has crews on standby around the clock in every county which overlaps the EPZ. The Department has fifty pieces of equipment in those counties - one piece for every 12 miles of highway in the plume EPZ - assigned for use in a general emergency caused by an acci-dent at the plant. Adams Affidavit at 2-4. Thus, if such an emergency were to coincide with a large snowstorm, the Department would be pre-pared to begin simultaneous clearing of all the roads in the plume EPZ
- and of the major evacuation routes outside the plume EPZ - when the first snow fell. Id.
4 .1 : ~-m Affiant Adams estimates that, for any storm dumping up to 6 inches bW j-jfj of snow, it would take between 2.5 and 4 hours to cicar all the roads
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.y {fd p' Rh8%p@g'i needed for evacuation. In that time, every major U.S. or State road in i
. ;, the plume EPZ, and every major route beyond the 10-mile zone and
, leading to an evacuation shelter, could be scraped twice, and every other road within the 10. mile limit scraped once. Adams Affidavit at 3 4.
7 In its reply to the motion, CHANGE raises no objection to the adverse
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'j weather assumptions in the time estimates, and moreover says that "[ilt appears that the concerns of the contention have been adequately ad-dressed, insofar as it addresses the elTects of snow and ability of the l State to clear the snow and ice from the roads." llowever, CilANGE goe,s on to say that "[ilmplicit in the contention . . . is the effect of snow and ice on the ability of drivers of poorly equipped cars to deal with
, treacherous conditions and the ensuing difficulty in effectively clearing eL ,
226 5~ hNE$Y YJ Y $E Y~E' - _. _ ' - : k' 'l
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111. TiiER.\lOLU.\llNESCEN i~ DOSINIETERS 25S A. Introduction 258 B. Background . . 259 C. The ANSI Standard . . . 260 D. CP&L Performance in Dosimetry Tests . 262 E. Applicants' Quality Control for TLDs . . . 263
. IV. ENVIRONh1 ENTAL QUALIFICATION OF
._ ELECTRICAL EQUIP. STENT . . . 266
. A. Introduction .. . . 266 B. Contention 9A: ITT Barton Transmitters . 269 C. Contention 9B. Limitorque Valse Operators . 272 D. Contention 9C: Thermal Aging of RTDs . 275 E. Contention OD: Leakage Currents from Instrument Cables 278 F. Contention 9E: Orientation of Installed Equipment . . 280 G. Contention 9F: Inadequate Consideration of Radiation EITeets on Lubricants and Seals . . . 284
- 11. Contention 9G: Test Failures . . 285
- l. Conclusion . . 288 i
j V. CONTAINNIENT CONCRETE . . . ...... 289 l A. Introduction . . . 289 B. The Record . 290 C. 51r. Eddleman's Proposed Findings . 293 VI. SU.\1.\1 ARY DISPOSITION RULINGS 295 I VII. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 298 2 Vill. APPEALS . ... . . 298
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PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON SAFETY
! CONTENTIONS I. INTRODUCTION
, The factual and procedural background concerriing this contested operating license case are set forth in our first partial initial decision on environmental issues. LBP-85 5, 21 NRC 410. 412-14 (1985). This Par-tial Initial Decision addresses most of the safety contentions that were
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for these daily tasks is assured by regulations issued by t$ . State Depart-ment of Public Education. These regulations set out standards for the
. - student driver's health, vision, hearing, size, strength, age, character,
]j and attitude. Ntotion at 5. Prospective drivers must also take a training s course in driving school buses. j
. . In an emergency caused by an accident at the Sheaton liarris plant the
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, :. school bus drivers would, as they do daily, pick students up at the schools and drop them oft somewhere else, at assigned shelters in the case of an emergency. At least one school staff member would be on i each bus to supervise the student passengers. Pugh Affidavit,17. Nei-ther student drivers nor adult ones would be asked to return to the EPZ; after arrising at the shelters the student drivers would be free te join their parents. Pugh Atlidasit at 4 n.2; 16. Thus the student drivers would have faced no greater risk of exposure ta radiation than their passengers would have, and very likely less risk than the general public would have faced, since the schools would probably receive notification
~
for evacuation sooner than the general public would. Id.16.
. For these emergency tasks so little ditTerent from their nonemergency tasks, the school bus drivers, both student and adult, will receive ade-quate training. They will know which shelter they should drive to, and
/ what route to take to get there. /J.18. They will be instructed in certain concepts about radiation. Id. They will be given some overview of the fi emergency plans so that they will be able to understand better their own role in the plans. /d. And they will be urged to discuss their roles with their families so that they and their families can make arrangements which are consistent with the roles the driser would play in an emergen-cy. Id. The plans also provide for refresher training. Id. Affiant Dr.
Stileti claims that the historical record on emergency response shows that persens well-trained in their emergency roles perform them well in time of emergency and that high school students have demonstrated a
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pv L{' jQ'%y { 3:f particular willingness to perform emergency roles. N1:leti Affidavit,15. y, ' ' ! He also argues that student drivers, being neither parents nor spouses,
! would be less likely than older drivers would be to be caught between conflicting duties. /d.113-4.
. The Applicants also argue that requiring parental authorization for stu-i dent drivers to perform their roles in an evacuation would not increase the reliability or the quality of the performance of the student drivers, and therefore would not contribute to the health and safety of the stu-dents who would be passengers on the buses. Ntotion at 11-12. Nor, the
~
Applicants argue, would such authorization contribute to the health and safety of the drivers themselves, for even if they were not permitted to drive the buses, they would still ride in them and thus would face exactly 228 . _ _ . *E l,'. " C .-WN l}l.S . i ?h $1.' ? $~ -; ' - ~ a**'
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s Emergency Planning Joint Contention EPJ 1 -
' The text is as follows:
~
fects of severe snowoand clear evacuation routes. ice conditions o
. site Emergency Plans to the ei vacuarson times and/or capabbrics t
_ Section IV.E.8 of the State plan (at 50) is defi hl sonable amount of ume.enough snow plowse in this ares I te roads of snow or sice a rea.
l ference, at Tr.We admitted this contention during the M 974 75, 993-96. summary disposition on DecemberThe Appli ay 2,198 10 1934 Acants filed their motm j were three amdavits. Amantccompanying Meteorolo . Brian DtheMcFe notion t i I Company.gical studies, monitoring, Supervisor and assessmentHe with Applican has d meteorok cal t Training & Technical Services Department I Manager of the Maintenance . Amant M.C. andAdams Equipm h Highways,forin responsibility the North overseeing Carolinathe anch and maintaining of the Depart Division of r . pathw y EPZ. The third affiant a was Ro e plume exposure al qualiScations we brie 0y describe in our discus i mm, whose profession-The Staff and the Federal Emergency Manages on filed a joint response in support ment of the motion Agency (FEMA)o n January 16,1985. Ac-II and Thomas I. Hawkins. We , briefly d omas Urbanik
, 7; " d 6 %::C tions of both men elsewhereein this Decisi professional qualifica-
=- c icX. M;jpg WC<g'h Contention 213a. Intervenor CHANGE n our discussion of
~
motion on March II,1985. Cosponsoring Intervenon opp at D. Wilson We420.had and the designated CCNC Conservation as leadorth rs were Dr. interveno Council Richard Carolina (CCNC). of N
' r. See LBP 84 29B,20 NRC Section IV.A of NUREG-0654, Appendix 4
\
and adverse. There cannot onditions,possibly normal jb possible weather condition. Rather, incalculated order t for every ' have to choose between sheltering and evacu tio giveJth of the effect of adverse weather on evacu t mes, the estimators s
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Klimm. We brie 0y describe the professional qualifications of all three
~- . men elsewhere in this Decision, of hlr. Pugh in our discussion of Con-1C
'y tention 213a, and of Dr. Stileti and hlr. Klimm in our discussion of Con-tention 215. The Staff and the Federal Emergency Slanagement Agency f - ./ e, j (FESIA) filed a joint response in support of the motion on February 27
- k e;;c f: H . m - j 1985, with an aflidavit from Thomas 1. Itawkins, whose professional 7 9 ; qualifications we brie 0y described in our discussion of Contention 213a.
. ~%7n;r.q, M $ $ ( ". - . -
, . - CHANGE replied in opposition to the motion on March II,1985.
~
, The Applicants argue Orst that the evacuation of the schools would
; probably be well under way by the time parents and other members of the general public receised notification of a general evacuation, since noti 0 cation to the schools, both public and private, would precede, to some estent, notincation to the general public, and the buses and drivers needed for evacuation of a given school would already be at the school as a matter of daily routine, or at least at a nearby school. Pugh Affidavit ,
i at 3. 1 I The Applicants argue second that parents well-informed about what is being done for their children's safety would not be likely to try to pick their children up at school. According to Dr. Mileti, if parents are in-j. formed well in advance about the plans' provisions for the evacuation of I their children, and informed at the time of an emergency that those pro-visions are being carried out and that parents shculd proceed to the shel-ter assigned them, there is no reason, in light of the historical record on the response of the public in general emergencies, to expect what some choose to call the "thm seneer of ciulization" to be stripped away and parents to show up in great numbers at the schools, in panic and needing l to be subdued by police. Aliteti Af0 davit at 3-4. Afliant Pugh reports that parents will indeed be informed about plans for the evacuation of
. schoolchildren; the public information brochures to be distributed
.;[ ,, ._3%b throughout the plume EPZ will describe those plans, as will planning -
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[l Q' E S I personnel at Parent Teacher Organization meetings at every school in I 3.". ' the plume EPZ. Pugh Affidavit at 4 n.2;14. In the event of an emergen-cy, the Emergency Broadcast System would inform parents about the l
' evacuation of the schools, report the names of the shelter to which each
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. school's students had been evacuated, and urge parents not to try to pick their children up at school. Id. at 3.
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i Nonetheless, the plans make some provision for parents' trying to i unite with their children before evacuation. Parents who do go to the schools will, of course, be permitted to pick up their children. Id. at 5 n.3. Personnel at each school will be trained to deal with the traffic. All the schools in the plume EPZ have multiple entrances and exits, with the entrances parents normally use to pick their children up separate
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roads within the time parameters specified." The issue CilANGE raises . , , .. here is new in this proceeding and can have no elTect, either procedural i ~^ *' N , or substantive, on our ruling on summary dispoi. tion. Moreover, the issue is late and pleaded without basis, and it has no bearing on the ade-
,1}7 ,
quacy either of the evacuation time estimates - about which Cil ANGE
'l now raises no objection - or the adequacy of the State's preparations M' N '- ', J[
for clearing the roads of snow and ice.
. :r.
'i' Emergency Planning Joint Contention 4(a)
The text of the contention is as follows: section E4d of State Procedures f r. 4h is deficient because - Fifty percent of school bus drners are high whool juniors .ind seniors (as young as 169 ) cars). They should not be espected to perform as emergene) personnel without esphcit and specific authoritation from their parents. Esen with such authorization they should not be trusted to perform in emergency situations. Of the seventy-five drivers planners judge would be needed to evacuate the public and private schools in the plume EPZ, about sixty-six would be high school students licensed to drive school buses. Pugh Affidavit,
- 13. We admitted the contention in LBP-84-29B, supra 20 NRC at 420 21. Cosponsoring intervenors were Dr. Richard D. Wilson and CH ANGE. We designated CH ANGE as the lead intervenor.
The Applicants filed for summary disposition on January 11, 1985, with affidavits from Jesse T. Pugh 111, and Dr. Dennis S. Mileti. We g briefly describe the professional qualifications of Mr. Pugh in our discus-sion of Contention 213a, and of Dr. Mileti in our discussion of Conten-
)
tion 215. The Staff and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
..... a.. v. . . (FEMA) responded in support of the motion on February 27, 1985,
[ v '$M7[c,.$%hhj J with an afTidavit from Thomas 1. Hawkins, whose professional qualifica- I
-". -f q ~ g.p v.q, ( 2 tions we briefly describe in our discussion of Contention 213a.
./- m
- %' CHANGE replied in opposition to the motion on March 11,1985.
The Applicants' argument, in a nutshell, is that the emergency tasks of the school bus drivers would be little different from the tasks they
, ,, .y , '
competently perform daily during the school year, that they will be well-
.W S' 1. '
' ir. formed about what would be expected of them in an emergency, and that there is no evidence in the historical record of emergency response to suggest that high school students would not perform their assigned
,?
~
roles. Daily during the school year, in all kinds of weather, school bus driv-ers who are students drive students of all ages to and from the schools in the plume EPZ. Pugh Aflidavit,14. The student drivers' competence
~ '
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Cite as 22 NRC 232 (1985) LBP 85 28 m UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ci
. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j.- ,
'I 7
~
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING 90ARD
. y. e,, ,
a
! Before Administrative Judges:
James L. Kelley, Chairman Dr. James H. Carpenter Glenn O. Bright in the Matter of Docket No. 50-400 OL (ASLBP No. 82-472 03 OL)
, CAROLlHA POWER & LIGHT i COMPANY and NORTH' CAROLINA EASTERN MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant) August 20,1985
! +
3 i In this Partial Initial Decision, the Licensing Board decides most of
, .. . g the contested safety issues, including management capability issues, in
- -3D - dN-F -esy.'q.p. _c;p@ the Applicants' favor.
,c. 6 y . - p .
--a .?-, . 9 v. .y ,9 ...
3'.- " . .h Terr "AL ISSUES DISCUSSED g Accuracy of Thermoldminescent Dosimeters Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment t
.- J. . , *; :G
Integrity of Containment Concrete.
-j APPEARANCES i
Thomas A. Baxter, John H. O'Neill, Jr., Pamela H. Anderson and j 311chael A. Swiger, Washington, D.C., and Richard E. Jones _ ; .; . k , l 232
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..I the same risks of exposure to radiation their fellow students would. Id.
,, , ~~
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.) at 11. The Applicants also point out that State law expressly authorizes
'*' ~
the use of school buses "for emergency management purposes," but O- - .
, neither State statutes nor regulations require parental authorization for
- y q.j :H ,h ' i " -
!, student bus drivers to drive the buses in an emergency. Id. at 6 (citing
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9 N.C. Gen. Stat. l 115C-242(6)). CHANGE replies with what amount to four arguments. First, it claims that Applicants' affiant Dr. Mileti " assumes," when predicting that high school students would perform their roles well, that they will be trained in those roles. Given Mr. Pugh's affidavit and the relevant j ! provisions of the plans, we fail to see what is questionable about this as-sumption. CHANGE argues second that the State Department of Public Education regulations on the qualifications of school bus drivers " appear to be at most , , paper requirement {s) of little reliability or application in emergency conditions." CHANGE proffers no basis for this claim. CHANGE grants that "the reliability and quality of a driver's perform-ance may not be dependent on parental authorization," but CHANGE nonetheless asserts that " parental authorization and approval are certain- ~ ly important in considering issues of this nature." How important in con-sidering which issues of what nature CH ANGE does not say. CHANGE last asserts its " general experience" of students of high school age
- against Dr. Mileti's " general experience" of students that age, and thus invites us to prefer undocumented, unsworn claims to sworn affidavits i summarizing scholarship. Again, "a party opposing the motion may not j rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his answer; his answer by af-fidavits or as otherwise provided in this section must set forth specific l facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact." 10 C.F.R. s 2.749(b).
,m ...
s- _ , _ . k ' g . :@:2: 7m ,.2y'$.gW$ w< Contention 4(d) 4
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; > s. The text of tl.e contention is as follows: l.
. p. -
Section E4d of State Procedures (p. 47) is deficient because - l . Most parents would demand to pick up their children at school. The chaos at escry y (% 73- - school in the area would require all local law enforcement officers and several county officers to contain. This factor is not mentioned in the plan. J l The cosponsors of this contention are Dr. Richard D. Wilson, Mr.
~
j Wells Eddleman, and CHANGE. We designated CHANGE as the lead
~'
intervenor. See LBP 84-29B, supra,20 NRC at 421. < The Applicants moved for summary disposition on January 14,1985, j with affidavits from Jesse T. Pugh III, Dr. Dennis Mileti, and Robert D.
, "-C.. .. .
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229 i i l L .a . en - _
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111. tiler.\lOLU.\llNESCEN T DO31.\lETERS 258 A. Introduction 258 - x 1 B. Background 259
~~ - ' ' ' ' ' '
'$ . C. The ANSI Standard 260 D. CP&L Performance in Dosimetry Tests 262
, y : . .~ m .. +
E. Applicants' Quality Control for TLDs . 263
' q p;w +w R:i
, N 'Ff/EyJM3h'A
., IV. ENVIRONNIENTAL QUALIFICATION OF r g r g . ,. , - ELECTRICAL EQUIPNtENT 266 A. Introduction 266 B. Contention 9A: ITT-Barton Transmitters 269
' C. Contention 9B: Limitorque Valve Operators 272 D. Contention 9C: Thermal Aging of RTDs 275 E. Contention OD: Leakage Currents from instrument Cables 278 F. Contention 9E: Orientation of Installed Equipment 280 G. Contention 9F: Inadequate Consideration of Radiation EITects on Lubricants and Seals 284 H. Contention 9G: Test Failures 285
- 1. Conclusion 288 V. CONTAINNIENT CONCRETE 289 A. Introduction 289 B. The Record 290 C. Nlr. Eddleman's Proposed Findings 293 I VI. SU.\1NI ARY DISPOSITION RULINGS 295 i
- Vll. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . 298
- .. ,.a_ .
.. . . Vill. APPEALS 298
=. ,. ng-sy .mp.9
> If PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON SAFETY
, CONTENTIONS I. INTRODUCTION The factual and procedural background concerning this contested operating license case are set forth in our first partial initial decision on environmental issues. LBP-85-5, 21 NRC 410,412-14 (1985L This Par-tial Initial Decision addresses most of the safety contentions that were e - *' =
234 u z 4 4 M m b H K% u wn w n w m u x ,a\ ..
from exits the buses normally use. /d. ' O. AIGant Khmm sa> s that al-though the esacuation time estimates were not calculated with the possi-
~
bihty in mind that parents would try to go to the schools, such trips to the schools would not invalidate the estimates, for the estimates allot ample times for preparation and mobilization, and the double-counting l _ .'~ ,. discussed in Contention 215 leaves some room for the trafGe " friction"
..,n ,h,[ - f, ,a caused by parents' going to the schools. Klimm Affidavit at 3.
"rJ- :' T s , Inexplicably, CilANGE construes the Applicants' Grst argument to assume that the schools would be evacuated before parents arrive at them. CH ANGE's only other argument is that we hase received testimo-ny at a limited appearance session from parents who said they would
, probab!y try to pick their children up at school. Thus we are invited to set aside, on the basis of t rief unsworn testimony about what the testi-Ger thought he or she might do in a general emergency, sworn af fidavits about how people base m fact behased in general emergencies. "[Al party opposing the motion may not rest upon the mere allegations or de-j nials of his answer, his answer by atridavits or as otherwise provided in this section must set forth speciGe facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact." 10 C.F.R. s 2.749(b).
Tile ATON11C SAFETY AND i t LICENSING BOARD i James L. Kelley. Chairman
, A DNilNISTR ATIVE J L'DG E 1
1 James H. Carpenter
- -@]kMh2..-YM[gh25$h*[.(f(
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ADSilNISTR ATlVE JUDGE l Glenn O. Bright ADN11NISTR ATIVE JUDGE 1
~ 'I Bethesda, Nf aryland e
231 y 3.v.'- 4' j:"cQ:{ysf[dNM .b h h ck%ApY5.i d g h .r. q ..ghyL .f .. .,
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is . - - - i tions. The result was a stipulation by all parties to Joint Contention I, j
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, which reads as follows: i
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,+
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The Apphcants have not demonstrated the adequacy of their managing. engineering.
, j operating and maintenance personnel to safely operate, maintain and manage the
- i. , + , .
1 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant as evidenced by their record of safety and per-
-:D*'; 3 9 ; . -}J formance at their other nuclear power faciltties. A pattern of management inadequa.
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cres and unquahfied and/or inadequate staff is likely to be reproduced at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant and result in health and safety problems. 3 Joint Contention I is very broad. Indeed it is so lacking in specifics that we probably would not have admitted it over an Applicant or Staff objection on that ground. In this case, however, it was apparent that a relative lack of specificity was the quid pro quo for a single stipulated contention, a price the Applicants and Staff were willing to pay. A princi- , pal reason for requiring specificity in contentions is to protect the oppos-ing parties from unduly broad discovery. Because the Applicants and i Staff evidenced a willingness (through their stipulations to Joint Conten-tion I) to waive that protection here, there was no reason for the Board
,j to insist on it. In any event, the Applicants and Staff apparently foresaw that they could adequately particularize this broad contention in the dis-covery process. To a large extent, that is what happened. ! t ; B. Standards Management capability or " competence": (as it is sometimes called) is a murky area of nuclear power regulation. The Commission, in one of its few pronouncements on the subject, has recognized "that it has not
, established definitive standards for management organization and opera-
. . _ . _ . . . . . tion for nuclear power plants." Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile d ,lf
- f. ( ,m- - c _pij..-.s r, .
g" r% Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CL1-80-5,1I NRC 408,409-10 (1980).
' W.S. -w ;+t &r .. exn ,-.'t . M. . ,. .m Acknowledging the present lack of standards, the Appeal Board has
' M M called management competence a " nebulous . . slippery concept." Id.,
ALAB-772,19 NRC 1193,1206,1208 (1984). Not surprisingly, the few , decided cases in this area do not illustrate clear " management" princi-
, ples, but tend to turn on their particular facts. See id., LBP-81-32,14 O:5. . 1 NRC 381 (1982); Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear
, *] Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3, and 4), LBP-7919,10 NRC 37 (19794 t
lg 'EA s 2
~
2 The phrases " management capabibty" and " management competence" are used interchangeably in this Decision and in the decided cases. Both grow out of the requirement that an apphcant ror an operat. ing hcense be "sechnicaHy quahfied" to operate the facihty.10 C.F.R. 6 50 40(bl. That rule. in turn, denses rrom ( 182(a) of the Atomic Energy Act,42 U.s C. ( 2232.
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- 3. . m . 236 i
br $.' P - - U N b.' .
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- - ,7-Houston Lighring and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units I and 2),
LBP-84-13,19 NRC 659,669-98 (1984). y, k i ,., ^,.;.* y. b-d
, 4.; The lack of clear standards for " management capability" becomes less
- .. , . significant, however, when it is recognized that in a particular case that 1 c
-- phrase may be little more than a loosely descriptive label for certain f .. W ., kinds of fairly specific problems that can arise at a nuclear power plant.
- 7. ].]1]fg+ M f,7 Q 3 :.sinN So viewed, a " management competence" label can be similar to the
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." " safety," " environmental" and " emergency planning" labels Boards have become accustomed to using as convenient demarcation lines for segregable parts of big cases. For example, in the " management" phase i
of the TMI Restart proceeding, the Commission raised a series of rela- i tively detailed questions for exploration by the Licensing Board - e.g., whether the Unit I health physics program and radiation waste system were appropriately stalTed with qualified individuals to ensure the safe operation of the facility. CLI-80-5, supra,11 NRC at 409. Presumably,
. these questions could have been raised as separate " safety" issues in the
; case without any explicit reference to " management capability."3 Similar-ly, in the present case and for the most part, the Intervenors' concerns l about CP&L management eventually focused upon reasonably specific areas, such that the parties were fairly called upon to respond to them, and the Board is now in a position to make reasonably specific findings, based on the hearing record.
C. 31ana:tement - General Considerations
- The Applicants presented a panel of high-level management officials to testify about CP&L's management structure for nuclear activities and
}
related matters, including E.E. Utley, Executive Vice President, Power
,. W ? - ' Supply, Engineering and Construction, and M.A. McDuffie, Senior Vice .fMd 1 fT 'DE] ..~
qp(q,+K g . u[.[ President, Nuclear Generation Group. See Applicants' Joint Testimony of Utley, McDuffie, Elleman and Banks on Contention I, ff. Tr. 2452, at I 1-5. These panel witnesses have extensive experience in nuclear matters s 1
! generally and in CP&L's nuclear activities in particular. For example, Mr. Utley has been a senior management oflicer of CP&L since 1972,
., and is currently Chairman of the Evaluation and Assistance Division of
- s. y j the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Mr. MeDuffie has 17
?
3 so too, in this case the Intervenors' particular concerns - although related in one way or another to 4 " management" - could have been heard individually as "sarety" contentions. Conversely, a contention
'I like Eddleman Contention 41. which was labeled a " safety" comention might have been heard as a
' " management" contention in light or widespread problems in the pipe hanger inspection process. Sn Testimony or Paul Bemis fr. Tr 3660 at 22.
- This section incorporates the Board's rmdings or ract and conclumons or law on Joint Contention I.
Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(ai.
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years of nuelcar plant construction experience; he has been a senior management 00icer of CP&L since 1974. It is not necessary for us to describe CP&L's organizational structure and functional relationships in detail We include such description only as necessary to provide a context for the Joint Intersenors' criticisms in the management area.
. ?'..
~,
Like all corporations, CP&L is headed by a Board of Directors. The Board has ten "outside Directors; four corporate otTicers also serve as "inside Directors.5 Sherwood H. Smith, Jr., is the Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive 00icer of CP&L and, as such, oversees all of the company's operations. Utley Testimony at 7. Nf r. Smith has been a member of CP&L senior management since 1971, when he was named Senior Vice President and General Counsel. Smith, Tr. 3N6. lie desotes a substantial portion of his time to CP&L nuclear actisities and to national nuclear md ustry ae tis itie 3. Tr. 3919-21,
. 3924-26.
} The Intervenors ask us to Gnd, without any record citation, that "reli-l ance on one person (Str. Smith) for the three top positions has the potential to prestude effective change in response to problems in nuclear t operation.' Joint Intervenors' Proposed Finding (JI PF) 13. The Board declines. !n the nrst place, it is unclear whether Str. Smith actually holds three separate corporate positions. His testimony suggests that he is
, " Chief Executive OfGcer" by virtue of his being President of the compa-ny. Smith. Tr. 3906. In any esent, there is no evidence in the record to support the Intersenors' proposition. On the contrary, it is not uncom-mon for senior corporate ofGeers to wear two or more hats, some of which may be largely titular. Smith, Tr. 3914. Oserall, the Board was favorably impressed with Str. Smith's appearance as a witness. See Tr.
3907-36. We have no reason to think that CP&L's nuclear activities will t.. % . .. n: . - suffer as a result of Str. Smith's having more than one title in the com- - %_ . 7*Mr._;*-Th.7h.j. J-AM ?.g
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9 I (, . ,: . .,y. .q 9 i in 19C. ai me reo. si of W br'h Carolm PJts L tmes Cemmmion. 4 r,rm of mmpment ton-whets reuewed C PALT Attuties ed made a numher of resommendat.ons tur enange. anout half in. solurg " management process improsements opportunmes " the f.ru such resommendation *as that
' ' CP&L stude on its Board ~outude" directors baung nudear ciperience in i9114. CP&L reported to
, the Utihties Commisson that the status or the "outside nudear director" recommendation was
" completed ' JI Lth.14. al 3 Homeser. M r Liley neuiricJ Ihat there is no outude director with nudear esperreme on the CPAL Board we were t(id . hat the intent of the status rerori was to reflect the
, hirirg of a part Aular indmduai miih ettenuse etrenence en nudear acteutres as a consultant to the g Board L tiey restimony at 7. Tr 2797. smith. Tr 391d.13 the Board riods CPAL3 'eport to the Utili-
, t'es Commusicn on this recommendauon mNeading even taking into accourit Apphcants' E thibit 3, w%h prouded a f#er esplan.ition Nesertheless we attJCh Po suDslJntial sigmIhancC lo lhls matter, in ar:d of itself. nor So any mher enlense lerd to prme a prxhuty to make mdleading staiements lo reg As:cr$ aumormes
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4 i Nir. Utley, as Executive Vice Pre 3ident for Power Supply, Engineering and Construction, reports to Str. Smith. Five organizations, each headed n- ,.- . .e. ,,
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by a Vice President, are involved in CP&L's nuclear power activities ; and report to hir. Utley. These organizations are the Nuclear Gei s ration
~
Group (headed by hir. NicDuffie), the Brunswick Nuclear Pror:tt, the {
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- :A. J 2.' NOperations
. Support Group, the Corporate Nuclear Safety and Research
. ,~ . . c Department, and the Corporate Quality Assurance Department. Two of
'__J . $~.2'5 $ '
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the tive groups - Nuclear Generation and the Brunswick Department l
' - are concerned solely with nuclear activities. Utley Testimony at 8-11.
The other three groups support all of CP&L's generating activities, including coal, hydro and petroieum fired plants. CP&L has approxi-i
' mately fifteen nonnuclear generating plants employing about 1000 peo-pie.
. A provision of the Staffs Standard Reuew Plan (SRP) states that:
"A corporate officer should clearly be respon3ible for nuclear activities.
E without having ancillary responsibilities that might detract from his at-
~ tention to nuclear safety matters."* The Intervenors correctly point out that "the only CP&L corporate officer responsible for all nuclear activi-ties is Str. Utley, who is also responsible for all fossil generation, trans-mission and distribution for the company." Ji PF 28. The Intervenors further point out, again correctly, that "this does not meet the Standard
' Review Plan acceptance criteria." M However, the Staff s Standard Resiew Plan does not rise to the level of a binding regulation. Like Regulatory Guides, the Standard Resiew Plan merely rellects the Staffs position on how one aspect of an Appheants' technical qualifications should be judged. Furthermore, the Staff is free to waise criteria in its Standard Review Plan if, under the circumstances, it is nevertheless satisfied with the Applicants' organizational structure. That is what hap-
' '~
- 7. g ,- g g. ' #'~" pened in this case.
Staff witness Bemis testified that "the Staff finds . . the present or- g f.pygll;3gy{, ,
- E;tnization within CP&L is acceptable . . although further nuclear con- 1
- m. . +' @. ", v.C D , Tcj solidation is desirable." Bemis Testimony, ff. Tr. 3660, at 36. N1 ore spe-cifically, Nir. Bemis testified that:
The Corporate Quahty Assurance and the Corporate '%uslear safety and Research
.a . , . .% - i.. Departments report to the Executne Vice Preudent. PSE&C rather th.tn to the
~
corporate ofTecer who has primary responsibihty for nuclear support actntties, which appears to be common industry practice. The reportabihty of the departments was
,' determmed by the appbcant to gne these ocpartmems additional independenee.
.s flowever, not only does this plase escessne direct responsibihty on the Executne
* ,I*..-
^
- sRP 131.1. quoted in Berms Testimony. IT. Tr. hrA at h
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,, , >pg Vice President who is alreaJ) responsible for the largest majority of the company
' employees and operation, it also remoses the day-to-day decision-making capabih-
.m ties intohing interface with the departrnents from the corporate officer who is con-sidered as the primary corporate officer for nuclear support actisi:.es. The staff finds 1
l this reportability to be acceptable for the three sites at this time. However, the staff
.q will continue to review this organization in practice.
~
,- :i Id. at 37. The Staff considered it significant that in August 1983, only a l year before its testimony in this case, CP&L had undergone "a major re-structuring of the corporate organization" which had been explained to NRC as "a major step in CP&L's movement toward nuclear consolida-tion in the CP&L organization." /d. at 30. Str. Bemis went an to outline the major features of these changes and their rationale. /d. at 31-35.
.Nir. Utley provided further details about the recent changes, mos:
notably the assignment of a corporate officer (or manager with the status of a department head) to each of the three nuclear plant sites to manage activities at that site. The principal purpose of this change had l been to " provide firmer management control over and greater accounta-bility for activities at the plant." Nir. Utley regarded this change as the
, " single most irnportant improvement . . CP&L has made in the way in which it manages its nuclear program." Utley Testimony at 34.
In view of the recentness and significance of these changes, the Staff
. decided to give its qualified approval to them at this time. The Staff also promised to " closely monitor . . to determine whether actual perform-ance is clearly demonstrated during major evaluations." Berp Testimo-ny at 38.
Ba>ed in part on the Staff's assurance that it will monitor the practical working of the recent changes in the CP&L organization, thit Board ac-cepts that structure, as it has been presented to us. That structure ap.
. . s . .. . s pears to be reasonable and calculated to focus prompt, high-level
-d j.I N 4 6,M h. M k M N_. - management attention on safety concerns as they arise. The Intervenors
.[$h ,
h y propose no finding that the CP&L organizational structure does not
; meet any binding licensing standard. Nor, except as already discussed, da they direct us toward any record evidence calling that structure into question.'
- I j
7 The Joint in:ervenors propose a rindmg that semor management personnet do not receive written evaluanons of their performance.11 PF 22. % hde the record supports that fact, we see hitle relevance to i i the issue of techmcal competence Joint intervenors' Proposed findirig 23 seeks to fault Mr smith for taking into account the performance of the nuclear umts in his evaluauon of Mr Utley, as disunguished from an evaluation based solely on safety contderations, apparently without regard to cost. Mr smith
+, made it c! car that top level management ofbam are evaluated under various enteria, he resuGed. how-ever. that ")ou hase to start with their safe performance . wfety to the public has to come first "
sm,th. Tr. 3 717. The impbcauon that management offkials should be evaluated solely on ihe basis of safety, wohout regard to such ihmg5 es output whedu;es or cost. is not rnerely urarealisuc, but fatuvus (Cantmud)
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f l D. Brunswick - General b'4 : ,d Apart from general management considerations, the testimony and ex-yc-17p - 1.<.
- H hibits largely focused on particular aspects of the Applicants' manage- ,y, e ,E_ Y , " ~i ment of its Brunswick facility and on the Applicants' ratings in the L a M;,I Jy, b . ; : r, Staf!'s annual " Systematic Assessment of License Performance" (com-monly called "SALP Reports") for 1981 84. The pertinent history at $fMh py#iMd99p M6fgp .cy7 .W % 7-; '
Brunswick and these SALP Reports are closely interrelated. For the sake
. L' _
of clarity, we turn to the Brunswick history first. Applicants' testimony concerning Brunswick came principally from hir Utley (Testimony at 29-33) and from the current senior CP&L managers at Brunswick - Patrick Howe, Vice President-Brunswick Nuclear Project, and C.R. Dietz, General Nianager-Brunswick Plant. See Howe /Dietz Testimony, ff. Tr. 3124. The senior managers and the orga-nizational structure presently in place at Brunswick are pertinent, not in , t and of themselves, but for what they say about the Applicants' willing-
, j ness and ability to identify management problems and to implement cor-3 rective action in a timely manner.
J c, , Both Str. Howe and h!r. Dietz have extensive training and experience In the nuclear field. Str. Howe has some 30 years of nuclear experience. 3: 4 .
,,c-M* -
. including senior positions at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, the Atomic Energy Commission and CP&L. Str. Dietz has held a variety of responsible positions in the nuclear industry. Howe /Dietz Testimony at '
- 13. Stessrs. Howe and Dietz spoke on the basis of first hand experience about the Brunswick plant and, generally, the Board found their testimo-ny persuasive. Stessrs. Howe and Dietz testified in some detail about i the present organization and staffing of the Brunswick Nuclear Project.
i Id. at 1 10. The record reflects that the present organization and staffing at Brunswick are adequate. However, an earlier period at Brunswick, Erg #d& sp % from about 1977 untillate 1982, raises questions about CP&L's manage- , ment competence, not only at that facility, but in all its nuclear opera-M* " L. k * ;-.t,h:hh 3 tsons. l E. The NRC Staff's View of Brunswick , i - i~ The NRC Staff's principal witness on the management contention was , Paul R. Bemis, a Section Chief in the NRC's Atlanta Ollice. hir. Bemis L l 1 was very well qualified to address the management contention. His Intervenors ask us to find that "only hrn'ted personnet acuens" have been taken in response to viola-l nons or NRC regulations JI PF 25. There is insufTicient evidence in the record to make acy generatira. i ! tions about this subject. Joint intersenors' Exhibit 17 inc.icates that more regulation violations occur at operating plants tRobinson and Brunswicht than at a construction site tHarrist Thai would not be surpnsing, but it proves nothing about the Apphcants' managenal competence. I 241 i
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general background and experience were set forth m his extensive tes-timony. Furthermore, for approximately 2 years preceding the hearing, 7,
~
Str. Bemis was directly responsible "for managing the performance of
' , d) the NRC inspection and enforcement program at all of the CP&L facili-
. ties." Bemis Testimony at 6. Ntr. Bemis explained this unusual assign-ment, as follows: r' %.
- 2 In the fall of 1982, the Regional Admmistrator and his top management statidecid-ed that due to numerous contmumg problems at CPAL facihties, m particular the I Brunswick site, a break from a consentional .NRC management style was required and a radical management style would be put mto place . Rather than managmg solch from the Regional Ofike I was detailed to obserse first hand the operations at the mdiudual nuclear sites and corporate otAc. Durms the first set months of this rew m;,me t. l spent i; proumaieh U of n'3 normal wod nme awgnment at Cral ncetear *.ies .tnd tne cor;wif e mnse es arcaimg ine ru.igement at the ruc. car sua. and at Ine sorporate olike. p' ant orcrauun, mduJmg support groups, and progress of the Brunswick and Robmson imprmement Programs to ensure that i les ons learned from these programs were implemented at liairts. Durmg the past
! year. I hase been esaluating the programs put m place to ensure that progress is 8
being achiesed. esaluatmg implementation of the new corporate and site organiza-
! tions including indmdual managers, and following closely the Robinson Steam
! Generator Repair Project, the implementation of the Brunswick and Robinson im-provement Programs, and the construction progress at the Harris facihty.
l Among other matters, Str. Bemis testified in some detail concerning the following areas of concern at Brunswick.
- 1. Enforcement flistory According to Sir. Bemis, " Brunswick's enforcement history has been poor." /d. at 15. (This assessment is also indicated by prior SALP rat-s . . w2 e m . - - u ings, as discussed further below.) Str. Bemis singled out a civil penalty 3-ylph 739c, - m s ...;fa, h .
of $600,000 - the largest penalty levied by NRC to that date - associat-ed with certain surveillance and quality assurance activities. Id. See JI l Exh.18. He testified that: Or gmal4. it was thought that on!) .t few sursei!!arw regairements were miwed but alter a thorough check of the Technwal Speci6eations it was determmed that a large number of Limitmg Conditions for Operation could not be seri6ed. When the magnitude of these problems was recc neted. CPil management shut down both units, performed the required seriGe stiens. and began development of the Bruns-wick improsement Program (BIPL
~
Str. Bemis characterized this incident as a " breakdown in management
. controls" (Bemis Testimony at 20), a characterization with which Nlr.
Smith and Str. Utley of CP&L seemed to agree. Tr. 2907,3928.
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? With respect to more recent trends in enforcement matters, however, 2-Ntr. Bemis testiGed that "my review of enforcement history of CP&L
- ~~ , ~
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~
sites indicates violations are becoming fewer in number. Store impor-4 . tantly, the level of severity of the violation is decreasing.' Bemis Tes-N U.. : w
' .*1, , , . timony at 18. He further concluded that violations at the liarris plant
. ' .. ~ . WL.gx. - ' ' . 'x.-. U r: - over the past 3 years, for the most part, "did not represent programmatic or management control system failures." /d. at 20.8 fl ~ ? 4 qD @% xy,e$,:n.3 $ @t
- 2. Other Bruinswick Problems Referant to Slanagement Competence Str. Bemis also cited certain other Brunswick problem areas he consid-cred pertinent to future operation of Harris. For several years, Brunswick had a relatnely 3 mall operatmg 3utT which haJ led to high turnover rates, long working hours and generally poor stati morale. These factors undoubtedly made it dif6 cult to attract and retain qualified personnel.
Nir. Bemis noted, howeser, that "due to management directed changes at Brunswick of the past 18 months, employee morale has improved and f _ , .. ._ site attrition has dropped from greater than 11% to less than 4% per
-w .
. xG+ - ^ 7 '{ year." /d. at 25. As Ntr. Howe testiGed, the number of employees at
- ; .^'". t . s .c g 6- - Brunswick has increased dramatically, from 400 in 1980 to about triple
, W. ~', that number at the present time. Howe Testimony at 1516. Completion of required rework Gowing from TNil requirements and equipment fail-ures, and NRC regulations limiting working hours hne reduced extend-ed working hours. All of these related changes hase improsed the quality of work and employee morale. Bemis Testimon> at 25-26.
i Brunswick had experienced " numerous problems" in its radiation pro-tection program. Str. Bemis attributed these problems to " poor manage-ment control of the problem." /J. at 26. He testiGed that: 5* In the summer of 1980, the radiauon protection problems culminated wah a large M f civil penalty being issued for Brunswick allowing contaminated material to be J.*mf % h Q i dumped in a clean area. CP&L management then took decrsne action by instalhng a new manager oser the program and gave him the required backing to completely re. structure the raJiation protection program. Urgrading proced ares. additional upgradtrg rif equipment, and more quahned personnel were ir.3talled at the faulity i This program has seen continued improsement to the present and is reflected in I each S ALP rating since that time. . The if arris program has t enefited from the problems experienced at Brunswick. in that personnel are better trained from the l
- i
- rhe joint Intersenors aho point to an incident that occurred in January 190 insching refueling oper-e aiions as evidence of programmaus detiuencies at Bruns *sk. Il Pt' 10e. rr J'54 5 7. the circumstantes concermng this rnodent were nel ful!y desekiped on the recorj aad n is undcar whether it represents an nolated enodent or a prograr" main dehaeaev in any esent. i*ic rudem murred when the Hruns-
*sa !mprmernent P'an e n first bemg implemented h siew of imremerre'"5 under th.si plan and thereaf ter. *e see no vgmfacance in the inaJem for present rurmes.
243
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beginning, a superior program will be m place at fuel load, and Harris has state-
- of-the art equipment to begm operation. These items lead the NRC to conclude that v - -
the Harris radiation program will meet requirements and not hase the problems ex-s e p, .. . .- . . - ' , ;c :.; I perienced at Brunswici . Q.- u,- u.
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- 3. The Brunswick impronfment Plan '
As the foregoing discussion indicates, Mr. Bemis saw in Brunswick a disconcerting pattern of regulatory problems between the late 1970's and late 1982, followed by marked, even dramatic, improvement from then until the present time. It appears that from a management perspec-tive these healthy changes come about partly as a result of changes in CP&L attitudes and partly as a result of strong pressure from NRC offi. cials in Region 2. Mr. Bemis testified that:
" By mx!-1982, the Regional Office had concluded that no substantial program im.
provements had been observed since the Cantrell concerns were aired in the 1979 j ASLB hearings on Harris. Therefore, the NRC insisted en a formal improvement program. The NRC gase general LSut to the BIP requirements The general require. ments of this program were:
- Estabhsh a centrahred tracking system to insure all regulatory requirements
; and commitments are met.
- Rewrite all procedures required for safe plant operation msuring technical adequacy.
- Upgrade the corporate and site QA organization.
- Contmue post-mamtenance testing program, t
- Upgrade training and discipline of operations.
{, j
- Upgrade the corporate and site Nuclear Safety organ:zations.
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- Implement the findings of several previous outside audits.
t This program was confirmed and imposed by an NRC Order on December 22,1982.
/d. at 1516.
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' The Applicants prewnted testimony and proposed rindings on several other aspects of Brunswick op-erauons. including shift rotations. radwaste control and training prog ams. APFs 101 108. In general, the Board was favorably impreswd with the Applicanis' evidence in these areas. We do not make specific findings on these areas smce the lmervenors propose no such rindings.
'f- .
'l i The intervenors cite the high number of Licensee Event Repor's (LERs) at Brunswick in the 1979-82 period. JI PF 39 They fail to note, however, that LERs decreawd sharply after that, a trend that con-forms with our overall aswssment of Brunswick management. Sre APF (Reply) 19. The Intervenors also propow findings on Brunwick capacity factors. JI PF 44-45 The Intervenors do not eiplain the rele-
, vance of such factors to this caw, which we thinu is marginal.
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F. Conclusions About Brunswick
.J '- a ,. Partly as a result of implementation of the Brunswick Improvement J"1.j~,1". .g .'. %Y }. p,M Plan, Mr. Bemis expressed a positive view about Brunswick operations,
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JMj -w;w. present and future. As he saw it: r qec,. w; ,,,.;. %p @. W. %; 4m$; .:'%.(
,gFm.., The Brunswick facihty has shown steady improvement over the past 18 months in
$l;. kbD 6 @ gg management programs. control and abihty to adhere to regulatory requirements, f ':,f > *fe 5 f.y. f,Jh , y,{$ , Each project improved over its predecessor indicating a management committed to _- -.g 3'N ; improvement. CP&L acknowledged . . NRC concerns and was able to implement l
- corrective actions in such a way that many major improvements resulted, bringing l'
1 about a more enhghtened and aggresme staff attitude that was more sensitive to detail and NRC regulations than before implementation of the Brunswick Improse-6 ment Plan. CP&L recognited where weak areas custed and Giled posiaons with capable indinduals from outside the company when necessary. The result has been an improsed. more closely coordinated operauon, capabte of performing diffkult, i mtegrated site projects. Region il feels that the Brunswick of today is signincantly
; ., ; e improsed o$er the Brunswick of Gie years ago. Our aggressive inspection and en.
~ / . ,. , ' g . t fi ,7,1 forcement program gises us coa 6dence that CP&L will continue to improve its 4
. 4 & 7-G:; management and operation ofits entire nuclear program.
-, - 7, y . .
zr . - 7; p. ,:>3,3.WMyi$) Id. at 23 The Licensing Board agrees with the Stafi's evolving assess-
- e ., ,...c- ment of management performance at Brunswick from the late 70's until
'[ y ' V ', [w jM-i,ym--
wy fIhy - the hearing in the Fall of 1984. That assessment, in its essentials, reflects poor management performance for several years, until implementation of the Brunswick Improvement Plan in late 1982. Since then, however,
, there has been fiirly steady improvement in Brunswick management. At
. the present time, the record indicates that Brunswick management is basically sound.
We reach these general conclusions about Brunswick for several rea-sons. First, we rely substantially on the detailed and informed testimony Iw - of Mr. Bemis. He was in a unique position - based on his unusual as-lf;..W7- .. .n g@r, &3g/;.2.;.;.g . signment to oversee all CP&L facilities in the relevant time period - to
' 7.h*4hf e ,, assess Brunswick management in depth and to provide an objective view-f
.' -W;g,.y, point. That assessment is also supported by the weight of the other evi-dence. Thus, the Arplicants' witnesses (although generally more favora-
; ble to the CP&L Nrformance than Mr. Bemis) testified to much the
- same effect. For example, they candidly conceded that some of their 3 $ [ .; d " f. , past difficulties at Brunswick stemmed from management deficiencies.
Tr. 2907,3928. The Intervenors did not present witnesses on Brunswick;
, responses to their cross examination were generally consistent with the
.,' 4 j ;' g , . conclusions we reach here. Furthermore, the "SALP" Reports, which
- 'l we discuss next, also support our conclusions about Brunswick.
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G. The "SALP" Reports on CP&L Facilities
- 1. Introduction
' .I For the past several years, the NRC Regional Offices have conducted annual " Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance" of each
, licensee of a nuclear power plant, including an evaluation of each facihty.
J. Uniform procedures for such assessments were first formalized in
- "'?cn '
- i. 1982.M The nature and purposes of the SALP program were summarized
. at that time, as follows:
; S ALP is an integrated NRC sta!T cffort to collect auitable obsersations on an annual basis and esaluate htensee performance based on tho.c obsersations Posi-tne and negatise attributes of Iwensee performance are considered Emphasa n p!ac,'d upon urderManding the renons for hcensce's pertarmance in important fune-non.il are.n. aal sharing this u Nmta un.: 4 e me h.mee De 5 sLP process is eriented toward f urthering N RCN underuaneng et the m. inner in wh Ah Il7 IN bcensee management directs, guides, and prasides resources for awuring plant safety. and ID such resources are used and apphed. The integrated S ALP assen-ment is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational basis for allocating NRC resources and to provide meaningful guidance to twensee management.
f. Each year, a licensee's performance at each site is assessed in several functional areas - for example, plant operations, tire protection, securi-ty, refueling. On the basis of that assessment, including consideration of inspection reports, the S ALP Board for that particular licensee assigns a rating for each functional area. Such ratings, in turn, call for sarying lesels of NRC inspection and enforcement effort, as follows: a Category 1. Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate. LNensee manage-ment attention and insolsement are aggresse.c and nriented toward nustear safety; Lwensee resourecs are ample and ef fecovely used such that a high lesel of performance with respect to operauonal safety or construction is being d f achiev ed. Ns h.,,*
- /h s . h 7Ne*r,y nt 5%'a y 2. NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels. Lwensee
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%"j M.'j ih b. Category management attention and insolsement are evident and are concerned with
; , nuclear safety; INensee resources are adequate and are reasonabi) ef fettis e sush that satisfastory perforr"ance with ropect to operational salety or con-Crustmn a being ashtesed
- c. Category 1 Both NRC and lwensee attention should be increased Lwensee management attention or insolsement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety, but weakneues are evident. liternee resourtes appear to be straincd or I
i M See sofemat'c %swwmefit or t.nenwe Perrormante. Request for Paw Commeri, af led Res l' :41 ile2 s 2#
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< not effectisely used such that minimally utisfactory performance with revect r to operational ufety or construstion is being achiesed.
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- 47 Fed. Reg. at 12,241. SALP boards are composed of Regional Of6ce
. -$ 3:, ;,_ N / , 1 T.; . . ; personnel particularly knowledgeable about the licensee; they receive
. . 3;g. J [.hj:. g.,g input from knowledgeable sources, including resident inspectors at par-ticular sites. Written input is obtained from the Office of Nuclear Reactor
'.'O N M ) E h d 4 Q 3 % Regulation and other Washington offices, as appropriate. Ratings are ar.
% f & .; y q 4 g' y,.7 p p :: p rived at through discussion and consensus judgments, with differences resolved by Board vote. /J. See Bemis, Tr. 3653 55. J' One or more of the following criteria are used to evaluate performance in each functional area:
- 1. staragement ins ch ement in anurirg walii).
- 2. Approach to resolubon of te6hnical mues from a wiety u.indpoint.
- 3. Responsneness to NRC iniuatises.
~
Enforcement history. 4.
$. Reporting and analysis orreportable esents.
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- 6. StafGng (including managemend.
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", J. . ^+ 7. Training etTectneness and qualification.'8 As can be inferred frdm the criteria, a conscious effort is made to assess managerial etTectiver.ess in the various areas. In addition to assessments of indisidual facilities, the S ALP Report contains an overall evaluation of the licensee. Following completion of the SALP Board's assessment, the licensee is given an opportunity to Gle written comments. Thereafter, both the Board assessment and the licensee comments, if any, are issued as an NRC Report by the Regional Administration.
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n,#.g. The NRC Staffintroduced the most recent SALP report into evidence, the 1984 Report. Bemis Testimony, IT. Tr. 3660, at 42. The three preced-
- 3. '
i
- ing reports were introduced by the Joint Intervenors. JI Exhs.19, 20
; and 21. These four SALP Reports were referred to in the hearing as
. S ALP I-lh they covered the following time periods:
*a : ;. -
. u. y. *, "f - . >*S SALPI Apnl 1,1979 .\f arch 31,1980 SALP 11 July 1,1980-December 31,1981
- s. :- ,.
S ALP Ill January 1,1982-January 31,1983
, ' ,#f/ - .' SALPIV February 1,1983-April 30,1984
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in the aggregate, these time periods cover the time periods of principal interest in this case. Events occurring prior to April 1979 would probably
,.:'; be too remote in time to have much bearing on future management abil-
' L :im . .' . , i ,, ; '. .
s ~ ity to operate Shearon Harris. The Joint Intervenors seek to make selective use of these SALP
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' N .) Reports in order to denigrate CP&L's management capability. See JI PF
'. 32-43. As we explain hereafter, although some individual Ondings do 3 . f 1. [Q; y@M:', g .: c.u@.]f".E'
' ^ '
not reDect very favorably on CP&L, read as a whole the SALP Reports l
' / ' support CP&L's claim of improved management competence. The other parties make references to the Reports, but do not rely strongly on them in their Ondings. This is understandable in the case of CP&L, which emphasized the testimony of their own witnesses, who occasionally disa-greed with the SALP Gndings. See, e.g.. Utley, Tr. 2969. The Staff's ap-proach was to rely on its witness. Nir. Bemis, who made only a passing reference in his prepared testimony to the most recent SALP Report."
The Board considers the four SALP Reports to be highly signi0 cant t evidence on the management contention. As noted above, the reports
- I blanket the relevant time period and therefore should redect any signifi-
~
j cant trends. They represent the judgments of disinterested observers, as contrasted with necessarily self-serving declarations from the Applicants' , j witnesses. The SALP Reports are based upon expertise from a wide l range of technical disciplines. For example, the Board that produced the i most recent SALP Report on CP&L included four members, three of whom are Division Directors at Region II, and thirteen " attendees," among these Nir. Bemis. four Resident Inspectors, and three NRC spe-cialists from Washington. SALP IV at 8. The reports attempt to factor in management considerations, including an overall judgment about the licensee's competence. Before turning to the most pertinent aspects of the four SALP p ' Reports on CP&L, we emphasize again that a rating of"3" is not a " fail-9.h
- '.-' ;N,,..gp$pd;
~ - ~!Mbb; WMi $:dyg. ,uv 5'S'W ing grade." As we have explained, a "3" means that " minimally satisfac-
, q tory performance . . . is being achieved." A "3" rating probably would f result in greater inspection attention by NRC Regional personnel, but licensees can continue to operate notwithstanding a "3" rating on a safety related function.
4 , U Had the staft 6hosen to rely heauty on the sALP Reports. it may have been required to produce
, several additioral eitneues to stand crosvenamination on them. That. in turn, might have stra:ned the 1 staff's resources. w enote in this connection that the start nevertheless produced more than a dozen wit-M1. ." d -
nesses at the 1979 remand heanns. a heanns held at the Commisseon's behest. See LBPJ919, mera. 10 SRC at 43-44 w eimply no cnticism or Mr. Semis, who was an efreceive witness in observing that the stafY chose to prewns a modest direct case in this proceeding, comrared to its command perform. ance in 1979
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- 2. SALP i (1979-30)
M ; ' c - , , - 7, , 0;N E ;, '. .ei The first SALP Report on CP&L was relatively brief and conclusory, 1.j c,. : y ., .; -
'j perhaps because it was the first such assessment to be performed.')
s.e ,s . ' .: .. < . .a.. n; [ , . . '. 2 SALP 1 did not include numerical category ratings. Because of the prob-s.r . . "' 7..7
- s tems then being encountered at Brunswick, we will focus particularly on diT-s,,N.M jdQ LJ:(9 MQ.' _ *'NI.# SALP I's assessments of that facility.
The Review Board stated that there had been "no adverse trends with
~
. " ' NC y respect to noncompliance" at Brunswick, but that " problems related to l " The
~
radiation protection and contamination had been observed l Board concluded generally that " Brunswick had been responsive to NRC regulations and findings of noncompliance." The view was ex-pressed that "the recent reorganization at the corporate and site lesels appears to be providing increased responsneness to our concerns." S ALP 1 at 2-2. The assessment of Brunswick concluded with a discussion of an unmonitored, uncontrolled release of airborne radioactive material.
~ '
flowever, the " Action Plan" portion of the assessment did not call for
- H any escalated enforcement action. S ALP I, App. B. The "Overall Evalua-
- . . . tion" of Brunswick was as follows:
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compared to other Region !! facilities. Subsequent performance would indicate a well below average performance as indicated by recent insp.ction Gndings in the areas of radiation control, contamination control, and enuronmental protection pro. gram. These areas are being closely mondored by Region !! and corrective action is bem; taken by the !!censee. SALP I at 2 4. The SALP I assessments of the Robinson and Shearon llarris facilities were generally favorable. Overall, Robinson was deemed to be "slightly
-@ above average as compared to other Region 11 facilities." Shearon liarris 4Nh $h 4Mg
- i'gk ,fy.n.~Mk.ggyp[i was rated "slightly below average," with certain deficiencies noted in the quality assurance area. SALP I at 3 3,4 3.
27pp. ,~d=%.M," .w ,.- ;
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j in its overview of CP&L as a licensee, SALP I noted certain areas of
" good performance," other areas where "improsed performance is war-ranted," including contamination and procedural controls. The "overall
. 4 evaluation" for the licensee was that:
; . p ,
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, CP&L is, in general, responsive to NRC requirements. Gndings of noncompliance, and information requests from the NRC. Their performance is evaluated to be
; . , .: .m.
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- 61 pyes. and IV - 69 pages Generally ehh succenne s ALP has provided more Jata and analyses j ihan its predetessor
;rs --
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3 d below average for Region 11. floweser, their reorganizauon appears to be improving l
'h P"I " nance. A e nunuau n f this upinnd insped.
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- 3. SALPII(198ND
[ [". . :;5 b .b bl.'d The S ALP 11 Report represented the low point for Brunswick. The per-
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formance analysis for Brunswick was relatively lengthy and frequently critical. SALP 11 at 5-21. For example, the discussion of numerous viola-tions in plant operations concluded that they were " examples of recur-
; rent problems and the lack of management control in the area of plant operations." /J. at 5. Following a lengthy discussion of radiation control problems, the report concluded that "signiGeant management control probicms" were present. /d. at 13. Similarly, the analysis of certain quali-ty assurance problems found that "insufGeient management attention
I had been given to that area. /J. at 16. SALP II was the Grst SALP to assign numerical category ratings to functional areas. Brunswick received the following ratings (SALP 11 at
- 2 3):
Functional Area Rating 4.
- 1. Plant Operanons 3
- 2. Refueling Operauons -
- 3. Maintenance 3
- 4. Surseinance and inscruce resung 2
- 5. Personnel. Tr.nmng. .ind Piant Procedures 3
- 6. Fire Protection and flousekeeping 3
- 7. Design Changes and Nfodificanons 2 J
- 8. Radiation Protection. Radioactise Waste Stanagement,and 3 Transportanon
, ,. . ., 9. Environmental Protection 3 t ,. >O ,.54*4 3WM:' 10. Emergency Preparedness 2 g
MOM -rr.
@,/iM.w W3id'A,.4,,,. I1. Security and Safeguards 2 4
/4~ c 3./ U- 12. Audits. Review and Committee Activines 3 *!
- 13. Administrative, QA, and Records 3 14 Correcuse Action and Reporung 2 These ratings represent an average rating of 2.6. In terms of the category
. l'"".h q de6nitions stated above, this rating may be equated with a below aver-age, slightly above minimally acceptable, - in a word, mediocre - per- -
formance.
' a ,. M The overall facility evaluation for Brunswick was as follows:
~
e m.,, .;. ! During the review period the licensee underwent a reorgamzauon which included major personnel changes Evaluanon of these chariges is still in progress although improved performance is expected to result. Slajor weaknesses were noted in
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- areas of plant operations. maintenance. Grc protection, plant prwedures. radiation I protection, enuronmental protection and quality a3surance.
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L' S ALP 11 at 2. lc .;_ . ' f pp ~ The SALP 11 analyses for the Robinson and Harris facilities were less extensive. These facilities received ratings of "2" for almost all function-c.;[%[@
- '@fG5 .M A s.y-;._ , _.'.'. i.- al areas. Id. at 3-4.
mj . . . . . gM ?d S ALP ll's "overall utility evaluation" was that the licensee is coopera-
'~
tive with the Commission and displays good technical competence. Weaknesses common to both operating sites were found in the areas of plant operations, procedures, and radiation protection. /d. at 2.
; CP&L Gled extensise comments on the Review Group's Report, con-tending that that report was not fairly balanced, and taking issue with numerous speci6c Gnding and ratings. Addendum 3 to JI Exh. 20. The
; Regional Administrator reviewed thes,: comments but, in the main, upheld the Review Board's positions. Addendum 4 to JI Exh. 20.
. n
- 4. SALP 111 (1982-83) 4 e. . : ,p-SALP III found improvement at Brunswick in a few areas, but other
. " "~ ' ' problems persisted. Licensee performance was termed " acceptable."
y- ' -
~
SALP 111 at 3. On the positive side, the report noted that " major a strengths were identiGed in the areas of emergency preparedness and security and safeguards. Positive actions take1 during the period were the assignment of a semor manager to the site and deselopment of a long-range impresement plan. Improsements were evident over the j previous S ALP period in the area of radiological controls." /d. i However, on the negative side " major weaknesses were identined in the areas of plant operations, maintenance, surveillance, Gre protection,
,i refueling, licensing activities, and quality assurance. Improvements MM,kk$k[Z"&ghjfjg
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tions, maintenance, and Grc protection." /d.
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The report expressed the hope that "the long range improvement ini-Liative, which is currently being implemented, is expected to result in improsed licensee performance in the weak areas. The licensee has com-
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,*. . ,g.$;N mitted a substantial amount of facility and corporate resources to this im-provement program.,, /d.
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. - , Brunswick's S ALP 111 ratings were as follows:
y$pn. .:Q jg.A,% 3.-- u., Funettonal Area Rating I. Plant Operations 3
- 2. R adiologreal Controls 2
- 3. Maintenance 3
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, 5. Fire Protection 3 1
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These ratings yield an average rating of 2.5, not a significant improve-ment over S ALP ll's 2.6 average. The SALP 111 ratings of Robinson and flarris were substantially similar to S AL P 11 - i.e., an as erage ot' 2. The "oserall utility esaluation" for S ALP lli was m part, as follows: During this appraisal period. the beensee has shown significant improscrient in j some areas; but several areas, ident4Ged durmg the previous resiew period as requir-t ing increased management attention, have not shown improvement. The heensee has ident 6ed those areas and has initiated ciitensive long range improsement
^ }{ program s.
j The hcensee has exhibited a poutne attitude to NRC initiatnes, but, in general, 4 hcer'see responses have demonstrated inadequate management insolvement in
.) heensirg actnities, particularly in the interface with NRR. Lesels of performance were consatent with that noted in the previous resiew period Once again, CP&L liled extensive comments on the Review Board's report and, again, the Regional Administration generally upheld the Review Board. See 11 Exh. 21, Letter from O'Reilly to Utley dated June 4 14,1983.
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b 5. SALP IV (1983-84) c -)'. . . g;.:- + r TJS .f.A.. 43uj SALP IV found very marked improvement at Brunswick, as reflected
., in the ratings for functional areas.
Functional Area H ating
,- ..g '
- l. Plant Operations 2
' 7 -[.' + 2, A i+ 2. Radiological Controh !
- 3. Maintenance 2 4 4 Surveinance 2
,.% . :i,.;; ,4 & 5. Fire Protection 2
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- 6. Emergency Preparedness i
- 7. Security and Safeguards 1
- 8. R efueht's !
9 Licensing Actaities 2 10 Quality Assurance Program 2
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1 l The rating for each functional area improved from SALP 111, except for
- Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards, which retained their maximum T.3- .,
. ,, gM s ci.1.i.w. d? G.,C ratings of "1." The average rating for SALP IV was 1.6, almost a full 3' p ~ y. .~1 w. unit higher than SALP lil's 2.5. The SALP IV average of ratings for d j? E . , a Robinson and llarris were also improved and were very similar. SALP
'm. O ;"-y,. 4,-w.N lE,.f* g'M IV at 4 6
? D The overall evaluation of Brunswick was quite favorable. Id. at 5. It iw N.m.'3 x SN",N 9 3.G. N..s.,Q.N~rN q .. c. . . . ~
Y @..\ b spoke of "several major achiesements," including implementation of
- , the Brunswick Improvement Plan. No " major weaknesses" were identi-fled. The following comments are particularly relevant here:
i The reorganization at Brunswick has resulted in a signi6 cant increase in manage. ment awareness and control, particularly in the areas of operations and out. ige management. The elTests or awgning a corNr.de Vice Preudent IVPt to the ute
. became esident during this SALP period, as many rroblems were handled quialy and effectively with the S P dealing directly with adminatrative obstacles.
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/d. at 6.
. Similarly, the SALP IV overall evaluation of CP&L was fgvorable.
' ~ '
N* including the following endorsement: J Ja .:
- s r.
' M ' *) g n. . Z." 3 During the evaluation period the increased INensee management attention applied
-' ' ' ' to the entire nuclear orgamration has changed CPAL from being considered as a poor performer during the previous s ALP period to a signi6eantly improsed utility.
The improsement Program implemented by CPAL has been used as a modet by some other Region tl utilities to follow in desciorme9t of their own improvement i protrrams_
/d. at 3.
M {*i[.R" 4qr.. g.,,n h. N'.. ~r. - H. The Joint Intervenors' Approach to the SALP Reports , MM.y g .. d . The preceding description of the SALP Reports casts CP&L in an
- s. WyA,[.M * ~. improving and generally favorable light. The Joint intersenors ask us to look at various pieces of these same reports from some different angles and to draw less favorable conclusions about CP&L. We consider these 7 .'.; !. /tc.;4 d[ ' %, Intervenor perspectives next.
yG; in their Proposed Finding 32, joint Intervenors note that several
' W 1-4 W 94_ M.,7. E 9P M~'2e : areas of weakness in SALP !! showed up agam as weaknesses in SALP
<. - . _ , , 111, notwithstanding Executive Vice Presideru Utley,s statements to the T f N_%g$ VQ Mp@,s .y ;
effect that CP&L would attempt to make improvements in areas of weak-
' M u.. ,- ness. Tr. 2968 74. In this same connection SALP Ill criticized CP&L for not mosing with sufficient Sigor in areas cited as weak in the past.
Report at 3. We do not believe that, taken in context, the areas of con.
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i tinuing weakness from SALP 11 to SALP !!! are fairly viewed as an in-7.3 .. dictment of CP&L. Stost importantly, all the areas of cited weakness .. ,.. L p < W.y y.Q:" M
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MM,J; y / .. were cited as improved (to category I or 2) in SALP IV. This trend of gradual improvement supports hlr. Uticy's testimony that remedial ac. x.C .;<, M ,y , yw.e..;- tions were under way early, but that some would take time. Further-
.. dr4 . ,m M de,s.
My ' . . . .sf., r.t.MP# n . eE , ' Y. more, CP&L's extensise comments on SAlf s 11 and til reflect that the
, c :p?pW,9fsy isus*gs 3 s,d. SALP criticisms were being taken seriously at the time, even if we
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as e h CPR mi@ hve taken remedial action more quickly and
~
- elTectively than it did.
The Joint Intervenors introduced into evidence their Exhibit 39,
! which " compares selected functional areas for SALP 11 through SALP IV in those areas where comparisons can be made . " They assert that JI Esh. 39 "is helpful in amsting in comparison between the dif-ferent SALP reports and their evaluations." JI PF 33. Iloweser, they do not go on to explain why this exhibit is " helpful." This exhibit might be somewhat helpful if the SALP methodology simply equated numbers of violations with category ratings. As Nir. Bemis made clear, however, vio-
.y. , i lations are only one factor. Tr. 3855. Even under Exhibit 39's violation.
>m .a . -. . .
counting approach, it generally indicates that higher numbers of viola-n., y,, tions lead to lower ratings, and vice versa. See, e.g., Robinson: Radia. tion Controls, Emergency Preparedness, Quality Assurance. Other rat-ings do not exhibit the same relationship between numbers of violations and ratings. See, e.g., Robinson: Slaintenance; Brunswick: Surveil-lance Fire Protection. Apparently, other factors were controlling in the latter group of ratings.In any event, we do not think we can draw any
} useful conclusions from 11 Exh. 39.
j Joint Intervenors' Exhibit 40 consists of excerpts from a publication entitled Public Cat:en 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report. The publication
~~
was based upon and included data derived from NRC reports, including [p ed ' ' ' ' ' S ALP 11 on CP&L's facilities. One apparent purpose of this Public Cirl:en
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m, , _. y compilation was to compare the sixty two commercial reactors operating in 1982 in order to show which were " safest" or "least safe," "best" or
" worst" in the country. It comes as no surprise that Brunswick fared poorly in that comparison. Thus, among the ten reactors hasing more
, a y s . ,. than 100 LERs (License Event Reports) Brunswick I and 2 ranked 4th y s.$ g o.,. q,. . ;ysg..4,e,9 g;.,y and 5th, with 150 and 141 LERs, respectively. In the category of "5 or f more incidents with an NRC ratmg of 2," Brunswick 2 tied for first
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18 lJndet this management sonienteun, me are not consideneg the mems of any or the individual ratings Nt tearnple. if Bruntesk were rated T for fire protetteon, et torg.det that along matti other evidence only tre determine CPAL's overall management competerst as rede(ted in the 5 SLP Reports. e g .
, whether they take Petempt remedial anon in respemte to staff shinetm
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- v' y m.% , , S.; y s .m place. (Brunswick I also scoreo high in thn dubious dntinction category with seven incidents. Forty-three of the sixty two operating reactors had fewer than Ove incidents.) Brunswick I and 2 exposed 4957 workers to
' - ' ~
measurable doses of radiation, the highest number by far of any facility in the country. Finally, Public Circen averaged the SALP ratings for 4 Brunswick (as we have done above) and compared them with the aver-
. a .: j, [-; aged ratings of the other sixty operating reactors. Brunswick's average
' %, >C Q
~I$' rating for 1982, as we have already seen, was 2.57. Comparatively, Brunswick had the highest (and poorest) average in the country. The next highest average rating went to Arkansas I and 2 - 2.45; the lowest and best aserage ratings went to Yankee Rowe and lladdam Neck, with perfect "I" ratings.'5 Joint Intersenors' Exhibit 40 indicates that Brunswick was a poorly managed facility in 1981. The clear preponderance of the other esidence in this case supports the same conclusion. It may be worth noting that i
Exhibit 40 casts a somewhat more fasorable light on CP&L's contempo-raneous performance at Robinson (aserage rating 2.13) and Sheaton liarris (average rating 2). Beyond that, however, Exhibit 40 sheds little or no light on the ultimate issue before us - will CP&L operate Shearon Harris competently in 1986 and thereafter? Most significantly, Exhibit 40, based largely on SALP 11, does not renect the sery different results of S ALP IV at all. I
- 1. Ottier Matters I. Robinson CP&L's operation of its Robinson 2 facility was not a major focus of separate attention at the hearing and there is httle evidence in the record
. on that subject. As noted above, the SALP Reports on Robinson are ih. m:D.k,k, .kNh generally favorable. The Intersenors' proposed findings on Robinson (JI Ndh"7' %'2fd',g pf*!j.]
PFs 7177), viewed in context, do not lead to any relevant conclusions.
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15 to be sure, the comparatne " rankings ' of Bruns *wli and other facihties reScted in Ethidii 40 may not he taken uncntically to demonstrate that Brungenk was then one of tne oorst managed racihties in
, q. ,, . . ,
the country. f or etample, et the Apphsants point out t %PFs 1940) the number of L LRs a faahiy generates can depend on factors unrelated to ufely in addition. the Apptwanis and the stafr urge that
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"sALP ratings canrot be algebranally manipulateJ to result in an anthmets rnean rr 3655 56 iBemis) " APF 18 W hile that may be true in the sinct nen,e. we thirk that a empte averasing o( 5 ALP rahr$1 for a faulity in a given year doel yiet i a gofki rough e%timate of h0* a 14en%ce performed at that fauHy at that time tmilarly, we thina it is legitimate to cor" pare the agerages of dif ferent fauhteet r . N; ; [ , .
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. 2. Shearon Harris Similarly, whila certain of the intervenors' proposed findings on Shea-9,.fE; . -
ron Harris 01 PFs 78 90) Gnd some support in the record, they say little T P ;4l .g; . .<.y; 9y$x,T.@S y;M about the ultimate management issue before us. See, e.g., JI PFs 87-90.
'S -)E'. .;d -lI.MNl The portions of Mr. Maxwell's testimony cited in Proposed Findings e m .,he. W;%.(Qg/}.} . 84-86 appear to be the kind of grist one would expect to find in any resi-
, j dent inspector's mill, and not to reflect management failures. The sub-
[g:y h' M i k..; h M$i% k.;,k , . p [4, .j ject of cable tray supports - as discussed in SALP IV and referred to in JI PF 81 - is fairly characterized by the Applicants in their PF 28. On the whole, the SALP IV evaluation of this activity area was favorable. S ALP IV it 61-62. 1
- 3. Trainin.uc
; The Applicants presented two witnesses. Messrs. Davis and Powell, who testified at some length about the CP&L training program for its
- i nuclear plant personnel. Testimony, fT. Tr. 3399. In their proposed find.
ings, the Joint intervenors take exception with only two narrow aspects
, q ,,g ,. of the training program. First, they allege that the record evidence is in-adequate to determine whether "GET" Levels I ar d il satisfy regulatory
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training requirements.11 PF 91. As the Applicants correctly point out, their witnesses, who were well qualified to address the question, testified that Levels I and 11 did satisfy regulatory requirements. Testimony at 9. Tr. 3423 35,3453 55. There was no esidence to the contrary, except as noted hereafter. Joint Intersenors' Exhibit 29 is an NRC Information Notice entitled i " Deliberate Circumventing of Station llealth Physics Procedures." The Intervenors point to it as proof that the CP&L GET Level I or 11 Train- t s
. .,s . , . ,
ing received by contractor personnel is not adequate. JI PF 92. We agree with the main thrust of the Applicants' Reply Finding 32, as follows: m ;- . . ;w .. . . .. , , . n v . .~. V* - An investigation of the incident at Brunswick, which involved two contract person. nel allegedly swapping dosimeters. revealed no evidence that there was a widespread practice of any duration. There is no evidence that this incident at Hrunswisk was the result of inadequate training.
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- M 14 The Intervenors cite 4fr. Maseell's testimony that he has been a resident inspector at shearon liarris S 9,". mfke 1950 and that he was employed by CPat. as a quahiy assurance technician at Brunswich in i
19 4 74 rr 3816.It The Board imphes no personal critisism of Mr %tas cil in questioning the misdom of asogning a fufmer employee to pnbse acteuties at the former employer 5 site 1
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! J. Conclusion
,y . Generalizing largely from the Brunswick experience to CP&L's overall nuclear program, including flarris, hir. Bemis expressed confidence in CP&L's managerial ability and commitment to safety. lie testified that:
. ..c , At the time of my assignment my impression about the management at allleseis of EY '4 the CPAL structure was that they were not being kept informed as to what was oc-3
'~.,_ curring at the nuclear facilities. that they were only interested in meeting the mmi-mum requirements, and that they did not understand the difference in operating a nuclear facility with its many ditTerent rules and regulations for protection of the public health and safety and operating a fossil facility. We m rudear regulation call th:s " fossil mentality" . The desclopment of the BrunswNk Improsement Pro-gram m 1982 and the issuance of the ciul penalty for the breakdo*n in management contrels was where I feel th.it CP&L's geneus of a "nutear mentahiy" took place.
from the summer of lH2 to present I found strong dedot.on from all CPAL management not only to meet the NRC regulations. but to eweed our regatrements when possible. . I found management open minded about presentative enforce-ment. By this I mean they would envelop areas that the resident inspectors and I l
- would see as having potential enforcement concerns and implement immediate cor.
rectise measures in these areas prior to NRC being required to mstitute enforce-
. _ . ment actions.
- h1r. Bemis summarized his conclusions and the NRC Staff's position as follows:
The staff concludes CPAL is technically qualified to operate the liarris facility within the purue* of the regulations and wi'h due reirard for pu5he health and safety The Region 11 m*pection and enforcement program will be applied to assure the CPAL continues to operate withm the regulatior.6 and contmues to make improsements m the nuclear program. The Board basically agrees with this Staff assessment. As we stated
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previously, we have high confidence in Nir. Bemis, based on his techni-cal expertise and extensive experience with CP&L. Nforeoser, the '
"""-"G" StalTs assessment at the hearing, as expressed by Af r. Bemis, is consist-ent with the SALP Reports. The Joint Intervenors' rather miscellaneous collection of evidence unfavorable to CP&L largely derives from events i occurring in 1982 and earlier. This evidence has been superseded 'sub-
!Ihy.j stantially, if not entirely) by a sustained period of improved CP&L lE j 4 management performance since that time. The Applicants, supported by the NRC StatT, have etrectively refuted joint Contention 1.
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i l III. TIIER3 TOLU 311NESCENT DOSI3IETERS D MpM.g.7.jfbq,,./'h A. Introduction
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- 1. A thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) is a device used for a' NMlu M . W .~ p .: q h -
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%$N'MbM-measuring exposure to radiation. When a TLD is irradiated by ionizing radiation, some energy is absorbed and stored. If the TLD subsequently by - h .b ~ T,f,P[ is heated, some of the stored energy is released as light which can be
-] '~
detected and measured. The quantity oflight released is proportional to the dose received by the individual wearing the TLD. (Browne, ff. Tr. 6407, at 3.)
- 2. Joint Contention IV concerning Applicants' use of thermolumi-nescent dosimeters originally consisted of four claims: (1) TLDs are inaccurate: (2) TLDs lack real-time monitoring capability; (3) TLDs are inadequate to assure worker heal.h and safet); and (4) pressurized ioni-
, zation monitors are necessary to protect worker health and safety. Appli-
., ; p..c.
s.-
, cants mosed for summary disposition .nd the NRC Staff supported the
- g. motion. Summary disposition was granted on three of the issues. The
,en a m.nf m wp m.S. ,c'-
m:a, Board found that other instruments provide real-time monitoring capa-bility; that TLDs used in conjunction with the totality of the radiation Af*Wrg.;%, .a ;s :a y - protection program are not inadequate and that pressurized ionization
- . D . .,';WJ - monitors are not necessary. The sole issue litigated was "whether the TLDs and measuring equipment and processes to be used at the llarris facility can measure occupational doses with sufficient accuracy to comply with the NRC regulations." (Memorandum and Order Ruling on Motions for Summary Disposition, April 13,1984 (unpublished),
and Tr. 2218 for Telephone Conference of August 10, 1984.)
- 3. Mr. Stephen A. Browne, who currently is responsible for the technical direction of personnel dosimetry programs at all CP&L nuclear pg. 4~- W~,..a .-G: - e~
plants, testified for the Applicants. (Browne, ff. Tr. 6407, at 1.) Mr. ; m John P. Cusimano, Mr. Seymour Block and Mr. Ross Albright testified erM
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on behalf of the NRC Staff. Mr. Cusimano is employed by the U.S.
~ ' ' -~ Department of Energy, Radiological and Environmental Sciences Laboratory, as a Senior Physicist in the Dosimetry branch. Mr. Block is
! employed by the NRC as a Senior IIcalth Physicist and is responsible for M y i& gp; . . reviewing Applicants' radiation protection programs. (Cusimano/ Block,
'My[:y3c.g. s ..'# y, . +, ff. Tr. 6560, at 12.) Mr. Albnght is a Radiatica Specialist with NRC 1., 7 7 Region II. Ilis responsibil ties include the inspection of the radiation pro-tection and radioactive materials transportation programs at various yUCh . ,f WtD; .ffw Wrk"'%g.6he$,:a gl.. J.. licensed facilities in Region II. ( Albright, ff. Tr. 6567, at 1.)
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- 4. At the request of the Board, the Staff also presented Dr. Phillip Plato as a witness in this proceeding. Dr. Plato is a Professor of Radiolog-ical llealth at the University of Michigan. Dr. Plato was a r.: ember of the
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s t Health Physics Society Working Group which wrote draf t standard ANSI N13.11. lie is also the contractor who conducted the pilot studies involv-ing both versions of this draft standard. (Plato, Tr. 6562.) Dr. Plato adopted and agreed with the StalTs testimony of Stessrs. Cusimano and Block to the extent that it described the third pilot study. (/d.)
- 5. Joint Intervenors did not contribute any testimony on this contention.
1 i B. Background
- 6. NRC regulations do not contain an explicit standard for accuracy in measurements of radiation doses to workers. In 1975, the llealth Ph:,3 es Societ) Standards Committee formed Workmg Group 1.4 to pre-pare a standard that could be used to test the performance of organua-tions that proside personnel dosimetry processing for radiation workers.
The Standard was issued for trial use by the American National Stand-ards Institute as ANSI N13.l t in 1976. At this same time, the NRC an-nounced its intention to amend 10 C.F.R. Part 20 to require that NRC licensees obtain personnel dosimetry from a processor that had passed the ANSI standard. The NRC held a public meeting to diset.ss this potential amendment to Part 20 land other Government agencies ex-pressed similar intentionsl. The attendees at the NRC's public meeting requested that, before a mandatory testing program were initiated, a pilot study should be conducted which would use the ANSI standard. In 1977, the Unisersity of .\ltehigan was awarded an NRC contract to pro-side two tests to dosimetr> processors that chose to participate l voluntarily. i The results from Tests #1 and #2 were reviewed by the llealth Phys-gy, ics Society Standards Committee and formed the basis for revision of -c, yN, e, j:7
.m-d ?;'Q:. Af.c.@ p cy the Standard in 1981. Subsequently, the revised Standard was used in u ---
4 Test #3 conducted by the Unisersity of Stichigan during 1981-82. l (NUREG/CR 2891, " Performance Testing of Personnel Dosimetry Sersices," February 1983.) The revised Standard was adopted by ANSI and published as ANSI
; Standard N13.ll-1983. Further, the NRC has issued a proposed rule j under Part 20 titled " Improved Personnel Dosimetry Processing" (49
! Fed. Reg. 1205-11 Uan.10,1984)) that includes the ANSI N13.II-1981 Standard as part of the evaluation of dosimetry processors. The Summary
. in the Proposed Rule states:
Tests have indicated that a sigmfbnt percentage of personnel dosimetry nrocessors may not he ;w:rtorming *ith a reasonabk degree of auuracy. Current regulations do not address the competency of these prosessors T he NRC is proposing amendments
' 259 f
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l o that would require its licensees to utilue the specified sersices of processors that
! have been accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program b... . . r W. . . (N AVLP) of the National Bureau of Standards.
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Th.is nationwide and decade long concern with dosimetry inaccuracy
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- formed much of the basis for the Joint Intervenors' allegations in this r.-s ,W%.y.;..:+; p c.y-t - s
- q. ; .
proceeding.
- s. , .-
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- 7. The ANSI standard is formulated in terms of tolerance limits, L, as a pass / fail criterion. The performance index for a single dosimeter, P.
2
- is calculated as:
P = (H' - # )/#
. where:
.c ,
9f' , ,y.g../ N; i # = delivered quantity
%g.-pm,- , , m.
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< - M.f.{.i s., S. .>q *
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/* #GW3%FWF, For each radiation category, the average performance index, F, and the standard deviation, S, are calculated. These two statistics are combined
- 6K%u.
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.c in the ANSI formulation of the pass / fail criterion. A processor passes a categcry if F+SSL i
where: l L = 0.5 (doses below 10 rem) L = 0.3 (doses above 10 rem)
.g % a- A. - b a This formulation of the tolerance limit is less stringent than the origi-
- ..%mh ? -d nal formulation in the draft ANSI standard, which was F + 25 Ei L. j ML ,
^ %>.- 6 g .1 The Health Physics Society Standards Committee recognized that the
^ 9, .'% 4 l]
revised formulation was weaker than the recommendations of interna-tional authorities in the field of radiation protection." II
* .* As the Board saw it, we were not directly litigaung the adequact of the ANSI standard, which, as we
,>. .t 3 ,, 'y,,,, . ;, N .. .<,.% have noted, is the subject or a pendmg rulemaking Ser Di,At Powe Coc (Catawba Nuclear station.
-4 7.D * *, "
*.'9 * ';N . * *y( l11,7 : .; ,'" ~f.'J' Units I and 21. ALAB-81),22 NRC 59,8$ (198$1. Rather the huganon focused on whether the Appis.
Cants' dosametry was sufreciently accurate to meet esisung 5RC accuracy standards As the record devel. j oped. howeser, the two subjects were to some extent nectuarity mtertwmed.
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18 The ranonale for the tolerance level is described in ANsl NI).ll.1983 in Appendia D) to the stand-
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, Choice of Tolerance Level. L
~' The values chown for the tolerance level represent a compromne beiween the recommendauons
, of international authorities in the rield or radianun prosecuen and ra&auon measurements, and IContmurd)
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! 8. As Applicants' witness Browne testitied, a recent publicationi* of the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRPI states the following concerning the measurement of dose equivalent:
. If these quantities are of the order of the relesant annuallimits, the uncertainties
~
should not escced a factor of !.5 at the 95% conGdence lesel % here they amount
- . . ?- to less thJn 10 mSv [1 reml an uncertatnty of a factor of 2 at the 95% conGdence
.] 2{ >
level is acceptable. (Browne, IT. Tr. 6407, at 6.) The Board finds, in agreement with Str. Browne, that the ICRP 35 recommendation can be expressed in mathematical terms as: P + 2S E0.5, for doses of approximately 5 rem (the annual limith (/J. at 10, 11.) The weaker ANSI standard appears to be questionable when viewed agam3t the ICRP recommendation.
- 9. In our April 13, 1984 Stemorandum and Order, the Board took the position that the NRC regulations require that personnel dosimetry be carried out in a manner such that the results can be relied upon to be accurate to integer values or one significant figura C doses of a few i rem. Regulatory compliance is not compatible witn tne acceptance of performance with a standard deviation of 50% A consentional interpre-tation of the 50% standarf' viation would be that, at the 95% confi-dence level, an individual dose estimate would be uncertain by 2 stand-ard deviations amounting to 100% An obsersed dose, for example, of 2 rem in I calendar quarter could not be siewed, nuh reasonab/c con /i-dence. as meeting the regulatory 3-rem quarterly limit t' .cuuse the uncer-tainty would range from 0 to 4 rem by the ANSI sts .Jard. We find the
.. the limetauons dictated by availablc measurement techniques. In ICRU Report 20 [E201 and S %q#f k" -5 h '[
.'E. ,, 4 - g NCRP Report 57 (E421, a 30-percent limit is recommended for the uncertainty m the mierpreta-
' - . $*ggJ tion of the dose equivalent (or absorbed dose) in the vicmity of the masimum permissible ,
-t y. . '* " s., c y f.
Q. . ./h& g** < lesels, although an uncertamty of as much as a factor of three is considered acceptable at levels smaller by an order of magnitude. In ICRP Report 12 R4U. on the other hand a l'mit of 50 per. cent is recommended m the sicmity of masimum permswbie lesels under 6cid conditions, when errors caused by unknown irradianon geometry or ambient coridinons are talten mio ac-count. For dose mterpretations at actident lesels, a interance level of 20 percent is recommend-ed m SCRP Report 57 10441 i in this standard, a 6 sed irradiat on geometry and fised laboratory ambient condiuons are spect-
. .- fied for the test irradiations. Because of limitsuons m measurement techruque, the tolerance
'I . "
lesel is set at 0.5 (50 perceno far all but the accident catesooes, where it is set si 03 00 per-cenO Larger tolerance levels for dose equnalents well below the maximum permiss:bie dow
} equivalent were considered and, m fact, had been mcorporated in the Grst version of this stand-ard. subsequent to the esperience gained m the pilot scums program referred to m the Fore-
-1' word, this feature was deleted since for the tests specified in this standard (callms for irradianon m relausely straightforward radianon GelJs under ideallaboratory conditions and analysis of per-formance based on the average performance quonent obtamed over a large range of dose equva-tertts), relasauon of the tolerance levels was found to be unnecemry li-General Prmciples of sfonitonng for Radunon Protetuon of workers." ICRP Publ No. 35 (1982).
at 25.
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261
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..~.,,,...s ICRP recommendation to be compatible with our reading of the NRC
; regulatory requirement and, thus, from both points of view, we review h > JS, ',l,l.?M..M. (he Applicants' TLD program to see if these performance qualities will
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r,;, N ,r L.e s. D. CP&L Performance in Dosimetry Tests E;'h s h.hh~ h8,%$$$$T 10. The Applicants propose to use Panasonic Model UD-802 AQ l~ E~ ' f , , W TLDs at the liarris plant. These TLDs were used by CP&L in the per-
~' - - ;8 fo mance testing carried out by Dr. Plato at the University of Michigan.
(luowne, IT. Tr. 6407, at 10.) The results of the testing were summarized i as follows: 1982 CP& L 1984 CP& L Performance Performance ANSI m . , ,. m :
...q. y Category Radiation Type (P + S (P + M Limit
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I X r.iy Accident 0.24 0.18 0.3
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. ;, , Gamma Accident 0.10 0.15 0.3 ms. J.:.t. v 4.'g .
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. 11
- 111 X-ray Shallow 0.11 0.18 0.5 Q9 R, ' ? ,1
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X ray Deep 0.12 0.16 05
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- IV Gamma 0.06 0.10 0.5 V Beta 0.30 0.28 0.5 VI Gamma & X-ray 0.06 0.19 0.5 Shal!ow l l Gamma & X-ray 0.16 0.18 0.5 Deep 3-: ,,.;,'..., ...
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Vil Gamma & Beta 0.16 0.29 0.5
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.c i e VIII Gam:.& Neutron . 0.09 0.5
*CPAL d,J not NrtoNtc m this test category m 1982. .
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[ The Board finds that the CP&L performance in all eight radiation l categories met the ANSI tolerance limits with fairly comfortable margins. l
..u4'
- 35. ~,' y'. &> ,
_ n ,.. Further, the Applicants testified that the test results would be acceptable
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even if the more stringent tolerance formulation ofICRP 35 or the origi-
' ~ ~~
; nal 1976 ANSI standard were used, as shown in the following tabulation.
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gi rg g-]rA 7..v r 1982 CP&L 1984 CP&L 1974 Performance Performance AMI
~
Category Radiation Type (P + 2S (P + 2S 1.imit ., 0.29 0.3
~
l X-ray Accident 0.37 f 11 Gamma Accident 0.14 0.21
. 1
~ -
X-ray Shallow 0.16 0.26 af
. f 111 '$ .
~~
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Y ' -; X-ray Deep 0.22 0.25 W Gamma 0.09 0,17 0.1 , IV y 0.37 64 : V Beta 0.36 t VI Gamma & X ray 0.12 0.26 f3 Shallow Gamma & X-ray 0.23 02S a Deep - 0.22 0.41 0.5 i VII Gamma & Beta , Shallow t Gamma & Beta 0.17 0.18 0.5 g Deep 0.15 0.5 VIII Gamma & . Neutron Deep
*CP&L did not patopate m this test category m 1982. ,
(Browne, IT. Tr. 6407, at 10.)
- 11. Applicants' witness noted the exceedance in the results for the accident x ray category in 1982 and took the view that it is not realistic to expect that an individual could receive accident-level exposures to x rays in a nuclear power plant. We agree and, further, the improved m.. 1984 results in this category lead us to give little weight to this one
_ . .e . . . 2y ^fy.lh/iK M M T;i~h,.s..- . iglh . exceedance.
- 12. The Board finds these test results provide an unusually clear and
'~-
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unequivocal line of evidence that refutes the allegation of dosimetry
~
~
inaccuracies in this contention, and demonstrates compliance with NRC regulations.
.- . _ l E. Applicants' Quality Control for TLDs
'}
- 13. Test results may be questioned in terms of whether unusual care
,- I was exercised during the tests, so that the results might not be repre-sentative of the accuracy achieved during routine personnel dosimetry.
Consistent accuracy will be dependent on the existence of an appropriate quality control program.
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2:a y 3 ' ,; , 3 ._ . .. 14 SUREG/CR-2591, the report of the resuin of the 1982 Pilot study, noted the existence of four common reasons for poor performance 1 - ., 3 ; of dosimetry processors. These were: (1) use of incorrect cahbration
,q factors; (2) dosimeter variability; (3) clerical errors; and (4) poor cali-
.f j bration for accident doses. CP&L has taken steps to mmimize errors in each of these four areas through an extensive quahty assurance program.
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,< (/d. at 20-21.)
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- 15. Calibration factors have been determined for the Applicants' TLD system based on irradiation of TLDs to Nils traceable radiation standards. These correction factors hase been verified by the tests con-ducted in 1982 and 1984, and will also be verified by the quarterly inter-compar!>on program engaged in by Appheants with the Unisersity of N1:chigan. (/J. at 21J This program follows the format of the ANSI per-formance test. except that CP&L has added two additional radiation categories which are apphcable to the radiation types and energies found i in its nuclear plants, and has dropped the accident categories which
- differ from other categories only in the dose lesel. These two added categories are low-energy beta and mntures of low-energy beta with
- s ,
q high-energy photons. (/d. at 1213.) A monthly cross-check program is conducted where a number of TLDs are read on each TLD reader with a O.3 accuracy standard. Each reader is calibrated semiannually and after any maintenance afTecting calibration. (/d.) The TLD recders also under-go a daily quality assurance check which requires a 15% standard of accu-racy for critical parameters. (/d.)
- 16. In the semiannual cahbration cf the readers, ten TLDs are read at fise exposure lesels from 0.25 to 4.0 rem. They must be withm 10 A of the known dose, and the standard deviation must not exceed 101 For daily TLD reader calibration checks, TLDs are read after being irra-diated to known doses of 0.5 and 4.0 rem. Each TLD must read within
~
5g = 15% of the actual irradiated dose. If a reading within 15% is not f n... ev -E
>l'CN@rhb$
w)hyldhe.: r>:ws_. 9,v; 6% M g obtained, the check is repeated two more times; if the check fails two g out of three times, the TLD is removed from service. (/J. at 22.)
- 17. Dosimeter variability is minimized by carrying out an initial acceptance test of TLDs received from the manufacturer. Each TLD in a batch of 500 must be accurate to within = 15 G. The same test i procedure is performed semiannually to determine whether any TLDs
~
l should be removed from service. Id. at 23.
- 18. In order to climinate the potential for clerical error, CP&L has
, j installed an automatic data processing system with detailed verification
-t techniques. Individual records are on a computer which interfaces with the TLD reader. Where a manual er ry is required it is serilled by other
! 264 l
l l
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I I people, and hard copics of records are maintained to back up the computer. (/d.) y 1 19. With regard to poor calibration for accident doses, CP&L has performed in-house tests which establish the dose response of the TLDs
;m to doses of 100 rem. The response is essentially linear within approximately 15% in addition, CP&L has participated in and passed the accident dose categories during ANSI performance tests in 1982 and
't 1984. This verifies that poor calibration for accident doses is not a problem at CP&L. (/d. at 24.)
- 20. During cross-examination of Applicants' witness, Intervenors raised the issue of whether the effects of fading are considered in the reading of TLDs. (Browne, Tr. 6440.) Applicants' witness indicated that their procedures consider fading and that most fading of the stored signal on the TLD occurs within a relatisely shcrt time period after expo-sure. (/d.) It is Applicants' opinion that fading is contingent on tempera-ture, and that at the temperatures experienced in a nuclear power plant, fading is not a significant problem. (/d., Tr. 6441.)
- 21. The efTects of fading also depend on the way the TLD reader is calibrated. (/d., Tr. 6442.) Applicants allow the badges used to calibrate their readers to fade for 24 hours before they calibrate their system, so
! that most fading has occurred. (/d.) The fading of the TLD which occurs I between the first and 30th day after exposure is relatively small, less than 10% (/d., Tr. 6442-43.) Applicants' witness testified that the ele-ments in the TLD, which are sensitise to light, are always protected to prevent fading from light. (/d.)
- 22. It is the Staffs position that the Panasonic System has been
! found to provide reliable and accurate information. (Cusimano, Tr.
- 6568.) In addition, inspections of the Applicants' dosimetry program in-dicate that they have quality control programs for dosimetry equipment.
f.s Q c 4 M f d' h y
. ; Such inspections also indicate that the TLD program is adequate to pro- :
.N.M > v <$.5/;nM$.+dkd s m. tect the health and safety of the Applicants' workers. (Albright, Tr. ?
6569 70.) Finally, it is the Staffs position that the results of the third
~~. .;., .)I pilot study conducted by the University of Michigan indicate that Appli-cants have the capability to perform good-quality dosimetry processing.
. (Cusimano/ Block, ff. Tr. 6560, at 8.) Therefore, Applicants' personnel K . ,. , monitoring program is adequate, in the Staff view, to protect the health
.; and safety of the workers and complies with 10 C.F.R. { 20.202(a) of
; the Commission's Regulations. (/d.)
. . j 23. The Board finds that the CP&L quality assurance program for
~.5 -* -1 TLD personnel dosimetry appropriately controls the sources of errors I that have plagued other dosimeter processors. Although CP&L's self-imposed accuracy requirements are more stringent than the ANSI stand-1
.sp'
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ard. CPil us :.o miec. tit : J ' !.mng ia ow n m-muse sundards if the
^'
ANSI 3tandard is adopted by the NRC as part ef a final rule for accredit-j-l ., ' ;._ - 'f a j ing dosimetry processors (Browne, Tr. 6536.) We concur with Staff that
...r..
I the program is adequate and go further to the view that indeed we think
,.'e
, .- ~
':- m' the program is commendable.
,sS : p .tgny
- 9. s . .
~, . . .
24 Joint Intervenors' proposed findings basically comport with the r,l'. : r~Q . m.:-.wr,vy' .-
@$:, .. .o record as we hase described it. linwever, their Proposed Finding 12 T- R N %..'Ej@.y'f.~r - " . ""
Q~ urges the Board to require Applicants to have written procedures for the performance of all routine dosimetry operations. formal training and quahtication of all operaung personnel and supersisor) review of all l quahty controi records Th:s v..ggesnon has no n erit since Applicants h.n -:
- sm'eJ that "e- ;m
i're.'i> conu!ns these features
~-
_ N m s. il 5 . ,. meu tb; r es.yence :c ._ < . . ;; r wesnt i u ' g.r ff Tr D5b7.)
- 25. Joint intersenors adsocate, in their Proposed Findings 13 and
- 14. that Appheants should be required to compensate for possible inac-
. r. curacy in TLD measurements by hmiting worker exposure to two-thirds
- ' s';.
?%. -
of the regulatory hmit. Such an exouc modification to the regulations is
- - - s.g. . -/ .
beyond our authorit). As the NRC Staf f points out in reply, if the inter-4 - s .: venors wish to challenge the regulatory limits, then their remedy would hase been to show "special circumstances" pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
, i 2.758.
- - Faz s a of ,'e tes uN t'1e ln er-it) of %ehigan and the Ar!. '- ;ua is- - ,. , .gr a tur ,':rsonn21 aosimetry using
; TLD3 proside clear and urcontrm erted esidence that resoh es this con-tention in faser of the A;T scants.
i IV. ENVIRON 31 ENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL kM[Ihf;h. ' r.er w. s -~h-y h N'#N i
.2.e seg.-- w .%. n m+ EQUIPNIENT A. Introduction
. i. C R ntion 's n :!ngauj In i 113 [f 0Jeeding staley The Program I'or ens trormenta: quahntanon of electrical equiprnent at Shearon liarrn is maJequate for the Ichowing re.asom i s a the proposed resolut.on and s endor s rmdiiicaoon for IT T Har:on tran mete s nas noi been shown to ne ade.
I auaie. ire.. IE Informauon .%mes sl-29. 32..'2. and 83 72.) IB) Ibere is not suffi-l cient assurante that the concerns with Limacrqu s abe operators ident, lied in IE I M'ermanen Nonte 8.1.72 f eucri for nems C2. C5 and C't hase t cen .idecuate!)
-. l . e ! 't , it ,n .e,.e'm.r- t .: N ; R Tih has e Nen quau6ed in
/ *e i s .n . en * . . , - "rt . t a vt aae pa:e to ee' ett
-4 I
i 166 l m .. .. .. - .. . . .. . .
,, &$. . O,, w -
q
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.. m
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- I the actuai e:Yeo of es;%res :a P. .'e f .m.. o el ,
.J < i +e . < - ) .iN awder oser the times the RTDs c. 2d t' e w s, meJ to it ,. . 'reratures : R e f.
'- StJREGiCR 1466. S AND-N-l.i6l. Predictmg Lire Lsre uro of Comries Equip.
,, }
] ment l% ng Accelerated Aging Techniques t (De The qualiiication of mstrument cables did not melude adequate consideration and anal >us of leakage currents re-suit.ing from the radiation environment. These leaisage surrents euuld cause degra-dation of signal quality and/or spurious ognals in liarris instrument cables. IE)
There is not sutTicient assurance that the physical orientation of equipment in testing
.~ ' '
. J is the same as the physical orientation of equipment installed 8 FP The effects of radt-ation on lubricants and seals has not been adequately addressed in the enuronmen-tal aualification program (G) There is madequate assurance that fadure to report all results of enuronmental qualification icsto meludmg fadurA 5as %een brougnt to
!!ght m coinection with e:ectrul equipment mstaued u Harns This includes ra t test fadures of equipment a h cn subseat.cnd) pmes an lQ t;u .cd test fadures of equirment wNch is said m be uaared m sedanty i R E l . I .e- .' Pap i L D
, IL .ard . sx R
- i': . e re bJ'Id 4 \J. sVJ! b al' * ,JF .w f?NI i 2. Eddleman Comention 9 was originally admitted by the Board in September of 1982. LBP-82-119 A, supra, le NRC at 2091. The conten-tion was modified to read, as stated abose, by negotiations between Ap-plicants and Intervenor Eddleman. This moditication was accepted by the Board in July of 19S4. "N1emorandum and Order iRevision of and Schedule for Filing Written Testimony on Eddleman Contention 9; Rul-ings on Eddleman Contentions 45 and 67) Uuly 24,1984)."
- 3. Intersenor presented no direct evidence on this contention.
J. The Staf f Presemed the te3t:mont of Arma.mlo Niasciantonio with re3pe,t to each w ine 3e ca sug. : , :h:s c.. c em .~ i!r N! .se:- antonio is employed as an Equipment Quantication Engmeer. Disision l of Engineering. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulanon. He is re3ponsible for the technical reviews, analyses and esaluations of the adequacy of the environmental qualitication of electrical equipment important to safety, and safety-related mechanical equipment whose failure under . M(;A ry N z.. #i M .. Wh..
<j.6. Q @$_ , ,
g . , .?.v postulated environmental conditions could adversely affect the perform- J m ^.-1 ance of safety systems in nuclear power plants. Slasciantonio. ff. Tr. 1 5567, Attach.1. N1r. Niasciantonio is directly responsible for the review of the Shearon liarris Enstronmental Qualification Program. Niascianto-j nio, Tr. 5608.
+ -
.c-, [. .,; - . j 5. The Applicants presented the testimony of sarious panels con-s 1 cerning ditTerent subparts of the contention and those panels are identi-
- fied infra in the findings for the specific subcontentions. In addition, Ap-plicants' panel, consisting of Sir. Robert W. Prunty and Peter 51.
u.
]i' Yandow, provided for informational purposes introductory testimony which described briefly Applicants' prwrrm for ensironmental qualifica-tion of electrical equipment ("EQ Program"L (N1r. N1asciantonio's tes-
_g ~ -y
, );; j p p 6 -
267 E*N. ' *il. d. - ' e_ ..:~c T 4
Qf.:/ q } ?QQ f,.Q:xW'.x- -l:c
-.: . 6*** ,
. 1 N timony also included general discussion of Applicants' EQ Program.)
hir. Prunty is employed by CP&L as a Principal Engineer in the Electri-
,..$'c gc.'-[ -9/C D. . E.] cal Group and Instrumentation and Control Group at Harris. He is re-y; mq f.
.( - '
sponsible for the EQ Program in a supervisory capacity. hir. Yandow is NN.3-Ni E5 bgt-[;h-F,dM I$I.3 ' +.c : fi.! employed by CP&L as a Senior Engineer in the Instrumentation and Control Group and is responsible for the detailed aspects of the EQ Pro-gram, ff. Tr. 4971, at 2.
, M7J qg/
Lp.j@h,[mj-OgypQg.yjd Nfi%h 6. The purpose of the EQ Program at the SHNPP is to ensure all y'.* .4 "' safety-related electrical equipment and other electrical equipment impor-tant to safety is capable of performing its safety functions in the environ-
^; ment postulated for design basis events. Environmental conditions in-clude temperature, pressure, humidity, radiation, chemical spray and submergence. Applicants' Introductory Testimony at 9; hlasciantonio at 3-5.
- 7. The Commission's regulations at 10 C.F.R. j 50.49 establish re-
. , .,. . i quirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment im-Qj-j {
j portant to safety. Equipment "important to safety" includes safety-i related electrical equipment, nonsafety related electrical equipment 2.M f.Ijf,dhNdk % h',.
. c , ;f whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent
.. satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions by safety-related equip-
- - .. fh)'
ment, and certain post-accident monitoring equipment in general, envi-T' ,; . M. 'J ronmental qualification is required to meet General Design Criteria 1,2, 4 and 23 of Appendix A, and ! III and XI of Appendix B, to 10 C.F.R. Part 50. Staff guidance for meeting the regulatory requirements in 10 C.F.R. } 50.49 is provided in NUREG-0588 (Rev.1), " Interim Staff Po-sition on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equip-ment," July 1981. Applicants' Introductory Testimony at 9-10; Niascian-tonio at 3 5.
.a.... .. . .
- 8. Applicants' Environmental Qualification Program is contained y
M in f 3.11 of the FSAR. FSAR Appendix 3.II A compares Applicants' 4
%m.
MIN $ W.%..% @.,w-"m mg$.gg..'cR-M. procedures for environmental qualification of electrical equipment with !: NUREG-0588. Pru.nty/Yandow, ff. Tr. 4971, at 10. The Staff's review of Applicants'submittals is in the early stages. hiasciantonio, Tr. 5601.
- 9. However, Applicants submitted letters on July 25 and August 24, 1984, indicating how the specific concerns raised by Contention 9 i were being resolved in their Environmental Qualification Program. Afas-
! ciantonio, IT. Tr. 5567, at 7. The Staff has reviewed the information provided by the Applicants to determine the adequacy of the Environ-
.j mental Qualification Program in addressing each of the issues raised in this contention. Id. The Staff also made a site visit to verify the accuracy I
of the information submitted by Applicants. Id. at 8. j
^
s 268 l A w M % e a M aa w a u 1 m =1
_ . , . . ,, , , m,
- r. ,
~
l
- 10. Intervenor Eddleman points out in his Proposed Finding 30 l
j.. , that the NRC Staff request:d additional information after the hearing on
'. x . m g the Harris EQ Program (transmittal December 5,1984), and Nir. Eddle-man takes the position that this request for information " undermines all assertions that the Harris EQ Program is adequate." N!r. Eddleman has
^
3, , , . i ignored Applicant and Staff testimony that only the specific concerns in
~
r- N ". . this contention had been reviewed at the time of the hearing. We do not
,l find any merit in this proposed Gnding.
~
l
! B. Contention 9A: ITT-Barton Transmitters i 11. Testimony for the Applicants on this contention was presented by Peter 51. Yandow, Robert W. Prunty and Richard B. N1 iller. N1r.
Yandow is employed by CP&L as an Electrical Engmeer and is currently responsible for the Environmental Quali0 cation Program at Harris. Nir.
,1 Prunty is employed by CP&L as a Principal Engineer in the Electrical and Instrumentation and Control ("I&C") areas, and he established the l
- EQ Program for the Harris plant. Mr. Miller is employed as a Principal l Engineer with the Nuclear Safety Department of Westinghouse Electric
; Corporation. Mr. Miller is a co-author of WCAP-8587, which describes I Westinghouse's methodology for qualifying electrical equipment. Mr.
} Miller was active in the performance of safety evaluations concerning i the problems noted with ITT-Barton Transmitters. Prunty er al., ff. Tr.
5093, at 2 3.
- 12. ITT-Barton Transmitters are pressure-type transmitters. They use either a bourdon tube or bellows assembly to measure pressure and j differential pressure, respectively. Pressure changes cause the mechani-cal movement of strain gages. The variation in tension causes changes in electrical resistance of the strain gages, which is converted into an p-e - : M irq electrical output by the electronic circuitry of the transmitters. Id. at 4.
O_- N.%@MY#iMDN1.4fg%g iYgp 13. yAt Harris, both models 763 and 764 ITT-Barton Transmitters ! s g,
" pressure, pressurizer pressure, steam pressure, pressurizer level, steam generator level, and steam flow. Such transmitters are located through-
. . out the containment building. Id. at 6.
' ' cL ,.XMM - : -
. 14. Both Applicants and Staff testined that three deGeiencies with M*t- N ". ITT-Barton Transmitters were noted by Information Notices 81-29 j 82 52 and 83-72. Id. at 5; Masciantonio, ff. Tr. 5567, at 8-10.
.- i ,
- 15. The Grst defect consisted of failure of initial quali0 cation tests s~ "* due to erratic behavior. The significance of the failure was an error in 1
output which could have resulted in the safety analysis limits being ex-ceeded. Prunty er al., ff. Tr. 5093, at 5. The failure was determined to 4,
~
269 1 k EN 3 2 M M b I ,~. d M > h i l & '1
l l l l 1 resuit from Jeyaaats n et cm a m imer 'a. c;ccun connector anem-blie3 of the transmitters. /d. This problem uas corrected by 'he soldering of connector assembbes. /J. The modification and test results were reported to the Staff and approsed by the Sta!T on Nosember 10, 1983. j /d. at 6; Ntasciantonio, ff. Tr. 5567, at 8.
, c . l, ,, j 16 Applicants returned the alTected models of ITT-Barton Trans-
.. _. e .3 mitters to ITT-Barton for performance of the abose-desenbed modifica-
~
tions. Applicants hase received test reports to confirm that the modifica-
, tion is adequate to qualify the equipment. Prunty et al.. ff. Tr. 5093, at 7.
17 The two additional problems with ITT-Barton Transmaters con-cern the negatne shift which is a decrease m output during initial expo-sure to constant operam;g pressure. and thermal rancere.itability of pa , -, g ; , % ; q- , ; '- - - r ,, a ; r a ' s. \la eun-1 ' t .
'. ';i., af the tr3trument to rerea, a , rec:..ca output witam .i owar'e limit, when .
esposed to the same temperature and pressure to which it was imtially 1 calibrated. Prunty et al.17. Tr. 5093, at 8.
- 15. The cause of the negative shift problem was determined to be combined creep in the link wire between the pressure bourdon tube and the strain-sensing beam, and in the matenal used to attach the link wire. .
/d. This negative shift problem was determmed not to hase any safety sigmticance. /J. The etTect of negatne shift on the oser-temperature i delta T is minimal and m the consersalise direction. Also, the effect of such .ug ,,: sMt en W-pr se: tr7 is cor+:n.un e. There is no o . . . . - .. , .,;. ,. .
.;.- /./ t il 'A 23 u n g h m. 3; 3 w ;cw a regard.ng the saf2:3 sgmficance of the negaine shift problem are contained in an analysts performed by
, Westinghouse. This analysn was first presented to the StatT in a meeting
. . _ during February of 1984. Niiller. Tr. 5095-98.
,[, iip 20. At the time of the hearings, the StatT had not completed its 4
. Wy.h.3%
A~2.Y58$ ALW d ah, Y G h h h *N review of this Westinghouse analysis. Slasciantonio, ff. Tr. 5567, at 9; } m s.4.vegi , Stasc antonio. Tr. 5634. The Sta!T testified, however, that there is no I indication that such analy us is inadequate. N!a3ciantonio. Tr. 5635. 21 Duns; the haanng. St,if Caunse, mforn':d the Board that the resiew of the Westmghouse ana > sn raiaung to 11 f-Darton Transmitters
; could be accelerated end that this review would be mmpleted shortly.
1 Tr. 5692. This resiew was completed and the StatT submitted the Af-lidavit of Armando S. Niasciantonio. Richard A. Kendall and Robert C. Jones, Jr., along with a N!otion to Supplement the Record to receise the Aflidavit. "NRC Staff Slotion to Supplement the Record" (Nosember
- 20. 1984). During the hearing. .\1r. Eddleman indicated he had no desire to cro s .na "me St of ranes+2s on the results of their review, 270
... z. -.s ; -
* $*l.hkh?.N,.k& up&f5f. &hnU* & (; j.h ..
. . ,1 . .
~
,T *'
..Thr~... $+' . ' -
m. 4 and had no objection to the sunnwm of a -cc,' '
. Sw.i .\tiidas it setting forth those re3uit3 floweser he wisned it to re understood he I
did not necessarily agree with the Allidasit. Eddleman. Tr. 5770-71. On
~ '
~
December 17,1984, the Board admitted the StatTs Attidavit which sets
-' ' ' - forth the results of its review of the Westinghcuse analysis as NRC Staff
- Exhibit 7. Tr. 7413,7432.
. . -/.2 .N. Z ,m ._
- 22. With respect to the negative shift problem, the Staff concluded X.2: q r. ' - ' :
that the additional error introduced by the negatise shift does not cause a safety concern. The Statrs resiew indicates that the masimum addi-tional errar due to the negatis 4hift in the transmater output was cal-culated l'a3ed on actual ' n;-: rm IN da.a Th:s m.'s::"um transmitter error was 'nclud:J in u . reulanon -! 9 imai actuav. n 3',em chan-i
- s 'en Li nei .
L .r ta: and .-ppcos. nc ' , rien ice ;; sed !com ,40 p3tg high pressurize: pr x ure react to 2445 pyg. The 5:aff had detern :nea tnat this ces ned sa!ue witt pro- ' vide adequate protection for the RCS oserpressurization esents and limit the peak RCS pressure to ten ihan 110' of the design salue. This i is consistent with H 15.2.1-15.2.5 ot the Standard Resiew Plan. Stati Exh. 7, ' 7.
- 23. With reg rd to thermai nonrepeatabihty, the sources of the errors were discovered to be improper eahbration techniques used by Barton. The resultant error would s r.s s ne m ne positive direction.
Barten ano ;ound 21 e.ee ne n .e m .ai,.. ..;a ae T;r arm of ce , ~ u rata oni) the zero and scan poteattomete s - ,tc. . creates po3 tise errors at higa temperatares nd s ord, of concern l
; during accident conditions. Prunty cr al.. If. Tr. N93. at 9-10. Westing-house calculated the expected destatiens due to 'hi3 error. and esaluated the etTects of the deviations on transmitter function. W e3tinghou3e ...--( h,.:'v, s
a.. .W6.-;;m.4. w w . ~. nu ., ;,.
- :v:J changed the set points at liarris to provide an adequate margin between
~?
-;rs.;5 m g, q; c; w y . M - .-e
- p ~. - ,.
- m. " - the Safety Analysis Limits and the set points so that there would be no safety concern. Id. at 10-11.
24 As correctise actions. the correct cahnration techniques were used to eneck the tran3nrtters .\:o. a tircr;W, o , .v w w insta!!ed between the potentiometer and the case to interrupt the leakage path. Id. at 11. Any transmitter returned to the factory for other repairs would also have the above modifications performed. /J.
- 25. With regard to thermal nonrereatabiin'.. the StatTs aftidasit in-dicated that their resiew of test results for modified units demonstrates that the proposed resolution of this defect is adequate. Staff Exh. 7,16.
j
- 26. During cron-examinat;on. An;licana' wanen tesntled that another report of a negatise shift proi'icm oa the zero-based pre 33ure l
i ri W
c.
-._ ;3
- g. . gv. .
.g- .
.. ~,.
~ ~ %J.2 %.f::.'
transmitters manufactured by ITT-Barton has also been observed. Some _ . of these transmitters are used in liarris. The nature of this negative shift M. .'. 3. - b J r :'.. , - 1" is the same as that discussed in Applicants' testimony. Miller, Tr. 5102. T' The efTect on the Barton transmitter is less, according to Applicants' wit-
,;.. % j , ^ :u .
ness, in magnitude than on the other suppressed zero model. Id., Tr.
'sid i.:e Np;.- 1.t 5103.
- 27. Applicants' witness testined that there is a m 1% shift allowance ItP4';.y?J
- p- [ ,, 4 Qig ( 77a*ggifik ri6: !$ for Barton transmitters. The negative shift discovered on the zero based
~
transmitter is within the 1%. Id.
- 28. Applicants' witnesses testined that all of the ITT-Barton trans-1 mitters were qualified by test rather than by similarity. Miller, Tr. 5113.
Applicants also indicated that the potential safety significance of thermal nonrepeatability is somewhat mitigated because the establishment of a set point is not at the point where there would be a safety concern. These set points are backed off from safety limits so that an instrument l could exceed the set point and stay within safety limits. Yandow, Tr. I 5121. The margin between the set point and the safety limit accounts for
.i all instrument errors. This margin is on the order of 10 to 15%. Miller, j Tr. 5122. Applicants indicated that upon receipt from Barton of the I transmitters previously returned to the factory they would be inspected l by Applicants' QA Program. Prunty, Tr. 5133. l 3 29. On cross-examination Applicants stated that Westinghouse has l i
now approved Barton's calibration procedures, and that Westinghouse's i QA organization will actually check as to how the procedures are per-fo rmed. Miller, Tr. 5160.
- 30. In light of the modifications being made to correct the thermal nonrepeatability and connector problems, and in light of the results of
, the Westinghouse analysis dealing with thermal nonrepeatability and j.,- v % ,, .;c .
,' negative shift problems, both Applicants and Stz.fl have concluded that fd?hgip%p,, p. p%$[{.g the Harris Environmental Quali6 cation Program adequately addresses 98.~
khi/cem,QFQ;-d all of the concerns with the ITT Barton Transmitters. Prunty et al., fi. Tr. 5093, at 12; Masciantonio, ff. Tr. 5567, at 8-10; Staff Exh. 7,18. i
- 31. The Board Gnds that Applicants' Environmental Qualification Program has adequately addressed concerns relating to ITT-Barton trans-mitters. The Board also Hnds that the proposed vendor modifications of t the ITT-Barton transmitters are acceptable.
~
i C. Contention 9B: Limitorque Valve Operators i
- 32. For Contention 98, Applicants' panel was composed of Mr.
Prunty and Mr. Yandow, who are identiGed supra.
]
272 bb.M : ; h 5SE$5 D !r k .-i. h d t' b CI N
e ---
- 33. A salve operater is a component of a vahe which causes it to
- open or close. These valve operators have motors which cause the valve to change position. They are used in velves such as globe valves, butter-f .I fly valves, and gate valves. Limitorque vahe operators are used on a number of valves at liarris which perform safety functions, including
...I containment isolation, reactor coolant pressure boundary isolation,
^ ' :d
- ECCS operation, and operation of the emergency safeguard system.
These valve operators are located both inside containment and in the
, auxiliary building. Prunty/Yandow 9B, ff. Tr. 4971, at 3.
j 34. Applicants testilled that Limitorque determined that only one of a number of deficiencies noted in IE Information Notice 83-72 per-taining to Limitorque valve operators was applicable to liarris. That defi-cicney concerned the use of unquahtied terminal bleeks in some Limi-torque vahe operators supphed to Westinghouse. Appheants testitied that Limitorque indicated that Westinghouse had undertaken to replace l all unqualilled terminal blocks. /J. at 5. In addition, however, Applicants ha.e committed to do a 100% tield serification of all Limitorque vahe operators on active vahes in harsh environments. Yandow, Tr. 4975-77; Prunty/Yandow 9B, ff. Tr. 4971, at 5.
- 35. Applicants testified that an actise valve is one which actually must mose to perform its function. Yandow, Tr. 5029. It is Applicants' position that the function of a passive valve would not have safety sig-nificance ifit failed. Yandow, Tr. 5030.
- 36. The inspection is being performed in three phases. The first phase - the in3pection of all aethe safety-related salves inside contain-
, ment - has found no deficiencies. The second phase insolved inspec-tion of a'l actise valves in the steam tunnel; no deficiencies were found.
All of the remaining safety-related active vahes in a harsh environment were yet to be inspected at the time of hearing. Yandow, Tr. 4975.
- ,g, . . , ;. .
-qq.Nyg . jf i 37. A concern was also raised about the motor insulation used in }
-i[D.o 8% 1 Limitorque valve operators. Prunty/Yandow 98, ff. Tr. 4971, at 8. Bech-te! had raised a concern about the use of a class ofinsulation which had not been type tested for inside containment. As part of the field verifica-tion program, Applicants are checking the name plates to determine that j the insulation is correct. /d. at 9. To date, all insulation has been found to be Ril. Any motor inside containment found to be unqualified would be replaced. /d.
- 38. A concern was also raised whether Limitorque valve operators l are qualified for all installation onentations. Id. Applicants have specified procedures for ensuring the proper installation orientation of safety-related electrical equipment, including Limitorque valve operators. /J. at
- 10. The field veritication program includes a check of the insta!!ation 273
,. . [ ' ' - q m ,- M;pQgs, h f57hjj k f ; ; .
. ' .j,. , , .
orientations. No desiations from Limitorque's recommended orientation
.- - '. . . - j has e been identified. /d.
~
- 39. Bechtel also raised a concern about whether the installation of drain plugs and orientation of drain holes at other than the lowest point f of the operator would alTect its qualitication. Limitorque has required T . , ' d'i f the installation of drain plugs to prevent moisture buildup on the motor;
.- :j y 4 %.,5 . .
plugs must be installed in the two lowest drain plug locations. The drain plugs are placed in the limit switch compartments with installation in-structions at the time of shipment by Limitorque. /J. at 11. Applicants have specifically instructed their personnel, via design documents, how to install drain plugs. /d. Installation of these drain plugs is serified as l part of the Geld scritication program. Id. H A wneern was aho raised w hether purcha3e order and qualitica-tmn des agree with the installed components. Id. at 12. Applicants testi-tied that both CP&L and Ebasco resiew the qualitication documentation ! against the requirements contained in the purchase order and specifica-tions for the equipment. The equipment is inspected prior to shipment, upon receipt at the site, and after its installation. During the verification I program Applicants will be verifying that the equipment, as installed, agrees with the purchase order specifications and other design docu-ments. /J. '
- 41. The final concern about Limitorque valve operators is related to the qualification of 0-rings. /d. Applicants do not believe that this concern e3 applicable to the equipment employed at Harris. App %nts testified that 0 rings cannot be identified without disassembh the
; equipment. Iloweser, Applicants have committed that if the field h.iti-
, cation program identifies any equipment component of which qualifica-tion appears questionable, the operator will be disassembled and all ques-c t % Im m.s tionable components will be replaced, including any unidentifiable N $g.- h- -.4,
. 4 gs.g y $,, -
r
, t .,. , . -
O-rings. Id. at 13.
- 42. The Staff testified that in light of Applicants' commitment to perform a 100% reinspection of all Limitorque salve operators in a harsh en aronment, there is reasonable assurance that Applicants' Environ-mental Qualitication Program has addressed the concerns raised in IE In-formation Notice 83-72. Stasciantonio, ff. Tr. 5567, at i1. In addition, the StatT testitled that it is possible that during the audit the Staff would tear down a Limitorque valve operator to independently serify its qualiti-cation. Ilowever, the Staff went on to point out that a decision to do so i has not been made at this time. Stasciantonio, Tr. 5642-43.
- 43. Based on the commitment to perform a 100% reinspection of all the Limitorque operators in a harsh ensironment, the Board finds that Applicants' Environmental Qualification Program adequately addresses 274
._ _T_ N T d $ D I N I5 I". MbbbY-Nbd b 2 MC A _* ~' CA
. , . w, ,n;--.. ..
3., .
,= . w . . < . -- -
i l t i I the concerns regarding Limitorque valve operators raised in Contention
. ~ . , 98.
, , . ;., m . . . * . ,e -
, p_.. <' : , f D. Contention 9C: Thermal Aging of RTDs
'v.2 3F ^,.2 44. Applicants' witness, Dr. Thomas Dakin, is a consultant for j'_, . J.3 -
- g. ,7pfy."y: r Westinghouse. During his career Dr. Dakin's research activities con-y . e ' _ . 4 , g .t centrated on the electrical behavior, and electrical and thermal aging of j insulation, both in service and laboratory tests simulating service envi- ,
ronment conditions. Dr. Dakin has published papers which discuss l most, if not all, of the precautions regarding application of accelerated aging mentioned in the Sandia Report referenced in Contention 9C as well as other precautions. lie is a fellow of the IEEE. Stiller /Dakm, ff. Tr. 4839, at 2-3.
- 45. An RTD, a resistance temperature detector, is an instrument i i used to measure temperature in which the primary element, a resistance i I wire, has a well-defined resistance temperature relationship. liarris uses j RTDs manufactured by the RdF Corporation. There are eighteen Nlodel 4 - -
! 21204 RTDs directly immersed in the bypass lines to the reactor coolant system. There are three coolant loops at liarris. The eighteen RTDs are I used to measure the " hot-leg" and " cold leg" temperature in each loop.
i , These RTDs are directly immersed to provide rapid time response meas-
; urements for use in the reactor protection and control system. Six
! Nfodel 21205 RTDs are installed in wells located in the reactor coolant system piping to provide measurement of the hot and cold-leg tempera-ture in each loop for use in monitoring plant conditions. /J. at 4 ' j j 46. Thermal aging is a temperature-dependent chemical process
. which can lead to changes in the properties of organic materials over a i ~# . e -
wl " period of time. /d. at 6. Since real-time aging is not practical over the b .hY f'ub, . mu wqry m ~p ,Q', c c,. "
,W
. gt, long periods of time over which electrical equipment must be qualified for nuclear power plants, accelerated processes have been developed to t
simulate a defined life over a much shorter period of time. /d. at 7. j
; 47. The Arrhenius methodology has been descloped to simulate ac- 1 l celerated aging. This methodology is based on the premise that deterio- ,
~
- l. ration of materials in service is due to chemical reaction. These occur in- !
- l
{ T- . i '
~
ternally, sometimes between components of the material, and sometimes , with compounds in the environment such as oxygen or water vapor.
. Chemical reactions occur more rapidly at higher temperatures. Arrhenius
-I showed that temperature dependence of chemical reactions follows an j i exponential equation. lie postulated a consistent correlation between ,
the amount of physical change and chemical reaction so that the time to reach a selected amount of physical change will vary according to an l . _. i
- 275
} ! l 1 I i l $_ ikdkN5 beniEMNG. a. . - z. w :e n
1 l l l l l l equation. /d. at 7-8. The rate of thermal aging is the slope of the graph using the Arrhenius equation. /d. at 8. It is Applicants' conclusion that
.. , -[ ,
other than testing of the material or system for the predicted years of service, this is the most logical scientific way of predicting whether a i
. material or system will be reliable. /d. at 9. Type tests for thermal aging I
, ,_
- are made from I to 2 years. After the linearity of the Arrhenius graph P -v.7 - ' '
. ; for a particular material is confirmed, then short-time, more accelerated
' '5; .
tests are acceptable to evaluate small changes in materials or application
, conditions. /d. Generally, the experience has been excellent in confirm-i ing the predictions. /d.
- 48. The NRC Staff has concurred in the use of the Arrhenius meth-odology for thermal aging. /J. at 9; N!asciantonio, IT. Tr. 5567, at 14
- 49. The environmental qualification for the RTDs to be used at Harris includes thermal aging, thermal cycling, irradiation aging, and si-bration aging, as a part of the preconditioning process. The RTDs are temperature-cycled to account for plant heatup and cooldown tempera-tures. They are exposed to radiation for normal and accident conditions.
They are also exposed to conditions which simulate pipe and flow vibra-
, tions. This process simulates a minimum 20-year life for those RTDs in the bypass line and a minimum of 10-year life for those in the wells. Afil-i ler/Dakin, tT. Tr. 4839, at 10. After preconditioning, these RTDs are i
subjected to the etTects of seismic event and high-energy line-break envi-ronments. Id.
- 50. Since epoxy is the only age-sensitise material used in the RTD, the actisation energy was selected for this material. Using the Arrhenius methodology and the ambient temperature at*the cable interface, the aging temperature was calculated which would simulate the desired life at an accelerated rate and not inadvertently degrade the material due to the high temperature alone. Id. at 11. The normal ambient temperature
' / N A Q % W T[ 4 M id
' equivalent to the normal ambient temperature in the region, plus the ex-
.> 7 N h ..E< $c.h $..l.c,y- h J. F $l pected temperature rise associated with the heat transferred to the inter-face from the reactor coolant system, is a 49'C plus a 50*C rise. There-fore, the temperature to which these RTDs would be exposed would be 100'C. /J.
, 51. The activation energy chosen was at the low end of the range of
, e ~.4 activation energies for epoxy resins. Therefore, this activation energy is quite conservative. Dakin, Tr. 4918.
- 52. The Arrhenius methodology was also used to simulate accident
' '{ conditions, but only in the post-accident period. The first day, after a i high-energy line break, was simulated in real time and temperature. Fol-i lowing the first day of testing, the remainmg post-accident period was simulated by accelerated thermal aging. Nfiller/Dakin, ff. Tr. 4839, at r-l
, r , J.a . ] '
276 1
~
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- 12. Westinghouse uses a standard accident profile w hich u3es a 0.5 stand-ard electron volt activation energy to determine the time / temperature
, j relationship during this period. RTDs were subjected to this generic 4
profile. /d.
- 53. After the accelerated aging was performed, the RTDs were tested by calibration checks and resistance measurements at O'C,274*C,
~'
and 329'C as well as insulation resistance measurements. Id. No degra- {. -
.[ dation was detected. Id.
- 54. In supporting this contention, Intervenor Eddleman cited a Sandia Report which cautioned using the Arrhenius methodology for ac.
! celerated aging. The predicted deficiencies noted in the Sandia Report do not apply to the epoxy used at Harris. The insulation system of the RTD and connector are sealed against moisture so that diffusion of the moisture is presented. .\loisture dif fusion is the only potentially insali-dating condition referred to in the Sandia Report that could apply to the i accelerated aging of RTDs. In addition, epoxy resins are not known to l be sensitive to moisture effects as was the polyurethane used in the Sandia Report. Id. at 14-15.
i 55. The Sandia Report concludes that " accelerated aging techniques I offer the best opportunity for predicting lifetimes or simulating life of j complex equipment." /d. at 15; Slasciantonio, ff. Tr. 5567, at 14.
- 56. Dr. Dakin testified that another potential mechanism for degra-
- dation of epoxy is oxidation. However, he testified that the requirements on the epoxy in an RTD are minimal. and that it does not have to with-stand much soltage. Therefore. it needs almost no detectric strength.
Epoxy could endure large amounts of cracking wid.vu: narming the function of an RTD, even if oxygen were present. Dakin, Tr. 4924.
- 57. Epoxy is also relatively insensitive to radiation. Dakin, Tr.
4945. Applicants' witness is not aware of any radiation-caused cracking i n d " M 8 M h g g g g- or diffusion in epoxies. Id.
- 58. The Staff reviewed the basis for Applicants' aging calculations.
t"
-( dQEMl3pgg5 c." e'~ . The Staff is aware of the inadequacies in the Arrhenius methodology.
However, it is the best approach currently available to address accelerat-ed thermal aging and has been used in Equipment Qualification Pro-grams of every nuclear power plant in the country. Alasciantonio, ff. Tr. i 5567, at 13-l'. The Staff does not allow reliance exclusively on the Arr-u i henius meth.sdology of accelerated aging to address the requirements for
- establishing a qualified life for equipment. Applicants must have a sur-
, veillance and maintenance program to account for unanticipated degrada-tion which is not reflected in the results of the accelerated aging process.
Combined with the surveillance program, the Arrhenius methodology is 277
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considered acceptable for aging to establish a qualiGed hfe. /d. at 14. Ap-
~ plicants have committed to a surveillance program in compliance with s
i Regulatory Guide 1.33. Id. at 12-! 3.
'i 59. As stated above, the life of 20 23 years for RTDs was based on
,s- d an ambient temperature of 50*C and a 50'C temperature rise. The tem-1 perature rise is based on heat transfer analyses which presumes 327'C
.. 2;; . -
- .' ~
, - 1, ~'
- f
,,1 coolant temperature and a 60*C ambient temperature. Conservative acti-
.# vation energy was chosen. The StafT believes that the activation energy 3
chosen by Applicants was conservative because the ranges chosen were those which would give the shortest lifetime for the RTDs. Sfascianto-nio. Tr. 5652. Tests for the NRC performed by Sandia National Labora-tory showed that RTD housing temperatures are in the range of 66*C to 93"C for PWR primary coolant temperatures of 316'C and containment temperatures of 42*C. These are consistent with the liarris calculations. Therefore, the Staff judged the methodology used by Applicants for ac-i celerated aging of RTDs to be acceptable and to represent actual plant i conditions. hiasciantonio, ff. Tr. 5567, at 16.
' 60. For the reasons set forth above, the Board finds that the use by i Applicants of the Arrhenius methodology, coupled with a maintenance and surveillance prcgram, is adequate to demonstrate that the RTDs
-j have been environmentally qualified.
I E. Contention 9D: Leakage Currents from Instrument Cables
- 61. Applicants presented the testimony of Richard M. Bucci and Edwin J. Pagan on this contention. Mr. Bucci is employed by Ebasco Services, Inc., as an Associate Consulting Engineer in the Corporate and Consulting Engineering Department. Mr. Bucci is Manager of Ebasco's i Equipment Qualification Program. Bucci/ Pagan, ff. Tr. 5166, at 2-3. Mr.
_ -r wnce >~:.
> 2 _.4 ( p ] g Pagan is employed by Ebasco Services, Inc., as a Senior Electrical Engi- j
- '^ r _ ,q .z:q. ~ neer. He is responsible for developing and implementing the EQ Pro- -
.m 4 gram for non-NSSS equipment and supervising the work of the EQ 4
i group, which consists of nine multidisciplined engineers. Id. at 3 4.
. 62. Instrument cables are cables constructed of a conductor. insula-
, . j tion, shield, drain wire and overall jacket. They are designed to conduct
.' .; j
<?
low-power electrical signals which give information about plant operating conditions such as reactor coolant system pressure, temperature, and i containment radiation levels. /d. at 6.
- 1' '> , sJ 63. These cables have been qualified by tests using the methodology
' -l employed in IEEE-3831974. This methodology is endorsed by Regula-tory Guide 1.131. Id. at 7. These cables are subjected to thermal aging.
i radiation, and design basis accident conditions as applicable. /d. at 8.
, -1
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- Q3 .
278 i U* ;
, ,7 _ ,
The cables are qualified for the worst-case location and most sescre envi-ronmental conditions that any part of the cable could experience. Id. They are exposed to much higher doses of radiation than the most i severe doses which could actually be received under normal and accident
.y,, 4 1,. conditions. /J. According to conservative radiation calculations, the maximum normal, plus accident, dose which this instrument cable d_.b h Y .1 D .' $..,.., -
Y' could receive at liarris is 5 x 10' rads, one-fourth of the dose which the D. y,.- T.d.!;m M i p %. g ., .I cable sample received during testing. Id. After the testing was complet-ed, the cables were require <' to pass a voltage withstand test which sub-
, jected them to additional electrical and mechanical stresses of a greater magnitude than the cables would experience during normal service. This test indicated that margins still existed in the integrity of the insulation after the qualiGeation testing. Id.
64 The leakage current is that portion of the signal carried by the cable which is conducted through the insulation to the ground. The insu-l lation resistance is the resistance of the cable insulation to the Gow of
- i the leakage cunent. The leakage current and insulation resistance are in- ,
versely proportional to each other. Id. The safety implications of reduced {
'T -
insulation resistance depend on the instrument sensitivity. Leakage cur-
~c'
< rents could affect the accuracy of the information transmitted by the ,
- instrument. If the instrument is a safety-related instrurnent, plant safety I j could be impaired. /d. at 9. I
- 65. Both the leakage current and insulation resistance were meas- I ured during qualiGcation testing. The leakage current is sensed by a !
measunng device and converted to an insulation resistance value which is recorded. The insulation resistance of these cables was measured at a
! minimum prior to the test, after irradiation and at frequent intervals during the design basis accident testing. It was not measured during the
. o,2 w . _ . . , _ - - - _ radiation test because radiation causes a cumulative change which does t , yf not result in Ductuations in insulation resistance during testing. Id. at
> ; y v . S .q:-w 9-10.
- 66. Irradiation was not found to result in a signiGeant decrease in insulation resistance. For example, in one sample, the insulation resist-ance before irradiation was 8.75 x 10" chms per 1000 ft. The insulation ij resistance after irradiation was 1.75 x ION ohms per 1000 ft. Insulation
. - , resistance values of these magnitudes indicate negligible leekage currents in the circuit. Id. at 11.
- 67. Ebasco is performing insulation resistance calculations which
; will consider insulation resistance measurements taken during the entire qualiGcation test sequence. The results must show that the quality of the instrument signals will not degrade to a point where the instrument may not be capable of performing its safety function. These results will be 279
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_ contained in individual environmental qualification packages. /d. at
. p '.; .
', }j 11-12.
- 68. Therefore, it .is Applicants' position that these instrument
-l r
'4 cables have been reviewed to ensure there will be no adverse effects on
[ .
.. . . j the safety functions performed by Harris instrument cables as a result of
.N J leakage currents caused by radiation. Id. at 12. :'
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,02 69. During Board examination, Applicants' witness Bucci pointed i out that the current loss, due to the decrease in the insulation resistance, would be 2 x 10-S amps, which is too small to measure. Bucci, Tr. 5228.
- 70. The Staff during its site visit found that the efTects of radiation on insulation resistance had been included in the Environmental Qualifi-cation Program. N!asciantonio, ff. Tr. 5567, at 16. It is the Staft's posi-tion that the measurement of insulation resistance gises a direct indica-tion of the leakage current. Staff review of three qualification files on
, August 9 and 10 determined that leakage current was measured after ra-i diation exposure. The results showed little loss of insulation resistance due to radiation exposure. Id.
j 71. Intervenors did not raise any issues during cross-examination which caused a change in either the Staft's or Applicants' conclusions.
- 72. The Board finds that Applicants' Environmental Qualification Program takes adequate account of leakage currents resulting from the radiation environment.
F. Contention 9E: Orientation of Installed Equipment i 73. Applicants presented the testimony of Str. Richard h1. Bucci, Str. Edwin J. Pagan, and hlr. Edward 51. SicLean on this contention. Str. NfcLean, a Project Nicchanical Engineer, has worked on the installa-tion of electrical and mechanical equipment insofar as the preparation of
.-v4fM.:d.it["
' S. s; r ;.N
.' work packages and process control sheets are concerned to ensure the :
n-v-5/'Q W , , ,,-) proper completion of quality control inspection. Bucci et al., ff. Tr. 5234, i
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at 3-4. t
- 74. Generally speaking, the physical orientation of a piece of equip-j .
ment is not relevant to its environmental qualification. For the most i
, W3 part environmental conditions are identical regardless of the orientation
- ~
}j of the particular piece of equipment. Physical orientation is more likely to be related to seismic quahfication or operability. However, Applicants I
. , , jj ,
, testified there are some circumstances where physical orientation could
~
., _ ' b-W* - affect environmental qualification. These include, for example, circum-stances where a valve operator would be upside down and hydraulic j fluid could leak onto cable terminations causing corrosion of the connec-
! I tions. Similarly, incorrect orientation of battery chargers could result in
. . J:q; : . <
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. 280 4
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W ,.,74 v:n , . improper ventilation, and thus raise the temperature for components above the expected normal operating temperature. This could shorten
' ~ -
the life of that component. /d. at 5.
- - .: . - - - 75. The environmental qualification test reports, provided by the s.w m E [T[;hf vendors of equipment which is qualiGed by testing, include sketches of s D
- gMisfM'h;. e.' . test configurations, including the physical orientation of the tested equip-
-%', J :: E ment. The vendor may test the equipment in several manners. First, the
- 3 M* hJ ME
'~
vendor may test the equipment in the most limiting orientation, that which causes the most stress on the equipment. Thus, the equipment is ensironmentally qualified for any orientation. This is the most common form of testing equipment. /J.; Bucci, Tr. 5395.
- 76. The vendor may also test the equipment in a single orientation which is not the most limiting. and quahfy equipment by analysis for other orientations; or the sendor may specify that the test orientation is the only permissible orientation. Bucci er al., ff. Tr. 5234, at 6. The
, vendor may also test in several orientations. lie must provide installation and maintenance instructions. lie must also provide mounting drawings which include the mounting orientation instructions. /d.
...' ejQpf;z.a. a '
- 77. Ebasco, as the design organization, reviews the test orientation Q%QMZ
- '% against the design drawings for installation. The orientation during test-
' ? ' W * '- - ing must either be identical to the design drawings' orientation or the equipment must be susceptible to qualiGcation by analysis for a different orientation. /J. at 6-7. Ebasco also reviews the manual accompanying the equipment to determine its consistency with the test conditions. /J.
at 7. i 78. Applicants also have employed procedures for the review and i control of installation documents and documentation of corrective ac-tions which includes physical orientation. Drawings are prepared based - on the vendor's information and physical conditions at the equipment to-
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_ . -c th .%,- cations. They are reviewed by the affected engineering disciplines to ensure adequate consideration of all aspects of plant design. These draw-1 ings are sent to vendors for review and correction before they are issued I to the field. As part of the Environmental Qualification Program, vendor reports are reviewed to ensure that the test orientation is consist-
~
-; ent with the installation drawings. Concerns about orientation are
*7 documented in the environmental qualification packages as outstanding items which need resolution prior to considering the equipment qualified. /d. In order to change an installation drawing, a design change
'-- 0 j notification (DCN) must be issued. This is reviewed in the same manner as the original drawings. /d. at 8. It is affixed to the drawings so that all affected personnel know of the change and it is given to the field personnel for implementation. /d.
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. c 79 A pphea nt3 en3ure that equipment is installed accordmg to the
, ; - drawings through procedures for control of design documents, prepara-
[f tion of work packages, and quality assurance inspection to verify proper
~
I installation. The construction engineer receives documents from the document co,,'rol center and prepares the work package. The work package in-
~ - -
~
cludes installation drawings, sendor drawmgs, sendor manuals, process control sheets, lield change requests (FCRs), and DCN3. /d at 1-9.
- 80. The work package is sent to the field supermtenuent to ensure that the equipment is mstalled accordmg to the documents and notifica-tions. /d. at 9. Inspection point 3 of mstaNation are noted at which point quaMy andrance mv;,m :1 xm ': s m , N Je r.'.ue'e.! Th s : + ,:-
are adia ed un the n .; - ' Jet ir .r-p;c:. r p ,.c n , m : - tion documems. In3pectors esamme ine wers pac.s ges w hen conductmg i inspections and look at phy3l cal orientation. /J. at 9-10. f 81. If a piece of equipment cannot be installed in accordance with the work packages, and needs a change in installation orientation which esceeds design tolerances in the work package, the construction engineer writes a ticid change request which must be reviewed by the responsible design engineer. /d. at 10. The de3ign engineer evaluates the changes, obtaming additional information from the vendor or Ebasco, if neces-sary. If the FCR is approved, it is sent to the document control center, forwird J to :he tonstruction ergm;;r. and made part of the work pack-ap. Then . c..,n . ,, s..d N in 3:ao ed. /d
. 52. U ou lidd change re@est i3 demeJ, and the equipment cannot I be installed accordmg to the original design, the design engmeer should provide an alternate resolution. /d. at 11. If the FCR is denied, an instal-lation cannot be completed as deugned, and work stops. The program hs.J M F. M. ,i @- A 6 8[N does not allow the work to be completed and accepted until installation .
p,[t_.,v. "" gg.Y2; MW .ys,3D agrees with they,yM design documents. /d. l
'- " 83. At an inspection point such as location, elevation, orientation,
; and anchor tightening, there are places on the process control sheet with spaces for craft and inspector ugnatures. The30 are reuewed by the qual-
, ity assurance inspector and the con 3truction engineer. Inspection pomts
. . j are provided for those actisities that affect the quality of installation.
! Until the inspection is acceptable, the installation is not acceptable. /d.
at Il-12. If there is a di3crepancy between the design documents and the
. installation, a nonconformance report is written (NCR). /J. at 12. A d hold tag is placed on the equipment which may limit the work which can be performed regardmg that equipment. Each NCR requires specilie dis-position, w hich may include rework. /d.
t e
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37- ,n rw ~ - - s I 1 l t l S4. An additional assurance is also prosided concernmg the physical c orientation of electrical equipment due to the fact that the startup organi-
- - '~ zation checks 'he orientation of equipment prior to plant operation. M.
.w-at 13.
?
- s. ' ' - 85. Therefore, Applicants conclude that they hase programs to ensure the correct installation of e!ectrical equipment. M. at 13-14.
.c' w f ,_a ,R.p% , @Q,g
, y ?{'f._ y- g.g 86. The StatT reviewed certain ensironmental quahfication packages
^ 7~ and determined that the installation review procedures of the Applicants demonstrate that the physical orientation of equipment is adequately ad-y dressed in the Environmental Qualitication Program. Niasciantonio, ff.
j Tr. 5567, at 18. In the Staffs testimony, a conearn about interface re-quiremen:s in the packages reuewed was rahed floweser, during cross-exam; nation S:atT w anew \Lw.m nm cm ac 2d 'n . 2du:onal mfor-mation prosided during the ute siwt and saNguent to that s hit, ap-peared to show that the contiguration of the interfaces was representatise
. of the '.est configuration, and that the StatTs concerns on this matter were alleviated. Niasciantonio, Tr. 5689. In addition, durmg the final
- . ,- - , walkdown, equipment will be inspected to serify that the installed con-s
, s
,.,m '
figuration compares fasorably with the te3t configuration. Masciantonio, a <- s- Tr.5688.
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- 87. Intervenor Eddleman propo3ed only a single finding (35E) on x- -
this part of the contention. Ile cites Eddleman Exhibit 49, which is NRC Inspection Report 83-25 (October 14.1983 L Thh exhibit was olTered in support of Contention al concermn? ptre banpr inspections, not this contention. It was not admitted into eudence at the hearmg because we whhed to gise further con 3iderauon to the App;icants' and Staffs posi-tion that only a very limited portton of the Construction Assessment Team (CAT) inspection report is poss:bly germane to Contention 41. 2,.g t 4 s >;.6~/ 4% On the basis of this report, Mr. Eddleman would now have us find Nd%g t , . . f.C[
- that "NRC inspectors have found C1 (Construction inspection) did not 7, e - m- ~
.i have sufficient independence to perform their duties in accordance with
-'I an adequate 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix B QA program." We do not be-liese that any " structural inderendence" concept relating to the Appli-cant 3' QA organization is within the 3 cope of this contention, which re-
, j lates to the actual ort ntation of equipment. We, therefore, exclude pro-
'l
. posed Exhibit 49 from any consideration under this contention.
- 88. Based on the above, the Board finds that the Applicants' Envi-ronmental Qualification Program prosides adequate a33urance that the
-_ ; physical orientation of tested equipment is the same as the physical orientation ofinstalled equipment at the liarris site.
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G. Contention 9F: Inadequate Consideration of Radiation Effects on Lubricants and Seals ..c:. 2
.;:,, - ': y- . W9 *
- 89. Testimony on this part nf Contention 9 was provided by Appli-
.* .. cants' witnesses Richard M. Bacci, Edwin J. Pagan and Peter M.
.c. [- .; ' ' . ' . ..;l.,
Yandow.
. , : f , ,j % M -.J !.' .Q 90. All of the balance-of-plant, safety related electrical equipment,
; s c.g. q: ; ~., which is equipment not part of the nuclear steam supply system, is t
provided by Ebasco, and if located in the harsh environment, is qualified by test. Equipment which normally contains lubricants or seals is tested with those as part of the equipment qualification tests. The tests consist of accelerated thermal aging, radiation, and design basis accident simula-tion, if applicable. Bucci er al., fT. Tr. 5441, at 4.
- 91. During the radiation portion of these tests the equipment is irra-diated as a whole, including lubricants and seals. The dose to which this equipment is exposed exceeds the total integrated dose to which it could
; be exposed over its qualified life. The required radiation dose exposure
; is based on normal operation, design basis accident, and post-accident j conditions as applicable. Id. at 4-5.
- 92. Ebasco reviews vendor reports for balance-of-plant equipment to identify organic components of the equipment including lubricants and seals, and compares them with the lubricants and seals supplied or recommended to the vendor to verify that they are the same. If the lubri-cants and seals are not defined in the test report or a discreparicy exists between those in the reports and those recommended by the vendor, Ebasco attempts to obtain more information from the vendor or correc-tive action is taken to qualify the component. These corrective actions
, must be documented in the environmental qualification package. Id. at 5.
i
- 93. The Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) safety related electri-St %. S . w < .,. . w.
jh cal equipment is supplied by Westinghouse Corporation. There are lubri- . M. . .h.w,
~
W s p S E .r g p f f
. N j { dli cants and seals in NSSS equipment in some instances. These seals may !
.. - . be either metallic or organic. Id. at 6. Metallic seals are not degraded by the environmental conditions for which electrical equipment must be qualified. Organic seats are qualified as part of the equipment tested. Id.
j Westinghouse has not identified the lubricants used ir testing, but 2- c._ . ,,
'l recommends a general type of lubricant and provides specifications
!~
which the lubricant must meet to ensure operability of equipment. Therefore, CPAL has obtained a lubrication study performed for llarris
. - ; by the Mobil Oil Company, a leading lubricant vendor, to identify the
.~ Fi
I specific brands oflubricant which can be used for each piece of electrical equipment requiring lubrication. Applicants are presently reviewing the adequacy of this study. The study provides the results of radiation stabili-ty testing. This radiation stability testing included standard performance _.h m, -%.ig 284
- l k $
i _ I tests which were conducted both before and during irradiation to meas-
.g ure the effects of radiation. The dose for lubricants will be compared ce; , .. . , . . .
T , d . 0 2. Ji with the total integrated dose the equipment will receive. The test dose
^
] must be higher than the qualified dose. Applicants will verify that the
~~
'. - ' 3; -
./ ~i; manufacturer's lubricant performance specifications hase been met. /d.
. , y :.C'( . E.yf at 6-7. There will be an equipment qualification package for documenting L.:
tests of the lubricants in the study, and analyses which apply the test re-J; ( .C'.[JM- -;-g-.
. g.j.. . :.g, e ,, ?
. suits to specific equipment at Shearon Harris. /d. at 7.
~
- 94. Applicants have concluded that their program adequately ad-dresses the efTects of radiation on lubricants and seals. /d. at 8.
I 95. The StalT testified that 10 C.F.R. j 50.49(cH4) requires that a radiation environment must include the total dose over the installed life of the equipment, irradiation from the most severe design basis accident, and dose rate etTects. Applicants have shown that radiation is included in the ensironmental qualification testing of equipment with lubricants and seals, and other organic materials. N1asciantonio, IT. Tr. 5567, at 19.
- 96. The Staff testified that the etTects of radiation on lubricants and
, j seals are accounted for by exposing the equ'pment to the total dose
.-i 4t ,,g during the expected life, including lubricants and seals. Where lubricants are other than those tested, the documentation must provide a proper
- a..: ' w.' ', , ., ,,
. N. e c . t'. analysis to show that they are qualified for the intended application. The
~"^ ~ results of the actual test and analyses, with a good surveillance program, will provide assurance that unanticipated degradation is not takin, place.
The Staff has concluded that Applicants' program properly addresses the etTects of radiation on lubricants and seals. /J. at 18-20.
- 97. Intervenor presented no contrary evidence on this subpart, and the cross-examination raised no issues which would cause any change in Applicants' or StafTs conclusions. His proposed finding only emphasized
.s f.< A - FMr,r;,. , the need for Staff review. The record shows such review has been and
&D12 <
will be carried out by StalT. yp%@M. - W - $' . 3%g 2 98. Based on the above, the Board finds that Applicants' Environ-
. _ c" - mental Qualification Program adequately considers the effects of radia-I tion on lubricants and seals.
H. Contention 9G: Test Fallures
. . . .n.g y
- f.
~
-'- ~
- 99. Applicants presented the testimony of Niessrs. Robert W.
Prunty, Richard 51. Bucci, Edwin J. Pagan and Kumar V. Hate on this
> ,'- contention. Nir. Hate is employed by Carolina Power & Light Company's Corporate Quality Assurance Department at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant as Principal QA Engineer, QA/QC Harris Plant section. He has worked on QA for CP&L since 1974. Prunty et al. ff. Tr. 5515, at 3
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7 2-3. Ilis responsibilities base mcluded the direction of a team of quality
, assurance engineers in an oversiew ot' the electrical design, procurement
' ^
} . )j and construction installation process from a QA viewpoint for the liarris
- project. /J. at 3.
s A 100. This contention references item 2 of a report issued by Sandia 1 _7,. ^- National Laboratories. Applicants testified that this item is based on in- _C ' '; ~ if. '
' ;'. spection reports which document the results of inspections of the Rock-bestos Company. The inspection report questions the use of Rockbestos
! environmental qua! fication test report QR 2806 to qualify their entire 100 series line of coaxial, triaxial and twinax cables. The Rockbestos Company argued that other members of the product line were qualified by similarity. One product had substantially degraded during presious at-temrud wh Degr Jauoa Arsed m pre'.;ous tm w is neser div cu3 sed in tne 3mli!arity report. The company had ai30 changed test parameters until they obtamed good results. These etrorts were never mentioned by the reporting company. /J. at 5.
101. Rockbestos cable RSS-6-104/LD is used in the Shearon liarris
- , radiation monitoring system. RSS-6-105/LD coaxial and RSS-6-108/LD triaxial are both used in the electrical containment penetrations. Rock-
~
bestos was not the direct cab le sendor at liarris. Other than the radiation l monitoring systems interconnected cable, there are no Rockbestos cables in the Ilarris raceway systems. /J. at 6. 102. In determining how they would qualify Rockbestos cable. Appli-cants siseed RockSesim and determine ! that there was not officient documentation to sur;' ort the Use of the original Rockbestos report to qualify cables at liarris. Prunty et al., Supplemental Testimony, ff. Tr. 5515, at 3. 103. Applicants have obtained ;w o test reports, IPS-1053 and cf.S8. :2pgggg IPS-1054, from Conax Corporation which describe vnvironmental qual- , NM6' ,
._.D,dh[f ., .. ,i4*@g_fdg% y ilication testing of perietration module usemblies including Rockbestos j
.; m .._ ... ,1 RSS-6-105/LD coaxial cables. Applicants have reviewed these reports .
and determined that the test parameters envelope Shearon liarris parameters for the worst-case locations through which the coaxial and triaxial cable 3 are routed. Appheants testilled that the minor ditTerences among the RSS-6-105/LD, RSS-6-104/LD and RSS-6-108/LD cable e types do not affect qualification. Thus, Applicants concluded that the qualification testing of RSS-6-105/LD cables is applicable to the other Rockbestos coaxial and triaxial cable used at liarris. Id. at 3-4.
. ; - 104 Conax's quality assurance program has been reviewed by Appli-cants since it is a direct vendor to CP&L and its quality assurance pro-gram has been found acceptable. Id. at 4.
i l
..'s., e f d
286 l e L
c-- .-- , 7 , .- , 105. With .egard to the two R A wee : rc.un e. des. Apphcan5 j hase recetsed two test reports which describe enuronmental quahhea-
. , , . - tion research tests performed by Sandu National Laboratories on Fire-ie f . .
a '
- wall lli control cables. Shearon Harris cables are one of the cable types tested in these reports. NUREG/CR-2932 and NUREG/CR-3588. Appli-
'.f. > ,-,~
. . . .c.~- .
cants have determined that the test parameters enselope appheable Shea-
~ ~ '
~~
,f. .C- _ ; -J ' ..;
ron Harris parameters for the worst-case locations for both types of l ? , y (~$ _' l Q~ cable, in addition, the control cable is representative of the thermocou-pie cable for environmental qualitication purposes, smce all the features
~ ~
of the two cables signiGeant to enuronmental qualitication are the same. The thickness of the insulation materul on the thermocouple cable is 25 mils compared 'o 30 mils on the control cable. Ilowes er, the thermocou-p!e cabic w:res are cosered by a n'etalhe shield and II)palon oserall jacset w hich mer,: tha. cc pr, , :cr .u , _ , . N .w .: in threx-nes3. Prunty er al. Supp;ememal Tecnun). ff Tr. 5 5 ' at 5-0. Bucci. Tr. 5500. Appheants' witness al o tesu6eJ that the control cable was stressed to 480 volts rather than the mihsolts which would be used on the thermocouple cable. Bucci. Tr. 5561. Therefore. it is Appheants' po-sition that tne Ensironmental Quahlication Program can demonstrate
~ ., s
' " the cualification of the limited number of Rockbestos cables used at.
. g ..; ,;' 01: '
< Harris. Prunty et aL. Supplemental Testimony, ff. Fr. 5515, at o.
- - '7 106. Applicants testdied that they hase reasonable assurance that sig-ni6 cant test failures have been identitled or hase not occurred. In specif-ic vender test programs initiated at the request of one or more custom-ers. a 'est plan ard test proceJure . ire &rrosed by the customert s) prior to actual testing. Specitie numbers and types of test samples are delineat-
.l ed. Upon completion of testing, data gathered with respect to each sample, as well as the conclusions drawn, are presented in the report.
Applicants test Ged that it would be apparent if the vendor had not reported test results on any of the samples. Prunty et al., ff. 't r. 5515 at
$__;,%.chd..%
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107. In addition. Applicants hase taken steps to assure the quality of
-l '
vendors. Suppliers are evaluated before contracts are awarded. Visits are made to supplier's facilities. Id. at 12-13. Vendors may be qualified by an audit. or by acceptance of the sendor'3 ASME certitication, by accep-
;, ,, 1 tance of the NRC. or by quahtication through the CASE system. In the
; , .j CASE system another utility has performed an audit of the sendors in question. Hate, Tr. 5529-30. In the case of Conax. Applicants quahned
, -m this sendor through the CASE sy3 tem. Ilate. Tr. 5529.
7 :;.e. - .74 108. The Staff testified that Part 21 of the Commission's Regulations requires that all ensironmental qualification test facilities must report all _- .c . : . . . .u - , .e'. , M[.liL,2 : % . - .) s. 287 1 l l l
~ . _.
,. 4 . . . * "
d
' h 1. \ O'~ e5'si?N.q,', N$ {:. 's'-,. . A b d f Y $ $' I'fY *;h, .. ..Q"N-&
c . Q'jA '. * * * , , ,
, [!
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.s test failures and test results which could affect safety. In addition, the re-
_ . . ;: quiremer.s for quality assurance programs at vendors' facilities are
, r.j;:a:e 62^.M @. 'y detailed in Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50. This section of the regula-
~'
, . - - y jh" tions also requires that all results of environmental qualification tests be y , ! ;;f %%OfiQM documented and reported. There are also industry standards which are
, : M ,..; Y gg.WA & explicit in the requirement to report all qualification tests results. Masci-antonio, IT. Tr. 5567, at 20.
f A, m, . ~ .- .y+t' ,(3-Og.[W . a%24447.y$/,h 109. In August of 1982, the NRC institutec' a vendor inspection pro-
, f; gram to assess test facilities' QA programs. This program has found j numerous nonconformances which have subsequently been corrected.
The specific case cited in this contention is based on one inspection of the Rockbestos Company. It was, and still is, concluded by the StalT that environmental quilification of these cables has not been established based on the documentation provided by Rockbestos. /J. at 20-21.
, 110. The Staff set forth its findings concerning the Rockbestos
. Company in Information Notice 84-44. The Staff suggested the possible courses of action which could be taken to qualify Rockbestos cables, v which are: (1) a valid qualification test could be performed of the in-P;g e.;
stalled Rockbestos cables; (2) an Applicant could obtain documentation from other available qualification tests already performed, and determine
~
#V its applicability to the installed cables; and (3) Applicants could perform analyses of the existing qualification reports applicable to the installed 1
cables to ensure that the documentation relied upon to demonstrate en-vironmental qualification supports such a conclusion. Id., Attach. 3, at
, 2-3.
, 111. The Staff reviewed Applicants' supplemental testimony on this
! contention, and testified that the approach described in that testimony is l consistent with the pertinent StalT suggestions in Information Notice
..._. - O f. m. A y 84-44. Masciantonio, Tr. 5585.
x
~
112. Intervenors did not present evidence either direct or by cross-N-e D 5.s , ,~b n.6 y examination which would raise a question as to the adequacy of the Ap- !'
.~g 7 3.A plicants' envircnmental program to address concerns regarding test fail-
+
1 ures with regard to Rockbestos cables. The Board resolves this issue in I favor of the Applicants. cJ /
- ' +: +Q$;&
g<q;c - , I. Conclusion
~
, , . 113. The Board finds that the seven issues raised in this contention
;,( .
V$y;/gd W. *T, -Q have been satisfactorily addressed in the Applicants' Environmental Qualification Program. No significant deficiency was raised through cross-examination. This contention is resolved in favor of the l ; A pplicants. ! ... u 4:
- ; . n--rig '
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.;. y
- . ^ -
288 I 5 & i E I
93 y tf $ *. Fy W f~ W P:W'D'QM} WF y . :.W a : 9 zy Tig. . , , ~ . gi. e , % ;-3 ( A;r ] W ' .m p"- yE - 4, _ s
; V. CONTAIN31ENT CONCRETE )
4
. .. . 1. . .
A, Introduction p.3,,:,xe.g .. v. wm ;.l .T'.,i.y jff,a..{m.QQM.
. . .4 cm~e . . g. ,.w; y ;..:1
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c 1. As origmally admitted by the Board on September 22, 1982,
< MEM;@37NSDW7?l:'Mb Eddleman Contention 65 stated as follows:
. T,fhW..nw$5W-l's." n . . (% y W ;'.$'i"q'P 2 5i) W (ik hkN Because Daniel International, CPat 's prime contractor on the liarris project, has a history of building defective basemats and contammeats (e.g.. Callaway, Wolf F r 'c Creek, Farley) a complete ultrasonic reexammation of the containment and base-i' M [ mat, able to detect voids over I mch in any size (any dimension over l') therem, or
""
- another type of exammation with similar capabihties to detect soids, is necessary before liarris I is allowed to operate. Otherwise, the voids could become (through a cracking from thermal stress, concrete agmg, or external impact) paths for radioac.
tmty to leak from containment at unfereseeable times. including during rad releases inside contamment, e g. from reactor and prirnary sptem rehef salses after a reactor trip or feedwater trip.
- ' \
W Supplement to Petition to Intervene by Wells Eddleman at 171 (May C,1 ' d '6 -; ; n ~a 14,1982); Memorandum and Order (ReDecting Decisions Made Follow-J ~i;M', S !., .. ., . . . '. ~ T ' ing Prehearing Conference), LBP-82119A,16 NRC 2069,2101 (1982).
"*N %ND .;: s ,/c N: 2. In a telephone conference on July 12, 1984, the Board an-S .- :$ ','.[ % %gQiymMg nounced its decision to grant in part and deny in part Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Eddleman Contention 65 Uanuary Nw.,w;yr
- 18, 1984). As a part ofits ruling, the Board substituted the following lan-guage for the original Contention 65, to reDect the matters which re-mained in dispute:
s t Inspection of CP&L concrete pour packages has shown that numerous instances of
] + improper concrete placement have occurred m the basemat and contair. ment struc-ture. In view of this, a complete exammation of the basemat and containment strue-
.g " . 1
- m. .4,,- - 3 g; ture must be conducted usmg ultrasonic techniques or, where use of such techniques h^u '
is not feasible, other appropriate tests. 2 ! / M@n, (%.@;cy.W.7~- f- ,4 , Q:y;,,b.., Tr. 2168-69. The Board further ruled that the concrete pour packages at l- , . ._ -.m c .. . , . , . -
.g., . -m.m/;c r issue are those discussed in Wells Eddleman's Response to Summary
,. Disposition Motion on Eddleman 65 (Concrete) Uune 14,1984), and
. . .~ . . . c, c the accompanying affidavit of Charles C. Stokes, with the exception of matters related to the waterstop, which the Board excluded by rejecting
$]p.3g d?Fy,;4jMhUdd g*hW'M@,gi.%s [ proposed Eddleman Contention 65-B. Tr. 2172-75. The Board also held
. % :WC ng., y , that the second sentence of the revised contention (on testing) would not be at issue unless litigation of the first sentence revealed actual "WMi $'Qi U i)A, V C, W,;. Q- @M C @ W, dinfS J
W.s; C ' ,?) defects the Oconcrete. Tr. 2170.
. .g ;r . m . , a s. c ~s. r 3. Following the receipt of evidence on Eddleman Contention 65 and prior to the adjournment of 'S leasing on safety matters, the b d 9 a ?k o
8 se
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Board, on its own initiative, reached a tentative decision on that conten-tion. Tr. 7368-70. As Applicants pointed out in their proposed findings,
. [ ':. 1 2. 7.. p--<W 4 h ..u% n',-, the Board " tentatively concluded that there is no basis for questioning
< y.; y .,c p y .- the integrity of the concrete in the liarris containment." Tr. 7369. In 4.f,j.*g.J.f , ti explanation of the grounds for its tentative decision, the Board stated its
- -- ~ T , ddi%ieg. [ : findings that "the Applicant and Staff direct cases were very convinc-ing," and "that those cases were not shaken by the cross-examination."
._[ ,DM$fk?[7Ngi{AQ c *g glh -
f ,, Q /d. With respect to Eddleman witness Stokes, the Board found that: (1) he "was rather substantially impeached in his presentation"; (2) "he retracted much of his testimony previously filed", and (3) he did not I raise "any questions of a safety nature about the containment concrete."
/d. The Board, therefore, adopted the direct testimony of Applicants and the Staff as its tentative decision in favor of Applicants and the Staff on Eddleman Contention 65. Tr. 7369-70.
- 4. The Board provided Str. Eddleman with the opportunity to Gle y j proposed findings on Contention 65, if he wished to continue to pursue
- 1 the matter. In view of the Board's tentative decision and the state of the A - record, any proposed findings by Mr. Eddleman were to be filed by y .. U .h.i s December 21, 1984. Applicants and the Staff were provided the oppor-tunity to file any reply on or before January 4,1985. Tr. 7369-70.
- 5. Mr. Eddleman filed proposed findings on December 21, 1984;
~ ~ ?[' ~ ,- 'j". Applicants replied on January 4,1985, and the Staff filed a reply on January 11,1985.
B. The Record
! 6. In opposition to Applicants' motion for summary disposition and in support of his newly proposed Contentions 65-A and 65-B, Mr.
....-.%,-- . . . - Eddleman filed the affidavit of Charles C. Stokes on June 14,1984. The JMf C%
_Y Stokes affidavit evaluated thirteen containment concrete pour packages 20 produced by Applicants during discovery. These same thirteen pour g
'~
" packages became the exclusive subject of controversy as a result of the
' O .7,$ y/ -5
"' "'g' o Board's ruling of July 12,1984. See 1 V.A.2, supra. In the affidavit of
^
Roland M. Parsons filed in support of Applicants' Response to Eddleman
.- . .- Proposed Contentions 65 A and 65-B (June 29,1984), Applicants
.. .<k.h. .3jMjh[y_l'ij pr vided a point-by-point refutation of Mr. Stokes' evaluation of each of n_ . G. .j.p w; 4 .
. the thirteen pour packages.
- _ .* m '}
3 n < I* "
k 20A " concrete pour package" is the assemblage or documentatsen for each concrete placement which is required to be retened by Quahty Assurance in its reuds sault. See Apphcants' Testimony or
, George A. Kanatans. Roland M. Parsons and Larry F. Garner in Response to Eddleman Contenuon 65 i (Concrete Containmem structure). fr. Tr. 5764. at 10.
.s . .<, , ,
['$fMMl.S,%2f' i ,g
, 190 k NNN$ bad'. $b rbN[hE$Ni$bi'
OlW TlW"GW+?ff??$1lW-; Q fif.W R W f~ T Q,' '-
; GQ{ W %.y;g: ,
+ n;_- .g .n . gy ,
.. _ -.. - . . . - . . .~. .
- 7. Thus, well in advance of the August 9,1984 deadline for tiling direct testimony and exhibits, N1r. Eddleman knew not only the identity 4 AfpW w,s.M ce of the concrete documentation at issue, but also Applicants' defense to E , , .
T'
% , N .e r g. W ' C M .
Nir. Stokes' evaluation of tha- documentation. Yet Nir. Eddleman filed
.e . b ._ _l [y y'.' li no new or revised testimony responsive to Applicants' positions. Instead, qv-M :z-a, 9 9 9.' he chose to rely on the Stokes affidavit of June 14, 1984, as testimony b in support of Contention 65. Indeed, not until it was time for Str. Stokes l ..
vc - N es h~g.q
-- q[k $v h5.
, to take the witness stand on October 30, 1984, did Str. Eddleman and I
, n. . ... . . / q'. . if fp?- his witness attempt to come to grips with the other parties' positions. t -
'- .?V '
- 8. Applicants' direct testimony, Gled on August 9,1984, again l
I - included the point-by-point response to the Stokes afGdavit (Kanakaris et al., IT. Tr. 5764, at 13-22). The NRC Staff's direct testimony, Gled on
; the same date, included an even more detailed response to the Stokes af-Gdasit. See NRC Staff Testimony of John R. Ilarris, Joseph J. Lenahan and Paul R. Bemis on Eddleman Contention Number 65, Concrete Placement, IT. Tr. 6320 (hereinafter "llarris er al."), at I l-50. Neverthe-j y- O less, it was only on the third day of Str. Eddleman's examination of Ap-
?' plicants' witnesses that the Board and parties were informed that Str.
' . '.. Eddleman's witness had abandoned some undefined portion of his tes-
+
' .- Gb . '.h;c - timony upon review of the information provided in the testimony of Ap-W.tg g~. m.$ plicants and the NRC Staff. A recess was required at that point in order
^ % for hir. Eddleman and his witness to confer and to reach a position on
~
the subjects which remained in controversy. See Tr. 6035-45. Conse-
. quently, not only had substantial hearing time been wasted on examina-i tion of Applicants' witnesses on matters later abandoned by the interve-nor, but hearing time was also expended while he determined what the
_ areas of controversy actually were and while the witness and the Interse-nor proceeded to edit hir. Stokes' testimony on the record. See Tr. 6046-68. All of this could have occurred prior to the Gling of testimony m.,,; < ag r C ' J*? Y on August 9, and should in any case have occurred prior to October 30, Yd.N., Edj *T' ~# 1984. The path followed, however, is partially responsible for a record
- " ' .Mmm. y,.
- E,~;;WM mf.s'lxn.nB a which the Board described as " extremely convoluted and confused." See rp i ,,- .c
,cy 3, Tr.7370.
- 9. Applicants' panel included three witnesses. Str. Kanakaris is
, blanager of Civil Engineering for Ebasco Services, Inc., the archi-
% f. x tect/ engineer for liarris. He is responsible for direction of all civil
- ' A MM.-,Nyg
- ~ M. a M r ng,ww, C '..m'. gg ag.
. .g engineering and design of Ebasco power plant projects, and has over 25 N ! O f 4 1.2 y years of experience in the civil engineering and design of generating
- - :. D . stations (Kanakaris et al., ff. Tr. 5764, at 1). Str. Parsons, also a civil engineer, has been employed by CP&L at the Harris site since major 7.
,*@~ h'h"
? construction activity was undertaken in 1976. Previously Project General 51anager of the flarris Plant Construction Section, Str. Parsons
. . ~ . . + . . .
em .# g , ' " ' - * . CV:4%CY - &g;'*l. Q.Y 291 1 I f
.$ &.*N"-u';}_~ .'x Q
N .$f%f~ if-A 4.gjjpg*!YA' & T f W 'j~? f mh ( . . j$N?k , il
~- y .y .q ; y - - - -
s_ i
- The Staff testimony was not challenged during cross-examination.
- 2::: & The Board Gnds hlr. Eddleman's statement that there is "no evidence"
'l 2qQq,.siM.Z.-;A"$@j JNgp/
- j of corrective action to be not only wrong but in culpable disregard of the s
x: '. record. r, w d .'-6bSdv dY -; 4dgigt ; M a,?
- 16. Eddleman's Proposed Finding 9 cites Mr. Stokes' view that yMN d "you generally do not want the slump below 2 inches" (Tr. 6140-41).
i)k':-f;T' Q Git'$@[hM.
;If3.j .m;. We note that none of the 160 slumps reported in the referenced pour packages were less than 1% inches and only 10 were less than 2 inches.
Kanakaris, Tr. 6102. Since stifT or low-stump concrete has maximum strength, low slump is desirable. Stafrs expert witnesses had the view that "you can place concrete easily with a 2 inch slump or a 1% inch slump." (Lenahan, Harris, Tr. 6395J The Board agrees with the Staff witnesses.
- 17. The remainder of Mr. Eddleman's proposed Ondings are con-cerned with the strength testing and evaluation of placement i ICBXW29001 ( Applicants' Exh.14). These proposed Gndings do not re.
flect the record accurately. As succinctly summarized in the Staff tes-
, . . . , gg - timony (Harris, er al., fr. Tr. 6227, at 26-27), test cylinders from this placement had an average strength of 4865 psi at 28 days, which is slight-
& og 7 ly less than the required design strength of 5000 psi. Therefore, noncon-formance number C-508 was issued The reserve cylinder set was tested at 90 days and showed an average strength of 5660 psi which is well above the design strength. The Board finds the Applicants properly identified a nonconformance and properly resolved it.
In addition, the Licensee drilled Ove cores in this placement for test-ing. Because of reinforcing steel congestion, the diameter of the cores was limited to 1% inches. Three of the cores tested satisfactorily and two
. . did not. Staff testimony was that " experience has shown that test results
- . u. -
t
. . .o.. -
;, g, g j,/ concern in these results, particularly in view of the satisfactory results
. m3.'pt,g,,,.:.g. :j .c r e .- ~ n -
r ..
~
from the test cylinders at 90 days. 4
- Mr. Eddleman would have us Gnd that many errors are present in these pours. We Gnd only one. Lab test 9323 is shown in Applicants' Ex-3._ , hibit 14 as a sample from Placement ICBXW29001. As reported in the 4
^ N Staff testimony, this sample came from ICBXW296003. The low o-{.Gr.jRMy$5[4[2N-@Ihj % (4105 psi) in this test lead to Nonconformance Report C-507.
~
strength
' 4.;; ' ' Ninety-day test results on the reserve cylinder of 5040 psi (40 psi above
- _ ~, % . - 4 cQMpM-h p
? required design strength) form the basis for resolving this nonconfor-NIF.MdN$.
+ . s-u e:1.c mance. The Board finds the error in tabulating the lab tests undesirable but without any ultimate harm. Clearly, the record does not support Mr.
Eddleman's proposed conclusion that a pattern of widespread errors may
..% have occurred.
' M2h> g mhyC .
194
. . _. cp - ..
W '" W.W W. .-.F.:RM . , .. . l J' LM u ,.Q '
'g - " p {Mi
.}
- 18. The Board finds the record provides no evidence that concrete was inadequately placed during the IIarris construction of the contain-
' 4 '.. l .
~ ,' ,5);f[7 ment building, but rather the record demonstrates the Applicants' proper identification of a few nonconformances and proper resolution of
,/ ;h 7 - ' M.M D these items. This contention is resolved in favor of the Applicants.
y :.:.;,; .
. . a .: a .wy;,., g j [p-{'".'.Q[ m.'.<; a@ k VI. SU3131ARY DISPOSITION RULINGS Prior to the safety hearings, the Board granted the Applicants' sum-mary disposition motions with respect to Eddleman Contention 11, con-j cerning polyethylene cable insulation, and 132C(ll), concerning control room design. We stated at that time that we would set forth the reasons for those rulings at a later date. Tr. 2167. Those reasons follow:
Contention 132C(II) Eddleman Contention 132C(II) states as follows: With respect to layout (of the Control Rooml, [ Applicants'] proposal arranges con.
. trol and display cabinets such that they block or impede view of some others (see Fig.1, p.12, where view of/from panels 8, 9, 10 & 11 is obscured by e's 12,13,14 and 15 from **s 6,7, and I,2,3,4 and 5. #6 and 7 are hidden from operators by I and 2 (as well as 3,4 and 5). *'s 16 and 17, the incore instrumentation and nuclear instrumentation system are almost totally behind the 2 blocks 1 through 5 nd 6-7 with respect to the radiation monitor equipment pane!s 12 through 15 the 811 block istartup and generators and the I-5 block's sections I through 4 and possibly 5 Operator inability to see, read accura:el), or integrate the information on these panels can imperil public safety in an accident.
. .;u.. .. .
- This contention was accepted by the Board in a Memorandum and C %FAMd M S h ',[?h@ 2'!N".IgjyjLi M h ,h3.3 $
Order of October 6,1983. Discovery was conducted by the parties and on May 9,1984, Applicants submitted a Motion for Summary Disposi-r? 7p 7 '" , tion. Staff responded in support of Applicants' motion on May 29,1984.
' ~
, Applicants submitted the Affidavit of Raymond G. Ramirez. Mr. Eddle-i man responded to Applicants' motion on June 14, 1984.
+ . .y n
- The control room at Shearon liarris was laid out according to the
, , j,"23. , p<,.- %VF#3 recommendations resulting from a detailed control room design review
, e .- ; y;,jp;gt ,Q, 9 conducted by CP&L with Ebasco Services, Inc. (Architect / Engineer),
's Westinghouse Corp. (NSSS Vendor) and Essex Corp. (fluman factors
,' e.O c y .u~/ R Ca s consultants). Prunty Affidavit,114-5. Three operating positions were
;~
#ogg% ' ' "
chosen at the main control board because of their proximity to the Reac-tor Controls, Emergency Safeguards and Emergency Power controls and
'] - j' : z .jjj{ll 295
,4*.. 1 . z . .. 4
" i. &
.. % a ** . ~D N%~
- p. .,.; ~>, m - . . - v ~ r- v w, ; . n.e.r ~, ; #. lrys, Q.+, . . s
- 7 s s -
displays. The position of equipment panels other than the main controi
- m .s n. r . . . .,m, .. board were then optimized for operator visual access. /d.116-7. Nir.
' y' q p. L [?T.
{ Eddleman alleges that regardless of the design process used by Appli-j cants there are points in the control room where an operator would have
. f;g_ ,; . '
+ .-o .
-4 his view of certain panels blocked by other panels, and specifies them in
.. ...n ,
Le.w . 4._ M. .: q .f - /. - 2. s.' . %E. ' . c. , his contention. Applicants agree that this is true, but that Str. Eddleman
?. mm., -
.,% :...-. ;.n. cy. y
~
errs in essentially assuming that all panels must be visually accessible to
' ,, y v, +c all operators.
Applicants point out that NRC regulations require that two operators, one of whom is a senior operator, must be in the control room and that l ; one operator must be at the controls at all times. 10 C.F.R. l 4 50.54(m)(2)(i) and (iii). Applicants expect that a majority of the time there will be three operators and a shift foreman in the control room.
, Prunty Affidavit,18.
Nir. Eddleman's first situation in his contention is that operator view
~ ,
f.n . of panels 8,9,10 and 11 are obscured by panels 12,13,14 and 15.110w-
; ,. ; 7 '. , . ever, this is true only if the operator is standing at panels I through 5 or at panels 6 and 7. Applicants state that operators are not ordinarily sta-
- w a c,. q g,, ,
.. c .
tioned at panels 1 through 5, but even if an operator were in that posi-
' ,; .. :.,g; s . +
~
tion, the other operator or operators would have visual access to panels
- o. ., L -- 8 through 11. /d.118,9.
l N!r. Eddleman's second concern is that panels 6 and 7 are obscured by panels I through 5. The Applicants agree, but state that panels 6 and 7, which have to do with Cooling Tower and Riser Water N1akeup Control and Condensate Booster flydraulie Coupling Control, are neither safety-related nor are required to be operated in an accident scenario. /d.1 10. The third concern in the contention is that panels 16 and 17 (incore Instrumentation and Nuclear Instrumentation System) are obscured by M.ihMM
& ;; p M NMt.@g r;,9 p nets 1-5 and 6 and 7, and/or panels 12-15, and/or panels 8-11, assum-ing that the operator is located at various positions across the room from
- ;*M,. .fj;f,F7.pg' _ ;y..n panels 16 and 17. As with hir. Eddleman's first concerns, the operator l
l positions necessary to cause such blockage are not typical, but even if an l
, operator were at one of these there would be visual access for the other I i operator or operators. /J.1 11.
,- & s cy, % ,. 7 The Staff's affiant, Ntr. Ramirez, having reviewed the Applicants'
_ . A @$~ ~='t 3m ' ~ ~' motion and related documents, visited the Shearon liarris control room and physically determined the visual access available to operators in vari-
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ous positions in the control room. Ile found that the blocking of visual
,%jf 6: ',w.Cr'J.M access of certain panels from certain positions was as N!r. Eddleman al-
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leges, but he also agreed that Applicants' arguments that such blocking is unlikely or of no importance to safety are valid. Ramirez Affidavit, 11 7-9.
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7, c 7 Str. Eddleman's response to Applicants' motion touched in principal part concerns beyond the scope of his contention. The Board found ' litigable substance to it. The Board therefore finds, based on Appl
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arguments which were corroborated by the S s ration, and the contention is therefore dismissed. . a [ ':f; e'
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Contention 11 i
- Eddleman Contention i1 states as follows:
ke Applicants' FS AR and the SER are deGeientdeteriorates and in error much because the> do no acco:.nl of the t'act that polieth)iene used as cable insulation. d more rapidly under tung-term doses of gamma Imhtch isradianan ihan it dees
- hen espm how this mate-to the same total dose oser a much shorter period of ame f K. Gitten I
nat. PE. is tested for service in nuclear plants). as shown h b) thatthe work o and P. Clough of Sandia Laboratories. Thek tests these hemical bondsworkers in conducted s ow t the insulation becomes embmtled by the radianon's brea ing cll d 'mers' allow-I
' these polymers (which are long groups or linked chemical units ca e ij
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1 ing osidation of the plastic PE which makes it brittle.
! This contention was admitted by the Board in its Niemorandum and Order of September 22,1982 (LBP-82-Il9A 16 NRC at 2091-92). Dis-25, 1984, Applicants covery was conducted by the parties, and on Nf aymo Bucci and of Peter 51. Yandow, Edward N1. Stendel and liarold W.
Bowles. Staff responded in support of Applicants' motion on June 18, j 1984, submitting the afGdavit of Armando S. 51asciantonio. Str. Eddle j man responded on June 29,1984.
. . . . . In the course of discovery it was determined that polyethylene is not
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< I N. S'NNh3dd$ used as electrical cable insulation at Shearon liarris, and, to Applic
^' % If ?[jy knowledge, is not used as insulation on any electrical equipment ins 1.' % 11 31 32. This fact was affirmed by the
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' Staff. Stasciantonio AfTidavit, t 4. The Board therefore found the con-tention to be moot and dismissed it from the proceeding.
In this response to Applicants' Slotion, Str. Eddleman l k intodid not attempt
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~ ' AM? radiation effects on neoprene insulation, which he states is used in S
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ron liarris cables, to see if a Board question on the subject might be ap ff
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i propriate. The Board did review the G informati I well as Nir. Eddleman's own pleadings, but could find no signi eant safety concern therein. The Board therefore declined to entertai Eddleman's suggestion.
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y_. . y ;v , y - y;9 's.~ . r VII. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 3 1, 1,. .
.j The safety matters in controversy in this proceeding are limited to
- those raised by the Intervenors.10 C.F.R. { 2.760a. As renected in the
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~NJ [- - foregoing opinion on management capability and Gndings of fact on
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.. ; - other contentions, those matters have (with a few exceptions to be ad-
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dressed later) now been resolved in favor of the Staff and the Applicants N - - and against the Intervenors. Based on that opinion and those Gndings of fact, the Board concludes that as to the contested safety matters ad-dressed herein, there is a reasonable assurance that, if an operating l license is subsequently granted for the liarris facility, the activities au-thorized thereby can be conducted without endangering the health or safety of the public and that such actiuties will be conducted in compli-ance with applicable NRC regulations. Vill. APPEALS
,.. ;. ; . ,, s ,
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. {j 2.760(a) and 2.762, an appeal from this Par-tial Initial Decision or from any prior Board Order granting a motion for
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summary disposition, in whole or in part, of a safety contention or ex-ciuding a proposed safety contention from litigation may be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board within 10 days after seruce of this Decision.2' A brief in support of an appeal must be filed within 30 days after the filing of the notiec of a $E.Ns A$[ m y g .g y M[hN-ph bjg3 Nf.k+ t I o m N :. 2: Although this Decision does not author re issuance of a inense or resol te ali pending safety issues (because of confheting and higher priortly assignments of the Board members),it does resolve a " major I segment of the case
- and is therefore appealable at this time Ser Boston (dans Co (Pdgnm Nucicar Power station. (Jmi 21. AL AB-632.13 SRC 91. 93 n 2 (1981) l rhe Apptwants' unorposed motion of Decereer 20.1994 corserning transcripi corrections is granted and the endentiary record shall be deemed amended to incorporate said chariget.
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appeal (40 days if the appellant is the NRC Staf0, any other party may file a briefin support of or in opposition to an appeal. THE ATOh11C SAFETY AND
.7 LICENSING BOARD
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James L. Kelley Chairman ADN!!NISTRATIVE JUDGE Dr. James H. Carpenter, Alember
. ADN11NISTR ATIVE JUDG E t
Glenn O. Bright, hfember
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. ADhlINISTRATIVE JUDGE ,
I s l Bethesda, hfaryland I August 20,1985
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s .' - h c ,; :q Cite as 22 NRC 300 (1985) LBP 85-29
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, , , : '~ J: f ,M 2 '-- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 7;;; n y;- J.6s et. - , A -;-d a NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD o, 9' 8efore Administrative Judges: Dr. Robert M. Lazo, Chairman Dr. Richard F. Cole
. Dr. Emmoth A. Luebke
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'T (Vessel Flux Reduction)
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
, (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4) August 16,1985
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- In this Order the Licensing Board rules on Licensee's motions for p c Al^!'97t $.b ... y,k%.. ~
.... summary disposition of Intervenors' two admitted contentions in this
- "i" , operating license amendment proceeding. The motion for summary dis-
, position of Intervenors' Contention (b) is granted. The motion for sum-mary disposition of Intervenors' Contention (d) is denied.
,. . ..,-. ,.,..2 RULES OF PRACTICE: SU3131ARY DISPOSITION
, ,, Under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.749(d) a motion for summary disposition will be
.-l. granted when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a favorable decision as a matter oflaw.
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TECHNICAL ISSUES DISCUSSED
, . . 5 8 :. '
- ECCS evaluation model, peak cladding temperature, fuel design limits, heat transfer coefficients, Appendix K, critical heat flux, depar-ture from nucleate boiling (DNBR).
I i ORDER INTRODUCTION
! Before us are two motions from the Licensee for summary disposition.
I two motions to strike which are related to the motions for summary dis-position, and a motion from the Intervenors for suspension of the license amendments which are the occasion of this proceeding. We grant one summary disposition motion, on Contention (b), deny the other, and deny the motions to strike and the motion to suspend. We begin with a brief account of the origin and course of this proceed-ing, one of three dealing with amendments to the licenses for Units 3 and 4 at Turkey Point. In the course of this account, we rule on the mo-tions to strike, and we pay particular attention to the prehearing confer. I cnce we held on the summary disposition motions to aid us in determin-
! ing whether any genuine issues existed concerning any material fact.
Though the Intervenors had supported the holding of this conference, 4 b tshk. . k%7
. .. 5 they ultimately objected to it. We set out our reasons for holding it, and Nh@ff,fs-p&Q.
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+. s e--- ..;-WW.W.ig for conducting it as we did. After this account of the origin and course of this proceeding, we shall rule on the summary disposition motions and on the Intenenors' motion to suspend the amendments, which is closely tied to Intervenors' Contention (b).
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'i':'- ~ . HISTORY OF THIS PROCEEDING By letters dated August 19 and September 9,1983, the Licensee l requested amendments to the technical specifications of Licenses DPR 31 and DPR 41, to support the Licensee's program for reduction of neutron bombardment (vessel flux), and consequent embrittlement, of the pressure vessel walls, and to remove restrictions imposed when
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4 y . - ' 1 the Licensee was operating with steam generators hasing a larger number of plugged tubes than the steam generators which the Licensee is now using. Notice of the proposed amendments was published in the Federal
,- :, A L ', u , , Register on October 7,1983.48 Fed. Reg. 45,862-63. In response to the '. ;g/o,;' - .!,D:
m . ,&. notice, the Center for Nuclear Responsibility (CNR) and Joette Lorion
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filed a joint petition to intervene. The NRC Staff (the Staff) issued the amendments on December 23, 1983, stating that the amendments j posed no significant hazards and therefore, under 10 C.F.R. j 50.91(a)(4), could be issued without a hearing on the contentions filed by the Intersenors. The Intersenors filed an amended petition on January 25,1984. We ruled on the contentions filed then. and on other matters, in our Niay
; 16, 1984 Order (unpublished). We admitted only Con 4entions (b) and (d), each of which is now the subject of a motion from the Licensee for
. summary disposition. Contention (b) alleges shortcomings in one of the computer models which, when functioning together, yield predictions of
-v the temperature of the hottest rod in a reactor core during rellood of the core after a loss of-coolant accident (LOCA). Contention (d) alleges that under the amendments there is an increase in the probability that films of steam will form around the fuel rods during normal operation and certain abnormal occurrences other than LOCAs. Such films reduce transfer of heat away from the rods. The chief concern of both conten-tions is that operation under the amendments not increase the risk that the integrity of the cladding of the fuel could be threatened.
The Licensee filed motions for summary disposition on August 10, 1984. Along with the motions, the Licensee also submitted a memoran-dum of law, statements of material facts as to which the Licensee con-
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*gf tended that no genuine issues existed (required by 10 C.F.R.
} 2.749(a)), and affidavits from hfark J. Parvin and Edward A. Dzenis, both of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse). Afr. Parvin, whose affidavit is in support of summary disposition of Contention (b),
is senior engineer in the Reload Safeguards Analysis Group of the i Nuclear Safety Department in the Nuclear Technology Disision of West-
} inghouse. IIis professional work has included analyses of LOCAs and preparation of computer code input data for these analyses. Afr. Dzenis, l whose affidavit is in support of summary disposition of Contention (d),
t is hianager of Thermal and flydraulics Design for the Nuclear Fuel Divi-sion of Westinghouse. IIis principal professional work is management of thermal hydraulic analysis of fuel for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) which are supplied by Westinghouse. The PWRs at Turkey Point are Westinghouse reactors. l 302
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I On September 4,1984, the Staff Gled responses in support of the mo-tions. The responses were accompanied by af0dauts from Summer B. Sun, on Contention (b), and Yi-fisiung lisii, on Contention (d). Both Dr. Sun and Dr. lisii are nuclear engineers in the Core Performance Branch of the Division of Systems Integration, OfGce of Nuclear Reactor
' Regulation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Dr. Sun's profes-sional work includes review of models of core thermal-hydraulic behav-ior during LOCAs and other abnormal occurrences. Dr. lisii's work in-ciudes technical review of safety evaluation reports and methodological i topical reports submitted by applicants and licensees.
On September 4,1984, the Intervenors responded in opposition to the motions and submitted af0dauts from Joette Lorton - who is one of the Intervenors and Re3earch Director of CNR, which is the other in-tersenor - and Dr. Gordon D.J. Edwards, President of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility and Professor of N1athematics and Science at Vanier College, N1ontreal, Canada. Both afGants spoke to both contentions. The opponent of a motion for summary disposition is li required by 10 C.F.R. s 2.749(a) to submit a statement of material facts l as to which the opponent contends there exists a genuine issue. The in-tervenors did not submit such a statement. I TIIE MOTIONS TO STRIKE On September 21, 1984, the Licensee Oled a motion to strike both the Intersenors' response and the accompanying af0dauts. The Licensee argued that the response should be struck because it was not accompa-nied by statements of material facts as to which it was contented that no i genuine issue existed. Licensee's Motion to Strike at 9-10. The afGdavits
" y $ y N M h.i d M should either be struck, or the facts as asserted by the Licensee deemed x x '**y -Q.h
r admitted as true, the Licensee argued, because the Intervenors had not met the burden, imposed by 10 C.F.R. l 2.749(b), of showing afGrma-tively in the afGdavits that the afnants were competent to testify to the matters stated in the afRdavits. The Licensee cited cases indicating that
; such competence was to be shown by education or experience which i gase the afnant some special knowledge or skill germane to the matters
- discussed in the afGdavits, and that neither a well informed layperson's general familiarity with issues surrounding nuclear power, nor expertise in an unrelated Geld of science or engineering, was sufDeient proof of an
)
j afGant's competence. Id. at 3 4. The Licensee argued that alriant Lorion, despite her title of Research Director, had no more than a lay-person's knowledge of the issues in the proceeding (id. at 4-7), and that 303 O q es y b
y- - Dr. Edwards, though a mathematician, had not shown that he had an ex-
, pert's knowledge of computer modeling of the behavior of a reactor cere i (id. at 7-9). The Licensee also argued that some of Dr. Edwards' state-l ments amounted to attacks on some of the Commission's regulations and should be struck for that reason alone. /d. at 10-12.
. The Staff responded on October 9,1983, largely in support of the 5, Licensee's motion to strike, though granting Ms. Lorion a general famili-arity with nuclear issues, and construing Dr. Edwards' statement that as an applied mathematician he had been keenly interested in mathematical modeling to mean that he had expertise in such modehng. See Edwards' Affidavit, Exh. A at 3. StalTs Response at 6-7.
On October 12, 1983, the intersenors responded to the Licensee's motion to strike with, among other things, their own motion to strike the Licensee's motion to strike. The Licensee responded to the interse-nors' motion to strike on October 17, 1983. The Intersenors construed
.f the Licensee's motion to strike as an unauthorized reply to the Interse-g nor's answer to the Licensee's motions for summary disposition.' We, however, construe the Licensee's motion to strike differently. It does not address, as a reply would, the merits of the Intervenors' arguments against summary disposition. Rather, it contines itself to the procedural sufficiency of the Intervenors' response and affidavits. The Licensee's motion to strike is simply that, a motion to strike, and thus is to be either granted or denied, but not stricken. We therefore deny the Inter-venors' motion to strike the Licensee's motion to strike, and go on to consider the merits of the Licensee's motion to strike.
in their response to the Licensee's motion to strike, the Intersenors make only oblique defenses of their affiants' competence to testify to the matters they discuss in their affidavits. In defense of Ms. Lorion's
.., G qualifications, for instance, the Intervenors appear to concede the Licen-
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-to see's point. "Joette Lorion has not represented herself to be an expert j
4 q witness in the nuclear field Intervenors' Response to Licensee's *
.i Motion to Strike at 4. Nonetheless - or rather, somehow therefore -
the Intervenors conclude (using a wonderfully self-illustrating phrase) that "a finding by this lloard that she is unqualified would be inappropri-l ate and superfluously redundant." /d. at 5. The Intervenors also say that
. 3 the affiants "have had no fair opportunity to defend their professional i
I The Imersenors arcarently are rehing on 19 C i R y 2 'hM. whsh w,s. 4mong mhet thmp. that "the rang party shall hase no r ght to reriv. euepi as per%tted by the preutng otraer or teriam other orTaers or the Commmmon " l l 304
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qua'ifications." /J. at 3. Yet the Licensee's motion to strike provides
, j just such an opportunity.2 i We nonetheless deny the Licensee's motion to strike. We deny it as it applies to the Intervenors' affidavits in opposition to the motions for summary disposition. 'We are inclined to think that in a proceeding where safety is at stake, a motion to strike a Gling and affidavits on sum-
- mary disposition is most useful when it is directed at a proponent of a
~
motion for summary disposition who puts forward, on the basis of ques-l tionable competence, technical arguments before a judicial panel wholly unprepared by education or experience to distinguish competence in technical matters from incompetence in the same. In such a situation, without the motion to strike, safety may receive less than its due. Flere, howeser, the contest of the motion to strike is quite different. First, it is the opponent of summary disposition who puts forth the chal-lenged alTidavits. If on the strength of the opponent's representations,
- the motion for summary disposition is denied, the proponent still has a chance at hearing to persuade the judges that his case is sound. Second, the challenged filings consist, in most telling part, of claims quoted and 1 paraphrased from technically competent Staff discussions, and we found the Intervenors' emphasis on those discussions helpful as a starting point for our coming to a fuller understanding of the technical questions t
raised by the parties' filings. Last, the members of this Board are, by both education and experience, together competent in several fields related to nuclear power. Denial of the motion in no way compromises safety, and the proponent of the motion can at the hearing challenge the competence of the opponents' witnesses under the more rigorous rules j applicable where an evidentiary record is being built.
. We also deny the Licensee's motion to strike as it applies to the Inter-
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venors' response to the motions for summary disposition. As the Staff
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points out (Staff's Response to Licensee's Motion to Strike at 3 n.2), under 10 C.F.R. i 2.749(a), the Intervenors' failure to file statements of the material facts as to which the Intervenors contend there exist i genuine issues is grounds not for striking the Intervenors' response, but for deeming as admitted the facts as set forth in the Licensee's statement of material facts as to which the Licensee contends no genuine issues
- exist. Finally, though we grant that some of Dr. Edwards' statements in 2 The Intervenors also make a general defense of their response to the motions for summary dispnw.
l tion they argue that. Simply by haunt admitted Contention Ibl. "the Board has stready acknowledged that the Intersenors hate rassed a substantial issue n( material fact suitable for dispoution at hearing *'
' intersenori Response to Lwensee's Motion to 5tnke at 2 suet a new of the legal signi6cance of the admisuon of a contemion leaves no room for summary dispostion.
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his affidavit can be read as attacks on some of the Commission's regula-
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..'- ' i Contention (b).
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[ ~. , . . [ THE PREHEARING CONFERENCE ON MARCH 26, 1985
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,b y We found the pleadings and the rest of the written record insufGciently informative for a determination of whether there existed genuine issues about material facts. We therefore called, on February 8,1985, for a pre-
' hearing conference to be held on March 26,1985, and we ordered that
, the Licensee be prepared to make didactic presentations in response to l
issues raised in the parties' Olings. In the February 8 Order, we listed, as examples, several such issues. On February 19, 1985, the Licensee Gled a motion calling upon us to clarify or reconsider our decision to hold a prehearing conference on the
}'
summary disposition motions. The Licensee claimed such a conference
' would provide opportunity for testimony that the other parties might regard as unfairly surprising. Motion for Reconsideration at'7. The Licensee noted that the Commission's regulations consistently speak of summary disposition as judgment on the pleadings, and make no men-tion of oral testimony as a basis for summary disposition. /d. at 3 4. Al-though the Licensee recogr.ized that there were federal court cases in which oral testimon) had, at the discretion of the judge, been given on summary disposition, the Licensee nesertheless argued that this discre-tionary power was derived from a rule of federal cis 1 procedure for which there was no analogue in the Commission's regulations. /d. at 5.
Since the Licensee thought that the pleadings supported summary dis-position, the Licensee would have preferred ajudgment on the pleadings 4:d4%W.$ $ 2 M .99
~ alone. Id. at 9. As next best, the Licensee wanted us to put our questions '
7 ;', j@/&,'y S-hts in writing and order that the answers likewise be in writing. /d. at 7-8.
~.~: The Licensee suggested that even if we decided to take oral testimony, we nonetheless use written questions - to avoid surprise and to limit the scope of the additional material to the question of whether a genuine 1 issue existed about a material fact - and give the other parties an oppor-
'l tunity to examine the witnesses. /d. at 8.
1 The Intersenors responded on February 25 to the Licensee's motion for clari6 cation or reconsideration. Noting the existence of federal court
, cases in which oral testimony had been taken on summany disposition a
motions, the Intervenors supported holding the prehearing conference we had proposed, on condition that testimony taken at it was limited to the question of whether a genuine issue existed, and that other parties were permitted to examine the witnesses. The Intervenors also said that
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they should be given an opportunity after the conference to rebut ele-ments of the Licensee's presentation. The StafT responded to the Licensee's motion for clartlication and reconsideration on Starch 6,1985. The Staff argued that although no regulation explicitly permitted oral testimony on summary disposition,
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neither did any regulation explicitly prohibit such testimony, and that a
- licensing board did have the power to request additional information where it believed that the existing record was insufficient to allow sum-mary disposition. StafTs Response to Licensee's Stotion for Reconsider-ation at 3 (citing Cleveland Electric /Iluminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power l Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443,6 NRC 741,752 (1977)).2 The Staff also pointed out that there had been other boards which had heard oral testimony on motions filed outside of a hearing. /J. at 3 n.2 (citing Pacilic Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2), ALAB-756,18 NRC 1340,1343 (1983) (Appeal Board heard oral testimony and cross examination on motion to reopen the record)).
The Staff agreed with the Licensee that caution had to be exercised, to " avoid a lengthy trial for the purpose of establishing that an actual trial is necessary." /d. at 4 (quoting 6 J. Stoore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, htoore's Federal Practice, 1 56.11[1.61). The Staff even suggested that one proper course for us was simply to deny the motions for summary disposition, a solution we believed to be more in keeping with the letter of the law on the Licensee's burden of proof than with the spirit of the
; summary disposition rules, w hich seek to avoid needless litigation.
I The StalT nonetheless saw that permitting only written additions to the record, as the Licensee had suggested, would " deprive the Board of an opportunity to pursue fully questions to determine whether there was a genuine issue of material fact." /d. at 6. The Staff echoed the other par-
- ~ . . , , ,Y.Q ties' call for an opportunity to examine the Licensee's witnesses, and 1- - - ..,i%%-Zg/-?
the Intervenors' call for a later opportunity to rebut. /4.
'..~~' On Starch 14, 1985, we aflirmed by written order (unpublished) our 4 intention to hold the prehearing conference, having d:termined that under federal court practice and NRC law we had a discretionary power i to hear oral testimony on summary disposition motions. We declared un.
- founded the parties' concern that we would permit unf.iir surprise. We
~ (' A said that it was manifestly evident that if the License: was presented with an additional opportunity to meet its burden on the motions for u
3 The start could Pave uted aho 10 C F R 4 2 74Wbl. *hhh empo*crs the teard to " permit air. davits to be supplemented or opposed by deptmtinn, answers to interregatones or fw ther affid4wns." ewntial-ly the means the Lwenwe propowd or supplementing the record
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summary disposition through oral testimony, the other parties would be given an opportunity to respond or rebut. We also clarilled what areas
, *; s -2 we were interested in pursuing and affirmed that oral testimony would be used solely to determine whether any genuine issues about material
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facts existed concerning Contentions (b) and (d). te 7 7, ,
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The prehearing conference was held, as scheduled, on Af arch 26,
^ wcy*, J - '~ . ' 1985. The Licensee's afliants, hiessrs. Parvin and Dienis, and Licen-j see's witness Stichael Y. Young, blanager of the Thermal flydraulic Ap-j plications Group in the Nuclear Safety Department of Westinghouse Corporation, gave didactic presentations on computer modelings of the thermal hydraulic behavior of the core during renood after a LOCA, and on how the steam which is formed in primary coolant during normal operation behaves. Each affiant then responded to issues the Olings raised in his area of expertise, both the issues we had listed in our order establishing the conference and other issues of which the ones we had I
listed were examples. About halfway through the conference, Intervenors began to object to I the procedure. Tr.152. At the point of the Intervenors' objection, the Licensee had completed its didactic presentation on Contention (b), and its response to the issues his. Lorion's af0 davit had raised in connection with Contention (b), and had just begun to respond to issues raised in Dr. Edwards' affidavit. Apparently, the immediate occasion of the Inter. venors' objection was that the Licensee had responded to two issues raised by Dr. Edwards that we had not listed in our order establishing the conference (sce Tr.156), though they were, clearly enough, the sorts of issues of which the ones we had listed we had said were exam-I ples. See February 2,1985 Order, flowever, as the Intervenors' explana-tion of their objection took shape, it was clear that the objection was quite broad. They charged that the prehearing conference in fact
-f,,g .,W,. 3M s fi$;.4(W G amounted to a hearing in which the evidence presented had been one.
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sided and had gone beyond the scope of any question the Board had pro-posed (Intervenors' April 18, 1985 Comment on Prehearing Procedure 4 at I (emphasis supplied)), that the Utility had been in control, present-ing evidence on the merits of the contentions, going down lists of the in-I tervenors' concerns, and providing no opportunity for cross-examina-
' - 9. .-[
tion; the Intersenors claimed that the Board should have been asking all the questions during the conference, and confining the answers to the I general issue of whether a genuine issue existed about any material fact. ( Tr.154 55. The Intervenors' objections during the conference culminated in, first, a refusal to avail themselves of the opportunity we gave them, as
, promised, to cross-examine the Licensee's witnesses (Tr.170 71), and, 7 ,s3 308 i
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then, in a motion to strike all the testimony offered at the conference,
- - whether didactic or not, and whether in response to the issues we had explicitly raised or not. Tr. 207 08. The intersenors also asserted that
. only if we denied their motion to strike would they avail themselves of
,( the opportunity we had promised them to rebut the testimony given at
' fy . - -- the conference. Tr. 212. They claimed that either to cross-examine or
- rebut during the conference was inappropriate, for it only contributed to turning the conference into an evidentiary hearing. Tr. 171,203.
We denied the Intervenors' motion to strike the testimony received in the prehearing conference. Tr. 214. We were conunced that there had been no signi6 cant departure from the original aim of the prehearing conference, and no defect in fairness toward any party. In retrospect, we could see that some of the testimony appeared to go to the merits, rather than merely to the question of whether a genuine issue existed, and we have pointed out such testimony in our ruling on Contention j (b). But we see here nothing which warrants the Intervenors' quite broad motion to strike. Less all encompassing motions might have been appropriate. Apparently, however, the Intervenors did not want to make such discriminating r"otions. At no time have they pointed out what por-
- tions of the testimony they thought spoke to the merits, and, indeed, they appeared to be conHdent in our ability to discern such portions, for, despite their motion to strike, they proposed that "the Board take judi-cial notice and consider in an informal way this presentation by the Licensee; but that this testimony not come in for its truth. . But make no mistake about it, we ask it all be stricken." Tr. at 207-08.
} We gave the parties fair warning about the issues we wanted treat .d in the conference: we listed several in the original order establishi g the conference, calling them examples; we made clear both in tha. order Gy and in the order afTirming our decision to hold the conference that we
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. $fdz45.L;6%(Tyh*t.Q q,-t ' gg , were askitig the Licensee to be prepared to respond didactically to all the
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issues raised in the Intervenors' afndavits, not just the few we had listed by page or paragraph number in the earlier order. We made equally
~
clear, both before and during the conference, that the Staff and the In-
, j tervenors could cross-examine and rebut the Licensee's testimony. Tr.
; 170 71, 202-03. Indeed, we gave the Intervenors 3 weeks in which to re-
.. ' ~'
spond to that testimony (Tr. 215) and made sure they understood the risk they ran if they did not respond. Tr. 202 03. By a Gling dated April s 18,2 days after the end of the 3 weeks, the Intervenors announced that i ^' ~ they would "not further dignify the procedure by submitting rebuttal or
- . other testimony." in the same Oling, they also asserted that "the net j effect of the Prehearing Conference hos been to Ormly estabhsh that i
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~ x -- ~ . . ,;. ,, there are substantial disputed issues of material fact at issue regarding both Contentions (b) and (d)." Which issues they did not say.
- i STANDARDS FOR SUSISTARY DISPOSITION By and large, licensing boards, when considering motions for summary disposition under 10 C.F.R. f 2.749, will apply the standards established by the courts for considering motions for summary judgment under l Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alabama Power Co.
(Joseph 51. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units I and 2), ALAB-182, 7 AEC 210,217 (1974). Summary disposition is available in hearings on amend-ments to licenses. Boston Ednon Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Station, Unit I), ALAB-191, 7 AEC 417 (1974). A motion for summary disposition will be granted when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a favorable de-cision as a matter of law. 10 C.F.R. 4 2.749(d). The record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Pubhc Senice Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units I and 2), LBP 74 36,7 AEC 877,897 (1974) (citing federal court cases). The fail-ure of the party opposing summary disposition to submit evidence against the disposition does not require that the motion be granted. The movant must stdl meet his burden of proof to establish the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Cleveland Electric illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753-54 (1977). 1 CONTENTION (b) J
' d'." b J$h 6,W,Yfj k- Paraphrased without technical language, the Intervenors' Contention
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c (b) says that the computer model used to make the most recent predic-tion of the temperature of the hottest spot on the hottest rod in the core after a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) during renood of the core doesn't meet the NRC regulations applicable to such models, that, in particular, the model does not adequately consider the effect even a slight decrease in the rate of renooding can have on the temperature of the hottest spot in the core.
, Certain aspects of the actual text of the contention, and of the Interve-nors' response to the motion for summary disposition of the contention.
A; "' will be clearer if we Orst set out some t:chnical matters. General Design Criterion 10 (GDC 10) requires that i
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It]he reactor core and associated coolant, control and protection systems shall be designed with appropriate margin to assure that speci6ed acceptable fuel design limits are not esceeded during any condition of normal operauon. including the ef-fects of anticipated operational occurrences. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A.
- '- The " fuel design limit" relevant under this contention is the tempera-
- ture at which the integrity of the cladding of the fuelis seriously threat-ened. The " anticipated operational occurrence" relevant under this con.
l tention is a LOCA. The " appropriate margin" GDC 10 calls for in this case is established by 10 C.F.R. } 50.46(bH1), " Peak cladding tempera-rure [ PCT). The calculated maximum fuel element cladding tempera-ture shall not exceed 2200*F." The PCT is not to be an average drawn from all the peaks on all the rods in the core. or even from all the peaks on a single rod. Rather the PCT is to be the temperature of the hottest region on the hottest rod in the core after a LOCA. 39 Fed. Reg.1001 (Jan. 4,1974). The cladding of the fuelin Units 3 and 4 at Turkey Poirt does not become embrittled until its temperature is somewhere between 2500* and 2700'F. Tr.132 33. Thus the 2200*F limit established by 6 50.46(b)(1) entails a safety margin of at least somewhere between 300' aad 500'. Before the amendments which are at issue in this proceeding could be issued, the Licensee had to show that the PCT in Units 3 and 4 under the operating limits to be imposed by the amendments would not exceed 2200'F. Usually a calculation of a PCT requires the use of several i models, each one specializing in a different aspect of the behavior of core and coolant after a LOCA. One model will calculate the rate at which the emergency core cooling system refloods the core; another model, with reflood rates as input, will calculate certain numerical varia.
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.e CD R :.N flowing in from the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). Yet another model will use these heat transfer coeflicients as input for calculations of PCTs. The NRC requires that these models conform to the criteria in i '
Appendix K of 10 C.F.R. Part 50.10 C.F.R. j $0.46(a)(l).
! The Licensee used two models to calculate heat transfer coefficients. l
.i The oldest of the two, the Full Length Emergency Cooling Ileat Transfer (FLECilT) was accepted for use by the NRC at least as early as 1974.
See 39 Fed. Reg.1003 (Jan. 4,1974). FLECilT is simply an equation which expresses a correlation of data points determined by experiment. The other model, "BART A1: Computer Code for the Best Estimate Analysis of Rellood Transients" (BART), relies on principles of engi-neering rather than correlations based solely on experiment. Tr.111 13. 311 i , i
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On December 21, 1983, the NRC StatT accepted BART as being in con-formity with Appendix K when apphed under cert in conditions, which
, j included, most important among others, a certain range of operation of i the core, a maximum on the distance between cladding points modeled, i and a prohibition against the use of a grid spacer model as part of the BART model. See StalTs Safety Evaluation Report on BART (BART SER), Dec. 21,19P' at 16. The range of operation of the core was
_~ ~
, ' .1 generous enough to include even the possibility of blockage of reHood by swollen or ruptured cladding. /J. at 9-10, 14 15. The StalTjudged that the accuracy of the grid spacer model was not yet established. /d. at 9. In-clusion of the model would probably have lowered the calculated PCT, because the grid spacers can be expected to contribute to the transfer of heat from the core to the coolant. /d.
Applied under the conditions imposed by the Statf. BAR l~, in conjune-tion with several other models - most particularly LOCTA, which per-forms the actual calculation of the PCT - yielded a predicted PCT of 1972*F, 228* under the regulatory limit of 2200*F. Parvin Af0 davit, 15.
. The Licensee revised the prediction upward to 2051*F when it was dis-covered that there existed a less than adequate connection between BART and the model which predicted the rates of re0ood of the core.
That rate varies, though not widely. Thus, a curve which charted that rate as a function of time would be gently rolling. The area under the curse would represent the total amount of water which had entered the core from the ECCS. Ilowever, a curse constructed from a small sample of points on the complete curse could miss some of the low points on the complete curve and thus, by overestimating the amount of water in
; the core, overestimate the amount of steam available for coohng, and, in turn, underestimate the PCT. Letter from E.P. Rahe (Westinghouse) e9'T-[dk'h-f;'h[j'$gj- .N to D.G. Eisenhut (NRC), March 22,1985.
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The Licensee has strengthened the connection between BART and the model which calculates renood rates, WREFLOOD, so that the input to BART on rates of redood matches the information available from WREFLOOD on rate of renood, and so that the total amount of
; coolant in the core as calculated by BART from rate information equals
" 1' .j the total amount of coolant as calculated by WREFLOOD. /J. The Staff a has reviewed the Licensee's modifications and ilas revised accordingly
; its safety evaluations of the BART model and the amendments at issue
, here, but concludes anew that the llART model meets the criteria of Ap.
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pendix K.* Board Notification BN-85-055, Stay 16,1985. This revision
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is the principal subject of the Intervenors' motion for suspension of the license amendments and will be considered by us again when we rule on
, that motion.
Sometime in 1983, the Staff asked the Licensee to calculate the PCT for Units 3 and 4 by using the older model of heat transfer coefficients, FLECHT. Staff Safety Evaluation Report on Amendment 99 to DPR-31 and Amendment 93 to DPR 41 (SER on amendments), Nfay 14, 1985,
~
at 5-6. The Licensee did so, and on December 17, 1983, submitted for Staff review a FLECliT based PCT of 2130*F, higher than the modified BART ligure, but still under the regulatory limit of 2200*F. Id. at 6. Thus, although the figure calculated using BART %as sufficient to meet the 2200'F limit, it was not necessar). The Licensee could have met the limit using FLECi!T alone. This fact is crucial to our disposition of the
; motion for summary disposition of this contention.
j One small, short term adjustment has had to be made in these two fig-
, ures, the 2051*F predicted with BART and the 2130*F predicted with FLECliT. The Licensee's principal way of preventing embrittlement of the reactor vessel by neutron bombardment has been to replace part of the low. parasitic (LOPAR) fuel in the core with optimized fuel assembly (OFA) regions at each reloading of the core. Eventually the cores in Units 3 and 4 %ill consist wholly of OFA fuel but for the next few years, the cores will contain a misture of the t%o kinds of fuel. The PCTs calculated with BART and FLECllT are applicable to either kind of fuel, but not, without adjustment, to a core containing a mixture of I the t%o.
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/ dated March 18. counsel for the Licensee informed us that on March 9 westinghouse had ,
dmovered. m work unrelated to l' pits 3 and 4. that shortcomings m the procedures for transfern rg m. formaten from W RU LoOD to BAR T would ented an mcrease in the PCT predicted with 8 AR T. rhe Licensee s letter to us only bne Ay descnhed the shortcomings m the procedures and could say at>3ut the
' revmed PCT only that ti anuld be less than the 2200*F hmit imposeJ by regulation on March 22. West-mghouw gate the stalT a full account of the shortcomines m the procedures and of how the shortvom.
, ings had been corrected. and reported that the revned PCT was 2031'F. to which, again.104 was to be I added dunns the pened of transsuon hetween fuel hpes Dunne the preheanos conferente on summary d dapnsvion. Wesurghouse wnnenes largely repeated what Wesims%ouse had told the stafr on March
- 22. Tr.12440 The stafr solunteered that n would be a3propna.e for the Statito provide the Board and I-the parties with its review of the mformation 3 sen it by %esunghouse, and we ordereJ that the sialtdo so wohm 2 weeks of the cor ference. Tr. 204 49, 218 19 On Apnt to the staff submitted an affidt a l from summer B sun, whose qualificauons we have noted, and Norman Lauben. Mr Lau'Jen is a '.ec-
- e tion Leader m ihe Reacte' systems Branch of the Division of Systems integrauon of the SRC. He super-i vises the review of transient and accident analyws and analytical methods submitted by vent' irs and uulines The af0 dawn reviewed the mformauon Westinghouse haJ gnen the stafr on March 22. the i relaled tesumony the Westinghouw witnesses gave at lhe preheanns conference, and the at0davn Mr sun had submnted en responw to the Lnensee e monon for summary darosition of Contenuon 8bt On May 16.1981, in Board Soufkanon BN.45-0$f. the 5tariprovided us with the revised safety evaluauons j >
, ., of B ART and the amendments at inue here 313 i
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M.. s - yp Experimental work on full size fuel assemblies of OFA fuel have
. ;J shown that the OFA fuel causes a 4.5% greater resistance to the passage
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of Guids than does the LOPAR fuel. Tr.115. This increased resistance, called hydraulic resistance, can affect the efficiency with which steam from the water Dowing into the core after a LOCA cools the core. Engi-
. L neering equations applied to the 4.5% Ogure for the increase in hydraulic resistance show that the velocity of steam going past a single OFA fuel J '?
rod surrounded by LOPAR fuel is reduced by 2.2% from what it would be were it surrounded by OFA fuel. Tr.116. The reduction comes about because steam, following the path of least resistance, crosses over from the single OFA clement to the LOPAR fuel, where the hydraulic resist-ance is less. Tr.115. No single OFA fuel red in Units 3 and 4 Turkey Paint will be surrounded by LOPAR elements at any time during the transition between the two kinds of fuel, but on the conservative as-sumption that every OFA rod in Units 3 and 4 is surrounded by LOPAR rods, as was assumed in calculating the 2.2% reduction in velocity (Tr. 117, 123 24), then the predicted PCT for Units 3 and 4 must be in-creased by not more than 10'F, Parvin Affidavit,15. This 10*F was calculated in the following way; mathematical model-ing of a three loop plot like Units 3 and 4 shows that a 5% reduction in the velocity of steam during renood entails an increase in the PCT of not more than 19'F. Tr.116. A 2.2% reduction, therefore, entails a pro-portionately smaller increase in the PCT, namely, 8.4*F, which the Licensee and the Staff are treating as 10*F. Tr.11617. This increase ap-plies to both the PCT as predicted with BART, and the PCT as predicted with FLECilT, despite the difference in the two predictions, for the 10*F is derived by simple proportion from the ratio of 5% to 19'F, and
! thus does not depend upon the temperature to which it is being added.
g Therefore, for the period of the transition between types of fuel, the
,. . $-;MIMb.aikW{[y$.T"J.w;$4.M.,,..f,p..d s-ifm PCT predicted with BART is 2051*F + 10*F, or 2061*F, and the PCT predicted with FLECilT is 2130*F + 10*F, or 2140'F. Both predictions i
fall within the limit set out in 10 C.F.R. 5 50.46(b)(1). Now we have set out suf0cient technical and regulatory background
- for understanding the contention and the Intervenors' response to the
. . . . m -tion for summary disposition. The contention is as follows:
Whether the entirely new computer model t sed by the utility for calculating re-I nood portions of acciden's meets the Commission's ECCS Acceptance Criteria. spe. l cifically, whether a 2.2% reduction m re.nood rate is raisteading because for a small
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decrease in re.nood rate, there results a large increase in fuel temperature. Re.nood
! rates are criticalif below I or 2 inches per minutes, f
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lt will be immediately seen that the contention was drafted without a full picture of BART's uses, or the meaning of the 2.2% reduction. The
- contention thus contains certain errors of fact which render it incapable of raising any genuine issue of fact.
First, there is no basis for the claim in the contention that BART is
.* " entirely new." Of course, BART is in some sense new, but many of its parts are old. The Staff repeatedly says in its safety evaluation of BART
#~ ~' . - that this or that submodel within BART is " conventional," or " typical."
~
See, e.g., ff 2.1,2.2.2,2.4.5 Second, and more important, the 2.2% reduction is not in the rate of I reflood, but in the velocity of steam passing by OFA fuel assemblies; it is a reduction only for the relatively short period of the transition from one fuel type to another; and BART had nothing to do with calculating either the 2.2% or the 10*F increase the 2.2% entails in the PCTs predict-ed with the aid of BART and FLECliT. As we reported, the 2.2% is the result of experiment and calculation exclusive of BART, and the 10*F follows from a simple proportion. Thus, insofar as one speciGe concern of the contention is that BART may not be taking adequate account of the 2.2% reduction, the concern is misplaced, for not only is the reduc-tion not in reflood, neither BART nor FLECliT should take into account the reduction. The Intervenors have taken no issue with the way in which either the 2.2% or the 10*F was derived. Last, and most important, the contention says nothing about the fact that the Licensee used FLECllT to predict a PCT that falls within the i 2200*F established by f 50.46(b)(1). Dr. Edwards, in his afGdavit m re-sponse to the motion for summary disposition, does mention FLECliT, not to argue any defect in FLECitT itself, though, but rather to argue that, given the uncertainties of mathematical modeling, it is a matter of
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political judgment whether the 2140*F predicted with the help of 3N.h q 3.x, eth..
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FLECHT, and adjusted for the transition core, can be said to fall within the 2200*F limit. Edwards AfGdavit at 7,19(e). Both the Staff and the i
- Licensee construe Dr. Edwards' argument to be, in efTect, an attack on the 2200*F limit (Licensee's Motion to Strike at 1011; Staffs Response to Licensee's Motion to Strike at 910); but, construing the argument in
- the most favorable light, we view it as kin to a question we asked during A 4r the prehearing conference on March 26: whether the figures the
+ ' '
models had predicted for the PCTs were signincant to the four places I being quoted us, or rather whether the 2130*F, for instance, ought to be rounded off to 2200*F. Tr.130. More generally, we asked whether there ll 3 The 14esuage of the contention is general enough to permit one to ihmn ihat the drafier thoushi ihat B ART. all by itselr. modeled renood. As we have noted above,it does not. 315 I. l
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was an error band of so many percent associated with the predicted
, PCTs. Tr.131-32. The reply was that the models provide four figures, j that the Staff required that the predictions be rounded off to the nearest j 10'F, and that the figures we were shown were upper bounds, that realis-
, .j tic estimates would be lower. /d. The Intervenors have not seen lit to
'a raise any doubts about this reply to our questions, and ourselves seeing
- ., no doubt to be raised, we must conclude that the Intervenors have
~
raised no genuine issue about FLECHT, or about whether the PCT pre-dicted with FLECHT meets the 2200 F standard. Therefore, whatever may be the Intersenors' concerns about the ade-quacy of BART, as long as the Licensee has met the standard in s 50.46(b)(1) using a heat transfer correlation which the Staff has long accepted, and whose conformity to the criteria in Appendix K of Part 50 is not in dispute in this proceeding, we are obliged to grant the Licen-see's motion for summary disposition of Contention (bl We are left then with the Intervenors' criticisms of BART. Before the legal significance of the Licensee's having used FLECHT was clear to 4 us, the concerns the Intervenors had raised about BART seemed to us j to be the most important aspect of the litigation of the contention, and it was largely tu find out whether these concerns raised any genuine issues about material facts that we asked the Licensee to make a didactic pres-entation on March 26. Therefore, it is fitting that, rather than dismiss the Intervenors' concerns simply with the observation that the Licensee has complied with the relevant legal standards, we make brief comments about the chief of these concerns. Some of the Intersenors' comments about BART are simply general cautions about the uncertainties of computer modeling. Sce, e.g., Ed-wards Affidavit at 4,17. We have taken note of those cautions and shall
..m. r;.g not further address them. Of the more than a dozen specific comments,
\ , f%Q;#5fg.WrtM., most either misrepresent facts, or expect BART to do what only other
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f codes or equations are to do, or seek to have imposed on BART burdens not imposed by law. A few of the claims appear to raise genuine issues, especially if we apply the rule that the record and affidavits are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. But since the Licensee has used FLECHT to predict a PCT which complies with the standard in s 50.46(b)(1), the few issues raised are not material l 1 and therefore do not justify the holding of an evidentiary hearing. We begin with those comments which raise no genuine issue. 1
,- 3 316
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- l. "[T]he small break LOCA analysis did not give much weight to the mixed fuel core." Lorion Affidavit at 4; see also id. at 5, item "e "
j hiost of the Intervenors' attempts to raise genuine issues paraphrase or quote from the StalTs safety evaluation of BART, and this attempt quoted above purports to have the same source. Ilowever, the Interve-nors' affiants never cite the StalTs evaluation by page, and we have been unable to find what his. Lorion is paraphrasing or quoting in the sentence above. Whatever her source, it is the task not of BART, but of other codes, to do small-break LOCA analysis. Tr.135; SER on Amend-ments, j 4.3. Aforeover, we do not know quite what "much weight" l might mean here, nor why it is important that the small-break analysis did not give much weight to the mixed core.
^
- 2. "BART does not have a gap heat transfer model or cladding swelling model as required by Appendix K." Lorion Affidavit at 4; see also Edwards Affidavit at 6-7.
This sentence is simply a quotation frorr 5 3.0 of the StalTs SER on BART at 13. As the sentence says, Appendix K requires both a gap heat transfer model and a cladding swelling model. See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix K, (( A.1 and B. But the Appendix does not require that BART contain these models. They are, in fact, contained in LOCTA, the model which makes the ultimate calculations of PCTs. Tr.135. hloreover, BART does reckon with the consequences of Ilow blockage caused by claddmg swelling, bowing, and other phenomena. Tr.159-60. Dr. Edwards implies, without citation to any document, that BART deals with such phenomena " simply by assigning a ' numerical penel-ty.'" Edwards Affidavit at 7. The Licensee, however, reports that the s g: ' i penalty is calculated. Tr.160-61. .
"g.;: , %ev.u- i~ g .o r f M.. M -gG yk, n;(
.+ l
- 3. "BART was accepted without a grid spacer model because it was still i being reviewed by the NRC staff " Lorion Affidavit at 4.
As we reported above, it was the Stafrsjudgment that the accuracy of J - I the grid spacer model for OFA fuel had not been established, and that l therefore the grid spacer model should, for the time being, not be l included in BART. Ilowever, as we also reported above, this exclusion only makes BART more conservative since the grid spacers increase the transfer of heat away from the rods. See BART SER 5 2.6. The Licen-4 see's predicted PCTs are doubly conservative, in fact, for they do take account of the grid spacers in one way: Those spacers are largely re-sponsible for the 4.5% increase in hydraulic resistance during the transi-s
~ [-
. t 317
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' -G
f fx;y -
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.c tion between fuel types, an increase which entails a 10*F increase in the PCTs for the transition. Thus the PCTs for the transition reflect a penal-ty for the increased hydraulic resistance caused by the grid spacers, but the PCTs do not reDect a credit for the increased heat transfer caused by c the spacers. Tr.137-38.
v '.'
- 4. "The Flecht Seasta [ sic: FLECliT-SEASET] data comparison were
[ sic] from a series of tests conducted on fuel rods in a 17 x 17 assem-bly and extrapolated to a 15 x 15 assembly." Lorion Affidavit at 4. Part of this sentence is drawn from j 2.7.4 of the BART SER. That section says nothing about " extrapolation," a word more appropriate to prediction than to data comparison. The FLECitT-SEASET data were not used by BART to predict heat transfer coefGcients for a 15 x 15 as-sembly. Rather, BART's results for a 15 x 15 assembly were compared to the FLECitT-SEASET results for a 17 x 17 assembly. BART's results were also compared to other test results for 17 x 17 assemblies. See BART SER j 2.7.2. The Intervenors do not say why such comparisons should not be made, or why, among the comparisons made with results for 17 x 17 aesemblies, they chose to sinse out the comparisons with the FLECitT-SEASET data. We note that the BART results were also compared with FLECilT data for 15 x 15 assemblies. See BART SER j 2.7.1 at 10; see also Tr.141. The following concerns of the Intervenors are not drawn, as far as we
! can tell, from the Staffs SER on BART.
- 5. "BART does not address or compute the probability that steam
. . , . generator tube failure and steam binding could stall the re0ood."
.?s Mdt9.drifdi&WIM Lorion Affidavit at 5.
- . , pa x,s;, ::ug& 5sm ,
.at
- 6. "BART does not compute the possibility or consequences of gross pressure vessel rupture." /d.
- 7. "BART does not take into account the aging to the system and components at Turkey Point." /d.
. The Licensee reports that its predictions of PCTs do in fact account for steam binding, but that - and we agree - Appendix K, which sets the standards for evaluation models of the phenomena which determine
- PCTs, does not require that such models take into account the other fac-tors mentioned in the three sentences quoted above.
4 I 318 l
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- 8. "BART has not conducted actual experiments on a mixed transition-al fuel cere, and instead adopts a purely hypothetical percentage for i thermal hydraulic resistance." Lorion AITidavit at 5, see also Ed-wards Affidavit at 6,19(b).
l The truth is somewhere between the two extremes the Intervenors set out: No experiments have been done on the mixed t.ansitional core, but the percentage increase in hydraulic resistance is not therefore
~
" purely hypothetical." As we explained above, the 4.5% f,gure for in-crease was established by experiment, the 2.2% figure for reduction in steam flow velocity this increased resistance causes was established by engineering equations, and the 10*F Ogure for increase in the PCTs was established by a simple proportion. BART had no part to play in estab-lishing this 10*F.
The Intersenors' remaining comments on BART appear to raise genuine issues, at least when the record and the affidavits are read in the light most favorable to the Intervenors. Ilowever, as we said, the facts about which these issues have been raised are not material, given the Licensee's use of FLECliT to comply with the regulation on PCT.
- 9. Again, quoting the Staff' SER without citation to a page, Intervenor Lorion says, "[t]he assumption of constant pressure made in BART
! may preclude consideration of the oscillating antigravity reflood phe-nomena." Lorion Affidavit at 4, 5 (quormg Staff BART SER at 3, s 2.1). Dr. Edwards adds, likewise quoting without citation, that BART does not " encompass all possible expected flow patterns" even if the system pressure is relatively constant. Edwards Affidavit at 6,19(c) (quaring Staff BART SER at 3, s 2.1).
. The Licensee's response to the comments on the assumption of con-
.~.-y D [,'.Wy %' ~-
~
stant pressure is not clear, but seems to be either that another computer code, WREFLOOD, takes variations in pressure into account (see Tr. 139-40, 158), or that BART's assumption of constant pressure is, for variots reasons, reasonable. See Tr.140-41. This last alternative goes to the merits rather than to whether the Intervenors have raised a genuine 8 issue. To Dr. Edwards' report of the Staffs comment about BART's in-
, complete coverage of expected flow patterns, the Licensee replies merely that, in comparisons with FLECHT, BART has proved to be con-servative. Tr.158-59. This reply, rather than showing that the Interve-nors raise no issue, avoids the issue they raise.
1 319
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. 10. "Only one single test was performed in the BART topical as a basis l' for parameter assessment." Lorion Affidavit at 4 (paraphrasing
]l
'J Staff BART SER at 5,5 2.2.3).
,.. .7, .q ;e. <
Again the Licensee replies merely that BART has proved to be con-O
,', 1 servative in relation to FLECHT.Tr.138 49.
- ?.:, , . ;3. . . Q-b. , ,' h g ._ ~
. , ^ ,.u ' '
- 11. "The BART code shows spikes in the calculated results of the heat
- transfer coemcients. The spikes are indicative of the discontinuous l heat transfer regime transitions. However, the overall BART pre-dictions are in good agreement with the heat transfer coemeient data." Of course, it is precisely where the " discontinuous heat transfer regime transitions" occur that cladding failure is likely to
. occur. Cladding failure generally begins as a local phenomenon, not necessarily as an "overall" phenomenon. Edwards Amdavit at 7,19(g) (quoting the Staff SER at 10-11).
It is not clear from the Staft's SER on BART whether these spikes are a product of a discontinuity which actually would exist in the fuel assem-blies during reflood, or a discontinuity which exists only in the model.
~
C Since BART uses only three heat transfer regimes (see BART SER at 3), there may be more discontinuity between them than there would be between the more numerous regimes in the actual fuel assemblies during reflood. Whatever may be the case, the Licensee replies that, be-cause of the " thermal inertia" of the fuel rods, the spikes have little effect on the PCT predicted with the help of BART, and that even assuming these spikes could cause cladding failure, such failure is taken into account in the BART model. Tr.165-66. The Licensee adds that, in
. . . , . . ', , the event of cladding failure, it is the average temperature in the hot as-c[/.U[ " ~ @, '
?y#r sembly that matters, not the local temperature. Tr.166. The Licensee ww~ e.MM$9
. / <.f thus implies that the model's "overall" agreement with the heat transfer 4 ,
=n n m,.. .
s g:. coefficient data is sufficient. Th.is reply appears to go to the merits. THE INTERVENORS' MOTION TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE
-- ~, u.-mJ , THE LICENSE AMENDMENTS
~ . u..,q..r..
. m .p W.C As we have reported, on March 18,1985, Counsel for the Licensee in- .
- 4. .
formed the Board by letter that because of shortcomings in the proce-D@[/if.,! [,' - - dures for transferring information from WREFLOOD to BART, the PCT predicted with BART would have to be revised upward. In our dis-
, cussion of Contention (b) we dealt fully with this revised PCT, but must briefly consider it again now in another procedural context.
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4-l Toward the beginning of the Starch 26, 1985 prehearing conference .c. ' . .- 3 on the summary disposition motions, the Intervenors delivered to the
" ' 'l
~
.! Board and the parties "Intervenors' hiotion to Suspend or Revoke the l License Amendments." Tr. 93 96. The heart of the motion was the
, /
i- 6. , 3 . ; claim that the Licensee's hlarch 18 letter - which did not describe the
^
shortcomings in the WREFLOOD-BART link, or say what the revised
.l.?. "C5& .h "NS.'-
[ [j JX .- ".J.
' ~
PCT would be, but only that it would be less than the 2200*F limit im-l posed by 10 C.F.R. j 50.46(b)(1) - showed that there was "no valid
' technical basis for the WREFLOOD BART computer model," and that there was therefore "no valid legal, technical, or mathematical basis for operation of the Turkey Point nuclear power plants under the subject license amendments." hiotion to Suspend at 1, 3. The Intervenors concluded that the Board must now suspend or revoke these heense amendments, with the require.
ment that the Licensee . . operate the facihty m accordance with the origmal techni-j cat specifications . . until this board has determmed that there exists a computer
- a model that allows operation of the plant withm the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50 46
. and 10 C F R. Part 50 Appendis K.
i Id. at 2. The motion was accompanied by the same two affidavits which accompanied the Intervenors' response to the motions for summary dis-i positions. Of course, since these affidavits were written before the Licen-see's counsel had informed us of the revision in the PCT, they could not support the Intersenors' claim in their motion that the Licensee's 6 h! arch 18 letter showed that the "WREFLOOD BART computer 1 model" had no valid technical basis. Neither did the motion contain any legal discussion of our authority to suspend or revoke amendments to an operating license. At the prehearing conference on summary disposition, the Licensee
",_ Wy..:.,myWr.ff;3.(
?f ~hN.g g gave the Board and the parties the new figure for the PCT calculated DDk
, -e ' !, after the shortcomings in the procedure for transferring information
~
. from WREFLOOD to BART had been corrected. Tr.124. The Licensee also explained what those shortcomings had been and how they had
_., j been corrected. Tr.125 30. Later in the conference, on the basis of this x -
. , _ ^ ^- c.2 new information, the Intervenors withdrew the motion to suspend or Li ?! Y revoke the amendments. Tr. 216. Apparently, for the Intervenors, the
. mere specificity of the revised PCT was enough to put "a valid technical basis" under BART. Intervenors' counsel said, "I think that [the
" je revised PCT) puts the BART model back into the realm of certainty,-
whereas there was no certainty at the time we filed the motion." Id. l Later in the conference, however, the Intervenors reinstated their motion, arguing that the Licensee's testimony on the circumstances sur-p [ em < 321 .- 1ick&g'$h %pa n ,_
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~
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. .,_ . f j rounding the resision in the PCT had not been full enough, that "all we base today is [ Licensee's March 18, 1985] letter saying those original i values are no longer accurate." Tr. 219-22. As we have noted, we also i' - O had thc Licensee's witnesses' testimony about the revision in the PCT.
T - As we have described in our discussion of Contention (b), the Licen-
~ '..
" , ' 'Q see had in fact even before the prehearing conference given the Staff a n . . ,g
~-
fuller account of the revision of the PCT. After the conference the Staff I' Cf' reviewed the account and revised its safety evaluations of both BART and the amendments accordingly. The Intervenors have not amended their motion to take into account either the testimony at the prehearing j conference, or any of the further filings by the Licensee and the Staff. l The Licensee and the Staff Gled in opposition to the Intervenors' motion to suspend or revoke on April 4 and April 10,1985, respectively. The Staffs Gling was accompanied by an afGdavit." Neither the Staff nor the Licensee saw any merit in the Intervenors' claim that the upward re-vision in the PCT meant that the BART code had no valid technical basis, but the Staff and the Licensee disagreed on whether we had the authority to suspend or revoke the amendments. The Licensee argued that the Intervenors should have Gled a petition for suspension Or revo-cation under 10 C.F.R. j 2.206 with the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The Staff argued that in amendment proceedings in which the Board will, in its initial decision, rule oc the issue raised by the motion to suspend or revoke, suspension or revocation by the Board could be analogized to a temporary restraining order issued by a federal court, and could be based on the facters for stays of decisions (sce 10 I C.F.R. s 2.788(e)). However, we need not reach the question of whether we have the au-thority to suspend or revoke the license amendments,'since, as is clear from our discussion of Contention (b), the Intervenors' motion is with-y q.yy, .. .. ... . ,J out substantive merit and must be denied. Whatever the shortcomings
. :/ of BART may be - and the Intervenors' motion, being wholly unre-
~ Nikhk$,
~ ' A' v f . .7
[N sponsise to the Stafrs and the Licensee's Slings on the revised PCT pre-6 this was the same afridavit whwh accompanied the stafTs rihrg on the restsion of the PCT. As we
;g s C q ,.- noted in our discussion or Contention (b), that latter fihng abo mas on April 10.
7 we simply note that the stalTs position on a Board's authority has at least this advantage that it is
.. j -
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;? cansisten' with a recogniaon that in an amendment proceeding, in contrast to construction permit or operating IKense proceedings. the swus quo is et necessanly bemgn in relauon to public health and safety. and that the Board presiding over an amendment proceeding in which the issues raised by the monon to suspend or revoke are already issues in the amendment prrKecding is likely to know more f,[][Kf.5pZ.1 h(,QN ~ than any other Commission ofrwer knows about the issues. Both the cases the Licensee cites in support
," or its clem that we would not have the authority to suspend or revoke the amendments mvolve con.
gruction permits, and in ne ther case d6d the Board have already m the ongoing proceeding Jurisdiction I oser the substanme swues raised by the Intcrvenors' ribrgs. neither one of which was a motion to sus. red or rewke
, , .- ) .. q M -
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dicted with BART, cannot possibly point to any shortcoming - BART _ , is irrelevant to the resolution of either the Intervenors' motion to sus-
) pend or revoke, or the Licensee's motion for summary disposition of j Contention (b), for, without using BART, the Licensee has met the
. . y legal requirements imposed on predicted PCTs.
.g.q,. n.. Accordingly, Licensee's motion for summary disposition of Interve.
;a
- M .fl # , . nors' Contention (b) is granted.
, %. '._ r n CONTENTION (d)
This contention, like Contention (b), is concerned with the efTects of running the fuel in Units 3 and 4 at higher temperatures, principally with whether the integrity of the cladding of the fuel would be main-tained at certain times. Contention (b) focuses on the integrity of the cladding during re0ood of the core after a LOCA; Contention (d) focuses on the integrity of the cladding during normal operation and cer-tain abnormal occurrences other than LOCAs. In lay terms, the contention says that the license amendments in issue here make it significantly more probable that the temperature of the cores in Units 3 and 4 will reach the point where the fuel rods will become, in elTect, insulated by films of steam, and thus will retain heat that would otherwise be transferred to the water Dowing by the rods. The rods thus insulated, the cladding of the fuel is significantly more likely to fail. Moreover, the contention continues. failure of the cladding would release Ossion products into the coolant and thus make it more likely that there would be serious consequences from an accident.
. The text of the contention, and the parties' arguments on summary disposition, cannot be understood without some explanation of how steam behaves during the normal operation of a pressurized water reac-
~ M:d#O.i
%.R8f;;&pta;-M'm,. dRgMtf ., tor. If the temperature of the fuel m the core of a PWR is high enough,
~. % -v- 1 gz s but not too high, bubbles of steam will form on the surfaces of the fuel
.j rods, and will be swept away from the rods by the now of the coolant.
Once in that Dow, the bubbles will either condense and thus disappear, or, at some higher temperature, survive in equilibrium with the liquid
! coolant. The stage of boiling at which the bubbles form and leave the
,3 surfaces of the rods is called nucleate boiling. During nucleate boiling,
; the transfer of heat from the surfaces of the rods to the coolant is effi-cient and increases more or less in proportion to the increase in the tem-l t perature of the rods. The conventional numerical measure of the heat I transferred in a given time from a given surface is called " heat flux."
SeegeneraRv Dzenis Affidavit at 3-4. 323
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j If the temperatures of operation are high enough, howeser, some bub-bles of steam will remain on the surfaces of the rods, and on each rod
,-( '
, , *?'"'~- adjacent bubbles will coalesce and thus begin to form a film of steam over the surface of the rod. The beginning of the formation of such
- p;;.'. T ~ 2, r q:- films marks the beginning of what is conventionally called departure n eg en ' > g., from nucleate boiling (DNB). Such Alms in effect insulate the rods, causing heat that would be lost to water at the surfaces of the rods to be
-- ' _' -+ @ g:s,dg @ , y gL ?h retained in the rods. Thus, at whatever temperature films of steam begin to form on the rods, heat Hux begins to decline. The heat flux at the beginning of this decline is called the critical heat Dux (CIIF). With the reduction in heat Aux, a vicious circle forms, increasing the probability i of failure of the cladding: lleat is trapped by the f..ms, the temperature of the rods therefore increase 3. the Olms grow esen larger, heat Oux de-clines esen further, more heat is trapped, and so forth. The heat Hux from a given rod increases again only when the rod is completely cov-ered by a film of steam, at which point, any further increase in the tem-perature of the rod increases the difference between the temperature of rod and the temperature of the liquid coolant on the other side of the
~
- o. ' W .
.] film, and thus increases the amount of heat the film conducts. See gener-ally id. at 4-5.
'j It is a long way, however, from DNB to a release of significant x]m 3
? amounts of fission products to the environment. DNB does not necessarily lead to a breach in the cladding, and even if a breach were to occur, the fission products inside the claddmg would be released only into the primary coolant 3fstem, which is itself a closed system. None-theless, prudence requires avoiding esen the first step toward a signili-cant release to the environment. Thus, during the operation of a reactor there must be some proper proportion kept between what the critical c
- g. heat flux would be for a given set of operating conditions and what the M$kN 'Qp,; 3% p. gg,.; actual heat flux (AIIF) is under those same conditions.
' h "'m;gg d Q.5 M- wR'? $ g~d y -]? It is, however, not possible to say with a high level of certainty what the CHF for a given kind of fuel, operating under a given set of condi-1 ~~\' 'j '
tions, in a given kind of reactor, would be. Different experimentally de-rived correlations between CIIF and these other features afford different
.: - degrees of assurance about the CIIFs they help predict. The choice of a j {j" q
/Ech'8dQt
%gg7;,f
. proper proportion for a given core must be made, therefore, in the face of uncertainty. The choice can, nonetheless, be made prudently, and the NRC generally imposes on its applicants and licensees the following l
, iW'f6MQgd%-dj. , statistical measure of prudence: For a given plant, with a gisen kind of
. q.Wg w . .9 y fuel, and a given set of operating conditions, the minimum ratio between CilF and AIIF - called the minimum departure from nucleate boiling
! ratio (DNBR) - must afford at least a 95% confidence lesel that there
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i e is a 95% probability that DNB will not be reached on the hottest rod in
,)
the core during either normal operation or certain abnormal occurrenc:s
~ other than LOCAs.: This statistical measure of the prudence in the
~. .
i}j choice of a minimum DNBR, a measure we shall often call the 95/95 condition, is set out by the NRC Staff in its Standard Review Plan c
' o 4
(SRP), NUREG-0800 at 4.4-2 to 4.4-3 Ouly 1981). The SRP is intended
- v. .. ,c
.x - [ f. k MN .'f
~ s 4. g largely for the guidance of the Staffin its exercise ofits licensiag duties,
-c'.
- o k
and therefore does not have the status in law of Title Ten of the Code of federal Regulations, which was the source of the regulation which guided our ruling on Contention (b). An applicant or a licensee need not con- ! form with the standards set out in the SRP, if the applicant or licensee can persuade the StatT that it is conforming to a better standard, or even one just as good. See id. at 4.4-8. Ilowever, no party to this proceeding has argued that there is any defect in the 95/95 standard. The license amendments at issue here impose a ditTwnt minimum d DNBR on each of the two kinds of fuelin Umts 3 and 4. The difference O between the two minimum DNBRs is a result of the differences between the ways the CHFs in the DNBRs were predicted. For the fuel which is Ml being phased out in Units 3 and 4, the LOPAR fuel, the minimum ac-ceptable DNBR is 1.3. Hsii AfGdavit at 2; Dzenis Affidavit,122. That 7 is, operating conditions in those units must be chosen so that the pre-dicted CHFs for the LOPAR fuel in those units is at least 30% greater than the corresponding AHFs for that fuel. The 30% reflects the uncer-3 tainty with which CilFs can be predicted for the LOPAR in those units. The prediction is accomplished using a correlation between CHF and operating conditions called the L-grid correlation, which Westinghouse established on the basis of an early set of experiments with coolant Gow-ing inside isolated heated tubes, and a later set of experiments with cool-
. ant flowing in the channels between rods in rod bundles. Tr.176-79.
N N !$ k h'k-ki h dj y y This L-grid correlation is used in analyses which model the operation of the reactor and yield predicted CHFs for vanous sets of operating condi.
- ID' OM % @'@' M 1 -t tions. These predicted CHFs vary enough from the CHFs measured in the experiments which established the L-grid correlation, that the pre-dicted CHFs for LOPAR fuel must be at least 30% higher tnan the
, AHFs for that fuel, in order to achieve a 95% conGdence that there is a
. .j 95% probability that DNB will not occur during either normal operation
~
or certain abnorma! occurrences other than LOCAs. Dzenis Affidavit at
~
8-9. 8That is. there rnust be only a 5% chance that the probabilny that DNB won't te reached is less than 95 %.
~
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.c..- : ._. m c . n.e n u.. t
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mge 3, .m F m.- A I i i For the fuel which is being phased into Units 3 and 4, the OFA fuel, n 7p. n . - J
- : m......'
the minimum acceptable DNBR the amendments in issue here are 4' & .:J,g-,.v,..m'.p
~fg g .,c h t imposmg is 1.17, less than the DNBR being imposed on operations with
. '5
, f.$$M gM.$pC/NE s
f:r /S i ' the LOPAR fuel. Hsii Affidavit at 2. If the predicted CHF of the OFA fuel in those units is always at least 17% greater than the AliF for that fuel, then the 95/95 standard is satisfied. The 17% reflects the greater ~ ,M.M_.N. NDd@"QWWW .if.%; n MET..N
+. .t
?-T
; assurance with which the CHFs of OFA fuel can be predicted. This great-
. _- -. ; ye.: .. .o;;.;-,d.
. s. . er assurance comes from the use of a correlation called the WRB 1, de-veloped by Westinghouse in an extensive program of experiments with the flow of cooling water through arrays of heated rods. The experiments more closely simulated the geometries and conditions of operating PWRs than did the experiments which established the L-grid correlation.
Dzenis AITidavit at 6-7. The WRB-1 is known to apply reliably to OFA fuel arrayed in either 17 x 17 or 14 x 14 geometries. The geometry of the cores in Units 3 and 4 is 15 x 15. Hsii Affidavit at 5. The SRP has y , . for some years expressed approval of both the DNBR of 1.3 for LOPAR ;
. 7' , 7
~ -
fuel and of lower DNBRs for OFA fuel where circumstances permitted. [ SRP at 4.4-3.
.. ? - V .(';;..D. 2 .
3M 2- The terminology of Contention (d), set out below, is drawn from the L
}
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wm. mw Uf' l 'en *
'J conventional terminology which deals with nucleate boiling: :
s ( The proposed decrease in the departure in the nucleate boihng ratio (DNBR) would significantly and adversely affect the margin of safety for the operation of the l reactors. The restriction of the DNBR safety limit is intended to present oserhe.iting of the fuel and possibic cladding perforation, which would result in the release oflis-sion products from the fuel. If the mmimum allowable DNBR is reduced from 1.3 to 1.7 Isic: 1.17] as proposed, this would authortie operation of the fuel much - closer to the upper boundary of the nucleate boilms regime. Thus, the safety margm will be significantly reduced. Operation above the boundary of the nucleate boilmg ---g' regime could result in excessive cladding temperatures because of the departure M 3 ~ M,6; M( e sf, & j f h i *' g t-If 9?Lik3 M v eM from the nucleate boiling (DNB) and the resultant sharp reduction in heat transfer s p$ , *V coefficient.Thus, the proposed amendment will both sir.mficantly reduce the safety R$ e[. --
'U Y' margm and significantly increase the probability of serious consequences from an
-g %( % ' y - Q Q. f accident.
The particular focus of the contention appears to be on the mere fact
.. :.6,g y .W87"-}er r that the DNBR which the amendments apply to the new fuel in Units 3 e ;M and 4, the OFA fuel, is lower than the DNBR which has been applied to Jt.,.,Yi -
D '?p MW q. ..M.
' the older type of fuel, the LOP AR fuel.' We would not be denying sum-m mary disposition on the motion if the intervenors raised no issue other
$ . ,, f
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o 9 The wordirs of t'ie contention is imprecise erough to permit it to t;e ceristrued to be s.iyms that the ameridments apply the DNBR of 1.17 in all the fuelin t; nits 3 nd 4. ese, the lop AR fuel. sush is not d'e ,[ 'h' C'*
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i 1 1 l than the one of this mere difference between the two DNBRs, for, al- I though under the amendments, the differences between AHFs and CHFs for the OFA fuel may be proportionately less than the same dif-ferences for LOPAR fuel, these differences are not the true measures of the margins of safety between AHFs and CHFs. The true measures are probability measures: If a lower DNBR, and, consequently, proportion-I ately smaller ditTerences between AHFs and CHFs, do not lessen the
! probability that a CHF will not occur in normal operation and certain ab-normal occurrences, then the lower DNBR does not diminish the mar-gins of safety between the AHFs and the corresponding CHFs.
If this last statement seems counterintuitive, it may be because it is not unusual for a decrease in some measurable magnitude to entail a de-crease in safety. Usually, the closer one drives to the edge of a road, the more likely one is to go off the edge of the road. Howeser, the behavior of a prudent dnver depends on how clearly he can see the edge of the road. If the edge is shrouded in fog, the prudent driver will steer clear of where he thinks the edge might be, and the more in doubt he is about
! where the edge is, the more he is inclined to stay away from where he l thinks it might be. If, however, the fog clears some, the driver, by j moving closer to the edge of the now more visible road, does not in-crease his chances of going off the road.
j Similarly with CHFs in the operation of a reactor: The more doubt j there is about what the CHFs are, the greater will be the prudent mini-mum DNBR. But ifincreased precision in the models of the behavior of coolant flowing through bundles of heated tubes allows for increased accuracy in the predictions of CHFs, then the minimum DNBR can be lowered without decreasing the probability that DNB will be avoided. It is this stability in the measure of probability that the Licensee's affi-ant has in mind when he says that the lower DNBR applied to the OFA in Units 3 and 4 "in no way implies a reduction in the safety margin of a
%$M% - : nuclear reactor." Dzenis Affidavit,124. Here, by " safety margin," the
.-F v a Licensee's affiant means the 95/95 standard, which, according to the
.- 3 Licensee, is the standard applied to both kinds of fuel at Units 3 and 4.
i The Intervenors' affiant Dr. Edwards, while entertaining the possibili-ty that "the same margin of safety that was previously thought to exist
! can now be achieved at a higher operating temperature" (Edwards Af-fidavit,19(j)), nonetheless asserts that "it is undoubtedly true that run-ning at a hotter temperature materially increases the probability of DNB, and therefore reduces the safety margin of the nuclear reactor."
; (/d.; see also 119(i) and 10.) Paraphrased so as to remove the seeming self-contradiction from his remarks, and to bring into better focus the differences between his remarks and the Licensee's affiant's claim, what i
! 327
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, . , 3 Dr. Edwards says is that although a given probability measure of a e i..' margin of safety - in this case the 95/95 standard - may now be
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-i achievable at higher temperatures, the probability measure of the Jh.iw. ,c .4 .;j margin at those temperatures nonetheless is smaller than it would be at
. 2).Ch kM.f '). lower temperatures.
MfM$'$f%j['h'-[NQfQlgQ] t Dr. Edwards is, of course, right. If, for a given fuel, a DNBR of 1.17
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gives a 95% conGdence that there is a 95% probability that DNB will
- 77 t occur, then the imposition of the DNBR of 1.30 would no doubt increase
- either the measure of confidence, or the measure of probability, or both.
~
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! Dr. Edwards is, in elTect, asking for the imposition of a standard more i stringent than the 95/95 standard. Yet he has nowhere argued, nor have the Intervenors argued, that there is any defect in the 95/95 standard.
However incorrect the Intervenors may be in thinkir/, that it is impru-
; dent to permit a lower minimum DNBR for OFA fuc. than for LOPAR A fuel, facts reported in the Staft's response to the Licensee's motion X T f,j, . i
-" ] show that the Intervenors' principal allegation, namely, that there has
's f 1 6.J %'.- ? .O,' been a lowering of a DNBR to the point of trimming a safety margin,
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- 1.-; q n , raises a genuine issue concerning a material fact in the proceeding. Inter-
"-2-t,A W- M yg-y e e. p g venor Lorion's afGdavit claims, in particular, that two matters have not
$ J ff,5@-p[fqqdf e jf been adequately accounted for in setting a DNBR of 1.17 for the OFA
_ -wxe, . v fuel in Units 3 and 4: First, as we reported earlier, the experimental
, base for the WBR-1 correlation established that a DNBR of 1.17 for OFA fuel arrayed either in a 17 x 17 or a 14 x 14 geometry meets the 95/95 standard; however, the arrays in Units 3 and 4 are 15 x 15. Lorion AfGdavit at 8. Second, during the years of transition between fuel types, the difference between the hydraulic resistance of the LOPAR fuel and the hydraulic resistance of the OFA fuel, a difference which was taken
, , . . . ; into account in predicting peak cladding temperatures, the subject of Contention (b), must be taken into account, Intervenor Lorion says, in NMkh'hkrf~'!n d ., Yh'hEl 4d . determining a minimum DNBR. Id.
h K D . @ [.<.q> N h @Vf. %; g The Licensee's motion wholly ignores both of these matters. The
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eM Staff's afnant raises them brieGy, and one other, which we shall discuss shortly, but brushes them aside, though not before making it appear
, . ] that, in fact, the applying of a DNBR of 1.17 to the OFA fuelin Units 3
. EiM M Mif M i . _E- Q and 4 may well not satisfy the 95/95 standard.
On the ncxt to the last page of his afGdavit, the Staff's afGant reveals NQNN;7'pNS[4h.$!C/]
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w au %,1Em s . . ' .' '] that in its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on amendments 93 and 99, published December 23, 1983, the Staff relied on a DNBR of 1.34 for 'dhdy cg;Mhh5 m ,q , Mws M -y. @.- 1 - A the OFA . fuel in the cores in Umts 3 and 4, a Ggure which the Staff says is 12.7% higher than the 1.17 Ogure applicable to a full core of OFA in
^; an array either of 17 x 17 or 14 x 14. The StalTs affiant says that the i
- f. f 12.7% allowed room for several uncertainties, only the smallest of which
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e he notes in his afGdavit, namely, a 2% uncertainty about the applicability of the WRB-1 correlation to OFA fuel arrayed in a 15 x 15 geometry.
. Hsii Affidavit at 5. The two larger uncertainties reported in the SER are associated with the difTerence between the hydraulic resistances of the
- two kinds of fuel (SER on Amendments at 4), and with the bending of l
. '] the fuel rods during operation (id.), a phenomenon caused by, among 7: other things, lengthwise expansion of the heated rods while they are an-
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. / .-
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- chored at their ends. This bowing can constrict the flow channels be-
! tween the rods and thus can affect how efliciently heat is transferred from thc rods to the coolantM The SER lists the uncertainty associated with the difference in hydraulic resistance as 3%, and the uncertainty as-sociated with rod bowing as 5.5%. Id. That is, we take it, the DNBR of 1.34 which the Staff applied in its SER could have been 2% lower but for the 15 x 15 array,3% lower but for the mix in the core, and 5.5% tower
, but for rod bowing.
, The implication of the SER*s discussion of DNBRs is that since a DNBR of 1.34 allows 12.7% for these three uncertainties, a DNBR of 1.17 does not. The question naturally arises then whether, if a DNBR of j 1.17 does not take these three uncertainties into account, it does not amount, in fact, to a reduction in the safety margin the Standard Review Plan would ordinarily impose, that is, whether, under the amendments'
{
, imposition of a DNBR of 1.17 there can no longer be a 95% confidence that there is a 95% probability that DNB will not occur during certain specified operating conditions. The last sentence of 18 of the Staffs af-Gdavit seems to say that there is no longer that conGdence: After reporting that the 12.7% difference between the SER's DNBR of 1.34 and the more generally applicable DNBR of 1.17 compensated for the
} uncertainties identified in the SER, the Staffs affiant says, "[tlherefore,
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.r . the DNBR limit of 1.17 for WRB-1 as applied to the Turkey Point 15 x 15 OFA does not result in significant reduction in safety margin." How-
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ever, he explains neither his "therefore" nor his judgment that the re-
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The Licensee sheds no light on whether the application of a DNBR of 1.17 to the OFA fuel in Units 3 and 4 in fact means that the 95/95 stand-
. ,, 7 ,-y, ard is not being met. As we said, the Licensee's pleadings on the motion
' T. c - - , ^ ^ '
- do not even mention either the 1.34 DNBR used by the Staffin its SER t
on the amendments, or any of the three uncertainties for which the 1.34 was compensation. During the prehearing conference on March 26 7.,' 1985, the Licensee did discuss the two uncertainties which Intervenor 4 l Lorion raised in her affidavit. The Licensee did argue that the application i l ^ N intervenor Lonon does not mention this last uncertainty.
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l of the 1.17 DNBR to the Turkey Point arrays of 15 x 15 was justified
.i (Tr.180-81), but the Licensee did not say whether, or how, the 2% un-16 .- # [ ; i;; 14 ,
2 certainty the StafT assigns to such application was accounted for in the
'"~, . . . DNBR of 1.17. During the prehearing conference, the Licensee did
. ' , ... . "; ,;.v , q c.( .y report the 3% unce.-tainty associated with the difference between the hy-
'i
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. draulis resistances of the two kinds of fuel, but simply asserted, without m:i : explanation, that the 3% penalty "does not cause any of the fuel to go
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' -U below its appropriate safety limit as de6ned previously," by which, we
- take it, the Licensee meant that even when the 3% penalty is taken into account, the application of the 1.17 DNBR to the OFA fuel in Units 3 and 4 still meets the 95/95 standard. Tr.189. The Staff would appear not to agree.
' Under this contention three genuine issues as to material facts remain for litigation:
- l. Whether the DNBR of 1.17 which the amendments impose on
;.' , the OFA fuelin Units 3 and 4 compensates for the three uncer-
'w tainties outlined by the Staff in its December 23,1983 SER on the amendments, at 4.
- 2. Whether, if the DNBR of 1.17 does not compensate for those J; b,_
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._ . , , . . . uncertainties, the SRP's 95/95 standard, or a comparable one,
' M@$N. 7 . T.Y2 is somehow satisfied.
- w 3. Whether, if that standard is not being satisGed, the reduction in the margin of safety has been significant.
The Licensee has the burden of showing in hearing either that the ap-plication of a DNBR of 1.17 to the OFA fuel m Units 3 and 4 satisfies the 95/95 standard, or that if such application does not, the reduction in the margin of safety is not signiGcant. Accordingly, Licensee's motion for summary disposition of Interve-
.. .,,.,,a nors' Contention (d) is denied.
- y;T.G@pg%G .
..n. ..-
.. ORDER For all the foregoing reasons and upon consideration of the entire record in this matter, it is, this 16th day of August 1985,
. . .\ ;' s
~.. ORDERED a._
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- 1. That the Licensee's motion to strike the ir.terwriors' response and af6 davits in opposition to the Licensce's motions for summuy dis-1 e t , . ,. . e position, and the Intervenors' motion to strike the Licensee's motion to
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. i~ strike, are denied; 4 2. That the Licensee's motion for summary disposition of Interve-nors' Contention (b) is granted, and the intervenors' related motion to
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suspend or revoke the license amendments for Units 3 and 4 is denied; and
~ -
- 3. That the Licensee's motion for summary disposition of Interve-nors' Contention (d) is denied.
s . APPEALABILITY 4 A denial of a motion for summary disposition is interlocutory and i therefore cannot be appealed. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-220,8 AEC 93,94 (1974). Since this Order dismissed some, but not all, of the Intervenors' contentions, l the interveners are still parties to this proceeding; therefore, the dismis-sat of Contention (b) is interlocutory, and any appeal the Intervenors may wish to ake from that dismissal must await the issuance of an initial decision. See Cleveland Electric ///uminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2), ALAB-736,18 NRC 165,166 (1983). THE ATON11C SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Robert 51. Lazo, Chairman ADN11NISTR ATIVE JUDGE I Emmeth A. Luebke ADN!!NISTR ATIVE JUDGE _ ~:.4l N-k'9 $ ;;L-er,i :R E /di,Cf ,
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Richard F. Cole
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- AD511NISTR ATIVE JUDGE Dated August i6,1985,
. -a: '~~~.,. Bethesda, N1aryland.
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. . pp,
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Cite as 22 NRC 332 (1985) LBP 85-30
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
.^ - -
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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. " ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD l 'Z.'r';l J:':'-' :-J. n
. y&'g :;-).NM&!*"g
. ~;.;,2 h* 'R h;f:- '. .e Before Administrative Judges:
- ./ j Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Sheldon J. Wolfe Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
. ,,. .j. . ,
i' In the Matter of
- Docket No. 50 289 SP
- ;j (ASLBP No. 79-429-09 SP) j',i-[.{.,[w . ' J l d
,,2 .
(Rostart Romand on
- s ;j Management)
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. ~ ~' ' ' ' q} METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, et al.
(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1) August 19,1985 i t in this Partial Initial Decision, the Licensing Board resolves the re-
.: ;> .cs. g-$47% sa g ..-; g N . _ . .T.r . . ;-manded d "Dieckamp mailgram issue" in favor of the Licensee.
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' ~ '
APPEARANCES i
, On behalf of the Metropolitan Edison Company, Licensee: Ernest L.
i,.y- ._ _ .. ,. ,-.j Blake, Jr., Esq., and David R. Lewis, Esq.
,,- ; ,,. 3 .. .
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i On behalf of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Jack
- u. ... sv ;'
c.; nj R. Goldberg, Esq., and Lois R. l'inkelstein, Esq.
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~
' - ""E . ~.} On behalf of Three Mile Island Alert, Intervenor: Lynne Bernabei, Esq., and Joanne Doroshow, Esq.
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On behalf of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Thomas Y. Au, Esq.
. ., j
+ TABLE OF CONTENTS
_v.g -- .
.. , < Page i I. INTRODUCTION . . .. ......... .. .... 335
- II.
SUMMARY
AND COMMENTS .. . .. .. 338 'l l 111. ON WilAT INFORMATION WAS Tile MAILGRAM a ' BASED . .... . . . . . . . . 343 A. Licensee's Case on Dieckamp's Knowledge 343 f 1. Introduction .. . . . 343
- 2. The Task Force Investigation . .. 345 Mr. Lowe's Discovery of the Significance
+ of the Pressure Spike ... ... .. . 347 i
Mr. Dieckamp's Awareness of Core
. Da mage . . . . . . . . . . . .. ........ 348
~ B. TMIA's Case on Dieckamp's Knowledge . .s.. 350
! 1. Introduction . . . ... ..... ...... . 350 l
- 2. Mr. Lowe's Discovery . ..... ... . 350
- 3. Mr. Dieckamp's Information from Miller and lierbein . . . .. 354
- 4. Mr. Dieckamp's Information from Keaten . 355
- 5. Mr. Dieckamp's Understanding of Core Damage . . .... .... . . .. ... . 358 i
' IV. WFIETIIER ANYONE ON MARCH 28, 1979, Mi , a INTERPRETED TIIE PRESSURE SPIKE AND M;?.-[.
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-. ; _ ~w ^ .;
A. Introduction ... ... . .. .. .... . 360 B. Joseph J. Chwastyk . . . . .. .. . ... 361
~
; Before the Pressure Spike .. .. . . 362 The Pressure Spike . . 363
~
J_ '.T. .ui-s ',j Identification of liydrogen and Core
~ ~ ~ ~ U.~ i " ~,
1 Damage . .. . . .. ....... .. 365
. .y May 21.1979 Interview .. ........ . 365 u .- '*-
October 11,1979 Interview . ..... .. 366 October 30, 1979 Interview . . . . .. .. 367 i September 4.1980 Interview . . . 368 i
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; Page J IV.B. Joseph J. Chwastyk (Continued)
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... ,r. Testimony at the Hearing . ... .. .. 368
... f- j;2 g.gt;j ;- -
Report to Gary hiiller . . . ... .. . . .. 369
.4,'fy O$$: MA, $.; 2 Chwastyk's Communication with Others . . 371 T-icM-f.w; Wy.9% D raw a Bu b ble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
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yrm g%-wpf,;s i Chwastyk Prevents Sparks . . . ............ Board Conclusions on Afr. Chwastyk,s 374
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Testimony . .. .. . ...... . 376 C. Brian hiehler . .... ... .. . . 378 f Electrical Equipment .. . . 379 Conclusions on hit. Siehler's Testimony . .. 383 D. Theodore !!!jes .. .. ... . .. 384 E. Gary P. h! iller . . .. .. 388
. .c Board Conclusions on Str. h! iller .. . 394
~; W .' ..y : t ,. F. John G. Herbein . .. . . . ... ... 395
'. , e, J .:", .
; , -czeb ~
G. Knowledge of Other Individuals . .. . .. . 396
. . , FJ " . ~ , c..;. J H. Questionnaire Responses ... ..... ... .... 400 '#;.M,J f L;.y@@ G ; :.T M.j@@, I. Knowledge of GPU Service Corporation (GPUSC)
W.t y,.(.0 Engineers . . . . . .... . . .... . . . ... 402 e35.
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V. WHETHER, IN THE NRC STAFF'S VIEW,
.'" hlR. DIECKAh1P BELIEVED THE STATEh1ENTS IN THE SIAILGRAh! WERE TRUE . .. . . . . . 404 t
VI. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . ... . .. . 407 VII. APPE A LS , . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .... 409 APPENDIX A. List of Witnesses and Testimony (not
, . ...:. .,.. -_ ;:n, ~ _;,g 2. g, '
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publ;shed) T.. M.... D 1 ?.E M 6. g@ s s D. n., g g ]% =' Ey. ; .. epngAWfp'ke't"fW APPENDIX B. List of Exhibits (not published)
. ~ ..- ,. . ,
APPENDIX C. Principal Participants in Activity Related to the Dieckamp hiailgram Issue (not published)
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SUPPLEhiENTAL APPENDIX C (not published)
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PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON TIIE RE31ANDED ISSUE OF TIIE DIECKA31P AIAILGRAal
,,' l. INTRODUCTION
.n
' ' .-~
- 'i - This Partial Initial Decision disposes of the so-called "Dieckamp mail-gram issue," a matter remanded by the Appeal Board to the Licensing Board for further proceedings in ALAB-772,19 NRC 1l93 (1984). The :
remanding order pertained to the Licensing Board's respt etive partial ini-tial decision dated August 27,1981. LBP-81-32,14 NRC 381,555-56. On N1 arch 28,1979, the day of the accident at Three !. file Island Unit
- 2. at 1:50 p.m. (approximately 10 hours after the initiation of the acci-dent), there occurred a detonation of hydrogen in the TN11-2 contain-ment building. It was later determined that the hydroger. had been pro-duced by an interaction of zirconium alloy fuel cladding with steam in the reactor core, a phenomenon resulting from core temperatures greater than 2000*F. The core had necessarily been severely damaged by that time.
The hydrogen combustion produced a containment pressure " spike" or excursion recorded to be from about 3 to 28 psig, followed by an im-mediate decrease in pressure to 4 psig. The spike was recorded on both channels of the containment building pressure recorder strip chart which showed a sharp " spike" at the time. The pressure spike started the con-tainment building spray pumps. Each pump required for starting that l two out of three pressure sensors detect pressures of about 30 psig.
' Simultaneously a sound was heard described by some as a " thud" or a "whoomp," which was later determined to be water hammer in the con-
' - . + -
f A.A! ":-s;.a . , tainment spray system. The containment isolated on an engineered
~
'l J^j,[O'.Qy[ safety feature. Some alarms actuated. A few minutes after the pressure
/_
spike, the spray pumps were secured and the operators directed their at-j
- tention to other matters. The hydrogen detonation was not reported by the Licensee until Starch 30. This is a matter of significance, because an
- earlier appreciatien that the core was severely damaged would have been
- important to emergency actions in the vicinity of Three Stile Island.
On Niay 7,1979, Congressman N! orris K. Udall, Chairman of the Sub-
! rommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, other Congressmen, and NRC Commission-l er Victor Gilinsky toured Three N1ile Island. Str. James Floyd, then TN11-2 supervisor of operations, conducted the tour. Mr. Herman Dieck-l amp, then and now President and Chief Operating Officer of General l
1 . . 335 l I
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i Public Utihties Corporation, participated in the tour hir. Floyd men-tioned the pressure spike and initiation of containment building spray. gi ], . - ' - . y_, f - f lie identified the containment building pressure recorder and discussed
- ,jc -: m
,og / tbc conclusion that the pressure spike was not a spurious electrical
.4-
. m J.a c m. % .a. W ,b . signal because spray initiation required coincidence of at least two pres-
, N.I j,f l sure indicators. hir. Floyd also stated that the pressure spike was in full I M f M C4 % ;[2 [.f '{ M k % j$$%Q view of an NRC inspector.
p The tour was reported in the New York Times on the next day, Niay 8, NTW.QRd5 1
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1979. The article was entitled " Lag in Reporting Reactor Damage Laid to Experts" and stated in its lead sentence: 1 A techmeian from Three Mile Island nuclear plant told Congressmen today that con-l trol room personnel and Federal inspectors knew the plant's fuel core was seriously damaged two dan before the damage was formally reported and the seriousness of
, , the accident made public.
1
~
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- ^: < . , - ; The pressure spike was cited as the basis for this statement.
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hir. Dieckamp later explained that he was disturbed by the article be-a :- 3; fM;Jr cause he believed that there was an actual delayed recognition of the
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pressure spike significance and of the severity of core damage that had f occurred during the accident. On hiay 9 he sent a mailgram to Congress- [.E ' lMih, xx-y >-
. nkk w. 9 man Udall with a copy to Commissioner Gilinsky and other NRC Com-missioners. The mailgram stated in pertinent part:
There is no esidence that anyone interpreted the " pressure spike" and the spray ini-l tiaton m terms of reactor core damage at the time of the spike nor that anyone with. held any information. i
! In Starch 1980 NRC Chairman John Ahearne directed the Office of Inspection and Enforcement to conduct an investigation into suspected O-; .: - +
- infermation-flow deficiencies during the accident. Included was the
- 1. .
h,475{%y@ reportability of the pressure spike. The result of that investigation was
~ W%-d r ,(;Y published in NUREG-0760 (January 1981). NUREG-0760 reported that
't.-' ~# ' ' Shift Supervisor Joseph Chwastyk had stated that he was aware on 51 arch 28 that the pressure spike was real, that it was caused by hydro-t gen, generated by a zirconium / water reaction in the hot core, and that
~~
he had reported that information on Starch 28 to the Tht! Station
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hianager and Emergency Director, Gary h1 iller. NUREG-0760 also reported that another sh;ft supervisor. Brian i _. _
- Niehler, had stated that hydrogen was discussed on Alarch 28. This was
~'
i in the context that electrical equipment should not be operated in the . . .a.$.'.'.MM - ^;" ~* W!{ . containment in order to prevent ignition. Theodore Illjes, a control
, room operator, made a similar statement, also reported in NUREG-0760. These statements by Messrs. Chwastyk, .\lehler, and IHjes, were
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i , largely discounted in NUREG-0760. But, esen if the statements were i , not accurate, they could impugn Nir. Dieckamp's mailgram statement I .
. , . - E c _]
that no such evidence existed. 3 Then, turning their attention to Str. Dieckamp's mailgram, the Staff { , ,
. investigators concluded that it did not constitute a false material state-
.' ' . e ' , ' _ ~. ~ . . f_. '? -4 ment because it was not a statement required to be made under the
! < . _ f '.'. ' Atomic Energy Act.
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-( 2 The Licensing Board was then conducting hearings on Licensee's
. '. management, including integrity aspects, and, on hfarch 18,1981, hir.
, Norman C. 51oseley, the lead investigator in the information-flow inqui-
) , ry, appeared as a StafT witness. We could not accept the Staff's simple
, test for " false material statement" under the statute, because our inquiry d
was a broader one into the integrity of Licentee's management. No party pursued the matter, however, and after brief questioning of Slr. Aloseley, we allowed the matter to rest on NUREG-040 and on Str. 51oseley's stated conclusion that Afr. Dieckamp had believed the mail-j gram to be true when sent. l The issue was appealed and the Appeal Board remanded the matter to 1 j the Licensing Board for further proceedings. The Appeal Board ex-plained that our reliance upon NUREG-0760 and Str. 51oseley's testimo.
; . ny was misplaced. We erred primarily because that report was too sum- ; mary; because our questioning of Str. Nioseley on the point was insuffi-ciently penetrating; because there was then no firm record evidence that N!r. Dieckamp was ever interviewed on the matter; and because we j should have examined Str. Dieckamp on our own. ALAB-772,19 NRC l . at 1266-67.
i l The Appeal Board defined the issues on remand as follows: (1)
, whether anyone interpreted the pressure spike and containment spray,
) at the time, in terms of core damage, and (2) who or what was the i source of the information that Mr. Dieckamp conveyed in the mailgram.
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- W T g4", h l W ; h 6 The Appeal Board also defined the first issue as "was there evidence
-ys, . -i BWg?;p,t;;.q;,y l that anyone interpreted the pressure spike in terms of core damage at j
~
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l the time of the spike, and was such information withheld." The Appeal Board :haractcrized tha secre of this inquiry as "relatively limited." ALAB-772,19 NRC at 1267 n.103,1268. 1
, _ j The Licensing Board added a third facet: whether, when, and how l
- fj any such interpretation was commuriccted to Ntr. Diecksmp. The Board i ! also accepted as subissues: (1) vhether Str. Dieckamp took steps to
... , , correct any misstatament upon ;eatn;ng the facts; (2) did Str. Dieckamp
- - ,l expect the mailgram to be relied upon end to be important to the regula-I tory process; and (3) should hir. Dieckamp have known the facts and ll
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, did he make any effort to discover them. Memo:andum and Order Fol- l
, lowing Prehearing Conference (July 9,1984) (unpublished), at 8. liow.
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- E ever, the Board ruled that corporate agency and imputed scienter were M :. , . not issues in this proceeding. Rather, the key subissue is whether
, 1 7 O k l.q. . W ? # , anyone actually interpreted the pressure spike and spray initiation in p$$PR if. r,$W.JJ. ~ terms of core damage, not whether anyone shouhl have made that MfISMO, determination. With respect to whether Mr. Dieckamp should have
? '@d.%, y q, .
7 ;pg?f -d $ MO[j}$A h h known the facts, the Board ruled that the appropriate standard was whether he acted with careless disregard for the accuracy of the mail-gram. Memorandum and Order Ruling an First GPU-TMIA Discovery Dispute (August 13,1984) (unpublished), at 3-4. In addition to the Licensee and NRC Staff, Intervenor Three Mile Island Alert (TMIA) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Com-
, monwealth) participated in the remanded proceeding. The Common-wealth, however, elected not to file post-hearing proposals. There was
. j : [ -: extensive prehearing discovery.
,~ ~
J ~ m , Twenty-four witnesses testified at the hearing.' The parties also stipu-i .E , lated into evidence 144 prior interviews, depositions, and reports; and idM@SJ ffh,M, yC i . , portions of a number of the TMIA depositions were admitted in lieu of live testimony.2
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II.
SUMMARY
AND COMMENTS Mr. Dieckamp came to the hearing to avow that he believed that the mail! ..am was true. We believe him. It was not until March 30,1979,2 days after the accident, that he learned about core temperature readings exceeding 2000*F, the zirconium / water reaction, the combustion of
~
hydrogen, and core damage beyond local failed fuel. In fact, the evidence establishes that Mr. Dieckamp did not even know about the pressure [^[WRP-,hgyph[.gTak dh*M'gcM'#.U-MMyk 'jd[h Jpyspike until March 30. The real question was whether, in the following
- and before his mailgram, he learned that others may have 5 'L $.$,;.-CrI weeks a
possessed that information on March 28. The issue of whether Mr. Dieckamp may have acted with carelt.ss disregard for the facts in sending the mailgram evaporated early in the hearing, because, beginning on 1 s[g. . . 1 Appendia A (not pubhshed) is a hst of entnesses and trans6npt cita' ions to it'eir teat.meny, as u< ell as a hst of documentary matenal bound mto the transcnpts. J "g- ,- p ;.r " 2 Appendit B (not pubhshed) is a hst of enhibus ofrered or received m this proceedmg. The 144 pnor , micrviews depositions, and reports which were stipulated into evidence were marked as 144 nems in m- Part C of Jomt Exhibit 1. However, for simphcity we have cited the items m Part C of Exhibit I as 3 .j pnme es5ibit numbers; e g., the Joint Exhibit marked as UcH35) is cited as "Jomi Eih. 35 " Appendia a C I.m the pc:nc; pal participants in the actmt cs related to the madgram issue and bnetly descnhes the I role of each.
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Starch 31, he worked at Three Stile Island and was deeply involsed in the recovery elTorts.
.; Central to Licensee's case was its explanation of how GPU manage-ment, and Str. Dieckamp, became aware of the signiGcance of the pres-sure spike and containment spray actuation. Several individuals in the control room were aware of the pressure spike tracing and even more heard the noise. Stost thought that the spike was an electrical anomaly if
;,1 they had any perception at all. Two, however, Niessrs. Chwastyk and Niehler, appreciated the fact that the spike was real because of the simul-taneous initiation of containment sprays. The spike did not seem to
, have any lasting effect upon plant status at the time, and there were i other matters to attend to. The incident seemed to pass from the opera-tors' thoughts. But later, on evening of Starch 29 Richard Bensel, TNII-2 lead electrical engineer, and Ivan Porter. TNti-2 lead instrumen-tation engineer, and perhaps others, began to collect photocopies of plant parameter strip charts to begin the accident analysis. Nlr. Bensel noted the pressure spike tracing, learned that the containment spray had actuated, and he too then realized that the spike was real. In the mean-time Str. William Lowe, a highly respected nuclear engineer, and Chair-man of the engineering firm of Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, was working with the recovery planning group of the GPU Accident Events Analysis and Recovery Planning Team. Str. Bensel brought his information to Mr. Lowe.
Nir. Lowe's extensive background in nuclear engineering and chemis-
; try enabled him to recognize that the spike might have been the result of a hydrogen ignition, in part, from the shape of the tracing. Other fac-
! tors, subatmospheric containment pressure, for example, reinforced his j analysis. He suspected immediately that there had been a zirconium /wa-ter reaction. Subsequent calculations that night confirmed his analysis.
N'.i.hhE!dbhf2@.f y 51r. Dieckamp learned about Nir. Lowe's discovery the following day,
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, .,.n - jz March 30.
The Board found Mr. Lowe's testimony to be especially convincing - I [ , in part because of his demeanor, but more importantly, because of the inherent logic of his account. He had not been at the island on the 28th but had been in consultation since the early hours of that day. He arrived
- . 4 there in the early afternoon of the 29th. He had extensive communica-2 tions with other members of the analysis and recovery task force and plant personnel. He believes that he was the first to identify the pressure i spike as a hydrogen burn. He belier. as we do, that it is inconceivable that that information could have been concealed earlier.
But Joseph Chwastyk, TMI-2 Shift Supervisor, actually saw the pres-sure chart tracings rise and fall. He knew that the sprays had actuated i
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and he shared with Brian Niehler an early understanding that the pres-
, , -. sure spike was real - not an electrical anomaly. In October 1979 Str.
, .-; ,g-M: ;p.,
3 s Chwastyk told the Special Inquiry Group that he knew on N! arch 28 that
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;; there had been a hydrogen explosion. In September 1980 he told the d.' Mffdh Q. W .
U* , j special NRC team investigating information flow that, not only did he d i D[N#gh 0 4 2 p S f g Q @n i d h h !, know on the 28th that there had been a hydrogen explosion, but that he knew on the 28th that there had bcen core damage and heat sufficient to hWWj; ' produce a zirconium / water reaction. He said that he promptly reported M ww b uQ-2 [9
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' g ,$. _ - this information to the Station hianager and Emergency Director, Gary
, , Stiller, and imparted it to others that day.
The Board listened to hir. Chwastyk over 2 days. We have read every relevant statement reported on his memory of Starch 28,1979. Str. Chwastyk simply is not to be believed on this subject. Ilis memory became increasingly accurate over time, but then faltered at the hearmg. [ There was no corroboration of his statements that he told others about
.J
! hydrogen and zirconium / water reaction. His actions were not consistent
_1 - $19 l with his asserted awareness of severe core failure. He had sharply varying accounts of his understanding of hydrogen and his reporting ofit. In the 4h.MMf'd,$ yr+ j findings below we explain that these conclusions are not intended to dis-parage Str. Chwastyk's candor. IIe, more than any other witness to the
"@. [N[@$. )'{M. M5" ' J events of Nfarch 28, has been confused by after-acquired information.
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. He makes no allegations. He is, himself, concerned about his memory.
He feels that his statements have been overanalyzed and that his mean - ings have not been fully and accurately understood. Brian Afehler, on duty as a shift supervisor with Str. Chwastyk at the time of the spike, was interviewed in August and October 1979. lie stated with emphatic assuredness that an order was given on the evening of Afarch 28 not to start electrical equipment in order to avoid igniting 4m m. hydrogen. Subsequently, however, investigators pointed out to hir. I Ni _ :... . . e 6.a 3 hichler that his memory was at odds with log entries and the accounts of other participants. Mr. Mehler consulted the logs; compared his b Es' J A..S
~
TR. . ~,- reg :.iF c fjj memory with others, including Mr. Chwastyk; engaged in some intro-
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; spection; and came to the conclusion that it is more likely that the order l not to operate electrical equipment was given on the 29th. Ile later ex-plained that the days of the accident seemed to run together and that it
{- was hard to recall what he remembered, compared to what he was told [ [ _ ' T' ' $$M
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mj and what he read. Nir. Theodore Illjes, a control room operator, stated on Ntay 23,1979, [
~s cpw - l that, in the evening of %farch 28, a hydrogen explosion had been dis-i ,- ,
'" / n : cussed as a possible cause of the pressure spike. As with Mr. Chwastyk,
! we came to the conclusion that Mr. liljes' memory has been influenced l _ by information acquired after the 28th. The most significant example of [ .
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this was that Str. Illjes recalled a concern about a "hard noncondensible bubble in the reactor vessel head on N1 arch 28. It is beyond any dispute
-* ' that the existence of the noncondensible hydrogen bubble in the reactor vessel head did not become a matter of concern until Slessrs. Lowe,
-f Thomas Crimmins, and James N!oore calculated the volume of hydrogen
-1 in the reactor vessel very late on Starch 29 and in the early morning
. . - 1 1
- ' hours of Starch 30. Nir. Illjes also believed that the containment pressure
. Y- ? . N ~ i
' record tracings were photocopied on N1 arch 28, but the better evidence
, is that it was on the 29th that this was done. N1r. liljes' testimony at the hearing demonstrated that he had a very unreliable memory.
It is also significant that, of the three individuals who stated that, on N! arch 28, they were aware of hydrogen, only .\1r. N1ehler had been in-tersiewed before .\lr. Dieckamp sent his mailgram on Ntay 9,1979. In an April 25, 1979 interview, Str. Aleh!cr alluded to the pressure spike but made no reference to his later recollection that hydrogen ignition was a concern on N1 arch 28. Whateser the validity of the statements by
- Slessrs. Chwastyk, Alchler, and liljes, there is no reason to believe that Nir. Dieckamp had any evidence on Stay 9 that any of them knew about j hydrogen on Alarch 28.
q The Board has pored over the statements of seventeen others who were m the control room at one time or another on Starch 28th (includ-l
; ing two NRC inspectors) who, because of their duties, would probably hase been aware that the pressure spike was recognized as a hydrogen explosion if such were the case. About half of them did not even know on Ntarch 28 that a pressure spike had been identified on the strip chart.
The other half, those aware of the tracing on the 28th, were about
! evenly divided among those who thought it was an electrical anomaly, l and those who simply did not understand it.
, ._ ,z .,. .x . m. a As noted, the Board discounts entirely the statements of Alessrs.
M- " k- 4 h;h, .h d Chwastyk, Niehler, and liljes to the effect that a hydrogen detonation was identified on N1 arch 28. With that, the case against Nir. Dieckamp
*Q-M.QM becomes inconsequential. When considered with the additional fact that
] -
virtually no one else in the control room realized the spike was real, let alone a zirconium / water-hydrogen combustion, the case against Str.
- Dieckamp vanishes.
We are left, then, to ponder how it could have been that an event of 1' such significance was not appreciated at the time. In the first place, the pressure spike appeared on the pressure recorder at a time when operat-J { ing and analysis personnel had their hands full trying to understand the i conditions they were dealing with so that they could proceed with confi-dence to recover from the accident. The pressure trace rose and fell back almost to normal very quickly, with seemingly minimal consequences to 341 'D
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l indicate any substantive change to the puzzling situation being confront-
; ed. It seems to be a normal response for the persons concerned to have concentrated on the puzzle-solving task before them, particularly since there was little appreciation that the spike actually represented a true pressure transient.
In the second place, for the significance of such an event to have been
. q.- ._
appreciated would have required a somewhat complex conceptual analy-sis involving such questions as (a) what substance (gas or steam?) could be available to raise the pressure of so large a volume to the value seen from the trace; (b) what mechanism could account for the rapid return of the pressure to a near normal value; and (c) what mechanism could have provided the source of such a substance whose behavior would be consistent with observations at the time? The passage of time has seen
, answers to these questions evolve. But at the time, the persons involved I
could not cope with such questions. The operational personnel of TN11-2 were not schooled in the chemical and thermodynamic properties of
. zirconium in a high-temperature steam environment, or the exothermic and autocatalytic nature of reactions that might result therefrom. It was known that hydrogen could be one of the reaction products. The Final Safety Analysis Report for TN11-2 analyzed hydrogen production follow-ing a postulated loss-of-coolant accident in terms of months before the flammability range would be reached. Two very experienced operations persons, N!essrs. 51ichael Ross and William Zewe, on the day of the oc-
, currence did not see how such a large buildup of hydrogen in the con.
tainment building (approumately 2 million cubic foot volume) could occur so rapidly. N1r. N!oseley, who led the team that performed the information-flow investigation, testified: I conduded that on March 28. 1979, it was beyond the range of credible operator
-t
' T > .h ' dEhb*h knowledge to infer that amounts of hydrogen sufTicient to reach a Gammable con-
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centration in a two million cubic foot containment might exist at 10 hours after the
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, Initiation of the event.
, In addition to resolvir.- the mailgram issue on our own, it was also our duty to hear and decide the cases presented by the Commonwealth and the Intervenor TN11A. The Commonwealth had no position.
N .] TN11A's case against Nir. Dieckamp rests on two theories. First, there is a very large body of data consisting of interviews, testimony, investiga-tion reports and other records. From this pool of information, TN!!A would have us believe only the small and unreliable portion indicating an awareness on N! arch 28 of hydrogen. TN11A would have us disregard all evidence to the contrary. TN!!A's selection from Ntr. Chwastyk's
, varying accounts of the relevant events is a refinement of this strategy.
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7: ~a;..c:4, , ,, ~ . , ,. c. ~ Th!!A's other theory of the case is that there has been a criminal per-jury and subornation of-perjury scheme afoot in this proceeding. By our
, ; count TN11A, either directly or by strong implication, accuses fifteen of i the twenty four witnesses who testified before us oflying and invites an inference of perjury by even more witnesses. Th!IA accuses GPU law-
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. yers of pressuring company witnesses called by Th11A to lie, and sug-gests that the NRC Staffinvestigations have been deliberately restrained.
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'j $ ' ' - In our Decision below we have alluded to Th!IA's charges as disruptive,
" unfounded, and professionally reckless.
~~".i 5.
But ThilA's perjury theory is not merely reckless - it is logically
~
absurd. The theory would have to depend upon a massive conspiracy to i conceal a discovery on Starch 28th of the hydrogen detonation and its implications. Such a conspiracy would, of necessity, have been formed instantly among about twenty people present at the time, with either the acquiescence or the ignorance of NRC inspectors. The conspiracy would need to be expanded quickly to as many as a hundred individuals, per-haps even more. It would have to include, or be skillfully hidden from, the many engineers, scientists and the managers from other utilities
,{. ~' who came to Three Stile Island following the accident to aid in the acci-dent recovery and analysis. The conspiracy would have to escape the r .-f e g ~ ;.- r _- - penetrating investigations of the Senate, the House of Representatives,
;w -~ - - the Kemeny Commission, the Special Inquiry Group, the multiple NRC inquiries, and our own proceedings with its thorough discovery oppor-tunities. Finally, this conspiracy would have to be incredibly stable over 6 years.
In this remanded proceeding, and during the entire Th!I-l restart pro-ceeding, this Board has not seen any evidence of even the slightest relia-bility to suggest that htr. Dieckamp lied in his mailgram or evidence that in any way impugns his integrity.
- v. .~ . . . y f e. . ..g Findings of Fact 7 III. ON WHAT INFORNIATION WAS THE l
l hlAllGRAh! BASED 4
,' A. Licensee's Case on Diecksmp's Knowledge x ,
- 1. Introduction
- l. hir. Dieckamp came ta the hearing to explain what he meant by the mailgram and how he arrived at the conclusions stated in it. lie was
< supported in his testimony by those who were most intimately involved v ,--
343 I L f. _
l l in the recognition and interpretation of the pressure spike. Nir. Dieck-amp and those reporting to him, together with their records, were sub. ject to very penetrating and thorough prehearing discoscry authorized by the Board. The cross-examination of those individuals reDected that
?
discovery.
, 2. By way of background, Str. Dieckamp explained that in using the term " core damage" in the mailgram, he was referring to the kind of
~
,' ' - , ~' M significant damage that would be consistent with a major fraction of the l zirconium having reacted with water or steam. Tr. 28,345 (Dieckamp).
l liis frame of reference was the New York Times article, which he be-lieved suggested that knowledge of the meaning of the pressure spike in terms of core damage could have influenced the decision to evacuate the populace from around Three Ntite Island. For this reason, Str. Dieckamp was referring to the degree of core damage sufficient to base cast doubt on the ability to cool the core with confidence. Tr. 28,948 (Dieckamp).
- 3. Str. Dieckamp believed that, at the time he sent the mailgram, the pressure spike and its meaning were not understood on the day of the accident, and consistent with that belief, that no one made a con-scious decision to withhold information about the spike. Dieckamp, ff.
Tr. 28.316, at 18. The mailgram reDected Af r. Dieckamp's own under-j standing of the positive discovery and interpretation of the pressure
, spike - of the first recognition ofits meaning on the night of Starch 29.
Id. at 5, 9. Str. Dieckamp first became aware of core damage beyond local faded fuel when he was informed of the pressure spike, the pos-tulated mechanism of a hydrogen " explosion. ' and the reaction of arco-nium and water as the source of the hydrogen. This information came to Nir. Dieckamp sometime on Friday, Starch 30,1979.
- 4. Ilis chronology of the events leading to this awareness began with a coincidence in that, on Wednesday, Starch 28,1979, the day of
. c -%M < the accident, Str. Dieckamp had been in liarrisburg, Pennsylvania, at-pIMff%sN;x/!k.,Q.q. tending a Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission meeting unrelated to
~ " TO EQP.iM e. TNfl. Str. Dieckamp had spoken with Walter Creitz (then Slet Ed's Pres-ident, who was in i.eading, Pennsylvania) and with Robert Arnold (GPU Sersice Corp.'s Vice President of Generation, who was in Parsip-pany, New Jersey) on the morning of .\ larch 28. In the early afternoon
~ , of Niarch 28, he had a very brief conversation on the steps of the
_ Pennsylvania State Capitol with John flerbein (then Niet Ed Vice Presi-dent of Generation), Gary Stiller (then Thtl Station Stanager), and George Kunder (then Supervisor of Technical Support-TN11-2), who
, were on their way to brief the Lieutenant Governor. Later on Wednes-day evening after returning to his home in New Jersey where GPU's corporate olhces are located, Str. Dieckamp again spoke to Robert 344
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e .; g . l Arnold. On Thursday morning, Starch 29, he met brie 0y with Nir. Arnold in order to review and sign a memorandum establishing a " Task
. .l Force" to investigate and analyze what was then thought to have been a
'j severe plant transient. On Thursday afternoon, he attended a briefing f.p, ; . for a group of Congressmen at the TN11 visitor's center; and at this time,
-- . s u;gp. ; ~ he spoke with R. Vollmer of the NRC and with some members of the Task Force. On Thursday evening, Nir. Dieckamp again spoke to 51r.
$h ,f#EN 6s %h G.% d:hlWf,gj .u;',' Arnold. 51r. Dieckamp testified that at no time on Starch 28 or Starch
; 29 did anyone mention to him core temperatures in excess of 2000*F,
+
the pressure spike, zirconium / water reaction, hydrogen. or core damage beyond failed fuel. /d. at 5-9. No witness suggested otherwise. TN11 A, however, argues that Str. Dieckamp had all of this information earlier ia the accident.
; A 2. The Task Force Investigation t
~, -
l 5. On Thursday, N! arch 29, 1979, the Task Force - designated the
~
! " Events Analysis and Recovery Planning Team" - met at the TN11 site.
. .. Q;- _ d
' The team members met at about 3:30 p.m. in the TN11 supervisors' con-
+
ference room and were assigned to either an Events Analysis group or a _ N N.s.sQt$/4M
- ' Recovery Planning group. Ntr. William Lowe, founder and Board Chair.
M-
~
man of the consulting firm of Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, was one of the team members and was assigned to the Recovery Planning Group. Lowe, ff. Tr. 28,151, at 3-4. As will be seen below, it was Ntr. Lowe who first interpreted the pressure spike in terms of zirconium / water reaction and hydrogen combustion - a point very much in dispute in this pro-
> ceeding. Other team members present were Niessrs. Richard Wilson
- (the Chairman), Edward Wallace, Donald Reppert, Gary Broughton, George Kunder, James N1oore, Lee Rogers, Ron Williams, Thomas Crimmins, and Robert Long. With the exception of Nir. Rogers, who N.Ih*p,' dhNdNMjdh') was B&W's representative, all these individuals were engineers or
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; managers from GPU system companies. TN11A Exh.18, at 3.
8
- 6. The information available to those attending the Thursday after-noon Task Force meeting is an important issue in this proceeding.
TN11A generally argues that the full significance of the accident, partic-ularly the pressure spike and hydrogen combustion was understood and
." ^. '
discussed. The reactor building pressure recorder strip chart was availa-l ble to the Task Force and general knowledge of plant status and accident progression was excellent according to TN11 A. See } Ill.B, infra.
- 7. Str. Lowe had a recollection, imprecise as to time, that at some l ,
time on N! arch 29th the containment pressure spike was mentioned
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l I l l I his presence and said to be a spurious indication - a voltage anomaly in instrumentation. Mr. Lowe remembers being skeptical of the explana-
.pt_. . c ' " g. t tion. Mr. Lowe, however, did not see the strip chart during the afternoon meeting and does not recall anyone analyzing or exhibiting recognition
.- T .k-c.".C
- . , & of the significance of the containment pressure spike. Lowe, IT. Tr.
~ - f '{,.q.- [ p.X g g f 28,151, at 10; Tr. 28,177-78 (Lowe).
. ..t.. QW. pj 8. However, Mr. Thomas Crimmins (a GPU system engineer who
- N .-*[jsg@s- *-
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attended the meeting) has stated that he remembers seeing the pressure trace during the meeting, but he too states it was assessed to have been a spurious instrument problem. Mr. Crimmins remembers no mention of hydrogen. TMIA Exh. 32F. i
- 9. Mr. Kunder recalls a side discussion during or after the Thurs-d.ny afternoon meeting in which he was shown the strip chart or a repre-sentation of the strip chart. He thinks Gary Broughton showed the chart to him. Tr. 30,001 (Kunder). He believes that hydrogen, along with instrument malfunction, were offered as possible explanations - possi-bilities that needed to be examined. Mr. Kunder, however, remembers no discussion of the pressure spike during the main meeting. Tr. 30,005 y ,
(Kunder).3 Nor does he remember any discussion or concern about a zir-conium/ water reaction. Tr. 30,016-17, 30,074 (Kunder). Mr. Kunder "I does believe he mentioned long-term hydrogen generation at the meet-ing, but merely as a topic for subsequent' recovery planning and without discussion. Tr. 30,007-08 (Kunder). j 10. Mr. Gary Broughton, GPU Service Corp. manager, remembers i no discussion of the pressure spike or a hydrogen explosion at the meet-ing and no observation of the strip chart. Tr. 31,159 (Broughton). His recollection was corroborated by Mr. Richard Wilson. Tr. 31,530-31 (Wilson). Mr. Broughton does not remember that conversation concern-w.w.y m c . . m - - ing the pressure spike recalled by Mr. Kunder on March 29th. Mr. M-91MQQs ~ Broughton remembers in detail that he first learned that there had been l a hydrogen explosion on Friday morning, March 30. Tr. 31,166,31,198-pr W WM*lpgR .. . ' '}. : i
^
t; 201 (Broughton). Moreover, Mr. Broughton stated that when informed i- on Friday of the pressure spike, he at first did not understand that the
- . pressure spilce had not just occurred. Tr. 31,199.
j 11. In sum, it is unclear whether there was discussion of the spike
., f.ld '"'*?
or of hydrogen during the afternoon Task Force meeting on March 29. Hydrogen may have been mentioned and a record of the pressure spike i M may have been available. 1
- 4
~ . . .
1 4 3 Licensee pomts out that Mr. Kunder exhibried uncertamty m his recollection as to what was said l about the pressure spike, by whom, and when. ciung his May 23. 1979 IE mteruew. Jomt Esh. J7, at j 50 5t; ser also Joint Exh. 80. at 74 75.
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- 12. It is probable that Nir. Kunder's memory associatmg the pres-sure spike record with hydrogen is imprecise on that point. It is more
.- likely that hydrogen was discussed as one of the many aspects of the transient which should be explored. The subissue has grown out of pro-
- - . .. 4 ,- , 3- portion to its importance, because, even if the pressure spike had been s - - /w . , , g recognized as real, and, even if it had been attributed to hydrogen, those facts would not undercut the accuracy of the mailgram or the spirit of
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, "N the mailgram. The only relevance is one argued by ThilA, i.e., that the evidence that it was hir. Lowe who first identified the spike and hydro-gen later that day is incredible - a matter we address below in s !!!.B.
- 13. Later that evening (Starch 29) the Recovery Planning group reassembled and Str. Lowe told Str. Herbein that the basic problem was plant stabilization, not recovery, and that several senior people should be immediately assigned to the control room to help with stabilization and damage control. 51essrs. Lowe and Crimmins solunteered. They
~' '
sought information about plant status and were told that the primary
- system was still " mushy"; that is, it was hard to control pressurizer level. The operators thought there might still be a steam bubble outside the pressurizer, but none of the many temperature readings were high
~,.-
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enough for that. Lowe, IT. Tr. 28,151, at 5-6.
- 14. In the meantime in the evening of the 29th, hiet Ed engineers
_ d '"' C 1 iT+
'~ Richard Bensel, Ivan Porter, and others had begun to pull together and photocopy strip charts of various plant parameters during the accident in order to begin the event analysis. Str. Bensel recalled that he began to review these charts to familiarize himself with them. Upon reviewing l
the reactor building pressure chart, Str. Bensel found the 28-psig pres-sure spike. Joint Exh.107, at 54 (SIG Report).
- 15. 51r. Bensel showed the spike to a number of other individuals who were in the control room area and who were concerned with opera-
~ D,1(j.dg.Wh'F W/ M. M M tions. hir. Bensel learned that the spray system had come on at the same J7flgfifin- @Mdh" -
time. Looking at the alarm printer, he also discovered that all six pres-sure switches had activated. This led $1r. Bensel to conclude that there had actually been an increase in reactor building pressure. Id. N1r. Bensel then showed the pressure spike to Str. Lowe at about 11 p.m. on
- the 29th.
1
~
Mr. Lowe's Discovery of the Significance of the Pressure Spike
- 16. hir. Lowe's background in chemistry and nuclear power plant accident analyses led him to the intuitive judgment from the shape of the spike that it had been caused by the ignition of hydrogen in the con-tainment building and that the hydrogen had been generated by the in-
- . i -
3.. 347 1
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teraction of zirconium with steam in th: reactor sessel. Ile postulated that the presence of hydrogen in the reactor vessel could explain the in-ability to stabilize the plant, the " mushiness," and could offer a potential for hydrogen expansion in the core that might prevent maintaining
~
water coverage of the core. Str. Lowe concluded that it was urgent to _ ~2 j determine how much hydrogen was present and to eliminate it. Lowe, fT. .Tr. 28,151, at 4-10.
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- 17. At about i1:30 p.m. (on N1 arch 29,1985) hir. James N1oore, an experienced GPUSC engineer arrived. Niessrs. Stoore, Crimmins and Lowe set about calculating the volume of hydrogen in the primary system above the core and ultimately determined (at about 3:30 a.m. on N1 arch 30) that the hydrogen volume was approximately 1100 cubic feet at S75 psi absolute (psia). B&W supplied them with the information that the free solume within the reactor sessel above the outlet nozzles is 1129 cubic feet. This comparison, plus the fact that the one primary pump that was running was functioning normally, led to the conclusion that the core was covered, but generated the concern that further de-pressurization of the reactor vessel could uncover the core and prevent core cooling. /J. at 10-12.
- 18. Shortly before 4:00 a.m. (on Starch 30), Nir. Lowe attempted j to calculate the amount of zirconium that would have had to react with I steam in order to account for the burned hydrogen in the containment plus the then-existing amount of hydrogen in the reactor vessel above the core. This led him to conclude that a large part or perhaps all of the zirconium had reacted and hence the core was seriously damaged. After discussions with N1essrs. Crimmins and N!oore, Str. Lowe then recom-mended an approach toward removal of hydrogen from the reactor vessel while maintaining sufficient pressurization so as not to impede core cooling. Removal of the hydrogen from the reactor vessel was sub-4G.h sequently accomplished and confirmed, as was hir. Lowe's interpretation c ". .'s;fP:hh1,;M6@'ip.-ifib.j
.J., .~ pg ofits significance. Id. at 13-14.
- y. :.:x g . - .. 3 Mr. Dieckamp's A wareness of Core Damage
- 19. On Friday,51 arch 30, and continuing for the next several days,
, Str. Dieckamp gained an explicit understanding of this first recognition of the meaning of the pressure spike, the confirmation of hydrogen, and a rough quantification of the degree of core damage suggested by analysis of the zirconium / water reaction. 51r. Dieckamp recalls that his awareness i of core damage increased abruptly on Friday, h1 arch 30, when he was in-formed of the pressure spike. In telephone conversations with personnel at the site, most likely Robert Arnold, Nir. Dieckamp was told of the i 348
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! pressure spike recording being brought to the attention of the GPU Task
. .y fe,c c ,,.c ._
- Force during the night of hlarch 29. Dieckamp, ff. Tr. 28,316, at 9; Tr.
' ?'cg; M..@,1} *-Q ; -' . ,- ,s. Q. ' 28,348 (Dieckamp). Alr. Dieckamp also talked to hir. Lowe by tele-c . ., ..'. ' '. phone several times near midnight on Friday, Starch 30. Lowe, ff. Tr. a v . M g .. ' 3 .-. m%] ~ ;r y ..%.
. ;, 28,151, at 15; Joint Exh. 86, at 22-23.4 e r, r: ,,-;;M..Q. . ...4
'U
%.'.c . #y d, 20. hir. Dieckamp learned that the Task Force had postulated a zir-
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- c. W. conium/ water reaction as the source of the hydrogen and that the pres- .l
- e. ,
ence of hydrogen was recognized as being consistent with the abnormal pressure volume behavior in the primary system. The postulate caused
- ' e ~. the plant staff to take steps to take a containment building gas sample
., l
, and to take steps to permit operation of the hydrogen recombiner. l Dieckamp, IT. Tr. 28,316, at 5, 9-10.
- 21. Str. Dieckamp moved to the site on the afternoon of Saturday, Starch 31. He then became aware of the confirmation of hydrogen through analysis of the containment building gas sample, and thus the
, ( yf s u 7 : ., ;1. 01 e first quantitative indicator of the degree of core damage. /J. at 10.
- w. g' '
'E. . ,
- 22. During the first few weeks of April, hir. Dieckamp remained at
. p;[; ,.
the site. He availed himself of early GPU interviews of operators, sat in l'e'm .'Gl@ffE .MliM%)'* on preliminary reviews of the sequence of events, participated in status Wy.te&'ec. reviews with the onsite NRC Staff, coordinated the activities of the in-
~ M* M{ '. y@ $y ? K'.K y" @ O dustry Advisory Group, and generally participated in managing the re-sponse to the accident. /d. at 10-11; Van Witbeck, ff. Tr. 28,261, at 2-3; Zebroski, ff. Tr. 28,441, at 11-12.
I 23. During the third week in April, N1r. Dieckamp assembled tes-timony for presentation to the Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (Hart Commit-tee). Dieckamp, ff. Tr. 28,316, at i 1.
- 24. Alr. Dieckamp did not conduct or cause to be conducted any i&;h$
MSh@,g'".p .c
$ih
.9 additional inquiry into the facts beyond his own knowledge before send-ing the mailgram, nor does he remember consulting with anyone. He 3..
f-p&?$g. 4%'2% had neither heard nor seen any indication that on Starch 28 the pressure
~ { 4;O.k<
" '] '
spike had been properly diagnosed as the product of a zirconium / water reaction or that the pressure spike caused the plant staff to change or t adopt a strategy for bringing the plant to cold shutdown that recognized j
' [ ca .- .
e- c _ the presence of hydrogen or noncondensible gas. His examination of c - K m,- Jy, ;P, , " ,T.
#'- .. . .T. '{a
- operator interviews and his involvement in development of the sequence
/
of events revealed nothing to indicate that anyone had on the 28th
~
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~lq , .j 4 Mr. Dieckamp was also bnefed on Fnday by Robert Keaten, who had that mornmg obtamed from Gary Broughton a sequence of events and update on the current status or the reactor. The update con-
{ tained inrormation on the explouon in contamment and the bubble m the reactor. Joint Enh. 45. at 7; 4 Tr. 31.247-49 (Keatenn TMIA Exh.10. at 1012. Mr. Diechamp no longer remembers this bne(ing. Tr.
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28.646 (Dieckampl.
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, identified the meaning of the spike and taken actions in response. Id. at
- g. . -J'. ,
- s. . .i 12.
- 25. Mr. Dieckamp believes that had operators and plant manage-ment correctly interpreted the pressure spike, they would have immedi-
'h. 1.df(k , n [ 7, .
il ately turned on the high-pressure injection pumps and left them on. 4 A,'.Wff -- * .. ; , However, this action was not taken until around 5:30 p.m. - several hours after the pressure spike - at the direction of management that ' $,r g3y 2 6 ;; * ' '~ - l was unaware of the pressure spike and for reasons unrelated to the pres-sure spike. Tr. 28,901 (Dieckamp); Tr. 28,542-44 (Zebroski). See also Tr. 30,324-26 (Herbein) (referring to Joint Exh. 82, at 38-40); Joint j Exh. 63, at 7 (NSAC-1 (July 1979)). In addition, they should not have left the block valve open, as it was, for more than an hour after the pres-sure spike. Tr. 28,842 (Dieckamp). Finally, Mr. Dieckamp believes that had the pressure spike been understood, Gary Miller and Jack Herbein would not have left the plant to brief the Lieutenant Governor. Tr. 28,906 (Dieckamp). This belief was confirmed by Mr. Miller in this pro-ceeding. Tr. 30,239-42 (Miller).
. B. TMIA's Case on Dieckamp's Knowledge
- 1. Introduction
- 26. TMIA attacks Licensee's position on the basis for the mailgram on four grounds. See general & TMIA Proposed Finding 241. (1) TMIA j first argues that Dieckamp's belief that William Lowe was the first to in-terpret the pressure spike the night of March 29th/30th was not reasona-ble. (2) Second, TMIA argues that Dieckamp knew better because Her-bein and Miller briefed him on plant status on March 28th, including the fact that a hydrogen burn had occurred. (3) Third, TMIA contends 2..~i30g . g:r;q. u .
z .-T. _icp# ;. that Robert Keaten, on the basis of information obtained from Gary pme,4=g'g2r;ge.gp;}p.GS.Wfh Broughton at the site the morning of March 29th, briefed Dieckamp on
~ ~
plant status and informed Dieckamp at that time of the hydrogen burn. (4) Finally, TMIA argues that Dieckamp's understanding of the degree of core damage on the 28th or early on the 29th implied that he was
~
~'
- 7 4 .g y.,
aware of the hydrogen burn at that time.
- , WsT qa,- -
~
~
- 2. Mr. Lowe's Discovery
.7, n.'c[, f 7 ' '
- 27. TMIA asserts that Mr. Lowe's testimony contains many contra-
1' -
- dictions. Its first example of such derives from a comparison of Mr. I Lowe's testimony, regarding his being the first to understand the signifi-cance of the pressure spike, with the information contained in a memo x .;n - %.
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f;N " s ; ; j ? j.<? . . - 'L* -f 3" ? - . of December 4,1979, written by 31r. Lewis Battist of the NRC/TNil Spe-
,a
, ., .s- , ., -j cial Inquiry Group, Group #3. This memo states that durmg a telephone ccnversation (date not documented) with hit. Lowe, the latter stated t
..t E ;, . -
J that he did not know that he was the Grst to have understood the spike's
. q
~c -
, . - 1 J- signincance. TN11A Proposed Finding 287; Joint Exh.104. We Gnd no '
contradiction between hir. Lowe's telling hir. Battist that he did not N5 y .; know that he was the Grst such person and his testimony that he has no !
' f. ?.,' ' [.s y gQ evidence to indicate otherwise. As Licensee points out:
#-~~.'
Lowe was not present at TMl on March 28th and does not claim to know w hat people behesed on that day. He did testify, howeser, that he "behesed" he was the 6rst to recogmze its signi6eance. Tr. 23.154 55 (Lowe). See also Tr. 28.216-17 { (Lowet This testimony presents no centrad:ction. As he testt6ed. "I find #1 incon. cc,saNc that y annve irad kmmn inJrveen was rencer in amtammeer anJ haJ ie taeJ.
' tha souU have concealed that knomicJee from ;'eces or manJeers and that the ansae technicci supt' ort team wou!J not hase been toU of it." Los e. tl Tr. 28.lSl. at 14
- e. -
(Emphasis added.l Licensee Reply Finding 14. y ; ~>. 28. On Starch 28, 1979, Nir. Lowe documented by memo a tele-
.~_ -
E,c . phone conversation between himself and Nir. Jack Thorpe, at TN11, that c ' , ~ . } '. . took place at about 4:20 p.m. that day. The memo stated that hir. Thorpe told Nir. Lowe: " Plant thinks core is recovered, but proof not yet established." TNil A Exh.1. In his testimony, Nir. Lowe stated
; that: -He {Thorpel reported the plant thinks core cooling is recov-ered.' Lowe, ff. Tr. 28,151, at 3. TN11 A interprets this as a misleading contradiction indicating in reality that NIr. Lowe knew on N1 arch 28 that the core had earlier been uncovered and subsequently covered again.
l Thus, reasons TN11A, Nir. Lowe knew of the seriousness of the accident
. -- on that date. TNII A Proposed Findings 288,289.
. 4 O]
', 29. Upon being questioned about this, Nir. Lowe testified that the
(.1294Mj?)"$.MFFy[h$.~P@'
~ '
_ " T M. fMbi 5, . term " recovered" is commonly used to mean that core cooling has been
.- m , '
returned to some understandable state; and that it was much later when l he made the shocking discovery that the core may have been uncovered. Tr. 28,161,28,163 (Lowe). We fmd no basis in this situation to impugn Str. Lowe's credibility. TN11A is making too much of a play on the word
"~,-, , ' :' " recovered." Granting for sake of argument that both Niessrs. Thorpe
~, and Lowe had been thinking in terms of a core previously uncovered by i coolant, there is no evidence to negate the conclusion that it was not
~
. y' ' '7, . y until near midnight on Starch X and during the early morning hours on
" :s- ' _
. ~V N1 arch 30 that Nir. Lowe's analysis of the pressure spike trace led him to conclude that the core had been seriously damaged.
- 30. TN11A also opines that Nir. Lowe's testimony is incredible be-cause it appears that there were general discussions about the pressure 4.m , q. .o . , ' . ~ .. , ,.,
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spike and hydrogen buildup during the afternoon meeting of the Task i Force on Ntarch 29 well before Str. Lowe's analysis of their significance. i According to TN11A, Nir. Richard Wilson (GPU Service Corporation)
- j
.I opened the meeting by stating that the company had assumed there had been core
. damage in the range of $20 to $30 milhon. and that a one-year outage was anticipat-ed. Although differer.. mdividuals attending the meeting have difTering recollections
~
about the meeting, what is striking is that the pressure spike, hydrogen burn. or pro-duction of hydrogen to Rammabic hmits was discussed m some manner. TN!I A Proposed Findings 290,291.
- 31. However, N1r. Wilson's one page of prefiled testimony and his answers to many questions subsequent thereto indicate that he based his core damage concept solely upon his awareness of radiation and that that concept was of several or perhaps many failed fuel pins in the core. It was in that context that the dollar and downtime estimates were made and discussed with the Task Force. Wilson, ff. Tr. 31,504; Tr. 31,505-44, passim (Wilson); see also Licensee Reply Findings at 16,17. We find nothing to support ThilA's statement that the significance of the pressure spike, hydrogen burn, or production of hydrogen to flammable limits were recognized or discussed during the Thursday Task Force meeting.
- 32. TAllA refers to statements by h1r. J.D. Abramovici (GPU Serv-ice Corporation) that there was concern expressed about hydrogen build-ing up to a 4% concentration and a discussion of hooking up a hydrogen recombiner, both occurring during the afternoon Task Force meeting on N! arch 29. TN11A reasons that such a magnitude of hydrogen buildup in so short a time since accident initiation could only have derived from a
, zirconium / water reaction and, hence, at the subject meeting, there had nN-kMi[M N ~~ 7 7 3. W , y n 9 9 2 y f @,26 . g;.2.s . M to have been a recognition that a zirconium / water reaction had occurred.
ThfIA Proposed Findings 292-293. i Sc,or t]
- 33. However, hir. Abramovici stated that George Kunder raised
'~] '
the concern about hydrogen but that Abramovici did not recall a discus-sion of how the hydrogen originated. Nir. Abramovici thought that Afr.
. . 4 Kunder had the results of a containment atmosphere sample. TNIIA M/ ' .
2 ; L. f.. ? Exh. 32H, at 43-44. But such a sample was not taken until Afarch 31,
~
. ' N 'f , and showed 1.7% hydrogen. Lowe, ff. Tr. 28,151, at 13; see also Dieck-i amp, ff. Tr. 28,316, at 10. hir. Kunder testified that he did not have any
.L> -
knowledge of hydrogen concentration until the weekend following acci-
'- dent initiation; and that his concept of hydrogen formation was in terms
; ^ , g.~a '
j of a long-term effect rather than a short-term zirconium / water reaction. Tr. 30,011,30,016 (Kunder). Attempts to contact Atomic international
, , _l personnel to assist in setting up recombiners did not occur until Friday,
.. ~ . ns. . -2
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- I I
I March 30. Tr. 31,010-11, 30,018-19 (lienriet Thus, any discussion on
._ s . ;.
March 29 about setting up a hydrogen recombiner was not in reference
"];
- r. . g , ..
j"; n-i .G,i . to a zirconium / water reaction source of hydrogen.
. , . m. ~,. n:j 34. TMIA references two written comments by Nfr. Crimmins
~
g ; ;f a p..
,..,..n J'
- -] (from Jersey Central Power and Light) for the proposition that the con-
.c . tainment building pressure recorder spike was viewed and discussed at c.
' 3 ...'_'-
- . j Nwg,a. .g- wi .. o ,-.cf .
w g.i- , .-- w O.) the Task Force meeting on the afternoon of March 29, and that Lowe 7 ' ' '> ' should have immediately recognized its signincance. TMIA Proposed
. Findings 294-296. Our own review of Crimmins' comments reveals his saying that: "The assessment at that time was that it must have been a spurious instrt mentation problem " Mr. Crimmins did not recall any mention of hydrogen until late evening of the 29th or early morning of the 30th. TMI A Esh. 32F
- 35. Finally, making references to notes, depositions and testimony,
; TMIA states that information derived from Messrs. Abramovici,
~ . . Broughton, Kunder, and J.E. Henrie (Rockwell Hanford) supports TMI A's thesis that a hydrogen burn was discussed at the afternoon Task E Force meeting on March 29,1979, that spark-generating equipment was
-# n gym,w. j .
ordered not to be started because of the hydrogen concern, and that ef-g d . .j y a forts to set up and operate hydrogen recombiners were initiated because D6, of an awareness of a serious hydrogen problem. TMIA Proposed Find-ings 297-302. The Board has carefully reviewed the citations in TMIA's proposed Ondings and concludes that they do not support a finding that a consideration of the possible presence of hydrogen by any of the named individuals was in the contest of a large amount of hydrogen i deriving from the interaction of significant amounts of zirconium fuel cladding with water. This is consistent with Mr. Henrie's testimony that three successive inquiries (on March 28,29 and 30,1979) by Atomic In-
~
ternational to GPU regarding the need to set up the recombiners met b..dNh 3 with negative responses. Tr. 31,011 (Henrie). Thus, we cannot accept
* "& Wy;; W ! W@Q g g TMI It"sqW -@W
*~
, ; "cdh .,
, A's assertion that Mr. Lowe's testimony is not credible on that
,- 7 4 account.
- 36. Mr. Lowe's closing comments regarding this matter deserve special attention:
4 GO.hD-/Rdkh'hd N-- pv?q7 $Q"I@h&(.y M ".D( . ..
";-r.h M To recapitulate, no recognition of or even speculation about the sigmficance of
't .
the pressure spike was expressed or implied in all of the extensne and intensne
~~4' . . -
J communications I heard or was party to from early mormng of 28 March until the X; spike's sigmficance was recogmzed at about 2300 on 29 March as I have described.
-'. . dQMiyt?'7.j"g
,h M M Q @h f.?f% 3 4 J.v[Ij These communications were with both semor and junior engineers, operators and 4 ,fm. e. h ~c j managers, probably more than 50 in all. Nor did I hear about any such prior recogm.
. t tion from the hundreds of people I dealt with subsequently while on duty at TMl for nearly a month. Furthermore. the peor!e I know and dealt with would not hase 4 .' . . ,
j
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' k. _ L ,
.~.y. by
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. _ a .n- ,
s delit >crately concealed cKh knowledge .And I state that judgment with emphasis
..s and without qual;Deation.
Lowe, ff. Tr. 28,131, at 15. When asked during the hearing whether he presently knows that he was the first person to recognize the significance of the pressure spike, Afr. Lowe testined that "all the evidence I've got so indicates." Tr. 28,217 (Lowe).
~
- 3. Mr. Dieckamp's informationfroan Miller and Herbein I
- 37. As we noted at the outset, on Wednesday, Starch 28, N!r.
Dieckamp was in Harrisburg for a meeting with the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission unrelated to TN11-2. At about 2:30 p.m. on the steps of the Pennsylvania State Capitol, Nir. Dieckamp encountered Niessrs. j Hercein, N1 iller, and Kunder, who were on their way to a brienng of the Lieutenant Governor. Nir. Dieckamp had been excluded from that brief-ing session. Their conversation was very brief - Nir. Dieckamp ex-pre:: sed his concern about senior personnel being absent from the plant. 51r. Dieckamp testified that he could not recall any detailed discussion of plant parameters or conditions but that he gained the impression that the plant was stable. Dieckamp, ff. Tr. 28,316, at 5,7. Nir. Herbein only recalls in pertinent part that Nir. Dieckamp asked who was " minding the i store" at TN1I-2. Tr. 30.378 (Herbein). Like Nir. Herbein, Nir. Niiller could only recall N1r. Dieckamp's question about "who is minding the store." Tr. 30,214 (Stiller). Sir. Runder recalls a sense of urgency on the part of Nir. Dieckamp that they should promptly proceed to brief the Lieutenant Governor. Tr. 30,071 (Kunder).
- 38. Having gained the impression from these three men that the
.. . . . . .gg plant was stable, Nir. Dieckamp felt no need to contact either these men a p c; N g g f g ,,g$
or other personnel at the site on N1 arch 28th after the briefing of the 7- I NNNhf ' Lieutenant Governor. Tr. 28,403-05 (Dieckamp).
- 39. TN11A asserts that it is not credible that none of the four partici-pants during the course of the encounter on the steps of the State Capitol could remember anything other than an of. hand remark by Nir. Dieck-1 amp. It argues that it is reasonable to conclude that N1essrs. Herbein and
_ M
- / Niiller briefed Nir. Dieckamp on the status of the reactor at some time
; during the afternoon of N1 arch 28, and that this brienng necessarily would include informing him ofincore thermocouple temperature read-
..y . ings greater than 2200'F, the pressure spike, and the hydrogen burn.
TNIIA Proposed Findings 195-202.
- 40. In i IV below, we discuss at considerable length the evidentiary record that establishes that neither Str. Niiller, Nir. Herbein, nor Nir.
~ *.
Kunder was aware of the pressure spike on Starch 28. We also find there
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i that, while N1r. Niiller and 51r. lierbein were informed about preliminary incore thermocouple readings exceeding 2200*F on N1 arch 28, they did SJ:. . ,f. not regard those readings as reliable because of their improbable scatter.
. x j g .' ,
N1r. Kunder testified that he did not even know about incore tempera- _; ,, 3 .. tures in that range until weeks after the accident. Therefore it would n, ~ [ _. , fy s, have been impossible for any of those individuals to impart information about the pressure spike and its significance to Nir. Dieckamp during the
, , 59 _. -
#N QD C- @2.%.,yh.5.
-4 . encounter on the State Capitol steps.5
- 4. Mr. Dieckamp's informationfrom Keaten
- 41. On the morning of N1 arch 28, N!r. Robert Keaten, then N1anager of Systems F.ngineering, GPU Service Corporation, located in Parsippa-ny, sent Nlr. Gary Broughton, then Control and Safety Analysis 51anag-er, as well as a group of other engineers to investigate what had occurred at TN11-2.* Tr. 31,238-39 (Keaten). On Fnday morning, N1 arch 30th, N1r. Keaten telephoned hir. Richard Wilson, then Director of Technical Functions, GPUSC, who had been at the plant site for over 12 hours.
7., This was tte first time that Nir. Keaten heard about a hydrogen bubble in the reactar. Later that morning, pursuant to a prior arrangement that
~
w '- - Nir. Keater in turn would brief Nir. Dieckamp, Nir. Broughton tele-phonically briefed Nir. Keaten. Tr. 31,131-32, 31,149 (Broughton); Tr. 31,246,31,148-49,31,255 (Keaten); Joint Exh. 45, at 7. Prior to placing this telephor.e call, on the morning of Starch 30th, Nir. Broughton was told for the first time by one of GPUSC's Task Force intersiewers. Str. Robert Long, that there had been a hydrogen explosion or burn on N1 arch 28th. Tr. 31,147,31,170-71 (Broughton).
- 42. The notes made by N1r. Keaten, to record the information ob-tained from hir. Broughton on the morning of Starch 30th, were set forth in five pages of a notebook. TN11A Exh.10, unnumbered pp.
TMhMNMNNYkh i.M?$" Q,E.M 7:fs..w.eg ., . . , ~
!!-15; Tr. 31,263 (Keaten). These notes reflect inter alia that Nir.
Broughton spoke about the sequence of events which had taken place on d N1 arch 28th. Thereafter, under a separate heading, "Present Status," the
~j following appears in the notebook:
. ~,..;-
i Sit is by design. not oversight. that we have not rollowed TMl A's theory about the so-called time
" 1
' , . (.4;
-:->. "[- gap ' In essence TMIA argues that Messrs Miller. Herbein and Kunder cannot account ror their time
, ' ' :3_g 4 J.4 Q J 'g' between the bnefir g at the state House and their return to Three Mde Island and that Mr Dieckamg,
.~
- cannot recall detads or his trip back to New Jersey TMI A Propnsed Findings 187 188. 200 202 it is nm as clear as TMlA would have us rind, that there was a time gap in the return trip to the island But thai l # c P 5, X . h N },9'7$"f M irJ '." v yh .. id g{ Q
~
is not the important point. we can rind no basis to infer. rrom the void or information about the return _ V M .;" trips, that any such time was used to inrorm Mr Deeckamp about conditions back at the plar'L Having round that Messrs. Herbein. Miller and Kunder did not have the information in the rirst place. it is poindess to unscramble TMI A's involved anah ses 6 Sec ) tv l. m/nr. re GPUsC Engencers' Knowledge.
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355
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," 280 degrees F260-280
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could be 100,000 ft) TNilA Exh.10, at 13.
- 43. On the basis of his earlier conversation with hir. Wilson and the subsequent one with Mr. Broughton, N!r. Keaten for the first time became fully aware on March 30th that the transient had been very severe in terms of damage to the reactor, that there was still a hydrogen bubble, that the plant was not in a stable configuration and that a lot of work remained to be done. Joint Exh. 45, at 7,8; Tr. 31,292 (Keaten).
1 44. Shortly after the briefing by Mr. Broughton, at about 10:45
.. a.m., Mr. Keaten contacted and personally briefed Mr. Dieckamp at Par-i sippany. Tr. 31,248,31,624 (Keaten). Mr. Dieckamp has no recollection of the content of the briefing but his notes indicate that he talked to Mr.
i Keaten on March 30th. Tr. 28,645-46 (Dieckamp). { 45. TMI A contends that the Broughton-Keaten telephone conversa-tion took place on the morning of March 29th because of the following: (a) The reporting procedures had been changed in that, as of the time Mr. Wilson arrived at the site during the afternoon of March 29th, Mr. Broughton was to report directly to Mr. Wilson, and thus Mr. Broughton's phone call to Mr. Keaten must have taken place on the morning of March 29th rather than on the morning of March 30th.
, . . ,..~.. i.t4W~^.glp:g.%Q TMIA Proposed Findings 207-210. Ilowever, we are convinced that the ,
Broughton-to-Keaten phone call was held on the morning of March 30th YDMhdfCh.pg~Jd e.w -ngqr 9 /g ;d.- pp because, as found above, there was in place a prior arrangement that
' " ~ ~ '
Broughton would contact Keaten and because we have found that both
} men were credible witnesses. Moreover, we are persuaded by the fact
~
that as early as June 1,1979, during the course of an interview with A.a.: e 6, NRC personnel, Mr. Keaten stated that the phone conversation had W ~..
^~
~ been on Friday morning, the 30th (Joint Exh. 45, at 7).
] (b) The first of the pages of Mr. Keaten's notebook recording the conversation with Mr. Broughton bore the date of "3/29/79" s E- c.t but, sometime prior to October 19, 1979, when a copy of his
.j
- ]i notes was turned over to NRC investigators, Mr. Keaten insert-ed in red ink both a question mark after the date of"3/29/79"
. . n. -
and a date of "3/30" below the date of "3/29/79." TMIA
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urges that the date of "3/29/79" was correct because it was wrien initially, and because the first two entries related to
" ;;gp"-i-i[l; O , ,,.p:. g Mr. Dieci.nnp's activities on March 29th and thus would not have been reported by Broughton or recorded by Keaten on t, ;;m., g m 4.b
'7 March 30th.
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TMIA Proposed Findings 214 215, 222-223. Again we found Mr.
- w. -
o!%.3.%y.M: n yggQ, 4 . Keaten to be a credible witness when he testified that he inserted the question mark and the date of 3/30 because he deemed the date of M MM,M . Ap;g @2@@-w M9f2 3/29/79 to have been an error (TMIA Exh.10, at 11; Tr. 31,260-61, 31,271) and we see nothing unusual about Mr. Broughton fulfilling his duties by making a complete report upon Mr. Dieckamp's previous
' day's activities. (in passing, absent more, we cannot but conclude that Mr. Broughton erred in reporting that a Congressional briefing had taken place at 1:00 p.m. on March 29th when, in fact, it began at 2:30 p.m.) Finally, we are persuaded that the Broughton-Keaten telephone call took place on the morning of March 30th because Mr. Keaten's recording in his%otes reflecting that a specific primary core coolant sample and its reading had been taken "last night" (TMIA Exh.10, at
- 14) was confirmed subsequently in NUREG-0600 as having been con-
,gs7. . '
2_ _ , ,m 4 ducted at 4:15 p.m. on March 29, 1979. Joint Exh. 62, Appendix Il-A,
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at II A-59. (c) There were discussions among the GPUSC engineers on
~ '
e March 28th indicating that they suspected a bubble somewhere in the system and discussions on March 29th indicating that the bubble was noncondensible gas rather than steam. TMIA I alleges that the references to a bubble in the reactor and to noncondensibles in Mr. Keaten's notes evidence that the tele-l, phone conversation with Mr. Broughton took place on March
, . . } 29th.
pp TMIA Proposed Findings 220-221. However, TMIA's citations to the
" kdNff-w wp " (gpf,}g Q record do not show that Mr. Keaten had been informed prior to March
- N'gpfg % -c.%W 30th about a hydrogen bubble in the reactor,
, (d) The 1000 ft) calculation in the notes was an earlier, rougher Wg.s J[.M '
' ,.Q-;$' d2 calculation than the 1500 ft 2calculation made by Messrs. Lowe
.= and Moore on the night of March 29th.
m TMIA Proposed Finding 221, n.3. This is erroneous. Mr. Lowe initially
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~;H.5 calculated a bubble size of 1568 ft at 2:45 a.m. on March 30th and there-3 after, at 3:30 a.m. on March 30th, calculated a bubble size of i100 ft)
Si ;ehN).: 6.t)$ h Lowe, ff. Tr. 28,151, at 12. It appears that Mr. Keaten's notes reflected a rounding off of this second calculation.
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m . vz.n:w! s f. (e) The primary system pressure and temperatures recorded in Mr. Keaten's notes were measured at 6:30 p.m. on March 29th
*J as is evidenced by TMIA Exh. 2 at 5.
TMIA Proposed Finding 221, n.23. However, as the Licensee points out, no evidence was adduced showing that these temperatures were
^
,l, -
. unique to March 29th and did not exist also on March 30th as well.
J3: m
^?. ' ' '. 46. We conclude that the probative evidence establishes that Mr.
Broughton briefed Mr. Keaten on the information contained in the lat-l ter's notes on the morning of March 30, 1979, and that Mr. Keaten i relayed this information to Mr. Dieckamp that same morning.
- 5. 3Ir. Dieckamp's Understanding of Core Damage i 47. We are convinced from the lindings of this section, supra, and
{ IV, /rtfra, that Mr. William Lowe was the first person to recognize the significance of the March 28,1979 containment building pressure spike;
. and that that recognition occurred during the late evening of March 29 and the early morning hours of March 30, 1979.' But TMIA argues that Mr. Dieckamp's awareness of core damage on March 28 and 29,1979, demonstrates his early awareness of a hydrogen burn in the containment building.TMIA Proposed Findings 228 236.
- 48. Mr. Dieckamp testified that he met with Mr. Arnold on the morning of March 29 for the purpose of formally establishing the Task Force to investigate the TMI-2 event of the previous day. Dieckamp. ff.
Tr. 28,316, at 8. TMIA characterizes that meeting as one in which Dieckamp advised Arnold of serious core damage. TMIA Proposed Find-ing 228. Mr. Arnold substantiated that such a meeting and discussion took place, but with respect to serious core damage stated: "If
, S de.M$jg[' ~
~
someone wanted me to quantify it, I would say half a percent or a per-y cent failed fuel type situation." Joint Exh. 84, at 25. The Board finds
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Arnold and Dieckamp alleged by TMIA.
- 49. TMIA refers to the briefing given to the Task Force on the af-ternoon of March 29, 1979, by Mr. Wilson, in which Wilson tells the
,...r. Task Force of core damage to the extent of $30 million. Since the chain 4c r
, of command was Wilson to Arnold to Dieckamp, TMIA concludes that Mr. Wilsen's knowledge could only have come from Messrs. Dieckamp
, ,_ , and Arnold. Hence, according to TMIA, Mr. Dieckamp must have been 7
In s IV B. uths we Gnd incredible Mr Ch=astyk's statement of september 4.1980, so the effect that on March 28 he quickly 6dentiGed the pressure spike as a hydrogen emplowon produced by a arconi. um/ water reactro. See Joint Exh.117. at 27, r t !A 358 I i M.:M'53:$ti$k filskU Y Y
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_m i I aware of the true seriousness of the core damage. T\ll A Proposed Find-ing 231. We lave previously dealt with each of these communication S 1 'j ; - " scenarios. We conclude that they are not supportive of T>ll A's position regarding Mr. Dieckamp's awareness. g
- 50. Finally, Th!!A asserts further corroboration that Mr. Dieckamp ;
_e_ ._- understood the serious nature of the accident on March 28,1979, from [
.[ e.y the contents of a memorandum written to Dieckamp on March 29 by
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~~"'
Mr. B.H. Cherry, who was then Vice President for Planning of the GPU
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Service Corporation, and who reported directly to Dieckamp. ThtIA Pro- f posed Findings 23'-235. Licensee points out that the Cherry Memoran- ' i dum (TN!!A E@. 5) focuses primarily upon Str. Cherry's perception of I communication madequacies on the day of the accident. Licensee Reply Findmgs 55 anc 56. We agree.
- 51. The C ierry N1emorandum stated that the communication difG-culty persisted until I spoke to you and got your view of the state of the reactor, etc. I t link it was really only at that point that I had the full un-derstanding of the situation and the condition of the plant." TMIA Exh.
5, at 2. TMiA would have us conclude from this statement of Mr. Cherry that: "This would be true only if Dieckamp were in fact in-4 formed of the high incore temperature readings and the hydrogen burn which would lead him to the correct assessment that TMI-2 had suffered I serious core damage." [ Footnote omitted.) TMIA Proposed Finding 235. The most that the Board can conclude from this is that Mr. Cherry l believed that Mr. Dieckamp had provided Cherry the best account that Cherry had been able to obtain by the time the memorandum was writ-ten. We can Gnd no probatise evidence here or elsewhere to establish that the Dieckamp-to-Cherry communication reGected an awareness on Mr. Dieckamp's part of the true and actual extent of core damage on March 28,1979. In fact, Mr. Dieckamp's own account of his awareness of core damage, as of March 29, concludes with the statement: "I cer. M5$$gTM(yyk.n,p"j
"~,
(f' b1., k v ::h, . c ..~ ... , tainly had no sense at all of massive reaction of zirconium with the
" water, oxidation and scalding, falling apart." Tr. 28,344 (Dieckamp).
' ~
We find nothing that impugns the credibility of that statement and we 1 accept it as fact.
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- 7. -- . 7 , ,
f jncq:g,g y . . ,,, . g: 3p,7 y; , 2.c - w -~ : , gyy . IV. WHETHER ANYONE ON MARCH 28, 1979,
- INTERPRETED THE PRESSURE SPIKE AND
, 1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION IN TERMS OF
! REACTOR CORE DAMAGE
' ~
_ . .. A. Introduction
, v....
?
- b. '.!:
C ' 52. In this section we deal with the second prong of TMIA's case which, in effect, alleges that the significance of the pressure spike and
! the initiation of the containment spray pumps was well understood at the time of the spike and throughout the day on March 28, and that this understanding was widespread among the people gathered on the island that c'ay. Here too we comply with the Appeal Board mandate to deter-mine "whether anyone interpreted the pressure spike and containment spray, at the time, in terms of core damage [ emphasis in original]" and whether "any such information [was] withheld." ALAB-772,19 NRC
- 1193,1267 n.103,1268.
. 53. Our emphasis is on those who were working in the control room at the time of the pressure spike at 1:50 p.m. and during the fol-lowing hours. We focus on four persons in particular whose early state-
.j ments or role in the accident more than any other factors, gave rise to
.; the issue of whether Mr. Dieckamp was truthful in his mailgram: (1) i Joseph Chwastyk, a shift supervisor, who once stated that, on March 28, he interpreted the pressure spike and spray actuation in terms of hydro-gen combuttion, zirconium / water reaction and core damage; (2) Brian Mehler, another shift supervisor, who realized that the pressure spike was real soon after it occurred, and who once stated that, on March 28, an order was given to avoid starting electrical equipment to prevent the ignition of any combustible gas (presumably hydrogen); (3) Theodore
, N .c"',",k .. hg s[._
Illjes, a control room operator, who once stated that a hydrogen explo-
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41 sion had been discussed on March 28; and (4) Gary Miller, TMI Station Manager and Emergency Director at the time of the spike, to whom any
] such information might be imputed, and who was in direct communica-tion with Mr. Dieckamp within an hour after the pressure spike.
. 54. We conclude below that Mr. Chwastyk's memory has been
.j hopelessly influenced by after acquired information; that Mr. Mehler,
), after careful reflection, came to the conclusion that the order to avoid ig-y] nition of hydrogen was not issued on the 28th; that Mr. Illjes has a very poor memory of the timing of events; and that there is no reliable evi-f- j dence that Mr. Miller was even aware of the pressure spike, let alone its
! significance on March 28.
4 'n :;,
! 360
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__x - ._ m. u _ a t_. ~ ~ B. Joseph J. Chwastyk
- 55. Str. Joseph J. Chwastyk is very important to the resolution of the mailgram issue. A TMI-2 shift supervisor with 10 years' TMI experi-ence in 1979, Mr. Chwastyk was present in the control room at 1:50 p.m. on March 28 and actually observed the rise and fall of the contain-
- . . : 4 - - ment pressure strip chart recorder pen at the time of the pressure spike.
%- Mr. Chwastyk is the only person to claim that on March 28,1979, he J'
~
knew that the pressure spike and containment spray actuation were caused by hydrogen combustion and that the hydrogen was generated by l a zirconium / water reaction and that the zirconium / water reaction meant damaged zirconium cladding and core damage. Moreover, Mr. Chwastyk states that he imparted a substantial amount of this information to Sta-tion Manager Gary Miller soon after the pressure spike. If Mr. Chwastyk's account of these events is correct - or more precisely, if TMIA's selection of Mr. Chwastyk's several accounts, is correct - it l would be likely that Mr. Dieckamp had knowledge of some evidence
. I that the pressure spike and containment spray actuation was, on March 28, 1979, thought to be indicative of core damage. Mr. Chwastyk's vari-
- ous accounts of the pressure spike and its implications cover virtually every area of dispute about the knowledge possessed by those in the con-trol room on March 28.
- 56. By way of background to the findings in the following para- 7 graphs, Mr. Chwastyk testiGed that he saw the actual pressure recorder '
going straight up, but that initially he did not know what was happening. fle noted that the containment spray pumps came on. The pressure e came back down and looked like it was staying there, so he ordered the spray pumps secured. Then he ordered an external check of the reactor building and ordered the control room operators to verify containment
. , -. .. .o .
integrity. lie testined that " eventually" he came to the conclusion that the pressure spike did in fact indicate a real increase in pressure after dis-
~4 pm. ' Wjuh p,'p.y .9q~7 jJy#dhS3EE
'I j! mms cussing the cause of the spike with Brian Mehler. lie then discussed the
, .- - pressure spike with Station Manager Gary Miller. lie testified that he i told Mr. Miller that he thought there had been a real pressure increase.
fie does not now recall mentioning hydrogen or core damage to Mr.
. . Miller and is uncertain whether he mentioned that there had been an
. . 1 explosion. Nevertheless, Mr. Chwastyk testiGed that at the time of his
} ' '2.["@i
~
~. conversation with Mr. Miller, Mr. Chwastyk's understanding of the pres-sure spike was that it was caused by a hydrogen buildup from zirconi-l y ,
um/ water reaction in the core. According to Mr. Chwastyk, he asked and shortly thereafter received permission from Mr. Miller to " draw a ] bubble" in the pressurizer. Mr. Chwastyk also testined that, to avoid i
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>=..y, s s i sparks, he ordered that the electrically operated pressuriter relief valse not be operated and testified that a similar but general orde was gisen later in the evening Nir. Chwastyk also testified that he discussed the pressure spike with an NRC representative, but cannot recall if he told him that there had been a hydrogen explosion. lie stated that he dis-
~-
cussed the pressure spike with operators who later came on shift. Ile be-lieves he told them the pressure spike indicated a real increase in pres-sure and may have discussed hydrogen and zirconium / water reaction with them. i i Before the Pressure Spike
- 57. On .\ larch 28, 1979. Str. Chaastyk was a shift supersisor licensed on both units and wa3 scheduled for the three to-elesen shif t at j TN11-2. lie came to the station early, about noon, because he had heard about the accident. lie receised an informal briefing when he reported to the Unit 2 control room sometime before 1:00 p.m. Ilis testimony is vague on the point, but he believes that the prevailing impression at that time was that there was some " sort of core damage" based upon
~
temperature and radiation readings. Tr. 29,11213 (Chwastyk). Nir. Chwastyk, himself, did not know "for a fact" that there was core damage, but believed that there had been. Tr. 29,189 (Chwastyk);" see a/So Tr. 29,325-26 (Chwastyk).
- 58. In any event, Str. Chwastyk did not think in terms of zirconi-im/ water reaction prior to the pressure spike (Tr. 29,346 (Chwastyk)).
- 59. N1r. Zewe was the shift supervisor on duty at the time of the accident that morning and was still on duty when Str. Chwastyk arrived at Unit 2. N!r. Chwastyk saw that Nir. Zewe was very busy on other mat-
, . c J '.". - -C):Oy ters, so N1r. Chwastyk took over the actual direction of the operators. ~['
v -
'_.<:M ~?4c M ,;i gp}: t{ Q )
.n ,,., o Nir. Gary Niiller was in overall charge of Unit 2. Str. Chwastyk could not
,c % .
describe the direct reporting line, but there was a standing order that Nir. Niiller was to approve any changes in operation. Tr. 29,118 i
~
(Chwastyk). There were no existing procedures to govern the plant status. Tr. 29,124 (Chwastyk). l 4 8 t.ater in his testimony, Nf r Chwastyk *as much more emptiut about his appreaation or core damage before the preswre spike. He speaticaily recalled radiaison lesels spearicaHv in the reactor building. water that had thied into the ausiliary building w as radioactively " hot" and that there had been a loss or the reactor conlant pumps. rhose signs. and others. auordmg to his later testimony, indicated to Mr Chwestyk that
- in ract there was (ore damage
- prior to the spike Tr. N.366 4Chwastykt b
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The Pressure Spike
- 60. Something, perhaps alarms, alerted N1r. Chwastyk and he hap-pened to be standing near the reactor building pressure recorder at 1:50 p.m., the time of the spike. He saw the recorder indicator go straight up
- and then down again. Some alarms went olT, but Nir. Chwastyk cannot recall which. He does, however, recall that the reactor building spray 7 .
pumps came on. Tr. 29,124-26 (Chwastyk). Prior to the spike everything had been fairly quiet, but with the alarms and operator actions connected with the spike. Str. Chwastyk assumed that everyone (as many as , i twenty people) in the control room was aware of the pressure spike. Tr. 29.124-27, 29.174 (Chwastyk). One or two others may have actually seen the strip-chart pen rise and fall. Tr. 29,175 (Chwastyk). Nlr. Ch-wast > k did not hear the " thud" heard by others at the time of the hydro-gen detonation. Tr. 29,132 (Chwastyk). j
- 61. The timing of the awareness that there had been a real rise in the reactor building pressure (as compared to signal anomahes) at the
- l time of the strip-chart indication and the spray pump initiation is the Orst of several events giving rise to the question about the accuracy of N1r. Chwastyk's memory of the relevant episodes. Those who doubt Str.
Chwastyk's accounts suggest that his memory has become suspiciously and increasingly sharper with the passing of time.
- 62. At the time of his Orst interview on Ntay 21,1979, there was not the same focus on the pressure spike and its signi0cance as there was after the issue of mformation flow had surfaced. At the beginmng.
Nlr. Chwastyk stated that he did not know initially whether the spike ex-isted in the sensors or in the building itself. lie recognized, however, I that the spray pumps had come on. Since he did not know what caused the spike indication, he delayed securing equipment, particularly the spray pumps. Joint Exh. 35, at 9. During the N!ay 21 interview he did Y dJ.y.q,fNDWQ 9J5 n @n.s;3f not state how long after the spike before he came to the realization that M. se. u.g- - A M.'. y,, it was real.
- 63. Interuewed again on the point on October 11, 1979, Str.
Chwa3tyk stated again that he did not know at the time that the spike was an explo> ion.* It was not until "sometime later" but on the same
- shift, that he associated the noise heard by others with the pressure l
l spike on the strip-chart recorder. Then he knew there had been some
" kind of explosion in the building." Joint Exh. 88, at 19. And, consist-9Nf r. Chwastytt has used the terms " detonation." "etplouon,* and " combustion interchangeably f
' since he first began duussing ibe matter we see no ugrnficance in the varying uw of the terms. and we d4tfer with Lnerwce on that score. \lr. Owntyk n not sertain whether the term "etrinuon" was ever used on \l4rch 24 hunt Eth 117. at iO5a 363 I
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t ently, on October 30, 1979, he told the Special Inquiry Group that he initially did not attribute the spike to a real pressure excursion and that he had considered the possibility of an electrical malfunction. Joint Exh. i 117, at 5. Again, N1r. Chwastyk believed he became aware that the spike _. was real "sometime later." As between afternoon or evening, it was, he
- .< thought, "before the evening" when he "put it together." /d. at 11.
j f', 64. At the hearing, Nlr. Chwastyk testified that he " eventually"
~ ~
- came to the conclusion that the spike was real. But he said that, in terms of "real time," it was not very long after the event that he appreciated that it was an actual pressure spike. Tr. 29,130 (Chwastyk). Later, on cross-examination, N!r. Chwastyk explamed that he became aware that the spike was real apparently sometime during the 6 minutes he allowed the containment sprays to operate. He reported to Nlr. N! iller just after securing the spray pumps. Tr. 29,318-19 (Chwasty k).
- 65. The Board has difGeulty reconciling N1r. Chwastyk's use of the term "sometime later" in his October 11, 1979 interview, his October j 30, 1979 recollection that it was "sometime later" but "before the eve-l ning,' and his testimony that he " eventually" reahzed the spike was j' real, with his Gnal testimony that the realization came within a few min-utes after the strip-chart indication. Even allowing for a distortion of time perception because of excitement, his earlier statements are incon-sistent with his Gnal testimony at the hearing.
- 66. We have even greater difGculty reconciling N!r. Chwastyk's final testimony that, not only did he know the spike was real within a few minutes, but he alv knew it was a zirconium / water, hydrogen explosion that early (Tr. 29,372 (Chwast>k)), as we discuss below.
- 67. The Board noted other inadequacies in N1r. Chwasty k's memory as to how he became aware that the spike was real. Ilis early memory, on October 11, 1979, was that he "put two and two together,"
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i.e., the pressure spike and the noise, and then he realized there had e@.. _c .W.e . '- been a detonation. lie also believed that the detonation correlated with the actuation of one of the valves, which valve he could not then speci-fy.'d Joint Exh. 88, at 19. At the hearing, he initially, and for the first time, explained that the actuation of the spray system and its "two-
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* ~ 18 Esen though, on october 11.1979 Mr Ch*asiylt could not idennfy the vahe he thought correspond.
,j ed to the detonanon, earber, on May 21. he referred io it as an "electrnm.ignenc rehef sabe " Mr
_ , Ch*astyk has frecaently referred to the non farnous pilot-oreraied rehef vahe IPORv) as an "elettro.
', ,, - J" magnenc reher salve" or "EMoV." O,..trs have referred io the same sabe (operated by a wlenned) as an "electromanc operaied vehe" (ako ' EMOv") or "rnotor-operated wabe" ("Mov"t Tr 29.334 we have generally used the somewhat redandant term "LMOV vahe " This salve has a downstrearti biosk vahe. % e interpret Mr_ Ch*astyk's October ll stater .eni io encari inai ise dn.i noi hi.io. .heiher l it eas the actuanon of the EMOV or its bhxk vahe which sorresponded to (Me detonanen A t ot he r urres. he was more confident that it *as the EMov sabe
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A 3 out-of-three logie (two of three pressure sensors are required to actuate j each pump) convinced him that the spike was real. Tr. 29,130 1 (Chwastyk). The sensor-logic explanation materia'ized in a conversation with Nir. Niehler. Tr. 29,317 (Chwastyk).
* ~'3
- 68. Later in his testimony he believed that it was the combination
._ c- of the noise and the actuation of the ENIOV or its block valve, that led
,I w him to the conclusion that the spike was real. Tr. 29,319, 29,331 (Chwastyk).
- 69. The varying accounts of how Nir. Chwastyk concluded that the pressure spike was in fact some sort of detonation are confusmg, but an explanation could be that the seemingly different accounts are each in-complete. Our greater concern is that, m his four interviews and in his hearing testimony, Str. Chwa3tyk may hase accepted incomplete and not fully accurate statements of the events put to him by his questioners.
i identification of flydrogen and Core Damage
.\ lay .'1, I979 inremew
- 70. In his Ntay 21, 1979 interview by the NRC, Str. Chwastyk made no mention of hydrogen. Joint Exh. 35. He later explained that he simply was not asked about hydrogen then. This is true. However, he was asked to express himself about any observations from his experience which might be helpful to other plants. He had nothing to say. Joint Exh. 35, at 54-55. The Board has carefully read Nir. Chwastyk's Nla) 21 statement. If, as Nlr. Chwastyk later testified, he fully understood the implications of the failed fuel cladding, zirconium / water reaction on
' N! arch 28,1979, that understanding should have been apparent on Niay w 21. In fact, one cannot determine from his Niay 21 statement that Nir.
~
' 'u7'c g @. ./; Q o i (,' M ; Chwastyk inferred anything at all about core damage from the pressure
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. spike. But the question never came up.
j 71. On the other hand, by that time N!r. Chwastyk probably knew, as did many people, that there had been a hydrogen detonation and that the hydrogen had been produced by failed zirconium cladding in the
; core. Therefore, at least as of N1ay 21,1979, N1r. Chwastyk's memory
' - did not seem to be influenced by any after-acquired knowledge.
.{
- 72. Nir. Chwastyk's Niay 21, 1979 interview is significant to the Board in seseral respects:
j (a) Although not beyond belief, it is unlikely that, if on Starch 28, i 1979, N!r. Chwastyk possessed all of the information concern-ing zirconium / water reaction and hydrogen buildup to the extent that he later recalled, some of that information should hase appeared in the Ntay 21 interview; J65 i { l l r ., . no .
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(b) Assuming that Mr. Chwastyk did in fact possess such knowl-
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he later recalled because, by Stay 21, 1979, the NRC had al-
. .- -L g .,,, ready interviewed most of those present in the control room
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on Starch 28 (e.g., Joint Exh.12 - 33). Yet the three NRC
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inspectors who interviewed hir. Chwastyk on Stay 21, 1979, N . [ L y,;p,n-nM'7'
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did not allude to the very importam information that Mr.
, Chwastyk today believes he possessed and communicated on N1 arch 28.
(c) The Grst recorded statement by Ntr. Chwastyk was made after
! the mailgram and esen then it provided no information incon-sistent with the mailgram.
- 73. We believe that it is also signi0 cant that, on Ntay 21, Mr.
Chwastyk provided no more information about his report to Station Manager Gary Miller, other than Mr. Chwastyk's suggestion to Mr. Miller that the " electromagnetic relief valve" not be cycled. Joint Exh. 35, at 18. [g , ,3
. s . October 11,1979 Interview
- 74. Mr. Chwastyk was mterviewed by four members of the Special Inquiry Group on October 11, 1979. For the first time Mr. Chwastyk alluded to "the hydrogen detonanon or combustion." lie referred to the phenomenon in a contest which assumes that the intentewers already were familiar with it; not in the context that on March 28 Mr. Chwastyk
, had been aware of hydrogen combustion. Joint Exh. 88, at 6.
- 75. Later in the October 11 interview, Mr. Chwastyk stated that "I
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, " , , again went to Gary Miller and explained what I thought had happened as i far as hydrogen detonation and the simultaneous opening of the
;-Webe" - valve. . . " /d. at 18. This suggests inat, on October 11, Mr. Chwastyk
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3'j.jp e. W recalled that, on March 28, he informed Mr. Miller about Chwastyk's
' N S ' ' C < c ., awareness of a hydrogen detonation. Ilowever, immediately after that i statement, Mr. Chwastyk stated that he "just can't remember" whether
., ,. .j he related to Mr. Miller his thoughts at the time about correlating the
" - .: j$MM4'. "<tN..Id, pressure spike with the valve operation. /d. at 22.
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- 76. Mr. Chwastyk explained during the October 11 interview that
. he was "not that well acquainted with hydrogen or any other gases for
- 5. 4;per.pm;. - that matter" and that, because he had seen the initial spike, he was nerv-
' . Uj;f'h;@ig,h[ "
ous about hydrogen gases. /J. at 36. Indeed, we cannot discern from the October 11 mterview that Mr. Chwastyk understood the zirconium / water reaction at that time, let alone on March 28. lie does not refer to it.
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- 77. The Board has compared Nir. Chwast>L's statement on October 11,1979 to the elTect that he had explained his thoughts about hydrogen detonanon to Ntr. Niiller on Starch 28 with other portions of his state-ment that day and with his testimony later. We beliese that the most log-ical explanation is that, by October 11,1979, N1r. Chwastyk had begun referring retrospectively to the pressure spike as the " hydrogen detona-tion" or " hydrogen explosion."
October 30. /979 Inter view
- 78. The Special Inquiry Group interviewed Str. Chwastyk again on October 30, 1979, after having resiewed his October !I statement. This time there was no question about N1r. Chwastyk's assertion. In response to specifie questions, he stated in certain terms that he knew there had been a hydrogen explosion on Ntarch 28 before he reported his concerns about the pressure spike to Gary Stiller. Joint Exh. 99, at 1415. Alr.
Chwestyk felt sure that he had discussed hydrogen with Brian Nichler on N1 arch 28 but doesn't remember the conscrsation. /J. at 17. Ile recalled on October 30 that he mentioned "some sort of explosion" to Gary Niiller at the time but was not sure that he attributed it to hydrogen. /d.
- 79. Then the Special Inquiry Group, apparently aware of the special importance of Nir. Chwastyk's statement about hydrogen, came directly to the point. The interviewer explained to Nir. Chwastyk that the Group hid not discovered any general appreciation on Wednesday, Starch 28, of hydrogen, and that the general appreciation did not materialize until Thursday afternoon or night or Friday morning. Id. at 17-19. In fact the l Special Inquiry Group apparently had not found anyone with an under-standing on NIarch 28 of the fact that there had been any sort of explo-sion, let alone one produced by hydrogen. Yet, as the interviewer point-
;.Qg edly explained, Nlr. Chwastyk seemed to hase arrived at the hydrogen
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conclusion on Wednesday afternoon. The interviewer further observed that N!r. Chwastyk had stated that others about him probably knew about the hydrogen then. Id.
- 80. Nir. Chwastyk conceded that he may not have told Str. N1 iller about the hydrogen explosion or any explosion at the time of his report
' _ . . ! to N! iller on the 28th. Id. at 20,28. Nir. Chwastyk nevertheless insisted
! that he told others in the control room about it - probably counterparts to Chwastyk himself. /J. at 20. lie also stated that he had reported to
. . someone from the NRC that day that there had been some sort of explo-sion. Id. at 21. He was not, however, able to state the names of those
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with whom he discussed hydrogen or the explosion (Joint Exh. 99, passim) with the possible exception of Brian Nlchler (e.g., /J. at 17,19).
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Se;'rember 4.1980 Inteniew m; j 81. At the direction of NRC Chairman Ahearne, the Office of in-spection and Enforcement (IE) began an insestigation into questions about the adequacy of information transfer between the Licensee and
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the NRC following the accident. NUREG-0760. The IE team, headed by ns I"g=[m.W$b-M,y a N ym Nir. Norman N1oseley, interviewed Str. Chwastyk on September 4, 1980. Joint Exh.117. The IE team focused sharply on Nir. Chwastyk's
,' ~~
l asserted knowledge on Starch 28 of a hydrogen esplosion.
! 82. N!r. Chwastyk's memory of the esent appeared to be sharper 4 than ever before, especially respecting his understanding on N1 arch 28 of the signi0cance of the pressure spike. lie stated that, after the explosion, it dawned on him that "we did, in fact. hase some core damage in there because zirconium / water reaction created the hydrogen.' This is the first mention by Ntr. Chwastyk of the zirconium / water reaction. lie re-called that it made him nersous. /J. at 24. Nir. Chwastyk said he knew on the afternoon of Starch 28 that the core had heated up enough to cause the zirconium / water reaction. /J. lie knew also that the hydrogen
, came from one place - the zirconium / water reaction in the core. Nir.
~
Chwastyk imputed to Gary Stiller a serious attitude about the matter based upon Chwastyk's report to N! iller. /J. at 26. Stost importantly, Nfr. Chwastyk told the IE team: It wn shortly after the xtual esplovon and the pressure spike in the t'udding that I surrmed that it was, in fat. .in espimion and pr*ahly a hy drngen esplosmn. and I relatcJ that to Gar). This was prior to Gary leasing f or the Gosernnri of fwe, as far as t un rerlernber.
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- 83. At the hearing, Str. Chwastjk was examined extensively by the t '
, parties about what he knew on N! arch 28, 1979, about the pressure i
spike, hydrogen, zirconium / water reaction and core damage; at what time he knew about them and to whom he imparted this information. af. . lie testiGed over 2 days. lie had not read the transcripts of his previous iA - v .7~M. . M. ..Pg .,~y interviews before his testimony on the Grst day. After the floard had l concluded that his unaided memory of the events on Starch 28, 1979,
. . .d , , .m ,.<. a , gi e , had been tested sufGciently, we requested that he review the transcripts
. ,; , .g. v , ' c. ;f.n. . over the recess before appearing for the second day. lic reported that his memory had been refreshed by his reading. Tr. 29,286 (Chwastyk).
, 84. Consistent with his September 4, 1980 statement to the IE team, Nir. Chwastyk stated that he understood when he reported to Str.
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y .:. , , s l l Stiller that the spike or explosion had been causeo by a hydrogen buildup; that he knew there had been core damage; ihat the core
; damage produced a zirconium / water reaction in which aydmgen is freed. Tr. 29,141 (Chwastyk).
. 85. 51r. Chwastyk provided his Gnal version of how thoroughly on Starch 28 he appreciated the signiGeance of the pressure spike near the
, end of his testimony. He was queried by Licensee's counsel as to wheth-
! er the combusted hydrogen could have been thought to be from a source such as the hydrogen used to scavenge oxygen in the reactor cool-ant water, Nfr. Chwastyk immediately discounted that possibility by pointing out that the makeup tank, where scavenging hydrogen could be found, was in the auxiliary building, not in the reactor building where the detonation occurred. Tr. 29.372 (Chwastyk).
- 86. Then .\lr. Chwast>k explained once again his version that he knew there was an explosion when the pressure spike indication hap-pened simultaneously with the operation of the ES10V or block valve.
/d. Simultaneously with that realization, Afr. Chwastyk knew that the explosion was from hydrogen, and, once he knew that it was a hydrogen explosion, he knew that it had to be from the zirconium / water reaction and not from the makeup tank. /d. If the Board were to accept this ver-t sion of Str. Chwastyk's account, we would then have to impute to Ntr.
Chwastyk a very thorough appreciation of the zirconium / water reaction and core damage within a few minutes after the pressure spike.
- 87. N1r. Chwastyk also testiGed that the zirconium / water reaction was an indication to him on Starch 28 that the core was damaged more than he thought w as the case before the spike. Tr. 29,354-55 (Chwastyk).
Report to Gary Miller
- : Wn$./S'h
~~
' 'L'c/ h h[ #< / $ 1 588. With his analysis that there had been a zirconium / water reac-tion, a hydrogen explosion, and core damage fresh in his mind, Ntr.
Chwastyk reported to Station Stanager Gary Stiller.
- 89. As is well recognized, Str. Chwastyk's report to Niiller about the pressure spike would be the closest link connecting Ntr. Chwastyk's
; Starch 28 understanding of hydrogen and core damage on that day to Nir. Dieckamp. Str. Stiller encountered Str. Dieckamp soon after that report. There are two aspects to Str. Chwastyk's testimony on this l issue: (1) If, in fact, htr. Chwastyk made any report to Str. Stiller, i what does his report tell us about Chwastyk's understanding of the pres-sure spike; and (2) what did Str. h! iller understand from Ntr. Chwastyk's report?
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- 90. To resisit the sequence of events: The pressure spike hap-
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. pened at 1:50 p.m. N1r. Chwastyk allowed the containment spray pumps
- 4 ;.y .- ,.j c to run until he was satisfied that they should be secured. The time of
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, .. . . . securing the pumps has been established as 5 to 6 minutes after the s
4... ,,p . 3.0 g . spike by the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center. Joint Exh. 63, at 44,45.
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- t. .;.; Then Str. Chwastyk discussed the two-out-of-three logic for spray pump
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actuation with Nfr. Nichler. E.g., Tr. 29,166 (Chwastyk). It was during this conversation that Nir. Chwastyk, in one of his accounts, came to the conclusion that the spike was real. Tr 29,130, 29,317 (Chwastyk). Ntr. Chwastyk then reported to Ntr. N1 iller, who had to lease shortly thereaf-l' ter to brief the Lieutenant Governor. Tr. 29,159 (Chwastyk).
- 91. The Special Inquiry Group estimated from the State log entry of his 2:30 p.m. arrnal at the Lieutenant Gosernor's 00 ice that Ntr.
Stiller left for the 30-minute trip soon after the spike. Joint Exh.106, at 906. Str. Niiller believes he left the Unit at about 1:55 p.m. (Tr. 30,246 (N1 iller)), and N1r. Herbein believes he may have left (from off site) with Str. Niiller at 2:00 p.m. (Tr. 30,343 (lierbein)). Ntr. Chwastyk be-
. ' ' ~ ., . .,
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lieves that Str. N1 iller left 15 minutes to a half-hour, perhaps less, after the spike. Joint Exh.117, at 27.
~
t -l 9 s. 92. By any account, Nir. Chwastyk's report to Nir. Niiller was necessarily a short one. Ntr. Niiller does not remember N1r. Chwastyk's report. Tr. 30,204 (N1 iller). The report to N1r. Niiller, according to hir. Chwastyk was after Chwastyk made a "bec line" to Niiller's office. lie followed N1 iller back to the control room in what has become known as the "mosing consersation." E.g., Tr. 29,170, 29,320 (Chwastyk).
- 93. N!r. Chwastyk testified that he told Nir. Niiller that the spike was real and that it was primarily the spray pumps that supported that
. conclusion. Curiously, contrary to his repeated testimony at other times,
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he stated that he did not report the noise or thud heard simultaneously
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- with the spike to N1r. N1 iller. Tr. 29,131 (Chwastyk). Nor did Str.
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te Chwastyk, during the account just cited, testify to his oft-repeated state-
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ment that he reported to Str. N1 iller his view that the simultaneous oper-ation of the ENIOV or its block valve provided the basis for believing the spike was real. /J.
. , .w h 94. Contrary to his important September 4,1980 deposition, Nir.
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/ ,%.:,gh"!.w -p a $'Op fg:J Chwastyk testified that he could not recall whether he told Niiller about e.
his understanding that there had been a hydrogen explosion (Tr.
-- 29,141, 29,358), or any explosion (Tr. 29,153 (Chwastyk)). But see Tr.
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%i$O? 29,358 (Chwastyk). Nir. Chwastyk may not even have mentioned
~- - ,
" hydrogen" to Niiller, relying on the assumption that both he and Stiller understood the presence of hydrogen. Tr. 29,154 (Chwastyk). But Nir.
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N1 iller said nothing to Chwastyk to indicate that he, N1 iller, understood
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, ,- .g that 'he spike was caused by a hydrogen burn. Tr. 29.281 (Chwastyk).
hir. Chwastyk testified that he could not recall telling Str. Niiller about core damage during his report and doesn't believe that he did. Tr. 29,180, 29,281 (Chwastyk).
- 95. According to hir. Chveastyk, whatever it was that he reported to hir. hiiller, it was not serious enough to distract hir. Niiller from other
- thoughts. Niiller, getting ready to report to the Lieutenant Governor, was very busy. Ile responded to hir. Chwastyk with the advice that they should not get excited. Tr. 29,159 (Chwastyk).
- 96. As noted, hir. Stiller said nothing to indicate an appreciation that the pressure spike was caused by hydrogen or that it indicated core
' damage. Tr. 29,281 (Chwastyk). In fact, Mr. Chwastyk never received any acknowledgment from Str. Stiller that h! iller believed the pressure spike was real. Tr. 29.282 (Chwastyk). When questioned whether Mr.
Chwastyk believed Mr. Miller was absorbing Chwastyk's report, or whether Niiller may have been preoccupied with other things, hir. Chwastyk explained that hir. Niiller was preoccupied and that Chwastyk was sure that hiiller was thinking about other things. Tr. 29,321 (Chwastyk). Chwastyk's Communication with Others
- 97. Mr. Brian hiehler, another shift supervisor at TMI-2, was also on duty at the unit at the time of the pressure spike. His account of the events is covered below in the next section. Ilere we are concerned with whether hir. Chwastyk communicated to hiehler his understanding on March 28 of the hydrogen explosion and zirconium / water reaction.
- 98. Mr. Mehler was in the shift supervisor's office at the time of
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w.% the spike, but left to go to the control console when he became aware of
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p ,TNMf,N$ 7.4 h( ~g .4yG the increased activity and alarms. Tr. 29,475-76 (Mehler). In the impor-tant minutes that followed the spike, Mr. Mehler had a close working relationship with Str. Chwastyk. As we noted above, it was Chwastyk's conversation with Mehler that, in one of Chwastyk's versions, led Chwastyk to realize the spike was real because of the two out-of three
., sensor logic for the containment spray pumps. E.g., Tr. 29,166-67
/ (Chwastyk).
- 99. When interviewed on October 30, 1979, Mr. Chwastyk could not remember having a conversation on March 28 with Mr. Mehler
;. . ' about the causes of the spike, i.e., whether it could have been caused by a chemical explosion or by hydrogen. lie believed then that he may
. have had such a conversation, and that, because Mehler was present, they probably did confer. Joint Exh. 99, at 7 8.17.
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i 1 100. By the time Mr. Chwastyk was interviewed by the IE team on a,+ ...,f.> <a 1 September 4,1980, he recalled definitely that, after the spray pumps D. N.Jy.Q U h r%.2,C.D" 7' . ,[MMM. 6 N" ' . , ' were secured and matters had returned to a relatively normal state, he discussed the pressure spike with Mehler and that Mehler agreed with [>.d#1sjOf@ Y; y(. , Chwastyk that there had been an explosion. Joint Exh.117, at 6,9-10,
.g e :t <W iyf3 2 : 24 4 y 26. There was, however, no reference to hydrogen or zirconium / water
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. m eg . . h ges ?i;e f$ reaction in Chwastyk's 1980 account of his conversation with Mehler. Id.
101. At the hearing, Mr. Chwastyk testified again that he believed
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5 on March 28 that Mr. Mehler understood that there had been a real pres-sure spike. And again Mr. Chwastyk could not recall any discussion li about hydrogen with Mehler. Tr. 29,167,29,317 (Chwastyk). 102. In his testimony at the hearing, Mr. Mehler recalled a conversa-tion of a few words with Mr. Chwastyk right after the spike. He corrobo-rates Mr. Chwastyk's statement that he, Mehler, soon knew that the
,. spike was real but does not recall that it was described as an " explosion."
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- . c; ~ Mr. Mehler was quite specific in his belief that hydrogen was not dis-
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m - . < . D-{ v,.'W e ,T cussed with Chwastyk on that date. In fact, Mr. Mehler recalls that he g: Mm p. -
, first learned about hydrogen in the newspaper. They discussed a possible e - gy>;9).ipi.Qyg.9%,; chemical reaction but could not identify any source. Tr. 29,486 87
. .; . .w (Mehler). Nor was a zirconium / water reaction discussed at that time.
, ' , ' 2M;.
N"l~ a. .rN. .,, mJy . ~ v.-;5.e .7.+ #'p W.! Tr. 29,566 (Mehler). l- 103. Mr. Chwastyk testified that he discussed the pressure spike
'I with members of the oncoming shift the afternoon or evening of March '
- 28. These were Theodore Illjes, John Kidwell, and Chuck Mell." While he cannot recall specificelly, he thinks that he discussed hydrogen. Tr.
. 4 29,167 68, 29,337-38 (Chwastyk); see also Tr. 29,349 51 (Chwastyk).
, i He may also have discussed the zirconium / water reaction with them. Tr.
! 29,356 (Chwastyk). Messrs. Ilijes, Mell, and Kidwell have also been
, at. W Q W w.M.7 - 4a interviewed.
W.94&$fg A 4 104. On July 14, 1979, Mr. Charles Mell stated that during the sh J turnover they were shown the spikes and told that both building spray N%'NM;c.<'4.m-pf6,
' rh y 5 , g ~ g r' pumps had come on. He stated, however, "at that time they . . . hadn't
. % p y v. really postulated why they had come on yet. No one really had the time to think about it." Joint Exh. 60, at 7. Mell stated that there was no dis-
. .s k. . cussion of hydrogen burn the first night and that it was not until the
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., il Mr. Chwestyk also indicated that either Bill Conaway or Carl Guthrie also came on shirt with liljes.
! '; Kidwell and Mell. tr. 29.167 (Chwastykt Mr. Conaway came on duty at 11 p m on March 28 we do
- ; not know when Mr. Guthrie came on duty. Mr. Cheastyk is probattiy mistaken about Conaway and
{. 's . , , , u. . - . Guthrie.
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next day or night that someone postulated one. Id. at 11-12; Joint Exh. 69, at 17-18. 105. In a Ntay 23,1979 NRC interview, Nir. Theodore Illjes stated, I when it Ithe shift) was turned over it was mentioned that we did have a gressure spike. when we turned over. That was the only thing that was mentioned, and that
-i they had recovered from a reactor building isolation.
5l Joint Exh. 36, at 8. Nir. Illjes, who testified, could not remember Str. l Chwastyk's briefing. Tr. 29.644-46,29,653-54 (Illjes). 106. Str. John Kidwell was interviewed by the Special Inquiry Group. The SIG Report, Starch 4, 1980, indicates that Kidwell's memory of Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday was blurred. Str. Kidwell recalled that there was discussion late one night about the pressure spike and what caused it, but he did not know which day. Joint Exh.107, at 61. 107. In his September 4,1980 deposition, Nir. Chwastyk identified
. Donald R. Neely as the NRC inspector whom he had told the spike was
! real. Ile could not recall Neely earlier. Joint Exh. I17, at 104 05; see also Tr. 29,166 (Chwastyk). Str. Neely, however, is certain that he was not informed of the pressure spike. Joint Exh.130, at 8-13.
Draw a Bubble 108. Since as early as his October i1,1979 interview, Nir. Chwastyk has maintained that, immediately after the pressure spike, and as a t result of his understanding of it, he sought and received permission from Nir. N! iller to " draw a bubble" in the pressurizer. Joint Exh. 88, at 7,18. As Nir. Chwastyk later explained, drawing or establishing a bubble
' : .Mc.9 Mf I;3@
k;N 'il in the pressurizer would mean closing the pressurizer ENIOV valve or _.j .; 4N.c. a block valve so that the water would not escape and by turning on the pressurizer heaters so that a steam bubble would form. Niakeup flow
' ']l would be increased. The purpose, according to N!r. Chwastyk, was to es-tablish a familiar mode; to know with confidence from the pressurizer
.] level what the coolant lesel in the system was; and to assure that the n / C,'1; .
j core was covered. This mode was contrasted by Nir. Chwastyk with cy-
'E ~{
cling the ENIOV or block valve, allowing water (or steam) to escape, thus not allowing a bubble to form in the pressurizer. Tr. 29,142 50, 29,288 (Chwastyk).
- 109. Drawing a bubble is not the same as the so-called "repressuriza-
'! tion strategy" (Tr. 29,291 (Chwastyk)), a theory of the case much fasored by TNil A. Nir. Chwastyk's request to draw a bubble, and Nir.
Chwastyk's statement that Str. N1 iller authorized that tactic is advanced
.w.~.
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by TNilA as evidence that the signiGeance of the pressure spike was
; . .: .;V N ;. .:. - . . fully appreciated by Chwastyk, Miller, and, in general, by others on j Z.m,'
.tx tv;#'* # T1: % .- March 28.
4 w ,j Q. '. . ,1,l..[c:
. .[. 3,
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110. The dif0culty with the theory is that no special relationship be-
.--m tween drawing a bubble and the pressure spike has been demonstrated.
$ ' ;., Moreover, as Mr. Chwastyk himself concedes, he had requested permis-yM,Nlk.J.fW.1,MIMY[
dd sion to draw a bubble before the pressure spike and could not explain
.. ' ; -M'.y (l$.y4MI[, Np'; , - .'c q h why the request after the spike differed from earlier requests except that
~ '-~
^ ' ae perceived a more pronounced need. Tr. 29,322-25 (Chaastyk). Also, as Licensee points out, at the time of the pressure spike, people were al-4 ready working on the pressurizer tryinc, to draw a bubble and to establish a level. Joint Exh. 2, at 11 (Faust); Joint Exh. 24, at 12-13 (Wright).
i Chwastyk Prevents Sparks J f" irl .. .f 111. At least one order, perhaps more, was given following the acci-
. ' ', 4. . E ' 4 \' ;i '.: dent not to operate electrical equipment in the containment in order to
"; . . . prevent sparks which could ignite combustible gas. TMIA argues that
,2-<
y; . A lf fg y p %g., m the first order was given on March 28 soon after the pressure spike and
'i-TNd'.pyggf.ny: that, therefore, there must have been an appreciation of hydrogen at Q , '- / W e . g ic that time. We discuss the spark-prevention strategy in greater detail in the section below on Mr. Mehler's testimony (where we Gnd that the
, first order was given on March 29). In the following paragraphs we ad-dress Mr. Chwastyk's memory of the Grst spark prevention order.
1.12. Beginning with his very Orst interview on May 21,1979, Mr. Chwastyk alluded to his idea of the relationship between the " electro-magrietic relief valve" (EMOV) and his assumption that there had been
, an explosion. Mr Chwastyk stated then that he suggested to Miller that gg ,3:gM/4*~'"gh.g.]
jf.5v$ hw o,, the valve no longer be cycled. Joint Exh. 35, at 18. During his second in-terview, October 11,1979, the interviewers pressed Mr. Chwastyk to be j
' 8 id .!lM(k.d J
g gna. ,
%g .
careful about whether he told Miller that he, Chwastyk, thought that 7 opening the valve had caused an explosion. Mr. Chwastyk responded l 1 that, while he was sure that he had that cause and that effect in mind at
, . , , , the time, upon thinking about the matter, he could not remember telling
.- avi w U; /.l. sc,5 Miller about his theory. Mr. Chwastyk may have stated to Miller only
- s. + g p cr.; g y:,, another request to draw a bubble. Joint Exh. 88, at 21 22.
i13. A few weeks later, during hislhird interview, Mr. Chwastyk i < 4: 3 :.ig by.. was again requested to state his best recollection about what he told Mr.
- $ #.{,qqhGg./ Miller about his spark theory during that report. On this occasion, Mr.
i' ~- '
,.~
Chwastyk stated that he had thought about that matter, and that he did go to Mr. Miller with his thoughts sbout the sparks and the valve opera- !, tion. Joint Exh. 99, at 13 14.
;g '
, .4
- n. . ' . . ._* W Ah'% *y a 7:q:.:.,.'.x;g.1 .? ,** g 374 k _.* s . .J . m. " ~
114. The question arose again during the September 4.1980 inter-view by the IE team where the team alluded to Str. Chwastyk's first tes-
' timony on Stay 21,1979 (when Chwastyk had recommended that the E510V not be operated). The interviewers wanted to know why hir.
Chwastyk's recommendation was limited to the E510V. Str. Chwastyk responded that in fact there had been an order put out not to operate other equipment and that he " sort of kicked" himself"for not thinking ofit.' Joint Exh.117, at 15-16. 115. At the hearing, Str. Chwastyk testified, for the first time, that the first order not to operate equipment was issued by Chwastyk himself after a discussion with Ntr. 51 iller and that the order pertained to the EN10V or block valve. Tr. 29,152 53, 29,285 (Chwastyk); see also Tr. 29,332 (Chwastyk). Ile entained also that his " kicked myself" state-ment was not inconsistent with his current testimony. According to Str. Chwastyk, his first order was limited to the E510V because that was the only item being operated. Tr. 29.332 (Chwastyk). When the later order covering all electrical equipment came out, Str. Chwastyk realized that he should have anticipated that other equipment might be used. There-fore, he " sort of kicked myself." Tr. 29,344-45. I16. The Board disagrees with Licensee's proposed findings on this point. Licensee Reply Findings 92, 93. hir. Chwastyk's explanation about overlooking other electrical equipment, thinking only about the EN10V, is consistent with his earlier interviews as he explained during the IE interview of September 4,1980. Joint Exh.117, at 1516, supra. 117. We are, howeser, troubled by the recurring phenomenon of Str. Chwastyk's memory improving over time. From no early mention
! of the fact that he, Chwastyk, had given the order not to cycle the ENIOV, and uncertainty whether he had even discussed the matter with hit. Niiller, hir. Chwastyk came to the hearing confident that the order T " , . .-@ Q$, .. .hf;h{
was issued by Chwastyk himself after consultation with 51r. h! iller.
. 'T- . . . - 118. When deposed before the hearing on September 24,1984, hir.
Chwastyk stated that it was Nir. h! iller, not Chwastyk, who gave the order not to operate the EN10V. Tr. 29,284-87 (Chwastyk) (deposition not in evidence). But having since refreshed his memory by reviewing i all of the depositions (at the Board's request), Str. Chwastyk arrived at
- his present view that the order was given by Chwastyk after consultation with hir. Niiller. Yet, as we have recounted above, hir. Chwastyk's ear-I lier depositions and interviews were much less specilic on the matter than is the memory they refreshed. And of course, we must consider the fact that no one else has ever mentioned Chwastyk's order not to m J 375 Lacit.SdiS : .. . . . _ . L_,
W
..pM- . , , ..f- ' '~~C^ W g
2 W .
- = a operate the E.\lOV or block salve. Nir. .\liller does not recall any discus-sion of Ntr. Chwast> k's account. Tr. 30,204 (N1 iller)."
. y :. ... -,, _ , ,
* ,3 2 3 Board Conclusions on Mr. Chwastyk's Testimony o . - q
'Tf'," 119. The Board concludes that, on Starch 28, 1979, h!r. Chwastyk W...m . :.: v.c s ;. (p w did not interpret the pressure spike and the actuation of the containment
. , [-[ ly'$R$[O;)*75MN spray pumps in terms of hydrogen combustion and core damage. IIis tes-timony and previous statements to that etTect are not reliable. We also
! conclude. that Str. Chwastyk's testimony is probably consistent with his understanding of the truth. But his memory of events has been in-
, fluenced by after-acquired information.
120. .\fr. Chwa3tyk probably understood on .\tarch 28 that the pres-sure spike was real. Alt. Nlchler corroborates th: 3. As of .\ lay 21,1979, i his first statement on the matter, he had already associated in his
' memory the cycling of the ENIOV for the block vahe) with the pressure
; yi '
spike. Therefore, by that time, he may have had a memory that on Afarch 28 he knew that there had been an explosion or detonation. But
- .. , the record is not reliable on that point, because he refers solely to the
~ ~
' simultaneity of the spike and the valve cycling without reference to 7 . / u T- , , , sparks.
121. The Board was innuenced by the fact that, as a trend, Alr. Chwastyk's memory seemed to improve over time. But this was not always the case. For exampic, he was less certain about what he had reported to Str. Stiller and to the oncoming shift in his hearing testimo-ny than in some earlier statements. Nesertheless, there were too many
; inconsistencies in N!r. Chwastyk's accounts of the relevant episodes for the Board to accept any of the various versions over any other. Ilis ac-count that he understood on 51 arch 28 that there was a hydrogen com-iddhyh..
bustion which derived from a damaged core and degraded zirconium ( :M.J$hh.Myrjcu;f.w@hh
":2:c.n 7s .. e cladding and that he communicated the essence of this information to *;
. .. .; r 4.gg -
others is not corroborated by those to whom he believes he spoke. Nor
-~
l is it corroborated by the record of events. 122. In sum, we find that on Starch 28,1979 Str. Chwastyk did not believe, as an interpretation of the pressure spike and spray actuation,
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)
i 12
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fn two early intervtems. Nlr. Nichler stated that either the same aay or imo days laict" there was a
. .. - e
' ' dmsuon of the source of ignition. First he rhought it had been the pressurtier vent satse doint F sh.
J M' .' ' C
' 32, at 32) and later the pressurizer block salse (Joint Esh 64. at 8L But Nfr Nfchler has neser men-q taoned Ntr Chwastyis order not to cycle ibe ENtov or bloth salse in his seseral statements about when the first order not to operate electrKal equTment was issued See the J:scusvon or operattr'g elettncal equipment iri connectson with Ntr Nf ehler's testimony belo*. ser al><> Joint Eth. 36. at 9-10 filhest 6
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s.3 that there was core damage (more sesere than believed before the spike), nor did he believe that any such core damage produced hydrogen
~ ._.
7 by a zirconium / water reaction, nor did he then believe that the pressure spike was a hydrogen combustion. Nor did he communicate any such in-
- m. ._ 7 ,
j formation to anyone on Starch 28. Since we do not find that any of w 4-. . . . .w O e , _..I those links occurred, the possibility that they all occurred is extremely
" ' .jQ[i g {r . ~,
remote. o.%n - " - - 123. Sforeover, even if we were to believe that Afr. Chwastyk appre-ciated the full significance of the pressure spike, and, assuming further, that he spoke about some or all of this information to Afr. Niiller, Str. Chwastyk's testimony was that hir. Stiller was not paying attention to Str. Chwastyk during the report. Indeed, hir. h! iller's immediate depar-ture to brief the Lieutenant Governor after Chwastyk's report is a strong indication that Alr. Niiller had not received any such information from Chwastyk. 124. It is not necessary that we understand why Str. Chwastyk made statements inconsistent with the reliable evidence. However, since those statements constitute the main collection of accusations - by others, j not Chwastyk - against hit. Dieckamp, some additional observations
; about hir. Chwastyk might be helpful.
125. He was not a volunteer. He appeared under subpoena. He car-l
, ries no brief against Str. Dieckamp. He stated that he is sure that h!r.
Dieckamp did not know what Chwastyk knew during the accident. Tr. 29,421 (Chwastyk). 126. The Board and the parties have had the opportunity to ponder deliberately the transcripts of Str. Chwastyk's testimony and various 4 statements. We have read exquisite analyses of virtually every subtlety and nuance in the differing accounts. Yet, h!r. Chwastyk's testimony 3 and depositions have been on-the-spot oral answers months and years
.d_.. _h%djj after the events. j J$d2h,
^ We
. dydM'g$IOf t 127. As Afr. Chwastyk explained, there has been an overanalysis of
~
', his answers. He does not have the verbal skills of the lawyers who have
.~~ l questioned him. His meanings have not always been accurately under-stood by his questioners. Tr. 29,420-21 (Chwastyk). He points out that
, information is missed in transcribing the depositions; the tone of the
, ._ ] "
] question; some possible facial expressions. Tr. 29,420 (Chwastyk). We
'j are sympathetic to that observation. As we noted during the hearing, his l ! demeanor was frequently consistent with uncertainty - a shrug of the l
I shoulders for example. Tr. 29,190-91. Yet this uncertainty may not be
' h evident in the raw language of the transcripts.
l 128. Str. Chwastyk acknowledged that he has learned a lot since the accident and doesn't know how much of that information could have 3, j.O[ * , 377 t 7;.*-.. ._
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,'y [ * *. ' ,;, _.4 ., ,
4
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1 I become confused with his memory of esents. Tr. 29.314 (Chwastyk). f , '- ~ , .u - .
- .';' fie also acknowledged that he probably had less confidence in his under-
'.N .)
. standing of the events on the day of the accident than he did during his L ;. v . . _; , ~ , - -
'-- fc testimony. Tr. 29,352-53 (Chwastyk).
,M e i. . f y; .a..}f .
. l,s 129. lie appeared to be cooperative with all participants regardless of QQ their positions on the issues. lie tried to provide information as best he E--cbW }iW>:.i44U'hf@
Q p;"gf
,.U .yj
'J<
could. This we see as a possible part of the problem - a willingness to provide information even though uncertain about it. All in all, we thought his summary advice to the Board was very constructive. Ile is not sure that 5% years after the accident anyone can make total sense i out of the events of Starch 28.1979. Tr. 29,420 (Chwastyk). C. Brian Niehler 130. As noted above Str. Brian N1ehler was, with Str. Chwastyk, also [ '. a' a TN!!-2 shift supervisor on duty at the time of the pressure spike. Notic-1 ing increased activity and the actuation of some alarms, Nir. Nichter n[ . 'n . e ,: ". ;;7 m went to the console. Tr. 29,475-76 (Nichler). The pressure recorder
,[c; ' '
looked to him as if there had been an electrical fault, but shortly thereaf-5' , 4 T,. ;.. ' 7 Mj, ter he saw that both containment spray pumps were running. Based
/ - "' upon the two-out-of-three sensor logic for the pumps (and an engineered safeguard (ES) signal), Str. Stehler realized the spike was real. Tr.
29,479 (N1ehler). After the equipment was secured, Ntr. Niehler and 51r. Chwastyk " looked at each other" and mutually agreed that there had bc , a spike. They didn't know the cause - perhaps a chemical reaction. It was over, and there was no more that could be done about it. They went on with their work. Tr. 29,562 63 (Niehler); see also Tr. 29,487 (Niehler). a e,.-fc :::'N@. j : ., ' 131. Nir. Siehler was examined thoroughly at the hearing about
#j"s9.# hi$g 3 A .x,, ,
whether he appreciated or discussed the fact that there had been a hydro-gen explosion on the 28th and he was quite specific that neither hydro-
'~
~yV' gen nor explosion was understood or discussed on N! arch 28th. Tr.
29,487, 29.563-66. Nor, of course, was zirconium / water reaction. Tr.
.. 29,566 (N1ehler).
'1 -
- -t 132. Str. Niehler has been interviewed or deposed at least six times
> f"r. :.w' s nce the accident.') IIis earlier statements contain many references to the hydrogen explosion and other core damage indicators on Starch 28.
' * . Str. Siehler has repeatedly explained that these references are products 13 Thew statemems are m cWdence- Jeunt Enh.17. Met Ed interuew ( April 25,19794Jomt Exh. 32.
NRC mterview (May 17.1979h Jomt Enh 68. Hart Committee mieruew ( August 22.1979h Jomt Exh. 89. NRC deposition loctober i1.1979). Jomt Exh. 98. NRC deposmon toctober J0,1979h and y s _ Jomt Emb. I15, NRC mteruew (september J.1980L 5- - %;;.:f: ~*
, _4,u -
378
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7
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t f i i of knowledge gained after hlarch 28. Tr. 29,488, 29,490, 29.514, 29,564, 29,581 (hlehler). The Board has examined these statements, particularly the portions cited by the parties. With one exception, we find nothing inconsistent with Mr. Mehler's assertion that, on March i wC - crf CO 28, 1979, he did not know that the pressure spike and containment
~
j,is,.(l;JR ~M R spray actuation was caused by a zirconium / water reaction, hydrogen j 4
. a [- ~ (IeshD;.y '~
explosion, or that anyone interpreted the spike or spray actuation in terms of core damage on that day. 133. The exception we allude to is Mr. Mehler's prior statements i concerning the timing of an order not to actuate electrical equipment. Electrical Equipment 134 There is no dispute that, once hydrogen or an explosion was identified as the cause of the pressure spike, an order was given not to operate electrical equipment to prevent ignition by sparking. To support the theory that zirconium / water reaction, hydrogen and core damage were understood on March 28 TMIA cites statements by Mr. Mehler that the order not to operate electrical equipment was issued on March
'- 28. We consider the entire subissue in the context of Mr. Mehler's statements.
135. When interviewed on August 22,1979, by the Hart Committee, Mr. Mehler was asked if he heard anyone express any concern about energizing the block valvejust prior to the pressure spike. Ile replied: No. After the pressure - don't know exactly what the time eieraent was after that. Smce we did have an explosion. it needed a source ofignition. We assumed the igni-tion source could have been the block valve. If it was that same day or two days
. . . , . .. ._ later I can't tellI know it was discussed at some time or another.
- b. . $5_ .. Yr$
. av c -) ym{.f.g-w,pg.M,
.c .. ..
s. Joint Exh. 68, at 8. : n 7; ., 136. Mr. Mehler was again interviewed about the spark potential by the Special Inquiry Group on October 11,1979: Q % hat I'm trying to do is key in to some events on 3/28.
. .j
.j
.3 I l 84 TMIA pomts to Mr. Mehler's August 22.1979 mterview by the Hart Committee Umnt Enh. 68. at j 12) ror a proposed rmdmg that Mr. Mehler had moscated that he may have discussed tyarogen with Mr.
j' Chwastyk. TMIA Proposed Findmg 45. In that mternew. Mr. Mehler tated "we were concerned but we couldn't determme ifit was hydrogen or maybe we had some kind orchemical reaction that time " Jomt Eih. 68. at 12. The entire discuwon however mdicates that hydrogen was not as might he m. ferred, discussed as a powble source of the spie. Mr. Mehler stated m that same mteruew that no one j i realized that there could have been so much hydrogen, and that neither he nor anyone else had any idea at the time that the temperatures were high enough to produce a zircomum/ water reaction. IJ.
. ~.
l 379 t
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A Yes, you are trpng to 6gure out if they told us not to operate lhft pumps l why we did.
~ '
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Q Not really,I'm trying to Sgure out if someone told you not to operate electrical
, equipment in the containment, was that on 3/28 or 3/29 ?
, ~ , ,
s~ . ,
! s. , ' , . . ,' ' d $~ b1 ,~~' ' < A That was 3/28.
C. - [ u' ' . , .[ u rQ,.f [, - Q Why are you so sure?
< yg -;pr.dl9 w .:
rr 4 - *
.. t
# g.- : A Because it was prior to the reactor coohng pump starting and we started that at 3/28 in the esening.
Q So that was contrary to the instruction that was issued?
?
j A It was after the hydrogen burn and we had to get some kind of pump running, you know, you had the lesser of two esils Q Oka), well I admit it has been sa months ago since th:s occurred. but the last question on this ts, is that in the control rcom leg. it was on the three to elesen shift on the 29th, on swing shift around 2114 [9:14 p m.] when the entry was
" q' made to place the pumps in the off position (minimize spark potential at reactor building). And as I understood, that in your memory, that is about when that
, instruction was given to you. So do you see why I hase the question?
. . 1., .
' , u: ,,;;;;g-47. d A I understand and I can say for a fact and I will go under oath and I will take a
- . , , ...e A6.y &.,.. y .
he detector test, prior to running the reactor fore pumps, someone did tell us 4 @ M n- D ' not to start anything and I remember telling Gary, it's too late now I have al-
' " q.- m ready started them. And that was after the hydrogen spike.
Q Now the reason why you were not to start anything - A Was a gark in case we did h.ne hydrog:n in there. Q Oka) And you did not know who adsised you of that? A No, I don't. 6 i Q Where did they think the hydrogen came from at that point in time?
} ., I
_ - ".r /d. at 24-25. i . 137. We have considered the possibility that, in the passage just cited, Nir. Niehler was attempting to explain that the order not to start electrical equipment came after the spike rather than before it, and that
~
- m. . P. .
he was thinking of the starting of the reactor coolant pumps rather than
~ ~
the date. But other portions of the October 11 interview support the con-clusion that h!r. Nichler then believed that, in fact, the order was given
, . <- .." .* ~, . . - . ,.ii on the 28th. See id. at 15,16.
4 -t 4 138. On October 30,1979, Nir. 51ehler was interviewed again by the Special Inquiry Group about the order not to start electrical equipment.
. This time Nir. 51ehler believed that the order was given by hir. Niiller i from his office, but that he, 51ehler, did not know what day the order
*} '
380
., u y ) ~..l:;.ahhhf}l&k h~ (5lf. hkhkhj jNk$$$C.5 -L.Z?.Rl'*nlhN':b. lllb}
was given. lie recalled that the order followed Nlr. Niehler's testing of i the lift and backstop pumps, a step necessary before actuating the reactor
! coolant pumps. The comment was made to the efTect that since those l pumps had been started (already sparked) there would not be ary hydro-
. .- j gen left. Joint Exh. 98, at i1-12.
- - ' ,- 4 139. Referring back to the October 11 interview, Nir. Siehler was
- - 5 :) asked about what had made him then believe that the order was given
-i on Ntarch 28. He responded that "because I remember starting the lift i pumps and backstop pumps on Starch 28." Ilowever, he recalled starting
' those pumps also on the 29th. /J. at 13-14. N!r. Siehler explained that since the earlier interview, upon " thinking back upon it" he had become less certain that the order had been given on the 28th. lie had talked to N!essrs. NIiller, Ross, Zewe, and Chwastyk, none of whom re-called the instruction being gisen on the 28th. lie stated that .\f r.
Chwastyk in particular recalled the instruction being given on the 29th.
/d. at 15-16.is 51r. Stehler summarized the matter by statmg that his own memory standing alone had been that the instruction was given on
- the 28th but that, in talking to the others, it is more likely to have been j
given on the 29th. /d. at 1617. 140. On November 1,1979, N1r. Niehler provided to rke Special in-quiry Group transcript corrections to his October 11,1979 deposition in a cover letter informing the Group that he was unable to state that the instruction not to operate electrical equipment occurred on Nf arch 28, 1979. or at some later date. Joint Exh. 89 (coser page). 141. 51r. Stehler was interviewed for the last time by the IE team on i September 3,1980. Nir. N1chler stated that the change in his opinion i concerning the instruction not to operate electrical equipment was the result of having talked to people, having had the chance to review logs,
> and having had a chance to sit down, talk to his wife, and figure out
.f'.^5 where he was. Joint Exh.115, at 23. He st .ted that, after 6 months, the 5 ShN, . _ . , ,%,WU[..
S.D"'J .rF k 28th,29th and 30th ran together. /d. at 21. i 142. The control room log tends to support the position that the i order not to activate electrical equipment remembered by N!r. Stehler and others was given on N1 arch 29. TN11 A Exh.16. The entry for 2114 hours (9:14 p.m.) on Starch 29 noted "Placed RCP [ reactor coolant _ . q 15Mr. Chwastyk remembered the conversation. He stated that he didn't want to talk to Mr Mehler i about it. He thinks that he may have made a comment to Mr. Mehler that he. Chwastyk. didnTthink it j harpened on the 29th 6n one answer) and that it didn't happen on the 28th hn arlother answer). but Mr. Ch*astyk could not remember either way. Joint Eth 117. at 38 Mr. Chwastyk was withng to defer to Messrs Zewe and Miller on the pomt. // at 41. In an carber mterview Mr. Chwastyk stated that he didn't t'chese that the order not to operate electrical equ'pment. particularly the hft pumps. was gnen on March 28th. Moreover he prouded his reasons for tending to 'hink the order was gnen later than the 28th. Joint Enh 99. ai 1517 381
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4;. . . - pumps] lift pumps in off [ position] (minimize sparking potential in
.. c u . ., . RB)." ThllA Exh.16, at 87. This entry indicated to Mr. Siehler that the lift pumps had been started in case it became necessary to start a reactor ! ' 7 f, .iNQ'.i.y Y.n .; 7; ff-J. , p ' -
coolant pump. Tr. 29,531-33 (Mehler). Mr. Mehler acknowledged that
. ' f l?'F i ?-QGYh.,* U sk y this could have been the esent that occasioned the instruction he f Q$.k ' y!O'M remembered, though he is not certain. Tr. 29,578 (Mehler). No similar
.!6 -[M $$,$@A Mhj[@q;,- M entry can be found in the log for March 28th. TMIA Exh.16.
"' UNM E.$ @dqM 143. Mr. Mehler's testimony at the hearing was not very helpful,
~ XEy'??,g ' 1 but, in general, it was consistent with his last two interviews. Tr.
J 29,507-34,29,567-79 (Mehler). As he explained: As time goes on. you know, from March 28th,it became harder to recall what actu-ally I remembered, and what I was told about, read about. or found out about. It a sery h.ird to differentiate between them. T 144. Others who had a good opportunity to hear about any spark pre-I - 4
. 'i $.5 i ' ,
.. vention strategy recalled either that it took place after the 28th or could M not recall that it happened on the 28th.
, , . J:.,--@o.bm.J
, m 1
- .4- .p< .;e.Cmh'
~
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145. Mr. Kunder testified that he gave such an order - to deener-gize unnecessary equipment in the reactor building - to Mr. Bensel n after the Thursday meeting. Tr. 30,028-33 (Kunder); Joint Exh.118, at 9hM@$[0if+id3%g{ByA's 7a ~ !y .n , 51-53. Mr. Zewe specifically recalled that the order was given sometime s on the 29th. Joint Exh.119, at 46. Mr. Ross stated that he was sure that the order was not given on the 28th; it was given either on the 29th or 30th Joint Exh.124, at 66-67. 146 NRC Inspector, Mr. Neely, present on March 28, did not hear j any such order that day and it was not until much later that h'e heard about it. Joint Exh.130, at 910. Similarly, NRC Inspector, Mr. Higgins, also present, did not learn about the spark prevention strategy until
, 3 . . , _ -. , ,, .,{.g much later. Joint Exh.129, at 30. Mr. Faust guessed that any such order ,
Ogg[ s: "
.~ i '
~yR . . .. w e 7. would have been given on the 29th. Joint Exh.133, at 17-18. Mr. Porter '
' " ' .pg' W,3 t'$@M does not recall such a discussion on the 28th, but recalls that preventing sparks was a consideration later. Joint Exh. 70, at 19-20. Mr. Logan re-calls such an order but cannot recall whether it was given on the 28th.
; Joint Exh.136, at 47. Shift fo:eman Adam Miller, when asked if he re-called whether there was a concern about sparking on the 28th replied:
.~, _,. 3 ; m( Q y. Q' W -
s "No, not on the 28th." Joint .xh.137, at 13. Mr. Frederick seems
, unable to recall anything about such an order on any date. Joint Exh.
. . : .3.q:-f,i.7. ...;.; ;
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l l 132, at 8. Nor does Mr. !!!jes. Joint Exh.127, at 10-11.S Nor does Mr. I Conaway. Joint Exh.136, at 47. ~ *
. . m
- 4 h Conclusions on Mr. Mehler's Testimony
-Nm-* 147. Even though Mr. Mehler realized rather promptly that the pres-F -.. S'X
- sure spike on March 28 was a real pressure increase, he has never wav-
/<
' ered in his belief that there was no appreciation or discussion of hydro-gen o- hydrogen explosion on that date. The only thing remarkable about Mr. Mehler's testimony is the Grmness of his initial belief that the instruction not to operate electrical equipment came on March 28 just prior to operating the reactor coolant pumps that evening.
148. It is not clear that Mr. Mehler " retracted" his earlier statement
, to that elTect as Licensee suggests. Licensee Reply Finding 8. A better (
interpretation is that he deferred to what he regarded as better evidence q that the order came on the 29th and that Mr. Mehler recognized that his earlier statements were probably wrong. Mr. Mehler's revised opinion was not a simple change of mind, he came to the conclusion that the order was probably given on the 29th only after a thoughtful approach to l , the matter - studying the log, talking to his colleagues and thinking it 1 over. He does not claim that his memory was refreshed by those steps, a restraint that enhanced his credibility. t IM In any event, we cannot accept TMIA's argument (not without its egic) that Mr. Mehler's earlier statements, closer to the events. ,
' sheuld be accepted over his later statements. Mr. Mehler himself lost '
con 6dence in the earlier statements. Given the large amount of reliable esidence that the order not to operate electrical equipment came after March 28, and no reliable evidence that it came on the 28th, we accept 4 . . . _ . - :s ' J Mr. Mehler's revised opinia. The order was not issued on March 28. It
- 9NO h N bg!??jDP y b hj ?]
was issued Grst on March 29. 150. Mr. Mehler's interview with Mr. O'Connor of Metropolitan C:JG*%.NQi ' ' 11' Edison took place on April 25,1979 - before the mailgram. Joint Exh.
- 17. It reDects Mr. Mehler's awareness then that the spike was real - a point not in dispute. Id. O.her than the pressure spike itself and the reference to the actuation of the containment sprays, the April 25 inter-Q. _ . view provided no information that would have alerted Mr. Dieckamp to any possibility that anyone appreciated a hydrogen detonation on March j
- 28. In fact, Mr. Mehler's April 25 interview and others conducted
; before May 9,1979, are interesting in that the pressure spike seems to i
16 But Mr. liljes stated on May 23. 1979, that there had been a discumon or the aremg potenual or the EMOV which could igmte hydrogen. but he could not wy that it was dncussed on March 28. Jomt Exh.
. 36, at 9-10.
* ,4 383
,i 4
. ne ..
7 , f. a-
,s- ( .c c-m have a rather low priority in the discussions. Esen weeks after the acci-dent the importance of the spike was not apparent in the interviews.
. 3 _
;- c'
~
Theodore Illjes D.
. q s . ;. ,
~ sy _
=
ey(c.%;, c. g, . f. '_ . , 151. N!r. Theodore Illjes was a control room operator working the
?W'N4dDM Q@ff{ly'fjF$yp;.;.m' three-to-eleven shift under Nir. Chwastyk on Starch 28. By the time he W y_ M fcj was briefed and made other preparations it was not until about 6:30 p.m.
that he began working at the console. Joint Exh. 36, at 2-5. Nir. Ilijes was interviewed twice before the hearing. In the first interview, by the
! NRC on N1ay 23,1979, Str. tiljes stated that, upon initial brieling, he was told that there had been a spike and containment isolation. Later in the esening a " hydrogen explosion" was discussed as a possible cause.
/J. at b.
152. Pressed as to when the hydrogen explosion was discussed, N!r. I liljes explained: i
~' "' j If I want to relate it. I wou'd say it was after we drew the bubble in the pressurizer 3
r . which we did fter that. As far as what time that was mentioned. as far as we dis. 9.' ' .p Q.g; ., . . m . . _ , - ,.k cussed it. I know at was discussed when we turned owe l shift changel, when we came
.g w s ; . . ..c.,..- in but we didn't make any bones about it because we were interested in getting
*@f-Qq%:. 7. vu- . . g .-
flow through the reactor and the bubble in the pressurizer and so. They had recov-ered from the building isolation high pressure injecuon. They had recovered from l that situation, and our concern was coolmg the reactor and insuring it had flow. Later on when we had fungs stabilied, we had a bubble in the pressurizer and had a reactor coolant pump sunning and that term area, we we e discussing with, I can't remember if it was one cf our engineers. But ne Jed hair a perssure >pde. We pulled it out and I don't know who wanted a copy but we made a couple copies of the chart. i
/d. at 7 (emphasis added).
. . ~ . , . 4 153. Nir. Illjes had recalled clearly that when the shift "was turned g ry%#4* .-M *Mh* x.ny, over" he learned only that there had been a pressure spike and the unit
,MSt. M, .SD/-hc MiF%' wg^ >k%MM ' had recovered from containment isolation, with no mention of hydrogen at that time. /d. at 6,8-9. Therefore, we posit from the passage just cited
, that Nir. Illjes on Ntay 23 had begun retrospectively to refer to the pres-sure spike as the hydrogen explosion, and rice versa, as we have noted in a accounts by other commenters.
1-
** ,~
v;y ' - r .
- 1 154. The NRC interviewer may also have fallen into the same pat-4, tern as the following exchange indicates:
,, EASANO: 50 a pressure spike was discussed at the turn oser, when you first came I
in, about 3.45. And then somewhere about 8 00 further discussion and also Aeros copies (of the containment pressure strip-chart recorderl? ILLJES: R tght.
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, 384
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h ' f454NO: And apparently . ILLJES: I thmk we remembered the xerox machme wasn't working too good.
~. . <; f,, ,
f "l FASANO: At this time you discussed w hat and with whom, if you can remember?
.'. s -4 ' J N . ' 7. .! .'. -
ILUES: We talked, I talked about it with the trainee on our shift, who was
-l r,N h % 3 > w 72 ,
%- Chuck Mell. And the person that asked for the informanon, and I don't Mgg'g g ,,
remember who that was, whether it was an NRC mspector or a B&W
? .$h$.0NS f
- F 4- ,. _ FASANO: Was any discussion related to this? Was the hydrogen burn or was a real r ,
spike or was this discussed as an electrical spurious signal possibly? ILLJES: This was discussed that evening but we also talked about it several times
- i after that and I cannot separate t'e two ditTerent discussions but as far as I remember we related it to a cyc!ing of the electromatic retref isola-tion, which is a DC operated uhe i beliese and that nas a contact in there which will cause arcing whnh possibly could ignite the hydrogen.
; That was discussed, but I can't say we dtscussed it that night. We didn't
! really have that much time to do a lot of discussion, but we talked about
, f it and when I walked away from the panel, the guy that wanted the copy.
, - you know, he wanted it now, and I had to walk away from the panel to make sure that the other guy, my shift supervisor, was there uhile 1
?'
J-r;te " .-
- walked away so .
Qfe ,; _-' , cO"~ FASANO: On the first evenmg, can you recall if on that first esemns you were dis-
- 7. - * ' --
cussmg after 8.00 that it was possibly a hydrogen burn? e . -- ILLJES: As far as I know that possibihty was discussed that esenmg.
/d. at 9-10.
; 155. From the foregoing one could, and perhaps should, conclude i that as of May 23, 1979, Mr. Illjes' best memory was that a hydrogen I
explosion was discussed as the cause of the pressure spike the evening
. of March 28. But as the interview continued, Mr. Illjes introduced a new
': A4,%NN$Idd$M$h.'s factor into his memory of the events: *
- ?h,dN'E$k&&hM &%N Y
,q #T -;. @ +y"- M m Q ILLJES: It was also that mght, you know, that we determined that we had a hard f 2 bubNe and shar rhar bubNe was, you know, we had talked about that too, a
you know . .What is the gas and is it hydrogen or other and all that water that went through the reactor and out mio the RC drain tank and i out mto the reactor building.
/ ,
e
- , . ' . , ^ .4 1 Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
, 156. The "hard bubble" comment was not pursued on May 23. The
^ '
j question would arise again as to whether the "hard bubble" to which j Mr. Illjes refers was related to a real pressure spike on March 28 or to ,. ;- the widely publicized concern of some days later that there was a hydro-gen bubble trapped in the head of the reactor vessel. l
- - .Q+ ~.', .
N. 385 l , i i
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I l 157. Mr. Illjes was interviewed again on September 24,1980, by the
. . . s ." /:/ -
. special IE team investigating the information-transfer matter. Joint Exh.
. .7. ,
'5" 127. The team was very interested in Mr. Illjes' earlier statements about
- . . n.
a/ ,, o ,
. , -y hydrogen:
n - -
. . . . . - . . . ~.
iN%.' l . i-s 1'T J '!;. ' Q is it still your recollection that hydrogen was discussed on hf arch 28th,1979, as (N.3'-h:sk[~l((((:*i7['#;t.[;.. n: 7; 2 4 - C ' .. - a possible cause of the pressure spike?
. A To my recollection. we discussed the pressure spike.
Q Do you recall who you discussed it with? g A The other two men in the control room at the time. and Joe Chwastyk was sit- , 1 ting behind us, or in the near vicinity. I don't remember if he was in the con-s ersation or not. But the other two men on the shift - f Q That would be blell and Kidwell? A Yes. u- , BY N1R. fiOEFLING:
~
~
Q Was hydrogen a part of those discussions, do you recall?
^..g ' . ._ , . , '.3* 4.; - -.
A 1 don't remember. Q When you said pressure spike," you used that intentionally? You were talking about the pressure spike? 8
, A Yes.
Q And not necessanly hydrogen? A It's hard for me to separate all the discussion that was made on that night. I can't really say, because it was discussed how many times thereafter, and that
. m. s , ... . .c a far apart I can't relate the difference.
., Id. at 6-7.
. R s...n y e<.y ;; y 158. This passage suggests again that Mr. Illj_es had begun retrospec-
_- .. a a s O tively and generically equating hydrogen with pressure spike. i 159. The IE team also attempted to resolve with Mr. Illjes his memory on May 23, 1979, that there had been a "hard bubble" deter-1 , . .. . J.V .: 'CA mined on March 28: W m- y, .f;-y.; Q . .The other investigations to date have concluded that it was not until subsc-quent to Starch 28th,1979 - either late Thursday evening or early Friday
~
P .T.jk; < ... morning sometime - that a reahzation took place that a hydrogen bubble ex-isted m the primary system in the reactor vessel head, this noncondensible bubble. I You have previously testified that the reason you recall that you knew of the
..g . . .y.
,f.,., spike on Afarch 28th, the evening of hf arch 28th, was that that same evening S
l,l ~ * * ' , ** * *, i 386 i t 1 i f
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- f.(
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I you became aware that there was a hard bubble of h)dregen - using your words there - w hich was in the reactor vessel head. The discrepancy which I'm trying to resolve is the contradiction in when you knew of the hydrogen bubble and when the other insestigations have conclud.
/ ,
. ed that there became general knowledge of the fact that a hydrogen bubble, or noncondensible gases still custed m that reactor system.
c ::'a , 3 7 , _ s_ Can you explain the discrepancy between that?
'1N - A* 'Y '- ' -
_n- - x y;;- n : q m - , r , A No. Q is it still your recollection that you were aware of a bubble of hydrogen, or non. condensible gases, which remained m the reactor sessel head on March 28th, 19M ? l A I .an remember the bubble and the problem th.it we had which we were trying to resche at the time. I can remember the tubNe being m the noncondensi-ble Dubble," so to put it. I do remember that. Joint Exh.127, at 8-9. 160. When pressed on the point he remained of the opinion that the "hard bubble" was identified on the 28th because he associated it with a v' , + m _ ..- ' - trying to establish a bubble in the pressurizer. Id. at 9. Alr. Illjes also con-
" .'. . - ..2 : sistently remembered in both interviews that the pressure spike had m : been xeroxed on the 28th, a point we return to later. Joint Exh. 36, at 7-8; Joint Exh.127, at 5-6.
161. At the hearing Mr. Illjes had almost no recollection of conversa-tions on the day of the accident. To the best of his recollection, he does not remember a discussion of hydrogen on the evening of the 28th. Tr. 29,595 (Illjes). He could not recall discussing the pressure spike with Messrs. Chwastyk, Mell and Kidwell that evening. Tr. 29,597 (Illjes). He does not recall any discussion correlating the spike with the operation m g. of the relief valve. Tr. 29,600 (Illjes). He could not recall any discussion
;M'.M[49..d,j.,
- f.gy .sg,QL;g,T; MMvjM; Q; ~ about hydrogen in the reactor vessel. Tr. 29,610 (Illjes). He hid no z s. , w ;4y,.p. - recollection of being told by Mr. Chwastyk that the pressure spike was real, that it represented an explosion, that the explosion was due to hydrogen, or that the source of the hydrogen was a zirconium / water reaction in the reactor core. Tr. 29,652-53 (Illjes). He didn't seem to
" recall his previous interviews. He simply acknowledged that the tran-
~
scripts say what they say. E.g., Tr. 29,607 (Illjes). 162. Mr. Illjes tried to be helpful by his analyses of the log and knowledge of procedures. On that basis, Mr. Illjes believes now that the j realization that a hydrogen buin had actually occurred was later, probably
! Friday, March 30. He believes that if the pressure spike had been at-tributed to a hydrogen burn or hydrogen explosion on Wednesday, 387 i
l I l l _h
- w f. $ ,
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Starch 28, there would base been correctise measures taken and perhaps a log entry made. Tr. 29,650-51,29,745 (Illjes). ei 163. Nir. Illjes also testified that he remembers Steve Pogi as one of the engineers who was present when the spike was attributed to hydro-I gen. Nir. liljes recalls that Nir. Pogi was not present on the day of the
. ,,,.'- accident. Tr. 29,657-59 (Illjes). Nir. Pogi was a Penelec Former GPUSC
# ,' - startup engineer who arrived at TN11 on Friday, Starch 30,1979. TN!I A
' - Exh. II, at 2.
3 164 The Board has no reason to believe that N1r. Illjes' loss of memory was simply a convenience. lie was no more helpful with his memory to counsel for Licensee than he was when cross-examined by Intervenors. E.g., Tr. 29,642 (Illjes Blake). We conclude that Str. Illjes simply does not base a good memory. By the time of his first interview, Nlay 23,1979. he had already begun to show signs that his memory was influenced and confused by af ter-acquired information. Ilis recollection i of a "hard bubble" of hydrogen in the head of the reactor vessel on N1 arch 28 is a very good example of this. Today he acknowledges that,
; during his earlier interviews, he had difficulty keeping his days straight.
1 Tr. 29,637 (Illjes). j 165. In sum, and without disparagement to N1r. Illjes, we conclude { that the better course is to give little weight to Str. Illjes' testimony from memory at the hearing or in earlier interviews. llis analyses of the log and procedures, however, are credible. In any event, Nir. Illjes' first interview, on N1ay 23. occurred well after the Stay 9 mailgram. E, Gary P. Stiller 166. On N1 arch 28,1979, Nir. Gary P. Niiller was the TN11 station
. .. .. . . . . .m t ,.:.4
- e. d manager in charge of both units through their respective superinten-
.' d,%5@r.qggg.Mr{j ,
, dents. He arrived at the station at about 7:00 a.m. on N1 arch 28 and, be-cause of radiation indications, he soon became aware of the need to initi-
. , ate the emergency plan. 51r. Niiller served as emergency director. lie as-sembled his senior and most qualified people into what was later labeled the "think :ank." lie placed Nir. 51ichael Ross, operations superintend-
. ent of TN1I-1, in charge of operations (Nlr. James Floyd, operations su-
^
I
. .s I perintendent of TN11-2 was away on a training assignment). Str. George Kunder, Thir 2 Technical Support Superintendent, was placed in charge of engineers. As we have noted throughout. SRO shift supervisors Chwastyk, Niehler, and Zewe, and perhaps other shift supervisors, were l also present during much of the day and at the time of the pressure spike.
388 NY l . I ~5$ k'lSEt Yn '_ n_ ~ .a . .
- - m-
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- 167. Ntr. Stiller testified from a mixture of his own memory and his
> understanding of events from transcripts of his previous statements. lie
- ' testified that, on hf arch 28, he heard a " thud" which was subsequently
..y'4 s ~ J ' . -' 3 .~', ^
. , correlated to the time of the spike; that he asked others in the control
, -. v.5%w , room what the sound was; and that he was told something to the elTect
- that it was the ventilation damper." Tr. 30,186-87 (htiller).
4 j. s.G'ra..":2.. m/ MfC. .-
.GfzD.a' # .1,,' .
s 168. Str. Miller testified further that today he cannot recall that he r t4W4 UYU y" 2-.@Q@p@[f.;e$$M @ peg rit v was aware on March 28 of either the pressure spike or the actuation of spray pumps. Tr. 30,190, 30,200 (hfiller). He seemed to place greater
>~ ~
reliance on previous statements to the effect that he was not aware of
~ " i those events on Starch 28 than on his present memory. Id.
169. On April 14, 1979, Str. Stiller organized a taped, group discus-sion with key personnel on his own initiative to discuss and record the events of Alarch 28. Mr. Miller prepared a statement from the transcript of that discussion. Joint Exh.10. c.3 - - 170. Subsequently Mr. Miller was interviewed or deposed seven U - ' [.l *-((( , times, by our count, ending with the September 5,1980 interview by
,- ' MAng ' the IE team investigating information flow. The Board has reviewed
~ , m. m .. m. 4 < N. mo.p1.m. .._. . each passage cited to us by the parties (and two identified by the Board)
. .y# $ - -
relevant to whether on March 28th Mr. Miller was aware of the pressure
- spike and the containment spray actuation."
b[iDDM[f%@D.$~ ^de gat '~ m; 171. On the whole his statements support his present testimony that he cannot recall being aware on March 28 of the pressure spike and the actuation of the spray pumps. Each of the statements is consistent with
!' that position, but two of them raise questions about the matter. First, TMIA points to Mr. Miller's report of the group discussion of April 14, 1979, where he stated:
lt should be noted that at approximately 1400 I heard a loud deep noise and at that
,_. zy 2' y isme the Reactor Budding spray pumps started and subsequent to the events of thts % $* W %gj' " -' ~'
- O day I learned that this was a 30 lb. pressure spike which occurred in the Reactor ,
Y }Isi~'
;qib **d'"* d"* #d'***"'
Joint Exh.10, at 2122 (emphasis added). 172. Licensee responded by noting that Mr. Miller stated only that _ _ . , i he heard a noise, not that he became aware of the spray. Licensee also
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, U The specal inquiry Group reported on the nature or this sound. It has also been rererred}}