ML20138F714

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Submits Revised Response to NRC Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-261/05.Corrective Actions:Addressed Three Listed Primary Causal Factors That Contributed to Fire.Mgt Expectations re-emphasized by Plant General Manager
ML20138F714
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/26/1991
From: Dietz C
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML20138D008 List:
References
NUDOCS 9610180043
Download: ML20138F714 (4)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:--- {y,, ^ ( Carolina Power & Ligfit Company ' mm. ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT f POST OFFICE BOX 790 s HARTSVILLE, SOUTH CAROJ INA 29550 S 'mJUN26 %., t 1:k, Robinson File No.: 1351,0E.y, , q,.,, 9. f-y.gl,,.RNPD/91-1523 > w w: w yfsnWjmg Ql, y..i. &; 1M L+,, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commiss, ion %;f.:g g-4,"F.;/ M re ?g ~ ,g ! '. y 9 g i. 'c.p..,, p Attn: Document Control Eask. ,*<Mieo :. k'emqp V .o Vashington, D. C. 10555 g j g:g, ,y g, H. B. ROBINSdN' STEAM ELECTRIC lh UNIT NO.T2.~ S ".70% "M T" .i' d DOCKET No? 509-261 U.WY ' ' /II F ^ ' P' ' ' ' # 4 NRC INSPECTION REPOR[MTCEN5E NODR' 3[TO"AIN0YICE @h b . 50 26,1/91 05VR&B " ',',. ' ',k {ll l 3 UPP'EEHeNTAt1TSPONSE' "' " # ' 8 " * - - r e v.,. y N 1 ! e % (' Gentlemen: ma

c',q,. Q',gy;,

u i 5 Carolina Power and Light Company hereby provides this revised response to the T)M Notice of Violation. identified in Inspection" Report'50-261/91-05. This l response sdpersedes the ' original l response'9ated'May (13',"1991', 'and'provides c-additional information to address the < corrective' actions'tiaken"vith' regard to, 4.s p' ' i, the thtee causal. factors ' identified in'the'RNP Fire Inves[til,gation' Report. The M.,f I revised portions 'are identified,by's vertidaFline"in'thefright hand margin of d i4 C J/ ,/V " WN9^4 J P d );,9 + o s i du if e t.n t.j s -. g b. a s h.t.;, ; 1 'the report. ."i Severity Level IV Violation f RII-91-05101Y1', CI @ N " d ), ~ p- '.m 10 CFR 50 Appendix'.B. Criteria [V?requiresjactivities,affecting quality be prescribed by ' documented instructions '{ procedures,I or"diavings 'of a, type appropriate'tothecircumstancesT' Establishing'a'meth$tomaintainthe'" reactorvesselheadflangetemperature'is'an,activityjAffectingquality. ^

m res.n aq: gqta.cga,

., - a Contrary to the above, ~ documented, instructions, prourdttres, or drawings were not provided, in that, dscumented instructions'verehn'ot"provided for'the method to establish tempmary heating equipment to adi'ntain the reactor vessel head flange temperature. i' l d in 'an#electr12al fire 'inside containment on February 10,Th s resu te* ^ I '" " ^ ! E'8? ,' '1991."

  • h

- n n w.my + 1

i mt %r'xr n d na q,,, e l

t, v.;1 th, R. 6 - ,+ c ~ i.e s e < p : : 0,1 :.t' ".h .J e O -1; re z-

i t alor. % ~

k ..a, .b u pra.- ; t m.c e, t, 1 n.. hkf h" \\ 1Rnna 610180043 910626 pDR ADOCK 05000261 4 A6 G PDR f. .o

'W'OM 4M&'Wg4,y,,gp. 4 g .y ,,4' I Letter to United States Nuclear Regulatori Commission Seric.11 RNPD/91-1523 Page 2 REPLY w ;.i_ i 1. The Reason for the Violation, ,,, e.g CP&L acknowledges that. the. violatIonIoccurr d $s" described. The requirement to maintain the reactor. vessel; head

  • flange within five i

degrees of the vessel flange, studs,was< identified during a previous reactor heac' stud. tensioning evolutionlinl January..' 1991.. Although Plant proceduresradbeenrevisedtoreflectithis)re'quirement, no formal' ^ defined process had been identified'as# to how this task could be ~ best accomplished. ;In order.to meet thelt i the decision as to what process would b'elemperature;requ rement,used"to y through discussions with the, individuals, involved with the process on an informal basis, Other options.vore discussed [ bht were eliminated due to fire protection concerns.: As the need for,;a defined process was not recognized, no formal review was performed,togevaluate the. conditions that would be created using temporary. heating, equipment. The Corrective Steos That Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved 2. ,b,. m,.a w At the time of the fire,, an investigation team was established in accordancewiththePlants'. Corrective. Action; Program.to.conductaroot Several short term corrective'. actions were taken to cause assessment. t facilitate the investigation process,.phichl included limiting access to, the containment building, and. preserving evidence via video tape for Also, other, temporary; power configurations were root cause assessment. inspected at that time.to. determine if additional fire hazards existed, andsomechangesweremadeasaresultof.;thisinspection, g m a r., g n. -, y e, and a final The investigation team completed'the root'cause' assessment, Fire Investigation Report was issued., This report identified the t following three primary causal factors;that contributed.to the fire: i g ~, y.f a, r.s o Lack of a formal, process,for;accomp ishing the. reactor head 1) J..-- heating; o Overloaded temporary _ power; hookups. supplying light bulbs 2) used for heating; + ' g,#, g y.,; = Quantities of combustible taterials had been allowed to 3) accumulate in thenhead(st,orage;.ayea. factor,. management expectations have Vith regard to the first causalg been re-emphasized by the Plant General'Hanager to the Unit Management level on how procedures are to be utilized in the operation and maintenance of Unit No. 2. These3 expectations include utilization of the Special Procedure process for.. situations not. currently covered by e existing procedures,=and dictate;that procedure usage is neither 3 optional nor a matter of convenience.: 3 i e .i 4 rrL.,

    • W. =,

'm.- - - --w%w y. y + p' m u .y 7 p y: 1.etter to United Statis. Nuclear Regulatory Commission' i. Serial: RNPD/91-1523 Page 3 Concerns with temporary power hookups. wore initially addressed to Fire Protectionpersonnelbyinformallinstructionsforirspectionof temporary electrical devices,(suchtasiextension cords, six outlet i This receptacles, drop lights 4 etc.):durin5snormal shift rounds. process has since been formalized <as;a apacial order to operations J personnel through the "Managar M operationsiDirective and Information i This^ process)will'continueLuntil procedural methods for Book" process. Q: controlling such;eonfigurations?are4in(place ~f, T l j , wa$ Og7 t The impact of utilization of combustibleimaterials.as ya causal factor has been communicatedito'sitefpersonnelivia a'. variety of Plent 5 information systems. Noteworthy:amongsthese'icommunication= methods was a i detailed review of the event and~its causestbylaisite Fire Protect. ion ~ l i specialistwitheachSiteSafety; Council $This!Processeffec ~ control of

  • combustible" materials,'Withithe'sajoritylof Plant personnel.
g
y,4 In addition to tthe corrective < actions Etaken' to address each of the

.n, causal factors listed above, further: management; emphasis has been placed on ensuring appropriate proceduralfcontrols'are in place for quality This has been' accomplished...in part,. through the related activities.- OEF)feventireport publication process. Operational Experience Feedbackj(hetthree# causal. factors and why they' An OEF event report, explainingit were a problem, has been issued.9 0EFireports:of this nature are widely^ distributed in order to communicatolimportant.information directly to G'M-l ?' all work levels at the Plant. 4 z w 6 The corrective Steos That Will:Be Taken to Avoid'surther Violations 3. . pA s TheFireInvestigat1onReportLeontainedseveralcorrective' action These, recommendations recommendations' applicable to:thistviolation.- include development of methodology for controls of temporary po installations. determine the proper methods andJequipmentinecessary to maintain the five degree delta t:emperature"requirementsifor reactor vessel head stud This process will,be'. incorporated'into Plant procedures. z tensioning. ,' s The Date When Full Comuliance Vfil Be Achieved; 4. q Methods for the control of. temporary; power configurations will be in J-place by March 31, 1992. 'D y.. 7 Appropriate methodology for maintaining < reactor vessel head stud tensioning temperature requirements will'be incorporated into Plant j procedures prior to reactor vessel; head ~ reassembly activities during - C s refueling outage 14 ~ L 9 .[{ } o. ' G), qlG r ! 4

  • V,.

l. .u Q.' 'b 4 Jb: 4 Y' /mngsnade Y meL M

-m, - --. ~_ - .i o 9 a 4 'l 4 ': + -+ * - e ' Commission Letter to United States Nuclear Regulatory?m"w' 'y Serial: RNPD/91-1.523 u :e,., Page 4 .w.y> yg,z.. h'i!:/'"l T1?))f-l x ' * % ., 2 p 3 ey 7 2 <, s ng Should you nave any questions regarding,,this matter,'please contact Mr. J. D. Kloosterman at (803).38321491. 2 ~ f ,.Very truly yours, 3; / L h l i ..C.ar es R. D etz s,. 1 .c Manago r Robinson Nuclear Project Department 4 t M. J.'.' Q*

., pp {,.,

a < y p '- J RDC:dwm '<,;,a n:; ~ -. a. n. n,. r cc: Mr. S. W. Ebneter

    • Mr'." L.f,V;rl Carn, e rvc,,'.c4' T

INPO -e 4;, u, t.q,,. 3 . n t e-I ,g \\ $'('a$ b' , "* k a 'II g ,5 e - 3 e,~ r F. p :p. h J A 'attd N h k.I., 5 $h4. ' ' ' f' l r !. <.'-9irEvt m /im4'6 ir.>'aj' I M ' ) !:,7 *; '.' e > 4 A) f'. ! ts D'. e e n- ,.i I' J..$ t 6 k } I?d.4 Y O OF.' 1 I = ' 7

I' 1 e

O r 4

  1. ),, h b.,

.k \\ .r' as ., 'i ty e ..s h $ h 0, F i - e' L ; '. r e tb f V y 9* h /F#.l%. + 8 * *:abi) hY[, ' k. y bIY C - V L1^ ^ j o m.r.: e u. yg v i lv, ! a j 7, ' e '. ! n u n y. .t ~ J i r. t t T V. t h fd, p t i.*J d ', - a <.1, 9 t g ; g, g 43 Q g, gyq.

    • r

.-J.,f 4 pi.Q,t W u. *m o d F i ' ile

  1. gl'6letalrQ'.,'*

_t: )4 1Pi t. ',..'f I, h 4-v S l' V 5 h. g. + y 't-4 A k No. I.

f ,, - -~ ~ ' ~'~ ~ ~ d \\ / 2CP&L s s \\ Carolina Power & Light Company l ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT POST OFFICE BOX 790 HARTSVILLE, SOUTH: CAROLINA 29550 E AY 1 8 1991 o' i 3 3 oc..t. r e d Robinson File No.: 135,1,0 E ' amT.,Yf^ Serial: RNPD/91-1116 aio i f ',,Mili r"/, k 'E i i f' et

  • h i :n W pAlt*- *. '

f g g to brty this t. Jv fi t i t [ e United States Nuclear Regulatory CommissiorP'#" "W, I" 0 '7 '^

  1. 5 Atta:

Document Control Desk

  • Y ' Y"p:

S ^ tlashington, D. C. ~ 2055,5 '. M%n ./ < wau>, t n 3 6 t.- un !.m d t!- i a N q t i pt"7 tit s t. - as,:t 10ML4* aN *F# ' N, H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PIANT g "" UNIT"NO.Y2f'" Y'*" DOCKETNo.f509'-260 MF' LICENSE NO.*DPR223 '? " l I ,,I NRC INSPECTION REPORT No. 50-261/91'-05',REPLiT0"A NOTICE OF VIDIATION l' T .tt .A. 4g e i. t.i.ww v i n,n .c v ury p.o r n'- I 'c- 't i f sdM t.hena ! fi: - ! Centlemen: +o az o t l e of UC D - W 7

  • P i f
  • i'

-t. r Carolina Power and Light Company hereby provides this' reply to the Notice of 4, Violation identified in Inspection Report"50-261/w.1!05." '"I C' '1, H 9 ~ (m. v.

-,,, u r.,um c a..

cq - t Severity Level IV Violat-iori ( RII-91-0510'1PM f " Y "* i . ngmnc w;h ts L" i h t' . u. 10 'CFR 50 Appendix B,' Criteria'V',I raquires*hetih1Ne'aIYffeciting'qualitybe ' ') 7 i prescribed by documented' instructions.fprocedures, Tor drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Establishing a method to maintain the reactor vesse1 head flange temperaturaq s,an activity affecting quality. i ~ !l 7,us W M. c A 9.s v W. Contrary to the above, documented instructions, procedures, or, drawings were not provided, in that,7 documented' instructions were'not'provided for the [ method to establish temporary heatirg^ equipment'to" maintain the reactor vessel head flange temperature.'" This' resulted' in'an elechrical' fire (inside "" W " containment on February' 14, ' 19 91.'. '% er c qu i p wt a n eu y > < ' ' .p., r g @iirb we.t'e r roe -tm ca ?.n cin ' eg.ute. c hto c b < n.

~.

6 ( a A M I V J Ge Q GF m

, y.mn -.cw w- ~ * '~ ~~ ~~ ' ~ ' 'I i' B U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Condission r. Serial: 'RNPD/91-1116

  • l Page 2 REPLY

-1. The Reason for the Violation i ym e, mg i CP&L acknowledges that.the violation-occurred,as described. The c requirement to maintain the reactorsvessel head flange.within five t degrees of the vessel. flange studs;was identified,during a previous reactor head stud tensioning-evolution in Janusry, 1991.Although Plant procedures had been revised to reflect lthis' requirement, no formal defined process had been identified assto how this= task could be best 3 .y accomplished. InorderrtolmeetitheSpenparature.. requirement, the decision as to what process'would besusadito4heaththe< head;was developed t through discussions.with thel individuals? involved with the process on an informal basis. As the need~for a' defined' process was not recognized, no-formal review.was performedito<evaluatatthe' conditions;that would be created using temporary)heatingiequipment,; ~ s t ' -{. K 2. 1he Corrective Stens That Have Been Taken'and the Results Achieved . u yg,w At the time of the fire, an'investigationiteam.was established in accordance with the Plante' CorrectivefAction> Program to conduct a root I' cause assessment. Several short term

  • corrective' actions were taken to facilitatetheinvestigation'processTwhichtincibded-limitingaccessto the containment building, and preserving!avidene,e3via,videoitape for root cause assessment 4 Also,other; temporary!powerconfigurationswere inspected at that time to determina tif; additions.li fire hazards-existed.,

and some changes were made as a result.ofithisl inspection. ~,, ' e e ra uc, The investigation team completed'theTroot cause assessment, and a final 6 Fire Investigation Report was issued.b This report identifies that inadequate controls over the head heating ~ process' contributed to the-occurrence of the fire. Additional management 2 emphasis.has since been placed on ensuring appropriate procedural controls are placed on quality related activities; (' y se s, 3. The Corrective Steos That Will Be Taken to Avoid Furth?r Violations .v The Fire Investigation Report contained several' corrective action recommendations applicable to this" violation,':These. recommendations include development of methodology for controlstof temporary power installations. In addition, a technical analysis isLto be performed to determine the proper methods and equipment'necessary to maintain the five degree delta temperature requirements'fortreactor vessel head stud tensioning. This process will be' incorporated-into Plant procedures. 3_/ -+ I t 4 ~

y ny M, M ij J t .e. e U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Pr I ' ' ' - 4 Serial: RNPD/91-1116 N 3** M W "' - Page 3 N i_

0. d '. _[$."

,,, i s_ i _ ; s ib N (f 'e r 1'\\ kt.') ) (' '& yj R 't 1 c v>y 4. The Date When Full Come11ance Will Be Achieved vi;6um As an interim measure, compensatory-actions which have been taken are inclusien of inspection of-temporary l electrical. devices in shift rounds until formal methods to control;such! configurations are developed and implemented. Formal methods for;the'controliof' temporary power configurations will be in place by March'31 M1992.f m Appropriate methodology for maintaining" reactor vessel head stud tensioning tamperature requirements;will-be incorporated into Plant s ~ procedures prior to; reactor vessel head reassembly activities during refueling outage;14. Should you have any questions regarding thin matter,'please contact Mr. J. D. Kloosterman at,(803) 383-1491. . s N U m nfcyttd.> 6 cVery truly yours, p g. "a r vu.,09 GGT [? . ( -j t.?? Ja h; ) d(7/112$ f M k k. [ Charles R.,Dietz '~ ..d Manager 4 binson.. Nuclear Project Department - Ro ,93, l t. . m,w.mwzw\\&<. q q. l .w.y;pygeg m./ ,. c. ;v > =n l,, RDC:td _,,. ( ;;7 y, ,gj s*

y y g,., g gg: "Q,g. p.

j cc: Mr. S. W. Ebneter 4-h Mr& LU W.v,. Garner % ?4,i.w. n e w s,; e c (h s r.aic i..., v,,,a. sa t 4 ,. 4; g.j,g.g.., g INPO 4 j t i. x,, w t5 a,...y g l,y g - 4 ;,4., g y q..i i d. -f', (p,, ( g Kh g a;s .g. ,.y i s !4 m.q j,,.a y,.m ..,g 4.; g 4,

.~

t- 'o*. q,4 p%f, 4./e.g p :;, j f f 1, ; 1 '.1 t rt '. I p np ' 4.. } i,, Ig;gi; j! oj; l i e, I-l l I 1 I s .{ 4 !!p 4 )}}

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20138F714&oldid=4201033"