ML20138E232
| ML20138E232 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1985 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138E208 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8510240627 | |
| Download: ML20138E232 (3) | |
Text
"
UNITED STATES
,[
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
- j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
%...../
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 69 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-6 ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-368 Introduction By letter dated March 13, 1985, Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L) proposed Technical Specification (TS) changes for ANO-2 to revise Table 3.8-1
" Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices." The following changes to the table are proposed by AP&L:
1.
Breakers 52-51E4, 52-51C1, 52-51K2, 52-51J4, 52-61L2, 52-61D2, 52-53H3, 52-53H2, 52-61L4, 52-61L1, 52-54G2,52-54CS, 52-54G3, and 52-54B4 are to be added to Table 3.8-1 due to plant modifications pertaining to low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP), pressurizer spray valve, and H2 purge valves.
.2.
RCS sample line solenoid valves 2SV-4632, 2SV-4639 and 2SV-4665, which are protected by two redundant 6-amp fuses, are to be removed from the table since TS 3/4.8.2.5 references testable devices only.
3.
The backup overcurrent protective devices for the pressurizer proportional and backup heaters are to be listed as the primary protective devices while the main load center feeder breakers are to be made the backup devices.
4.
Pressurizer vent valve 2CV-4697-2 is to be removed and replaced with valve 2CV-4740-2 on Table 3.8-1.
5.
Typographical errors are to be corrected on pages 3/4 8-16, 3/4 8-17, and 3/4 8-18 of Table 3.8-1.
Staff Evaluation The licensee's FSAR states that ANO-2 is in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.63 for its electric penetration assemblies.
RG 1.63 recommends that electric penetration assemblies should be designed to withstand, without loss of mechanical integrity, the maximum short-circuit vs. time conditions that could occur given single random failures of circuit overload protection devices. The licensee has installed backup overcurrent protective devices for each circuit in the contair. ment electric penetration assemblies.
8510240627 851011 PDR ADOCK 05000368 P
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- The licensee has provided the time-current characteristic curves for the electric penetrations' primary and secondary current interrupting devices.
The data submitted show that the primary and backup circuit breakers for the modifications pertaining to LTOP, pressurizer spray valve, and H, purge valves are adequately designed to protect the penetration assemblies frbm normal and fault current conditions.
The primary overcurrent protective devices listed in Table 3.8-1 for the pressurizer proportional and backup heaters are located inside the containment and would not protect the penetration should a fault occur between the protective devices in containment and the penetration itself. The licensee is proposing to use the main 480-volt load center breakers (52-512,52-612, 52-912 and 52-1012) as backup to the primary 480-volt load distribution breakers (52-523,52-623, 52-922,52-923, 52-1022, and 52-1023). The time-current characteristic curves for these breakers show that primary and backup breakers are coordinated such that the primary breakers will trip first.
In addition, both will trip before the thermal capability of the electric penetration is reached during maximum short-circuit conditions.
The removal of the two redundant 6-amp fuses (RCS sample line solenoid valves) from Table 3.8-1 is appropriate since the Technical Specifications reference only circuit interrupting devices that can be operationally tested, and does not require resistance tests of fuses.
The removal of pressurizer vent valve-2CV-4697-2 and replacement with valve 2CV-4740-2, as well as the correction of typographical errors on Table 3.8-1 do not result in any changes to the overcurrent protection of the electric penetration assemblies.
Summary The staff has reviewed the proposed TS changes to Table 3.8-1.
The changes do not constitute a reduction in the integrity or reliability of the electric i
penetration assemblies.
The proposed changes to the ANO-2 TS are therefore
(
acceptable.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility l
component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents l
that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiai.fon exposure. The Commission has previously published a proposed finding that the amendment l
involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public coment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility I
criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 951.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 651.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
N 3-CONCLUSION Wehaveconcluded,basedontheconsiderationsdiscussedabove,that(1)there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date: October 11, 1985 Principal Contributor:
Ray Mullikin, Region IV e