ML20138C631
| ML20138C631 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/01/1999 |
| From: | Wessman R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Blockeyobrien AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9909070159 | |
| Download: ML20138C631 (8) | |
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September 1, 1999 Ms. Pamela Blockey O'Brien D23 Golden Valley 7631 Dallas Highway Douglasville, GA 30134
Dear Ms. Blockey O'Brien:
I am responding to your letter of July 10,1999, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in which you expressed concerns about the safety of nuclear power plants and a nuclear fuel facility, Many of your concerns relate to the year 2000 problem and its potentialimpact on plant and facility safety. As described in the enclosure, the staff addresses the issues you have raised and has organized its responses into general categories of concern.
I trust that the enclosed information addresses your concerns. The NRC will continue to monitor nuclear industry activity and, when warranted, take regulatory action to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety.
Sincerely, (Original /s/ by R. Wessman)
Richard H. Wessman, Deputy Director Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation h h)
Enclosure:
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,o September 1, 1999 Ms. Pamela Blockey O'Brien D23 Golden Valley 7631 Dallas Highway Douglasville, GA 30134
Dear Ms. Blockey-O'Brien:
l l am responding to your letter of July 10,1999, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC;in which you expressed concerns about the safety of nuclear power plants and a nuclear fuel facility Many of your concerns relate to the year 2000 problem and its potential impact on plant and facility safety As described in the enclosure, the staff addresses the issues you have l
raised and has organized its responses into general categories of concern.
l l
l trust that the enclosed information addresses your concerns. The NRC will continue to monitor nuclear industry activity and, when warranted, take regulatey action to provide reasonable i
assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety.
i Sincerely, Richard H. Wessman, Deputy Director Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated 1
r Y2K CONCERNS OF MS. PAMELA BLOCKEY-O'BRIEN (JULY 10,1999) t
. Year 2000 (Y2K) and Power Reactors The Nuclear Regulatory Commisslor (NRC) has a high degree of confidence that t_he safety systems relied upon at U.S. nuclear power plants will perform as designed during the Y2K i
transition. This confidence is the result of four basic factors. First, there is only a limited use of computer software and embedded chip technology in safety system equipment. Second, the NRC has stringent review criteria for the application of digital technology into a safety system application. Third, plant owners have responded to the NRC's Generic Letter (GL) 98 01," Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," indicating that they have implemented comprehensive, staff approved, industry Y2K programs and that no safety systems are susceptible to Y2K related failures. Finally, the NRC's oversight of the industry's preparation for Y2K has confirmed the adequacy of licensee processes and programs through the use of onsite audits and reviews of licensee activities during which all 103 operating nuclear power plants were inspected, inspectors conducting these reviews and audits were provided with training, guldelines, and acceptance criteria in ordu to effectively complete this activity. Guldelines and acceptance criteria were developed utilizing GL 98 01 and the following industry doc'ufnents: Nuclear Energy Institute / Nuclear Utilities Sof tware Management Group (NEl/NUSMG) 97 07,
- Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness," and NEl/NUSMG 98 07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning." Both of these industry documents had iseen previously reviewed by the NRC staff and determined to be acceptable in meeting the Y2K challenge. The NRC staff conducted two different sets of onsite Y2K audits of the industry's response to Y2K related deficiencies. The first audit encompassed 12 different nuclear power plant sites and focused -
on licensee activities required to ensure Y2K readiness. The second set of audits was conducted at six nuclear power plant sites to investigate the depth and appropriateness of licensee activities in the area of Y2K contingency planning. The audited sites were selected to encompass a broad sampling of plant types and external challenges. Finally, the NRC staff conducted onsite Y2K reviews at all 103 operating nuclear power plants. The reviews were conducted by NRC inspectors using Temporary !nstruction (TI) 2515/141,
- Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," a copy of which is on NRC's Y2K Web site. These reviews provided an additional level of confidence in fict:nsee Y2K readiness.
By July 1,1999, all operating reactor licensees reported that there are no Y2K related problems that directly affect the performance of safety systems at any operating nuclear powor plant.
Licensees for 68 plants reported they were Y2K ready. Licensees for the other 35 plants reported that a few remaining activities involving non safety significant items had to be completed in order for the plants to be considered Y2K ready. Typically, the remaining Y2K j
work that is to be completed is due to the need to wait for a plant outage or the necessity of waiting for delivery of a replacement component. The NRC staff is following up on these plants to provide an Independent verification that the remediation activities are effectively
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implemented. At this time, we believe that alllicensees will be able to operate their plants ENCLOSURE
2-safely during the transition from 1999 to 2000, and we do not anticipate the need for the NRC to direct any plant specific action. A copy of NRC's preliminary report on Y2K activities, dated July
- 19,1999, is enclosed.
One plausible scenario that could affect nuclear power plants as a result of Y2K related computer problems could be local power disturbances on the electric distribution system (grid) that could lead to a degradation or a loss of offsite power. The NRC has been working with the Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability Council (an Industry group) to assess the potential for a grid disturbance and has determined it to be low, in general, if a loss of offsite power were to occur in an area serviced by an operating nuclear power plant, the iesult would be an automatic plant shutdown as the turbine and reactor protective design
%ctures respond to the disturbance. The loss of offsite power is an anticipated transient to y t 5 all nuclear plants are designed to safely respond. Typical design features include multiple grid tie ins to minimize the potential for a loss of offsite power, along with redundant backup onsite power sources (for example, diesel generators and batteries) capable of supporting a safe plant thutdown. Although a totalloss of offsite power is uncommon, nuclear plants have experienced these transients in the past with no adverse consequences.
Accident lasues and ContlE9fDcv Plannina A large release of radiation as a result of a Y2K related (or other) event is highly unlikely.
Nuclear power plants are designed and built with multiple bacl<up systems to ensure plant haf 6ty, in addition, the plant containment - a large, concrete and steel-reinforced structure -
is desigred to contain the radiation in the highly unlikely event that there is an accident. For example, the 1979 Three Mile Island accident resulted in a partial meltdown of nuclear fuelin
- the roactor core and high radiation levels inside the containment but this high radiation was corcined inside the plant containment building, thus protecting the members of the community from raclation axposures.
Nonetheless, alllicensees are required to be Y2K ready. Plant operators are trained extensh ely to deal with potential emergencies, and time tested plans, including evacuation and notification procedures, aro in place to deal with a plant accident whether or not it is triggered by a Y2K problem. In addition, each licensee must develop a contingency plan to deal effectively with any unforeseen Y2K problem. A contingency plan helps ensure that sufficient resources are identified and helps guide decision making if something happens unexpectedly, NEl has developed guidance to ascist licensees in developing their plans. The Y2K contingency plan has been prepared to supplement existing contingency plans that deal with a myriad of potential plant pmbbms rtnd include involvement of State and local response organizations.
Typical nuclear power p! ants have emergency diesel generators in case there is a loss of all offsite power. These generators are required to be highly reliable, they are tested regularly and are required to have at least a 7-day supply of fuel oil on which to operate. Licensees for many plants are planning to take precautionary measures to have additional fuel oil on site as part of their site specific Y2K contingency planning efforts. The industry knows from experience that diesel generators will reliably supply backup power for extended periods. For example, the diesel generators effectively provided power to the Turkey Point plant in Florida for approximately one week during Hurricane Andrew in August 1992.
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3 Public Awarenest In January 1999, the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion introduced a now Y2K information line (1888 USA 4 Y2K), and other councilinitiativos for providing consumers information about the Y2K computer problem. This information line is a key part of the council's ongoing efforts to make availablo information that will help Americans respond appropriately to the Y2K problem. The councilis committed to providing consumers the latest information on how the problem may, or may not, affect Government services, banks, household appliances, and other items consumers depend upon in their daily lives.
This line offers free Information of interest to consumers in common areas such as power, tolophones, banking, Government programs, and household products. Information for the lino comes from primary sources such as Govemment agencies, companies, or industry groups.
Pre recorded Information, which is available 7 days a week,24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, is available on the most common topics, and information specialists supported by researchers are available to provido additional information to callers.
The NRC has kept the public informod about our Y2K activities through numerous media releases, responses to questions by telephone, electronic mail, and letters, interviews with reporters, participation at workshops, public meetings, and maintenance of current Y2K information on our Web site at <http://www.ntc. gov /NRC/ NEWS / year 2000.html>.
Specific Nuclear Facility Performance issues Your letter raised concerns about the Farley, Hatch, Sequoyah, and Nuclear Fuel Services, incorporated facilities.
On February 2,1999, the NRC staff completed a plani performanco review (PPR) of the Farley plant. Overall performance at Farley was acceptable. Management oversight, involvement, and emphasis on plant safety and resolution of equipment problems continued to be strong.
Preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance were generally performed well. However, steam generator tube integrity conthued to be a concern. Engineering support for operations and maintenance activities continued to be offective. Overall, the performance in the plant support area was consistent with perf 3rmance during the previous assessment period.
Problems regarding the adequacy of Kaowool, fire main integrity problems, and chronic pre action sprinkler failures persisted.
Also on February 2,1999, the NRC staff completed a PPR of the Hatch plant. Performance at Hatch was acceptable. No plant scrams or unplanned transients occurred during the assessment period. Operator communications and poor chocks continued to improve. In the maintenance area, the plant material condition was maintained at an acceptable level.
Housekeeping was recognized by the licensee as an area needing improvement, although no equipment issues directly rotated to housekeeping had been identified. Engineering continued to be effective. Root cause analyses for equipment problems were thorough. Although engineering support to operations was good, some engineering analysos relied heavily on
' engineering judgment" without thorough supporting documentation. Security, emergency preparedness, and fire protection continued to be acceptable. Lato in the assessment period, more emphasis was being placed on the as low as reasonably achlovable program (for
4 personnel radiation dose) and personnel contaminations. However, additionalimprovement was warranted. First line supervisors did not always clearly communicato or enforce manape:r.st expectations.
On February 8,1@9, the NRC staff completed a PPR of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Overall, performance at Soquoyah was acceptable. Both units operated at high capacity factors, and Unit 2 completed a successful refueling outage. Audits and self assessments continued to provido positive results in plant performance. Some performance challenges during the period woro in the areas of licensed operator training and operator performance; electrical breaker correctivo and preventivo maintenanco; and the identification, evaluation, and resolution of adverse conditions in several activities.
On December 2,1998, the NRC staff issued a performance review for Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS), incorporated. Improvement in overall facility performance was observed during the assessment period. Performance in the areas of safeguards, radiation exposure control, and f acility support continued to be good, and improvements were noted in fire protection. Although i
performance in the areas of safety operations and licensing was adequato, challengos wero observed in (1) management oversight and control of the readiness of systems for startup of l
now operations; (2) communication of management expectations to workers regarding safety and compliance with procedures, including followup to ensure these expectations are met; (3) timely self identification of deficiencies and implomontation of corrective actions in the area of operational safety; and (4) timely, complete, and high quality licensing submittals that resolve outstanding safety asues. On the basis of this review, inspection focus has been increased on the area of safety operations. On July 2,1999, NRC staff issued a licenso renewal and on August 3,1999, NRC staff issued an amendment that approved operation of the KAST fuel process for NFS, because upon completing the safety review of the renewal application and amendment submittal, the staff concluded that there was reasonable assurance that the activities to be authorized by the renewed license and amendment would not constitute an undue risk to the health and safety of the public and on sito personnel. NRC staff have reviewed the Y2K status of NFS and concluded that NFS will be Y2K ready well before the year 2000.
NRC inspection efforts continue at these and all other licensed facilities to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety.
NRC Reaulatory Action To Avoid Unnecesserv Plant Shutdowns Because of Y2K issun it is recognized that in spite of every reasonable effort by licensees to identify and correct Y2K computer system problems at their facilities, some software, applications, equipment, and systems may remain susceptible to the problem. Additionally, sof tware, data, and systems external to the facility could adversely affect the facility (for example, interruption of communications or partialloss of offsito power).
As two of the more important elements of the North American economic and social infrastructure, elec:ricity production and delivery systems must remain dependable during Y2K transition or rollover periods. Most nther critical elements of the infrastructure depend on the availability of an interconnected, stable, and reliable supply of electrical power. There is no
5 doubt that cascading or even localized outages of generators and transmission facilities could have serious short term and long term consequences.
Continued safe operation of nu: lear power plants during Y2K transition or rollover periods will play a major role in maintaining stable and reliable electrical power supply systems, providing necessary reserve power if there are major losses at other generating facilities. Although the I
need is considered unlikely, the NRC staff has issued guidance on the process for the NRC to exercise enforcement discretion in certain situations in which power reactor licensees encounter Y2K associated compliance problems in the Y2K transition period or in other key rollover periods. The exercise of enforcement discretion may support a licensee's decision to keep a plant in operation, if the licensee has determined that safety will not be unacceptably affected, in order to help maintain electrical grid stability and reliability, The NRC Headquarters Operations Center and the NRC Region IV Incident Response Center will have augmented l
staffing during the key transition from December 31,1099, to January 1,2000, to ensure that l
appropriate actions can be taken for any regulatory issues that arise, This policy applies only during Y2K transition or rollover periods (December 31,1999, through January 3,2000; February 28,2000, through March 1,2000; and December 30,2000, through January 1,2001). During these periods, a licensee may contact the NRC Headquarters Operations Center and seek NRC enforcement discretion with regard to potential noncompliance with license conditions, including technical specifications, if the licenses has determined that -
(a)
Complying with license conditions, including technical specifications, in a Y2K related situation would require a plant shutdown; (b)
Continued plant operation is needed to help maintain a reliable and stable grid; and (c)
Any decrease in safety as a result of continued plant operation is small (considering both risk and deterministic aspects), and reasonable assurance of public health and safety, the environment, and security is maintained with the enforcement discretion.
A licensee seeking NRC enforcement discietion must provide a written justification, or in circumstances in which good cause is shown, an oral justification followed as soon as possible by a written justification. The justification must document the need and safety basis for the request and provide whatever other information the NRC staff needs to make a decision regarding whether the exercise of discretion is appropriate. The NRC staff may gyare"C enforcement discretion on the basis of balancing the public health and safety or the common -
defense and security of not operating against potential radiological or other hazards associated with continued operation, and a determination that safety will not be unacceptably affected by exercising the discretion. Enforcement discretion will only be exercised if the NRC staff is clearly satisfied that the action is consistent with protecting public health and safety and is warranted in the circumstances presented by the licensee.
NRC Renulatory Action To Restrict Plant Operations as a Result of Y2K Issues Although the possibility is renste, there may be unanticipated Y2K issues at several generating f acilities (both non nuclear and nuclear) whose cumulative effect could adversely affect the
6-overall grid. Therefore, if a Y2K deficiency at a nuclear power reactor were to cause the reactor to shut down or experience a transient during the Y2K transition, there could be a detrime'ntal effect on the grid. This effect, in turn, could adversely affect the public health and safety and/or the common defense and security of the United States. To address this concom, the Commission may elect, for a plant with identified Y2K deficiencies, to conduct management meetings with a licensee and/or schedule reactive inspections to evaluate the significance of the Y2K deficiencies. Licensees may take voluntary actions to restrict or modify plant i
operations as a result of Y2K deficiencies, similar to voluntary actions taken by licensees in l
l anticipation of severe weather such as hurricanes. When there may be a lack of reasonable l
l assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety and the common defense and security, the Commission may order a licensee to take remedial actions, restrict plant operations, and/or shut dowr. the plant in anticipation of the Y2K transition. As stated earlier, we believe a!! licensees will be able to operate their plants safely during the transition from 1999 to 2000, and we do not anticipate the need for the NRC to direct any plant specific action.
Plant information Review in the mid to late 1980s, NRC team inspections began to Identify concerns that design bases information was not being properly maintained and that plants were being modified without the licensee having an understanding of the plant's design bases. As a result, the NRC took several actions to address these concerns. In 1995, concems re emerged, most prominently at Millstone and then at other facilities, regarding the ability of licensees to operate their facilities in accordance with the facility's design bases. Considering the potential scope of these re-emerging concerns and the need to ascertain the extent of the problems within the entire population of operating *eactors, the staff requested licensees to describe their programs and processes for ensuring their ability to operate their facilities in accordance with the facility's design bases. Additionally, licensees were also asked to discuss the effectiveness of these programs and processes, including a discussion of any design bases documentation initiatives they had implemented, The staff reviewed al!!icen,see responses to this request and concluded that licensees have established programs and processes to maintain their facility's design. Additionally, the staff determined that no further generic action was required. However, the staff identified that there was a need for further plant specific followup because of instances in which (1) a licensee's regulatory performance brought into question the effectiveness of its design control programs and processes or (2) the staff determined there was a need to validate the effectiveness of a particular element of a licensee's design control programs and processes.
The staff determined that there was a need to continue the increased emphasis on inspection of licensee conformance with design bases. Therefore, the staff changed the normal reactor inspection program by providing an inspection precedure to be used to evaluate licensee design control programs and processes.
The completed staff reviews and the ongoing inspection program provide reasonable assurance that each nuclear power plant is being operated, main,tained, and modified in accordance with the plant design bases. A:
"NRC's Preliminary Report on Y2K Activities," dated July 19,1999
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f W ASHINoToN, D C. 20244c1 Se July 19, 1999 MEMORANDUM TO: William D. Travers Executive Director for Operations FROM:
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SUBJECT:
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR 2000 READINESS This memorandum provides the staff's preliminary report on nuclear power plant (NPP) year 2000 (Y2K) readiness. The report integrates the results of regional staff reviews (conducted at cach NPP site during the April June 1999 period) with the initial Headquarters staff icview of licensee responses to Generic Letter (GL) 98-01, Supplement 1, " Year 2000 Readiness of l
Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." Additional review and followup activities are continuing; a final report is expected in the form of a NUREG and will be issued by August 31, 1999. This preliminary report, as well as the final NUREG, will be placed in the Public Document Room and on the NRC's Y2K Web site.
Regional staff reviews of licensee Y2K activities were conducted at each NPP site during the April-June 1999 period following the guidance of Temporary Instruction 2515/141,
- Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." The reviews were conducted to verify that licensee Y2K programs and processes were being implemented consistent with the industry guidance in Nuclear Energy institute / Nuclear Utilities Software Management Group (NEl/NUSMG) 97 07, ' Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness," and NEl/NUSMG 98-07, ' Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning," both of which have been found acceptable by the staff. Because of the timing of the regional reviews, there were instances in which licensee activities had not progressed sufficiently for the NRC staff to conclude that all activities were being implemented in accordance with industry guidance.
On the basis of its review of the 103 operating power plant Y2K programs, the staff concludes that licensees for 89 nuclear power plants have implemented Y2K programs consistent with industry guidance. As described in the report, the staff has identified 14 plants at which a followup review will be conducted to provide a high level of confidence that licensee Y2K activities have been implemented consistent with industry guidance. Licensees for 10 of the 14 plants reported that they had completed their Y2K readiness activities by July 1,1999. The f;llowup onsite reviews are expected to be completed by August 13,1999.
As reported in Press Release 99138, issued on July 7,1999, the NRC received responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1, from licensees for all 103 operating nuclear power plants indicating th:t there are no Y2K related problems that directly affect the performance of safety systems.
CONTACT:
M. Waterman, NRR/DE 415-2818 iQ p~,, ~,,x a
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2-W. D. Travers Licensees for 68 of the 103 plants reported that all their computer systems and digita embedded components that support plant operations are "Y2K ready."
Licensee reports also indicated that to be fully Y2K ready, licensees for 35 plants h additional work to complete on a few non safety systems or components. These licens provided scheduled completion dates for their plants. Of these 35 plants, components that could affect power generation (e.g., digital feedwater controls an performance monitoring systems). The remaining 17 plants have systems do not affect power generation (e.g., plant simulators and administrative syste maintenance activities). None of the remaining work in the 35 plants affects the a plant to shut down safely,if necessary. Typically, completion of Y2K work afte necessary because of a scheduled plant outage in the fall of 1999 or because ti waiting for delivery of a replacement component. The staff is committed to the completion of the remaining Y2K items at each of these 35 plants.
If, by September 30, Alllicensees are expected to be Y2K ready before December 31,1999.
1999, it appears that Y2K readiness activities will not be completed in advance 31,1999 - January 1,2000, transition, NRC will take appropriate action, including the of shutdown orders,if warranted.
Attachment:
Preliminary Report l
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1 PRELIMINARY REPORTON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
. YEAR 2000 READINESS July 16,1999
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Contact:
Michael E. Waterman Electrical & Instrumentation and Controls Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTACHMENT 99^7??Ouji's I 7e
. CONTENTS
. ii Executike Summary.....
4
. 4
. 1 1.0-INTRODUCTION...
4.
. 1 2.0- BACKGROUND'.
3
- 3.0' REVIEW AND INTEGRATION APPROACH..
.... 3
~ 3.1 Site Review Meth'odologp;.
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. 4 3.2 Integration Process.,,.....,
5 4.0 NRC Y2K REVIEW RESULTS AND FOLLOWUP ACTIONS
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- 5.0 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS.,,.,....,.
-Tables 7
1 ' Plards Requiring Tl 2515/141 Followup Reviews
-- 2 Plants Witti One or More Systems and Components That 8
.Could Affect Plant Operations
'3 Plants 'Mth Systems and CompSnents That 10
_ Do Not Affect Plant Operations..,,..,,,,,,..
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. 4 Plants Reporting Y2K Readiness on July 1.1999 S.
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PRELIMINARY REPORT ON NUCLEAk POWER PLANT YEAR 2000 READINESS July 16,1999 -
Executive Summary This report integrates the results of the staff's onsite Year 2000 (Y2K) readiness reviews of 103 nuclear power plants (NPPs) and licensee responses to Generic Letter (GL) 98 01, Supplement 1, " Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." The onsite reviews were based on acceptance criteria developed from the staff accepted industry guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute / Nuclear Utilities Software Management Group (NEl/NUSMG) 97-07, ' Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness," and NEl/NUSMG 98-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning."
On tne basis of the staff's onsite reviews of licensee Y2K readiness activities at the 103 operating U.S. NPPs, the staff concludes that the licensees for 89 of the 103 NPPs have followed Y2K programs that are consistent with industry guidance. By August 13,1999, the staff will conduct followup reviews of the remaining 14 plants to verify that licensee Y2K readiness activities are consistent with staff accepted industry guidance.
- Licensee responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1, indicate that licensees for 68 nuclear power plants have achieved Y2K readiness as of July 1,1999. Of the remaining 35 operating NPPs, licensees for 18 plants have yet to achieve Y2K raadiness for digital systems or components that could affect plant operations. None of these systems or components are part of the safety
- ystems designed to shut down a reactor or activate systems and components required for eccident mitigation. Each of these plants has a small number of incomplete items; typically, the licensee is awaiting delivery of a replacement component or a scheduled outage in the fall of 1999. The staff will verify completion of the remaining activities for all 35 plants as Y2K readiness activities are completed. All NPPs are expected to be Y2K ready before the transition
- from 1999 to 2000.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This report integrates the initial Headquarters staff review of licensee responses to GL 98-Supplement 1," Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," w results of regional staff reviews conduc'ed at each NPP site during the April June 1999 pen Additional review and followup activities are continuing; a final report is being prepared in the This preliminary report, as well as the form of a NUREG and will be issued by August 31,1999.
final NUREG, will be placed in the Public Document Room (POR) and on the NRC's Y2K W site.
Regional staff reviews of licensee Y2K activities were conducted at each NPP site during th April-June 1999 period following the guidance of Temporary instruction (TI) 2515/141, " Rev of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." NRC conducted reviews to verify that licensee Y2K programs and proce. ses were being implement s
consistent with the industry guidance in NEl/NUSMG 97 07 and NEl/NUSMG 98-07, both of which have been found ipcceptable by the staff. Additionally, as the NRC reported in Press-Release 99138, issued on July 7i 1999, the NRC received responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1, from licensees of all 103 operating NPPs indicating that there are no Y2K-related problems that directly affect the performance of safety systems, These two sources of information regarding Y2K readiness have been incorporated into in this report.
Section 2.0," Background," summarizes the nature of the Y2K problem, the history of NRC activities related to resolution of this problem in the nuclear power industry, and the scope of activitiet, conducted by the staff to verify that licensees will be Y2K ready before the end of 1 Section 3.0, " Review and Integration Approach," descibes the methodology used by the NR staff to perform the 66 NPP onsite reviews of licensee Y2K activities and integrates the the site reviews with the responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1. Section 4.0, "NRC Y2K Review Results and Followup Actions," summarizes the results of NRC staff reviews of licensee Y2K program activities and the licensee responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1 Section 5.0,
" Preliminary Conclusions," describes preliminary staff conclusions regarding Y2K readines U.S. NPPs.
2.0 BACKGROUND
The Y2K computer problem pertains to the potential for date-related problems that may o a software system or an embedded digital component. These problems include not
' representing the year properly, not recognizing leap years, and improper date-based or based calculations. An example of a date-related problem is misreading "00" as the year 1 rather than 2000, which could cause some computer systems to malfunction. A software system or an embedded component that is determined to be "Y2K compliant" accurate processes date and time data (including calculating, comparing, and sequencing data) into, and between the years 1999 and 2000. A software system or an embedded compone s
that is determined to be "Y2K readf performs its functions correctly, although the system or f
component is not Y2K compliant.
B in NPP safety systems and plant operations systems that use software systems or em j
components, the Y2K problem could cause an event such as a plant trip, or could affe n !
that either report post-shutdown plant status or that support emergency data collection capabilities. Additionally, to the extent that a Y2K deficiency could cause an NPP trip or transient, the resulting loss of electrical generation could introduce an electrical distribution grid instability and a resulting loss of offsite power. Y2K issues can also affect plant support or y
administrative systems. Most NPP safety systems are analog systems and, consequently, are not affected by Y2K issues.
Since 1996, the NRC has been working with NPP licensees to ensure that NPP systems are Y2K ready before 2000. To ensure that senior level management at operating U.S. NPPs were
- aware of the Y2K issue, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 96-70, " Year 2000 Effect on Computer System Software," on December 24,1996. In IN 96 70, the staff described the potential problems that nuclear facility computer systems and software might encounter during the transition from 1990 to 2000. The NRC sent copies of this information notice to all U.S. NPP licensees, fuel cycle facility licensees, and nuclear materials licensees.
In 1997, the NEl took the lead in developing industry wide guidance for addressing Y2K issues in the nuclear power industry and. with cooperation from the Nuc>ar Utility Software Management Group (NUSMG), issued NEl/NUSMG 97-07. Subwquently, NEl and NUSMG issued NEl/NUSMG 98-07. In Generic Letter (GL) 98-01 and its supplement, the NRC accepted the guidance provided in NEl/NUSMG 97-07 and NEl/NUSMG 98-07 as appropriate methodologies for addressing Y2K readiness in NPPs.
In GL 98-01, the NRC requested all holders of operating licenses for NPPs't6 i;. form the NRC of steps they were taking to ensure that compute. systems will function properly by 2000. All licensees responded to GL 98-01, stating that an NRC accepted program (NEl/NUSMG 97-07
- and NEl/NUSMG 98 07) had been adopted, the program addressed both safety-related and non-safety-related systems and components, and the plants would be Y2K ready by 2000. GL 98-01 also required the licensees to confirm that their plants would be Y2K ready, including contingency planning, rio later than July 1,1999. Licensees not Y2K ready by July 1,1999, were required to provide a status report, including completion schedules for work remaining to be done, to confirm their plants would be Y2K ready by 2000.
. Beginning in mid-1998, the NRC audited 12 Y2K programs at different NPP sites. The staff did not identify any Y2K issues that would preclude the audited licensees from achieving Y2K readiness. The information obtained during these audits and from other licensees and industry groups indicated that significant Y2K problems do not exist in those NPP systems that affect the ability to safely operate and shut down NPPs. However, licensees have discovered Y2K _ _ _
problems in non-safety (but nevertheless important) coinputer based systems, such as secunty computers, control room display systems, engineering software, control systems, raciation monitoring systems, emergency response systems, and communications systems.
The NRC issued Supplement 1 to GL 98-01 in January 1999. The scope of this supplement is broader than the scope of the original GL 98 01. The supplemental request for information, which was voluntary and also due by July 1,1999, expanded the scope of the reporting requirements to include systems that are not addressed by the plant license and NRC regulations but are necessary for continued plant operations.
2
'In Marc,i 1999, the NRC expanded its scope of Y2K ret sness program reviews to ine:ude ali l
operating NPP sites These 66 site reviews, covering 93 NPPs. were completed by June 30.
1999. As described in Section 4.0, the staff evaluated the reviews and is scheduling followup reviews for selected plants that had not sufficiently completed Y2K readiness preparations at the time of the site reviews.-
During May and June 1999, the staff also conducted six detailed audits of licensee contingency planning activities. In these audits, the staff reviewed approximately 15 to 20 licensee system and component contingency plans, contingency plans for internal facility risks, contingency plans for external risks, and the integrated contingency plan (typically, in the 66 onsite reviews, the staff reviewed 6 contingency plans for software or components). The acceptance criteria for
- these audits were the same as the acceptance enteria used in the 66 NPP onsite reviews.
By July 1,1999, the staff had received responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1, from licensees for.
all 103 operating NPPs. As described in Section 4.0, the staff reviewed these responses and integrated the results of these reviews with the results of the staffs onsite reviews of licensee Y2K readiness programs.
3.0 REVIEW AND INTEGRATION APPROACH This section describes the methodology used by the NRC staff to conduct Y2K reviews at each of the 66 NPP sites comprising the 103 operating NPPs and the integration of those review results with the licensee responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1.
3.1 Site Review Methodology The NRC conducted reviews at each NPP site. These reviews addressed 452 acceptance criteria (Tl 2515/141, Appendix A) that were based on guidance provided in NEl/NUSMG 07-07 and NEl/NUSMG 98-07. A checklist format was used to ensure that the reviews would be conducted consistently at each NPP site. Additional guidance for completing the checklists was provided to NRC reviewers in training sessions and in telephone calls between the reviewers and NRC Headquarters staff.
The checklist is divided into three major areas of Y2K readiness acceptance criteria: (1) planning and initial assessment, (2) detailed assessment, and (3) contingency planning. These three major areas are further subdivided into more specific areas of acceptance criteria, which are shown in the following list:
Planning and initial Assessment Management Planning Documentation 4
a Implementation Plans Initial Assessment
')
3
~
Detailed Assessment -
- _ System / Component Detailed Assessment
. System / Component Remediation c
System / Component Testing and Validation System / Component Notification Contingency Planning:
I System / Component Contingency Planning
- - Contingency Planning for Internal Facility Risks Contingency Planning for External Risks Integrated Contingency Planning To review detailed assessment activities, the staff selected a system or a component from each
- of the following six plant system classes:
. Reactor Protection System / Engineered Safety Features System (including emergency diesel generators)
Feedwater System / Balance of Plant Systems -
Radiation Monitoring Systems -
Emergency Notification Systems Plant Process Computer Systems Plant Security Systems -
~e
- One system or component from each of these system / component classes was reviewed during each NPP onsite review. The one exception to this approach occurred in several of the older i
plants in which no digital systems or components are used in the reactor protection system or L
the engmeered ' safety features systems (i.e., there are no potential Y2K vulnerabilities in these systems because the systems use only analog technology). These six classes of plant systems -
. were chosen to ensure that any system or component could be reviewed by the NRC during the plant onsite review, thereby allowing the staff to assess the full scope of each licensee's Y2K readiness program.
3.2 Integration Process The integration process to develop an overall perspective of licensee Y2K readiness involved a
- three-step process. The first step involved staff onsite reviews of licensee Y2K readiness activities during the April-June 1999 period using the acceptance criteria checklist described in
_ Section 3.1, above. The second step involved a review of fi,casee GL 98-01, Supplement 1, responses, all of which were received from the licensees by July 1,1999. The final step involved integration of the results of the first two steps to determine licensee Y2K readiness and
- tM need for regulatory followup actions.' The results of the third ' tep are discussed in Section s
4.0.
In the first step, the NRC staff reviewed Y2K readiness programs and implementation progress at each of the 66 NPP sites comprising the 103 operating NPPs.- Because of the timing of the onsite reviews;the staff expected to identify instances of incomplete Y2K readiness. Each review involved discussions with the licensee's Y2K technical staff and reviews of licensee ~
7 n
- documents and work practices?To' ensure consistency r, the reviews, the staff developed l acceptance criteria in th~e form of a 452 question checksi; which is descabed in Section 3/
v
~ These checklists were completed by NRC staff reviewers and forwarded to the lient,uarters
~
staff for evaluation and integration'with the licensee responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1; The staff's onsite review activity was documented in routine Resident inspector reports.
y# In the second step. NRC staff reviewed licensee _ responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1 In responding to GL 98-01, Supplement 1, licensees provided the~ expected completion date of their Y2K readiness program and, if the completion date was later than July.1,1999, the -
- licensee's schedule for completing Y2K readiness activities. Licensee responses to GL 98 01,
. Supplement I? are available in the PDR.
- in the third step, the NRC. staff reviewed the acceptance criteria checklists prepared by the NRC
- staff reviewers and_ integrated the results of these reviews with the licensee responses to-
- GL= 98-01. The results of this integration process are provided in the following section L4.0L NRC.Y2K REVIEW RESULTS AND FOLLOWUP ACTIONS '
The staff compared the results of the acceptance criteria checklist assessments from the onsite reviews with'the licensee' responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1, to identify areas requiring -
additional staff followup actions and reviews.- Alllicensees were following the NRC-approved industry guidance and, at the time of the staff's site review,89 NP_Ps were sufficiently complete
- that the Tl 2515/141 reviews were closedJ Even though the Tl was closed,'in some cases, (17
' NPPs) a licensee had not completed all Y2K activities at the time of the staffs onsite review (some reviews were conducted in April and early May).' For example, the licensee may not have completed remediation of a plant system or a component, or may not have completed some aspect of contingency planning activities at the time of the staffs review However, the staff found that sufficent work had been completed in related Y2K activity areas such that the staff
~
had a high level of confidence that the unreviewed activities would be completed consistent with industry guidelines: Because the overall implementation progress at the NPP was close to complete, these NPPs will not receive followup reviews.
- Fourteen NPPs had not sufficiently completed Y2K activities at the time of the site review..The
~
staff concluded that these icensees were following the industry guidance but that a followup l
review would be appropriate before closing Tl 2515/141.' Table 1 lists the 14 plants that will-receive followup reviews by August 13,1999. Licensee responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1, reported that 10 of these 14 plants were Y2K readyJ 4
- Responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1, indicated that licensees for 35 of the 103 opeselse-NPPs have additional work to complete on a few non-saf sty computer eystems or devices in order to be fully Y2K ready. The licensees provided scheduled completion dates for these t plants /_ Tables 2 and 3 list the NPPs that licensees reported were not Y2K ready on July 1,
._1999, the latest scheduled completion dates for Y2K-related activities, the systems requiring
~;
L Y2K remediation,' and the reason for the delay. ~ Typically, completion of Y2K work after July 1, 1999, is necessary because of a scheduled plant outage in the fall of 1999 or because the licensee is waiting for delivery cf a replacement component. 9 F
Of the 35 NPPs that were not Y2K ready on July 1,1999.18 plants have systems or components that could affect plant operations, for example, digital feedwater controls and core performance monitoring systems (see Table 2). The remaining 17 plants have systems or components that do not affect plant operations, for example, plant simulators and administrative systems that track maintenance activities (see Table 3). None of the remaining work at the 35 NPPs affects the ability nf a plant to shut down sefely, if necessary. The staff will verify completion of the remaining Y2K items at each of the 35 NPPs.
Table 4 lists the 68 plants that have been reported as Y2K ready in the licensee responses to GL 98-01 Supplement 1.
5.0 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS On the basis of the results of the staff's Y2K site reviews of the 103 operating NPPs and the licensees
- responses to GL 98-01, Supplement 1, the following preliminary conclusions are provided:
1.
Alllicensees are following the staff-approved industry guidance of NEl/NUSMG 97-07 and NEl/NUSMG 98-07 to address the Y2K issue. At the time of the staffs initial review, licensees for 89 NPPs had implemented Y2K programs consistent with industry guidance.
The staff will conduct followup reviews of the remaining 14 NPPs (seh Table 1) to review Y2K-related activities that could not be addressed during the Y2K site reviews conducted by the staff in the April-June 1999 review pericd.
2.
Eighteen NPPs reported systems and/or components that had not been replaced or remediated by July 1,1999, and could affect plant operations (see Table 2). The staff will verify completion of the remediation activities for these systems and components as they are completed.
3.
Seventeen NPPs reported systems and/or components that had not been replaced or remediated by July 1,1999, and do not affect plant operations but require Y2K remediation (see Table 3). The staff will verify completion of the remediation activities for these systems and components as they are completed.
4.
As of July 1,1999,68 plants have reported being Y2K ready (see Table 4). Alllicensees are expected to be fully Y2K ready before the transition from 1999 to 2000.
The results of the staff reviews wili be incorporated into the staffs final NUREG report of licensee Y2K readiness activities, which should be issued by August 31,1999.
Table'1 Plants Requiring Tl 2515/141 Followup Reviews NRC Plant -
Region.
Areas to Be Reviewed During Followup Beaver Valley 1 and 2 1
Detailed Assessment, Contingency Planning Indian Point 2*
1 Detailed Assessment, Contingency Planning -
Three Mile Island 1 i
Detailed Assessment Vermont Yankee
-l Detailed Assessment, Contingency Planning Summer
- 11 Contingency Planning Piairie Island 1 and 2' ill Detailed Assessment, Contingency Planning Arkansas 1 and 2*
IV Contingency Planning Cooper
- IV Detailed Assessment, Contingency Planning Grand Gulf
- IV Detailed Assessment, Contingency Planning River Bend
- IV Detailed Assessment, Contingency Planning Waterford*
IV Contingency Planning Plants reporting Y2K Ready as o.f July 1,1999 7
d
Table 2 Plants With One or More Systems and Components That Could Affect Plant Operations (continued)
Plant Systems Requiring Remt.diation Completion Reason for Delay Date Peach Bottom 2 Core performance monitoring system
- 9/30/99 Remediation Peach Bottom 3 Digital feedwater control system
- 10/31/99 Outage dependent Core performance monitoring system
- Turbine vibration monitoring system
- Salem 1 Digital feedwater control system
- 11/6/99 Outage dependent i
Overhead annunciator system
- Plant computer monitoring and alarm system
- Safety parameter display system Emergency response data system Plant training simulator South Texas 1 and 2 Plant process computer system
- 10/31/99-Ongoing projects to replace Procurement and inventory control system obsolescent systerns independent of Y2K I
L Three Mile Island 1 Digital turbine control system
- 10/21/99 Outage dependent Personnel radiation exposure tracking system Personnel qualification tracking system 4
Vermont Yankee Plant process computer
- 10/31/99 System on order; installation Site security computer pending
, Refueling equipment control system
- Systems that could affect plant operations
Table 2 Plants With One or More Systems and Components That Could Affect Plant Operations Completion Plant
' Systems Requiring Remediation
- Date
. Reason for Delay Beaver Valley 1 and 2 Plant rqonitoring and trending wmputer*
9/30/99 Remediation Atmospheric radioactive effluent release assessment system Emergency response data system Emergency response facility monitoring anc '
trending computer Brunswick 1 Digital feedwater control system
- 11/30/99 Outage dependent ~
Clinton Core performance monitoring system
- 9/22/99 Vendor delivery, site acceptance Station security system testing, and final installation Comanr% Peak 1 Condensate purification control system
- 11/30/99 Outage dependent Plant training simulator Diablo Canyon 1 and 2 Main annunciator system
- 10/31/99 Outage dependent Farley 2 Turbine electro-hydraulic control system
- 12/16/99 Outage dependent '
Hope Creek Fire detection and alarm system
- 10/29/99 Outage dependent Safety parameter display system Emergency response data system Plant training simulator Limerick 2 Core performance monitoring system
- 9/30/99 Remediation Monticello Core physics monitoring system
- 9/1/99 Integrated testing
. Systems that could affect plant operations
Table 3 Plants With Systems and Components That Do Not Affect Plant Operations
' Completion Plant Systems Requiring Remediation Date Reason for Delay Browns Ferry 2 and 3 Site health physics information management system 10/31/99 Implementation Site nuclear operations management system Site security check-in process software Comanche Peak 2 Plant training simulator 10/30/99 Remediation Davis-Besse Maintenance management system for surveillance 8/1/99 Software modific;tions, trackhg testing, and implementation D.C. Cook 1 and 2 Meteorological information and dispersion assessmer.t 12/15/99 Installation, test, and system verification North Anna 2 Steam generator blowdown control system 10/29/93 Design change development. installation, acceptance testing Oyster Creek Personnel qualification tracking system 9/30/99 Remediation Personnel radiation exposure tracking system pew Meteorological monitoring system 8/1/99 Remediation Sequoyah 1 and 2 Site health physics information management system 10/31/99 Implementation Site nuclear oparations management system Site security check-in process software St. Lucie 1 and 2 Health physics administrative computer system 7/15/99 Replacement (7/7/99)*
1
- Telecon with licensee on 7/15/
indicates that this item was completed on the date in parentheses a
Table 3 Plants With' Systems and Components That 9-Do Not Affect Plant Operations (continued) -
Completion Plant -
Systems Requiring Remediation Date -
. Reason for Delay Salem 2 Radiation monitoring system 10/29/99 Outage dependent -
Safety parameter display system Emergency response data system Plant training simulator Turkey Point 3 and 4 Health physicshdministrative computer system 7/15/99 Replacement (7/11/99)*
Site health physics information mana9ement system 10/31/99 Implementation Watts Bar Site nudear operations management system -
Site security check-in process software
- Telecon with licensee on 7/15/99 indicates that this item was completed on the date in parentheses -
Table 4 Plants Reporting Y2K Readiness on July 1,1999 Plant Name NRC Region Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2 i
Fitzpatrick l
Ginna l
Indian Point 2 I
Indian Point 3 i
Limerick 1 1-Millstone 2 and 3 1
Nine Mile Point 1 and 2 i
Pilgrim i
Seabrook l
Susquehanna 1 and 2 1
3 Brunswick 2 11 Catawba 1 and 2 11 Crystal River 3 11 Farley 1 11 Harris 11 Hatch 1 and 2 ll McGuire 1 and 2
' ll North Anna 1 ll Oconee 1,2 and 3 ll Robinson 2 11 Summer 11 Surry 1 and 2 ll Vogtle 1 and 2 11 j
Braidwood 1 and 2 Ill Byron 1 and 2 Ill Dresden 2 and 3 Ill Duane Arnold :
111 Fermi 2 Ill Kewaunee --
til LaSalle 1 and 2 Ill Palisades 111 Point Beach 1 and 2 Ill i
~
)
i Table 4 Plants Reporting Y2K Rea 'inioss on July 1,1999 Prairie island 1 and 2 lli Quad Cities 1 and 2 lll Arkansas 1 and 2 IV Callaway IV Cooper IV Fort Calhoun IV Grand Gulf IV Palo Verde 1,2 and 3 IV River Bend IV San Goofre 2 and 3 IV Waterford 3 IV Washington Nuclear 2 IV Wolf Creek IV
u
- ?'
4CTION EDO Principal Correspondence Control-FROM -
DUE:
/ 1/
EDO CONTROL: G19990366 DOC DT: 07/10/99 FINAL REPLY:
-POn310-Blockey-O'Brien D5ugicaville, Georgia TO:
Travers, EDO FOR SIGNATURE OF :
- GRN CRC NO:
DESCt ROUTING:
Y2K NUCLEAR INDUSTRY CONCERNS Travers Knapp Miraglia Norry Blaha Burns DATE: 07/22/99 Congel, IRO Reyes, RII
" ASSIGNED TO:
CONTACT:
Hiltz, OEDO
For Appropriate Action.
^
m
w I.
Pamels Blockey &Brwa The Executive Director, D23 Gd* Vd1'Y 7631 Da!!u Eghway Wa [11 g o,'D.C.
20555 D"#"#* " *"
Re: Y2K and Nuclear Power Plants:
Dear Sir,
I refer to my call of July 31, 1998 to the NRC and subsequent response from Region II (Mr. Ignatonis) con-cerning my suggestions and concerns regarding Y2K.
In the interim, my fears have become even more profound due to the abysmal state of many plants, if not most nationwide, with their history of problems, most of which are public record.
Combine that with the age, plant degradation due to exposure of everything-from cement to wiring-to radioactive contaminants and the string of so-called " generic" problems r
that have never been addressed, let alone fixed (turbines rotating TOWARDS the reactor, so if pieces fly off or the shaft breaks the wretched thing would go barreling towards the reactor, to name but one) and it is surely by the Grace of God that we have escaped certain catastrophe so far. By that I am refering to a meltdown, and not to other things like the vast amount of Plant Sequoyahs records being unreadable or stored in deteriorating conditionj(which NRC admits to) but to the fact that in a station blackout case, according to NUREG-1079 (which could occur with Y2k) that dump could EXPLODE in a core melt. Yes, EXPLODE.
At another dump of a reactor, Plant Hatch, (and others of similar design) NUREG 1079 cites as an example a loss of feedwater leading to core melt, and that can start in as little as FORTY MINUTES.
The core uncovering at about thirty three minutes.
One of those " generic" issues - i.e. NRC even allowing them to operate.
If Sequoyah blows up, 1&osing the Tennessee River would not go over too well.
If Hatch goes, loosing the Altamaha would not make people happy either.
In fact, it is highly likely that anyone that managed to make it out of either region alive, would probably head straight for NRC headquarters in an extremely disagreeable frame of mind intent on creating a few " generic" problems of their own, if you'll pardon my borrowing one of NRC's terms.
What I'm getting at, le that we all know that if the power goes l
(forget computers for a moment and think "NO ELECTRICITY") the back up diesel generators MUST work to keep the water circulating I
etc. even if the plant is SHUTDOWN, because if there is no water, the results will be catastrophe as outlined above. So, G 9 di l'f o t i "' Vo EDO --G19990366 H
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buckets to be lined with plastic garbage bags that can be then sealed for later disposal should be part of any preparation, j
as should a non-flammable heat source, such as a hot water bottle which can be filled with hot water heated on a camping stove, and a camping stove (for use only with a window slightly open).
It will be winter as I said. Warn the public, and do it NOW.
Warning them will allay a lot of more serious problems later if the situation turns out to be more serious than anyone thinks.
That brings me to my last proposal, which is this: as the best ladd plans have a tendency to proceed according to Murphys Law, it is vital that NRC re, quire all nuclear plants to have a manual siren, which could be augmented by police and fire departments- _
sounding theirs simultanously, to warn of a nuclear power plant accident / release / meltdown, and the need to get out of the area at once. That should go in concert with each county mailing a preset evacuation route based on the four most common pre-vailing wind paths (i.e. four routes)
As one in three people in many areas of the South (and perhaps other parts of the nation) over a certain age in particular, are functionally illiterate (240,000 Illiterate in the Metropolitan Atlanta area alone) and as many people speak Spanish, radio and TV presentations should also be made in English and Spanish nationwide on preparation and evacuation routes.
The public should also be advised to have an emergency suitcase already packed prior to Y2K so people y
are not running around in the dark trying to get out as well as find things.
As the NRC and its predecessor the Atomic Energy Commission were irresponsible enough to posh nuclear power and the utilities greedy enough to go along with it, the least that can be done is what I have detailed.
Asking utilities to send backslittle letter saying they'll be ready or not 1s inadeauate. EVERYONE is asking EVERYONE ELSE to 3
supply such letters, they are a dime a dozen. Because NO ONE knows what WILL happen, and the best minds in the world are i
saying many problems WILL occur across the board, even if only in fits and starts, it is wise to take every precaution, and to spg1J cud; that every precaution must be taken in no uncertain terms or " generic" language, or wishy-washy wording like NRC has used. Either they should be (ully compliant and _readv by now, or they are not, and if they are not, they should not only be shut down now, but should have their license revoked (which is a darn good idea anyway, in particular for all those* Mark I* " disasters waiting to happen", as well as Plant Farley, which I have heard is not ready anyway, which should be no surptise.
(Did Farley EVER fix the 20 foot long cracks in the concrete l
floor of the containment ?
And how about all those leaks ? When even the Death of the Earth Squad-the DOE _- is worried about one l
4, you KNOW there is a problem. But hey, what's a little Cesium - 137 and radioactive iodine dumped on the unsuspecting public when " energy to serve your world"is involved ? )
1 Please do us all and yourselves a favor : shut them all down,get the extra diesel fuel on site, issue the advice and warnings, and l
don't let most of them re-start.
In particular the 54 plants the REC /NRC allowed anyway, knowing they were unsafe as their staff told them so, according to Ford.
Told them in great detail. Plus l
NUREG 1079 details what a catastrophe they ALL can be.
To allow plants to operate which can explode, or meltdown and rupture likv at Hatch, and NRC knows it, is really criminal negligence,isn't it ?
If, for example, an auto manufacturer had an oversight com-mittee and buMt a dangerous, awful vehicle that could blow up and the oversight committee also knew and did nothing to stop it, it would amount to the same sort of situation.
However, a nuclear power plant can kill countless people and contaminate land for hundreds of thousands of years, which make such a situation even worse than the example of cars.
l l
Last but not least, Nuclear Fuel Services in Erwin, TN should also i
be shut prior to Y2K, in part due to the constant problems involving l
fires and releases over the years, not to mention contamination.
i i
NRC does not even require that hell hole to have an evacuation plan l
so, in event of fire and explosion and no electricity or anything l
and perhaps even fire equipment or pumps failing due to Y2K the illumination would be coming from exploding uranium and plutonium I
and hazardous chemicals and massive fire itself - with that small town desperately trying to leave across the mountains, in the dark perhaps, in winter. The resulting massive contamination would poison the river for thousands of years to come.
Please respond in detail as to what NRC intends to do about all this.
Thank you.
Ta%%- D%u-Pamela Blockey-O'Brien.
DISTRIBUTION FOR GT # 19990366 DATED: September 1,1999
SUBJECT:
Y2K NUCLEAR INDUSTRY CONCERNS LETTER FROM MEMBER OF PUBLIC (PAMELA BLOCKEY O'BRIEN)
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