ML20138C426
| ML20138C426 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1986 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8604020490 | |
| Download: ML20138C426 (3) | |
Text
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DUKE POWER GOMPANY
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P.O. BOX 331110 G
CHAHLOTTE. N.C. 211242 IIAL D. TUC,KER Ten r:enowr.
(704) 373~4531 WE PWFhfDFNT DET. LEAR PRODt'CTION March 19, 1986 Dr.'J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission O.
Region II T'
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 1 -'
Atlanta, Georgia 30323 gj Re: RII:SJW a
50-413/86-03 N
l 50-414/86-03 Catawba Nuclear Station A
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Dear Dr. Grace:
Attached are our responses to Violation 413/86-03-01 and Violation 413/86-03-02, as identified in the subject Inspection Report.
Very truly yours, W
Hal B. Tucker LTP:slb Attachments
.xc: NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station i
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7 Violation 50-413/86-03-01 Duke Power Company, Topical Report, Quality Assurance Program Duke-1-A, Amendment 9, Section 17.2.5, requires that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with the instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Contrary to the above, procedures for the restoring and inspection of the pipe support as stated in specification CNS-1206-00-04-003, " Procedure Requirements for Fabrication and Erection of Hangers, Supports and Seismic Controls," Section 7.10.B.4.a. and Procedure MP/0/A/7650/59, " Controlling Procedure for Support / Restraint Maintenance Activities," Section 11.3.7 and Section 11.3.7.1 have not been met.
As a result the support was not reinstalled and inspected correctly.
Response
(1) Duke admits the violation as stated.
(2) This violation is considered to be the result of a failure of the involved craft and QC personnel to fully understand the scope of required inspections upon reinstallation of the support. They incorrectly interpreted the supports special instructions to mean that the clamp end of the support was unaltered by the rework.-
(3) Upon discovery of the misaligned sway strut to pipe clamp axis of support 1-R-SA-1507, rework instructions were issued to correct the problem. The support was reworked and found to be acceptable by a subsequent QC inspection. After repairs were completed on this train of the SA system, follow-up inspections found no other similar occurrences.
(4) Future violations of this nature will be avoided by strict adherence to the present wording in the referenced sections of MP/0/A/7650/59.
However, to more clearly define the support / restraint installation /
restoration inspection requirements, the following will be added to the existing content of Section 11.3.7.1 of MP/0/A/7650/59:
...This also includes an inspection of those support parts not directly affected by the scope of special instructions to assure that there is no obvious physical damage, misalignment, missing or loose parts, etc.
Additionally a letter will be sent to all appropriate Mechanical Maintenance and QA personnel to identify this occurrence and to advise them of tha procedure addition.
(5) We will be in full compliance on April 15, 1986.
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t Violation 50-413/86-03-02 Duke Power Company, Topical Report, Quality Assurance Program. Duke-1-A, Amendment 9, Section 17.2.16, requires that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.
' Contrary to'the above, the first evaluation of the Auxiliary Steam (SA)
System damage done on January 3, 1986, by Design Engineering was inadequate.
Response
(1) Duke Power Company acknowledges the violation. The initial evaluation of this incident was not as complete as it could have been; however the additional minor support damage not included in the initial evaluation had no significant impact on operability of the system.
(2) ' The violation can be attributed to a breakdown 'of communications and a misunderstanding of responsibilities between Design Engineering and Nuclear Production Personnel. The operability statement for the SA system was based on responses given by Nuclear Production Department to questions asked by Design Engineering. Inaccurate assumptions (example - what determines adjacent supports) made by both departments led to the exclusion of some supports in the initial evaluation.
Also, several groups within Design Engineering were involved in evaluating the incident; however, no one had the clear lead responsibility for the overall evaluation and response.
As stated in the inspector's report, a more thorough review was performed after the additional damaged supports were found. The additional supports were shown to have no impact on operability. All of the supports have been restored to their original condition.
(3) Design Engineering has taken the steps necessary to assure that misunderstandings on operability evaluation do not happen in the future and information needed to make a complete and and thorough evaluation is obtained from Nuclear Production Department. The Piping Analysis Group has been assigned technical lead responsibility in Design Engineering for operability evaluations related to piping systems. The Piping Analysis Group will assure that the proper
.information is obtained to perform a thorough evaluation and that all 4
involved groups are actively evaluating the questions of operability.
The potential communications and coordination problems have been discussed with the responsible supervisors to assure similar problems
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do not occur again.
1 (4) We are currently in full compliance.
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