ML20138C317

Ro:On 851030,during Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test, Operator Failed to Load Diesel Generator Per Test Procedure. Caused by Operator Error.Test Completed.Incident Will Be Covered W/All Personnel

ML20138C317
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	12/02/1985
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
NUDOCS 8512120541
Download: ML20138C317 (2)

Text

- m DUKE Pownn GOMPm P.O. Box 33180 CIIAltLOTTE, N.O. 28242 HALH. TUCKER TEI.E PIIONE vice perminaser ,3 r- (704) 373-4531

. _ . . . . . - - . ua DEC 3 A7 .

25 December 2, 1985 Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Docket Number 50-369 Diesel Generator Failure Gentlemen:

l In accordance with McGuire Nuclear Station's Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 l and 6.9.1, attached is a report of an invalid Diesel Generator (D/G) failure l

which occurred at McGuire on October 30, 1985 during routine testing of the Diesel Generator.

The event had no impact on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours, 7 Mss Hal B. Tucker JBD/j gm Attachment cc: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. W.T. Orders NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 8512120541 851202 PDR S ADOCK 05000369 PDR l t \

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. DUKE POWER COMPANY McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE DUR TO OPERATOR ERROR On October 30, 1985, at 2055, during a review of the completed Diesel Generator (D/G) IB Operability Test is was determined that the time from D/G breaker closure to 3000 Kilowatts (KW) was greater than 60 seconds (sec). This did not meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 and therefore resulted in an invalid failure.

Unit I was in Mode 1 at 100% power at the time of the incident.

A classification of Personnel Error, with a contributory Management Deficiency, is assigned to the incident. The Operations Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO) failed to load the D/G according to the test procedure. Also, the Operations Assistant Shift Supervisor, aiding the NEO in performing the operability test, failed to give proper guidance in performing the procedure.

Description of Event:

On October 30, 1985, at approximately 1900, an NEO started D/G 1B to perform the D/G 1B Operability Test. Since this was the first time this NEO had performed this test, an Operations Assistant Shift Supervisor (OASS) was assisting the

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NEO in performing the procedure. A personnel error occurred when the NE0 did not load the D/G to 3000 KW within 60 see after the D/G breaker closed. Both the procedure and T.S. 3.8.1.1 require that the D/G be loaded to 3000 KW within 60 sec. Also, a Management Deficiency occurred due to the OASS not properly instructing NEO in loading the D/G. The delay in loading the D/G properly was in part due to a note in the procedure which stated that rapidly increasing the D/G load may cause it to trip on low crankcase vacuum.

A review of past incidents indicate no previous incidences of personnel error in improper loading of the D/G. This incident is considered to be an isolated event.

Corrective Actions:

Subsequent: The D/G Operability test was restarted. A personnel error during the retest caused a momentary train "B" blackout. This incident is detailed in LER 369/85-33. The test was successfully completed.

Planned: Both incidents will be covered with all Operations shift personnel.

Safety Analysis:

The failure of the D/G was invalid and due to personnel error. The D/G was available to perform its design function throughout this event. Also, Train "A" was available at all times during the incident.

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