ML20138B946
| ML20138B946 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Framatome ANP Richland |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1985 |
| From: | Malody C SIEMENS POWER CORP. (FORMERLY SIEMENS NUCLEAR POWER |
| To: | Crow W NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| 25771, NUDOCS 8510220087 | |
| Download: ML20138B946 (10) | |
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7s-A257 ML ERON NUCLEAR COMPANYINC.
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2101 HORN RAPIDS ROAD. PO BOX 130, RICHL.AND,WA 99352 "o
ment (50913758100 TELEX-152878 August 29, 1985 RETURN TO 396-SS Mr. W. T. Crow,- Ac ting Chie f Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch s
Di' vision of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NMSS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 License No. SNM-1227 Docket No. 70-1257
Dear Mr. Crow:
The additional information requested by your letter dated August 5,1985 s concerning our earlier application for license amendment is enclosed.
The additional information is presented in two parts.
Part I is non proprietary and responds'to Questions _4-8.
Part II is considered proprietary by Exxon Nuclear, it responds to Questions 1-3, and is presented in document XN-NF-837, f.ddendum 1.
Also enclosed is a revision to Section 3.2 of the license application as requested.
Sincerely, C. W. Malody Corporate Licensing CWA:jrs 6'
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.. is the formation of concentrated hydrofluoric acid.
Special construction materials and procedures are required for handling HF.
Hydrogen fluoride vapor or liquid is very toxic and corrosive. A corroded or broken line or valve in the HF condensation / collection system could result in an HF leak to the process area floor of up to 70 liters of 50 wt% HF.
A spill would be confined and neutralized within the process area and would have a negligible environmental impact.
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XN-2 SPECIAL-NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE N0. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 Section/ Appendix / Attachment ID:
Application - License Conditions Rev.
3.2.2 Technical Practices Where practicable, criticality safety will depend upon equipment designs where dimensions are limited, rather than upon decisions or actions of people. Where this is not practicable, reasons for not using favorable geometry shall be documented as a part of the criticali.ty safety analysis.
The following criteria form the bases for criticality safety controls.
3.2.2.1 Double Contingency Policy Process and equipment designs and operating procedures incorpor-ate sufficient factors of safety to require at least two unlike-ly, independent, and concurrent errors, accidents, equipment malfunctions, or changes in process conditions before a critical-ity accident is possible.
3.'2.2.2 Limits on Maximum Multiplication Factors The keff to be used as the permissible upper limit for single units or multi-unit arrays at the worst foreseeable accident conditions, including appropriate allowances for uncertainties in the data and methods used to demonstrate safety, is defined as follows:
a)
Where reliable experimental data exists for closely similar systems and adequate calculational techniques exist for relatively small extrapolation of data, keff shall not exceed 0.95 at the 95 percent confidence level.
Amendment Application Date:
July 1980 Page No.:
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XN-2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE N0. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 Section/ Appendix / Attachment ID:
Application - License Conditions Rev.
b)
If limited experimental data exists for a similar system and relatively large but reasonable extrapolations are neces-sary, or where calculational methods compare less favorably
.with experimental data the keff of the system shall not exceed 0.90 at the 95 percent confidence level.
3.2.2.3 Geometry Wherever practicable, reliance is placed on equipment designs which physically limit the dimensions of units containing special nuclear material. Safe dimensions may be established by utilizing the following safety factors:
a)
The keff of..the. unit may be established by using the guidelines given in Section 3.2.2.2.
b)
Critical dimensions multiplied by the applicable safety factors given..in Tables 3.2-1 and 3.2-2.
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Where applicable, dimensional limitations include an allowance for fabrication tolerance and/or potential dimensional changes fromcorrosionormichanicaldistortion.
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3.2.2.4 Neutron Absorbers Criticality safety may be assured through the use of fixed neutron absorbers, such as cadmium, boron, etc., provided that:
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Neutron absorbers are designed and fabricated as an integral part of the equipment.
Amendment Application Date: June 1980 Page No.:
3.29 1
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