ML20138B663
| ML20138B663 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1997 |
| From: | Roche M GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 6730-97-2127, NUDOCS 9704290232 | |
| Download: ML20138B663 (3) | |
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..e GU GPU Nuclear,Inc.
U.S. Route #9 South NUCLEAR Post Office Box 388 Forited River, NJ 087310388 Tel 609-9714000 April 24, 1997 6730-97-2127 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
Subject:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 j
IR 97-001: Reply to Notice of Violation In accordance with 10CFR 2.201, the enclosed provides GPU Nuclear's response to the violation identified in the subject inspection report.
If you should have any questions, or require further information, please contact Brenda DeMerchant, Oyster Creek Regulatory Affairs Engineer, at 609-971-4642.
Very truly yours, 1
Michael B. Roche Vice President and Director Oyster Creek MBR/BDE/gl Attachment i
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Administrator, Region 1 NRC Project Manager NRC Sr. Resident inspector 9704290232 970424 PDR ADOCK 05000219..
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Attachment I
Response to Notice of Violation Violation:
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," states, in pan, that activities afTecting quality shall be prescribed by procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with those procedures. Procedures shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
l Contrary to the above, Procedure 108.7, " Lockout /Tagout Procedure," Revision 4, did not include appropriate quantitative or qualitative criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. This resulted in preparing an incorrect tagging order on January 24,1997, and the subsequent tagging of a valve in an incorrect position. A spill of approximately 250 gallons of control rod drive system water in the reactor building occurred on January 25,1997, due to the incorrect tagging.
1 This is a severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1).
Response
GPU Nuclear concurs with the violation in that equipment control requirements were not followed when preparing the switching order for the hydraulic control units (HCU's) in question.
However, contrary to the stated violation, this activity is controlled by Procedure 108,
" Equipment Control," rather than Procedure 108.7, " Lockout /Tagout Procedure " as cited.
Reason for the Violation:
The primary cause of this incident was personnel error in that the Control Room Operator (CRO) did not specify adequate isolation boundaries in the switching order he prepared. A contributing cause to this event was an inadequate procedure. Although independent verification is implied in the procedure it is not clearly stated. There was no requirement to have a second pany review the isolation boundaries when the CRO who prepared the switching order made changes to the requested boundaries.
Corrective Steps that Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved:
Immediately following the incident, the discharge was isolated, the spill was cleaned up and the switching order was revised to provide the appropriate isolation boundaries.
Procedure 108 was revised to specifically require independent verification of all switching orders.
t 6730-97-2127 i
Page 2 Corrective Stens That Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations:
Station Management will implement changes to improve the quality of switching order preparation and verification by establishing a standard interval for the submittal of switching order requests in advance of prescheduled work.
This is expected to be implemented by June 30,1997.
In addition, consideration will be given to assigning a dedicated crew oflicensed personnel to prepare and verify switching orders.
Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved:
Full compliance was achieved on February 14,1997, when the revision to Procedure 108 became effective. Additional corrective measures are in progress as stated above.
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