ML20137Z526

Temporary Instruction 2515/131, Licensee Offsite Communication Capabilities

ML20137Z526
Person / Time
Issue date:	01/18/1996
From:	NRC
To:
References
2515-131, NUDOCS 9704250007
Download: ML20137Z526 (10)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l g g j WASHINoTON, D.C. 2066dko001

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PERB TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/131 3 1 3 LICENSEE OFFSITE COMMUNICATION CAPABILITIES SALP FUNCTIONAL AREA: PLANT SUPPORT (PLTSUP)

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APPtICABILITY: This Temporary Instruction (TI) is to be implemented at those

',ites at which Inspection Procedure 82701, " Operational Status of the Emergency i Preparedness. Program," is scheduled to be performed between February 1,1996, and July 31, 1996.

2515/131-01 OBJECTIVE l

To gather information on the licensee's capabilities to communicate with state and local governmental authorities during and after a severe natural event.

To gather information on licensee communication contingency procedures, which are implemented when communication with offsite governmental authorities is lost.

2515/131-02 BACKGROUND In a memorandum to the Executive Director for Operations dated July 22, 1993, the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) set forth a plan to resolve the generic issues identified in the " Report on the Effect of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station From August 20-30,1992."

Action Item 2 of NRR's plan directed the staff to review the existing' require-ments and guidance related to normal and backup offsite communication system design capabilities.for hurricanes. On the basis of this review, the staff would consider the adequacy of the guidance for other external events and issue' any  ;

revised guidance on-requirements that might be needed. i The existing requirements and guidance reviewed by the staff appeared to be

sufficiently detailed to provide guidance to licensees for maintaining reliable communication capabilities. However, information on the existing offsite communication systems at nuclear power plant sites is insufficient to conclude that'these systems could maintain, or at least quickly restore, continuous and reliable communication capability after a severe natural event like Hurricane {

, Andrew. Therefore, in determining whether generic action is warranted to ensure compliance with the regulations, information must be obtained on the reliability of offsite communication systems at selected sites.

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-Issue Date: 01/18/96 TI ?515/131 1

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1 2515/131-03 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS 4 03.01 Communication Systems Used and Their Vulnerabilities. Describe the media, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of communication systems that the licensee

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would rely upon to notify offsite agencies of emerge'ncy events or plant status, h

a. Briefly describe the different offsite communication systems that the licensee might use in the event of a natural disaster. Particular .l emphasis should be placed on both the primary and first backup offsite l

, notification circuits as described in the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. .

b. . Determine whether common system vulnerabilities exist with regard to potential external hazards.

03.02 Communication Continaency Procedures. Determine whether the licensee has l

established contingency procedures for quickly restoring the capability to '

communicate with offsite agencies,,should it be lost, and describe how the 2

procedures are to be used.

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! 2515/131-04 INSPECTION GUIDANCE General Guidance 4

Requirements for emergency response communications can be found in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Sections IV. D.1, IV.D.3., and IV.E.9. of Appendix E to 10 CFR  ;

j Part 50. Acceptance criteria for licensee communication capabilities can be found in Part II.F of NUREG-0654 and Appendix 3 to NUREG-0654. Further detail relative to these requirements and guidance items is given in Appendix A to this-TI.

Identify the individuals in the licensee's organization who are most qualified to answer questions about the design, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of communication circuits used for offsite notification. It may be helpful to

, contact the licensee before the inspection to ensure that these individuals will i

be available for interview during the week of the inspection. Communication support frequently is handled by personnel who work at a utility's corporate

headquarters, which sometimes is far from the site.

Under " Specific Guidance" in this TI are listed some specific questions the

. inspector may ask in order to gather information on a licensee's offsite l notification system. It is agt necessary to perform a system walkdown or a 2

detailed document review to obtain answers to these questions. It is acceptable

to obtain answers solely through interviews with licensee personnel.

The severe natural events against which system reliability will be evaluated

. should. be those most likely to affect the specific -site. For sites along the

) eastern seaboard and the Gulf of Mexico, particular attention should be given to the impact of hurricanes, severe tropical or winter storms, and high tides. For sites located inland and in the midwestern part of the United States, attention .

. should be given to the impact of severe tropical or winter storms ~(high winds or icy precipitation), tornadoes, and flooding. For sites in the western'part of the United States, the focus is on severe storms, tornadoes, flooding, fires, and volcanic eruptions. For sites particularly susceptible to . earthquakes, consideration should be given to the potential impact of earthquakes on communication systems.

TI 2515/131 Issue Date: 01/18/96 1

A significant lesson learned from the loss of communications at Turkey Point

. after the landfall of Hurricane Andrew was the inability to restore continuous, reliable comunications until 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> after the initial loss. In their joint o.. " Report on the Effect of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating W)a Station from August 20-30, 1992," the NRC and INP0 recommended that the industry consider establishing procedures to rapidly restore offsite communications in the I

i event they are lost. Contingency procedures for restoring communications could I be considered an acceptable compensatory measure if a severe natural event disabled all of the offsite communication capabilities.

Specific Guidance 04.01 Communication Systems Used and Their Vulnerabilities

a. Obtain information on the different communication systems that the licensee would rely on to notify offsite agencies of emergency events or plant status.

Some questions to ask informed licensee communication support or emergency preparedness personnel should include the following: (This list is not intended to be all-inclusive. The inspector should ask additional questions, as appropriate, to obtain information about any unique communication setup used by the licensee. Some of the following questions may not be applicable to a particular licensee's communication system.)

NOTE: It is n21 necessary to gather information on the capabilities of any of the FTS-2000 circuits used for communicating with the NRC. An assessment  !

of the survivability of these circuits is being done independently and is outside the scope of this TI.

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1. What are the communication circuits that the licensee would rely on to notify offsite agencies of emergency events or plant status?

a) Which one is the primary method used?

b) Which one is the first backup method used?

c) What other means beside the primary and first backup circuits can also be used? l l

2. For all the circuits listed in a.1. above:

a) Which use commercial telephone lines?

b) Which use dedicated telephone cable runs?

c) Which use radio systems?

d) Which use microwave transmission towers?

e) Which use satellite uplinks / downlinks?

3. Which of the circuits listed in a.1. above have transmission and reception capability in

% a) the Control Room?

b) the Technical Support Center (TSC)?

Issue Date- 01/18/96 '- TI.2515/131

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i c) the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)?

d) the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?

i e) the local E0Cs? O

4. Which circuits listed in a.l. above rely on the relay of an event notification via an intermediate offsite organization in order to reach the authority responsible for implementing offsite protective ,

actions?

b. Obtain the following information on the vulnerabilities of the various systems used.

1. Identify the particular external hazards to which the plant may be susceptible (hurricane, tornado, flooding, earthquake, forest fire, ice storm, blizzard, etc.). Information on these hazards may be found in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

2. Identify any communication circuits that share a common cable run or conduit external to the plant.

3. Identify any common susceptibility of components in both the primary and first backup circuits to wind, missile, flood, or fire damage.

Consider asking the following questions or additional ones, as appropriate:

a) Which of the circuits listed in a.l. above have components contained in structures that are not designed to withstand the plant's design-basis external hazards identified in b.1 above?

i) Which of these structures that are not designed to withstand a design-basis external event contain components of more than one circuit, so that the loss of a particular structure would disable more than one circuit? (List the circuits that would be affected.)

b) For the telephone circuits listed in a.1. above:

i) Which use above-ground transmission lines?

ii) Which use underground transmission lines?

c) For circuits listed in a.l. above using microwave, radio, or satellite antennae:

1) What is the wind load rating (in mph) of the microwave tower (radio antenna, satellite antenna) at the site? at the E0F7 at the offsite agency EOCs?

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4. Identify redundant communication systems that use the same power supply. Consider asking the following questions or additional ones, as appropriate:

a) Describe the power supplies to the circuits listed in a.1.

above.

TI 2515/131 -4 Issue Date: 01/18/96

b) Which circuits would be disabled by a loss of all offsite power?

c) Which would be disabled by a station blackout?

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' d) Which share a common power supply so that a loss of this power supply would affect more than one circuit?

e) Which have battery-powered backup power supplies?

f) For those with battery-powered backup power supplies:

i) Is the communication circuit the only load served by the battery?

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11) What is the useful lifetime of the circuit (in hours) under blackout-loading conditions?

5. Determine if any notification circuits listed in a.l. above are general emergency networks that would be cluttered with traffic concerning the external event so that it would be difficult for the licensee to get a message across these circuits. I l

04.02 Communication Contincency Procedures. The licensee's contingency l procedures should discuss those natural disasters to which the procedures apply, under what circumstances they are to be implemented and how, who is responsible  !

for their implementation, and what is to be accomplished. Consider asking the j following questions: '

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a. Does the licensee have a contingency procedure for restoring communica-tions after a severe natural event? {

b. Are responsible personnel trained in its implementation? j f

c. Has the procedure been validated? j 1

d. Does the procedure include a callout provision for personnel to restore l communication capability after it has been lost? If so, does this pro- l cedure provide for notifying these personnel by means other than electronic communications (e.g., sending a messenger to locate and inform these personnel)?

e. Does the licensee maintain spare parts onsite (in structures designed to withstand the effects of external events) for use in restoring communica-tion capability (e.g., spare antennae, cabling, microwave tower repair parts)? (Obtain a list of the circuits with provisions for replacing damaged parts.)

2515/131-05 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS Inspection findings are to be documented in attachments to routine inspection rep 9rts for inspections done under Inspection Procedure 82701. Both the Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Protection Branch (NRR/DRPM/PERB)'and the Inspection Program Branch (NRR/ DISP /PIPB) should receive a copy of all inspection reports with attachments generated as a result of this TI.

v Issue Date: 01/18/96 9 2515/131

2515/131-06 COMPLETION 30, 1996.

The inspection effort outlined ir this TI should be completed by June 2515/131-07 EXPIRATION This TI will remain in effect unti) July 31, 1996.

2515/131-08 CONTACT j

Questions regarding this TI should be directed to the Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Environmental Health Physics Section, Emergency Prepared Radiation Protection Branch (PERB), NRR (301/415-2910).

2515/131-09 STATISTICAL DATA REPORTING is to be reported against TI 2515/131 for RITS Direct inspection effort reporting. The IPE code is SI and the IMI code is IEPI.

2515/131-10 ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION INFORMATION The Emergency Preparedness and Radiation 10.01 Oroanizational Responsibility.

Protection Branch, NRR, initiated this TI.

For broad planning purposes, the estii.;ated Actual time at inspection ta 10.02 Resource Estimate.

complete this TI is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of direct inspect!on effort.a specific site This TI may be oerformed in parallel with IP 82701.

10.03 Parallel Insoection.

If this infermation has already been obtained during previous intpectio TI need not be performed.

inforn tion should be identified by number in PERB and PIPB.

10.04 Training. There are no special training requirements identified for this TI.

2t'5/131-11 REFERENCES Regulatory Guide 1.101, " Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Powe Reactors," Revision 3, August 1992.

NUREG-Of 54/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans :,nd Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980.

HijREG-0696, " Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities," February 1981.

Issue Date- 01/18/96 TI 2515/131

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! NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980, and l

Supplement 1, January 1983.

l , NUREG-1474, "Effect of Hurricane Ar. drew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating <

, ps Station From' August 20-30,1992," March 1933.

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END i

Appendix:

A. }

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDANCE

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RELATED TO 0FFSITE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 1

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Issue Date: 01/18/96 11 2515/131

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APPENDIX A '

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDANCE RELATED TO 0FFSITE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS A. PURPOSE This Appendix supplies a more detailed summary of regulatory requirements and guidance related to offsite comunication systems than could be included in the body of the TI.

B. BACKGROUND The requirements for offsite comunications are given in 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Additional guidance is provided in NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Revision 1. They are compiled here to provide an easily accessible reference for inspectors who are gathering information on licensee offsite comunication systems.

C. BASIC REQUIREMENTS

= Section (b)(6) of 10 CFR 50.47 states:

Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.

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= Section IV.D l. of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, which describes the contents  ;

of emergency plans, states in part: 1

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Administrative and physical means for notifying local, State and j Federal officials and agencies and agrer,ments reached with these i officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they become necessary, shall be described. '

= Section IV.D.3. of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 states in part:

A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency.

• Section IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 states in part:

Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency facilities'and equipment, including...

9. At least one onsite and Sne offsite comunications. system; each system shall have a backup power source. All comunication plans shall have arrangements for emergencies, including titles and alternates for those in charge at both ends of the comunication links and the primary and backup means of communication. Where consistent with the function of the governmental agency, these arrangements will include:

a. Provision for comunications with . contiguous-State / local governments witF.in the plm exposure N pathway EPZ... .

y Issue Data: 01/18/96 A-1 TI 2515/131, App. A

Guidance on meeting the above requirements is given in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980.

a Evaluation Criterion F.1 in NUREG-0654 states in part:

b Each organization shall establish reliable primary and backup means of communication for licensees, local, and State response organizations. Such systems should be selected to be compatible with one another. Each plan shall include: ,

a. provision for 24-hour per day notification to and activation of the State / local emergency response network; and at a minimum, a telephone link and alternate, including 24-hour per day manning of communications links that initiate emergency response actions.

b. provision for communications with contiguous State / local governments within the Emergency Planning Zones;

c. provision for communications as needed with Federal emergency response organizations- '

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d. provision for communications between the nuclear facility and the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility, State  ;

and local emergency operations centers, and radiological l monitoring teams;

e. provision for alerting or activating emergency personnel in j enh response organization; and '

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f. provision for communication by the licensee with NRC head- i quarters and NRC Regional Office Emergency Operations Centers and the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility and radiological monitoring team assembly area.

• Appendix 3 to NUREG-0654 states in part:

The triggering of processes to mobilize forces and warn the public is deper. dent upon the communication between the nuclear power facility and government authorities (Federal, State and Local).

The communications net must feature the following capacity... l

d. System Availability and Reliability: All stations / points on the network and the communications linkage must provide a capability for immediate dissemination, receipt and acknowledgement of alert and warning messages on a 24-hour basis. The system should be able to function notwithstanding adverse environmental conditions, such as floods and power outages. It should not be subject to pre-emption for lower priority purposes nor to failure due to traffic ,

(subscriber) overloading. To the extent a single system does not meet these performance standards, alternate means must be in place which have dissimilar vulnerability characteristics. .

END Tl 2515/131, App. A A-2 Issue Date: 01/18/96