ML20137Y074
| ML20137Y074 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/30/1985 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0750, NUREG-0750-V22-N03, NUREG-750, NUREG-750-V22-N3, NUDOCS 8512100721 | |
| Download: ML20137Y074 (201) | |
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NUREG-0750 Vol. 22, No. 3 Pages 459-Gl9 i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ISSUANCES l September 1985 ysREcy w 4G Ay i s a zt -
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION "a *2e n n "s223o 0750 R PDR
Available from Superintendent of Documents WE U.S. Govemment Printing Office Post Office Box 37082 Washington, D.C. 20013-7082 A year's subscription consis's of 12 softbound issues, 4 indexes, and 4 hardbound editions for this publication. Single copies of this publication are available from National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 h$.'- f. Brors in this publication may be reported to the Division of Technical Information and Document Control, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555 (301/492-8925) or (301/492-7566) L
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ISSUANCES September 1985 4; .
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This report includes the issuances received during the specified period from the Commission (CLI), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal i Boards (ALAB), the Atomic Safety and Ucensing Boards (LBP), the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the Directors' Decisions (DD), and the Denials of Petitions for Ruiemaking (DPRM). The summaries and headnotes preceding the opinions reported berein are not to be deemed a part of those opinions or to have any indepen-dent legal significance. s: .:l:} :f . d ' -. ' M . , _,, , 7 " . N.' -.3( ' U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO I SSION r " ' q
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. Prepared by the Division of Technical Information and Document Control,
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'a, COMMISSION ISSUA\lCES September 1985
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This report includes the issuances received during the specified period from the Commission (CLI), the Atomic Safety and ucensing Appeal l Boards (ALAB), the Atomic Safety and Ucensing Boards (LBP), the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the Directors' Decisions (DD), and l the Denials of Petitions for Rulemaking (DPRM). I The summaries and headnotes preceding the opinions reported berein are not to be deemed a part of those opinions or to have any indepen-dent legal significance. l c
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Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Thomas M. Roberts James K. Asselt. tine Frederick M. Bernthal Lando W. Zech, Jr.
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Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel B. Paul Cotter, Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel W'
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, g" } ~ r . .a S , 4 Issuance of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9%.
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'. PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
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Dockets 50-352-OL, 50-353-OL 7.- ORDER, CLI-85-16, September 19,1985.................. 459
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Issuances of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards BOSTON EDISON COMPANY ~ (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) Docket 50-293-OLA DECISION, ALAB-816. September 5,1985 . . . . . . . . .. . 461 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units I and 2) 2,<, y. ,
- Dockets 50-456-OL,50-457-OL
. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, ALAB-817, l[ September 6,1985............. ................ ..... 470
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Issuances of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards
- CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, et al.
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) Dockets 50-440-OL, 50-441-OL (ASLBP No. 81-457-04-OL) CONCLUDING PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON - EMERGENCY PLANNING, HYDROGEN CONTROL AND DIESEL GENERATORS, LBP-85-35, September 3, 1985... 514 V
.,,. FL'ORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
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(Spent Fuel Pool Expansion) 1; 1 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER,
' C. ; HYg] .,- LBP-85-36, September 16, 1985 .... ....... .. ... 590 "d q "
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3 KERR-McGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility)
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, LBP-85-38, September 26, 198 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 604 7 *
- TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al.
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units I and 2) Dockets 50-445 OL,50-446-OL ( ASLBP No. 79-430-06-OL) MEMORANDUM, LBP 85-37, September 18, 1985 . ..... 601 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
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Dockets 50-338-OLA-1, 50-339-OLA 1 ( ASLBP No. 83-481-01-L A) INITI AL DECISION, LBP-85-34, September 3,1985. . .... 481 Issuances of Directors' Decisions ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, et al. ~ ~ (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units I and 2) Dockets 50-528, 50-529 DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206 DD-85-15, September 16, 1985.. .. . .. . . . 643 l
! CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, et al.
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2) Dockets 50-440, 50-441 DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 C.F.R. f 2.206 DD-85-14 September 13,1985. . . . . . .... . . . . . 635
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Cite as 22 NRC 459 (1985) CLI-85-16 e'
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Thomes M. Roberts James K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthat Lando W. Zech, Jr. In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-352-OL 50-353 OL PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY (Limerick Gene.atirig Station, Units 1 and 2) September 19,1985 t By completing its consideration of emergency planning issues raised by the Graterford inmates, the Licensing Board has mooted the need for the exemption to 10 C.F.R. ) 50.47(a) and (b) which it had granted Phil-adelphia Electric Company in May 1985. The Commission has therefore vacated, on grounds of mootness, ALAB-809 and the underlying Licens-ing Board decisions which addressed the exemption issue. ORDER +
- t-- On May 9,1985, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Licensing Board") granted the Philadelphia Electric Company ("PECo") an ex-
- emption from the requirements of 10 C.F.R. j 50.47(a) and (b) related to potential emergency planning issues that could be raised by the Gra-1 -
terford inmates, and on May 24, 1985, the Licensing Board authorized
- the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to issue full-power operating licenses for the Limerick Generating Station. However, the Commission 4 459 1
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e i. j itself declined to make the decisions immediately effective, CLI-85-ll, 21 NRC 1585 (1985), and in ALAB 809, 21 NRC 1605 (1985), the s '". ~,.'i, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board vacated both of these Licens-
- ( TH m - ing Board decisions and remanded the matter back to the Licensing
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2 . ..'. ". .wy " r ., Board for further consideration.
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Subsequently, the Licensing Board completed its consideration of the
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g;;,s l:rg,;;l 's N for any such exemption. Accordingly, we vacate both ALAB-809 and
/> . ; the underlying Licensing Board decisions as moot. This has no effect on the full-power licenses since issuance of the full power licenses does not depend in any way on the grant of the exemption at issue in these
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4 It is so ORDERED.
; For the Commission SAMUEL J. CHILK Secretary of the Commission
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- Dated at Washington, D.C.,
*- " "* - m' this 19th day of September 1985.
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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL PANEL
..x Alan S. Rosenthal, Chaaman ,a Dr. W. Reed Johnson g Thomas S. Moore ;
Christine N. Kohl 3 q,j Gary J. Edles Dr. Reginald L Gotchy
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_ _ . . . . . _ _ _ . . . _ . __ _~ - . _ - Cite as 22 NRC 461 (1985) ALAB 816 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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a ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD V, , , g . , Administrative Judges: 1 Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman l Dr. W. Reed Johnson Gary J. E6tes l
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In the Matter of Docket No. 50 293-OLA BOSTON EDISON COMPANY (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) September 5,1985 The Appeal Board affirms the Licensing Board's denial ofintervenor's untimely petition to intervene in this operating license amendment pro-ceeding for failure to address the 10 C.F.R. f 2.714(a) lateness factors. i l i RULES OF PRACTICE: UNTIMELY INTERVENTION PETITIONS l; Under 10 C.F.R. j 2.714(a), nontimely petitions to intervene will not t be entertained absent a determination by the Licensing Board that the petition should be granted based upon a balancing of five factors:
,, (i) Good cause, if any, for failure to file on time; 3 y , . , (ii) The availability of other means whereby the petitioner's interest will be protected.
(iii) The extent to which the petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected
. to assist in developing a sound record.
l' (iv) The extent to which the petitioner's interest will be represented by existing
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,. l (v) The extent to which the petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding 4
461
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RULES OF PRACTICE: UNTIMELY INTERVENTION i PETITIONS e j: i - . When filing a late petition to intervene, it is the petitioner's obligation n = c ,( ;, ;~a Q;. 7 .U.i i ' to address the five lateness factors of 10 C.F.R. $ 2.714(a) in the petition yM47-ntW 1 m .: n z. s t. itself.10 C.F.R. f 2.714(a). W:< pr!M.y'.r,.r.w'MMW s a;9
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10 C.F.R. { 2.714(a). RULES OF PRACTICE: APPELLATE FILINGS When appealing purely procedural points, appellants should explain in their papers precisely what injury to them was occasioned by the asserted error (s). Cf. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, J c Unit 1), ALAB-788,20 NRC 1102,1151 (1984). g;3;y'o g,ie Y
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I John F. Doherty, Boston, Massachusetts, petitioner pro se. Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., R.K. Gad, III, and William S. Stowe, Boston, Massachusetts, for the applicant Boston Edison Company.
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Gregory Alan Berry for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff. DECISION 4s. . . .,. A~. .. . k_g#W.gs;j
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. w.. - - s. N. .. ,. D. amon8 other things, the request of the Boston Edison Company (appli-c..~,7 . . . y _ ,- < : -
cant) for an amendment to the operating license for its Pilgrim nuclear
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,, technical specifications governing the facility's spent fuel storage pool.'
we c. The proposed change would raise the K-effective limit of the pool from a ..t $,N Y' O.90 to 0.95 for normal conditions.2 According to the notice, "[t]he K-- 3.C[p m ., SY c, a.7'fi.& 3;. ' - mh""p/N N b f,M.h J effective of the pool is [ currently] limited to 0.95 for abnormal condi-w .s. c o tions and this would not be changed. The K-effective limit of 0.95 would W 4 . .o,a Me 3;e-w%m-ns a n4.# .. . 61- then apply to both normal and abnormal conditions in conformance with
- - .: ,.un m,.t.W .m , e WW.w > NRC's current practice."2 ? . frM m, ,..M @nJ W.V The notice further advised the reader that the Commission had made s y;&. g :q C9.gf.OM' a " proposed determination" that the desired amendment involved "no -
M,.a >V q d 4 significant hazards consideration"; that is, it "would not (1) involve a n . 9, - ' c:' significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident pre- -
, 1 i- '
viously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind V' of accident from any acciden't previously evaluated; or (3) involve a sig-nificant reduction in a margin of safety."* Nonetheless, those persons
; whose interest might be alTected by the amendment were provided the j opportunity to file a request for hearing and a petition for leave to inter-t vene. In this connection, the notice stated that the deadline for any such submission was June 21, 1985, and directed attention to 10 C.F.R.
2.714, the particular section of the Commission's Rules of Practice , ;c c'y Q v . ; .
^'
governing petitions to intervene in NRC proceedings.5 Prospective inter-
, A A;r;Y .
^
venors were told that a nontimely petition would not be entertained ' 3 y;.g.m.q:. y, c ,y .>, unless the Licensing Board determined that the petitioner had made a
- m.w;W ' ' *" ' "
" substantial showing" on the five lateness factors set forth in section 2.714(a).*
\
3 30 Fed. Reg.20,969. 20,971. 2 thl. Tbc K-effective concept has been explained in these terms:
* ' A system containing rissionable material - such as a spent fuel poci - is "cntical," or " super.
critical," if it is carable of supporting a neutron chain reaction. Tius condition is expressed in terms of the *efTective neutron multiplication factor" (ketr) - ie., the ratio of the number of
- ~4 -
neutrons produced by fission in each generauon to the number of neutrons lost by absorption and leakage. Thus, when a system is entical or supercritical, kerr equals or is greater than 1.0. Cossamiers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Nuclear Plam). ALAB-725,17 NRC 562,564 n.2 (1953). See also fac/lc Gas and Elecinic Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. Units Nos. I and 2). ALAB-334,
~.-. N>fR. 9- 3 NRC 809,819 n.24 (1976).
- j. h M - '
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- 3 50 Fed. Reg. at 20,971.
/.m.,.w. .- 4
/4. at 20,969; are also Mermpetiras Ednan Co. (Three Mde Island Nuclear station. Umt No.1).
, jiN9p r .,p3 7
. O pm - q .Am t e T;cW;w.f '
,?. ALA8-807, 21 NRC 1895,1200 n.12 (1985). The basis for that deiermination was summarized at 50 f1 9 @ w w w -,W.-:g e '. M T Fed. Res. at 20.971.
gf Q&q .M.i ,3 h ;,.j e _ 5 jg_ ,,30,%9, 2* ' ';jey.c.$g'.Nd VL ,i N' -i , ' m?.. ;* 614. at 20.970. Those factors, to be balanced by the Board, are-(i) Good cause, if any, for failure to file on time.
.M.N ~g ' ~
N 'r[. N.[y i f .Ng#pS yy<*. ]w4. .p ,% - p ; * '. ' . _ .. ' [..- (ii) The availability of other means whereby the petitioner's interest will be protected. (iii) The extem to which the petitioner's parucipation may reasonably be expected to assist in ,- .; 2 developmg a sound record.
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N -i (iv) The extent to which the petitioner's interest wdl be represented by existing parties. %. . .,*, #n ..,.,. 1 Mp 4,:t w p r,.t W o' e .( (v) The extent to which the petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the pro-
. 74 ceedmg"
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u - - c 3,> % . c _ The only request for hearing and intervention petition submitted in re-sponse to the notice (hereafter collectively referred to as the " petition") k,. was that of John F. Doherty. Filed on June 29, 1985, it was eight days 7 : d_ > ;: Q ^_;, f;. .
>< late.' it made no reference to that fact, however, and thus did not under-z; 4
s.~, m, w .r ;M 4. ~6r..6.,:: 9.. n . 4. take to address the five section 2.714(a) lateness factors. Rather, Mr. kJ' @ b g M . 4 6 M M. w ,c., W W W J M ffe W ee s :- W Doherty confined himself to a discussion of his standing and how his N/~fyy%:g;py-g;(' interest might be affected by the proposed license amendment. On the
.i W first score, he alleged principally that his Boston, Massachusetts resi-7 q. 7pyg$k,m.y M F. W -Tj ggg W .e, dence is 43 miles from the Pilgrim facility (located near Plymouth, b 6 ' e ,.j fSM 5Q ' , Massachusetts on Cape Cod Bay) and, further, that he consumes food
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'; -4 products (such as cranberries and fish) trown or caught in the vicinity q 3 _. ; g , , w.n ,. ,,1 _, of the facility.8 On the latter score, his artaulated concern is that the rais-e "-- ing of the K-effective limit for normal conditions t0 0.95 would enhance
~
the possibility that criticality would take place in the spent fuel pool,
'5 which in turn assertedly might occasion the release of radiation "through spent fuel heat-up and melt."'
Both the applicant and the staff responded to the petition. The appli-
-;-- cant urged that the petition be denied because Mr. Doherty had v; demonstrated neither that his tardiness should be overlooked nor that he meets the established standing test. For its part, the NRC staff dif-E .' .e.cen
,-.d .
+Oc 7-Vg h-if@7Yp? fered with the applicant on the standing question but agreed that Mr.
~'
y ., M . 1 r i Doherty had not met his burden with regard to the lateness of the peti-
' " ^^" #' * * * ~ '
tion." As the staff saw it, the Licensing Board should either deny the pe-
' ~
tition as untimely or require Mr. Doherty to make a further showing on the section 2.714(a) lateness factors.n in a July 19, 1985 memorandum and order, the Licensing Board denied the petition both because it was late and because the Board con-curred in the applicant's view that 'Mr. Doherty lacked standing to chal-
> lenge the license amendment in question.o The Board's treatment of the lateness matter was brief. After observing that Mr. Doherty "should have been aware of the need for timely filings because that need was ex-plained in the federal Register notice," the Board stated that it was re-ti -* i .p-/ . L .j .
.c , . , , , _ , -
Inasmuch as the petition mentioned the federaf Register notice. Mr. Doherty presumably had read y .,4. f e M .g.,,, . 7 the notice and was aware of the June 21 riling deadline imposed by it. r@. $g ,f . .a < .- s,j 4cMw.g f l,-.9 v. % f. M [s,'m t( 9eag ar *. % .y;.mic m; 4 . 8 Request for Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene with Resard to Unnombered Amendment to
. n #q - Operaung License DPRJ5. Announced in the federal Register. May 21.1985 Uune 29.1985) at 12.
H $ j g (.N.:r M Mr. Doherty addmonaHy claimed standtng as a ratepayer or the applicant. Id. at 2. D ; . f.f ?. ... ' $J';i '%l: ,.J'~ M M Q.Q s ;A y s 4
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eq to g c,,,,,.s Answer to John F. Doherty's Request ror a Heanns and Petmon ror Leave to Intervene Uuly 12,1985) at 2 8. 38 NRC stafr Response to John F. Doherty's Petition ror Leave to Intervene Uuly 19.1985) at 910 h . '.",. ! M . -.)kd 2;.l 9.s , 11 13.
. <.; 7 9 ,-p -%, , : p ,,
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y .,. UL8P-85-24,22 NRC 97.
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l '. i quired to dismiss the petition because he "has not shown good cause for his late filing."84 L. ., h ", ....Wu . .E /. . . ,w.f%':,9~h $& Y>fMr.. Doherty appeals this result under 10 C.F.R. 2.714a. His principal 'W -M.t W,WTM.7, '.W. . . , - . w claim is that the Licensing Board erred in denying his petition without
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p . memy.wwm MF n- glvmg him an opportunity to reply to the responses of the applicant and
- 1. N. - a.e w- m: .~. u
.m. ..w, .7. .. the staff.85 Insofar as the timeliness matter is concerned, Mr. Doherty -
, w 7;. . gn.g:.u.. + . 5, - believes that the Licensing Board could not deny the petition on lateness i !_ , M. 7. .qqZ. w. ,.g$Wn $n grounds unless either the applicant or the staff raised the issue. On the l '
. CD W:E ..J
- premise that untimeliness is akin to an affirmative defense and must be jr fWNyff ' asserted as such, he reasons that he was justified in withholding any L- , ',' S~#. .n* *"
discussion of the lateness factors until the receipt of the responses to the > petition. If those responses did not oppose the petition as late, that would be the end of the matter. If, on the other hand, the petition was opposed by one or more parties on tardiness grounds, then his obligation to address the lateness factors would ripen and he would be entitled to fulfill this obligation by way of a reply to the opposition (s).'7 Both the applicant and the staff dispute this line of argument and urge l t.
.mO -
s aff.irm. ance of the result below.38 t ,,
.m,'.i %5$kw2R ,W..wgn .'
g w b' ' , ' s~ ;j~ygg; , . o m ._ . . . - II. t gy, < w j ac.. . g-PT.. %s, 0 .37 fn m.ua wE2,MAWr% b In deciding the appeal before us, we need not and do not reach the P * ' question whether either his place of residence or his consumption of I l food products originating in the vicinity of the facility serves to clothe i Mr. Doherty with the requisite mantle of standing to challenge the pro- . l posed amendment to the Pilgrim operating license." For, given its fail-4;' 14
/d at 98. In an accompanyms footnote. the Board alluded to the fact that a balancing of all of the 10 '
, . , C.F.R. 2.714(a) lateness factors as a condiuon precedent to the grant of an unt.mely peution. /d at 98 3 , .3 n.3.
,. g .ky w
@y. - a4% d dt .. 18 John F. Doherty's Snef in support of His Appeal of the July 19.1985 AsLS order Dismissing His
- m
. m ;- a * - Petiuon for Leave to Imervene and Request for Hearing (August 13.1985) at 3 7. Mr. Doherty also as.
serts that the unumehness of the petition was of no pracucal significance in that, as of July 17.1985. the p
,?. '
M * @f,",(*, Mf'{* $[ apphcant's proposal had not been approved by the staff. /d at 7, still further, he maintains that the M.y Licensing Scard rehed upon entra-record information (not subject to ofrecial notice) in reaching its con.
+ h,2( j ,, g7.g 'A g[(r gg.g,. .EIdk . , _ clumon on the standans question. /d at 6.
< . VM ;e; . wM.L .; ; ,, 16/d at 4.
y . .g &4J.C.L. . &$ U ld at 3-4. Mr. Doherty does e1plicitly acknowledge, however. that "there is no statutory or common
,Q.k;fg e c. ef ; 7 .m Q*y*fQ .
.,. y ,@ ...,s law requirement that reply be permitted at the pleading stage as here."It at 4.
is Licensee's Brief (August 27. 1985); NRC stalt Briefin opposition to John F. Doherty's Notice of
. .. e' ^MW u. pw.M .M % :c ~
Appeal ( August 29. 1985). The apphcant supports the Licensing Board on both the untimeliness and
- . MyW . N c - standing quesuons. The staft's endorsement of the decision below is confined to the untimehness matter.
19 We note in pasung. however. that his claim of standans based upon ratepayer status is in the teeth of
.. [' , .NWsjiD.Ny'.*;'kd@"T+"
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._ controlhns Comnussion precedent. PorrArs.f Genensf EJerrre Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant. Units i and 2). CLt.76 27,4 NRC 610,614 (1976).
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' ure even to address the section 2.714(a) lateness factors, his interven-
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tion petition was correctly denied because it was untimely. A. There is no conceivable merit to Mr. Doherty's claim that his 1);)C.M.M.H a s;t.w3, w -m y:W. mn ;.-y m; A' ",.. V . t duty to confront the five lateness factors did not materialize until after ~ w. the applicant and the staff had responded to the intervention petition hn#OMwrs.d. ;6d.;. : 9 and raised the matter ofits untimeliness. To begin with, on its face sec-o %.~ .W, ,M,.x.;,Ma#. . A. 3~ tion 2.714(a)(1) lays to rest his suggestion that the lateness of such a pe- > .E' - .x-..: c: m.uNW4. ~~ .w.J 1 J.
, , . n '
tition is in the nature of an affirmative defense, to be considered by a M 42qfirt . 3 J%Q4hRh,;X MN g licensing board only if the board is asked to do so by a party to the pro-ceeding. In plain terms, the section permits a licensing board to grant an Qo 7.) "M c '. .
~
untimely petition only if, upon a consideration' and balancing of the late-p;E M.8 V, - J y M ' 17 s ; ness factors, it determines that the petition should be granted: "Non-l timely filings, will not be entertained absent- a determination by . . . the N atomic safety and licensing board designated to rule on the petition LJ l and/or request, that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the [ lateness factorsl."20 In short, it is of no conse-q;c j quence whether, in an opposition to the late petition, one of the other ' " ' ;cu' c . , litigants points to the untimeliness. Even if all of the parties are inclined to waive the tardiness, the board nevertheless is duty-bound to deny the MMi a. Petition on its own initiative unless it is persuaded that, on balance, the
- jg MN@hw.thge.h$Q&[C C i, f* 777 lateness factors point in the opposite direction.
- mia.ccm &w a - It is equally clear that the burden of persuasion on the lateness factors -
~
i is on the tardy petitioner and that, in order to discharge that burden, the
. l petitioner must come to grips with those factors in the petition itself.2' i The underlying reason for this requirement is particularly apparent in the context of the first factor. A licensing board hardly could determine I whether there was justification for the untimely filing without knowing
. why the petition was not submitted by the prescribed deadline - infor-D,.. s , = mation peculiarly within the possession of the petitioner. Likewise, in most instances at least, the board will not be able to assess confidently "f -
the third factor,(the extent to which the petitioner's participation may a; - 4 a- x ., ., reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record) without
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m , having before it the petitioner's reasons for believing that the factor
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e a /M i "b,._ . weighs in his or her favor.n
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20 Emphasis supphed.
._r [:@dse r 2* fer Duke power Co. (Perkms Nuclear stanon, Units I,2 and 3), ALA8 615,12 NRC 350,352 53
.yg e ,i 4N fN. . ? &,. t%.g .;4J ;Oi,' ', ; W; A ', , - , , (19act
$r .' N , r g, H Mr. Doherty points to our holdmg some years ago that, "[blefore any suggestion that a (timely) con-
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tenuon should not be emertained can be acted upon ravorably (by the licensms board), the proponent or the contenuon must be given some chance to be heard in response." Nousros Lighting and powr Co. g f4 " #Ad,u'3 S: a 4 - lc,.1 . (Allens Creek Nuclear Genersung station, Umt D ALAB-565,10 NRC 521,525 (1979). That hold na
~ m" 2.W.g4 N[U ? if9,, ,
( y . , ,,..L n, , " . , y. ; has no pertinence here It rests on the considerauon that intersenors (or petiuoners for intervennon) (Continued T~ m.,
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_.:c. n .._ _ _ ._ ,_ .._ .. _ .._ ... .. _ .._ _ _ _ __ ~ . _ . _ l It is thus not surprising that the federalRegister notice specifically in-
. . ,' g formed Mr. Doherty and others similarly situated that a belated inter.
- -x^
vention petition would not be entertained in the absence of a "substan-
" m" m. ~ . .
+
y.: tial showing" by the petitioner that there was warrant for granting it - a j 9 % .4 , i i; M ; Q $ .) showing that was to focus on the lateness factors.22 Far less understanda- [ _ J - c u.CMis.9 ble, however, is why Mr. Doherty paid no heed to that admonition.
' m: -
J }. g Our puzzlement in this regard is enhanced by the fact, noted by both
,; , V f}. F 1 the applicant and the staff, that Mr. Doherty is by no means a newcomer i . . e % .4 to NRC licensing proceedings.24 Some six years ago, while a resident of Texas, he succeeded in obtaining intervenor status in the Allens Creek
. ~ ?"s 4
., 4 construction permit proceeding and actively participated in that proceed-i ing until its termination three years later in October 1982.25 Of greater l present significance, after acquiring his current Massachusetts residence I in June 1983, he filed a late intervention petition in the operating license proceeding involving the Seabrook nuclear facility on the New Hampshire seacoast. In light of his present line of argument, one might have thought that that petition similarly would have said nothing with re-spect to its tardiness. But such was not the case. Acknowledging that it was late, the petition devoted several pages to the reasons why, in Mr.
O 4m M[%
- I Doherty's view, each of the factors favored the allowance of interven-l ,
7 p.$ tion.26 In the circumstances, it would seem reasonable to infer that, at l
- . , _ - .z . &%g',cy r-i i "cannot be required to have anucipated in the contrations themselves the posuole arguments their oppo.
nents might raise as grounds for dismissing them." lhi. (emphasis in ongmall But, as seen abote, late peutioners are not called upon to antgipate what their opponents might have to say about the untimelu ness; rather, their obhgauon is to establish afrirrr.atively at the threshold (i.e., in the late pention itseln that a balanctng of the five lateness factors warrants oserlooking the tardiness. Mr. Doherty's rehance upon Clerrland Electric //luminatint Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2), LBP.82 89,16 NRC 1355,1356 (1982), is equally misplaced. The snuation m that case was ! markedly duTerent from that at bar. There, an intervenor had sought tojusufy the Ghng of a late conten. tion on the ground that it was based upon new information which had just recently become available. In
'y .p response, the appheant asserted that the information had been available at an esther time. Relying upon 1 '
E ; what it deemed to be "the rauonale of Allens Creek," the Licensing Board decided to hage the imervenor "7?
? 4@
- l respond to this asseruon.
22See p. 463, supre.
, T. 7, y -. . p. W- W ~ .;; C
* ,j , y, 24We do not run to imply that, had this been Mr. Doherty's Grst appestance in such a proceeding, his
, *; , N;;Ib i* I failure to coa.piy with the Rules of Practice would have been escusable. As emphasized on more than one occasicc, there is an " imperative necessay that a# participants in NRC a4udicatory proceedings -
I ; ,g ? $ .j' - whether lawyers or laymen representing themselves or organizauons to which they belong - famihanze !' 3,. t . ; %. '
- themselves at the outset with*' those rules. Perkins,12 NRC at 352, guonnafrone Hausion Larer!ne and
+-
- te
]'q Pomer Co ( Allens Creek Nuclear Generaung stauon, Umt I). ALAB409,12 NRC 172,173 n.1 (1980L 25 See Houston Lierms an.t Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generaung stauon. Umt !). AL AB-$35,
, n.$. ,
.s A yg. 9 NRC 377.384 (1979); ALAB.625,13 NRC 13 (198th L8P.82 94,16 NRC 1399 (1982L
< ' 9 ,;
26 John F. Doherty's Pettuan for Leave to Intersene (september 6,1983), filed n Public Service Co. of a - 4 ' i V m h o ' 4 *;x' [l New #d*Pshart (scabrook stauon, Units I and 2), Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444, at 5 7. The petition was demed by the Licensng Board on the basis of its balancir g of the five lateness factors. on Mr. y~ --(- ys
'M7i'[ m.
Doherty's appeal, we affirmed the result on an unrelated ground. See ALAB 758.19 NRC 7 (1984). 7 4 N " ,e' , . ' . g 4
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one time at least, Mr. Doherty fully apprehended the reach of the af-firmative obligation imposed upon the petitioner who appears o.1 the
.x . ; scene after the prescribed deadline has passed.27
%D " a- ^ , B. It is manifest from the above analysis that, as he should have tG{ .w.s.m ._. - ..,m .
.readily appreciated, Mr. Doherty possessed no right to respond to the ap-g ...
-.P P ~: plicant and staff answers to his petition - i.e., a second opportunity to
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, have been included in the petition itself. And, although the Licensing
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Board might have accorded him that opportunity as a matter of discretio's,
- 's it was not obliged to do so. In short, Mr. Doherty ignored the procedural i
~
guidance contained in the FederalRegister notice - as well as the terms of 10 C.F.R. 2.714(a)(1) and his own past practice in Seabrook - at his peril. Nor are we inclined to exercise our independent discretion to allow Mr. Doherty a fresh chance to explain why a balancing of the lateness factors supports the grant of his petition.28 Among other things, it does not appear that saddling Mr. Doherty with the consequences of his own dereliction might result in a possibly serious safety problem escaping
^
proper scrutiny. While the merits of the proposed license amendment
"' are not before us, it can be said at this juncture that we neither have t '
-- - ~ 4
-p v been provided with nor know of any technical basis for questioning the
~ - _ . _ , .
staffs judgment that, if approved by it, the 0.95 K-effective limit will
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furnish an adequate margin of safety."
- r. y .m M s- sb 27tn contrast to the eight-day tardiness here involved, Mr. Doherty's Srebrook intervention peuuen 4, M ,44rgr- 61.! G , $y, 7. ,1,., , ,
was almost two years late. But, contrary to his possible behef, that distinction has no legal importance in-M P M dA ,.i.Q.' N.5 f,% . .g. sofar as concerns the necessity to bnns the lateness factors into play (although, obvic'. sty, the extent of the tardmeas may induence the outcome on the assessment of certain of those factors). .dl.,- cetwM wj,,Qg 46 28 In this regard, we Gnd it cunous that, in his appellate papers. Mr. Doherty has shed no hsht on what 4.:. K v 4 ,'- .
/ , U " .,. s . he would have told the Licensms Board on the lateness factors if seven a second chance to do so. For all s yi-e ' Q. 4? O O h ._A.;i f.S.y -
we know, his case on the factors as so weak that, had he possessed a right to reply, the dental of that
, , . " ,%ey.- 17, L nght by the Licensms Board would have been harmless error we expect pernes taking appeals on
r purely procedural points to explam precisely what irQury to them was occasioned by the asserted error.
N
- Cf. Long Isised L&4 tug Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power stauon, Unit 1), ALAS-788,20 NRC 1102
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, 1831 (1934).
g ;; y M N. D %- NAs the May 21 fchral Aerizare notice observes (see p. 46), siepre), a K.efrective hmit of 0 95 under '
- Wr.Lv,4 -
- c. . _- all conditions is in accordance with current NRC stafr requirements. It is also consistent with industry r standards for spent fuel storage facihues. Sec 8,g Rock Post.17 NRC at 56748.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Licensing Board's denial of Mr. Doher-ty's request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene 2* is affirmed.
; , 7 . It is so ORDERED.
. ... o .- 1
, . i r- .
t,. r , FOR THE APPEAL BOARD
- 4; . .cg..f..g.,..p; e u ~ -. .~ u m, . , . e, x . ,
C. Jean Shoemaker Secretary to the b Appeal Board f l g
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m.____.--..-.- _ . _ . . - . - . - . - . Cite as 22 NRC 470 (1985) ALAB 817 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
., NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD
., 1 .
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F' ~ Administrative Judges: Gary J. Edles, Chairrnan Thomas S. Moore i Dr. Reginald L Gotchy i In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50 456-OL i CO 457-OL W- , COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
~ T (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2) September 8,1985 I
The Appeal Board denies a motion by applicant for directed certifica-tion of a Licensing Board ruling that allowed intervenors to amend - I after obtaining discovery from the NRC staff - a contention that the Board previously found to be insufficiently specific. RULES OF PRACTICE: INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS (DIRECTED CERTIFICATION) ('" . In deciding whether to exercise its discretionary directed certification b J/ ' , -y [ , authority, appeal boards apply a two-part test, it considers whether a licensing board ruling either (1) threatens the party adversely affected h-:~.I,..f-.. q,.? , r e. < ;. ;.a . '
. v by it with immediate and serious irreparable impact which, as a practical matter, could not be alleviated by a later appeal, or (2) affects the basic JJ , a ; - ". _- .
1' . ' structure of the proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner. Public Service Co. ofIndiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1
- Q. a .;, f . f and 2), ALAB-405, 5 NRC i190, i192 (1977); see, e.g., Metropolitan
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7; , . - . : . . . .. , . p . _ _ . _ _ . ._.- .. _... ._. - _ _ -- . _ - - - ~ . . .- - Edison Co. (Three blile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB 791,20 NRC 1579,1582 (1984). RULES OF PRACTICE: INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
- ' ~ '
Since the admission of one or more additionalissues into an ongoing case seldom has a pervasive or unusual effect on the basic structure of a proceeding, appeal boards have traditionally declined to review on an in-terlocutory basis rulings that sirrply admit another contention. See, e.g., Cleveland Electric //luminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2), ALAB-706,16 NRC 1754 (1982).
! RULES OF PRACTICE: INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW The basic structure of an ongoing adjudication is not changed simply because the admission of a contention results from a licensing board
; ruling that is important or novel, Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three blile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB 791, 20 NRC 1579,1583 (1984), or may conflict with case law, policy or Commission regulations.
Cleveland 6/ectric //luminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2), ALAB-675,15 NRC 1105,1112-13 (1983); see also Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units I and 2), t ALAB-641,13 NRC 550, 552 (1981). Similarly, the mere fact that a
} party must litigate an additional issue, or that a matter will be subject to t adversarial exploration rather than NRC staff review, does not alter the i basic structure of the proceeding in a pervasive or unusual way so as to
; justify interlocutory review of a licensing board decision. See Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-742,18 NRC 380,384 (1983); Virginia Electric and Power Co.
(North Anna Power Station, Units I and 2), ALAB-741,18 NRC 371, 378 (1983), i RULES OF PRACTICE: INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW I
' I Although the general standard for interlocutory review is the same
- ~ - - - . e . whether or not undertaken on certification or by referral, see Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units I an.12),
-j ALAB 741,18 NRC 371,375 n.6 (1983), an appeal board is mora likely
! to intercede where a licensing board believes that its ruling has the type of overall impact on the proceeding that warrants the appeal board's im-mediate attention, i
i l 471 1
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APPEARANCES Joseph Gallo, Washington, D.C., and Peter Thornton, Chicago, Illinois,
- - for applicant Commonwealth Edison Company.
. . . ,.4 .. . ,, .
.*"*?. ' Robert Guild and Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., Chicago, Illinois, for inter-venors Bridget Little Rorem and the Appleseed organization.
, . . c . .. . A
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d^ ' Janice E. Moore for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Opinion for the Board by Mr. Edles and Dr. Gotchy: Before us is a motion of the applicant Commonwealth Edison Compa-ny for directed certification of a Licensing Board ruling.' According to the applicant, that ruling allowed intervenors, Bridget Little Rorem and
- the Appleseed organization (collectively Rorem), to amend - after ob-
- w ^' 3 taining discovery from the NRC staff - a contention that the Board pre-viously found overly broad and nonspecific. For reasons set out below, we deny the motion.
- 1. In March of this year, Rorem filed a contention in this operating license proceeding asserting that serious deficiencies exist in the quality assurance program at the Braidwood facility.2 The contention was predi-cated in large part on testimony in the Byron proceeding by James G.
Keppler, Regional Administrator of the Commission's Region I!! office in Glen Ellyn, Illinois.) Mr. Keppler's testimony was to the efTect that there are serious quality assurance problems at the Braidwood facility. In a ruling admitting other contentions, the Licensing Board rejected the Rorem quality assurance contention.* Because that contention was sub-mitted after the deadline for filing contentions, the Board evaluated it in
., ,' light of the lateness cri'eria set out in 10 C.F.R. { 2.714. It reached no
._' ,' definitive conclusion as to whether the proper balance of those criteria 3
$ l_ D 'l5f.;.
i See 10 C.F.R. if 2.718(i). 2.785(b)(i); Pubhe Servire Co. o/New Nampshire (seabrook stauon, Units
,' ~/'t ' ' I and 2), ALAS-271,1 NRC 478.482 8) (1975).
2The contenuon is set out in rull in the Licenung Board's special Preheanng Conference order. LSP 85.ll,21 NRC 609,627 (1985). f., , , , , . . ,
..a <. 2 Docket Nos. sTN 50 454, sTN 50-455. See sentrally Commonnes#h Edaos Co. (Byron Nuclear
.; f . . , .' * , ; w , Power stauon, Units I and 2), L8P.84-41,20 NRC 1203,1216, afd. ALAB-79),20 NRC 1591 (1984).
- L8P 85 il, supra.
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justified admission of the late contention, however, because it deter-I mined that the contention was in any event not sufficiently specific to f
^
justify admission for litigation.5 Even though the Board rejected the contention, it " permitted" Rorem 3 . . to depose Mr. Keppler with a view toward resubmitting the contention if it could be made sufficiently specific.* The Board also set a schedule for ! any resubmission and outlined the strict standards for specificity that it i. intended to apply if a new contention were to be tendered.' Rorem sub-sequently filed an amended quality assurance contention. With certain exceptions not pertinent here, the Board found the amended contention possessed the requisite basis and specificity and concluded that the bal-ance of section 2.714 factors favored acceptance of the contention. It thus admitted it for litigation.8 The applicant urges us to grant directed certiticat:on of the Board's ruling permitting Rorem to resubmit a quality assurance contention and, l in addition, requests that we strike the Keppler deposition and dismiss the amended quality assurance contention. In short, the applicant claims that the Commission's regulations and policies do not authorize a licens-ing board to permit discovery on a defective contention with a view toward resubmission of a perfected contention following discovery. The ! applicant, however, expressly disclaims any argument that the Licensing Board improperly balanced the lateness factors or misapplied the basis and specificity requirements insofar as the refiled contention is con-cerned.' The NRC staff does not seek interlocutory review of the Licens-ing Board's ruling but in its answer to the motion supports the applican't. The intervenors oppose the grant of directed certification.
- 2. In deciding whether to exercise our discretionary directed certifica-tion authority, we apply the two part Marble Hill test and consider whether a licensing board ruling either (1) threatens the party adversely affected by it with immediate and serious irreparable impact which, as a practical matter, could not be alleviated by a later appeal, or (2) alTects the basic structure of the proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner.io The applicant's assertion that the rulings at issue here have a pervasive
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5 See 10 C.F.A. ( 2.714(b). 6 LBP-85.II. 21 NRC at 634. I 7 //. at 636 37.
! 8LBP 85-20. 21 NRC 1732 (1985).
i
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. 'See Commonwealth 6dnon's Monon for Directed Ceruncanon Uuly 8.1985) thereaner Mouon for
' - Direc.ed Ceruficauoni at 1.
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10See, e s.. Aletropolisas Edaos Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear stauon. Unit D. ALAB-791. 20 NRC
- . 1579, 1582 (1984). applying the test enunciated in Pubhc Serwe Co. ofIndiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Genersung stauon. Umts I and 2). ALAB-405,5 NRC 1190.1892 (1977).
I 473
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effect on the proceeding rests essentially on the novelty of the proce-My ! - dures adopted by the Board and an alleged violation of the Commission's
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4 , regulations." Pointing to our decision in the Catawba case,i2 the appli-m
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', cant also claims that we have undertaken interlocutory review to resolve novel issues and correct. violations of the Commission's regulations p, .a, gy,m, . .~ .f-y .,f, ,4. . ,;/ @
7,,n m 3. y c-@_ q 'Mr even where the Marble Hill test is not strictly satisfied.12 The staffs argu-a'? e , . , N. .4 // , - ,
. ments in support of the applicant's position are predicated largely on the
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* ' ' view that it is preferable to commit staff resources to assuring that quali-
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E '. ty assurance deficiencies have been corrected, rather than litigating the
- i quality assurance problems,14 i Even assuming a violation of the Commission's regulations as claimed by the applicant and our dissenting colleague, the net effect of the Board's rulings is simply to admit one additional contention to a pro-i ceeding that already involves litigation of various matters. Because the f injection of one or more additional issues into an ongoing case seldom j has a pervasive or unusual effect on the basic structure of a proceeding, j we have traditionally declined to review on an interlocutory basis rulings that simply admit another contention.38 The basic structure of an ongoing
, ' , y
, ;y adjudication is not changed simply because the admission of a contention
- i 't" . 'l ,
results from a licensing board ruling that is important or novel, or may
- , ! , conflict with case law, policy, or Commission regulations.i2 Similarly,
, ,x +,.. . - " - the mere fact that a party (even the NRC staff) must litigate an addition.
al issue, or that a matter will be subject to adversarial exploration rather than staff review, does not alter the basic structure of the proceeding in i il Monon for Directed Ceruficauon at 12.I4. 12 puAe po.cr Co. (Catamba Nuclear stauon. Units I and 2), ALAS 487,16 NRC 460,46547 (1982), affd Ja pertiacarport, CLI.83 19,17 NRC 1041 (1983). 13 Mouon ror Directed Certificanon at 1215. 14 NRC stan Response to Applicant's Monon for Directed Ceruficanon Uuly 23,1985) [hereafter stafr
>.- . ., Responsel at 10-11.
r-. D-? ;) - - - 18 See es., Clevelsed Eirctre ihmiastar Ca (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2), ALAB 706
& . c . H .- 16 NRC 1754 (1982).
I.[M,N-l1. ,# , , J ,, le Three Afde (shad. 20 NRC at 1583. Ji% Q. I 6R c.; u
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ifClevelead Ehcrre thasiastar Ca (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2), ALAB-67$,13 NRC W .
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110$ 181213 (1983). See eine Fransylosade fo=ce A Le4r Co. (susquehanna steam Electne sianon, Unas I and 2), ALAB-641,13 NRC $50,552 (1981) (directed ceruncanon denied despae allegations l %. ~
- - that the Licenssng Board's ruling was "in the teeth of the Comnuseson's regulanons and the Admimstra.
use Procedure Act* and "may have erroneously expanded the issues to be tned"). We do not disagree
- , @ '::*-L s . ] f c - - f.;
- s- . with the notion that a violauon of the Commismon's regulanons could in some circumstances contnbute to a pervasive or unusual efrect on a proceeding. But that is not the case here. The apphcant objects to
' - ~ o -',
the admission of a quahty assurance comenuon. in terms, however, the Board merely admitted a conten.
- h 5N, , - . , uon earlier rejected for lacit of speciftetty - a course of acuon plainly not foreclosed by the regulations.
a"$ - - %. = ~ . - -- la may be, as Mr. Moore urges, that the Board violated the regulations by authoriang discovery agamst
$A. %+ ,- %', the NRC stafr aAer dismisens the onginal contenuon. But we are unprepared to conclude that such
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, ,A acuon had a pervasive or unusual efrect on the proceedms, especially where the stafritselr did not find the matter sufficiently disrupuve to seek relief from us in its own right.
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e ; a pervasive or unusual way so as to justify interlocutory r'e ie6 of a ' licensing board decision.88 ,~_$.
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i Nor does our decision to accept'thereferra of the Licensing Board's QL@; a,"f; 7 . ' ? ". Al ruling in Catawba justify our intercession here. There we reviewed the ,.d...,..
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Licensing Board's ruling because it raised an issue potentially affecting m % . g is Q. .t.,"g ow * . m. 2 - r..w.:;-.
. r cycry operating license proceeding then pending.I' That is plam. ly not
,- - the case here. Indeed, in Catawba. we specifically eschewed applying the
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resolution of the generic issue before us to the individual contentions
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,' M Q before the Licensin"g Board - a situation analogous to that ptsent here.
Moreover, we were asked by the Catawba Licensing Board to resolve a y yy w.
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*DA" ., novel and recurring legal issue. Although the .
general standard for inter-- 7 locutory review is the~ same whether or not undertaken on certification
'/, . -
g "' j j' or by reErial,M we are oisiously more likely to intercede whpe a licens-
, - - ,'i ~ . ing board believes that its ruling has the type of overall impact on'the
/
i proceeding that warrants our immediate attention. We find no justifica-l tion for our involvement ia.this case on an interlocutory basis.28 w The motion for directed certification is denied. m.- 1 -- ' ' It is so ORDERED. M%j ; f y , . ; 3 C.v r- FOR THE APPEAL BOARD < ~
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' - , . .s C. Jean Shoemaker
. Secretary to the 4 Appeal Board
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, *. % - . ~ , . IlSee Areone Pa bbe Servke Co. (Paso verde Nuclear Generaung station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-742, s . tr 6 m .
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le %RC 380. 384 (1983); V#riner Eiretric amt romer Co. (North Anna Power stauon, Units I and 2),
'd,. w,1.m A L AB-7il.18 NRC 371,378 (1983).
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-. p,:'. 3 s ggg T l' See Nare.t Aser.18 NRC at 376-78, explasning our Camrw6s ruhns and circumscnbing its apphcauon.
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s 20 See M. at 375 n.6. ,
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- t.g , ! " : C ,.7 e 11 In support of the opphcant's mobon, the statY andicates that the stibstance of the intervenors' amended .!
<-%~,* '
@ality assurance contenuon rests on documents avadable to the public pnor to the deposinon of Mr.
y ' a c .c; - .v ; p,7, c' 4. Y ;; 4eppler See stair Response at 910. If the statiis correct, this circumstance further dlustrates why this
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case is an unGt candidate for interlocutory review. Here, even were _we to sinke the depostion and . 5 '^ ' ( reject the contenuon as the applicant asks, the intervenors would bg f se to refile the same contenuon ' . .j 4 :s.-. o ) , O, 4c <
. using the pubiscly available documents as the basis for ts,eir conty'.on. Because the Licensing Board's
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4 ,, - , , u . balancing of the section 2.714 factors already weighed the Grst f,.ctor (i.e., good cause for late riling) p - .,' ; W . t . , ,, ,
. against the intervenors, theind result would be the same unless the Board were to reverse itself with re-a a . . ] v ,j.;tc < ; *g 't spect to the other factors. I.MJ5 20,21 NRC at 1744-49. Thus, in all probabihty the contenuon once .
. again would be admired. '
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t Opinion of Mr. Moore, dissenting: The Licensing Board's April 7,1985, ruling purported to reject the in-
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tervenors' quality assurance contention for lack of specificity but
' /'.' - ?n nevertheless permitted discovery by the intervenors on that same issue.'
[ [, a.g .q.w.j,'3..,, f.e1.c,q,yg$. , Q. Pursuant to the Licensing Board's order, the intervenors deposed Mr. - ... y,.c Keppler and another NRC staff employee and filed an amended quality [ N, assurance contention based on the depositions. The Licensing Board
~
' C then admitted the new quality assurance contention.2 Because the regula-i v tions proscribe any form of discovery on an issue that has not been ad-l mitted to the proceeding, the applicant seeks directed certification assert-i- - ing that the Licensing Board's ruling " compels the conclusion that the
!- Board knowingly violated [10 C.F.R.] Section 2.740 by allowing discov-
. ery on a rejected contention."3 The majority assumes the validity of the applicant's assertion that the Licensing Board's ruling violates the Commission's regulations but finds that the ruling does not affect the basic structure of the proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner - the second Marble Hill test. I disagree.
Without any mention of the significance of the regulations involved, or
, , m w. g the breadth and complexity of the contention admitted as a result of this
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]_ violation, the majority dismisses the Licensing Board's transgression be-
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M( G@h"f '" y cause the " net effect" of the ruling is simply to admit one additional con-
-- 4;u J . tention to a proceeding that already involves the litigation of several other issues.'
I L8P-85.II,21 NRC 609,627 38 (1985). In repeting the contenuon m the special Prehearing Confer. ence order, the Licensms Board found that -[tlhe contention's language is so broad and the lack of l specificity so damaging that it cannot be admitted under traditional contention admissibility cntena."Id. at 636. The Board stated, however, that ' [slettmg forth with specificity the contenuon's basis is crucial to the submission of any conten. i tion, but parucularly one involving potentially broad quahty assurance and quality control issues. ! The Board will accommodate Intervenors' need to provide specificity to develop what me believe
. - ._ may become an important part of the record. by permittmg latervenors to depose Mr. Keppler before submitung an amended contention.
[,-y Id. at 634. Addiuonally, the Licensing Board directed that the deposition "shall take place as soon as the
-f J O..' 87% y
- h. 1, y parties can reasonably coordmate their schedules" and suggested that the intervenors may wtsh to depose other NRC stafr members as well. Id. at 635, (ep;-
b - ' . .- ' e.. J:c
-t- y age,t,y 3 e-- W@R,t+~ W 2 Lap.33 20,21 NRC 1732 (1985).
-7:c- Pursuant to 10 C.F.A. ( 2.751a(d), both the applicant and the stafr objected to the bcensing Board's
!> i-* . * < pc - ." . discovery order and requested that the Board reconsder its ruhng because the Commesmon's regulanons Od '. -. only permit discovery regardmg a contention after it has been admitted. Sn= Applicant's otnections to
^; s
/* 5?.4;- xg* Board order (Apnl 29.1985) at 9-12; NRC staff's otoecuons to and Motion for Reconsderauon of
~
- Licensms Board's special Prehearing Conference order Dated Apnl 17,1985 (L8P-85 II) (May 6,
- . -' l ? ' 'M S.
^
1985) at 6-8. The beensms Board waited to rule on these objections until aAer the intervenors deposed
~
the staff employees and filed an amended quality assurance contenuon. Src LBP.85 20, 21 NRC at ( '. . . , h $,b.~ [4h b ;. 1737 p. . , ,. , i i!. :6". 3 Commonwealth Edison's Monon for Directed Cerufication (July 8,1985) at 1516. t .6C * + .&
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, , e l ' % , 4.] l. See p. 474, sspra.
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Because the Licensing Board's ruling directly contravenes the explicit i * . M discovery provisions of the Commission's Rules of Practice, that ruling, p7- - y' . 9c Q,E- N in the circumstances presemed, clearly affects the basic structure of the
. X. %gp. ;.W@Mf . ..
proceeding in a pervasive or unusual way. The Commission's Rules of
.b y W m M;A 4 - -
Practice establish the exclusive hearing procedures for all operating g
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m:3 . .p%yyr I cense proceedings. Accordingly, those procedures estabMrh the basic
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' i i*T W O rc h .i " ;~ , structure of this proceeding and all other operating license proceedings. .
Central to the scheme of the rules is the fundamental tenet that specific MS f n;g EMl rf n:M.59%MJi,C.- t:C jy 2 con'tentions must be admitied to the proceedint before discovery is per-e y, A n y .g .1,0. t ' _ s . mitted,5 and "the filing of a vague, unpartict4ized cotttention, followed c7,; 1. [f jg "T M 7 ; ; by an endeavor to flesh it out through discovery aghinst the applicant or staff," hi strictly prohibited.* Thus, the rules provide that " discovery n' i W a-
~~"I I ,
t stiall begin only after the presearing conference provided for in f 2.751a and shall relate only to those matters in controversy which have been
' ~#
identified ' by the . . . presiding officer in the prehearing order . . . ."7 When the NRC staffis a party to the proceeding, the Executive Director of Operations must designate what staff employees may be deposed on any matter, and "a particular named NRC employee" may be deposed
*j~
M. g i only upon a finding of " exceptional, circumstances" by the Licensing
<" , ; + pye@ ~ ; , Board.8 Moreover, the rules provide that Mr:b deposition of a particular
, w Mu .. ' named NRC employee . . . shall be required before the matters in con-
\' .a f 3;M[v.; troversy in the proceeding have been identified by order' 'of the
. 7 . . . presiding officer . . . ."'
3
! Yet here the Licensing Board ignored these express piohibitions in the Rules of Practice. Instead the Board allowed the intervenors to depose a partiedar'~ named NRC employee concerning the applicant's quality assurance program before this issue ivas a mitter in controversy
, . and invited the intervenors to ignore their " ironclad obligation to exam-Ine the publicly available documentary material pertaining to the facility 4 .. . in question . . . to uncover any information that could serve as the foun-
- q. dation for a specific contention."to This Licensing Board action, in turn,
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- w $ See Northere Staars Power Co. (Praine Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units I and 2). ALA8107. 6 gp
- m. i <-.-Q o >.P.' 7,c 6 f yw f !- AEC 188.192. efd. CLI-73-12. 6 AEC 241 (1973). afd sub nom. SPI v. MC. 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir.
3 y pe. +yp;b 3;l 1974). In Proine Isisad, we long ago rejected the argument that it is not possable for an intervenor to I y..wI, %-K N**) pry '.V "+ $ ""' Nd -:" . , state specific contentions until aAct they have had discovery. Rather, we found that argument " ignores
.fi . ,
i the fact that there is abundant information respecting the particular facdity avadable es the pubhc . . ." t
's i fb e,m,..S y a' ' W l and that "prospecuve miervenors have the benefit of the Freedom ofInformation Act (s U.s.Cs 552)
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.,. 9 . - . " /d. '
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.] 6 og, Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear sisuon. Units 1 and 2), ALAB-687.16 NRC 4M.,468 (1982).
afl'd atpertinentpart CLi-83-l9. I7 NRt.104s (l9831.
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. :, 10 C.F.R. i 2.740(b)(1). 3
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8 10 C.F.R. { 2.720(h)(2)(i).
' a n cp M. ,. a , ~ , ., 910 C.F.R.f 2.720(h)(2)(ui).
- M
, Casamba. ALAB-687.16 NRC at 468 (1982).
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l' (.: 5 L:N<i T 4 prejudiced the applicant by freely opening the door for the intervenors
, . _ . . to file a new, detailed quality assurance contention that the applicant M - ,M RfMM.;tO;.( . now has the burden of proving is incorrect. Contrary to the majority's
"$ UMQijyjgg , view, such a wholesale disregard of the Commission's basic hearing C.y M h _ ,?, M procedures to permit the deposition of a particular staff etnployee about e p y g q q .w y $y gg5M .QW a subject not in controversy, and then admitting a contention based on s
v.w.w~ m- s.osp+W yq -.e. :.be . that discovery, can only fairly be described as affecting the basic struc-9 ",, ' ture of the proceeding in an unusual manner. This is especially true
? _E M[2MyikA * ,j s . when the ruling in question results in the introduction into the proceed-4, ' ~Q-y~ r;; N - ing of a thirty-one page quality assurance contention that alleges multiple
' f_, '
~f~.? '
violations of twelve of the Commission's eighteen quality assurance regulations and requires an examination of the adequacy of applicant's extensive corrective action program. As the recent cases before us in-volving the litigation of quality assurance questions graphically demon-strate, the nature of litigation involving quality assurance issues is such that the addition of this "one" contention will add weeks of hearings to this proceeding,H I find, therefore, that the Licensing Board's ruling
" fundamentally alters the very shape of the ongoing adjudication"n and
- x. -
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( IlSee general & Commonwcohh Edison Co. (D)ron Nuclear Power station, Units I and 2), ALAB-793,20 NRC 1591 (1984); PaciAc Ces and Decter Cc (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power P! ant, Units I and 2). ALAB-763,19 NRC 578, rewrw denird. CLI 84-14,20 NRC 285 (1984). The majonty also suggests that interlocutory review should be denied because the intervenors would be free to refile their quahty assurance contemion based on publicly avail.tble documents in the event we struck the deposition and rejected the comention as the appheant asks. They then opme that the Licensing Board once again would hkely balance the factors set fotth in 10 C.F.R. { 2.714 in the same manner and admit the mtervenors' quality assurance contenuon. See p. 475 n.21, supra. Unkke the majonty, I do not believe it is appropntie to speculate on how the Licensing Board might balance the secuon 2.714 factors in considenng a future hypotheucal contenunn. . UCleveland Electne Illummarin.e Ca. (Perry Nu,: lear Power P! ant, Units I and 2), ALAB-675,15 NRC 1105, 1113 (1982). In support of this position that the bric structure of a proceedmg is not changed by a hcensms board ruimg that violates the regulations but only results in the admission of a contention, the majonty also rehes upon Pennsylvania Power J Lehr Co. (susquehanna steam Electne station, Umts I and 2), ALAB-64!,13 NRC 550 (1991). They seemingly equate the situation underlying the demal of directed
- r w[;% , y .[
certificauon in Susquehanna with the circumstances presented here. See p. 474 n.17, supra. The majon-
- 4 , ,_;v m ty's rehance on ALAB-641, however, is misplaced. There we refused to direct certification of a ruhns (ti@P' denying partial summary disponuon of several portions of a properly admitted contenuon. The staff
. . ;v . ,.iL:4W.dp m A claimed that the Licensing Bca d3 rkhng met 'he second MarNe #4 test for interlocutory review be-
,fi. "" y *. F Q s f M y T L. cause the Board had made extri-re:nrd factual findmss based on the intervenors' unsworn aswrtions m
, w % w eg g 6 p h ,W g.ha< contravenuon of the Ccmm.stn's regulations and the Administranve Procedure Act. we disagreed
* , MQ D. M, <
- that the test for emerlocutory vvise had been met and l'oand that "Idn the contest of the denial of a 1s, motion for partial summary dupt.,smon, the staff's arguments do httle more than state the apparent."
y
- 50. Mh(a. 7@, . j .pK
& , ,, ._M We stated that "[t]he fact that the ruhng below may have erroneously expanded the issues to be ined or
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;_-"v . NeW s done so on the basis of unsworn allegauons does Intle to disunguish this case from any other where it is allescJ that summary disposmen was erroneously withheld." Thus, we concluded that "ldn reality,
~
- , ; bM . ,, adoption of the staff's rationalt wossid alter the standard for dncrenorary intertocutory review; certamly
!, f M pQy#.4 N where a demal of summary discosmon is involved it would be reduced to a simple determination wheth-er the Licensmg Board erred." ALAB-641,13 NRC at 552. such is not the situauon here. A ruhng - 7.y i -f e oN.Af , *lhpby46MQ% M @M
, >. even an erroneous one - denying a moucn for partial summary dismt;on is not in any sense paral lel C , , d :,M.' O % ; , (Continued)
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- ' .:. ga . ,e,
^
Accordingly, I would grant the applicant's rnotion for directed certifica-s' . ~an.. f.W :' %
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@.y.Q* ..' mat l ace 7.rt-sim U- to a bcensing Board ruhng claimed by the apphcant to be a " knowing
- violation of the explicit prohibi-
.. ,ns of the Rutes of Practice that estabbsh when, and against whom, discovery may be conducted in an J'
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- i.i,-M Q .; ; ,. opeestmg heense proceeding.
.. - :py . . yg,. '
.y Further, she majority apparently gives signiGeant weight to the fact that the bcensms Board's ruhng Q",O'; n _s.l, .mN.[,; e. g-[Q7,'f .y /*, :ci.J... ~. s , O.
% P.O. 'J @. does not affect the basec structure of the proceedmg in an unusual manner because "the staffitself did D,, ly <
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. ;[ i not Gnd the matter sutTiciently disrupuve to seek rehef from us in its own right." Ser p. 474 n.17, suprs.
- Contrary to the majority's view, the impact of the Licensmg Board's ruhng on the structure of the pro-
. g.;. . q 3.e-; . J :, W -.g.c o : tmJy-,>. g .;
cceding is the same regardless of whether the applicant er the staff complains in any event, the majority points to a difference without a distmcuon. The Commission's regulations speciGcally permit a party to w , .-.. y .. . y $:g. ' 7 ' 9 / : ') . . file an answer "in support of" a motion. See 10 C.F.R l 2.730(ch itere, the staff's answer supported
- w.,,,,.p4; ,lb. , n.. j;se zw' c-[i the apphcant's motion for directed certiGcation in each particular and thus avoided the need for the staff
-% ' + vs .- to Gle a redundant motion seeking the same rehef.
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Atomic Safety - - +3.,.ysvr
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o and Licensing l.g' -< y?. :W. .v.: Boards-Issuances
~
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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL g',j B. Paul Cotter,
- Chairman Robert M. Lazo, 'Vice Chairman (Executive) asq Frederick J. Shon, 'Vice Chairman (Technical) h)
- )
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Members
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Dr. George C. Anderson James P. Gleason Dr. Linda W. Uttle
' ,. Mc2,;[7
'^ '
',' ' ' ". 1' '
. Charles Bechhoefer* Andrew C. Goodhope Dr. Emmoth A. Luebke' Peter B. Bloch' Herbert Grossman' Dr. Kennth A. McColiom Lawrence Brenner* Dr. Cadet H. Hand. Jr. Morton B. Margulies' Glenn O. Bright' Jerry Harbour
- Gary L Milhollin Dr. A. Dixon Callihan Dr. David L. Hatrick Marshall E. Miller James H. Carpenter' Emest E. Hill Dr. Peter A. Morris' }.}
g Hugh K. C! ark Dr. Frank F. Hooper Dr. Oscar H. Paris
- 3 Dr. Richard F. Cole' Helen F. Hoyt* Dr. Paul W. Purdom
Dr. Frederick R. Cowan Elizabeth B. Johnson Dr. David R. Schink Dr. Michael A. Duggan Dr. Walter H. Jordan lven W. Smith
- Dr. George A. Ferguson James L. Kelley' Dr. Martin J. Steindler Dr. Harry Foreman Jerry R. Kline' Dr. Quentin J. Stober Richard F. Foster Dr. James C. Lamb til Seymour Wenner 4
. John H Frye til' Gustave A. Unenberger' Sheldon J. Wolfe'
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s ..._ _. ~ _ _ . - m _ _ . _ _ .. ~--._..._ --_ . . . , . j Cite as 22 NRC 481 (1985) LBP 85-34 u' ~. . . - H: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s.4 , e c. . ./. a. . :;
.-; -,.q:. :
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- ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
. , , ,.c. s 3
.~ ' .#- -
, ,' : - ' Before Administrative Judges:
s , Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman Dr. Jerry R. Kline i Dr. George A. Ferguson i in the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-338 0LA-1
, 50-339-OLA-1 t pu.S . .%? (ASLBP No. 83-481-01-LA)
; w.w.,
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_ M-
?- VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND
-- . ~ ' ' '
POWER COMPANY (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2) September 3,1985 The Licensing Board issues an Initial Decision authorizing the is-suance of an amendment to the operating licenses of the North Anna Power Station, Units I and 2, which permits the receipt and storage of
] 500 spent fuel assemblics transshipped from the Surry Power Station, Units I and 2.
> >, . v -
REGULATIONS: INTERPRETATION
- y. .
;;,. 1-
~* ' "' '# # P" ' 1 The values in Table S-4 reflect the environmental risk of accidents in-
~~~ '
volving the shipment of spent fuel in casks as well as accidents which
' ' ' might be caused by employee error in preparing the casks for shipment.
' ' /1 SABOTAGE: EVIDENCE
. .,.w2 -
The record, in amplifying and supporting the analysis m the Safety
~
4 Evaluation Report, establishes that the probability is remote of either a
.]
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___ _ . . . __......_..__..____m-_....__.__,_.___.___.... _ sabotage attack being undertaken or being successful, and that, even if t such an attack was successful, the impact upon the public health and
. "- 'J. . c' -
f . safety and upon the environment would be very small. n: .,m-
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. NEPA: CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES (f 102(2)(E))
. . .. . :y y . -
a-
.. Pursuant to f 102(2)(E) of NEPA, the Environmental Assessment
%g. , ,. , . , h' -
- . must discuss whether a proposed action involves unresolved conflicts
. , . . concerning alternative uses of available resources.
~
NEPA: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS Consideration of an alternative based on economic superiority (and not environmental superiority) is not the responsibility of the NRC. s NEPA: AMENDMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT An ultimate NEPA judgment may properly be made on the basis of the entire record before adjudicatory tribunals.
.T '.g'
, - , . :.. ~
], TECHNICAL 13 SUES DISCUSSED Table S-4 values Consideration of sabotage Consideration of dry cask storage alternative.
APPEARANCES Michael W. Maupin, Esq., and Marcia R. Gelman, Esq., for the Licensee
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Henry J. McGurren, Esq., for the United States Nuclear Regulatory
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James B. Dougherty, Esq., for the Intervenor, Concerned Citizens of ,
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> *., . .. . OPINION............................................... 484 v~s. . s . .
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.. I. INTROD UCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484 s . . . . A. Bac kg ro u n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484 R. Content of Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486
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II. CONSOLID ATED CONTENTION 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486
- 1. Employee Error in Preparing Casks for
, Shipment ........ .................... 486
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- 2. Sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488
- 3. The Dry Cask A!ternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490 III. CONCLUSIONS . . . ... .... .. . . . . . . 493 FINDINGS OF FACT . . . . . . . ..... ...... . ... . . . .. . . . 493
. A. Employee Error in Preparing Casks for 'd
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.L % S hi p m e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494
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.f5" Cask Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494
,'. N,. _.. . . Safety.related Design Features . . . . . . . . . . . . 495
. Cask Handling Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497 B. Sabotage . ............................ ..... 500
. Threat of Sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500 Probability of Success . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 501 Consequences of Explosive Attack . . . . . . . . 504 C. The Dry Cask Storage Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . 505 Need for Additional Spent Fuel S torage S pace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505 Dry Cask Storage . . ...................... 506 Comparative Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510
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Comparative Environmental Effects . . . . . . . 510
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V: - Use of Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
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- ~ CONCLUSIONS OF L AW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
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.!t INITIAL DECISION m .a (Operating License Amendment) p . . 9.y., ,
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Q %Q:: W.;l-W ' j,.;4.? s n.....- .sq m , 3 - w. Opinion W . % -g % g ; w. W W :;';.?Fi n ' I. INTRODUCTION T, ,i'< { ~ , WQffp%;F5:k 1
.?.i Q': J V j ?'M e.. v,s 7 , . , A. Background
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~ ' y ;io E - .On July 13, 1982, Virginia Electric and Power Company (Licensee)
, applied for an amendment revising the operating licenses of North Anna Power Station, Units I and 2, to permit the receipt and storage of 500 A spent fuel assemblies from the Surry Power Station, Units I and 2,47
! Fed. Reg. 41,892 (Sept. 22,1982).' The North Anna facility is located in Louisa County, Virginia, 40 miles northwest of Richmond. The Surry facility is located in Surry County, Virginia,17 miles northwest of New-port News. The travel distance between the two facilities ranges between 159 and 177 miles depending on the selected route.
- On July 3,1984, the NRC Staff issued its Finding of No Significant c -
cc q j ,g7 -c Impact, the Environmental Assessment (EA) and the Safety Evaluation g, Wy. , Report (SER). On July 30,1984, Concerned Citizens of Louisa County
,. , h-e C4 - (CCLC) submitted five contentions, two of which were ultimately with-l drawn. During the course of a supplemental special prehearing confer-i ence held on September 7,1984, CCLC orally argued in general with re-spect to its contentions that Table S-4 relied upon by the Staffin the EA l was inapplicable in an operating license amendment case and that the i
}' Staff instead should have issued a final environmental impact statement.
Consequently, the Board requested that counsel submit briefs on the question of whether there had been any administrative (NRC) and Federal court rulings on the question of whether Table S-4 in 10 C.F.R. f 51.52 applies only in construction permit proceedings or whether that Table is applicable also in operating license amendment cases. In a Memorandum and Order issued on October 15, 1984, noting that coun-
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7_ ' M .. 3 I. ;A / m.~ ..] set had submitted briefs on the applicability of Table S-4 but that the c>
- y. 4 .. a. y.%,m vy,g w., .Mu:- n.t'.- ",< Board would not decide the merits of contentions at this stage, we re-a.:" wrote and consolidated three of the contentions, admitted Consolidated
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8 In a companion case, oLA.2, wherein the Licensee had apphed for an amendmen.t of the North
-- Anna operating licenses to permit the expensson of the spent fuel pool storage capacity. this Board reject.
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ed the proposed contentions of Concerned Catirens of Louisa County. Jented its petition for leave to in.
'7 ervene, dismissed the case and authonzed the issuance of the amendment. LBP 84 40A. 20 NRC !!95.
appealdismissed. ALAB.790. 20 NRC 1450 (1984).
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. Contention I as an issue in controversy,2 and admitted CCLC as a party-
, g: *s ' 7, . intervenor. LBP-84-40A, supra. 7;. Responding to the Board's Order of November 5,1984 (unpublished),
. _ ' O^ -y. m a letter dated November 16, 1984, the parties requested that the
_' - 1s m ~ .. L%.J Spi '4 .W j.O Board treat their previous submissions as being motions for partial sum- ) ,-c y- W4 e,4.c.z 5 ; i k.] . mary disposition and that, pursuant to @ 2.749 of the Commission's k i 'j.[x G.~ 'd '" 2 Rules of Practice, we should rule on the applicability of Table S-4 as posed in Consolidated Contention 1. Thereafter, in a Memorandum and '; ; ,y b jD .- - c ry .
.d j ' Mp Order of January 7,1985 (unpublished), we concluded in substance, as j
'y:,/, W( ,~ ( ; a matter of law, that the Staff's EA properly relied upon the valuca in s
Table S-4 to evaluate the environmental impact of the proposed trans-
,t , , a portation of spent fuel from Surry to North Anna in this operating license amendment case. Accordingly, we granted the Licensee's and the Staff's motions for partial summary disposition and denied CCLC's 1 motion. We deleted wording from Consolidated Contention 1, and 1
revised Consolidated Contention I to read as follows: I'
' The Staff's Environmental Assesznent is inadequate and an Environmental
'T'. Impact Statement should be prepared. The bases for this contention are two-fold.
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-t y ' ba y , y y , First, the Environmental Assessment did not evaluate the probability and conse-
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'_' QN quences of accidents occurring during the transportation of spent fuel casks from 1 ,
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4' the Surry Station to the North Anna Station which might be occasioned by acts of sabotage or by error of Applicant's employees in preparing the casks for shipment. Second, contrary to the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 IJ.S.C. f 4332(2)(E), consideration was not given to the alternative method of constructing a dry caak storage facility at the Surry Station which is feasible, can be effected in a timely manner, is the least expensive and safest method for at least 50 years, and can be used on or otT site. The evidentiary hearing took place on May 21-22,1985,in Charlottes- , ville, Virginia. Limited appearance statements were also taken. On June 21, 1985, the Licensee filed its post hearing brief, proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law,' and a proposed order. On July 8,1985,
- , ;, . CCLC filed a post hearing brief, and its proposed findings of fact and S x, .,
,: . - / t ,, p conclusions of law. On July 12th, the Licensee filed a reply to CCLC's
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2As rewritten by the Board. Con}olidated Contention I reads as follows-
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< , U' The staffs Environmengi Assessment es inadequate and an EnvironmentalImpact secement
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,,b, ment, in relying upon the inapplicable values in Table s-4, did not evaluate the probabilsty and
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' - >a',' consequences of acodents occumns during the transportation of spent fuel casks from the surry 7,6 .. ,
stauon to the North Anna stauon or which might be occasioned by acts of sabotage or by error
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4 .2 of Apphcant's employees in preparing the casks ror shipment. Second. contrary to the Nanonal w , . , . ,
? ~. Environmental Pohey Act. 42 U.s C. l 4332(2HE), consideranon was not given to the alterna-tive method of constructing a dry cask storage fachty at the surry sianon which is feasible, can
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be effected in a timely manner, is the least expensive and safest method for at least 50 years,
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and can be used on or off site. i i
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_ , . x..,~ . 1 - post-hearing brief. The Staff filed its brief, proposed findings and conclu- _' , ; y., . - - J' j , , sions of law, and a proposed order on July 18,1985. g, ,, , .
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Content of Opinion _ Q; J. a . .M, ' %, .,. .s. ; . . t.+;)..,e, B. r w f.. W-.v e . . e.ce-w.en The first part of this Initial Decision begins with the Licensing Board's 9h W 2 % 6 5,.r . M c :. A r . Opinion, which encompasses an Introduction, an analysis of Consolidat-
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]Q/ "j , N7M.Q ed Contention 1, and Conclusions. The second part consists of our Find-
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' ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
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j i% l. . All of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw submitted 3 . _.. _h/~, by the parties that are not incorporated directly or inferentially in this
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Initial Decision are rejected as unsupported in law or fact or as unneces-sary to the rendering of this Initial Decision. II. CONSOLIDATED CONTENTION 1
- 1. Employee Error in Preparing Casksfor Shipment (Fdgs. 2-28)
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..,,c, (Preliminary Discussion: In their respective briefs, the Licensee and the Staff argue that the issue of employee error (which they also refer to
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g;7 as " human error") in preparing casks'for shipment should not have
- 4-% a cg. 6 7 been considered in the hearing because the Board had previously concluded in the Memorandum and 0.uct issued January 7,1985, that the StalT's Environmental Assessment properly relied upon the values in Table S-4 to evaluate the environmentalimpact of the proposed trans-portation of spent fuel from Surry to North Anna.8 This argument pre-sumes that this issue of employee error had been directly addressed by the Licensee and the Staff and specific citations liad been furnished to the Board. However, in their briefs submitted prior to the issuance of
> the aforementioned Memorandum and Order, the Licensee and Staff merely discussed the applicability of Table S-4 at the operating license n2 .e amendment stage, and cited WASH-12384 and the Commission's State-
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v e .. d q::,: 4 ;.h" sqq . M.y g7,, y y p . 3The staffs EA stated that the environmental impact of the proposed transshipment of spent fuel
# .s , . s ; y : ~tM O from surry to North Anna is within the scope or Table s4 and therefore need not be addressed on a
~' site-specific basis. After setting forth a table comparing the pertinent parameters for the proposed trans.
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.n j g SN-C,.;;, '* k', [M. shipment with the parameters used in W ash 1238 for calculating the environmental impacts contained
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o p~ , - factor of at least 30 than that shown in Table s4 and accordingly, the impact would be well within the
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9' scope of Table s4. (stafr Esh. I at 27,28. as admitted in the heanns). Table s4, as well as the EA, did
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w j.?, ' not refer to and discuss the environmental impacts occasioned by error of Licensee's employees in
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December 1972. C m ' 1 486 a.. c- *,
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ment of Consideration (40 Fed. Reg. 1005 (1975)) for the propositions ' fi - C > _ '/ that Table S-4 is a generic rule, and that WASH 1238 provides the pri-j kR_ _ ,I mary data base for Table S-4 in analyzing the probabilities of occurrences D%[ - 'i.4? '. W $ $1}'" , of transportation accidents involving nuclear fuel, the expected conse-w A qr7 '
- quences of such accidents, and the potential radiation exposures to trans-re.
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portation workers and the general pubile under normal conditions of
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s . transport.5 Only at page 6 of its Reply Brief of October 1,1984, did the Licensee refer in passing to " human error." ~ ,".sy.sg%p..~.WO@_ M " .
'.' Thus, prior to the issuance of our Memorandum and Order and N
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?_ indeed prior to the hearing, the argument had not been presented to us, l
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a shipment. We were not told that WASH 1238, in Appendix A at 72, provided estimates which indicate that the possible frequency of casks I being improperly closed prior to shipment is very low. Also, we.were I not told that WASH-1238 (at 16) concludes that the likelihood of an f error, such as a package being used in a manner not in accordance with the design, is small in light of the regulatory requirements for quality
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assurance and for various observations and tests before each shipment.6 Qy 'p.yy>,2% 7.O} _ , We neither understand nor appreciate Licensee and Staff counsels' fail-(Zl Q, A ,lA. MV -
, . k a la ', ure to move for reconsideration of our Memorandum and Order of Janu-ary 7,1985, or their failure to pursue the recourse provided in 12 of our l
Order of November 5,1984, which stated that "[wlithin thirty (30) days after service of the Board's Order ruling upon the issue of the applicabili-ty of Table S-4, any further motions for summary disposition shall be filed with respect to the issues posed by Consolidated Contention 1." Had we been presented in a timely manner with the argument and ap-
- g. j propriate citations, we would have dismissed that portion of Consolidat-I ed Contention I which contended that the EA had not evaluated the probability and consequences of accidents occurring during transporta-tion of spent fuel casks which might be occasioned by employee error in
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, preparing the casks for shipment.)
r, ' Since, as a matter of law, it is clear that the StafTs Environmental As-x . sessment, in relying upon Table S 4 and WASH-1238, did evaluate the M, gp t xNNd 1.!?i.kN , Probability and consequences of accidents occurring during the transpor-gy S.t*% * @ 3
- 7 : tation of spent fuel casks from Surry to North Anna which might be oc-e s.m c .
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../. -L 3See Ucensee's Bnef of September 20.1984. at 6. 8 and 9. and its Reply Brier of october I.1984, at 1
- y, - ; .~_ 4 g.Q 4 See staff's Bnerof september 21.1984. at 5,6. and its Reply Bnef of october I.1984. at 4.
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- Moreover, pnor to the issuance of the Memorandum and order and pnor to the hearing, the beensee
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- 3,p y . .; . - - as.. ( ,. n *> Environmental statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and other Modes.
C Nr J - December 1977, at 4 31.
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shipment, we would not have to set forth Findings of Fact, ida, and s
, J , .; ,l i analyze these facts in this Initial Decision. However, not having been My, . 7'Jy.? ' N gj5 ,
properly briefed upon this issue prior to the hearing,7 we have decided
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w eg,N n 1;;.9% w.. . . T.7,N.g Our factual findings, Ida, confirm the conclusions in WASH-1238
^ which, being included in the values of generic Table S-4, were relied
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-Ti upon in the StafTs Environmental Assessment. In other words, the a ~ p :7 ...
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[ ' ' ' , j" ' chances of employee (human) error in preparing the casks for shipment are small because of the Licensee's cask-handling training program, and
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O ' because the handling procedures are thorough and require checking and s 1 _ 4 doublechecking by the operators' supervisor. In addition, whenever a 3 ' step is taken that requires that its performance be verified by readings of pressure, torque or visual examination, these values or attributes are confirmed by 1 quality control representative. Moreover, some of the
, safety-related design features of the model TN-8L cask to be used for the Surry-to-North Anna shipments make errors less likely and/or would minimize the effect of an error if committed. Thus, we conclude that an environmental impact statement need not be prepared because the Staffs EA, both as a matter oflaw and as supplemented by our find-e f' .1 N . y4
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.;g - - ings, adequately evaluated the probability and consequences of shipping
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' '; -,q accidents, including those which might be Caused by error of Licensee's employees in preparing the casks for shipment.
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-} Sabotage (Fdgs. 29-49)
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l The subject of sabotage was not discussed in the Stafrs Environmental Assessment issued on July 3,1984. However, the Stafrs Safety Evalua. tion Report (SER), issued on the same date, after observing that hijack-4
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ing or sabotage of a spent fuel shipment has never been attempted, set forth four considerations and concluded that, on the basis of these con-
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IDuring the course of the supplemental special preheanns conference held on september 7,1984 (Tr.
.p y-4 - ,' y p 2 - ...v i .e .% : . .h .g > 92), and agam in its bner of July 8,1985, at I and 2 CCLC's position is that the nsks of sabotage and
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* - human error. standing alone. do not create such significant environmental efrects as to require that an C ... % _y ; . environmental impact statement be issued pursuant to the National Environmental Pokey Act. In lighi et QE1 - c j W *; ' .g, ,g gwe c,4:-e of this position. CCLC neither proposed findings of fact upon these two issues nor discussed them in its bnef. Dunns the course of the supplemental special prehearing conference, however. CCLC stated that
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a it had retained an espert witness and led us to believe that it intended to put on a full case demonstrating
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stat the risks are significant and, therefore, that an environmental impact statement is required. Tr. 93 "t"-
- J':'..
However. CCLC did not present any witnesses. f .Y t . -?" ,
,' 'll Finally, we note that CCLC requests at page 2 ofits bnef that me reconsider our ruhng in the Memo.
N" ,A ^ randum and Order of January 7,1985, on the apphcabihty of Table s 4. such a request is demed as
' 4 untimely.
1 1
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488
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.s ,F 1, siderations, the probability of a sabotage incident is remote and the risk Qt ? g,- to the public is very small.
9[WN.Cld %;[MrCe p.@Q With regard to this subject, the thrust of Consolidated Contention 1 is that an Environmental Impact Statement should be prepared because ,M 99N:si[d @,%.p:S 64 $. % i! ,it C .'the EA did not evaluate the probability and consequences of accidents M.,..:&. .w m M,nWh. .~ m.gn . . occurring during the Surry-to-North Anna transportation of spent fuel y*:
~ ;. casks which might be caused by acts of sabotage. However, CCLC has u ' / [4 7F?$R 4 G @Q; W a, m."fhg ~ ,
never challenged the SER's analysis of sabotage and did not object to
-o @ekMf yp;Q.4 Qg, 3 FM the admission of the SER into evidence. Moreover, it presented no evi-dence and did not cross-examine the Licensee's and the Staffs witnesses
, 9,f .h g /:< on the subject of sabotage, and, indeed, as reflected in note 7, supra,
-S
- N r: 7 neither proposed findings of fact nor discussed sabotage in its brief.
Moreover, the Commission's Statement of Consideration, in noting that sabotage is not covered in WASH 1238 and is not accounted for in Table S-4, stated that the environmental effects of sabotage are subject
, to appropriate separate consideration in individual reactor licensing pro-ceedings. 40 Fed. Reg. 1005 (1975). We believe we have given "ap-Q w; , propriate" consideration to the issue of sabotage in this case.
( S;M; ~,y;[
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> The record made before this Board amplifies and supports the SER's s ,
- o. , ~ discussion and conclusions. First, the probability of an act of sabotage n~ ~
. , ~ <
g a y a &m;,~M $ : ' being directed at a shipment of spent fuel is very remote - there is no p a: wi"M"
- history of such sabotage attacks despite the fact that there have been.
over 5000 shipments in this country since 1964. Second, even if a sabo-teur made the efTort, there would be a high probability of failure because the cask design, the physical protection system required by 10 C.F.R.
! 73.37, and time pressures would impede a successful attack. Finally, even assuming a sabotage attack was successful, extrapolations from two studies,' evaluating releases of respirable material in a highly populated area such as New York City. show that the maximum possible harm to the public in Richmond, Virginia, the most populous area along the pro.
..*J posed route, would be one half a latent cancer.
LM *
, - Thus, we conclude that an environmental impact statement need not I. / , a[m. . be prepared because the intervenor has never challenged the SER's anal-A q#..ap g., , ysis of sabotage, and because the record, in amplifying and supporting
$Nhdh g r p y g d h y ; }/2; g% ..n DM, 3n . ' . ' t the SER's analysis, establishes that the probability is remote of either a sabotage attack being undertaken or being successful, and that, even if i, M d d [ ( $ such an attack was successful, the impact upon the public health and N,dkd.Me[%e..~*
%c
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n safety and upon the environment would be very small.
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1 8NUREG/CR 2472. " Final Report on shipping Cesk sabotage source Term Investigation." Battelle
'.d,c/-
A e,, .,m.i. 4 y Q4 &- - n
. Columbus La5oratones, october 1982; SAND 82 2M5. "An Assessment or the sarety or spent Fuel Transportation m Urban Ennrons," sandu Nanonal Laboratones, June 1983.
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. ~ . .l .. 3. The Dry Cask Alternative (Edgs. 30-71)
- . m 41 In Part IL1, supra, we concluded that the StafT's EA of July 3,1984,
- J 2d.:336 s2 g adequately evaluated the probability and consequences of shipping acci-4 Jyy.f . l. W ....Q3%>&' . yd u.; A dents, inclusive of those which might be caused by error of Licensee's W- employees in preparing the casks for shipment. In Part II.2, supra, we t, 5 $7@%%W@%
, i h 27 @ ] . 7 '~f found that even if a sabotage attack was successful, the impact upon the
- environment and upon the public health and safety would be very small.
, f'7!@P"
" ' _.j -Q@;Og In light of these conclusions, we agree with the EA's evaluation that the R $rQ:C9.l; p proposed receipt, storage and transshipment of the Surry spent fuel in-
, C ,, .
volved "no significant change in types or significant increase in the , amounts of any efiluents that may be released off-site, that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation
~
exposure," and that thus an environmental impact statement need'not be prepared. The Licensee's and the Staft's initial position is that, because the EA concluded that the proposed receipt, storage and transshipment of Surry spent fuel would not significantly affect the quality of human environ-ment and because it determined that an environmental impact statement t %; 2 ^fa aj need not be prepared pursuant to f 102(2)(C)' of the National Environ-
, 7& " $G mental Policy Act, there was no reason for the Staff to analyze the dry cask storage alternative pursuant to f 102(2)(E) of NEPA.in support of this position, they cite Duke Power Co.. (Amendment to Materials License SNM 1773 - Transportation of Spent Fuel from Oconee Nucle-ar Station for Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station), ALAB.651,14 NRC 307 (1981), Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units I and 2), ALAB-584,11 NRC 451 (1980), and Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263 (1979). We disagree with the Licensee's and Staff's position and con-clude that pursuant to f 102(2)(E), the Staff was required to analyze the dry cask storage alternative in the EA. We read the Trojan. Duke Power and North Anna decisions to mean only that, after reviewing the record
- - ~ made during summary disposition proceedings or at a hearing, if a licens-7 s . - p '. : . + 5- ing board were to conclude that the Staff had correctly determined that h8" .~ ; ;O an environmental impact statement was unnecessary because the pro-M. UMO@pte4
&& ym.m A2%, m ; posed action would not significantly affect the quality of human environ- $As [.~A '.a h'
- t,wg;g4 , . . - --; ,.. ,
Q ,,l l Q,. ment, the licensing board would not have to consider the impacts of any
- ,; ' t . ., _ . e ;. . ,;,,
N 'section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Pokey Act. 42 U.s C. ( 4332(2)(C) requires that a
..$iE, _ . 9 .., ; 3s ,. ,
Federal asency include in a report on mapr Federal acts "signaricantly afrectmg the quahty of human en-
.g t ,- - .'
.; vironment." a detailed statement on alternatnes to the proposed action.
^
-t ,s 5,, ' , 88 section 102(2)(E) directs Federal agencies to " study. develop. and desenbe appropnate alternatives
. , i u recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved confhets concerning alter-
'~
native uses of available re;ources." l 490 4
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> (, . alternative which necessarily would have to be equal or greater. These
, ym Er , ,,/ .
. decisions, however, did not relieve the Staff of its obligation to comply NK
.*/ re! b s . with f 102(2)(E). Apparently, believing that the case made in the EA M .h NMC L/Uc Y.M;j;b M P' M'(g @bN,N '
for the proposed transshipment was so strong, it opted not to discuss the 5W ;' dry cask storage alternative. Congress did not grant such an option.t8
+ 4 -e um u -
W --%ge,fg%p%gggy Further, the Appeal Board stated in Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock gg esg, .<A 1. m.*mm .m
.u< Point Nuclear Plant), ALAB 636,13 NRC 312, 332 (1981), "some o .y,
,#p. a..w. s. D.y r. #
,v% .s.
. ..M.., yM ,.. factual basis (usually in the form of the staffs environmental analysis)
M :0 , Q ..,uV;49;il.Y ih% is necessary to determine whether a proposal ' involves unresolved con-
~ @'7,:' Z giR %,,;D;yl%i$iN?gM$ flicts concerning alternative uses of available resources' - the statutory
.s'i?g standard of Section 102(2)(E)." As discussed, Iq/ra, the Stafrs failure to m 2.i, R y g , fs A W discuss this alternative is not fatal.
,' . J.'.O X -
As reflected in note 7, supra, CCLC does not urge th at a detailed final environmental impact statement should be prepared. Its position is that f 102(2)(E) requires that the EA be redone to include a discussion of or l at least acknowledge the dry cask storage alternative Apparently it argues that whenever a proposed action - here the proposed transship- ; ment of Surry spent fuel - has "some" impact on the environment, the
, , 9 , ,,.g,g 4 application of f 102(2)(E) is triggered and there must be an agency con-3s Q $dM U sideration of alternatives regardless of whether or not a f 102(2)(E) g p,ggk g p!#gagg. hg " unresolved conflict" exists. This argument is disingenuous. None of L - p Y.7% '-['j.?& the cases cited by CCLC remotely suggest that the words " unresolved c we . g .x .a. 9 conflicts" are or should be excised from i 102(2)(E). Moreover, two of
! 2 - ?! ' the cases cited by CCLC at page 4 of its proposed findings do not evi-L . _ . dence that this issue "has badly split" the Appeal Board.12 In'the Trojan
, decision, the Appeal Board stated that "there is no obligation to search out possible alternatives to a course which itself will not either harm the ,
[. environment or-bring into serious question the manner in which this (! _ country's resources are being expended." Footnote 41 in the Big Rock 4 Point decision is not in conflict in stating that "Section 102(2)(E) of P , NEPA is not limited to major federal actions with significant effects on the environment and may require consideration of alternatives even
- '. ' y rN.hu [A s ! n when an EIS is not otherwise required" inasmuch as on the same page,
...,:.,qo e.M $k X .
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. as noted supra, the Appeal Board reaffirms that "some factual basis (usu-
. es, b , g... y . p. ally in the form of the staffs environmental analys.is) is necessary to n~
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18 The stafr points out in its tmef that, at pages 2 3 ofits July 3,1984 EA. It referenced NUREO.0575, i b, .? y " Final Genene Environmental statement on Handhng and storage of spent Light water Power Res .cor i )'i jdp, % ' .hyM s J h
- h.N.yw v dMW.M,;' w
*:liMph(8d;,*. e Fuel," August 1979, and noted that the finding of the FCEls is that the environmentalimpact costs of interim storage are essentially negligible, regardless of where such spent fuel is stored. Apparently, in v.7 yg yr .g.tr - the alternative, the stafr is suggesting that in fact it did discuss the alternauve of dry cask storage and
- l. ,*.2 o: P.9 'h .gg 79 that no further analysis was necessary. See staff's Sner at 16. The suggesuon is without merit. Indeed, t.@ ,,iJN* W 4?F C2b. 'D the surry dry cask EA of April 12.1985, accurately observed that the environmentalimpacts of the dry I'7., * ',WDNN'M% LO.. cask storage option had not been specifically addressed in the FGEls. stair Eth. 3 at 4. -
. A .- e n,7. a b;&.qyQ gv.pW/.O 12 rrq/ae. ALAS.531, supnr. 9 NRC as 266; 8!* Roct Mar. ALAB.636. supra.13 NRC at 332 n.41.
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. ' determine whether a proposal ' involves unresolved conflicts concerning 1.1 alternative uses of available resources' - the statutory standard of Sec-
~ .-. n v v. ,c.. .
, w. 6 r u 3,. . . -
tion 102(2)(E). N.$.m. - fpM[QQQQQ 4. o.g ._, s , ,. - a ,.,. w. w.m . The Licensee has submitted extensive proposed findings of fact, as
. MW*
t m modified by the Stali, in support of its secondary position that the w@M 2.,9 np = .p%; M Fh +e g @w y.y: record establishes that there are no { 102(2)(E) unresolved conflicts @Mf9,@%n @& ca.,&,wM. M F,6W+f concerning alternative uses of available resources. We now turn to the
- c. nn M $lM M 0d2 M,'fg g , ,o m .
~,
record to make this determination.u First,' CCLC concedes that "[firom an economic point of view, dry cask storage appears to be no less attrac-
$tgMF,;MTQM4 79MQk@:/9M6 QG tive an alternative than transshipment." CCLC Proposed Finding 12.
MW4ET
.l*%ri 3 ,,
NQMM y,GSM , . . Thus, the costs are comparable. In any event, consideration of an alter-native based on economic superiority (and not environmental superiori-ay y ' YA.5 k? ty) is not the responsibility of this agency. North Anna, ALAB-584,
~ vl .
supra,11 NRC at 456. Second, the StalTs witness, Mr. Donald P. Cleary, testified that the proposed action will not involve any noteworthy conflict in the use of resources such as lead, steel, copper, resin, cement, labor, vehicles, casks and roadways. CCLC did not cross-examine Mr. Cleary. Thus, it cannot be heard to barrenly allege th it the
,4 proposed action will require extensive cominitments of those resources.
- v. n '. c .
, m. My~.a. A c.< p See CCLC's Brief at 5. Finally, contrary to CCLC's allegation at page 5 a
.,a w of its brief, the Licensee's witness, Mr. Marvin L. Smith, at page 259 of Vy'm[ f7 f "
i jW ng@Qp' fK T the transcript did not acknowledge that the transshipment proposal
.% w 6.r,-7.w w p%E would tie up the resource represented by the available storage capacity
' . .. at North Anna. He merely indicated that storage space is a resource and that generally he was involved in the planning stages of activities that
= - "_ might impinge on the storage of spent fuel.
On the basis of this record, we conclude that the proposed transship-
.y~ ment of Surry spent fuel to North Anna would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment, that the transshipment inherent ,
/ . in the proposal does not involve unresolved conflicts concerning alterna-L' > tive uses of available resources, and that there is no basis for concluding
" 4 that the dry cask storage alternative is environmentally preferable to the
,[ : ,' ct *[..;- instant transshipment proposal. Such an ultimate NEPA judgment may;
,.,m ,' yi. v.
2 y,9 = ..a. gyygg , fW, UW/ ^ properly be made on the basis of the entire record before adjudicatory dr.y y y.,,Wgg-gsggg}g4 n y w : q; % 3 w y @ W ,y y n Jr. m 4p.,,4p Ag
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H In passing, we note that. 6n its Proposed Finding 15. CCLC urges that even ir the surry spent ruel pool lost its rull core reserve and the nuclear plant had to shut down. this would be prererable to need. My e, b d ,afy(. A
- V-~4 gRi!%@g/W@.if.f$ .
f
*W.ai W*A tess esposure to the pubhc occasioned by the proposed shipment or spent ruel to North Anna. The c . My-1sC,. . %, u,C.Wy.; )$,.* record is not cited in support or this barren allegation. Also, we note that, in Proposed Fmding 17
]QwJy. - "..y , , @ y , f,.KMdM. CCLC asserts that Licensee's plan to construct a dry cask storage racihty at surry is sulYiciently advanced that it can be implemented in time to prevent the loss or rull core reserve and thus avoid the need ror
. 7 7.g ,.g g.<MT*
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.MD transshipment. As our Finding M renects, the dry cask storage hcense might not be granted or might be revoked as some ruture date.
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tribunals. Philadelphla Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units I and 2), ALAB-262,1 NRC 163,197 n.54 (1975).
~ ~
a., tQ . N
.s s .
4 4.. ' , , " w- III. CONCLUSIONS
~ .R y,m...,ws.;c q = yc e-
-a ,. . .. + . . , .. ac, a - + The Board concludes that an environmental impact statement need
~
not be prepared because the Staff's Environmental Assessment, both as
'f ~~ ' " a matter oflaw and as supplemented by the Board's findings, adequately
., , , . , , evaluated the probability and consequences of shipping accidents, includ-ing those which might be caused by error of Licensce's employees in preparing the spent fuel casks for shipment. We also conclude that an en-vironmental impact statement need not be prepared because the Interve-nor has never challenged the Safety Evaluation Report's analysis of sabotage, and because the record establishes that the probabikty is remote of either a sabotage attack being undertaken or being successful, and that, even if such an attack was successful, the impact upon the public health and safety and upon the environment would be very small.
Finally, the record establishes and we conclude that the transshipment 7' . proposal does not involve unresolved conflicts concerning alternative
?.
uses of available resources and that there is no basis for concluding that the dry cask storage alternative is environmentally preferable to the transshipment proposal. FINDINGS OF FACTu
- 1. Consolidated Contention I reads as follows:
l The Stan's Enuronmental Assessment is inadequate and an Environmental Impact Statement should be prepared. The bases for this contention are two-fold. First, the Environmental Assessment did not evaluate the probability and conse-quences of accidents occurrmg during the transportation of spent fuel casks from the Surry Station to the North Anna Station which might be occasioned by acts of sabotage or by error of Applicant's employees in preparing the casks for shipment.
- g. Second, contrary to the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
<.y < f 4332(2)(E). consideration was not given to the alternative method of constructing
.- .Q . + .. +& v-y
.~
18Despite the lJmerd decmon. CCLC urges that NFPA requires that a discusson oralternatives to a 4.. . c , , . , , given pronnal be included within the environmental assessment of that proposal. It asserts that the
. North Anna transshipment tiA should be remaMed to the staff for supplementation. lest the staff's offi-cials who will pass on the transshipment proposal not be aware of the dry cask proposal and its environ.
memae assessment. We reject tNs argument, which ir adapted by the Board. would produce nothmg
, other than delay an the resolunon of this controversy. There is nothing in the record to estabhsh that the NRC statY is so compartmentatued that responsible officials would I:e unaware of the dry cask storage
.. proposal and the environmental assessment.
The factual background is set forth in the introduction to our opinion, supns. .
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. .o 0-h: p =:; m . , gr _ 74 , a dry cask storage facihty at the Surry Station which is feasible. can be effected in a timely manner, is the feast expensive and safest method for at least 50 years, and can be used on or olisite.
- ~ , . , .
. * < H.;
. m %,.'.M C ..c
' , A. Employee Error in Preparing Casks for Shipment
- j. Cask Description
. l. &. - . . $ 2. The cask to be used for the Surry-to-North Anna shipments is
' :a ._ , N -c.
. .! , 'd/- the model TN 8L cask manufactured by Transnuclear, Inc. The TN-8L
- n. '
-/ fV ~ :7 l ,
cask is designed to carry three pressurized water reactor fuel assemblies,
' O C.'/ t '
one in each of three compartments. The cask cavity consists of three v y A; , s: , stainless steel square pressure vessels welded to an end plate and circular
- stepped top Dange, separated by a T-shaped copper plate, and surround-ed with boron carbide and copper plates. The main shielding consists of 135 mm of lead,26 mm of steel and 150 mm of resin. A wet cement layer is located between the lead and the outer steel shell to reduce heat How in the event of fire. Radial cooper Gns are welded to the outer shell and cover the surface of the cask between the end drums. Each end of the cask is surrounded by stainless steel drums reinforced by radial 3.s r- .. '. a# - , . ,( gusset plates and filled with balsa wood. A disk-shaped shock absorbing
.P' . _ - .
1 rGf cover, constructed of carbon steel and balsa wood, is fastened to each drum with four,1% inch bolts. The cask has six trunnions, which are
- ~ ~ ' the structures by which the cask is handled. Impact limiters are attached to the trunnions to reduce impact loads in the event of a side drop onto a trunnion. Certain vent and drain lines that penetrate the inner cavity are equipped with positive closures. All access ports are protected by the shock-absorbing covers. McCreery, ff. Tr. 220, at 3-4.
- 3. NRC has issued a Certificate of Compliance certifying that the cask meets the safety standards in 10 C.F.R. Part 71. Id. at 4 and Appen-dix 2.
- 4. The main cask penetration is the opening on the top of the cask through which spent fuel is loaded and unloaded. This opening is cov-
,, , // cred by a lid that is a welded stainless steel circular Danged shell contain-c .. g .v. - ., ,
ing lead and resin shields. The lid is secured by sixteen 1%-inch-diameter e : A.-Au .+ , . ;C bolts and is provided with a double seal consisting of two concentric
, Mr.U),Idh$.$.$ 84.;- Viton "O-rings" located within recessed grooves on the top Dange. Id.
.m.::4.y q gg . at 4,
- i. 5. Three other penetrations lead to the fuel cavity - the "A." "B
5;;,"
- y,@),5h.; _ , jt.2.f; - and "C" penetrations. The "A" and "B" penetrations are located in the
;%W . / .
lid. The "C" penetration is located on the side of the cask near its
<. Nse'@ . .- -.. . , bottom. The "A" penetration passes through the lid and is 1% inches in
,. ry-
. - lg . ,
, ,7. 1.q .;
diameter. The "A" penetration is used for cask evacuation and drying in
- n. .
n : p ,, t ?4 % 5 *
*4 ,
3 . . . .. . 7 W
- i ,-
~
7/is m+psh&M + :,,H4d%iK %GV3.W M. 7
- ~T ~ ~ ~~ - ~;
3,:,% 9 . s u +~ '
- 4. 33 3. . .
'Li - N .:.,;.% ;gQ up.YWf44 ' ; Oe ~
er,hA. -
, ', i .,. .
.- - , . . ~ ~ ...-.-..-.x . .- .~ .
l i the vacuum drying test, and for venting when the cask is being filled 1 with water. The "B" penetration is a penetration from the bottom of the P ' 1, J
- i lid that passes upward through a Hansen-valved quick disconnect fitting.
.g n it is used to provide access for instrumentation to obtain pressure read-
- ?- 5. .. -
.t ings within the cask during cask handling operations, and for backfilling N, - . :,
* .h" ' {
- . c.
the cask ~with nitrogen. When the cask first arrives, the "B" penetration is used to compare the pressures inside and outside the cask. The "C"
, 7 'o# { '-
,-W- penetration is a penetration formed by the drain lines at the bottom of L ,
the cask that converge into a single Hansen-valved quick disconnect fit- [ E " ' # ' i' ting. It is used to drain water out of the cask and to fill the cask with water. /d. at 4 5.
- 6. The "A" penetration is sealed by tae *A" plug, a lead-filled t
flanged cylinder that has one "O ring" seal on the underside of the j flanged portion and is secured to the lid by three bolts. The "B" penetra-l tion is scaled by a circular flange with a single "O-ring" and is held in place by three bolts. The llansen valved connector acts as a second seal. The "C" penetration is sealed by a flange cover, with one "O ring" and three bolts. Again, the Hansen valved connector acts as a second seal. Id. l . ;- 7. The "D" opening is an opening into the lid that does not lead into the fuel cavity. It is an access port to the annulus between the two lid "O-rings." It allows access from the top of the lid to the space be-tween the two "O rings" so that the integrity of the main tid "O-rings" i can be checked. It is scaled by a threaded plug with an "O-ring" on the underside of the head of the plug. Id. at 6.
- 8. The three bolts in the "A," "B" and "C" penetrations, the threaded plug in the "D" opening, and the sixteen bolts in the lid are L
torqued to levels specified in the operatinjt procedure, in a specified se-quence. The specified torque is applied to the bolts to compress the "O-rings" and to form a tight seal against the' metal on both sides. The Hansen valved connectors in the "B" and "C" penetrations act as a second seal. /d. n ~- SAfety related Design Features a g . s g f.. . m. . :, %..,. '
- 9. Both Staff and Licensee witnesses testified that certain design fea.
L 1 ~; .' tures of the model TN 8L cask minimize the potential for damage-i
'l '
*~
producing human error in cask handling. Lahs et al., ff. Tr. 346, at 19;
- McCreery, fr. Tr. 220, at 7.
[ 10. As reflected in Findings 11 17, litfra, some of the design features
- ^ ,,
of tne model TN 8L cask make errors less likely, and ot$ ars would mini. L 495 l .w L
' .a ,
a _ ,
- s. .
,_ __ ._ _ . . . . , . . _ - _ , , -.. - .._ c -
- c. :& % aus.-pig., ...y. . -
- u. . e ; .-
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,K' .
< ;6 pc s g.
- C
- - . ~ . . - . . . - . . . . - . . -
1 l l mize the effect of an error if one were committed. McCreery, ff. Tr. 220, at 7.
'l' ,,
.j ', ',* 11. First, the cask is shipped " dry," i.e., with no water in the fuel cavities. That precludes the development of steam pressures inside the
.4 v. C 4 C *.L.:.~ d f,l_;;.-;J cask, since there is no residual water that can turn to steam. The absence WA: .
.o ' AN, N of steam pressure reduces the possibility of a release of radioactive gas
[ .' b.; $ . in the event an employee erred and, for example, failed to properly tight-
..,. c
- 1;; ' < y i.le en the lid bolts, or failed to detect a defective seal. If no positive pressure exists inside the cask, there is no driving force to force radioactive gases
~'
. [.h((.[J ,
outside the cask. Also, the less pressure, the less chance for a seal to fail. /d.
- 12. Second, the casks were designed to carry fuel that has been dis-charged from the reactor only 6 months and is thus " hot" (thermally)
- with a decay heat of approximately 8 kilowatts per assembly (kW/assem-bly). The design parameters of the cask enable it to contain pressures of 105 psig, with a safety factor of 3. The Surry fuel that wit! be shipped to North Anna has been out of the reactors for over 5 years, with a heat output per assembly ofless than 2 kilowatts, and so is producing heat at only a fraction of the design capacity of the cask. This is another impor-T- ,
. ....... E i! . . tant safety factor over and above the original design safety factor of 3.
. f.,"' %
The fact that the fuel to be shipped is being selected from reactor dis-charges that indicated a low relative activity, and thus no major failures, also makes it less likely that a significant driving force would be created inside the cask. /d. at 8.
- 13. Third, the cask is designed to carry the maximum payload that can be transported by highway. One unloading / loading cycle removes as i much fuel as three loads in the only other available highway cask model.
The likelihood of handling errors is thus decreased during any given shipping campaign, since the Licensee will need one-third as many ship. ments with the model TN-8L cask. Id.
- 14. Fourth, while only one seal for each penetration will satisfy NRC
^ '
requirements, the cask features double seats for the tid opening and two of the other three penetrations into the cask cavity. Id. at 8-9; McCreery.
.%e 1;. .Z . ~ ~. 4 ; ..a .
Tr. 224; Labs. et al., ff. Tr. 346, at 19. The NRC StalT testified that
;. dT ?MNjM.
based on the cask closure design of the TN-8L cask, as well as on the
- M v q ,4 " -
~
cask handling procedures, a release of radioactive material due to em-
?
ployee error is unlikely. Lahs et al., ff. Tr. 346, at 17-18. J.n
'.' f^a G e .>C._ d ;t' '
N 15. Fifth, the cask uses seals made of a rubber-like material (Viton)
'k, rather than metallic seals. A scal containing this rubber-like material is
,y 7 +! less susceptible to damage than a meta:!ic seal, in that if it is deformed r .
during handling operations it will regain its original shape. This mini-m b.['.3's D ,. '
',g-
. mtzes the possibility of additional handling, which would be requir:d if a j
- l. 496 i l l- 1 l
_.. . _ . _ . . _ . _ . . . _ . . . ~ . . e-
xa:,. & :.GA %'.% y % f &L; W .a a ,w v .i H p,+. m y.n . a m...i.w :.m@. . m u , . . ,. .
.. - L.
f.4, ,% jjps ww j y. qu y y., , a -
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... ' . .y 4 4
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seal had to be changed, and thus decreases the likelihood of error.
. ,"'- McCreery, ff. Tr. 220, at 9.
,.; ; ~;
- 16. Sixth, the cask is relatively simple in design, resulting in easy-
' " ~
to follow operating prccedures. The less complicated the operation of X' -
, s the cask, the less likely it is for an error to occur. And, if an error oc-dd]N4Jh d- .
.5,.h . .M iu..
) M '. ;2 curred, it would be easily detected and corrected. Id.
iy1,7 G,
- 17. Finally, the cask is designed pursuant to 10 C.F.R. f 71.73 to t.* '
withstand savere accidents without significant damage. The regulations
' , n,. ,
require that it withstand a 30-foot drop onto an essentially unyielding i '" L, surface, a side drop of 40 inches into a 6. inch-diameter steel bar, expo- !?- - ,. sure for not less than 30 minutes to a fire of not less than 1475'F and immersion under at least 3 feet of water for not less than 8 hours. Id. at 9-10; McCreery, Tr. 226. . l Cask Handling Procedures
- 18. From the time the empty cask is removed from the truck until it is placed back on the truck tilled with spent fuel, the following proce-dures are prescribed:
's ,<r '5- O y .L . > -
n (1) r'ask protective devices are removed. e 1 ' ~ '.?r i ' o,. e >
;,- (2) Cask is taken to decontammation area.
(3) Skirt (cover) is placed on it. 50 that radioactive contamination will not accumu. l , late on fins while the cask is m the spent fuel pool. (4) Sotteen bolts that engage the cask tid are removed. (5) Cask is filled with water and then inoved to the loading station in the pool. (6) Cask lid is removed w hile cask is under water. (7) Cask lid is hfted above the water with a crane. (S) Seals are mspected for defects. (9) Seals that hwe defects are replaced.
. . . _ e: ,
V<- . (10) Three assemblies are loaded into the cask.
. , , u -
y... . . .
, . v;;r W.;
v.P ya.,W M, ,4 v , , w'. (11) Cask hd is replaced while cask is under water. ,- =*
-.m a g, .: c,. . . .% . H 47'.m ,c - ' (12) Cask is lifted partially out of water, and four bolts are replaced, hand. tight, in lid.
sc . .y + ,. - N.'
- i , _ , ,
, v .
U
*.', t (13) Cask is moved to decontamination area and the remaining 12 bolts are installed.
[ . (14) Numbered template prescribing the order for bolt tightemng is placed on the
, . ,y ,
cask.
~
i (15) All 16 bolts are tightened to 290 ft. Ibs. with calibrated torque wrenches.
~
t ,
.. - 497 9'
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~ . . .. u - .- - . . - . .- .. ....... . - - - - . ~ + . ~ - , .
- i. < <t l t . ,
W - (16) Water in cask is drained (gravity drainms) through penetration "C."
.; j1; &.,s., +. .
(17) Leak tightness of the lid seal is checked through the "D" opening.
~- s o.n.,g n . + , , all.a,M irM S R .G. . ~ . 3 -n (18) Air is evacuated from the cask, g; ; ;;. . y y 9 y ',. . , .* -
Wyct g - 4 ~< (19) Any remaining moisture is evaporated by the vacuum drying system. @w M 9 % 3r,-;.'gf.Q.., < q.c,c , W, n .- ;s.; , M/S?%dN% i:6.c; . /, (20) When pressure inside cask is less than 20 milhbars. cask is tested for 10 mm. -ic; u[47.MyD C . ?.
- s utes. If pressure increases no more than three millibars during this time, the seals are working and the cask is dry (vacuum drying test).
M. WA. 'tM.1 w .%.4A +c- c. d C . 9* v .y .
- b. *h *I [,'.;.
~
(21) Evacuated cask is back. filled with nitrogen to prevent oxidation of the fuel. . Rp'y;W{y%{ l . (22) Cask is back-filled with nitrogen to one atmosphere. in order to equalize the pressures inside and outside the cask.
; lO M);f. y. q,,,R.: s).
- i 74.' '- -'.
. (23) Remaining penetrations into the cask are checked under vacuum for leak tightness.
(24) Skirt is removed. and the cask is ready to be moved to truck. (25) Cark is secured to its specially designed trailer by a system designed to restrain the cask in all three motion modes.
> 'q '. d ..,m .; . ,
(26) Cask protective devices are attached to ends and trunnions. Secunty seals are WM %a; .,, g;p.ny fiC .%;7 6.. .c/. s y.
- .. ., .. attached at each end.
m mta: .e
.J:
, / d; W%;%w!% .
'n. .L*
Q. m: , ~ :i .,,Q. McCreery, 19. P4
' These Q ff. Tr. pN',9 220, at **
procedures 1416; Licensee Exhs. I and 2. are repeated when the shipment reaches its end destination and the cask is unloaded, except for the seal leak tests - and except that four bolts remain in the lid until the loaded cask begins its descent into the fuel pool. McCreery, ff. Tr. 220, at 14-16; Licensee Exhs. I and 2.
- 20. A supervisor watches as the operator performs each step of the n operating procedure. The supervisor's responsibility is to ensure that the operators perform each step in the proper sequence and as prescribed by iL' .. the operating procedure. The procedure contains a " checkoff" space beside each step delineated to verify that each step has been properly
*. p 7, 3 . .
performed. McCreery, IT. Tr. 220, at 16 17.
.w; 77:7.- ' ' "
- 21. In addition, whenever a step is taken that requires that its per-U.h$ d.$.. , - h . formance be verified by readings of pressure, torque or visual examina-
$[g[#.ss < ;ffu %e ew.m.
- e. : . . W G. ~ tion, these values or attributes are confirmed by a quality control repre-p W p ; y ,, A ; m _ - w, , es sentat.ive. Requ. ired quality control checkpoints provide an additional 6 .'A , layer of assurance during the performance of the more important steps.
e%.fAs m t 'm $ .ayU.s.t. ~ ;,x F r;N
.y
- m. c.,
%w.m.1lW, Id. at l7. .
r g,.g 2 . e. . c.
.s 9, ~
J 22. The cask handling procedures are' thorough rather than complex, p+p & & ,-y ~i# A ,.... i. c ,,* y, .;p. . and, as reflected above, require checks and doublechecks, /d. Not only p.mng:y. gfy n. s .m:<a n.- m( . ; . , ,
~
is a seal visually inspected, and then subjected to a leak test (/d. at 10), Y y,.. /.' e . . n
,y k g sw ;f,
. lM '; ; w .. .% _ ; ,
,4 - -
; 49g na q w, &~ e. : + ...s
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e,, w y +s - . . - y.. ....w-., - w. e wt g w=,f.*. .e P *. .*F
.'m
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- L ._ _ _ ' v. l'.' ,
,, a <
s.: q ; w =.n. ,+, m !9u.a,~4 + ,; ,j4 - ir,yp p 4 . p m g 5 p.. y m:; . 7.,e w. m m 4:L ,.9...-+-.-n qgV . > - - w ww.,o ; ,.m .p+ y- ;g.g g . . gQ3. ' ;
-: % ; -L~ . Q3 % ., ,gy.&:5. QQ ,y h; Q +4...& Q
.M-
.-.---..s...~ - - .
^'
, n W > bui it is also replaced annually, whether or not it has deteriorated, de-j,
~
spite a 5 year shelf life (/d at 12), it is then subjected to a still more
?Q1," - f. ,, demanding leak test. Id. A drying test is also a verincation of proper in-
?g$ -u. ' . %y :g - <
. ,j ~
,, stallation of the lid seals. Id. at i1.
..,.9 u.p> , ,1 * . 9
- 23. The procedures also include "self-checking" operation, i.e.,
+ j,p w & s.f/ M , .cM W o;; procedures that would make manifest any earlier mistake. For example, u.sM d' .@'* c.WW -
+.s-- *
- ,* so .
1 the " dryness" test under vacuum will not pass if the lid or penetration 3.,b :J:m',.
; bolts are not in place, or if the cask is not drained of water, or if the
- .g: a y'. ,M4 f h.My.
g.u. i s , .. . seals are defective. Id. at 17-18. a;.c' gp ; @ > .
- d};, : 24. There is a great deal of redundancy in leakage barriers and in the
,- 'eXO '
- e e . tests performed on them, and so any error would likely be found by test a g i ,.5 .. : 6. 4 - or negated by a redundant leakage barrier. Lahs et al., ff. Tr. 346, at 20.
- 25. These cask handling procedures are based on over 500 cask-
~
years' operating experience. Similar casks have been used in Europe since the 1970's. There have been at least fifty loadings and unloadings of TN 8L casks in the United States. These cask handling procedures to be used in the shipment from Surry to North Anna evolved from this operating experience and from knowledge gained through technical in-
, . vestigations. McCreery, ff. Tr. 220, at 17.
. ._ . .t f, : 26. The Licensee's witness, the manager of Transnuclear Inc.'s
.; g,e tc y Ig;9 - eg; f ,,'.'
m Aiken Operations, testified that he is familiar with approximately one-ag ,7:" % G ~ half of this historical experience in shipping spent fuel in casks and that
.. 4 -%. .' J A there is a fairly free exchange of information between companies in this industry. While an incident had occurred at a New Jersey reactor site, he stated that it posed no signincant threat to the public health and safety or to workmen and that such an incident would be unlikely to occur at the Licensee's reactor sites since a different type of mechanical joint is used which remains connected throughout shipment. McCr' eery, Tr.
- 218 19, 232 33, 235 36, 241.
- 27. A generic operating procedure has been approved by NRC along with the cask's Safety Analysis Report. The site-specine procedures have been reviewed and verined by Transnuclear, Inc., to conform to
~,( ;i _.
the generic requirements. McCreery, fr. Tr. 220, at 17.
- 4.-
qgy ; 28. The employees that will be involved in shipping the Surry fuel
..7 m.
~
42 ; . have had 7 hours of classroom instruction in cask handling and have A;N.D. .e.
..$1N.U;.L, $2i, , become certined operators after completing an 80 hour course in crane u 2 t .- ,. % operation and rigging by the Crane /MIT Operator School. These employ-i'
- lq;N' _ 0; g"* o g4gNy ,.' w; .
.~.:
ees also obtained hands-on experience with the cask at the Allied Gulf Nuclear Services facility in Barnwell, South Carolina, in August 1983. 3 [ ' 7 *.E ' ,
, Additionally, these employees have gone through a " dry run" (without < . u:S e 4+ : * -
fuel) that took place at Surry in November 1983. A refresher course will y h[,".Q 9. - j " [ be given, informing employees of any minor changes in cask handling t .: 7 1.f * *
^
.; , .- 499 I .. ,.n.
I :. , 5.- I .. i
. Y' g.p$d l Qa- ; .. . ,
2^ . > ,-d
,5 , *
- y. ' . K , .. .: * * .,y a l_ ,
3
. c f % , _ ,. x;.
4 3L, :g-[.
., s,s ',,.
{; . .
. ~ % % 'i " . .,;.~, & <., %; N,p, -& Q'M . M Q Q t '
y. %gW h4%.g. m - - . . -c % 'i..
. ,c
- , ;-~ . . b. e u . -
H.e .r ;Qa@.g.,~. . M .
,'2, m., y
@@yWhR @ * , *.l' ;' ,-v :.; 9 .
.- - , s A' .- - --
Q , _ _ _ . - _ ~ . - t procedures before any spent fuel is shipped. Pickworth, ff. Tr. 222, at
.! 2-3.
;,; ;. .,4., Sabotage
.g B.
,~ v.r .T 0 J . R . ., y.
'f, i 29. The subject of sabotage was not discussed in the Environmental Assessment issued on July 3,1984. Staff Exh.1. However, the Staff's
- r. 2.;.. 7, ., 7.c a , u .r .., ,". _",.. ' ' ?.e 4 : c '
Safety Evaluation Report, issued on the same date, stated that, so far as
.'g' fg 3. , ,2 . ^
known, the hijacking or sabotage of a spent fuel shipment has never N c i c been attempted. The SER also stated that the following considerations
, 'gcA > ' - -
.e indicate that the probability of such an event is remote and that the risk TN to the public is very smail: (1) Extensive safeguards precautions mini-
'" ~
mize the probability of success. (2) Attempted sabotage, even if success-ful, would not produce serious radiological consequences. (3) Attempted
, theft and separation of plutonium or fission products, even if successful,
{ would require complex equipment and time consuming reprocessing.
, (4) The size and weight of the cask and the intense radioacti vity of its contents would strongly militate against the successful theft of the spent fuel. Staff Exh. 2 at 4-3,4-4.
e , , O M-
"isy . .. [ l' ' ;j, .,,J,,L.
~
's,, Threat ofSabotage
.. . m.; , ,
~
- 30. More than 5000 shipments of spent fuel have been made in the United States since 1964. Except for pellets from a shotgun discharged l during a labor dispute in the early 1970's which penetrated the siding of the tractor-trailer carrying a cask containing research reactor fuel ele-ments, attacks upon this kind of transportation system have been virtual-
{' ly nonexistent. The cask in that incident was undamaged. Jefferson, ff. Tr. 326, at 9. The Staff regularly consults with law enforcement and intelligence. gathering agencies to obtain their views with respect to the possible existence of adversary groups interested in sabotage of nuclear
, activities. None n the information collected by the Staff confirms the i presence of an identifiable threat to domestic spent fuel shipments. Lahs c . .. .
. - et al., ff. Tr. 346, at 8.
~ r. 1 ,
"., 3. . . 11 S4oteurs might consider attacking a spent fuel shipment for d' i .E4 three different reasons:
.q . s. cm; ;Qfy.W. . .w .4 ;. -J.;; , (a) to acquire nuclear material for weapons. However, materials
'J ' 4 for weapons use could be extracted from' spent reactor fuel j?.;. 7 - } E , f]. i'. .' '
, . , - only by reprocessing. Since it is highly unlikely that a saboteur
~
f '.m J , could manage successfully to reprocess stolen spent fuel and since there are other more promising targets,it is unlikely that i
. . 03-N -
r.-- c _ .' he would attempt to purloin the material for that purpose. Jef-u , 2 4 . . . .,, s. G - A --
- ferson, fr. Tr. 326, at 14.
1
. ! 500
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(b) to make a " political statement" in order to embarrass the government or the nuclear industry. However, historically, such attacks have been carried out at times and locations so as v , to minimize injury to the public whose support the terrorists
..,. , ', seek. Moreover, given the dangers and obstacles, discussed
.o,.. .m ,, . , ,
,.c. . v below, a spent fuel shipment would not be an inviting target.
A "
/d. at 14 15.
'F '
(c) to cause direct harm to the public. However, if a saboteur at-( tempted directly to breach the cask in transit or to divert the shipment for use at a time and location of his choosing, he
~
would face a significant threat from law enforcement agencies and/or from radiation. There are other more attractive targets that would provide far greater risk of harm to the public with far less risk of failure and possible injury or death to the sabo. { teur. Id. at 15-16; Jefferson, Tr. 330. I l Probability ofSuccess
- 32. As discussed above in Findings 2 and 17, the TN 8L cask is de-signed to maintain radiation shielding in the face of severe accident con-ditions, which include conditions produced by certain accident like
_ , ._ events staged by saboteurs. A multiplicity of steel shells and thick, dense radiation shields enable the cask to withstand accident-like events causad by sabotage and attack by small arms or conventional explosives. Studies have indicated that it will require skillful use of explosives by persons with knowledge of both explosives and shipping cask design l' parameters to potentially achieve a release of radioactive material. Lahs cr al., ff. Tr. 346, at 6-7.
- 33. The regulations contained in 10 C.F.R. Part 71 specify that the
.:ask must be designed to survive a set of engineeririg criteria specified
, in the regulations as "hypotheucal accident conditions." These design criteria encompass impact, puncture, fire and immersion and, by infer-
, ence, such other phenomena as crushing and tumbling. Jefferson, ff. Tr.
Y s; 326, at 6.
;,_ ; - tl 34. While the TN 8L cask has never been subjected to actual test
. ..c4 s ~N E% 1 conditions, calculations contained in the Safety Analysis Report for 4'
, ., f Packaging (SARP) indicate that the cask can satisfy, without loss of con-c.
9,; ': . tainment and with minor loss of shielding, the regulatory requirements
- contained in the 10 C.F.R. Part 71 hypothetical accident conditions.
While it might suffer some cosmetic damage in an accident (such as the
~
bending of fins) the cask is capable of surviving the prescribed accident
.- + -J6 , conditions with no structural damage. Id. at 8.
'I i
! 501 s g . u =
, eg5.,4 A J :O n,,A .g% agx s 3 m c.%g. ;. Aan.
- w .t y .,a 4 .v; N .J;y % n f ;n . .
,g7 A.q,m.,5 . . .<,s ., ,, yy.m . s . 4 e g. . , Y YE9 ;.{ Q.'pSh ,',' 6 . - /QQ ^ ', . , * !. - + * .
< s j.1l , .l'f;l f." '
s a . y " 3
~
l . ~ - . - . . . ~ ~ -
.- - - . . . _ . _ i.~- . .
t I
- 35. NRC has promulgated the physical protection regulations in 10 i
i . C.F.R. l 73.37 in direct response to the possibility of sabotage against a
~
i ' l' (.; y i . ( f spent fuel shipment. Lahs et al., fr. Tr. 346, at 8. These regulations re- i
, p .- q %f... n .s ., u quire, for example, advance notification to NRC of each shipment,
.D, ., j. ' ; a & 3, procedures for coping with threatening events, prior arrangements with 9 qbbi.EJMM> d V local law enforcement authorities, and a continuously manned communi-
- g py % fg g. p q.,.-- cations center. For shipments by road, such as those planned by Licen-4 g.. ( , W N y ' s, ,J see, the shipping vehicle will be equipped .with an immobilization device. Jefferson, ff. Tr. 326, at 1011. Armed escorts or local law en-y7 j:.7 f..'W;rJS '",
r
,- m: ,. f forcement agents are required to accompany the shipping vehicle, and
,I '7 % .
these escorts. the shipping vehicle, local law enforcement agencies and L the shipper's communications center will be capable of contacting each other through communications equipment required by 10 C.F.R. !' ,4 ( 73.37. Id.
- 36. The physical protection system is designed to increase the obsta- ,
l cles faced by a would be saboteur and, in particular, to create substantial j time pressures for the saboteur. JelTerson, ff. Tr. 326, at 11,13. The saboteur would face armed resistance from the outset. The transport and i: -m i w. > escort vehicles could quickly alert local and State police. The transport I'"", vehicle could activate the vehicle's immobilization device at the first -
- g. ',fW %(.y S.h j g .:a hh , 4 QNp lgby sign of a threat. Id. at 1213. If the saboteur gained control of the vehl-A3.,. cle, he could not swiftly drive it away; he would have to uncouple the i ,
e s ,c ".- .
- u. . **
heavy trailer from the immobilized trector and recouple it with another tractor in full view of the public. Id. at 1617. The time necessary to deal with this array of obstacles would greatly reduce the probability of suc- ; cess. Id. at 12 13.
- 37. A saboteur who overcomes the impediments described above i might attempt any of the following three methods to breach the cask:
(a) mechanical means, (b) use of projectiles, and (c) use of explosives. l' -- Lahs et al., ff. Tr. 346, at 10. '
- 38. The first of these methods would be extremely difficult, danger-l I
c; ' ous and time-consuming. Id. at 11; Jefferson, ff. Tr. 326, at 19. As pre. l', ,
.- ~' ,, , viously indicated in Finding 33, the cask is designed to survive severe
- , y - : ._ re. o A ,e accident like events. Thus, the saboteurs might attempt to disassemble
'. e the cask mechanically. Lahs et al., ff. Tr. 346, at 1011. Performance of
. J r.-. u ~; < k7 m n&. t .mw:w w / this task would be difficult for several reasons, in the first place, the b g;w:;- ps;4QG;i.My' v.
.# J 37 ton cask is designed for vertical unloading but rests horizontally on
%.7.7 J .m - w.
. a : '.
@ %l,* $ ? % L w..J.N.: . the truck. The saboteur must either have access to a 50 ton crane or its
,j .h~ D'N d' equivalent in order to erect the cask or face the problems of removing
,/- L.6 pl.,'.+ ~ ,ne the cover from the horizontal cask. Jefferson, ff. Tr. 326, at 19. ("'". 39. To remove spent fuel from the horizontal cask, the saboteur N.73%'[df S.TJlb . .$? p u.,~,' Eq,.m
.s ,s,s L'
j y.g .,. f,. . _ would first have to remove the 900 pound shock absorbing cover. Then, . i, .<L .;; >l-
- 502 L.
e .. . L g ? ,, . $ . .,
,, f '
,$ "i
,,'bf I
.' k.
4 -u ae -e ; r e er- -n ' es-,--e, .- a.o e e.-no- . .-=.-,,e s e--- y m + 3 g. -e e.,.e. . v. e q gang. amm a g , pee-god , q,, b h ,
. g .
L- : - . v . mw, X .1 ' r
- . m. ,'
'.%.'-. q.qe ,. , v ., .
p f j .fg @l v.s':9.g. o '.* v/7,. 7 5'. 3 f [,
-%[$'[
/. 4 '_ L. J_ _ _a _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , . _ _ r - ' "L p;, > ;
pn~+ a n..4., s.n- .x m. sy;q a. . '; a. ,
- u ;z n m . m . p'g m.; c,.a..
7.- - Q> > <- F: 7, i. 4 gg y L ps '. 9 6 ,, %.f
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c . . 4-.. .**..-e...,sr.'. ...,va......+.--, 4 . .m . .., . wdeE w 4.'-m no.-e. a -wa--a-"..t I . , I L . t-1 I
,' . , s. he would have to removelhe lid of the cask, which weighs almost a ton 4'6.., .
. , .. X l and is designed to fit tightly into the cask. It is likely that the heavy,
% ..] ,l W ; 3 4 .n ,', Q l closefitting tid would bind during the process. Furthermore, a vertical
'd' D w #CIL 51. ,
steel wall, welded across the front of the trailer, would make it difficult f[br.%%@. M. i '. A 3- to use cables to pull the lid off 14. y u; .y..f.w :.iJ. - -
- 40. In the event that'a saboteur could remove the lid, the cask 1 would then project a radiation' beam that would be lethat near the cask' P t Cy' [ l' (V ,:O \.j c e opening. The saboteur would have to deal with this beam if he should at-i f y', d g Y , ,* . # tempt to remove the spent fuel assemblies. Id. at 19-20. .
. - E v ~ 41. To remove the fuel assemblies, the saboteur would have to grap-
^ ~
pie blindly for a place to hook the spent fuel assemblies, probably with a 5-specially constructed tool. This would be difficult, becauscihe .only l'
- grasping points lie flush againstIthe chamber walls, making them difficult l .
+ io hook. It would also be dangerous, as the saboteur might expose his
} ,,
;~
'N,, arm to a high dose of radiation. Moreover, the vertical steel wall et the
- front of the traiid woufJ block the complete extraction of the fuel as. ~
semblies from the cask. Id. at 20 21. .
, 42. If the saboteur were to attempt to breach the cask in this manner, apart fror.ithe risks of irradiation and the difficulties of dis-
. . . s. , .
m.% < 1 < assembly, he would have tremendous time constraints. If he wished to Jn "{ * t '. 5' ~ . s ., maximize hit time to dismantle the cask fully before interdiction, he would not attack the cask near a heavily populated area where law en-forcement agencies would be centered and7hc chance of* detection would be greatest. Instead, he would attack the shipment in a remote area. If the attack were carried out in a remote area, however, the conse-r "
> quences to the public would be minimized. Id. at 22.
- 43. The second method might be an attempt to breach the cask,by using projectiles. Id. flowever, the use of small firearms, high powered rifles and machine guns would not result in the penetration of the spent
,. fuel cask. Lahs et al., ff. Tr. 346, at I l 12. Tests conducted by Sandia Na-tional Laboratories establish that neither light antitank weapons nor
, armor piercing projectiles would be elTective means of penetrating the
~ g; ...f . W . [ + , casks. Jefferson, fr. Tr. 326, at 23. Light antitank weapons prove ineffec-L' 4 +
- tive for two reasons: (a) the extremely accurate aim required (a skill
' JNN, y; .y,4
'9'. - '
- ;,f.O f. . ;..g..Nh.;;hM. . .L - ,,f not expectea in those who do not use the weapons continuously) (1d.),
and (b) the limited penetration capability of the charges used. Jefferson, M 6, g.3 y , - '." Tr. 334. Moreover, armor piercing projectiles would be ineffective i y c g g . Q. . l[.o,, , O against the TN 8L cask because the' lead shielding is not an effective
; M t .. - . ... .
transmitter ofimpact shock waves. Jefferson, ff. Tr. 326, at 23. - 9% 3p . .. ,. ((Z$hMU(g 44. The third method, the c&e of explosives, is the most eflective
. 1., : "
means available 'to' breach the casks. Conical shaped charges, while a mD.. ,4 %
- 11.
- i .' ..' ,
S , A m . v. y.u .1/, ' *- 1 e , ,
.py a 3, y,, -1 p , s
*. -, 503 P *p h A ,
7
*q. ,
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, . . _ ... . ... ...,. .. _. _- _ ,__ ._.m._-
. g+
.d.t g ,
> ., i
* ' i
.1 l . ;4, *
( , (. t 5 6e/. < s, ,. - < w.?. m,y _3
[ ~; l'. . wn . 3 .. ;: jaz , g. m:.a '. o.aa,:Q w,: ;;.s:g, & :,o ;
' ~
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.r. .
- -. - - . . . . . - - - a..-..... . . . . _ - - - . _. _ .- -
1 I requiring some skill, would be the most effective means available, and could cause a penetration of the cask. Lahs et al., ff. Tr. 346, at 12-13. Consequences ofExplosive Attack
. . M. . ;^ !..w . . .h.
- W tJ --+ ~
- 45. Two research programs provile experimental data to sup' port es-
' s- ,
timates of the magnitude and the chemical and physical form of radioac-
~
tive material released from a presumed successful sabotage attack. The first study was performed for the NRC - NUREG/CR-2472, supra note c 8. Lahs et al., ff. Tr. 346, at 14. TI,1e second study was performed for the Department of Energy - SAND 82-2365, supra note 8. Lahs et al., ff. Tr. 346, at 14; Licensee Exh. 3.
- 46. The Sandia Study measured the fuel material released from a full-scale cask containing a single unirradiated, depleted UO2 fuel assem-bly when subjected to a full scale conical shaped charge attack, Jefferson, j
ff. Tr. 326, at 26; Licensee Exh. 3 at 2-3; Lahs, Tr. 355. The Battelle Study utilized a %. scale cask containing irradiated fuel pins. Lahs, Tr. s . 355. , c . :: ,
- 47. Health consequences were calculated using the following scenar-4 :
io: a three assembly truck cask is successfully sabotaged in Manhattan
'* during mid-afternoon of a weekday. Licensee Exh. 3 at 4; Lahs et al., fr.
-- ~ Tr. 346, at 15. .
! 48. The Sandia Study indicated that less than 34 grams of respirable j material would likely be released; the Battelle program indicated a likely release of less than 18 grams. NRC considers these release results to be
~
higher than releases would be under uncontrolled circumstances. The Sandia Study established that, in a highly populated area such as New
- York City, the release of this material would result in no early fatalities and an average of four latent cancer fatalities. The Battelle program in-
-l i
dicated that, in a highly populated area such as New York City, there would be no early fatalities and less than one latent cancer fatality. Id. Early fatalities are defined as those occurring within 1 year after exposure to the radioactive material. Licensee Exh. 3 at 93. Early latent cancer
,, [ . . .
( fatalities occur at any time after the initial exposure and are the result of
< ., fi > ~ 'C. I , ', . f that exposure. Id. These fatalities include early fatalities. Jefferson, ff.
-L- ,
Tr. 326, at 28. When the maximum value is assigned to each factor in m
~
N ..,. . .Y ~8 the calculation, the maximum effect would be three early fatalities and fourteen latent cancers. JelTerson, ff. Tr. 326, at 28.
.. t 49. These predicted radiological consequences would be significantly .. y ,, "-
- reduced where, as in the case of the Surry-North Anna shipments, the N . - . ,W fuel transported is 730-day cooled fuel and the maximum population i along the proposed route is 3.5% cf the test population. Id. at 29. Under T
. j 504
% * * ****=-eau =.* , e e. 3 0. A ei asee ,= e g -p ,., w -e g e- .ap e g.am , ep -. gar = m-we. -em.*
- 1 /
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*Jd =.
.f s '! + **S k'L q ' * .
b{ , V M ?.w d Q.g _W ', , . , *, -
r
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9f
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i s
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~
j these circumstances, and applying maximum values, the maximum
% ,- _ c- a. . 4 ., .
possibility drops to one-half a latent cancer for a successful sabotage in
'+ -
,,~.%.i. .~ Richmond, Vkginia, the most populous area along the proposed route.
,,1 4-t T-
.y+ 1 > Id. Assuming that the attack were to occur in a remote area, the conse-
; UM M.';MC$,['3.Q.- . ...,.N.
quences wostd,bc reduced to zero.
. % 4,. - s -Um e @yym.,,.w.> w
- j. c ,
I
- :f.-~ Yw. a e 4.q '. . , C. The Dry Cask Storage Alternative
, > s
_. ;. L, e.m.: . . . Needfor Additional Spent fuel Storage Space 4' . ~
< 50. The spent fuel storage capacity of the Surry Units I and 2 spent fuel storage pool is 1044 spent fuel assemblies. Smith (0, IT. Tr. 247, at
- 3. At the end of 1985,886 of the fuel storage spaces in the Surry pool will be occupied. Id. at 2 and Appendix 2. Thus, at the end of 1985 the Surry spent fuel pool storage racks will contain 158 vacant spaces. Id.
I at 3. I 51. Each of the two Surry reactor cores contains 157 fuel assemblies. If the reactor core from either Surry Unit must be discharged, to permit
. either inspections or maintenance activities,157 spaces must be available i, " ;MMM jc.c. 3 to store the spent fuel. Id. These 157 spaces will be referred to as " full l .,;%Q
, core reserve." Id.
~ &.3,f,/;yC" W ~D.)~ 32. The Licensee has carried out several full core discharges in the
- . . a.aw;; .W ~ ,
past. Id. The Licensee presently plans a full core discharge at Surry [ during 1986 in order to carry out required inspections. Smith, Tr. 261.
- 53. If the Licensee were required in the future to remove a full fuel core from a Surry Unit in order to perform an inspection or work essen-tial to continued operation, and if there were inadequate space to store the 157 fuel assemblies comprising the core, an outage would result and would last until additional space could be made available. Smith, ff. Tr.
247, at 3. This outage 'vould be long and expensive. The Licensee esti-mates that the cost of replacing the power from one Surry Unit would be
$300,000 per day. Thus, prudent operation requires that the Licensee
,m. Ys . . A q /.3$[ make every reasonable effort to maintain full core reserve. Id.
- y. .. <
M c v V -f.i?S 54. Pursuant to s 135(b)(2) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of IM.-.d ogw- MMtMhd I982* 42 U.S.C. ( 10,155(b)(2) (NWPA), the Commission made a WWmm genene determination that, for purposes of a determmation under 10 c . w..
.W 7 f.yWMrfW% C.F.R. Part 53, maintenance of full core reserve is necessary for contin- -
>g yjg
- "/J Z Tf.h1';D;.*J& !QQ' ued, orderly operation of a nuclear power plant. See 50 Fed. Reg.
- . . . ,r.J- N Xci W, M ?'
5548-67 (1985h 10 C.F.R. Part 53.
- 55. The Licensee currently plans to refuel Surry Unit I beginning baX4l"(([W K /
DM.MW'T. MMMhh July 5,1986. This date assumes that Surry Unit I will be operated beyond its normal end-of-cycle date in a "coastdown" mode. But if
) - a q ' , ;ym l
w.w;.<g h.[ Surry Unit I were to operate at a higher than-anticipated capacity factor w e- K ,
"~ .' m.;.w M ;
505
. . WJ Ln
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e ,.% m : , : 4. 'y
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f M,-{ y :Q a, 6-@ ...,g.aumW--p6 se-N'*hi.gu-ed9 944*- e-ed.- M..*W ap.4'O 9-"N* 9 *O #" 4'--eF W eg M s_# v* Nm. k ., ,,' . , , g a e 3 yb*-
^
4.... *
~ . - , p -:e.,x_ , ; .,
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.- . . u . . . w : . . . ~ . . . . .:.~. ...... _ . ., . . . . . -.
l l t prior to the 1986 outage or if an unplanned shutdown were to occur
- during the "coastdown," the refueling outage now scheduled for July 5, 1986, could start several weeks before that date. Smith (I), ff. Tr. 247,
. ~ . ,' l, m1p+ j w ,, - n, at 4.
I i. , J.h c j dZ., y .
- 56. The Licensee plans to discharge fifty-six fuel assemblies during the 1986 Surry Unit 1 outage. This would leave only 102 vacant fuel I
Iy + .. - 4. g.i.ng;7 spaces in the Surry spent fuel pool, fifty-five fewer than necessary to
..'e f;7 + . ; ce~, g,.k . dQi R$ maintain full core reserve. Thus, at least fifty-five fuel assemblies must I
- 7
> be removed from the Surry spent fuel pool and stored elsewhere prior to
- n. - S; $.f9
-.<~
the end of the 1986 Surry Unit I refueling outage. In fact, for reasons ;
^
. - ,A set out in the following finding, these fifty-five assemblies ought to be s
removed before the Surry Unit 1,1986 outage begins. Id. at 5. !
- 57. The Licensee prefers to avoid transshipping spent fuel between !
Surry and North Anna while a refueling outage is in progress at either I station. This is because refueling outages are periods ofintensive activi-ty, and work that may increase the length of an outage should be avoided in order to minimize outage duration and replacement power costs. Ship-( , ment of spent fuel involves use of facilities in the spent fuel pool that
+
m.
' 5 S. are also needed during outages for core ofiloadhg and onloading. Also, fd 4~= W.p;s w some of the personnel required for spent fuel shipments would have
.R: /; m ac 76%
- r. Ty . conflicting responsibilities during a refueling outage. The Licensee pres-p . J x .u. m a r.n 3. O@ .
ently has outages scheduled for North Anna Unit I during the period November 1 through December 19, 1985, and for North Anna Unit 2 during the period April 25 through June 12,1986. Id. at 5 and Appen-dix 3. . 1
- 58. In addition, the Licensee would prefer to avoid planning for '
spent fuel shipments during the period from mid-December through February because of the higher probability that bad weather would result in delays in the shipment of spent fuel. Id. at 5. Such delays would result in increased cask lease charges and personnel costs. Id. at 6.
- 59. The Licensee also has an outage scheduled for Surry Unit 2 during the period October 17 through December 14,1986 (id., Appendix h', . ; . . .. 7l [ ,~ '
3), and it plans to discharge an additional sixty assemblies during that L . ll ' , . , ;fdQ ,. s. outage (Id., Appendix 2). Thus, prior to that outage, the Licensee must
+W.
. f .- n. .a.n s'.'@l (g;;;.4 M '
w have provided storage space outside the pool fc' both the fifty-five Surry 3, L ~. n pm .p _.. p; - a Unit I assemblies, discussed above, and these sixty Surry Unit 2 n .2 ..: --;;f . , . . assemblies.
.W . %.y y.y f(G. 3QN;[
~ . . , ~
* ~
Dry Cask Storage
-t , ..uw .
- y.,,. g s . - . g.m p g.f 60. Dry cask storage involves the storage of spent nuclear fuel in
" large metal casks (dry casks) that, in the Licensee's case, would be
". ' I . ' "NI7.Z;. ja m.. s=
'e '# ' :. -* '
-f ~. t, . , , ,
506 e-% r., a,.
;; w 3 . ,.; .
~"p****"* sommuur .,4 ,__._-gi,g p 1m = egseawee
= ~ *t*=-- .- =ip.m .
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~ '
. V., %,, . d ' ' ;,. .. , d , ,,
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, .). ~ . y w < ,3 , , . , n
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<.} ,y ' % $! ,
stored on site at the Surry Power Station. Smith (I), ff. Tr. 247, at 6. Al- _ . _ . though the Licensee filed the application at issue in this proceeding, it c ;f' r;I has continued to pursue the dry cask storage alternative. Id. In fact, the
;; , ' + , , ?. j G - Licensee has (a) applied to NRC for a license for a dry cask storage
- m. s 7 %w Q e facility at its own Surry Power Station and (b) entered into a cooperative 4,jJT
'~
. ~ .g)? ^ ~ ^ " ' ' *e <.grp. m development program with the Department of Energy (DOE) designed to demonstrate the feasibility of dry cask storage. Id. at 7-11.
e 'k,,p W Q " 61. In October 1982, the Licensee submitted to NRC a license appli-j- '
+ '
cation under 10 C.F.R. Part 72 for a dry cask storage facility at the Surry
'~
^ '
Power Station. The facility would consist of concrete pads and security facilities, which would be built by the Licensee, and dry storage casks, which the Licensee would purchase from one or more cask vendors. Id. at 7. The NRC Staff issued its Environmental Assessment for the pro-posed dry cask storage facility on April 12,1985. StalT Exh. 3,
- 62. With respect to the public health and safety aspects of the appli-cation, by letter of March 15, 1984, the Licensee informed the NRC of its selection of the GNS Castor V type cask as the first to be considered for evaluation. Lahs et al., ff. Tr. 346, at 22. The application incorporates by reference the topical report for the Castor V cask. The Licensee has m ' R.5 .
. . ggj.
e 3- - ; answered all review questions except for those set forth in a March 7, m 1985 request from the NRC. Smith (I), IT. Tr. 247, at 7. The Staff wit-
. tyne
.n n u._ w . ness testified that the Licensee must still resubmit the dry cask safety analysis report incorporating the Castor V topical report. Roberts, Tr.
351. The Staff also testified that until it completes its review and Com-mission approval is obtained, it cannot be considered a viable alternative. Lahs et al., fr. Tr. 346, at 21; Roberts, Tr. 348. The Staff testified that completion ofits safety review could take " roughly a month. Roberts, Tr. 350-51. On April 10, 1985, the Licensee requested permission from NRC to begin construction of the dry cask facility at Surry. The Licensee estimates that approximately 10 months will be required to build the dry cask facility. Smith (I), fr. Tr. 247, at 7. The testimony revealed that if
._ , n, the Licensee were to receive an early construction authorization from y W . U; _ - NRC, construction could begin as early as June 1985." In that event,
. ? ,@4@ the dry cask facility could be ready for operation as soon as April 1986.
.n., ,j
- + . ;3."m
*-. :& d._ t r&yg n li^ p ; *N: /d. at 8.
, e q fNr.h j: t, w wA-
~
.. .- .y
. - .4
.W U NiM2Q f M.[.',)j.',,. 4
- The Licensee proposed as a finding that on June 10.1985. after the record was closed m this proceed-
=:4 W 3 .-~ ing, NRC advised the 1.icensee that it "does not miend to invoke legal bars" to the pre-license construe.
w
. *ThC- %5 tion work proposed by the Licensee. The Licensee reported on June 26. 1985, that this work would
': A+kV.s c,-
y S . , ?.f.WG
.r. Q f, begm momentanly, and reported on July 30.1985, that construction had begun but that the NRC had not yet issued a license ror the dry cask storage racility. See Licessee's letters erved on all parties. In a
-. (W-Q . s .% p.6%. v s %$h. s.A.
letter orJuly 9,1985, we advised Licensee's counsel that we wished to be kept inrormed about interven-mg developments provided such enrormation was served on all part es.
- -:.4 . g ': * [ '
.y ::. . L.
. .,y +.: - m -
% + N e 507
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f 63. The Licensee has ordered the first dry storage cask for use in the q m* facility. The cask, which will hold twenty one assemblies, is scheduled j, y 9j. .g*.+4.;'" , for delivery in November 1985. Id. The Licensee expected to order four f B #ig W n~lUr0: M .x additional casks during May 1985 (Smith, Tr. 255) and plans to order
. il12- w g. M d h .<: t M.. still more casks for Surry as often as necessary to maintain full core e ,.<c , .A,.W .
reserve m the Surry fuel pool. Once the fac.lity is completed, the first wMi i
~
s q $'6:-6W M~i s 7. M . o
. 4' W .J hf.o & M g- Q, 3 cask is delivered, and personnel training is finished, the twenty-one as-J[." dMQN76%d/Mk semblies could be loaded into the first cask in about a week. Smith (0, N.. i M ff. Tr. 247, at 8.
.gm'p 64. Pursuant to f 218(a) of NWPA,42 U.S.C. f 10,198(a) (1982),
o e g[ 9, a@7yp%.yIk.G,. [ [ [ , 'C,. the Licensee and DOE signed a Cooperative Agreement on March 29,
- a 2.s i' 1984, to conduct a dry cask storage demonstration program. Id. The pro-
^
"' gram will consist of (a) an NRC-licensed demonstration at the Surry Power Station, using the facility described in Finding 61, above, and (b)
{ research and development activities to be conducted by DOE at a Feder-
..1 al site. Pursuant to the Cooperative Agreement, the Licensee had, at the time of the hearing, ordered two storage casks for delivery to the Federal
.[ ;- site, one with a twenty-one-assembly capacity and one with a twenty.
Af WZ5,QQ
, . ?% . four-assembly capacity. The former was delivered in December 1984, M n $@ M [jj @M @M* @ and the latter is scheduled for delivery in February 1986. In addition, at
~e.. the time of the hearing, the Licensee was in the process of ordering a
/
yg L
. .. o 1'-W L+.4 S. u p,dgghMLA M M.wthird @.-l cask,@.
this one with a capacity of twenty four assemblies. This third
; cask is scheduled for delivery in September 1985. Id. at 9.
- 65. At the time of the hearing DOE we scheduled to begin receiving 3 Surry spent fuel for storage in the already delivered cask in July 1985."
l These shipments were expected to take about 2 months. Id. If this pro-gram was completed on schedule, the number of assemblies that would have to have been removed from the Surry spent fuel pool prior to the
. July 5,1986, outage at Surry Unit I would have been reduced by twenty-e ;
A. '.9 one assemblies, leaving thirty-four assemblies to be removed in order to preserve full core reserve after that outage. Shipment of spent fuel for
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the next cask, consisting of twenty four assemblies, was scheduled to begin in October 1985 and to require about 2 months. Successful com-
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N N,~ ..W.- t. ,N 7 3 /. pletion of this portion of the program would leave the Licensee ten 6 WwiM 3.-.3 M Mx..n W ~ .<.~.a W W;4.d .% . q - spaces short of full core reserve after the 1986 Surry Unit I refueling w p,gepe.grwmFFA period. Id. If another cask were delivered, as planned, in February 1986, , ' ' , ' { ' ?: 7 ; { h y *! shipment of twenty-four additional assemblies could begin in March or
=
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%. ,e::m.s i April of that year. Id. at 10. Thus, if all three of these shipping campaigns 9 .34 v m.4
, r .n~ y. : 5. .:q , e .; :}1 E.I *. .,'._h.(
r yrf'- ,5 . "$ Ag.) y. p '< [ , .;.M [ . . <v d a 17The Licensee reported in its letter of July 30,1985 that doe had accepted twelve of the spent ruel
*^cs g.'yr y ;g m % % ' assemblies and shipped them to the doe facihty in Idaho and that these shipments would continue 'y N l y. P.-; wp..,*' .O:f- 'M W s untd mne additional assembhes have been accepted and dehvered to the Idaho facility. thus rilhng the
- s
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were carried out more or less on schedule, full core reserve would be as-sured, without any shipments to North Anna, for the period immediately following the Surry Unit i outage and until the October 17, 1986, outage at Surry Unit 2. Id. at 11; Smith, Tr. 258. Even so, an additional
, . . x .. . ,
.s . J forty-six assemblies would have to be removed from the Surry pool before the October 17,1986, Surry Unit 2 outage. See Smith (1), ff. Tr.
- c 247, Appendix 2. Of course, if the Surry dry cask storage facility were licensed by NRC and completed in early to mid 1986, it could be used l
, to avoid the loss of full core reserve during the October 17,1986, Surry Unit 2 outage and thereafter. See Finding 62, supra.
- 66. The Licensee would prefer to use dry cask storage and forego shipping from Surry to North Anna to the extent consistent with the preservation of full core reserve at Surry. Smith (1), ff. Tr. 247, at 18.
The foregoing discussion, of course, reveals that chances are very good that the Licensee's dry cask options will materialize in time to avoid the necessity for shipping fuel from Surry to North Anna at this time. Id. Nevertheless, the Cooperative Agreement Program, involving as it does a maximum of four casks, woulp riot, in the best of circumstances, permit the preservation of full core reserve indefinitely. Id. at 9. The Licensee hopes, of course, that an NRC license for the proposed Surry dry cask storage facility will be issued during 1985, but that license has not yet been issued. It is conceivable, moreover, that theiicense will not be issued or that, ifissued, it might be revoked by NRC at some future date for reasons that cannot now be foreseen. If that were to happen, the Licensee would have no immediately available option for providing addi-tional storage for its Surry spent fuel unless it could ship spent fuel as-semblies from Surry to North Anna. /d. at 18.
- 67. In addition, s lil(a)(5) of NWPA, 42 U.S.C. s 10,151(a)(1)
(1982), explicitly makes utilities primarily responsible for interim stor-age of their spent nuclear fuel until a Federal repository is available. The Act provides for limited Federal interim storage for utilities, but only if they are unable to provide their own storage through the use of trans-shipment, dry cask storage or new fuel pools. 42 U.S.C. 5 10,155(b)(1)( A), (B) (1982). Indeed, utilities are required by 10
~~
~
C.F.R. Part 53, if they are to qualify to use Federal interim storage, to
. demonstrate to NRC that they have " diligently" pursued these options.
. Smith (D, fr. Tr. 247, at 18-19. In the event that both dry cask storage and transshipment were unavailable, the Licensee might have to apply for Federal interim storage. The Licensee could qualify for Federal inter-im storage only ifit could show that it had diligently pursued the authori-y zation for receipt and storage of Surry fuel at North Anna that it seeks in 1 this proceeding. Thus, given its shortage of spent fuel storage space at 509 m.w p qps.wg M4 _ W #
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s_ ~ . . . _ _ . . . ~ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ ._ _ _ . . ,_ Surry, Licensee has little choice but to seek the authorization that is the
; ; ?!. ,. ,. subject of this proceeding. Id. at 19.
F Q . f G % N. p y.l:y l.) Comparative Costs ,<;y;U. . ::cM.m;y%m gg . :4&W ry$ MX'dM@M@@ 34N 68. Under various scenarios, the cost of the dry cask storage option
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- m would probably be within the range of 11 to 18 million dollars, and the a g ;7 .';.
c .Q. . W r, , j : Ma cost of transshipment would probably be within the range of 8 to 22 mil-lion dollars. Smith, Tr. 268-70. p - 9 s n~ ,;.- w .. r-q:g. ,,.3.p;yt.?f..f. . .
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~
- 69. The* Staff's Environmental Assessment of July 3,1984, noted that inherent in the Licensee's application for an amendment to its operating licenses to allow the receipt and storage at North Anna of 500 spent fuel assemblies from Surry is the transshipment of this spent fuel.
s To the extent pertinent in this case, the EA concluded that an environ-
#< , mental impact statement need not be prepared since the receipt, storage
? $ N h M )f; M@.F 9 m .hMjM$
' transshipment involved "no significant change in types or significant and increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released off site
.R?;;;" MQS.y@@%q.K L.6; ' 2 S Q and there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupa-
~L.m./.G.m#n.'_@..
tional radiation exposure." Staff Exh. I at 4,29 30. Attached to the EA was the StalTs Finding of No Significant Impact which stated that, in
- light of the conclusions in the EA, the transshipment, receipt and stor-age of Surry spent fuel assemblies will not either separately or combined significantly impact on the quality of the human environment, and thus that ar. environmentalimpact statement need not be prepared.
- 70. The EA of July 3,1984, did not discuss the alternative method of constructing a dry cask storage facility at the Surry Power Station.
1 However, on April 12,1985, the Staffissued an Environmental Assess-4 ment of the Licensee's proposal to construct a dry storage cask facility at CJiL J $ its Surry Power Station (the Surry EA). Staff Exh. 3. The Surry EA S[$3 gf M. & p 1
..' m
.. .y examines a wide range of alternatives. Id. at 8-14. One of these alterna-tives examined in the Surry EA was Licensee's proposal to transship and 3 u , .,
receive Surry spent fuel at North Anna. The Surry EA observed that
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this alternative had been separately assessed in the Staff's EA and in the p p,. , x - . . M~ [,, y e W,M OM;.J' t.lN;g Finding of No Significant Impact issued July 3,1984, which found that gy - 7 Sga rTr action to have no significant impacts. Id. at 9 and 64. It includes a de- '. #J , T.? ,. ;- , scription of the proposed Surry dry cask storage facility. Id. at 28-36. It analyzes the environmental impacts of construction on land use and ter-M nW0 . V i d: G..m .. h ' .' N i:> ., ..27 . *' restrial resources, on water use and aquatic resources, on air quality and
' - on noise levels. Id. at 39-40. The Surry EA also examines the expected
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d n operational efTects of the facility including those due to direct radiation,
, t to radioactivity releases in gaseous effluents and to radioactivity releases
! in liquid ellluents. Id. at 41-51. It analyzes offsite dose commitments to
' ~
1- individuals and to the nearby population, as well as collective occupa-i ~{
- f. y tional dose comrnitments. Id. at 42-44. The Surry E A reviews the poten-
, ;q >g wy m 7 , g-~ u.~7 y-. .sr tial environmental efTects of accidents and the potential for sabotage at-
- 4 . -
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, tacks on the facility. Id. at 45,56-58. The analysis concludes that no sig-W- - , t r.. ~ ; - nificant construction impacts are anticipated, that the radiological im--
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. -; 7 pacts from liquid and gaseous elliuents during normal operation will fall 7
V -
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within the scope of the impacts evaluated for reactor operations that were assessed in the Surry Units I and 2 Final Environmental Impact . Statements, that the radiological impacts due to potential accidents are only a small fraction of acceptable limits, and that no significant nonradi-ological impacts are expected durlog operation. See !d. at 60-61. The document's ultimate conclusion is that the dry cask storage facility at Surry will not significantly. affect the quality of the human environment, 1 and thus that an environmental impact statement is not warranted and a I. Finding of No Significant Impact is appropriate. Id. at 61-62. pn.m ..c
" 2 .t Use ofResources
. m . .
W ' f ,.M.? ;.s . s b, _ 71. The proposed action will not involve any noteworthy conflict in , . the use of resources such as lead, steel, copper, resin, cement, labor, vehicles, casks and road - systems. Lahs et al., ff. Tr. 346, at 24-27; Cleary, Tr. 349. CCLC did not cross-examile the Staff's witness upon this subject. Any space in the North Anna spent fuel poal preempted by Surry fuel can be replaccd when needed either by consolidating fuel in the North Anna pool or by installing dry ensks at North Anna. Smith 0), ff. Tr. 247, at 14-15. Conclusions of Law
, u- ..
%g .c a -m .c The Board has considered all of the evidence presented by the parties. A ew. y.e - n~ , . Based upon a review of the entire record ia this proceeding and the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Board concludes that the Director of @% & f$;jd,7Cly'aj,$,h +- =
;x -
Nuclear Reactor Regulation should be authorczed to issue to the Licen- ?s g". v~ 'c , 2 a see, upon making requisite findings with respect to matters not em-braced in this Initial Decision, an amendment to North Anna Units 1
.) , . , s ,_ [ and 2 operating licenses to permit the receipt and storage of 500 spent M W+ < . +
fuel assemblies from the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. , g.y - 3. .~ .f . c r.-7..pa {:: . ;. ~~ - - * ,.
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- .- I.W ?.V ' WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, in accordance with the Atomic
> ' S@MMM@. M@. :y@y!f % Energy Act, as amended, the National Environmental Policy Act, as amended, and regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and p.w.f.w@m:M-N s .p w,. M:i M. f based upon the findings and conclusions set forth here.m, that the Direc-W q @ w ywJ @ @ge sM.1 * % q.le v/g tor of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is authorized to issue to the Licensee,
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- dl. .* - Tn' Virginia Electric and Power Company and Old Dominion Electric Cooperative, an amendment to their North Anna Units I and 2 operat-
'MyfMf m:mchgy o.'@k,g~$_;fgf,j
- c. .
- 7. ; ing Licenses (NPF-4 and NPF-7) to permit the receipt and storage of 500 spent fuel assemblies from the Surry Power Station, Units I and 2.
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In accordance with 10 C.F.R. f 2.764, this Initial Decision will
' ' ' ' ' .' become effective immediately upon issuance, Pursuant.to 10 C.F.R.
, . s s-
~ ' '
f 2.760(a) of the Commission's Rules of Practice this Decision will con-N - stitute the final decision of the Commission forty-five (45) days from the date of issuance, unless an appeal is taken in accordance with 10 C.F.R. f 2.762 or the Commission directs otherwise. See also 10 C.F.R.
' ~
, , =
4.,
..... , ff 2.764,2.785, and 2.786. ~ ..s. '
Any party may take an appeal from this Decision by filing a Notice of - i
~
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M $N
.'pt ,;[pl'yNJ N,,$3P'S.@@p 'F) 73M, w[.yi:fdd?
. Appeal within ten (10) days after service of this Decision. Each appellant must file a brief supporting its position on appeal within thirty (30) days
- s .4 2 ,u w unh.4, . after filing its Notice of Appeal (forty (40) days if the Staffis the appel-lant). Within thirty (30) days after the period has expired for filing and --
~w -
service of the briefs of all appellants (forty (40) days in the case of the
-l Staff), a party who is not an appellant may file a briefin support of or in
~ {' .
~l opposition to the appeal of any other party. A responding party shall file 4 #
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'. ;. '.;. .;.I IT IS SO ORDERED.
- m. ..t . . - . .- . .
s. m < THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND L. m. y. .. s, ~. y%,. ,,.- g.,.
~ .
s .T. . ~ .- w w- . p;.: , . , . LICENSING BOARD
. .~,
w :c. v. m .. 2 - u y.v u. nw4 - J~
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7; , , , Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman
- '. A -
u ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE r , o l Dr. Jerry R. Kline ADMINISTR ATIVE JUDGE
. Dr. George A. Ferguson
..L s ::.s .> ; , ,- t' N . ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
- .j y,(.,
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. Dated at Bethesda, Maryland,
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this 3rd day of September 1985. i i t
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Cite as 22 NRC 514 (1985) LBP-85 35 r .
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s . m. . s . .. .s . e'$.Q. M::?fel.;' ,. e: i. ;.. M,D:.Vg'1 ' i . E-' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION m m.2 ~ 9m: ; - 9.7 FRi "" ._9mgC v. ~%. ' .. 1 .t@- . ,4.Vw.:y .. w .m-pf.P_ ;A A. .s.o.:,e.*4. '
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. ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
.+ i.$--'$:.9?T'l;fjjWe..!e?../'
< '_ ,, r; , w jg ?- - r- .
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Before Administrative Judges:
. y %,. . 9 1 :.. G .
.; 9
. m,, s ..<g:. s .c t ,
4 > , e.v t .: ,. .
%,,. y$ * .
. - James P. Gleason, Chairman
, .c. ~:. m^
- Dr. Jerry R. Kline
.. c - Mr. Glenn O. Bright in the Matter of Docket Nos. 50 440-OL U 50-441 -OL
,. . . .; s 3 -
. - - . . . i 1. ,/ (ASLBP No. 81-457-04 OL)
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. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) September 3,1985 The Licensing Board issues a Partial and Concluding Initial Decision a in an operating license proceeding. Contentions on emergency planning, mv ' diesel generator reliability and hydrogen control are resolved in Appli-cants' favor and, the Decision authorizes issuance of an operating ,, license, subject to the completion of several conditions. . .-. .. .n e n . ~
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w: y!? m.y,w .W.~~~%=.m se7 Where NRC rules do not define the scope of a preliminary analys. is for pdil.?Uff;p'.. .p W )? N ' a facility's hydrogen control system, the Board's standard of acceptance %r._2,N. .GQXis#, uu , ,GM_ i.c.!.b/;:. bis. 1._!,;. :' is whether a reasonable assurance of safety has been demonstrated in
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HYDROGEN CONTROL: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS ,Y - -
- Basic questions that have to be answered in evAldating a preliiniriary
[ a ge j ., : c. 3 ,- anslysis required by 10 C.F.R. 6 50.44 for a hydrogen ignitor system are Lin:.. s f 4Wr.+ .1.. whether the system has been installed, whether it will function as de- +:/.,w n 7;,yg.ov; e; w . signed, and whether integrity of containment and essential equipment ,, ; . gv .w.+. M~"J ' w 11 be retained.
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.' - A.y_f SAFETY STANDARDS: HYDROGEN RULE g .,,' ;,y -
j Separate contentions should be proffered to challenge the adequacy of
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' h.' - , safety components that are not a part of the primary hydrogen control system even though these components might have a safety function in I an accident that causes a release of hydrogen to containment.
t TECHNICAL ISSUES DISCUSSED Emergency plan requirements Hydrogen ignition system s., . - . g m. : , a.- Containment integrity
, py];y,:" Weld quality Dry well capacity m ' " * ~
Hydrogen combustion States blackout Containment response modeling Containment spray operation Suppression pool bypass Equipment serviceability Diffusion of flames
.i Decay heat removal Secondary fires Diesel generator reliability Revalidation program for diesel generators 3 .
, Diesel component maintenance and surveillance.
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- '" - APPEARANCES
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sw y _ On behalf of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, et al., Appli-cants: Jay E. Silberg, Esq., Harry H. Glasspiegel, Esq., Mi-M ..s. 3,7. . , . . . . .. chael A. Swiger, Esq., and Rose Ann C. Sullivan, Esq.
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C . :. , , 1 h i t i i On behalf of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Col-
- leen Woodhead, Esq.
Jf 'i... On behalf of the United States Federal Emergency Management
. s uy 7 .g. . -;; Agency: Brian P. Cassidy, Esq.
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On behalf of Oh.io Citizens for Responsible Energy,Intervenor: Susan M
~ . L. Hiatt
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On behalf of the Sunflower Alliance, Inc., et al.. Intervenors: Terry J. e + _' ,S Lodge, Esq. ~
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! TABLE OF CONTENTS -
3 Page
- 1. OPINION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 516
- A. Emergency Planning . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 518 B. Hydrogen Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 529
' )
- :y > , . C. D iesel G e ne rators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551
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.a-IL FINDINGS OF FACT . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Emergency Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........
. . .......... 561 561
; B. Hydrogen Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 568 i
C. Diesel Generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580
! Ill. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 588 IV. ORDER ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589 CONCLUDING PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON i
EMERGENCY PLANNING, HYDROGEN CONTROL _ m ,f . AND DIESEL GENERATORS
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. KhK>Ziy.b(E.v I. OPINION
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This Decision concerns an application for a license to operate a nuclear
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' y fsyg JQ.R' power plant with two boiling water reactors, Units I and 2, each rated at
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1265 megawatts, and located at the Applicants' Perry plant site in Lake
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County, Ohio. The Applicants (Cleveland Electric Illuminating Compa-g- L ny, Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania
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b. Power Company and Toledo Edison Company) received permits to con-w ,.s . m struct the facility in 1977, which is on Lake Erie approximately 35 miles c N .U. N , -/C northeast of Cleveland. t[4 Z Avi M M U. - In this proceeding, held pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, NN 4 6/je , as amended, the parties, in addition to Applicants and the NRC Staff, MMW.$Oddb$ A,~.g w p . e q s. g.w-< f M @C&' M 7 are the Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy (OCRE), and Sunflower e . 2... ~ s -- n Alliance, Inc., et al. (Sunflower). Admitted as government representa-MMpWM n-yrpyy NW .(.y%gg$/ . tives under 10 C.F.R. 2.715(c) of the Commission's rules, were the j e: Lake County Board of Commissioners, Lake County Disaster Services
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C Agency, the Ashtabula County Commissioners and Ashtabula County Disaster Services Agency. j.~:M NL VM/ . M During a prehearing phase, the Board admitted sixteen issues (conten-
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tions) to the proceeding. Twelve contentions were dismissed as a result of motions filed for summary disposition or pursuant to Commission N rulemaking or policy statements.' The Board has previously issued a par-tial initial decision on a quality assurance contention in favor of Appli-
- cants. This has been affirmed by the Appeal Board. ALAB-802,21 NRC 4 490 (1985)).
,- Contentions were litigated during hearings on April 9-12, 1985 (emergency planning and diesel generator reliability issues), and April ik[dNFPkpW4 g ,
Uuq.' M. n., :jff p'.Nd, =. , 30-May 3,1985 (hydrogen control). The Applicants and Staff submitted
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. cs - - proposed findings and conclusions in the form of partial initial decisions
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as have OCRE and Sunflower on their particular issues. Our Decision here resolves those three contentions remaining. Limited appearance op-
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portunities were provided nonparty members of the public during both
, phases of the hearing proceedings.
The decisional record of the proceeding consists of the Commission's
. Notice of Hearing (46 Fed. Reg. 12,372 (1981)), petitions and findings filed by the parties,' transcripts of the hearing and the exhibits received into evidence. In preparation of this Decision, the entire record has been reviewed and considered. The proposed findings of fact and conclu-
[ . sions of law that are not incorporated directly or by reference in this Ini-iN_@S.M . y . . . tial Decision are considered to be unsupported by the record of the case Q Nhes[,.gg 3 c or as being unnecessary to the rendering of this Decision.
..g gwn.w.e- M69 The Board's jurisdiction is limited in this proceeding to issues placed h E. y N k k N M N c. -
in contention by the parties and to those concerns where the Board has
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February 27. March 13. Apnl 9.1985 (unpublished). See also Order or April 28.1982 (unpublished);
>- . .a _ w . y' LBP-82-53A.16 NRC 208 (1982). " Contention" and " Issue" are used interchangeably in this opimon.
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I I i found a serious safety, environmental or common defense and security matter exists. The Board has made no additional determinations of this nature.10 C.F.R. f 2.760(a). 4;/ , q . x ; d ,.;;[-9[.' . y , , , A. Emergency Planning Ussue 1)
# y .2 ,- 4. - ,- This issue was admitted by the Board prior to the development of off-o, ,
site emergency plans and expressed a general deficiency in the adequacy
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- 6f preparedness plans. After emergency plans became available, Sun-
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flower was required to specify the inadequacies alleged to exist. Seven _j > contentions and parts of two others, of eighteen specified, remained for
- litigation after Board rulings on motions for summary disposition.
During the hearing, testimony was provided by witnesses for the Appli-cants, Staff, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Sunflower. L Contention A: " Evacuation time estimates (ETE) have not been reviewed by State or local organi:ations"2 ^ r ' , The Intervenors, Sunflower, cite herein an inadequacy in Applicants' E , emergency plan on p. rounds that State and local officials had not
." reviewed time estimates proposed for evacuation during an emergency.
The adequacy of State, local and Applicants' emergency plans is eval-usted by guidance and criteria imposed by a joint NRC/ FEMA docu-ment, NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. The time estimates for i evacuation within a plume exposure zone are recommended to be in ac-cordance with Appendix 4 of that documc3t. The criteria call for the l ETE draft to be reviewed by State and M1 organizations and comments received from such reviews are to be it.auded in the plans when submit-ted for evaluation and appraisal to the NRC. Finding 1. The evacuation time estimate study for the Perry emergency planning zone (EPZ) was performed by HMM Associates, Inc., a firm that devel-
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oped ETEs for other nuclear power facilities; many of these were for
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- plants with EPZs similar to Perry's. Finding 2.
The Applicants' testimony indicated that officials from the three coun-t ,, ,
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ties located within the EPZ were, in fact, consuited concerning the study . f,/WA,y- 7UJ/$.5 % ' and concurred with its' scope. These officials, who were County Directors . 4., ', c + K ' of Disaster Service Agencies and County sheriffs, and the cognizant 7 , g..
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,.c 2 Applicants' witness- scott T. McCandleu. v.P.. HMM Associates. Inc. stafr witness Donald J.
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Perrotti. NRC Emergency Prep. speciali-s. FEM A witness- Robert o. shapiro, Emergency Manage-u - ?^. . , to s , .p:2 ment specialist.
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s State Agency were subsequently forwarded copies of the draft ETE.
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fl,-i.? Ji.~7i p, ? $ w'M.a.N.m Pla . c February 1985 revision of the Perry emergency plan and this document k h. khy gg Wpgw;wis.QQ was forwarded to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on February 20, 1985. Fmdings 5-6. NMNMMW.O' MWW " ,. , The Intervenors directed much of their cross-examination on an al-M M @2 @ $$h.S i h M W i 5 leged failure by HMM Associates to consult with and receive comments diW .d R s'fi$M<C .. Ton the ETEs from County engineers. In Intervenors' view, the holders of those offices should have been solicited for comments since County
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GUL.%C n@;M n 64 engineers have detailed responsibilities during an evacuation incident;
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,' Tr. 2795-2802; Shapiro, Tr. 3122-27.
, . Applicants' witness testified that in preparing ETEs, coordination work is accomplished with principal local offsite emergency response officials and their assistance is requested - as it was at Perry - to
.a f, identify any other local officials to be involved. This approach has been W A, , v..t '
a .- '.: accepted by FEMA..The guidance from NUREG-0654 does not indicate
% what individuals or ofTices within State and local organizations should @ I<N9 M ' M@
h M.MedmW.O N N $ @Q iff[$ @1[ QJA- c . review and comment on the proposed ETEs, but the intent is to have knowledgeable officials perform these tasks. Findings 7-8. The Board concludes that Applicants have complied with the guidance and criteria of NUREG-0654, Appendix 4, in the preparation and review of their ETE study as there has been no evidence that the interests of State and local governments have been ignored; the opposite has been the case. Finding 9. Testimony by Applicants' witness indicated that, in response to Sunflower's concerns, a meeting was ultimately held with
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- 4' - qs - basic assumptions, methodology and results of the ETE was in fact re-ceived. Finding 10. If NUREG-0654 required review and comments
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s .g s by the written responses from the engineers would have sufficed to remedy the omission. The Board finds that evacuation time estimates gg,N g . mVc Mk.7@*w g. n:m-~.~ % -~ r3N.w% gee a:4rx 94w.k.- p g.pw# F.A o # 'M have M,.:been sufficiently reviewed by State and local response organizations
. 4.lMW ed.WBQ@.. ..x ~ and that comments from these officials have been submitted as recom-mended by NUREG-0654. We find no merit in this contention.
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! 2. Contention J: " Emergency Action Levelindicators are GQA ~ . L ~.: incomplete in Applicants ' emergency plan"3
. s 7~fy 4,5 - c This contention rests on an allegation that indicators in Applicants' b;A 4 p d @f.4.:%A i'. W .u:U .,. M 4
- J emergency action level (EAL) scheme were incomplete. NRC regula-
< FJ.y tions establish four classes of action levels according to severity, any of 3 p v W,g q.,by-'* which can be initiated depending on the existence of certain plant condi-
"S...~.,..i:.llt'- ~ { tions. Each of the four emergency classifications is characterized by a set
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dition. Finding 1I; see also NUREG-0887, SSER-4 at 13-6.
? f In its third revision of the Perry emergency plan,13 of more than 200 individual indicators were noted as incomplete. Applicants' testimony revealed that technical data were not available for appropriate values to be included in the thirteen indicators but comparable values were insert-
. ed in their place (Finding 12); however, by the time Revision 4 of the
! plan was issued, the missing values were either determined and specified or an alternate indicator for the EAL had been chosen instead. Both Ap-plicants and Staff concluded that this action completed the regulatory re-w . 6 g6:s , , ,
quirement for EAL indicators. Findings 13-14. Glf ' L 7 i Sunflower's witness complained that there had been insufficient time -
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. . . . and technical information available to permit an adequate evaluation of
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the thirteen Eats. Sternglass, ff. Tr. 2566, at 3-4. Inasmuch as the miss- , ing indicator information was available in the February 1985 Revision 4 of Perry's emergency plan, the Board fails to comprehend a grievance concerning a lack of evaluation time. And, on the issue of needing addi-tional information, Intervenors' attorney did not take advantage of the opportunity of examining Applicants' and Staff's witnesses on the technical foundation for the EALs submitted. Hulbert, Tr. 2966-76. The Board, in a broad interpretation of Sunflower's contention, per-mitted its witness' testimony to be admitt:d over objections of the Appli-
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cant and Staff. See Tr. 2547-48. In doing so, Sunflower was able to raise g y:- y. 9 - . an issue that nomograms were not included in the Perry Nuclear Power M-Mf:oWA%*' Emergency Plan. Nomograms are a graphic device containing a series of assumptions and variables and are recommended for use by EPA's D@ cr D N !f.:$ D k ;o i.
,w.eppi&Weis, y f t" ,; Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear -
Incidents. Sternglass, Tr. 2648, 2701-04. The Intervenors' witness was ? cm@
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; also abie to advance testimony that the Applicants' emergency plan i v fg . e _-- ,-s -
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3 Applicants' witness: Daniel D. Hulbert, PNPP Emergency Planning Coordinator. stafr witness-Donald J. Perrotti. NRC Emergency Prep. specialist. Intervenors' witness- Ernest J. Sternslass. Prores.
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[ ~, l sor Ementus or Radiological Physics, University or Pittsburgh. 1
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on nomograms, Intervenors' witness acknowledged that methods other
, , i than nomograms were recognized by the EPA guide. Sternglass, Tr.
( ,g' 2702-04; Finding 15. In fact, the Applicants utilized a different and, in W g-e.r - 9 9 ~->c. 9 W . i t % iu their judgment, a better method for dose calculations. Hulbert, Tr. Jaw..w e:w ., 2971-72. On Sunflower's claim that the Perry plan included inaccurate c ,[. :he ' n.y"ln .,y;[; d di;c information on the sensitivity of fetuses to radiation exposure, cross- [9 a., examination demonstrated that Intervenors' information was derived g:J;S: P %;'u.i .;p;" . ~gnui from a Food and Drug Administration recommendation which relates J ,y only to ingestion pathway protective action guides. Although Sunflower's r ; ?cc " ,' witness made an effort to blur the distinction in the regulations, it is 9 ( ~, - . clear that this contention deals with EALs that concern the inhalation pathway area alone. Finding 16. The Board finds the Applicants' EALs complete. A Staff witness in-dicated that conformity of the EALs to the initiating guidance of NUREG-0654, Appendix 1, is still under NRC review. Accordingly, the correction of any deficiencies forthcoming in such a review will be refer-
. .. . , . , , enced as a condition in any license approval granted herein. Finding 17.
. . . ' . a. ; , g:f . 3. ', . . ' 4 In their reply to proposed findings of other parties, Applicants recom-hh,fj Tj$jfh mend that the failure of Sunflower to file proposed findings in this in-
, & sm
,'cQt;3cycp :
.--e.S c a
'[:
>.)' ' ~ f stance, as mandated by the Board, was grounds for treating the conten-tion as uncontested. Accordingly, the reply recommends its dismissal on that basis. We are not inclined to adopt this advice here since the parties have not been previously warned that failure to file would warrant such action. The authority of the Board to dismiss contentions under 10 C.F.R. s 2.754(b) is, of course, discretionary.
- 3. Contention M: " Independent Data Monitoring Systems should be installed within all counties in the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) "'
Intervenors' witness on this contention presented arguments that a , . : .m . I h w-: system of fixed electronic detectors was necessary for radiological acci-
. .w a dents in order to provide an instantly available picture of the plume's (N,Q[ NJ.E,,4:QQ shape, intensity and motion. It was alleged that monitoring deficiencies
.s %. ' .A %J.A without such a system during the TMI accident handicapped public offi-n,
' ^ 1+ :;U
% [;&Ww cials in making proper decisions. A report by Dr. Jan Beyea, stated that
.3. , ,
s ,;
- j. . ;<,
% a
- ^ .a . .ii i
, . , . . f 1-
#,e I j 4Apphcants' witnesser Rictiard R. Bowers. CEI Corporate Health Physicist; Kenneth B. Cole. state Nuclear operations officer. FEM A witnest shapiro. Intervenors' witness: sternglass.
y 3
'3
] 521
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j 7y eo L[ , - - - y u 7,y c,3,.g , car-mounted or helicepter-mounted instruments failed to provide ade-quate dose information in the " shifting winds" during that accident. The
- - - - - witness also asserted the cost of a fixed system with 100 detector instru-
. . . , . , ~ ~ , M , 7 .,u
' - ments would be minimal compared to the cost of the plant. It was further s
.y stated that C.H. Pelletier, an AEC expert, had reported that only many
.,f eg. g . w, - 7@t
< x.y g.4,?20" air samplers and fixed detectors could adequately characterize the extent
, v.
.;~ , v.. - .e4P , 1 of radioactivity in a timely fashion. The witness also. testified that a
/' ? ' -y - mobile system could not adequately measure a plume that was close to
[" ..g
~ ' ' '
' - inaccessible land surfaces or over water such as nearby Lake Erie.
~. ' -
V ;- - Sternglass, fr. Tr. 2566, at 7-9. The Beard denied a motion by Applicants, which was supported by Stiff, to strike most of Intervenors' direct prefiled testimony on this issue. The Board ruled that consideration of the necessity for an.inde-pendent monitoring system should include consideration of the adequacy or inadequacy of the system proposed. See Tr. 2549-53,2559. However, subsequent cross-examination throughout the proceeding raised serious questions concerning the probative and relevancy aspects of Sunflower's direct evidence. See Tr. 2667-76, 2702-09. The Interve-nors' witness, Dr. Sternglass, whose qualification as an expert witness in
. ,q the field of health physics was accepted by the Board, was questioned ex-tensively for . impeachment purposes by the Applicants. See Tr.
~f ,
2596-2645. Although conceding the existence of an extensive list of ad.
, ~
verse comments presented by Applicants' attorney on his prior testimo-ny and writings before various scientific and governmental bodies, Dr. Sternglass' reply to these sallies was generally couched in terms that sub-sequent investigations or events confirmed his prior conclusions or that various governmental agencies deliberately suppressed important scientific data and information on radiation hazards. See Tr. 2612,2615, 2635,2637,2638, and 2642. The Board notes that Sunflower's attorney
- made a limited but not convincing effort to rehabilitate the witness. See Tr. 2709 25. In view of the inability demonstrated to support important parts of his testimony, the Board concludes on this and several other contentions that Dr. Sternglass' credibility has been substantially I.^
# s r .. _ impeached.
'b @ ,._,] y The evidence here shows that Applicants, and State and local govern-
.1
;- .. 14.3.. % - ' , 7_.y - ments have available independent monitoring services capable of re-b -' ' "' sponding in a timely manner to nuclear radiation emergencies around 4
., . . . , .s c g.g. -
-' the Perry facility site. Offsite monitoring capability is recommended by
~
NRC/ FEMA regulations in NUREG-0654, and planning standards call
~
- . for the Licensee and the State to have monitoring capabilities and that R. + qJ -
State or Federal resources be available to track airborne radioactive ,.. s- , y,c.W - plumes. Findings 18-20. When Federal guidance and standards on
~ ~
- 522 c ,
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. s u _ s._ n _ ._. ___.._m__._____ . . . _. .
5 emergency response plans were initially being addressed by governmen-tal agencies, fixed monitors were considered and rejected due to that sys-m
, 2-7.1 J , : D.-
g tem's complexity and cost. Finding 21. As a consequence, there is no
, h M ;', ,I.MS. - . o regulatory requirement for a fixed system. At Perry,'such a system was u
p 77" Z .s @W g ?bMtytty .'._ *. l i[ 1.estimated M ~to cost about $2.7 million for installation alone. Findings 22-23. A mobile monitoring system is considered superior to a fixed y74:WM$pgTf. yf system because of its capability to identify the critical center line of a
>< ; i . %.w .i,,S. q A %. yy ~sj; plume while data from fixed systems cannot be extrapolated to project cw. v. w?w.w. . . .d doses at other locations. Findings 24-25.
/-o. . w = ~ . .5. _.: '
,4"A;e gy% s:g6 The State of Ohio has an independent capability of establishing a s
n -Q y 7 - ne mobile monitor response within 3-3% hours and before that, can rely, if
;. s G / N necessary, on Applicants' monitoring team and other resources.
- '" f-
. , - e Releases over Lake Erie can be tracked 12 y a Department of Energy helicopter and mobile teams 'can be dispatched to cover shorelines for re-turning plumes. See Bowers, Tr. 2958 59; Cole, Tr. 2901. The State has the primary responsibility for independent monitoring, and even though Lake County also will have independent monitoring teams, all counties within the EPZ will rely on the State which has demonstrated an effec-w 1. e.-y- h @ d tive capability during eight emergency planning exercises. Findings 26-34.
.d.16d9$'%#.;syELU-Gj se: .u MM...-.JTL9de ?.% o.n.w:,rrw The Board concludes that an effective independent monitoring
;m xem W% p % 22 g w$. *r ' ,
e
. system, which meets all regulatory guidance and standards, has been programmed for the Perry facility. Contention M has no merit.
4
- 4. Contention P: " Emergency plans are deficient with respect to hospital designations and medicalservices as well as procedures required to assist contaminated individuals"'
In support of Sunflower's contention, testimony was received from a Dr. Sternglass that studies showed a serious radiation accident at Perry could contaminate large numbers of people which local medical services could not accommodate. See Sternglass, IT. Tr. 2566, at 13-14. A state-M./ . .a . ment by Dr. Robert L. McTrusty, Chairman of the Ashtabula County 1 - -
', f y,h 4 Medical Center's Disaster Committee, averred that the Medical Center w ..u.ws .gW (one of four hospitals listed in local emergency plans) lacked proper 4 ,[.<MMM -4)M ~ equipment and facilities to decontaminate even minimal numbers of ra-
- o. g.6 My diation victims. Based on a Sandia National Laboratory report (NUREG/
~
c @ y 9~ . . p. e CR-2239), Dr. McTrusty concluded that worst-case accidents could 7 ,.
. e ., - .
- y ,
w f* h ""gf 1
,y.'.
_; g g 8 Applicants' witnesses- Roger E. Linneman. Vice Chm.. Radiation Management Corpa Deborah
;lA cs ,L. .
,, ; u Hankins Pnncipal Engineer. General Electric Co. FEM A wnness: Robert o. shapiro. Intervenors' wit.
'D . 3 *.: *
+ . nesses- Ernest J. sternslass, Robert L McTrusty. Dr. McTrusty did not appear at the hearing due to a
'~7{1_
"'.,, schedule con 0ict. but his testimony was stipulated by the parties for admission.
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~ - '
523
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y,, number in the thousands at Perry. His testimony stated that personnel at the medical center received only 2 hours of training and indicated that no requirement in the State's accreditation manual for the emergency y3 (' _ ?.. - handling of radiation victims could be found. See McTrusty, fr. Tr. 3149.
. w.rf Under cross-examination, Dr. Sternglass admitted that the studies his y .lg g;1. g ...m.%
~ . . testimony cited, and on whi:h his predictions of radiation casualties
- s. M 4. ?c , - -
- were based, were not related to the Perry reactor design and he acknowl-u,,
^
~
,O_ '
edged that he was unaware of the specific type of containment used at [ , Perry. Sternglass, Tr. 2685-90. Rebuttal testimony by the Applicants 1 r demonstrated the inapplicability of the Sandia study - which was for
. ' ~
- the purpose of developing NRC siting criteria - to the Perry facility.
That study assumed a design substantially different from Perry and does j not represent the risk of a severe nuclear plant accident at any particular site. The source term (SST 1) used was an estimate of the largest possi-
]
- ble release of fission products from a pressurized water reactor and as-
! sumes worst-case conditions. The Perry design has mitigating features i
not considered in the Sandia Study, which reduce fatalities and injuries to a minimum in the event of a core-melt accident. See Findings 45-46. NRC's regulatory requirements call for arrangements being made for c 4', medical services for contaminated injured individuals. See 10 C.F.R.
.^.
'7,,2 -
f 50.47(b)(12). In NUREG-0654, the applicable criteria recommend ar-rangements for local and backup hospital services capable of evaluating. a c _. _ radiation exposure and handling contamination and transportation of the I injured. Finding 35. The testimony of Applicants' witness, the Chief Medical Officer of. the Radiation Management Corporation (RMC), demonstrated that the four county hospitals within the EPZ listed in local emergency plans have trained personnel and equipment for han-diing contaminated injured individuals; letters of agreement for their services are being obtained. Finding 36. The State plan also !ists an addi-tional twenty-six hospitals and counties around the EPZ, all of which - have diagnostic and/or therapeutic radioisotopic facilities which can pro-vide medical support for contaminated injured individuals. Finding 37; see also Linneman, Tr. 2979,2981. RMC has trained eighty-five person-f ' net in the four hospitals within the EPZ, the State has provided addition-
,~,- , . ,i, C al training, and each of the County hospitals has equipment which
_-.C ,E cM._; _ .W M W~[ '
. allows detection of high and low levels of radiation. Findings 38-39. The hospital, with which Sunflower's witness, Dr. McTrusty, is affiliated,
- r. '
has a designated radiation emergency room with decontamination equip-C S e'.3T T
' ' ment and emergency personnel who received 24 hours of training for
,.g. nuclear emergencies. The Ashtabula Hospital is also accredited by the J- N ,~ i.( . , ,
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e 4 State and has been licensed by the NRC for handling contaminated indi-viduals. Finding 40. N :.
- f/ ,f ., y , The Applicants' witness, Dr. Linneman, is a radiologist with 15 years' .1 : .s.;. a. ; A... . x...' experience in the treatment of contaminated injured patients. He testi-
- .;. . , ~ .
4 i - df . . ._. J .Q r ..G; fled that radioactive injuries seldom required hospitalization and that the 9pp ig+ 7 % FW hospitals within the EPZ and the surrounding areas were adequate to ac-
. . e. ... , ;s.; ~
commodate the unlikely case of large numbers of casualties. Findings
' T ,hdA A,$.Qgf 42. County hospitals all have the capability of detecting radiation
% ,, 7 :;.3 K ' overexposure and local and State plans have provisions for the transpor-s _ 3.y,, x, 77 ;.W tation of radiological accident victims. Findings 43-44; Shapiro, fT. Tr.
; ~ s. .
3111, at 7. 4 -
.RlC, The Board found the evidence presented by the Applica1ts and Staff
' , to be unchallenged and credible. We conclude that the trai ing, person-nel and equipment at the designated hospitals within the LPZ as well as j the medical resources available outside of the EPZ are adequate to
, comply with the Commission's-regulations and standards on hospital l designations, medical services and procedures. The arrangements for
- , a medical services for contaminated individuals meet the requirements of
. 10 C.F.R. f 50.47(b)(12). In accordance with the Commission's policy JJzp u ' u ch.1 % d;@c statement of 50 Fed. Reg. 20,892, however, we will require the Appli-M, a: S h ..' n .n M cants to fully comply with any additional requirements that may be
-s , g7vyjy. forthcoming in the Commission's response to the U.S. Court of Appeals' s
.~.. , ww ~..n.
- decision in Guard v. NRC,753 F.2d i144 (D.C. Cir.1985). In that deci-sion, the Court vacated the Commission's interpretation that a mere list-ing of hospitals capable of caring for victims was a sufficient arrangement and the Commission is considering what additional medical service re-
~
quirements it should impose.
- 5. Contention Q: '"There are no letters ofagreement regarding the availability ofschoolbuses"*
This contention was founded on the fact that letters of agreement
.g , ,
. have not been obtained for the use of school buses during emergency
,- - . , ;a - . . evacuations. Finding 47. School buses in Ohio are owned and controlled
. w, m . , . , m. . w ~m .r u.cm%_etr. by local school districts and, consequently, their utilization, during an
, 4.Q.gke. ; M:M9; emergency evacuation, requires the consent of officials from those dis-
+ - -
- ~ - ,
W. tricts. Finding 48. cH . : 1 5iN 7
' '.N.w:
~-
~~
The Applicants and Staff provided evidence, which was unchallenged by Intervenors, that letters of agreement were in the process of being ob-
; , , J, ~ \, *
. * '. 1 t-s [=i .f , f 5- -
, 1 ,
u s- +5e a:; 6Appbcants' witness- John Baer, Project Mgr., Emergency Management services. statT witness-
.; Robert shapiro.
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- . . - . . . . . . - . - ~ -..L-t tained, no difficulty was anticipated in obtaining them, and it was expect-
- c. . ed that their acquisition would be completed by the time for fuel load.
- a. M u ? x.;,~.. . -J - There is a total of twenty four school districts within and outside the EPZ where needed transportation resources might be available and no
. p @ ,W r:
.'.3. Q . M.3.WR C ,y M M.3 4 W m .2 problem was foreseen in obtaining signed agreements. The Applicants
. ,- 7. p y m w e g z m v are supplying radios for the buses and agreements are expected to follow Q P '}S%Q
- the installation of the radios. Findings 49-52.
f -[;f ^W75] ..
- 1. y - We conclude that since no evidence has been submitted to cast doubt
% ", on the letters of agreement being received prior to fuel load, there is no
, + t.c
,4FhQ '9 h , basis to support this contention. Negotiations are under way, no objec-
- *D ' . tions to the letters have been reported, and Intervenors submitted no
'E i witnesses on this contention. The Board does believe, however, that these letters should be obtained prior to issuance of an operating license.
- 6. Contention U: " Reception centers do not han the means or facilitiesfor handling contaminatedproperty"?
The Applicant and Staff witnesses provided testimony that local
.m , t emergency plans and procedures include standard action levels in the Oc yf 'J. J., ,p.,.z three counties in the EPZ for monitoring and decontamination of cloth-ing, isolation of vehicles, and other property. Each county also has stand-FAs~Oy@,
;.s -1 . .p.s i -
ard operating procedures which provide specific directions to fire depart-g T
-- .: ~ . .: ww .* ments who are responsible for carrying out decontamination procedures.
Fir. ding 53.
- An adequate number of fire department personnel are currently being trained for monitoring and decontamination duties and equipment and supply kits are being assembled for monitoring and decontamination pur-poses. This activity will be completed prior to fuel load. Findirgs 54-55.
The County plans erroneously list the Cleveland Electric Illuminating a - Company as the entity to handle the disposal of decontaminated proper-
- ty. The Applicants' witness stated that the State plan accurately provides
.: that the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency will have that disposal
^
[ 1,3[m . responsibility and local plans are being changed to reflect that arrange-a;. 6;%C, ment. Finding 56. Intervenors' cross-examination brought out the fact that the Ohio Dis-
. b -_ m .@ %a -WWm ps:r: p'ygwy e
~, . .
w aster Service Agency's radiolog.ical traming manual, which .is used to i _
,4 ..g. e m.g, f.-". train firemen for decontamination procedures, implies that firemen and
,y 7 ? UMQEg., %A w%. policemen would have to decontamir. ate their own vehicles. However, 4 ar;.} zy p s y -
- ...: P 9.-ir %3-d g
*m i6.,.s e % %':.q d.g ; w 3
, y; gw.T
? (k h%'fA.h,dg,g. Sjf.r'. Apphcants' witnesses- John Baer. John Wills. Radiological Analyst, Ohio Disaster services Agency.
jh. . ~$.- FEM A witness- Robert o, shapiro.
. , , < W.14 06p *7.5 9;g , .:nq .y
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Applicants' rebuttal testimony from a DS A official corrected this impres-
. sion by indicating that the manual reference did not apply to contamina-
. tion received from accidents at nuclear power stations. Finding 57. The
.g-
. ._ emergency plans and procedures call for using areas adjacent to reception centers for decontaminating vehicles. Finding 58.
j Y.C The Board finds that the reception centers around PNPP will be ade-i ' quately supplied with equipment and supplies for implementing monitor. ing and decontamination procedures in. handling property and that
,, ,1 ' _ ' ', '
trained fire personnel will be available to carry out this assignment. This contention is without merit.
- 7. Contention Z: "Theplants do notprovide decontamination
- ~
protectionfor bus drivers during an emergency"' Intervenors' witness on this contention urged the necessity of provid-ing respirators and goggles to bus drivers alleging that repeated trips by buses into contaminated areas would make such equipment necessary. In support thereof, the EPA manual of protective action guides which recommends respirators for emergency workers was placed in evidence. ww
~
- There are NRC regulatory requirements to control radiation exposures l
s J., . @Y ' - to emergency workers. Finding 59.
. , , _ . Applicant and Staff witnesses testified that bus drivers would be ex-p,osed to little, if any, radiation since their duties would be completed prior to any serious contamination being experienced. In the possible event of some exposure, however, the plans do call for the issuance of dosimeters to bus drivers who will be trained in their use. Additionally, two-way radios are being supplied to bus-s by the Applicants which will facilitate the transmission of radiological information on evacuation routes to bus drivers. Findings 60-61.
Although the Ohio Department of Health currently requires that respi-rator equipment be provided to emergency workers, a rebuttal witness _ for the Applicants from the State's Disaster Services Agency testified
- '5- -
that the applicability of that provision to bus drivers was being eliminat-9; .
- v :. s. . . - ? .% - ed. Finding 62. The Board concludes that the duties of bus drivers I' I , K,g / during an emergency evacuation do not require the issuance of respira-p 4 .' ..s m. e .- a.
.e.7: .<;.e + tory equipment and that the decontamination equipment that is being i 1 4 provided is adequate to conform to Federal regulations. This contention g.r sm a , p. . .:: - , . ..
is found to be without merit.
~ < ~ . ~ - ,
i: .. ui!. \
&. c ;< , . . , a . .
, q r ,
+W * '
r, "M - . 8Applicents' witnesses: John Baer, John Wills. FEM A witness Robert shapiro. Intervenors' witness:
- Ernest J. sternslass.
~
527
. . l e
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4
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- 8. Contention BB: "Offsite emergency plans are inadequate due to
) the planning deficiercies setforth in the Federal Emergency
-f.4 ...W Management Agency Interin Report ofMarch 1,1984"'
.p, m.&n .
T', S s . ;;:.c . The planning deficiencies referenced in this document were the result g ; p.
- e s,. . . QN; of a review of the draft local emergency plans by the FEMA Regional lQhM/w. g.- 4 w %. ;.J(- [.. Assistance Committee (RAC). Of the 145 deficiencies listed in the inter-
..,,c. ' '
- n. l. . im report, more than half were corrected and accepted by FEMA in the Av. ' .~lN ':p_" .hli~ '
,, report itself; the remainder have since been corrected or are being ad-lS;sw/M .
.,7,.A dressed. Finding 63. The few remaining deficiencies primarily involve
^ 'N '
an emergency information handbook which is to be available prior to e ~;/
- " fuel load. An NRC witness testified that his review of the information handbook found the handbook adequate to meet NRC regulatory stand-i ards. Finding 64.
j All local plans have been revised since the 1984 Interim Report to re-Dect the action taken on the planning deficiencies, and Applicants sub-l t mitted into evidence a list of actions on each of the deficiencies noted. j Finding 65. In a full participation exercise conducted in November
. j 1984, no Category A deficiency (affecting public health and. safety) was a .e m , . . - : noted by FEMA. Finding 66.
A ac i t.'l : . The Board concludes that all deficiencies in the March 1984 Interim 2 Y7 ' . :E'O g i - Report are remedied or are in the process of being corrected. According-
, - . ' w.;;;; M 6 W. ,J2- ly, local emergency plans are not considered inadequate due to these
^
deficiencies and we find this contention to lack merit.
- 9. Contention CC: "The resolution items setforth by the staffin its l Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG-0887, Supp. 4 (February 1984),
pages 13-1 to 13-22, are uncorrected deficiencies in the emergency plans"" There were thirty-five items identified in SSER-4 as requiring resolu-n- tion in the PNPP emergency plan. The Applicants have since made
'
- r :. 9 7.- several revisions to their plan in which the deficiency items were re-
. .. , ~ g w:' -b2 . m .. solved. Finding 67. The Staff is currently reviewing the latest plan revi-
. .. M.. CM.O.;, M sion (Revision 4) to confirm that the Applicants have complied with the
-o:W , #,m:X w.w MMY;ij0 p g - . planning commitments previously identified. Finding 68.
- c. 5 ,4 ' .#92f W._H ', '
The Board finds that the deficiencies noted by [ntervenors, who con-
, .,., , g. W; ducted no cross-examination on this contention, have been satisfactorily
- a. .
-,.. cm Q; $ ,.- p.,. Q w..g., 0,. 9 m, E . - resolved.The contention is found to be without merit. t
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- NQ d[$6$$O *M k '.. ' ApplKants' witness- John Baer. FEM A witness: Robert Shapiro.
MApplKants' witness- Daniel D. Hulbert. staff witness- Donald J. Perrotti. "NJ - Q MyCde,s.'.Zf.h M .,
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s i <' a. Conclusions ' Q' p ._ + The Board has reviewed each of the emergency planning deficiencies
, , 9 ~3 . . ;;.T , .. < ~ . _
submitted by the Intervenors and on the evidence of record found them jQZ ' '
' , c .{ to be unsubstantiated. This is not to state that certain activities do not re-gy ,s m.. e ._ , . . c. Q$ quire completion. Progress still has to be made in regard to EALs, letters ygb . j" , ^ > Nc 'y , of agreement on the use of school buses, training of fire personnel, fg Q 31,. ,
6>w equipment at reception centers and a formal commitment to the Com- .O.:Q P4' ' s.- * ' . . > ' - mission's response on the availability of hospital facilities and services. Mk j : 'Ng The final accomplishrnent of these emergency plan activities the Board w :n -i . , 2 -
, believes will be concluded, but to assure this result, conditions will be at- ,
MS U -# ' tached to the issuance of a license. Exc"* for these items, the Board iO - concludes that Applicants have met the' rden of proof on Interve-
- nors' allegations, the emergency plans are not inadequate based on those allegations and the contentions are accordingly disrnissed.
B. Hydrogen Control (Issue 8)
.. s
> Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy (OCRE) and the Sunflower Alli-ance, Inc. (Sunflower) originally submitted hydrogen control contentions Sh..pQ.;. (dWI.by Gr ,- - E:~
that were rejected for not meeting admission standards. Specifically, In-sw < tervenors failed to specify a credible accident scenario as required by a
.,s. :*'*
Commission Order. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-80-16,1I NRC 574 (1980). Sunflower subsequent-ly renewed its motion and the contention was approved on the basis that the Commission was considering a proposed rule which specifically ad-
~
dressed additional hydrogen control protection to be required in M ARK III BWRs. The contention proceeded through a tortuous history which included at least one rewording and a later designation of OCRE as its
- lead intervenor. We need not recount that history here since it has been adequately discussed in previous rulings.
The Commission adopted a new hydrogen rule for BWRs with Mark
~
1 . ' III containments on January 17, 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. 3498. OCRE filed a
. . ,c ',-, . 2, ' '. , motion requesting another rewording ofIssue 8 so as to conform its lan-A.c; ," . " c. , %7 . .
guage to that of the new rule. OCRE's motion was opposed by the Appli-MN.UhMQ[$gs ~ cm cants and the Staff who sought summary disposition of the issue. The eQ Board granted OCRE's motion, reworded Issue 8 in a Memorandum and Order of March 14,1985, and dismissed the Staff's motion for summary 4c Zy ;sn;.. yn![h6 + y h@ e d((" d,spos, -s + tion as moot. i i
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The Contention
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The contention reads:
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- .,,.1'- The Perry hydrogen control system is inadequate to assure that large amounts of
( 9 g., , e. .e y,p.:. - 4 j .[., u hydrogen can be safely accommodated without a rupture of the containment and a
. . r, m?-w u - A e v. C.;. .e -Xgf4 release of substantial quantities of radioactivity to the environment.
9y z- . @ L. c e..:;p W.n 4
, w s. The wording basically alleges that Applicants' hydrogen control
- j7 % system does not conform to the new regulatory requirements of 10 1 ' 7,7 '
x.: . C.F.R. j 50.44 and challenges both the hydrogen control system and the
"-(. .
. ability of the containment to withstand the consequences of large amounts of hydrogen release.
The Hydrogen ControlRule Controversy The new rule requires BWR power plants having Mark III containment designs to install a hydrogen control system capable of handling an amount of hydrogen equivalent to that generated from a 75% metal-water reaction of the active fuel cladding without loss of containment in-
..,~'
tegrity. A license for full-power operation can be granted on the. basis of
.; M .; a satisfactory preliminary analysis of the efTectiveness of the system
~' ' - which is approved by the Staff. The analysis may reference previously ap-
" "w proved analyses for plants of similar design. A final analysis, addressing applicable provisions of j 50.44tc)(3)(iv), (v), (vi) of the Rule, must be provided by the Applicants after commencement of reactor operation at full power on a schedule to be established by the NRC Staff.10 C.F.R. j 50.44(c)(3)(vii)(A), (B). The rule deals only with recoverable degraded core accidents. The Applicants' hydrogen control system also includes a combustible gas control system dealing with design basis acci-dents that was not litigated in this proceeding. Finding 74.
Pursuant to the new regulation, Applicants' analysis must (1) evaluate for Perry the consequences of the generation oflarge amounts of hydro-gen, and include consideration of hydrogen control measures, as ap-
..g ' -
propriate; (2) include the period of recovery from the degraded condi-
+ tion; (3) use accident scenarios that are accepted by the NRC Staff; (4) support the design of the hydrogen control system selected; and (5)
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show that (i) containment structural integrity will be maintained; (ii)
. . %,: ,'g - that systems and components necessary to establish and maintain safe J,.ir;.;[ Nrf ,-
a -
, m shutdown and to maintain containment integrity will be capable of per-
. . m
. 4 ,c, ,
. forming their functions during and after exposure to the environmental
.p; w> 0 . -- conditions created by the burning of hydrogen. The effects oflocal deto-W@ .- - ' c- , , _
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nations are to be considered ualess such detonations c'an be shown as i unlikely to occur.
. S 7.. ,
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.g " . 5 4 .t- s The new hydrogen rule is unclear as to the boundaries that distinguish
- :m .e . ; -3, ; a preliminary from a final analysis. It is clear that the rule permits the is-4 jf, - u t .m ( '
,_T stiance oflicenses for full-power operation on the basis of a satisfactory
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$"q preliminary analysis. Not surprisingly, the parties dispute the scope of a 7 - 7." d < satisfactory preliminary analysis. OCRE argues that the preliminary anal-
" ysis must be all but complete before the Boa.~. can make a finding of rea-g i %..M9 , . . . -
sonable assurance of safety. OCRE PropJsed Opinion at 9-14. The Staff fy@. F* Et b ys& - - lT and Applicants, on the other hand, believe that a number of open' dr ' i ,' ' ,.' unresolved items can be deferred until the final analys: and have
' E ,. * ^ U ' '
agreed to the scope of a preliminary evaluation and analysis for Perry. Finding 71. The Board finds no need to resolve the dispute in this in-stance. We find' shat the Applicants' preliminary analysis as described in i the preliminary evaluation report and in Applicants' testimony, and as approved by the Staff and discussed in Staff's testimony, does address in detail the subs'tantive provisions of the hydrogen rule.
- In the rewording of the contention Order, supra, the Board defined q , the scope of the hearing to permit OCRE to challenge onty the-adequacy 5;mp g ( f > , .< . of the Appliemts' preliminary analysis. The Applicants have no obliga-
>i b lMt aQ' tion under the rule to present a final anatysis until some time after reac-
~
tor startup ani operation at fLil power. W did nt;t, however, attempt to
^ ' ' .de'ine the beundaries of the prelimine.ry otalysis in advance. During the hear.ng we termitted OCRE broad latitude in its cross-examination over ,
the objections of Applicants and Staff who asserted that the questioning went beyond the scope of a preliminary analysis. Our standard of acceptance in this case is simply that we will deter-mine whether there is reasonable assurance of safety during operation at Perry based on our assessment of the record that was actually developed. The Board takes account in findings that, if a license to operate is g(ant-ed, the final analysis will follow in a relatively short time after reactor startup. Finding 73. L-a .a. : , ,O: .: l .j _ Witnesses
,3 ~... -,
p y,%w: . 4 . Both the Applicants and the Staff presented the testimony of expert
= w .y. c.cp w .
h ~. ~ witnesses in panels." The Board found the Applicants' and Staffs wit-o' . u.+o , def;@? : ' l j c m 7- .u. , ..#
- ~.
_n . .
.o9
.i" > > i ,, y - , H Apphcar es' witnes es: Eileen M. Bunelh, semor Licensmg Engmeer at CEh John D. Ricnardson.
CJ5.
,. /V- Vice Prescnt or Enercon Seruces. Inc.; Kevm W. Holtzclaw. Pnncipal Lkensing Engmeer in the
.7
(.y jA5 fe,1 General Electne sar ety ard tace.1sms operauon of the Nuclear Energy Fusriess operation; Reor W. Alley. Man.iger or the structural Engmeenng Nuclear secuon of Gilbert / Commonwealth, Inc.. J;
- '< . O m-4 % . ,
t' (Connnued) f
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l 531 P - t- ,.
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4 a:.m v ;b - &R& om _ - - . . - . . . - . - . . ~ . m---- u - w ~ -- nesses to be competent technical experts and qualified to testify on the
! issues presented. The Board rejects as not substantiated all assertions
,.. .N, < - that one or more witnesses were incompetent, inexperienced, evasive or
? '. tr . 4
.~
- untruthful. OCRE presented no witnesses on this contention and relied
.m. Jp M.4.yJc.E 6 .:
/ $,. ,
- ~! -
on extensive cross-examination to make its case. 5'3 hd~?b Q f f -: , J v .m, x yr , > .; cyn; .
. n: : .-
^ ' '. .: The HydrogenIgnition System w.; y/'
N' ' 1 Ti . * - The evidence shows that the Applicants have installed a distributed
. 7 igniter system in the Perry containment, and analysis of its reliability
**} - .
; i-
' ~
has been performed. The igniter system, consisting of 102 glow plug igniters distributed throughout the containment, wetwell, and drywell, is e designed to control large amounts of hydrogen that could be released in - i a degraded ccre accident. The system is powered by AC Class IE power i systems which are backed by diesel generators, and is designed to burn oft hydrogen at low concentrations to prevent accumulation of high con-
. centrations. The igniters are manually actuated when the reactor water level drops to the top of the active fuel. Intervenors do not contest the basic features of the igniter system. Findings 69-84.
. , Written procedures for operation of the igniter system were not availa-
, ble at the time of the hearing but will be before Perry exceeds 5%
power. Firiding 85. Intervenors urge the Board to find that the absence
- n -"e of final operating procedures constitutes a deficiency in the Applicants' preliminary analysis. OCRE Proposed Opinion at 15. OCRE believes j that the procedures should not only be finalized prior to operation but '
! that they should be available for scrutiny in our hearing because, in its
! view, these procedures are of sufficient complexity to warrant our thor-ough evaluation. Without this scrutiny, according to OCRE, we would i have no way of assuring that the procedures used would be appropriate,
.! that instruments relied upon by the operators are available, or that 10 1 C.F.R. Part 100 guidelines will be met for containment venting.
l The Board concludes that the Applicants have installed and performed
. . .I technical analyses of a distributed igniter system in the Perry contain-W "
ment and that the system is designed to cope with large amounts of h,. ~
- g. ' r_ j hydrogen that could be released in a degraded core accident. Since Appli-46 ' .v. "
g-. e: cants have committed to providing written procedures prior to exceeding w.. _ s % u,
- ^'. --
}- < s :- _ m .: = jI, , .c .;. . Architect-Engmeer ror PNPP; Dr. Bernard Lewis. President or Combustion and Explosives Research, a Inc. (Combex); Bela Karlovitz, secretary-Treasurer or Combex; Dr. G. Martin Fuls. President or FMF i
-l Associares; and James H. Wilcos. supervisor or the Test support Group at PNPP. staff witnesses-
;fy . ; ,. .,
, t. 7l Allen Notafrancesco, NRC Contamment systems Branch (wntien testimony in two parts. designated I
- q. -' . 2
.jj and ID; Hukam Garg, NRC Equipment Qualification Branch; Li Yang. NRR structural and Geotechni-W,;f . --h'n s ,-
cal Engineenng Branch; and W. Trevor Pratt. Brookhaven National Laboratory. g; - s
.j 1
; ,, 1 532
- 6 -
- -- m.1
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7 M, .ONHg;pp e % r W 3-wyc O C
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4 w,,, e 9 s-a# =
.[.s- 5% power, this is not an element that will be deferred to the final analy-n ",79b . 4.m .;d f - sis. OCRE has not alleged or pointed to any equipment that would not Q@i!K4%?C,TW -
be available nor has it shown that NRC's new regulations on hydrogen >
$$$$ MTF# N control are the v'ehicle by which we test compliance with Part 100 in h M[Nb.k licensing proceedings. We need not address OCRE's concerns about M M.9fc' . F%[2.b N C 3.-c ,
[@9
- y$7 L .
%. M G Q Cy -
releases of radioactivity because Perry will not be allowed to operate if the hydrogen control system proves to be inadequate. Thus, we reject M4,MM$ Q.$$Q~,3 these arguments'as a basis requiring our scrutiny of written procedures. e dy OCRE further bases its argument on the fact that the Applicants have i ,M m.;: m e. <ar.y wn %.n .i,., %, , ; .
? ' not prescribed a. vent path for containment in the event one is needed
[Q:;.y,[ .W.',l - ;;WP ~3',,,,' e.f for a degraded core accident in conjunction with a station blackout V"~ event. We disabree with OCRE that the identification of a vent path
\" from containment is .a matter so complicated that it requires our scrutiny
; at hearing. It is sufficient to know that one will be chosen. The Board
! concludes that the Applicants' preliminary demonstration with regard to j the installation, design and operation of igniters is adequate. Their com-i niitment to produce written procedures prior to operation at full power
- u. . . !, is also adequate but it will be made a condition of licensing. If, when hf..-
.~ , . . . completed, the procedures are deficient in OCRE's judgment, it can
' N,. seek relief through other NRC proceedings. See 10 C.F.R. f 2.206. my$kJ F_ y',,47,5
,T. 9 % w W I [NVdN, a
."'a :; A
; M[.1+. M~ k *'a ut w. n.w.;w4.* - ~ .-
ContainmentIntegnty
,y The evidence shows that an analysis of PNPP containment ir.tegrity was performed according to the requirements of the ASME Code service level C. The internal pressure capacity of the PNPP containment was evaluated by Applicants' consultant, Gilbert Commonwealth (G/C). Re-suits are set forth in a report entitled " Cleveland Electric Illuminating
, Company, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2, Ultimate Structural Capacity of Mark III Containments" (Ultimate Capacity Repor0. This analysis presents one method pursuant to the rule by which Applicants can demonstrate the pressure-containing capacity of the Perry contain-
$ g%My
% q-: . ; ,. y1-yq .i ment vessel and it disclosed that the most limiting penetration in con-
+ GF- Ntb&Eneh? W- N.IihN. E., tainment, P414, had a pressure capacity of approximately 50 pounds per square inch (psig). The dome knuckle region and centainment cylindri-M 4 6 x eiW n s w%<,.g W, , cy, e . cal shell all had pressure-containing capacities considerably above that
. %%;gygQ4, feh . yy limiting penetration. Findings 86-94.
I M$k. dkMMi$YTI OCRE criticizes Applicants' analysis because it did not include a con- s 3.N,S3..:
,ex4 v &wcJ. w m: .nZ '.
- IY . sideration of dead load as required by the ASME Code, it neglected the
.s:8S e r; effect of elevated temperatures on material properties due to hydrogen b M W E.C Y "" combustion and it neglected the stresses resulting from the as-built, out-
[x .g$.$ . m-j ND$ , oll olerance t conditions of the PNPP containment vessels. The evidence s z. 1
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.es shows, however, that Applicants considered all three of the foregoing
% . < , . > > 3.. factors. They concluded that the factors were insignificant and would not ya affect their analysis. Findings 90,91,95.
74 . [19.i We do not find it impermissible to consider each of these quantities, 4.f, A: 2 b]w.ypy%g" ME. ,4
- ,' to find them of small quantitative import and therefore to neglect them.
L. # We also cannot accept OCRE's invitation to consider these effects as j)bs,,$lhi6f# l. HM % %5N$' L*4 4-p? additive. OCRE Proposed Opinion at 21. The three factors mentioned f { i t'C! y . V W W b,e ~ by OCRE do not converge in additive fashion on the limiting penetra-g N, 7 ]./N g t.G... . i
- m. y...
tion. The out-of-tolerance condition was acknowledged by the Applicants 2...w w Q ' .+ . S.$,r..e - but has its effect on the vessel shell and not the limiting penetration.
. . ,g,2 .;
,4 -
M. - Stresses during elevated temperatures were considered and shown to
- g. a & , .... :^ remain conservative, and the dead load contribution constitutes only
' ~ h .
4.7% of the stress. It is properly neglected in an analysis having substan-tial conservative margins. OCRE's assertion that Applicants' contain-ment vessel capacity analysis is inadequate or erroneous is not supported by the evidence.
- We also cannot accept OCRE's assertion that containment penetration P205 was analyzed in an improper manner because Applicants took
- credit for actual material properties instead of lower bound . material A' J properties. The analysis of that penetration adequately demonstrates A j;..U.hM w..ddu,& that the conclusions regarding the limiting penetration in containment yv [yw .gMC g. -
g:. ' ~ should not t.c altered. Findings 94,110. < , u..y r; r.:y g g . ment is significantly greater than its design strength, that it can withstand negative pressures and that containment strength exceeds the pressure expected from hydrogen burning by a large margin. Findings 96-98.
, Defective Welds Some defective welds remain in the lower weld courses of the contain-
. ment vessels in both Perry Units I and 2. Both Applicants and Staff are aware of the defects and a detailed analysis of their importance has been
. .u- - TM, performed by the Applicants. Finding 99. OCRE challenges Applicants'
;1e .
s - 4 w4, weld flaw analysis on the basis that stress margins used were not conser-vative, that measurements of weld flaw size used some radiographs of w # , c 4. o.+e -
,,Y./ M%, ,.7$k h Q.h<% poor quality, and that a faulty calibration was made of the radiographic . - .n.,,u ;s;4.c ,> analysis technique used by Applicants' consultant, APTECH Incorporat-V Q, . '
__ , '. $V'i* ed. The evidence reflects that the Staff has accepted the digital radiograph-
, 4 _,
~ ' ' '
'$2; ic enhancement technique used by APTECH and only has reservations
. y ef ,
on the depth-of flaw measurement using this technique. Calibrations
~ .
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My s ' '.:[. C D , i ;; . show that flaw depth measurements are conservative in that the digital
. s i
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i . . . .
.4 _ . . . _ . . _ _ __ - _. _ .. _ __. _ .. _ __ _ ...,..
. , .3 enhancement technique projects deeper flaws than actually exist in the
. , j ;s y , , material. Findings 100, 101. OCRE's assertion that inadequate margins
. .nE . M b c :.l M
were used in the stress analysis represents nothing more than a dif-
;4W v[ % ,e
~m. ference of opinion with experts and it ignores throughout the conserva-
.. 3. r,.q g %.m y v, p:4, tive aspects of the analysis. Findings 100-106.
i ; f.a.s.3,, M%%.u eN o.3- . . OCRE cn.t. .icizes Applicants, evaluation of stresses at these welds for y w W i i.,gy
,e M, .;. i y w 50 psig and their finding that the stresses at the higher internal pressures 4g
-6q%:hpy@%. 'i were less than at 15 psig as analyzed by APTECH. Contrary to OCRE's
. - J; assertions, however, we do not find Applicants' witness to be noncredi-
- 7 ,Q,.M Le.py.p .;3 fN "
ble on this matter. It is clear that Applicants conducted an additional
,y ], '
analysis of hydrogen oeflagration stresses that went beyond the analysis [, w [ performed by APTECH. While APTECH's analysis did not consider the annulus concrete, the Applicants in their additional work did evaluate additional stiffening in the containment vessel due to it. Finding 103. We see nothing improper in this analysis. Clearly the annulus concrete now exists in the as built structure and consideration of its additional strengthening characteristics seems to us appropriate. APTECH's choice not to consider the annulus concrete in its analysis adds to our confi-
'.L. dence'that the overall analysis is conservative relative to the final as-built w
q_ ..gg.jpf m, ,7 ..% ~ Q containment.
' . .,. ; %'j., D w
,g ' .' ) . T ' .ly. , y
- m - % ; ' %'* Applicability ofASME Service Level C Limits
- e. .
We rebet OCRE's invitation to challenge the use of ASME service level C limits to ensure a leaktight containment. OCRE Proposed Opin-ion at 25. The newly promulgated hydrogen rule permits the use of serv-ice level C limits as a means of demonstrating containment shell integri-ty and that ofits penetrations. The evidence shows that Applicants' anal-ysis of the equipment hatch and other containment penetrations has
- been adequate and that all penetrations meet service level C require-ments. Findings 107-111.
, . % ,, _.g r.n;;,L Q , Penetration Seals
. .w. ..
I 2 . _ jyDM%Q The Applicants performed an analysis of springback of the O-ring w j'~' W"MWNP seals in the equipment hatch. Findings 107-108. Contrary to OCRE's as-
. g ,-
s ,. .
- y. VgMy?;gg; D.7MN sertion, we find that the Applicants did not neglect the effect of compres-sion set which could result from thermal and radiation aging. Finding l ANT @
108.. Further, our analysis of the adequacy of the hydrogen control
. ~,
, _ . :.%W w.,w O system is limited to the adequacy of the Applicants' preliminary analysis.
',%' -,MC. n.n We are responsible for making findings of reasonable assurance of safety
*i. . * -
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'* s s..,..
~
535
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; .W
.;Mif4_Anl h.k..greg. . ;" ,
' y JG4~@'. p'; h.; & :4.4-_Ma**$ v 4+ Iw.. d: #4
-y~ y_ %.p: s, 3 7. ..
y- ;ygy;g _ ,
~ ' -
3-i 9 g 3, , f,.g ~ p .ggly.Nnf ,gg.sg:.g-9 p@g.,:gg%:gr%qp~ ;.e -~ s.4-g M:, Ar,Os
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. l. , . _ 7 f d3X%, ' L.; ,
~a _
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- ...--.-~
during the interim between reactor startup and the submission of Appli-cants' final analysis. Nothing in the record would cause us to conclude
' ys ~
_;%, g that radiation or thermal aging of materials could create serious compres-
# ;. W y 3- ,s . '-
i.- tw N+ sion set during this interim period. The Applicants have ample time to
,. ; o g. .. E - ' v: ".. '
complete their commitment to prescribe what appears to be a purely rou-kMicM h '.ZJ.MA@iRi,ns M tine procedure for maintenance and inspection of seals. Mys WS% M:-c.d Manufacturers and contractors have brought to the Applicants' atten-N .f % l C . ' . , G i~," . Q tion potential defects in inflatable seals. This notification caused a reeval. %n f.QQ. l. ,""TA uation of the integrity of seals and their possible degradation during
. f'y X1 ,M., t G4' - design basis accident conditions. We do not accept OCRE's assertion L%# ; f ~
that the discovery of such potential problems and their reporting - p- a; even though followed by assessment and corrective action - is a cause C ,
. for concern regarding the integrity of penetrations. Finding 112.
OCRE argues that the ASME Code may not be the most conservative method for all parts and conditions encountered in PNPP containment. However, the new hydrogen rule permits the use of ASME service level C stresses in a demonstration of containment integrity, and the Appli-cants have presented even additional conservatism by providing an anal-
/_
=3
_, , l- ysis based on service level D stresses, which the Code permits. Finding
' .' 92. Additionally, we see no reason for challenging Applicants' assertion
; . , - + a, a .u .msl 7,. ; T f .a -~e.2 G/:g. u- .
that their techniques are applicable for the linear elast.ic stress ranges & Q4M . .gfo ' . ", ~ ' . , ' r under consideration. Neither can we find a basis for challenging the finite element analysis used by Applicants for consideration of the stress i: , ranges in the Perry containment. Finding 93. We conclude that the Applicants have identified the controlling pene-tration in containment and that such penetration has an internal pressure - capacity of 50 psig. We find that pressure limit is conservative and that in fact the pressure limits of the controlling penetration are higher than
- those stated. OCRE criticizes Applicants' analysis of negative pressure 4
capacity of the containment because Applicants rely on the action of vacuum breakers during design basis events to establish that design negative pressure is not exceeded. No basis has been established in this
. . s- .
a ' record for challenging the actions of redundant vacuum breakers to
- - ' . J.1 m ;.c,. ..,.@
relieve negative pressures in containment. Finding 97.
- , * = , 9 f g. _ s.. l, W.{ g Q % , '
~.'. n %{.%+ m gMWD.f.t.)Q ? w m p - pf. ' -
T- . . t. 7%'. DrywellCapacity v-L i- . y; +n . w.m . ,w g .
-m. &' ., "; ,
qu %.+ ' . ,. 1 E
.c. . '.
The Applicants relied on the analysis of the Grand Gulf drywell to es-e.. O c kN tablish pressure-retaining capabilities of the Perry drywell. OCRE consid-
-m. ,.
. ', q. ' - ers this inadequate because the Grand Gulf analysis did not consider the
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,.,. *j'< _
4 # ** . Y., {. , , , . . . :- !wi_ ss -\.l;.l $ ', 'y , l 'l l s
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/
t
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. j effect of voids in the drywell. Voids were found in the Perry drywell con-N -M,...C Q.1A$
. A. . , .
crete. However, they have been repaired and analysis has demonstrated ggqn- S gg , , that they have no efTect on the pressure-retaining capacity of the Perry
,.g g g. .~27 m .i i drywell. The concrete of the ' drywell has been inspected and the Appli-w q 1 : a..ww 3. . .
W e b.vm.a
. ~ -
;gr pyM+u A % m-f. p y g f 9j;,p;4 % ! ,?V;e4 cants are confident that no further voids exist. Findings 114,115.
. , .,> - u nw n We have no basis to challenge Applicants' analyses on concrete voids gdph!".M..Q .g,, wljf 'in the drywell. The hydrogen rule permits the referencing of previously
, %ndt y@cM fJ h accepted analyses for similar plants as part of the overall analysis for 0-
$ .]4/FV@ np ' s Np' ,
i.% -
?. Perry. Thus, the Applicants' referencing of Grand Gulf drywell integrity is not inappropriate to establish, on a preliminary basis, the integrity of siV qq yrpi ,
~
the Perry drywell. A' ss n
,$s I s
Containment Response Analysis Applicants have analyzed two accident scenarios to describe the behav-ior of the reactor system during and following a degraded core accident. These scenarios consist of (1) a small steam line break in the drywell s with extended ECCS failure and (2) a transient with a stuck-open relief O. " valve with extended ECCS failure. Recovery of coolant flow was as-s,.
- M .g?.'-
, w. m m
2 .
^ ,
~ sumed to occur at the point of a 75% metal-water reaction. Steam and M 1 hydrogen release during these accidents was analyzed using a computer
& s. * - - * '
code termed MARCH. Intervenor does not challenge the appropriate-ness of the two scenarios used nor does it challenge the use of the MARCH code in spite of its recognized shortcomings. OCRE Proposed Opinion at 16. We have found that an improved MARCH code would show less hydrogen release than the one used in the Applicants' prelimi-nary analysis. Therefore that analysis is conservative. Findings 116-121. OCRE is concerned that the scenarios chosen do not represent the most severe challenge to containment from hydrogen combustion. The Intervenor urges that Applicants should also have considered a station blackout degraded core accident, which assumes loss of both offsite and
- % ,1,.
emergency electrical power. In this scenario, the igniters would not be e g;;% W @~;G g. available and hydrogen would accumulate to a concentration of 28% in m.V g a ,;c M. containment. Deflagration of this amount of hydrogen when power is re-MGdM:N[y$ ,Zi hy m stored to th: igniter system would produce high pressures in contain- $Q- , ment. Findings 144, 145. 33 y N-;zQ f6% Q. @.@ . . q. . m.7 9 ' - .">
. Applicants argue that consideration of this scenario should be deferred to the final analysis stage. StafT agrees and will require evalua-Qg -
- cQ
~
Lion of the station blackout in the final analysis unless the Applicants 4
=11 -
make an adequate demonstration as to why it should not be considered.
+4p . . . 'g-:pM
- o. um,:
Q m. L j
. . ^-
. Finding 158.
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- *; J..y -
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%, . . ww
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= ) 'es g g . - N.5 ,P [ . E I. r
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s b?Gh
, <fj= ~
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+;2p k af.4Q4Q L Q ..,;w e w .y.;.y 4pnQL Q ,p 3 3 .
~ -
. p3 ,
2' + Q & g. & g & u- w%&.5: ' -
.,, Qs;3 :;p <
. ..a z. -_ . _
_a - . _ _ The Applicants, however, have in testimony given preliminary consid-eration of the station blackout situation. A degraded core situation is un-likely to arise during a station blackout because core cooling would be
~
<M' -'
available up to 9 hours after the blackout occurred. As long as there is
.- .~ c.JR:
Gk.j$,Q core cooling, there would be no hydrogen release. Finding 146. The 9 ..y , , .u
~ . e 4 J :,. ' @
~
Board concludes that the core cooling capability during station blackout
.'U' ' ' " " " gives the station substantial amounts of time to recover either offsite power or emergency power before any hydrogen release can be expected.
If hydrogen is released during a station blackout event, however, the Ap-
^
plicants have options for venting containment rather than permitting a global deflagration to occur. Finding 145. The hydrogen rule is silent on the question of whether station black-out must be analyzed in the preliminary analysis or, indeed, whether it must be analyzed at all as one of the scenarios employed by the Appli-cants. A judgment must be rendered on the basis of whether a finding of reasonable assurance of safety can be made in the absence of the analysis at the preliminary stage. We conclude that such finding can be made on the basis of the low probability of the event and the fact that although the formal analysis has not been made the Applicants are able to outline
/ the general dimensions of their response. We find this to be adequate for a preliminary analysis.
We also note that the station blackout scenario has been addressed in the StatT SER as a generic unresolved safety issue (Perry SER). The sta-tion blackout scenario represents a safety problem, all aspects of which are not directly before us and the full dimensions of which are not on our record. Clearly our principal task under the admitted contention is to assess the adequacy of the hydrogen igniter system regarding its func-tional capability of coping with a 75% metal-water reaction without loss of containment integrity. Since the Staff intends to require that the Ap-plicants analyze the station blackout with regard to hydrogen generation in their final analysis, we conclude that adequate assurance of safety at Perry is provided.
'", " '~
The Applicants used the CLASIX-3 computer model, originally devel-oped by Westinghouse, for calculating their containment response analy-J.
.[. ,, , ./ '; .
'!~
sis. That model predicts temperatures and pressures resulting from the combustion of hydrogen and it tracks concentrations of hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen and steam in the containment. The model uses stand-E , ; ard equations and assumptions and predicts, for both scenarios analyzed, a large number of hydrogen burns taking place primarily in the wetwell 4 ~~ . - region of the Perry containment. Findings 122 124. OCRE challenged the input parameters used in the CLASIX-3 model
- and the validity of the code itself. In doing so, it urged Board reliance on d
538 _ , ~ . . _ . _ _ . . . t
, 3 a ,
. , ,, .f . -
g .. . #.+
+: , ,
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e
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+W:-
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--+ -
, , :v .. &: ~ n n Q W < W'& : j '
.~ v.
a document produced by Sandia National Laboratories labeled NUREG/CR-2530 (OCRE Exh. 21). That report contains Sandia's com-
) , ~_ '
' ' f"
parative assessment of a number of computer models designed to calcu-t % .
late containment response during hydrogen combustion. The analysis i, : ', i ' c was performed for the NRC Staff to assist it in the assessment of the @w n .g . . 7 t,.H hydrogen control system at Grand Gulf. One of the models advocated z.. v. .. -
^
by OCRE that was compared in the Sandia analysis was termed HECTR.
.# s y Results from HECTR consistently showed higher temperatures and pres-
'O sures from hydrogen burning in reactor containment than CLASIX-3.
,c. However, Staff claimed that the HECTR model was crude and did not model a MARK III containment. Notafrancesco, Tr. 3688, 3724, 3733.
We have examined OCRE Exhibit 21 and conclude that nothing therein gives us any more basis for relying on HECTR than on CLASIX. OCRE Exh. 21 at 12,15-16. The Sandia report does establish that several models used in early attempts to model containment response produced variable results. Sandia's report, however, does not indicate which of the models was the more reliable although it accepts the CLASIX results with reservations. Id. at 11. The Staff testified that the modeling of containment response has im-
,, y ..
proved since the Sandia report was completed. Pratt, Tr. 3700. Indeed, y - even the HECTR model of later vintage shows lower containment tem-
'q ' ~ peratures and pressures than the earlier version. Notafrancesco, Tr.
3733-34. The Board concludes that the modeling of containment re-sponse is a rapidly changing and improving research and development effort. We do not put our reliance on the model comparisons of the Sandia report for assessing containment response in Perry since we accept that later improved versions of models have been developed and that later experiments tend to confirm the validity of CLASIX-3. Fuls, Tr. 3621. Additional subjective considerations also support a conclusion that CLASIX results are conservative. Finding 133. The Sandia report identified numerous sensitivities of all the models to variations in input parameters, which we believe remain valid. One of these was flame speed during combustion of hydrogen. Sensitivity analy-ses established that high flame speed is accompanied by more rapid
- r . .-7. s .g Q release of energy, and correspondingly high peak pressures and tem'pera-hrg h y . '.'. p.4 - M. sS J .
tures are attained. 'ihus accurate modeling results depend upon accurate-
.e - '
v-
- ly known flame sp,:eds. OCRE Exh. 21 at 16-17.
. .;y '. -
' : .< [ The flame speed used in CLASIX analysis was 6 feet per second (ft/sec). The Staff believes this is conservative and that the flame speeds used in HECTR were overestimated. Similarly, Applicants' experts on
, , combustion believe that flame speeds could be lower than 6 ft/sec and that the assumption used in CLASIX is conservative. However, some 539
~++,..~emam+ -
---w-~~'-m-Ow=~*.~~ede-s--'**HRw*" * *
'**"-*T^
s .
~ ,
~
# , 4 # 3 .a- 4 g [ $ y ., a 6 r , j i
hMMd4eh$NkkhNMNENNb A w a s p u mppu g ;g n W W 7
;R '
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~
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^
~
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- _. ~. g .,2 c.u . . .
1
. ~ - . w . y,- .,
, R
.m
~- _. < a
_& ._._.__.__~2._.--._--:.-.-- xa* w: -
's '
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a >
, experiments have shown higher flame speeds and Sandia thought they
. c M- . t _ . should be higher as well. Finding 132; OCRE Exh. 21 at 16-17.
We accept that OCRE has established by its cross-examination and Ex-
* ')/@@$.y n.4 i M @.
.M. . ..M. m: -- . c,s @a;f. . s m.
.WQ,;gg, hibit 21 that flame speed is an uncertain quantity not known with high accuracy. The most we can deduce from the testimony presented is that g@gf4 Wt 2~rN 3 % @,QMMP. ,:fW. ytMi the flame speeds used in CLASIX are not deliberately biased.' We con-
*$#-M'Tf4@@y$ clude that true flame speeds, if and when finally known with precision,
. .Y PA.:N could be lower or higher than the values used. Finding 132. This conclu-y Mf.., 7.' W7d e$ .D;$ -
sion does not arise from any evidence of faulty craftsmanship on the y y 7 , 4 o 4 .. . - _ . part of those engaged in the construction of models. Rather, it appears
% ' o n to be an inherent uncertainty in the ability to measure a parameter that 7 '. E
,- n ,, 7 A . varies with environmental conditions.
9 ,
- -T 'In view of the uncertainty of the parameters which apply as well to HECTR as they do to CLASIX-3, we put no reliance on OCRE's detailed comparison of the results of CLASIX-3 with HECTR. OCRE Proposed Opinion at 33 and Appendix C.
;j OCRE also challenged the values for the ignition limit of hydrogen in air. The evidence shows that hydrogen has geometry-dependent ignition
', limits in air. Finding 126. Eight percent hydrogen concentration in air s ., -
V gW. ;& corresponds to.the downward propagation limit. Sandia used 9% for a
'. downward propagation limit and Applicants' expert thought that' the
_ u. ..
~'
..QQMF u >1 downward propagation limit was in the range of about 8% to 10%.
-< - 2 -
.; p v Upward propagation limit is about 4% and horizontal propagation limits i occur at around 6%% hydrogen by volume. The uncertainty in the igni-tion limits of hydrogen in air appears to be considerably smaller than the-uncertainty for flame speeds, and a lingering dispute as to the correct.
; values appears to be insignificant to the containment response analysis.
Citing the Sandia report, however, OCRE claims that the placement of E , igniter assemblies close to ceilings and the spray shield of the igniter
" housing would inhibit combustion effectiveness. Sandia concluded, how-
. ever, that igni_ tion would reliably occur at the downward propagation limit but not at lower concentrations. We fail to see any.important disa-M. .- - greement between OCRE and the Applicants since Applicants' witnesses by'..M 3gg , p-Qy- also state that hydrogen combustion will not occur in downward propaga-tion at concentrations less than about 8%. Eight percent hydrogen con-M centration is the concentration assumed for all flame pr_opagation in the p]W,4. ,m- , al jg w 2$, pqi 1j, s 7-@MM.ra CLASIX model. It is, therefore, a conservative assumption since n co .. . .w w r
. r o, , ~4 s W;s.pf upward propagation or horizontal propagation will in reality occur at con-eMb siderably lower concentrations. Findings 125,126,131.
Considering the undisputed fact that hydrogen tends to rise from
~ - -
aW6
'fi , j_ M *,$ ' '
lower to upper regions in the containment, we conclude that considera-uCG%i ble amounts of hydrogen will burn at the upward propagation limits
,. .Q.
; .; T .y '
~
w.y4 g
-- .- 540
~
g s . X
- # h 6
T 1 1 p - .
- 5
- g. ," -'p.
~
~
f fy % # A g
' - = -
gr~ ,# g** i CJ,. y g d.y , i,. .] ~ _t7< d, q. s%,- - ,
. "1 fw '
. t , , , . _
^
y9 nx y9 n.Ns & +.6p. %.-is Ln;99 P W hM Ga %.~i- Q & yW.~.&
? . , , ,, m , ,a, y;qqygg.y , . - . d % W-4 c., n hkV i -n *h mj, p y,y g 4 %.pg, Q' %4 :. Q.,n, s O.A g w % g w.
4' s ,.
.9 j #
S.
. _ ___ _ m -
o __ __. e.
.. before accumulating at higher concentrations at ceilings or spray shields on igniters. We agree, therefore, with Applicants that variations in the
*i2 ~^ j' : .' location of hydrogen igniters in containment is not critical to the overall
.f' f? .ew y
^ [ % .- V Y n ' analy -is of hydrogen combustion. Finding 84. The igniters are pbced in a y%w, @ .:<..-! +: w.ww .
containment anywhere that hydrogen might go and there is no need to w~2 t- consider an .igmter-by . igniter location analysis as performed by OCRE.
.; .Mc g .g.P':6 '.g.N .
c , OCRE Proposed Opinion at 35. Given the potential for combustion at [Q['D[W .y *~f lean ~ concentrations during upward propagation or horizontal propaga-tion, we see little hazard in the possibility that hydrogen might somehow
' . .,. 25y gM escape these ignition sources and accumulate at higher concentrations in X' '
m the containment dome or near ceilings. Findings 83-84. Even if hydro-
, gen did accumulate, however, it would burn in downward propagation at approximately 8% concentration just as the CLASIX model assumes and
! we see no error in this aspect of modeling the behavior of hydrogen by CLASIX. Finding 81.
OCRE challenges the combustion completeness of hydrogen in air of 85% utilized in the CLASIX model. Other researchers have used 100%
.. combustion of hydrogen at concentrations above 7.7%. There is no basis in the record for us to decide with any certainty on a correct value for
.p. ,f 9 tt s... g( 3.. :PO combustion completeness, although we have found that as a practical matter much hydrogen will be burned at lower concentrations than 8%;
, . VIy f[2F; . , . ~ this lends credence to the estimate of 85% completeness. We consider this to be a minor part of the intrinsic uncertainty in modeling.
We conclude that even current models have considerable parameter sensitivity and that at least some parameters are poorly known. Although the Staff acknowledged this in its testimony, it was not clearly highlight-i ed. However, as already indicated by the Staff, we conclude that it is es-sential that Applicants in their final analysis perform appropriate parame-ter sensitivity analyses in their determination of containment response. Finding 158. We reject OCRE's assertions that ionizing radiation will increase flame speed from deflagration to detonation. There is no evidence in our record that the specific chemical radicals needed to accelerate flame w.>~".... speed would be present in Perry containment or that ionizing radiation
.w.' .
C ' %s %. J .i- c in any event could create enough such radicals to accelerate flame w;,, ,- .
.g .
. r. 9 .a.3. c * ". ' speed. OCRE's assertion was based on old and outdated evidence and
' -m.
e f . . . . ; . w, ' : there was no recent corroborating evidence to suggest that ionizing radia-r
,. . Kg;y. tion in containment could have any effect.- Finding 135. The evidence is clear that no detonation of hydrogen from any cause is likely in the ',' E , . f. , , Perry containment. Findings 127,134.
& n .- ., .
,9 s . , , , - 36, '
4 4
., O'
. 541
- s .;
, w.,
d
'T
.)
- Q.q ;
- i. , y,,~ .}.l [ , -} - ,
! - [ . ,
.__ _ _ _ s . m_ c
, . i. ; +- - w; ..y . w :w . w . <
pw-Mf : MM.v+m :u . .
- w. n. au k' g;;ba.Q QQ?h%@%%Q5GiM$:&p % M+s M..%r=W a-4., u . , m< v. I ' '
~~
-2?MW. w: , .
L.
~ f s, ,
s ?.%N?t .V W&m&lo$$_. m-
$2W. 1.$.
Q ..&$$. .< . '.O.i? ,P N W h $ .G YQM^^'. z .wu ,
~ , , . w, . -
' : l
$9W@^M#p-WDe w, -p.u .._+,- --
- , .L .
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p, r . x.y y -..
- .- - . a ~ .u.- . .. ~ ~ .a --.a.. .
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-mQN
~
r "b
. r . .
Containment Spray Availability 4h , [ , sMNU m.N, Mend $ d.6.3@w:. C. ' OCRE also challenged the availability of containment spray operation during a degraded core accident. The ev dence i shows containment j, M..-. d!S E %d'eMwI M.m h &,d g e. sprays are an important heat transfer mechanism that, during a hydrogen M
.W h:.g burn, would result in a significant reduction of pressure and temperature.
p.4 fMMM 4 Q W @M NW
@M W . @ p Finding 129; OCRE Exh. 21 at 12. It is assumed in CLASIX-3 that con-W,WMk.
w .
-wn , ~ p%a%c ~
tainment sprays are automatically actuated after the first burn. No factual M r$ y$ b M N $ N M @.t basis exists in the record, however, for challenging the availability of NMW4"2W%94 UM f W @$ $ $ 12 % M $ $g containment sprays. We cannot accept OCRE's assertion that contain-9AWJW" ment spray unavailability can be deduced from the scenarios used by Ap-gQgf .TD9 @MA . plicants that postulated loss of core cooling. Finding 154. That assump-
.m f3 s
q:Ss v , n.g .. - tion was necessary in order to produce a degraded core in the models
"' and to produce a 75% metal water reaction. That hypothetical is not 7-'
improper since the hydrogen rule postulates the need to accommodate
~
^
hydrogen generated from a 75% metal-water reaction without specifying
,S - the mechanism of generation. It is fruitless to compound hypotheticals, 4 however, by deducing spray unavailability from a hypothetical loss of coolant. OCRE's assertion concerning spray unavailability is without i 1 NY ' ' q -
.n; p. .. .
merit and outside the scope of a test of compliance with the Commis-M 1'-*W MfM J sMMGM @A w ;; & g g ) sion's new rule on hydrogen control. The proper vehicle for challenging
@Mm s
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spray availability .isby a separate admitted content.ion. > s.:M.s M m! @% , n n&xAf, .:.y W +D
~; * * ,, % +, ,
Suppression PoolBypass
. m ,.
OCRE raised the question through its cross examination of the possi-
. ' P '
bility of hydrogen releases entering the containment or wetwell without first traversing the suppression pool. OCRE cites its Exhibit 21 at 197-98 correctly for the proposition that severe challenges to contain-
;c ment integrity could occur if hydrogen bypasses the suppression pool V~ ~ 6 and leaks directly into the wetwell. OCRE calls for added analysis of the
, y u - s, effects of drywell leakage on containment responses to a degraded core accident. However, the Sandia report goes on to say that the possibility 34 Q$dhMQMd , of significant hydrogen releases directly into the wetwell/ containment 9 4 U $id b N b i M M d. g without first traversing the suppression pool is apparently extremely N gij gw.gtC g e& n# & 4 h u .)
WWppm :> - Un;iye;y. w& -Gr F t p y yf p d @;; @ r h _;,_,. W Applicants agree that leakage of hydrogen through the drywell leak
... y %.pe ,'
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Paths could occur and that on the order of 14 to 19% of the total hydro-Wv.; 4@M@+m@,@:@%.w :
,$, y ,W-c , 4;MGM. ~bypass the suppression pool. They conclude, however, that gen could
, . :- hydrogen leakage through the drywell leak paths in that amount could
. 56PMQ'6A. T7 W . @ .~ W ,.. j not affect the operation of the hydrogen control system or their conclu-31.
sW[$ ,2p/.h@df@!;dE,4QD;, sions It is apparent that the scenario proposed by OCRE has been ana-r.Nfg@9M w lyzed. The Applicants also considered an analysis that was performed by n;c pg.y 3,. 9 s Q 6-H aQ' Qu L.W: 5 S .. ~~ 542
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5 General Electric for its assessments in a small break LOCA of the effects l , g _ of hydrogen bypass through the drywell. That analysis found that drywell
'-l$@d[N .
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bypass leakage is of no concern to the operation of the PNPP distributed
,y?i~a: 49<ma .: W.
. a M/Cr.7.4- v J igniter system. Even if hydrogen were to leak out through the drywell
- .1. . wall, the hydrogen transport and combustion characteristics analyzed in YIhM2(U7$,DI Perry's preliminary evaluation would not change. Richardson, Buzzelli,
~ ~.i _ R C T.f g -V - ~ R Tr. 3499-3501, 3615-16; Fuls, Holtzclaw, Tr. 3628-29; Pratt, Tr.
,Q. _MsD.u; - < W_<_' r @s e1 ,'N: . , 3726 27.
, . &.' l%,qC: : ; , ; &_ ,&]
'6' 2; Equ&MSurviv6iliq
. i.%
i 'c, i OCRE urges the Board to find Applicants' analysis of equipment sur-
' ' ~
vivability to be inadequate based on its proposed finding that the CLASIX-3 analysis itself was inadequate. OCRE Proposed Opinion at
- 45. Equipment survivability analysis depends on containment environ-
~
mental temperatures and pressures calculated by CLASIX due to hydro-gen burning. These quantities are used in subsequent codes to calculate
. equipment temperatures which are then compared with equipment qual-ification temperatures. Findings 136-137. We cannot, however, reject
- .f .e {i
.*4;- %,pW, OdON r o W the equipment survivability analysis since we do not find that the CLASIX-3 analysis is so flawed as to be rejected outright.
t .
..,%. e M' %n '
- bit J.j .p~ 1- Applicants' principal method for demonstrating equipment survivabili-ty is by referencing the Grand Gulf equipment survivability analysis. As we have indicated, such referencing is permitted by the newly pro-mulgated hydrogen rule. Confirmatory calculations for specific pieces of equipment in Perry have been made which show that the Applicants' conclusion that the Grand Gulf results will bound the Perry results is well founded. Findings 136-138. OCRE has not developed any basis for challenging the HEATING 6 computer code that is used for computing equipment temperatures at Perry. We conclude, therefore, that Appli-cants, in their preliminary analysis, have made an adequate demonstra-
. _ - tion of the survivability of equipment in the Perry containment.
r y. ' - The Board understands, as do the Applicants and Staff, that computa-
; ; m p. ' ' . % .~
. . I
- tions produced by the CLASIX 3 code have uncertainties in the results.
m,,--m.,
- e. :.nry :M A We conclude that these uncertainties do not constitute fatal flaws. We v m' . j g # W .:. &; f.- ,
g ; b. ~. , r~.M"..~,.'". are satisfied that the Applicants and Staff are making substantial efforts
',- ~ -
. .. . . to improve computer codes for the prediction of containment response viAgg ]* '; 1, .. in hydrogen release scenarios and we expect that these will be used in iQ - -
the final analysis. j;* ; . M?. 4D '. The existence of uncertainty dictates that we cannot find reasonable 1. w, y 9 a m x ,. ,. W... assurance of safety for operation in the interim based on model calcula-tions alone. We conclude, however, that it is appropriate to also rely on
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the fact that the analyses were consistently performed in conservative manner and that margins of safety exist. Thus, we conclude that J.y W,aE Q $ ,. g '
- CLASIX-3 computations, while not completely accurate, bound the con-A 3fM&af' #
gVNGNb * [' <. Ml
- ditions that would actually prevail during a hydrogen burn event in N.s M /W W.ca' W '&
Perry containment. Findings 133-143. MNNNbEb7$h The Staff has found that seals for locks and hatches and the transform-m 1
,p w!wg.Jh .i '. " (. er for the igniter assembly are not yet temperature-qualified. CEI is re-hN bNtNNb bb, quired by 10 C.F.R. f 50.49(i) to justify interim operation of this equip-ment and provide qualification for it by November 30,1985. Staff Pro-M M]leihew , wA
[ Pf" [~w[~ Oc, posed Finding 23. v nAv._ W ~f~ , , ,N, n.
~
.. y We have found, however, that the Staff has acknowledged in its SER j that certain components in containment have very low qualification pres-
%,1 ;47 -
sures but that it has an inadequate explanation on the record for its ac-
' 6 :, . .
~ -
a ceptance of that fact. Findings 139-142. We are not convinced from the
- . A ! Applicants' own analysis that compressors having a 24-psig qualification i . pressure are safe ' rom failure in an environment calculated by CLASIX
-I to have projected peak pressures of 21.2 psig. If we knew these numbers
~
exactly, of course, the reasoning would be correct and we understand jW jf',s
- 7 ; that Staff and Applicants believe the cited pressures are upper bound es-RM i %3;E.g,$@g i 1.j , -cr<o .
timates of containment pressures. However, our assessment is necessari-
- ly subjective and we conclude that in this case the actual survival pres-3d[Ib7[
nagm t,. I'7 ' sure approaches with small margin a calculated pressure having unknown m , bounds of uncertainty. Neither are we comfortable with the assertion l- that the active components of unqualified equipment will not be exposed
. to peak pressures. Thus, we conclude that the Applicants should make further confirmatory analyses of the equipment which has not been qual-ified for pressure survivability in containment and of equipment that has, in our view, inadequate margins of pressure survivability. These should be reviewed and approved by the Staff prior to exceeding 5%
a, power at Perry.
~
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~ '
Diffusion Flames
%:7,a,, .
,y .. OCRE asserts that the possibility of diffusion flames occurring in a MdSM#f7 % , c , _1 ' degraded core accident pose another form of thermal threat to equip-Mgw&.9m ve..w m W A e W- ,, -
ment and penetration seals. Diffusion flames are continuously burning,
- p. r. Wp.,n y . q ,
standing flames that could occur at the surface of the suppression pool. M $,De $ '. 5, . G,I . ' y <.~_m
.m.
The evidence shows that penetration seals would not reach a high tem-m%y- ., perature during hydrogen deflagration; there is a significant margin be-
# tween the temperature from hydrogen burning and the qualification tem-
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'Q.- -. 'a peratures of the seal materials. This is because the seals are next to a
@ q% ..fyq;w 3 y large mass of metal which acts as a heat sink. In addition, the sealing
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. ,. material for the equipment hatch is between the Dange materials, which
,." , . . 3.s v .s : _
is essentially outside of the containment structure, and would not be ex-7;b ..' : posed directly to the hydrogen-burning environment. Additionally, the g g;f e :v m.y Q, . ., % personnel hatch has two doors, one inboard and one outboard, and only the inboard door would be exposed to the possibly high temperatures D.E.II.N.,[JS
^
i # . s.G m L.U.,jNih ,+ from hydrogen combustion. Finding i13. 2 d: . , f Y' % ; p _ The Owners Group plans to conduct quarter-scale testing of diffusion
- _cr . m y f;7 y>,"
Dames and to submit the results in its final analysis. The Group, howev-U Gja; u ; er, will not consider diffusion Dames resulting from a release history cor-m 7: responding to a 75% metal-water reaction in its tests. The reason is that the rates of release and the volume of release required by that scenario would produce an unrecoverable accident. Findings 149-152. This is not realistic for conformance to the rule which is limited to consideration of a recoverable degraded core accident scenario. OCRE urges that we cannot ignore this matter and that we cannot defer its consideration to the final analysis. In its view, Applicants' plans for research constitute a defiance of the regulations which require evaluation of equipment sur-
. ,, vivability under a 75% metal water reaction scenario.
1 , We do not accept OCRE's argument that the scenarios that are going 4 g+ + + j { :Oy , to be adopted for future research constitute a violation of NRC regula-
.A , . h tions. All the hydrogen rule requires is that a 75% metal-water reaction 5,c,; a w-- be considered. It does not specify particular scenarios and is silent on the question of diffusion flames. We do not expect that Applicants will perform unrealistic research. There is no evidence to indicate that a hydrogen release accident is likely to proceed through a 75% metal water reaction with nothing but diffusion names produced. Indeed, the evi-dence shows that hydrogen will escape for the most part to the contain-ment atmosphere where it will be burned by multiple deflagrations. We consider the diffusion Dame scenario to be an investigation of one among many possible occurrences during a hydrogen release event.
Nothing in the hydrogen rule requires the Applicants to commit to eval-uating the thermal environment an't equipment response resulting from
^^E s.'.,. A.
', 'Q diffusion Games using a hydrogen release history resulting from a 75%
metal-water reaction. OCRE Proposed Opinion at 47.
. . ~ :
J D.n:mM s a m,..o' M .. m .,a.~. .
. M (nn;J *c.: OCRE raises the issue of whether other effects of hydrogen control J - , . N ,. system operation will aggravate the course of an accident. For this propo-
* ^
'i+..E .. s - sition it cites three possible events that would have adverse effects on
^
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. ' .*J mi the course of an accident and could arise because of hydrogen combus-tion: these are excessive drywell pool loads, loss of decay heat removal
'(. , ;,c 'y y
. ... . ,- capability and secondary Ores in containment. OCRE Proposed Opinion
. , m 7 . q. J - at 47-50.
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G,. fh$,[.t .MP' , . , Q., , OCRE's challenge concerning drywell pool loads is based on a paper jj $NYedC presented at a scientific conference by one of the Applicants' witnesses. [5 , wn([MN{ w.hO kW D , 'm), u .u.o , u . The paper outlines a scenario by which differential pressures between containment and drywell could result in a violent overflow of the sup-W9d@',.:.Q. M.Q x. %rh.N-4 . e@byd<i%e Mi .4, pression pool into the drywell. The analysis cited no adverse effects on MNdb.[J; MSM9 - essential equipment from such an occurrence but indicated that the ef-fects would be evt.!uated. That scenario was evaluated as part of a
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MG , . .JW. fdy. p.- - number of sensitivity studies using conservative assumptions in the q.n , . q u( c l' CLASIX model. These studies involved analyses beyond the design if g/
' - base case. The design base case evaluated the potential consequences of
. 17
- u c - .
$ Dy'
_.. any reverse or forwand pool swell. OCRE brought out on cross-
~ ~
' ' ~
examination that the Hydrogen Control Owners Group has a plan for long term investigation of pool-swell loading from hydrogen combustion.
'> However, in the case of Perry, the preliminary evaluation had considered differential pressures and those pressures were found to be less than the ones analyzed in the design basis case. Finding 153. The Board concludes that drywell pool loading is a design basis consideration which, for the
? '. ". . ,v _
most part, is beyond the scope of matters relevant to hydrogen control. Si'h jfQ.,;;u 1
~
ysf Ji W D - ,2 ,V It is analyzed separately in the Applicants' overall safety analysis. There
;yM?.' . T.32.C ; is linkage with the hydrogen control problem because hydrogen combus-A J c. 1.-s c ?D tion during the degraded core event could produce differential pressures between containment and drywell. However, those differential pressures have been considered and have been found to be less than the design basis case.
The Board does not find it unusual or alarming that sensitivity analy-ses utilizing very conservative assumptions might well show pool loading conditions as described in Applicants' paper. We disagree with OCRE, however, that such analyses need be accepted as literal descriptions of likely events during a degraded core accident at Perry. We conclude that the possibility of pool swell during a degraded core hydrogen release inci-
,y dent has been considered in Applicants' preliminary analysis and that it
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does not hold significant potential for further aggravating the course of
%; . " Q ., n .- T.. .s - an accident at Perry.
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y Y ',Q,y . y; Decay Heat Removal
~ g .u.m gqA , s. , y ._
fc < r.r @A y - f - OCRE asserts that in a degraded core accident, hydrogen combustion i J .d.JJ; hl.,Ni
,' adds heat to the containment atmosphere in addition to the decay heat f *M@WV?f,n .: s being added to the suppression pool. It is therefore appropriate, in its ..) ( C $-
view, to examine the decay heat removal capability in a situation where 1, [ $ '.O:1 '. s
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1 % r _, heat from hydrogen combustion must also be removed from contain-4- -?:1 .. ,, J e' ment. The evidence shows that there are redundant safety-grade residual - @M;,A . -23 b!?$3+ 7: 1 heat removal (RHR) loops available for suppression pool cooling. The y%y, .yp.t p W ggi.;w ' ._ ..., . m active components for the RHR system are located outside containment
.J.m p 4 % v. d and would survive hydrogen burning. Even if both RHR loops were lost
, m v n e w 2:~>;W.% P 4:An.s. Hw f MeMWW A.ib ~.HN. for suppression pool cooling, elevated pressure in containment could be r C M" MMUQ% p"..J3t,S? yg<g<my Nc7Fs handled by the containment spray which passes through heat exchangers
,, s
+ .~
- 1:4 before being sprayed. Thus, long term decay heat removal would be assured.
p g,.s, ;, @z ..W . 4;J . . w. . #.3 a+. m , a p %g The Board concludes that active heat removal systems exist.which m bq:,J* , g , would remove decay heat and the heat added by hydrogen combustion
?' , .# :.c '
from the suppression pool. Beyond that, the PNPP evaluation shows that hydrogen burning occurs early in the scenarios and that peak sup-pression pool temperature occurs after several hours. Thus, hydrogen burning would have an insignificant effect on the overall suppression pool temperature. Finding ISS. Mr. John M. Humphrey is a former GE engineer who expressed some safety concerns regarding Mark III containment. OCRE referenced a so - ' ' @j . C1,j91 r . 5 d
'df",%c called Humphrey analysis which indicated the containment spray opera-
- tion might significantly reduce suppression pool mixing effectiveness
, W."yjyQ ' qty and lead to pool stratification. The Board, however, is satisfied that the' 1,J.R gR AA , w. so-called Humphrey concerns were evaluated for Grand Gulf and that h they have been adequately considered not only by the Applicants but by the NRC and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. These r , . concerns were determined not to raise significant safety issues. Finding 156: We conclude that problems associated with decay heat removal would not be further aggravated by hydrogen combustion in a degraded core accident. 1
- i. . m..
7 n q L e_. _ Secondary Fires
- . gagg.%$ - ? OCRE asserts that Applicants have not evaluated the potential for q: wp 7.,Ww
#m M secondary fires in containment that could be initiated by hydrogen burn-
[e$'hhC7$$.p$y r g8AwgMW % g ; mWe. , n . P. ,'< . % ,. ing. Such fires, according to OCRE, would affect containment pressure and temperature profiles. There is no evidence in the record in support 3 nm W.G e c , M . ; of these assertions. The potential for secondary fires, particularly cable fires, has been considered in tests at Fenwal and the Nevada test site. ' M,3., r q .,hh,M$$.c. 4, + $m d',9 ',* Cable burning has been shown only for hydrogen concentrations above dbe&CN M., a,E.. ., 10%; although some burning was shown in other tests, they were not of the type of wire used in the Perry containment. Evaluations conducted 2 f9 5 ,p'..o X$.: W %~ s&c w b.fn$ Mumm,. u
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s , a _2 _ u ;_.. _,._ a. _ : --n.__.____. ... . ..u.__ 4 c j' for Grand Gulf have shown that there is no potential for secondary fires 'I,. ; . for the temperatures predicted by CLASIX-3. The Applicants are confi-
,,. "' i . ,.
s dent that secondary fires will not occur because the temperature peaks x a 'J - predicted for PNPP are intermittent, of short duration, and not uniform w, 5 ' 9- - . , .V ,. W . s >< t..,.. throughout containment. The Board concludes that the risk from secon-
- i. ~s 'G, m . GW "#.ma.4,,1 -
dary fires im.t iated by hydrogen combustion in containment is low and n, . . , ., ,- , that its consideration for the preliminary analysis by the Applicants has
~
';i t,- .7 _ ;.f been adequate. Findings 147-148.
. ,l <
The Scope of the Preliminary Analysis
. We stated at the outset that we did not intend to define the precise boundaries that separate the preliminary analysis from the final analysis because the Applicants submitted an extensive and detailed analysis of hydrogen combustion during degraded core events at Perry. We permit-ted OCRE considerable latitude in its cross-examination during the hear-ing because these boundaries were undefined. OCRE took advantage of the opportunity and included many subjects in its cross-examination
., 7 that may well have gone beyond the bounds of a reasonable preliminary 9 ..
~ '
j;2 .' analysis on the comparatively narrow safety issue of hydrogen control. E E -
- c. $ ~ Now, having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the basic
. W; questions that have to be answered at the preliminary analysis stage are whether an igniter system has been installed, whether it will function as designed, whether hydrogen will burn as predicted, and whether the con-tainment and essential equipment will retain their integrity under the pressures and temperatures predicted. From this we conclude that it was j appropriate to permit cross-examination on the CLASIX code which pre-
. dicted the temperatures and pressures in containment. Cross examina-tion on defective welds was also appropriate since this appears to be directly related to containment integrity. We also believe it was appropri-ate to inquire into equipment survivability and the basis for the Appli-cants' confidence that essential equipment in containment would survive
-' '+- '
the temperatures and pressures produced by hydrogen burning.
~~~ ^
The hydrogen rule for Mark 111 containments, however, is not the
, cC y .
- vehicle by which we test the comprehensive safety analyses of other sys-
.. .- - , s..
t g ,, . "' tems that are performed by Applicants and Staff. Many of the systems that OCRE wanted to include within the scope of the hydrogen control ( .w . issue are analyzed elsewhere in other parts of the overall safety analysis.
' - i Even though linkages exist we do not believe that an analysis of hydro-
,;' gen control raises each and every other aspect of the Applicants' overall
. : c. safety analysis. For example, we conclude that the issue of hydrogen control does not raise the question of containment spray availability
]
1 4 4 > 548 l-i I
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t
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+
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~
l I - i during a hydrogen event. This is not because spray availability is unim-m m.- 1 portant, but because that issue is analyzed elsewhere in the overall
-c.f.; ! j d % M , % safety analysis. Similarly, the broad issue of station blackout, while im-
, .M.ph >
portant, is not raised by the hydrogen rule, even though linkages exist
.e s.6+$yMW%.c,4.; @$@p . for which the Staff may require additional analysis.
- W r~$ p p W . M :- N $ We do not similarly analyze each of the other systems that OCRE chal-
~l [ ' ' d@MQWMQ2 " ;
I lenged in this case since the foregoing is sufficient to highlight our con-4 cerns. The hydrogen control issue can become unnecessarily complex g4W e Q"..Mi'%@.p eN &( .; 5 because of the number of systems and components in containment g,G'MMM Ag which could be brought into play during a degraded core event. We do
- 1
- e. %
not believe that safety is well served by conducting fragmented analyses of complex systems and we conclude separate contentions should be the
~ -
I means for challenging separate engineered safety systems and that the
, reliability of these systems should not be treated as collateral to a hydro-3 gen control contention.
,I The analysis of hydrogen combustion during degraded core events is a j new task in overall reactor safety assessment. New cases will produce new thinking on the issue which should be integrated with past analyses
_ sr . . as provided for in the rule. In an area of actively developing technology,
,sw ; s AgUhqwc. however, we are not comfortable in relying alone on references to similar reactors that have been licensed in the past. It would have been he!pful-1rffMIfh.y.Wk wg /%d:Wc
__ , ,,;.,; m e n' - . had the Applicants and Staff referenced other portions of the Perry FSAR or SER for its conndence that other containment systems that could be linked to the hydrogen control issue would function and that
, the linkages to hydrogen control had been considered. We conclude, however, that the Applicants' analysis of hydrogen control at Perry was thorough and reasonably within the scope of the preliminary analysis prescribed by the hydrogen rule for BWR Mark III containments.
< :.- , Conclusions
.. Based on the entire record in this matter, the Board concludes that
.. m A.s
, . 2 .pp g ge @ . the Applicants have made an adequate demonstration in. their prelimi-0.'. <
W.p.9 MM d nary analysis that: a hydrogen ignition. system has been installed at r -% MNNNh@NNA
+ ,w gem M .n.m ;
Perry; that the system will ignite hydrogen in lean mixtures, which will prevent the accumulation oflarge amounts of hydrogen m containment; tp..M,pQ
+
,. g
._ea _.rg .
- y. h that the Perry containment will survive the controlled combustion of hydrogen without failure; that essential equipment in Perry containment -
,,l.
- pA h-@glM,m..s .9 .is4qualined 7J? 2.*.2 to withstand T M;the% temperatures and pressures likely to be
"' <>h49.%; - P
, ;, generated during hydrogen combustion.
.u o,yy,a % gw w w,>. .
', . ,; ? 9,96% gg} g pnp g befib h.% p5 4 f6 hh*' *
. x :.w at %;.
. L: ,% f . f;':
' . /.
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s < , Our confidence that the Perry containment will survive hydrogen com-bustion is not based on computer analysis of containment response alone. We agree with OCRE that modeling of containment response is a process having some uncertainty. We are satisfied, however, that work 1.n._, s... 3. j, 1 is progressing on the problem of containment response analysis and that a
. 7. e v f:U M' progress has been made since the time the Sandia report for Grand Gulf
., y j y c /e, . was published. We do not accept CLASIX-3 results regarding tempera-
, . 4, , y , ;. g . . tures and pressures as exact representations of what would take place N. - 9 during hydrogen burns in containment. We do accept that these analyses
- - ", p ' are based on conservative assumptions, and are more likely to overesti-
' rnate than underestimate the response. Succeeding versions of other
~
models analyzed in the Sandia report also show that earlier models erred on the side of conservatism and that more recent results tend to show less severe conditions than earlier efforts. In the face of analytical uncertainty, however, which we believe still lingers, we must also find that other aspects of the analysis are conserva-tive or that margins of safety exist which could add to confidence that containment will not fait during hydrogen combustion. We find that sub-s _ stantial margins do in fact exist on containment strength. The ASME standards for analyses of stre'sNs'are conservative and show that there is
. Je.
- 4. dh.O 7, f6.;
]h likely added strength of PNPP containment and its penetrations beyond that performed under the service levels prescribed by the rule. Further-
_ _ . - ...m. s;" more, there is considerable margin between the peak pressures shown by CLASIX and the ability of the containment to withstand internal pres. l sure. The first yielding of containment conservatively could occur in a penetration at approximately 50 psig while the CLASIX-3 model shows that peak internal pressures would occur at slightly over 21 psig. The yield strengths are likely higher and the pressures generated are likely I lower than those stated. Thus there exists a substantial, though not pre-cisely measured, margin between the peak pressure likely to be generat-ed and the pressure-containing capacity of the most limiting penetration in containment. The overall shell of the containment is considerably stronger than the
,, ,e limiting penetration. We conclude that there is virtually no likelihood that the containment shell itself would fait catastrophically during a l
- .. ,~. ,
4,e a .a ,1.Q, * ', .. _ degraded core accident at Perry when the hydrogen ignition system func.
- - tions as designed.
, , y, Based on the foregoing considerations, the Board finds reasonable assurance that the hydrogen igniter system at Perry will function as de-signed and that the containment will retain its integrity during a degrad.
i ed core accident which generates up to 75% of the equivalent metal-2, water reaction. 6 i
- 550
. - . _ _ - _ . _ . , _ . . . , . . , _ , , _ _ ~ . . . .
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9 L/ . 4 - ? g. .,':,. Q.4 ' I w....__....._.e.,. _ _ . _ . . _ _ . - . _ . . ._ __ ... . . _ , . ,_ _ l The Applicants' analysis of its system is in compliance with 10 C.F.R. ( . , { 50.44(c)(3) as it addressed the preliminary analysis, provided applica- ! . ble requirements stated herein are met. The items that the Applicants .
, ~
1' C '
'.. and Staff have agreed to defer to the final analysis were technically rea-
- .f . . ( '. ' . 4 QQ sonable and were not selected, as alleged by OCRE (see OCRE Proposed Opinion at 52), for the mere convenience of Applicants and Staff. Find-7
." ' C ings 157-158. The deferred items represent events of remote likelihood
'A or refinement of existing analyses and we see no basis for deferring reac-tor operation pending completion of those analyses. The Board finds that Applicants have carried their burden of proof on issue 8.'2
! C. Diesel Generators (Issue 16)
,I OCRE and Sunflower filed contentions concerning the PNPP diesel i generators. By order of July 28,1981 (LBP-8124,14 NRC 175), the Board dismissed both contentions for lack of specificity. OCRE submit-ted a motion to resubmit its Contention #2 on September 26,1983. By Order of December 23,1983 (LBP 83 20,18 NRC 1404), the Board granted OCRE's motion in simplified form. As accepted by the Board
. the new Contention 16 reads as follows:
- m. , ,
~~
Applicant has not demonstrated that it can reliably generate emergency onsite l power by relying on four Trans.imenca Delaval diesel generators, two for each ofits Perry units. The diesel generators installed at the Perry plant (PNPP) are meant to supply . emergency power for the plant safety systems in case offsite power is not available. Finding 159. This requirement is set forth in General Design Criterion (GDC) 17 of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A. Various models of Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI) diesels are in use at a number of nuclear plants. When a TDI diesel at the Shoreham nuclear plant suffered a catastrophic failure of its crankshaft in 1983, a "TDI Owners Group" was formed for the purpose of developing a pro-
- - ~- gram to qualify the reliability of the units. The proposed program, which L -
. e m. >- included design review, inspection and testing, was submitted to NRC
- Ok!'
' 71
. in March 1984 and was approved in August 1984. Finding 160. The basic issue involved in this contention is the adequacy of the Owners L - ' ' - -
- m. Group plan.
, ~ a. z,. . ,< , ;. , ; <
. 'i[
~
l( II WNie our findings are adverse to oCRE. we compliment its reprewntative ror her efrorts in making a* , W.' ' 4. a substantial contnbution to the record which sided matenally in clanrying compten assues that surround the hydro 5en control problem. l
. , r.
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. ; Applicants and StalT presented panels of expert witnesses." The wit-
', . ~, ^}47- ._
. . .' nesses' testimony described in detail the Owners Group plan and the
,, implementation ofit by PNPP. Phase I of the plan was to qualify compo-
.j ~ [q i.'% s Q,;j.
O.ci gQ e nents which, based on actual operating experience with TDI diesels, ex-hibited possibly generic problems. Sixteen components were identified
- A p.WfM.$/M-% 4g as being of concern and were subjected to testing and detailed design g5 6yggl3. T$ review. Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) reviewed the Owners Group effort for the Staff and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) was
_,... . ...;# m,, %. ..~d.Nw9- c JP - w p n &y g .+:"2 yQ retained by the Applicants to independently review the analyses. Both of
~
3',W Q9.Wj% these elTorts were performed independently of TDI. Findings 161-165. W4 ~
- Phase II of the plan was aimed at all other components which were im-s o gg. - -2n portant to engine operability. These components were subjected to
/ % 1w' design review and/or quality revalidation. (DR/QR). A " lead engine"'
Y ' w concept for component testing was also employed, in which results of tests on engines using the same compo'nents could be applied to the same model engine at other sites. Findings 166-167.
~ q- A' revalidation phase required that the engines be completely dis-
, e assembled, inspected and reassembled under the owner's quality control
.V .me and quality assurance program. The final phase of the Owners Group sy - ;i;M M.% MMd( plan is an ongoing one: it involves the preparation and implementation of comprehensive maintenance and surveillance programs. As the Board m
- w. .;. ^t ],;.u.g-hyQi understands it, this will be a "living document" which will be revised
. -- . m s;w, 9h.?Mut
.quj *~ ,. and refined as operational experience dictates. Findings 168-169.
Both Applicants' and Staff's witnesses testified that the following had
.m been performed at PNPP:
- 1. All requirements of the Owners Group Phase I, including dis-assembly, inspection and replacement / repair / modification as
> necessary, of the sixteen critical components had been completed (Kammeyer, ff. Tr. 2179, at 12; Kammeyer, Tr.
~c .
v , 2182; Christiansen, ff. Tr. 2179, at II: Christiansen, Tr. 2499);
~'
- 2. The Phase !! design review and quality revalidation had been
~
completed on all applicable' components of the Unit i engines
, ' . 3.fu e (Finding 167);
- $f y. W. ,.
h, r . s ;g h
'?' * +' . 3n9; -mig $if. &; g*g Q
- 7 f
rg*' g -.f9,9 % gh s [* 83Apphcants' witnesses- Edward C. Chrisuansen Perry semor design engineer: John C. Kammeyer, s Program Manager. TDI owners Group; and Charles D. wood, lit. represenung southwest Research in.
, " a!,~
. *, ? 7; *t.c.1 31 sutuie (swRI). staff witnesses- Dr. Carl H. Berhnger. NRC Project Group Manager of the TDI Diesel
.;' / , -. Task Force: Drew Persinko, a member of the NRC TDI project group responsible for review of the
'.J 9 PNPP diescis. Dr. David A. Dmsee, a representante of Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) which was s , 9 d.-
" 4.. y
- w ; il' providing techmeal asustance to the staff an its review of TDI engmes; and four diesel engine and metal.
. q '. J N. . ' ., _. c, lurgy consultants to PNL. Dr spencer A. Bush. Howard M. Hardy. Adam Henrickten and B.J. Kirk.
wood. ohio Citizens for Responsible Enersy (oCRE). lead intervenor for Contennon 16. presented no
.. . . J , :%,' l5 : . .w. -
- " direct evidence, but cross eiamined Appheants' and staff's witnesses.
q '(' t . ***I.f * &I
'4, 552 f
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3
- 3. The Unit i engines had operated for some 20 hours at the time
. of the hearing (May 1985) with no mechanical problems en-
., countered (Christiansen, ff. Tr. 2179, at 31,32); and
, N -
- 4. Applicants have developed and are performing maintenance
, +;.
g.C. , 'dh.,.Mj . and surveillance programs based upon recommendations by A c, l ' . J the Owners Group (Finding 169). g. 4.' ~.p .T, OCRE submitted extensive proposed findings, including not only find. y, : . 4 " ings in opposition to the Applicants', but also findings where OCRE N .
!l
_' agrees with Applicants. The. Board commends OCRE for this helpful practice. The Board sees no reason to discuss in this Opinion items on .
- 7. >
which the Applicants, Statiand OCRE agree and are concurred with by .
'l the Board. ,
; OCRE attacked the credibility of the Owners Group on grounds that it i
! i was a " lobbying force" rather than a " disinterested technical organiza-tion." OCRE references several Owners Group internal documents and ! ' meetings with NRC Staff on various subjects relating to the Owners Group program as evidence of an organization concerned more with its ; i commercial interests than an objective requalification of TDI's diesel en-l gines. OCRE Proposed Opinion at 1316; OCRE Proposed Finding 57; W,U,, s 5 OCRE Exhs. 2, 4,5, and StalT Exh. I at 3. The Board finds no violation ! A>mi of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion I, in the activities of either !: ~
.~.+-~ the Applicants or the Owners Group as alleged by OCRE in this conter l l
tion. We find no need to consider the motivation of the members of the . Owners Group - the plan they produced is the Board's concern, and to that, the plan speaks for itself. We have not burdened this Decision with a pointless finding by-find-ing discussion of irrelevant matters. Those concerns which we consider
- to be of such significance as to possibly affect our decision are discussed
[. below. l l , GeneralDesign Criteria i and 17 - i y ' . f," Z t ' OCRE maintains that the TDI QA/QC programs have been shown to 4.0 M/ be inadequate, and alleges that the Applicants have not complied with M C4 hC.
+ -
either GDC 1 or 17 of Appendix A in 10 C.F.R. Part 50. OCRE Pro-
~_ggR> - J.
4 posed Opinion at 11 13. GDC 1 requires that systems and components
, N ._ ; d important to safety be designed, fabricated and tested to quality stand-Q *,~ ' I
' ards commensurate with the importance of the safety functions to be
~ ' -'
!1 performed. GDC 17 requires an onsite electric power system with suffi-g ,
. .$ 3 . ja cient independence, redundancy and testability to perform its safety cdt.
..w w . .
function assuming a single failure. The safety function is to assure that
, Y ,
l. ! l ., 553
., . i
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, qq : . f design limits are not exceeded during operation and that the reactor's
[ Qg i core is cooled while maintaining containment integrity. y u ]( s. . OCRE contends that the performance specifications for Perry's diesel Y*
%$@Q@M g:-Af9E N@@$3/ N NPiQ@TV engines, SP-562 and its attachment SP 706, should be the standard by which the design criteria are measured. OCRE Proposed Opinion at fMA.Q.Q%& iWi pdMD Wijd.0/a.x.ae 11-12. Although the Board agrees with OCRE's critical assessment of m TDI %,xa,@w.n,&+W QA/QC, we must view the entire record : as the measure for evaluat-dh Bh. WxW gMh 3rd;,e M g @ i i : whether ing the acceptability of Perry's TDI diesel engines. The question here is the requalification of Perry's engines through the Owners g&nb M W M f' Group program meets the requirements of GDC 1 and 17. The TDI
[F*d^WkN.jk L
*'/f N$d ' r. 3D'&s/.1 QA/QC f program was audited in 1982 and was found to be adequate for G.?, g, w1.f'.;M7. ? , ' *quality . Massurance . representative full time to TDI to monitor any safety-S: the manufacture of spare parts. Nevertheless, PNPP assigned its own p . ".gg [ 7' ..s[
niated engine component ordered. Christiansen, ff. Tr. 2179, at 16: A ' * ' ,
~
-[ * , . ! Christiansen, Tr. 2236 37,2267.
7 d I
~, , bd - l '
Engine Maintenance and Suneillance
- + ; a .x .
T + 1c" ..n. MySM N 91 - OCRE charges that PNPP's surveillance and maintenance program ap-pears to be directed at only meeting requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 21 h v.,4t MSNNNfE$ k @ ErfG h h h u
@h a
o , h'ok*' k' and f 50.55(e). OCRE Proposed Opinion at 19. While the requirements of the regulations are in fact met, the PNPP program goes much farther,
- as it includes all the recommendations in the DR/QR report as well as .a , a.#
o those proposed by PNL and SwRI. Finding 169. OCRE also states that there is "no assurance that the maintenance and surveillance program ,
- 1. w will exist for the life of the plant, or that it will be implemented at all."
fI . i
. OCRE Proposed Opinion at 19. The Board cannot find the basis for this statement in the record, but does find that testimony presented by the a' ' ' '
" - witnesses indicates otherwise. See, e.g., Staff Exh. 4, Tr. 2468. The Board concludes that the PNPP maintenance and surveillance program
. 1. ..13 ,
*~ at PNPP provides assurance of the reliability of the diesels.
7 * 'OCRE has cited a failure in the Owners Group program in not pre-
, l.7 '
n~ 14 . -
- J- / - venting a crankshaft oil plug defect at Gulf States Utilities' River Bend reactor. The deficiency was reported by TDI on March 18,1985, in a 10
..f@h.~ $d TG7%$g,N;.;i ;, - f.!A @ W M C.F.R. Part 21 letter to the NRC. OCRE Exh. 8. It is not clear that the 7ayw g.g;wn q.NMi defect referred to, which apparently was a crack and not a failure in the b@ Q y'^~? 4 ,( W ]NC.,
O @ G R -m, - j;,.
- f. I
.m , _
J oil plug, is a potential problem at Perry. Nevertheless, it is being subject-ed to inspections by the Applicants. Finding 170. The Board concurs' with the view that the Owners Group program was never expected to 'm ,Y M. -
- e. A:',
... . . .r. s
.C Z: D. eliminate all possible failures in TDi's diesel engine components. Kam-W, ' e.ay w.r .O, yy , s. .'J. m." w . .. , r meyer, Tr. 2230 31; Christiansen, Tr. 2262-63.
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. _ . _ ..e. m. . - _ . . _ . . a .m . . __. . _ . . _ . . -
StaffReview ofOwners Group Program
# OCRE criticizes the Staff's review of the adequacy of Perry's diesel en-w s gines for permitting plant operation prior to completion of the NRC's final approval and allowing Phase il requirements and diesel tests and in-q;c% ,
. .. a.: g < . . . .
spections to be conducted after the reactor's first refueling outage. This,
' " the Intervenor concludes, is tantamount to " interim licensing" which to
> J
- s. OCRE is an illegal act that violates the dictates of GDC 1 and 17. OCRE l
; Proposed Opinion at 19-23. The basis for OCRE's position is its interpre-
- - tatian of Staff's testimony that outstanding items in SSER 6 would have
< to be resolved prior to operation above 5% of power and that mainte.
nance and surveillance programs could be deferred until the first fuel outage. Stefano, Tr. 2473 74; Berlinger, Tr. 2305: OCRE Proposed Opin-ion at 20-23. Interim licensing is a concept developed by the Staff to apply to those i plants who would otherwise be eligible for near-term operating licenses prior to their completion of the Owners Group program. StafT Exh.1, ff. Tr. 2284, at 1319; PNL-5161 at 19. However, the Intervenor concedes that Perry has not applied for an interim license (OCRE Propose?.Opin--
- ion at 20) and most of the outstanding items in the Staff's evaluation
.q. 1 , ,
. have been considered and handled by the Applicants. Applicants' Rebut-
' ~ ^
tal Testimony, Tr. 2489-2509. Additionally, PNPP has completed its Phase !! program and the Staff will perform a reassessment after the first refueling outage to audit the reviews _ previously performed on the diesel engines by the Owners Group and the Staff. Berlinger, Tr. 2305. The Staff review of the adequacy of Perry's diesel engines to perform reliably has been extensive, it has included: (1) a review of the Owners Group program; (2) a review of the adequacy of Phase I compo-nents at Perry and the results of the engines' disassembly and inspection; (3) Phase II DR/QR review by PNL of Comanche Peak's diesels and their similarity to Perry's; (4) previous conclusions by Staff on similar engines at Comanche Peak, Grand Gulf and Ca.awba; (5) preliminary
.c ~ findings by PNL on Phase I generic components: (6) proposed preopera-L : *.b - ,
tional testing program at PNPP; (7) Applicants' commitment to a main-
> tenance and surveillance program which will be reviewed by Staff; and .M'e.. p.y.'
c- . m,.. i j b : " , . . . .y (8) Applicants' commitment to a torsiograph test and several other 7 technical commitments dealing with cylinder heads, push rods and water
',5
- pump shafts. Staff, IT. Tr. 2281, at 12 Staff Exh. 2 at 1 2.
[(4 ..
. %...-- Phase IComponents 1 .'
u e ve. - w- ,
, Of the sixteen Phase I components, OCRE does not question the ade-quacy of the design or construction for eleven of them. OCRE Proposed , e 4
555
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>- Opinion at 24 25. However, it expresses reservations about the mainte-
- nance and surveillance program as applied to these components. Id.;
7%. 2 5 :g )y _ ]- - OCRE Proposed Findings 33-64. The Board, as a result of the assurances
, .'d a;.f.e - Q: :$) pp,i and commitments by the Applicants on the record, finds no reason exists to question the implementation of an adequate maintenance and glif.;-M. gOgopr,W@h,4w.a 9/ %'# MWn surveillance program.The record shows that the requirements set by the
$P W; @ @ N MQ Owners Group plan, the DR/DQ report, PNL, SwRI and the Staff have - 7D %,p.,.W4. N .$,?n.p;e. _.ea ' d
, g + mn ~ C .
. . d M.a A ,,d ,/'. either been satisfied or committed to by PNPP. Findings 171-183. The Board finds that each of these components is suitable for its intended f O. D,'.
4 #. '.G.lq g ./.O'p g s service, q s , y y n ,- .c The components contested by OCRE were the engine base and bearing y., .a - # '** . caps, the turbocharger, the crankshaft, the' cylinder block and cylinder ao .0 , ,W, liners. w 3, m
- Engine Base and Bearing Caps . /
Althori,h OCRE did not contest design adequacy, it contends that the L material properties of the base need to be analyzed to assure that the specifications are met. OCRE Proposed Opinion at 25-26. Its rationale
, g.kg7./ for this position is the fact that the cylinder block, for which the Owners
/a ' ny".3 .7 3l.@ t Group requires such analysis, is made from the same material. The Bo.trd is unpersuaded by this argument. The record shows that only one 7 ,n C. ' .4 .7...,y; .
.. ;e .. .T ~ v in operation. The Owners Group considered that, due to the low loading
~
of the base and its excellent operational history, routine maintenance
- anJ inspection were adequate to assure the reliability of the base. Find-ings 184-185. The Board agrees and finds Applicants' procedures accept-ab:e.
7 :
- 1
. Tu bochargers OCRE contends that the TDI diesel's turbocharger is unsuitable for
- - ;' nu: lear use because the fabrication technique used in assembly of the Ep?f.; , g y, . . u ;. . ~ e. .- no!zle ring vanes does not permit the testing of the vanes for incipient y" . , *.'* a fai'ure. OCRE Proposed Opinion at 26-27. Statf agrees that due to visual y.'g - l. , f:m w .p & ~ ~ jn , 1, -,... g o.;'% ' W@Jf " '
, an.1 physical impediments such testing is not possible, but argues that enhanced surveillance and maintenance of the turbocharger will provide
, ' : .rG . 0; t reasonable assurance of turbocharger reliability. Staff points out that y - ;[;; , --T.* .
w hile it is possible for vane failure to seriously damage the rotor, opera-
- 0. V W . .
t.onal experience has shown that no turbocharger in nuclear service has u . , s . G
,,,t U-.
.e"-
JQ. ' ;
.. .?
, p . f.. *,hown severe damage from vane failure. Staff, ff. Tr. 2281, at 39 40.
The Owners Group analysis of this problem also recommends that the 4 7 * =.
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. turbine exhaust temperatures be monitored, as high temperatures indi-E... . cate a condition which might lead to a more likely failure situation. Kirk-j M E.
t , , j j wood, Dingee, Berlinger, Tr. 2354-56. The Board agrees that it is unfor-
- cT; .. Jp;. ,64:a.. , tunate that the nozzle ring vanes cannot be tested for incipient failure by h h 4 $ .x f;. conventional nondestructive testing methods. However, on the basis of -
$$@. N., d@MM@f'ip,cjMA* M/ &. C$M u 4 the record before us, which includes evidence of testing, commitments vr jdNa pgp[' ! - , vio.> N.;Q ^ + -
. to the Owners Group recommendations on surveillance and mainte -
nance, and the operational experience of these turbochargers, we find J.7f q f>:#; _ there is reasonable assurance that the turbochargers can be relied upon ( Cy i '
- J
%h% to perform adequately. Findings 186-187.
OCRE also questioned whether the turbochargers have been properly
;,2. . . - .
ih " 7 - aligned to their mounting brackets. OCRE Proposed Opinion at 27. Staff e
. testified that the mounting is adequate to prevent problems, and that the vibration testing to be performed will confirm it. Finding 188. The Board agrees that vibration testing is adequate to determine any misa-s lignment problem.
. ,. ~
,. Crankshaft -
H wAM s.;b . - p OCRE's concerns with the PNPP crankshaft are several: the result's
; wp,,-~j , @y g - of tests on the San Onofre desels, the use of the Diesel Engine Manu-5;. Y
~
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