ML20137X918
| ML20137X918 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1986 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-86, REF-PT21-86-084-000 ANPP-35237-EEVB, DER-85-41, PT21-86-084-000, PT21-86-84, NUDOCS 8603120037 | |
| Download: ML20137X918 (9) | |
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Arizona Nuclear Powegroj3ctFM 12 3' P O BOX 52034 e PHOENIX, ARIZbNA 85072-2034 Fe bruary, 20,,,1986 ANPP-35237-EEVBJr/LAS/DRL-92.11 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention:
Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2, 3 Docket Nos. 50-528, 529, 530
Subject:
Final Report - DER 85-41 A 50.55(e) and 10CFR21 Reportable Condition Relating to Burned Wire Insulation File:
86-006-216; 86-056-026; D.4.33.2
Reference:
(A) ANPP-34498, dated January 9, 1986 (DER 85-41 Interim Report)
(B) ANPP-34665, dated January 16, 1986 (DER 85-41 Time Extension)
(C) ANPP-35228, dated February 19, 1986 (DER 85-41 Time Extension)
Dear Sir:
Attached, ia our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under 10CFR50.55(c) referenced above. The 10CFR21 evaluation is also included.
Very truly youro, p
CU.A.
mLL E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President Project Director EEVBJr/DRL:ske Attachments cc:
See Page 2 8603120037 960220 PDR ADOCK 05000528 l\\
S PDR E&Y
Mr. D. F. Kirsch Acting Director ANPP-35237-EEVBJr/LAS/DRL-92.11 February 20, 1986 Page 2 cc: Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 A. C. Gehr (4141)
R. P. Zimmerman (6241)
Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway - Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339
F Mr. D. F. Kirsch Acting Director ANPP-35237-EEVBJr/LAS/DRL-92.11 February 20, 1986 Page 3 bect J. G. Haynes (4063)
W. E. Ide (4074)
D. B. Fasnacht (6330)
A. C. Rogers (4056)
L. A. Souza (6085)
T. D. Shriver (6195)
D. E. Fowler (6260)
C. N. Russo (6330)
J. R. Bynum (6125)
J. M. Allen (6130)
D. R. Canady (6345)
G. A. Hierzer (6330)
W. G. Bingham (6330)
R. W. Welcher (Bechtel/Norwalk)
H. D. Foster (6330)
D. R. Hawkinson (6330)
M. L. Clyde (6079)
B. T. Parker (6345)
J. R. Provasoli (4057)
D. N. Stover (4082)
J. D. Houchen (6330)
J. E. Kirby (6501)
ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT (ANPP)
PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, 3 1.
Description of Deficiency During routine maintenance, it was observed that the field wiring for Valve IJ-SGB-UV-1136B had melted and burned insulation. This condition was documented on EER 85-SG-150. A subsequent inspection of valves 1J-SGB-UV-1135A, B and 1136A (under Work Request No. 126081) and valve lJ-SGA-UV-138A (under Work Request No. 145922) found additional burned field wire insulation.
The field wires are part of the cabic routed to these valves to provide solenoid coil power and valve position indication. The cables are qualified in accordance with IEEE 383 for use inside containment and the cable insulation is rated for 90*C (194*F) conductor temperature. The vendor internal wires are rated 150'C.
The same condition as designed exists in Units 2 and 3.
EVALUATION The high temperature in the valve operator is the result of heat conduction from the connected valve which is subjected to high temperature process fluid. The damaged insulation is due to contact with hot metal parts within the valve operatcr. The high temperature damage could result in premature f ailure of the cable insulation. This could Icad to loss of control power to the valve and possible incorrect valve position indication in the control room.
A survey to determine the extent of potential wire insulation damage was made of the other Q-class Target Rock valves in each unit. The results of the survey are shown in Attachment A.
Twelve out of the 73 valves which were evaluated in each unit had the potential for similar wire insulation damage. These valves are:
J-SSN-HV-15, 16, 17
.J-CHB-UV-924 J-SCA-UV-134A, 138A, 1133, 1134 J-SGB-UV-1135A, 1135B, 1136A, 1136B The remaining 61 valves were climated from further investigation because they satisfied at 1 cast one of the following conditions. These conditions are also referenced in Attachment A for justification.
1.
The design or operating temperature is below the rating of the wire insulation (194*F).
2.
The normal operating temperature is below the rating of the wire insulation, but the process fluid temperature is greater during a LOCA. Ilowever, this is acceptabic because the field cable is qualified for in containment LOCA temperature conditions.
3.
The valve terminal block is located in an extended termination box. Therefore, the field wires are terminated away from the main body of the valve operator and would not contact the hot.
metal parts. Reference drawing N001-7.09-204-3.
4.
ECSA (Electric Conductor Seal Assemblies) or high temperature wires are aircady used for teruination at the valve operator.
The thermal rating of these' wires are the same as the vendor internal wiring provided with the valves.
Of the 12 valves, only valves J-SGA-UV-134A and 138A are considered to have a safety significant impact. Loss of control power would result in the inability to open these valves upon AFAS. This could prevent the operation of the steam turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The remaining ten valves are used to provide sampling for the PASS or isolation for the main steam system steam traps.
In all cases, these valves would fail' closed, thus providing isolation and the ability to safely shutdown the plant would not be jeopardized.
The root cause of this problem is attributed to Engineering's oversight in verifying process temperatures and relating this information to field wiring thermal ratings.
In addition to evaluating the Target Rock solenoid valves, Engineering reevaluated the effects of process temperatures on terminations within other line mounted devices (i.e., MOV's, solenoid valves by other manufacturers, and instruments). The field terminations on the MOV operators are not susceptible to high temperature f rom the process line due to the physical distance and intermediate couplings between the MOV operator and the process line. ASCO solenoid valves are not used in high temperature applications. Valcor solenoid valves, which are subject to high temperatures, ire already terminated using high temperature Kapton wire supplied
- Conax Corporation.
Finally, an engineering review of the instcument index found no suspect terminations associated with Q-class line mounted instruments. Therefore, this deficiency exists only at the Target Rock solenoid valves identified.
II.
Analysis of Safety Implications Failure of Valves J-SCA-UV-134A and 138A in a closed position could jeopardize the ability to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident by rendering the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump inoperabic. If this condition were to remain uncorrected, it would represent a significant safety condition. Therefore, this condition is evaluated as reportabic under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(c) and 10CFR21.
III. Corrective Action The twelve valves in each unit identified in part I will be reworked.
liigh temperature Kapton insulated wire supplied by Conax Corporation will be used to terminate the field wires at these valves.
r-q The high temperatuce Kapton insulated wire is rated 150*C which has the same rating as the vendor internal wires. The valves were qualified using 150*C internal wires.
n.
Valves 1J-SGA-UV-134A and 138A were reworked under Work Order No.
120829.
b.
The remaining ten valves in Unit 1 and all 12 valves in both Units 2 and 3 will be reworked under DCP's 10E, 20E, 30E-SG-147.
c.
Vork on valves 2J-SGA-UV-134A and 138A will be performed by Work Order No. 127716 prior to mode IV entry. Work on the remaining Unit 2 valves will be completed prior to mode IV entry. All associated work required on Unit 3 valves will be completed prior to lift.
o ATTACHMENT A' DER 85-41 Page 1 of 3 Target Rock Valves Under Spec JM-603 Process Design Fluid Tag No.
Description Temp Temp Remarks EWA-LV-91 Ess. C1g. Wtr. Surge 200'F 80*F Item 1 EWB-LV-92 Tk. Fill Viv.
4 DGA-UV-01 Dg. C1g. Wtr. Surge KJB DGB-UV-02 Tk. Makeup Viv 4
ECA-LV-15 Chilled Wtr. Expansion 250*F AMB ECB-LV-16 Tk. Makeup Viv.
4 4
llPA-HV-7A
. 112 Analyzer Inlet and 350*F 120*F Norm HPB-HV-7B Outlet Viv 350'F LOCA
-Item 2 IIPA-llV-8A IIPB-IIV-8B o
HCA-IIV-74 CTMT Press Transmitters llCB-IIV-75 ISO. Viv.
1.
IICC-IIV-76
!!CD-IIV-77 IICA-UV-44 CTMT ATM Radn. Monitoring ESCA-Item 4 IICB-UV-47 Monitoring ISO Viv.
ESCA-Item 4 HCA-UV-45 Item 2 IICA-UV-46 4
l SSN-l!V-15 111 Press Smp1. Viv.
650*F 650'F Re-work SSN-IIV-16 700*F 1
SSN-ilV-17 4
y u
SCB-PV-306A N2 Supply Viv.
140*F AMB Item 1 SCB-PV-306B For ATM Dump Viv.
SGA-PV-313A SCA-PV-313B 1 r RCA-IIV-101 Reactor Coolant 700'F 650'F ESCA-Item 4 RCB-llV-102 Vent Viv.
650*F RCA-IIV-103 120*F RCB-IIV-105 120'F RCA-IIV-106 650*F
+
RCB-IIV-108 RDB-UV-407 Rad. Waste Drains Sys.
250*F AMB Norm.
250*F-Item 2 Accident i
V ATTACllMENT A DER 85-41 Page 2 of 3 Process Design Fluid Tag No.
Description Temp Temp Remarks SIA-UV-708 PASS ISO Viv.
250*F 350*F-LOCA Item 2 SIA-UV-709 350*F 300*F-LOCA 4
4 SIB-UV-710
<r IIPA-UV-23 CTMT 112 Control Sys.
250*F 120*F-Norm.
Item 2
> 120
650*F 485'F Re-work CIIA-UV-715A 250*F Spare (Not Installed)
Spare IAA-UV-2A (Not Installed)
'r AMB Item 2 GRB-UV-2 RAD Drain TK. Cas Surge Spare GAA-UV-1A IIDR Ext. CTMT ISO Viv.
AMB (Not Installed) 140*F Spare CAA-UV-2A (Not lastalled)
SGN-PV-1128 N2 Supply Viv.
AMB AMB Item 1 CllN-ilV-923 PASS ISO Viv.
250*F 120*F Item 2 RDN-ilV-409 RAD Waste Drains Sys.
AMB Norm.
200
- F -
Item 1
,r Accident SGA-UV-1133 Steam Traps ISO Viv.
600*F 553*F Re-work SCA-UV-1134 SGB-UV-1135A SGB-UV-1135B SGB-UV-1136A SGB-UV-1136B ar GRN-AV-169 Auto N Dilution Viv.
400*F 171*F Item 1 GAA-UV-01 N2 CTMT ISO Viv.
AMB AMB GAA-UV-02 140*F 4
f-
?
ATTACHMENT A
- DER 85-41 i
Page 3 of 3 l
Process Design Fluid Tag No.
Description Temp Temp Remarks CHA-UV-715 PASS ISO Viv.
250*F 120' Item 1 IAA-UV-02 CTMT ISO Viv
'o 120' Item 1 Steam Supply Viv. to l
SGA-UV-134A Aux. Fdw. Pump 700*F 553*F Re-work l
SCA-UV-138A CE Supplied Target Rock Valves SIA-HV-605 Safety Injection Tank 200*F AMB ECSA-Item 4 SIA-HV-606 Vent Viv.
SIA-IIV-607 SIA-IIV-608 SIB-l!V-613 SIB-IIV-623 SIB-IIV-633 l
t SIB-IIV-643 1r l'
SIB-UV-659 llPSI Recire. to 350'F 120*F Item 3 SIA-UV-660 Refueling Wtr. Tank Viv.
l
- CIIB-IIV-203 Regenerative llent 650'F 496'F ECSA-Item 4 l
- CHA-IIV-205 Exchanger to Aux. Spray Viv.
ECSA-Item 4 l'
CilN-IIV-526 CVCS Letdn. Cont.
550'F 485'F Item 3 l
and Bypass Viv.
l l
RCE-IIV-403 Reactor Vessel Seal 650'F 565'F Drain to RDT Viv.
.p
- Target Rock valves used for Unit 1 only.
Valcor valves used for Units 2 and 3.
Items 1 through 4, see Section I for explanation.
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