ML20137V747
| ML20137V747 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1985 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-85, REF-PT21-85-498-000 ANPP-33988-TDS, DER-85-32, PT21-85-498, PT21-85-498-000, NUDOCS 8512100075 | |
| Download: ML20137V747 (5) | |
Text
v Arizona Nuclear Power Project P O. BOX 52034 e PHOENIX, AFH2ONA 85072-2034 November 13, 1985 ANPP-33988 -TDS/TPS
,O f %.T b[G' p 9 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V CD 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 6
>f f
Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Attention:
Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects Subj ect:
Final Report - DER 85-32 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating to Building Interface Seismic Separation File:
85-006-216; D.4.33.2
Reference:
A) Telephone Conversation between A. lion and T. Siegfried on September 17, 1985 B) ANPP-33719, dated October 15, 1985 (Interim Report)
C) ANPP-33852, dated October 28, 1985 (Time Extension)
Dear Sir:
Attached is our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e), referenced above. The 10CFR21 evaluation is also included in this report.
Very truly yours, etL8 4 4 E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President Project Director EEVB/TPS/ldf Attachment cc:
See Page Two N A N:hDA E 1 1 iil i21.0!! 9 CU.i 0512100075 851113 PDR ADOCK 05000528
-Q u S
PDR y,Va i
l i t t
1
.... ~.
tg
}4 I
L
'Mr..D. F. Kirsch L
DER 85-32 Novembi.r 13, 1985
'Page K l
- cc Richard DeYoung, Director.
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission "i
Washington, D.' C.
20555 J. G. Haynes D. B. Karner W. E. Ide D.
B.' Fasnacht A. C. Rogers L. A. Souza T. D. Shriver
-D. E. Fowler C. N. Russo i.
J. R. Bynum J.
M.' Allen D. Canady A. C. Gehr G. A. Hierzer p
W. G. Bingham t
R. W. Welcher H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson
+
R. P. Zimmerman r
M. L. Clyde B. T. Parker J. Provasoli.
D. N. Stover J. D. Houchen J. E. Kirby Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339
).
.n r.
I f.
~ '.
~
/
w
% g up.
l 3"
?
g f
- 9 9
s 9
_x
)
y'?
.l
/?
' ~
?,, '
s :
J
%~
f y
e f
[*
e-
9 FINAL REPORT - DER 85-32 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)
ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT (ANPP)
PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, 3 I.
Description of Deficiency DER 85-03 addressed seismic gaps between the containment liner plate and attachments thereto and the internal structures and their attachments.
As an adjunct to this, Bechtel conducted a review of seismic gaps outside of the containment; viz., those between adjacent buildings and their attachments. During this review, it was discovered that in Units 2 and 3
{
several hundred locations exist where seismic separation has not been
{
maintained between attachments to one building and any adjacent building and/or its attachments (Reference SCIP 667.0). This requirement is reflected on Civil / Structural drawings which require a six-inch gap between adjacent buildings.- Note, when individual systems that span between buildings were j
designed, provisions were made to allow for the relative seismic displace-ment, however, provisions were not made to separate the systems from inter-facing buildings and their attachments.
{
t EVALUATION A walkdown per SCIP 667.0 was performed to identify and evaluate all as-built conditions with less than a six inch separation between adjacent buildings or their attachments. Calculation 13-CC-ZC-293 has been initiated to determine j
the actual anticipated relative interfacing building motions and to evaluate I
the flexibilities of some of the systems which would interfere based upon ss-built. separation and the anticipated motion at that location. All but the j
following 3 as-built conditions have been found to be acceptable based upon
{
or.e or more of the following:
a.
The as-built separation was greater than the anticipated relative motion.
_l b.
The system components which would interact are not required during or' after the design basis seismic event.
l c.
The system components which would interact have sufficient flexibility to accomodate this deflection without failure of the system.
1.
Pipe Support / Steel Beam Interference (Units 1, 2, and 3)
The brace connection to a containment building embed for pipe support RD-259-H-003 is in contact with the top flange of a W12 x 65 structural steel wrap-around beam in the Auxiliary Building of Units 1, 2, and 3.
This rigid pipe support component will force the beam to develop the required deflection at its flexible connection.
It cannot be demon-strated that this connection will survive a design basis event.
Once this connection has failed, the beam will fall and dra:; down pipe support RD-259-H-00A which supports line RD-259-HCBA-1/2" on tte contain-ment side of its isolation valve and thus damage the line. This line is required to remain leak-tight, however leak-tight integritv cannot be
r; y g
h1 n
/
t
=
f
~N
/ )
FINAL REPORT - DER 85-32
(
/
November
- 1985 i
)
1
.Page Two i '
c 3
I
,J
'3
-demonstrated under the conditions described above.'
+
Other safety-related systems which have a high probability of being g
damaged from the' failure of this beam are as follows:
).
- 1. ' Cables ESI2SSclRA and ESI28BC1KA y
I 2.
Pipe SI-E-026-CCCA-2" i 3
,e i
a J d d
3.
. Control Valves for pipeline SI-B-308-GCBC-24"
~
,2. ' Pipe Support / Isolation Valve Interference (Unit 3) g
>-4
'At.another isolated location.in Unit'3,]Auxifiary, Building pipe b
> support RD-259-H-00A is-in contact with Containment Building isolation valve SI-V-463 on;line SI-E-149-CCBB-2".
This SI system is required 3 6 for' safe shutdowh'and it also cannot be demonstrated thht it will remain functlpnal during or after the design basis seismic event.
t m
l_
l' 3.~
~- EER' 85-SG-121 evaluated similar-~ interference problems in Unit 1
~
with supports SG-174-H-00A and SG-174-H-00B and they will b'e s
q mo'dified tolaccosodate skismic differential movements.
.y b
~
,e.
~
-The' root,cause of this deficiency'is that:various' engineering disciplines-were Mot made, aware'of the requirement',Leontained in Civil / Structural m
fdrawings. f to maintain seismic separation between items attached to adjacent
! buildings.- The -3: examples of seismic interference cited above would not 1~;
Esidered.in the~ design / layout process.
. (in the-absen_ce:of any cautionary direction or procedure) normally be con-t 3
(_.f It isibelieved-that the investigations of DER 85-03 (relating to inter al
- gaps) and DER 85-32 (covering external gaps)' assure that all seismic inter-
~
ference: problems have been identified and corrected.
I In addition,-a review for other. design areas was completed to determine if there were:similar-circumstances where various enginee, ring. disciplines,were f
'not aware of cross-discipline requirements.- One other area was noted which
- involves' power cable conduit' installation adjacent to hot process pipes.
~
- Appropriate detailed notes have been provided on the electrical drawings to assure adequate separat, ion for these installations.
~
.. i t JII. Analysis of Safety Implications N
+
IBased on the.above evaluations, the conditions are reportable under, the 3
- requirements'of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21 since, if left uncorrect'ed, L
they would: represent'a'significant safety condition.
i III. : CORRECTIVE ACTION
)
Engineering Evaluation Request (EER) 85-ZZ-058 evaluated support i
13-RD-259-H-003 in Unit 1 which was evaluated as having the potential n
a, j
ii V'
~
'f:
, 3=
..).:p,.
FINAL ~ REPORT DER 85-32 November-1985 Page Three-for failure. This support was repaired by W.O. No. 107597.
EER 85-SG-121 evaluated supports 13-SG-174-H-00A and 13-SG-174-H-00B in Unit 1.
Repairs to these supports is scheduled to be made by November 11, 1985.
Non-Conformance Report (NCR) CX-5239 for Unit 2 was dispositioned on September 6, 1985, and NCR CX-5240 for Unit 3 was:dispositioned on September 18, 1985.
The dispositions state that these safety significant conditions described herein be eliminated by notching the pipe supports to allow relative building motion without interaction. Other interferences were reworked'per the NCR's even though it was demonstrated that a safety significant condition did not exist at these locations, including the interference between pipe supports 2-GA-002-H-00M and 2-SG-174-H-00A and H-00B mentioned in the initial DER report (Reference calculations 13-CC-ZC-293 and 13-MC-SC-511).
SCIP 667.0 addresses conditions in Units 2 and 3 that existed prior to July 10, 1985.
- To prevent recurrence and address'the root cause Drawing Change Notices 3
(DCN's) and Specification Change Notices (SCN's) have been issued as noted to address future installations.
Specification or Discipline Drawing Number Civil 13-C-00A-001/DCN 41 Electrical 13-E-ZAC-080/DCN 30 Controls 13-JM-702 para. 4.11/Rev. 3 Plant Design' 13-PM-204/SCN 4010 13-PM-205/SCN 4011 Mechanical P-00C-001/DCN'2 13-MM-650-164/BR 4 13-MM-650-200/BR 3 A sample of the note added is:
)*.
BUILDING INTERFACES SEISMIC SEPARATION CRITERIA All attachments to one building or structure shall maintain
=4 a six inch minimum gap with any interfacing building and its d
attachments. All installations made prior'to July 10, 1985
'have"been evaluated by 2ER 85-ZZ-058'in Unit 1, and SCIP 667.0'in Units 2 and 3.
j i
)
i l
.Av i