ML20137T215
| ML20137T215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 02/07/1986 |
| From: | Bailey J GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GN-799, NUDOCS 8602180280 | |
| Download: ML20137T215 (2) | |
Text
._
Georgia Power Company
)
. Project Management Route 2 Box 299A Waynesboro, Georgia 30830 f
i Telephone 404 724-8114 404 554 9961 Southern Company Services, Inc.
Post Office Box 2625 VOgtle Proiect Birmingham, Alabama 35202 J
Telephone 205 870-6011 February 7, 1986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation File:
X6BB06 Attention: Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief Log:
GN-799 Licensing Branch #4 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 REf: Letter Number GN-701, dated September 30, 1985 NRC DOCKEI NUMBERS 50-424 AND 50-425 CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NUMBERS CPPR-108 AND CPPR-109 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT-UNITS 1 AND 2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
Dear Mr. Denton:
The NRC staff is presently reviewing the GPC request to not install an automatic sprinkler system inside containment and has requested additional information related to the concentration of combustibles inside containment.
The requested information and additional justification for the deviation requested in our letter to the NRC dated September 30, 1985, is provided in the enclosure to this letter.
Figures 1-6 of the enclosure provide the
-physical layout of the redundant safe-shutdown equipment inside containment.
The above referenced letter also indicated that the safe shutdown analysis for Plant Vogtle would be completed by March 1986. Due to the extent of the analysis required, it is expected that the analysis will not be. completed and ready for NRC review until May 1986.
If your staff requires any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,
. k.
8602180200 060207 ADOCK 050g4y4 J. A. Bailey PDR Project Licensing Manager F
JAB /RLK/caa Enclosure xc:
R. E. Conway L. T. Gucwa R. A. Thomas G. Bockhold, Jr.
J. E. Joiner, Esquire T. Johnson B. W. Churchill, Esquire D. C. Teper (w/o Enclosure)
A b#
M. A. Miller (2)
W. C. Ramsey B. Jones (w/o Enclosure)
Vogtle Project File I
I
i
<s ATTACHMENT id DESCRIPTION OF DEVIATION VEGP is committed to conformance with Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9 5-1.
Paragraph C.7.a of CMEB 9 5-1 as presented in FSAR Appendix 9B, recommends the installation of automatic fixed sprinkler systems for fire. protection in containment.
Contrary l
to this commitment, VEGP does not intend to install automatic fixed sprinkler systems for fire protection in containment.
JUSTIFICATION VEGP has provided fire suppression.and/or manual fire fighting capability for all significant fire hazards in containment.
Any credible fir,e which could occur would not impair the ability to achieve and maintain safe (cold) shutdown.
This provision of
. fire protection and this ability to accomplish safe shutdown is not dependent on the existence of automatic fixed sprinkler systems.
The installation of automatic fixed sprinkler systems in the VEGP t
containment would not significantly increase the level of protection beyond that provided by the following protection measures and other design features which will exist:
1.
The reactor' coolant pumps are provided with an oil collection system that directs leaking lubricant away from hot surfaces into a remote collection tank. This system is designed, engineered,'and installed so as to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake.
These collection tanks are provided with flame arrestors in the tank vents.
In addition, infrared flame detectors are strategically located in the vicinity of the reactor coolant pumps.
This t
fire detection provides early warning of a fire should one occur.
This fire detection system alarms locally and in the control room.
2.
Local standpipe hose stations are strategically located in containment to allow manual fire fighting should a fire occur.
Each hose station is also provided with a portable j
fire extinguisher.
3 Charcoal filter units in containment are provided with an integral water fire suppression system.
1
00 1
4.
Electrical cable trays in containment containing safety-related cables and the trays containing the pressurizer heater cables, are provided with line-type heat detectors which provide early warning of an incipient fire condition by alarming locally and in the control room.
5.
All electrical cables used in containment ere IEEE 383 qualified (demonstrate minimal flame spread) thereby limiting the capability of a fire to spread along the cables should a fire occur, 6.
The effects of a fire are contained locally because the height and volume of the containment structure allow excellent heat dissipation and because of the low combustible loading.
~
7 The number of equivalent
- standard 24-inch-wide cable trays (both safety-related and non-safety-related) stacked one above the other is less than six.
There is only one set of cable trays stacked five high.
Typically, a " stack" of
' cable trays consists of only one electrical separation division (i.e., A,B, C, D, or N).
Cable trays of the redundant safety-related trains never cross.
8..
Separation of safe shutdown trains (equipment and cables) is as presented in the following table.
In general, the west and north portions of the containment annulus area outside the secondary shield wall and the north steam generator / reactor coolant pump area inside the secondary shield contains safe shutdown Train B equipment and cables.
Similarly, the east and south portions of the containment i
annulus area outside the secondary shield wall and the south steam generator / reactor coolant pump area inside the secondary shield contains safe shutdown Train A equipment and cables.
While the secondary shield walls are not rated fire barriers, their thickness and penetration design for radiation shielding considerations provide a significant impediment to fire propagation past the barrier.
In addition, the limited fire hazards inside containment as previously discussed, are not situated so as to signi-ficantly challenge the ability of the secondary shield walls to preclude fire propagation.
As noted in the attached tables, some changes to the existing design are required to accomplish the design objective.
l
'The. definition of an equivalent standard 24-inch-wide cable tray is per BTP.CMEB 9 5-1 section C.5.e.
2
VEGP UNIT 100lfrAINMEIR FIRE EVErr SAFE SHtfrDOWN EVALUATION
'(Notes at end of table)
MINIMUM HORIZONTAL DEVICE TAG NUMBER SEPARATION COMPONENT DESCRIPTION (1)(2)
TRAIN
'A' TRAIN
'B' DISTANCE COMMEKTS RCS hot leg / core exit tenperature TE-0413A 40 ft.
TE-0443A i
RCS cold leg temperature TE-0423B N/A See Note 3 TE-0433B Pressurizer level LT-0459 LT-0460 65 ft.
See Note 4 RCS Pressure (wide range)
PT-0405 PT-0403 24 ft.
See Note 4 i
Neutron flux RE-13135A RE-13135B 88 ft.
Steam generator level (wide range)
LT-0501 LT-0502 22 ft.
See Note 5 LT-0504
- LT-0503
-CVCS normal charging path HV-8146 N/A See Note 6 CVCS letdown isolation LV-0459 LV-0460 N/A See Note 8 l
Steam generator blowdown isolation HV-15216A.
N/A See Note o HV-152168 HV-15216C j
HV-15216D i
- Core exit thermocoupler 1E-10002, 10003, 10006, 10008 thru 10012, 10014, 10016 thru 10019, 10021 thru 10026, 10028, 10034, 10036, 10037, 10046 and 10050.
4 0
VEGP UNIT 1 00KTAINMENT FIRE EVEKr SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION (Notes at end of table) 1 (Sheet 2 of 3)
MINIMUM HORIZONTAL DEVICE TAG NUMBER SEPARATION COMPONENT DESCRIPTION (I (2 TRAIN
'A' TRAIN
'B' DISTANCE COMEKTS I
Safety injection accumulator HV-8875A HV-8875E N/A See Note 7 vent valves HV-8875B HV-8875F HV-8875C HV-8875G HV-8875D HV-8875H HV-0943A HV-0943B RHR suction from the RCS HV-8701A HV-8702A 60 ft.
l HV-8701B HV-8702B l
1 i
S
}
i i
l (sheets 3 cf 3) j NOTES:
1.
Only components having circuits inside containment and which must remain operational to achieve safe (cold) shutdown in the event of a containment fire are listed. Spurious actuation concerns (such as the i
pressurizer PORV's) are not alleviated by separation. Using protected instrumentation, the plant j
operators have sufficient information to evaluate the effect on safe shutdown capability resulting from spurious actuations as well as other fire induced failures. Plant procedures will define the operator 4
responses to mitigate an undesired occurrence.
i 2.
Safe shutdown can be schieved using only two steam generators. Because of their association with the i
motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, steam generators 1 and 4 (RCS loops 1 and 4) are considered Train
{
A and steam generators 2 and 3 (RcS loops 2 and 3) are considered Train B.
sare shutdown devices
]
associated with these steam generators and RCS loops have equivalent train associations.
3 All RCS cold leg temperatu're instrumentation is associated with separation Train B.
Indirect indication of RCS cold leg temperature for loops 1 and 4 (see note 2) is available to the plant operators via j
steamline (steam generator) pressure indication. These steam line pressure transmitters are located j
outside the containment building.
4.
Three hour rated raceway fire proofing and radiant energy shield required to obtain the horizontal l
separation distance.
I 5
The safety channel designation for steam generator level transmitters LT-0503 and LT-0504 is being j
changed to make then consistent with the train associations defined in note 2.
Cable routings will j
maintain a miniman horizontal separation distance of at least 20 feet, either by location or by use of i
three hour rated protective coatings.
1 6.
Redundant means to accomplish the function is not dependent on a device or electrical cables located
[
inside containment.
i i
7 Due to the proximity of the safety injection accumulator tank vent valves, it may not be possible to depressurize all acetanulators following a fire inside the containment building. However, undesired i
accumulator injection into the RCS can also be precluded by closing the acetauulator injection valve which is capable of being closed from the control room or by local manual operator actions. The canbustible loadings in the vicinity of a safety injection accumulator tank are low and it is not expected that a single fire could cause damage to the cables at the redundant vent valves and the tank injection valves i
and also cause mechanical damage so as to preclude local manual operation of the injection valve.
8.
For a fire in the vicinity of valves LV-0460 and LV-0459 (inside the secondary shield wall) letdown isolation can be achieved by closure of HV-8149A, HV-8149B and HV-8149C (outside the secondary, shield wall). All valves fail closed upon loss of air or electrical power which is the desired safe shutdown j
position.
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a o 30TES-SAFESNUTOOWN 1.
LD V L NE DEP COMPONENTS TRAIN e
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RE XIT THERMOCOUPLES I
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Figure 1 REACTOR COOLANT HOT LEG TEMPERATURE INDICATION
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- 460, 459 Figure 2 PRESSURIZER LEVEL INDICATION
's SAFE SHUTDOWN MTES:
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V L E DEP COMPONENTS TRAIN y
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Figure 3 REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE INDICATION
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SAFE SHUTDOWN WTB:
COMPONENTS TRAIN
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Figure 4 NEUTRON FLUX INDICATION
SAFE SHUTDOWN MTES:
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COMPONENTS TRAIN 0
YR G
LT501 A
- 2. DASMED NEAVY LINE DEPlCTS LT502 B
EWSEODEO CONOUlf LT503 A
- 3. THIS FIGURE SHOWS THE CABLE LT504 8
ROUTINGS PRIOR TO IMPLEMENT-ATION OF THE POWER CHANGES i.
TO LT503 & LT504.
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I Figure 5 STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL INDICATION
SAFE SHUTDOWN EE COMPONENTS TRAIN ya ing H8 A
HV87028 8
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' /j 870 A Figure 6 RHR SUCTION VALVES
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