ML20137R406

Informs of Violation of Safety Tagging Procedure SA-AP-ZZ-015(Q) Concerning Relief Valves in CO2 Sys Tank.Mgt Fired All Contractor Personnel Present to Cover Up Incident. Immediate Action Requested

ML20137R406
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	10/14/1985
From:	AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA), Public Service Enterprise Group
Shared Package
ML20137R336	List: ML20137R331 ML20137R406
References
NUDOCS 8512050491
Download: ML20137R406 (3)

Text

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Hopeereek Nuclear Project Hancocks Bridge,NJ-08038.

To: Distribution 10 1985 Iear Sir, This is to inform your office about Safety Procedure. violations done by the operations group at the Hopeereek Nuclear Flant which have been covered up by firing a few contractor personnel by the management. The procedure in violation was the Safety Tagging Precedure S!.-AF-ZZ-015(Q) .

The incident happened as follows:

One of the relief valves on the CO2 System tank became defective and so a SDR was written by the startup system engineer, R.Choromanski, directing Bechtel Construction to replace the defective relief. alve, FSV-3470E. A red blocking tag was requested by Construction foreman M . Wright to block off FSV-3470B side so that the defective valve could be replaced.

The tagging request asked to position the hand lever of the three way isolation valve below to block off the FSV-3470B valve.

This request was in accordance with the tagging procedure step 5.4.1.3 which further says that "---- the request should include only the tagging necessary to make the equipment safe for work."

As per the above request, a red blocking tag #038114 was placed on the handle of the isolation valve by the operations group on 9/30/85.

This was verified by R.Choromanski and Wright .

On 10/2/85, a c{struction crew under the supervisjon of M . Wright removed the relief valve as per the SDR. After they removed the valve, it was noticed that there was another red blocking tag on the relief valve itself with the same tag # 038114.

Later enquiry in to this matter revealed that the operations  !

department was responsible for adding a second tag after changing the tagging request themselves without the knoweledge of the originator of the request, M . Wright or startup engineer.

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The FSEG management fired all the contractor personnel present at the site of work to cover up the whole incident.

There were serious violations of the Safety procedure SA-A?-ZZ-015(Q) done by the Hopeereek Operations group in the above incident as follows:

1. Changing the tagging request by the operations, group is not allowed in the procedure, per sections 4.6,4.7&4.8.

2. Adding a red tag on the' relief valve was unnecessary in violation of section 4.4.4 since the tagging request clearly indicated that the work involved nothing but the removal of that relief valve.

3. The supervisor incharge of the work ( Wright) was not informed about the addition of a second tag in violation of section 4.6.9.

4. The intent of section 5.1.1.9 is,1f there is any confusion about any tagging, Operation shall NOT place any tags till the confusion is resolved with the originators. There is no justification to add any more tags in case there was any confusion about the tagging request.

5. The Operator who added the second tag on the tagging request did not print his.name nor sign the tagging request in violaton of section 5.1.2.6.

6. The Special Instructios line on the tagging request was not filled as per note 5.1.3.2. This should have been the place for verification signature by the Bechtel Contractor supervisor that the safety tag was properly hung as per his request.

This was not verified by the Operations grou'p.

7. The safety tag on the relief valve was NOT hung in a visible location in violation of section 5.2.1. The constuction workers, the construction supervisor Wright, the startup engineer R.Choromansky all alike have not seen the red tag on the relief valve prior to the removal of that valve.

( It may be noted here that the removed valve was put back on 10/3/85 and the tag has been repositioned in a visible location now. Please make an immediate investigation before the records are further tampered with.)

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8. In general the Operations group showed their technical ignorance by putting a red blocking tag on a relief valve , which cannot be blocked technically.

We strongly conclude that the Hopeereek Management fired the wrong people. They should have fired the violators in the Operations group who were the only one responsible for the above incident.

It may be noted here that this has happened in the same 17 ton CO2 System which caused a so called malfunction ( another OovGr up!) while under the supervision cf the Operations Group that resulted in the injury of 22 innocent construction workers.

Ve urge that your responsible office should investigate into this matter and take immediate action in exposing the mismanagement in this plant.

We are unable to disclose our names due to fear of repercussion from the Hopeereek Management.

( A concerned group of Construction Engineers at Hopeereek) pistpigutiogi

1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Region 1 631 Park Ave, King Of Prussia, PA-19406.

2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office Of Public Affairs, Washington DC-20555.

3. President, New Jersey Board Of Public Utilities 1100 Raymond Blvd, Newark, NJ-07102.

4. President, Public Service Electric and Gas Hancocks Bridge, NJ-08038.

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