ML20137E697

Intervenor Commonwealth of PA Mailgram Exhibit I-1, Consisting of 810223 Memo Forwarding AEOD, Rept on Investigations Into Info Flow Re TMI Accident,

ML20137E697
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	12/07/1984
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Ahearne, Gilinsky, Hendrie NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
SP-I-001, SP-I-1, NUDOCS 8508230333
Download: ML20137E697 (11)

Text

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"!W!" l MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Ahearne Commissioner Gilinsky

, gg gg Commissioner Hendrie Commissioner Bradford 0FFICE 0 SEC:" -

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FROM: William J. Dircks

. Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

FURTHER INFORMATION - AE00 BACKGROUND PAPER ON TMI INVESTIGATION REPORT Per your request, attached is background information prepared by AE0D pertinent to paragraph 4 of their memo transmitted to you earlier this date.

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• William J. Dircks -

Enclosure:

As stated cc: IE SECY

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1 REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATIONS IllTO INFORMATION FLOW CONCERNING THE TMI ACCIDENT r

. BY: Dr. Harold L. Ornstein -

Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data Februa ry 19, 1981

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, , INTRODllCTION During the week of January 18,1981 the ' author was requested by the Director of the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data ( AE00) 'to review draf t reports written by HRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement -

(IE) and the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on the information flow during the accident at Three Mile Island (reference 1 and 2). The review of those documents was informal and was done within a two-day time frame.

The author had served on NRC's Special Inquiry Group for more than half a year, and prior to his review of the IE and House Committee Reports had considerable knowledge of the events that took place at TMI during the accident, and the actions of the Met Ed, NRC and B&W personnel involved in the accident.

This document contains the author's vi,ews which are not necessarily those-of AE00 or the NRC.

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REVIEW Of IE AND HOUSE OF REPRESLNIATIVES Col"illTEE DRAFI REPORTS ON INFORKATION FLOW DURING THE AQC10ENT AT'THREE MllE ISLAND 1

1. The facts, as presented in References 1 and 2, reveal that:

'. (1) A case for showing that the Met Ed staf f purposefully issued unt' rue statements or withheld information to deceive or mislead the NRC and the -State of Pennsylvania regarding the severity of the March 28,1979 accident is a weak one which is based upon circumstantial evidence. It is doubtful that a " conviction" is possible without' employees coming forward and " confessing" to such acts.

(2) In lieu of concluding that the Met Ed staff lied to the NRC and officials from the State of Pennsylvania, one is led to conclude that Met Ed's top plant management acted in an incompetent manner, i.e., did not put together the significance of numerous tell tale symptoms, each -

of which in itself was a sign of significant core ' degradation, which, when taken concurrently, revealed an uncontestable picture of significant damage to the core, that was placing the plant in a cnnfiguration beyond .those which had been analyzed, and had the potential for further degradation with significant impact upon the public health and safety.

. The symptoms included:

a. High in-core thermocouple temperatures (obtained per G. Miller's request using direct millivolt readings because the plant data logging and recording equipment could not handle temperatures above 700*F). .

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b. Extremely'high containment building radiation levels.

c. A containment building pressure spike at 1:50 pm-'and.the subsequent initiation of the containment sprays. Note: The.re were two independent containment pressure recorders in plain view of the control room occupants at the time of the " thud."

. Also, note that the Met Ed staff's training taught them that two independent signals were required to start the containment building equipment (one spurious signal would not have done it).

d. High hot leg temperatures, 730*F (loop A) and 780 F (loop B),

revealing the presence. of superheat and an uncovered core.

e.. Overexposure of the Met Ed staff who took samples of primary system coolant (Discussion subsequent to my review of References 1 and 2 highlighted the fact that the radioactivity and chemical analysis associated with the samples should have been an indicatinn of significant core degradation).

II. It appears that in many areas, the IE investigation report (Reference 1) did not go far enough, and in many areas the conclusions &nd recom.mendations are not supported by the facts, e.g.,

(1) Page.83,'"At 12:17 pm, headquarters requested the core exit thermocouple -

readings. This request went unanswered. (The readings were requested .

again at 4:00 pm. This investigation did not attempt to determine why the da'ta was not provided."

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(2) Page 88, With '.tet Ed's help, "Dornsife (BRP) believed that, although the plant was not in the desired mode, the' plant, was stable and that the

, core was being cool'ed through-a feed-and-bleed process..." Howe'ver, it is apparent that Met Ed had not-told him that such a process was not a

fully analyzed and that the equipment was operating beyond its design capabilities.

(3) Pages 89, 90, 93, "In general, the BRP expressed satisfaction with the information supplied to them by Met Ed.on the day of the accidents"

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a conflicting statement regarding Gerulsky (BRP); Gerulsky

". .. attributed his loss a confidence to Met Ed's failure during the (Lt. Governor's) briefing to admit offsite releases of which BRP was aware. This was reinforced by Gerusky's perception of an attitude conveying that the accident was over and all that remained was cleanup." , .

Versus another conflicting statement: " Based on the information recei'ved, the. investigators accepted the fact that some of the State people believed they had been misled."

(4) Page 99 - One investigator recommended that Met Ed be required to show cause why Gary Miller should be allowed to continue to be involved in the licensee's nuclear activities in a supervisory capacity, citing, among other things:

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"The failure of knowledgeable plant perscnnel to put together symptoms -to review previous assessments in light of later information, and to more thoroughly understand the accident is considered to be a supervisory or management deficiency in Miller's performance on the day of the accident. His role should have been to'cause those under his direction to be more thorough and complete in their analyses. He should have questioned explanations that were given to him (for example, the explanation about the core exit thermocouples and the containment pressure spike indications)."

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Nonetheless, the majority of the investigators concluded that enforcement

, action directed toward Miller is unwarranted.

(5) The case against Miller is reinforced by the Troffer tape and by IE's discussion of them. Nor.etheless, the majority of the IE investigators concluded that enforcement action against Miller (on the, grounds of

. incompetence) is unwarranted. Excerpts from the Troffer tape discussion follow.

Page 91 "If the Troffer tape transcript is read without ,

relating it with what the investigators believe to be Miller's lack of understanding and without relating it to what Floyd has been told, it can be inferred that Miller is describing a better situation than.he

. believed existed. Contrary to this inference, the investigators conclude that Miller was describinq how the accident was assessed at that time in the morning. A c'omplication to this conclusion- is the information that Kunder was providi_n,q to the Region about one-half hour later.

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The investigators conclude that althouqh Kunder had a more accurite perception of the accident, Miller and others did not share Kunder's concerns at the time." -

page 92 "Near the end of the Troffer transcript, there is a specific passage that could be interpreted to mean that Miller believed the situation to be more severe than he told Dornsife..." The investigators ,

conclude that this passage means that the situation was not understood ,

at the time, but it does not mean that Miller believed that the situation was continuing to deteriorate. The phrase, "If we had a leak we'd be all right," seems to reinforce the conclusion of a lack of understanding because procedures for handling a leak existed."

Page 95 "... information was not volunteered concerning the potential for degradation of plant conditions or concerning the uncertainty of the method being used to cool the core. The investigators conclude that the resoonsible Met Ed personnel did not perceive the _

situation to be as bad as it really was."

(6) Page 106 -.The investigators concluded that: "In the assessment of potential citations, the use of Section 6.9 of the technical specifications for failure to report information on March 28, 1979 was found to be inappropriate ... In relation to core temperatures, it was potentially applicable to the fuel degradation reporting reouirement; however, a belief that fuel damage had occurred was reported early in the ' morning. Lack of knowledge by those onsite of the extent of core damage preclude this meeting the requirements for a citation for failure to report." , .

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This conclusion totally neglects- the fact the utility management was-fully aware of the high in-core thermocouple readings (via direct mill-volt' measurements) and the fact that it took many days until. such information was revealed.to the NRC.

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References

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1. January 17, 1981 memorandum for the llRC Commissioners from V. Steilc, Jr. , transmitting a tiraf t copy of "lE Investigation into information

. Flow During the Acci' dent at Three Mile Island." .

2. Draf t copy of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs' report, " Reporting of Information Concerning the Accident at Three. Mile Island." '

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