ML20137E620
| ML20137E620 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1986 |
| From: | Falevits Z, Smeenge R, Williams C, Wohld P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137E502 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-85-34, 50-374-85-35, NUDOCS 8601170286 | |
| Download: ML20137E620 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000373/1985034
Text
g:.'hl. 2?
';
~
W
r. ; j :
n
1._ s. .
<
.
_ < m ,, ,
,w
g
-.
,
.
"
.'
U.S. NUCLEAR RECJLATORY COPNISSION
'
' REGION III-
.
-
.
3
Reports No. 50-3f3/85034(DRS); 50-374/85035(DRS)
S
Docket Nos.- 50-373; 50-374
, . Licenses No. NFF-11; NPF-18
i.
L}cenpae: Comenwealth Edison Corpany
-P. O. Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690
,
,
l
Facility Nare: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2_
,
l
Inspection At: LaSalle Site Marseilles, IL
'
'
L
Inspection Conducted: October 21-23, 30-31 and November 1, 1985
.
6.fC2fG 97*ilL& -- p
Da(te- 7 - W.,
Inspectors:
Z. Faletits
.
l
[lt6d[[E,,
,
R. Smeenge
/- 7- Efd
E
8h'Nef
.
^
?
P. Wohld
/- %36
!
Date
.
!
C : NR C MW--
'
!
Approved By: C. C. W1111 abs, Chief
/ - 7 - $/>
'
-
,
l
Plant Systeras Section
Date
,
!
inspe_ction Sumary
l
f.o. 50-3732_83034(DRS); 5F-TIT /BTOM(_Nt3]],~~~~~~,,"'"' Rep ~ orts
Inspection on October 21-23 30-31 and November 1
1985
l
~~
l
I
he~as Inspected: Routiine announcid inspection of safety-related equipment ar#
l
cables in tWUniel and Unit 7. drywells to identify any degradation which may
have occurre.d as a result of higher than anticipated operating ambient
temperatures.
In addition, notor operated valve Limitorque Units were
.
.
'
I
ex6 mined forlsttep, maintenance. . testing, and physical condithn. The inspection
,
l
involved a to;ai of 77 inspection hours onsite and eight inspection-hwrs
l
offsite by.three MC inspectnrs, y
.
,
l
Results:--Oftheareas. inspected,threeviolationswereidentiffdd(failure:co
Tmpler*,'t weasuvus to promp';1y) identify and correct conditions adverse toq
>
.
-
failure to (c;10w procedures which lir.iit the number of terminations on a single.
L
stud-Paragrnh 3 b.(4); and failure to provide pertranent identification for the"
Unit 1 SRVs Paragraph 2.b.(5)).
l
.
,
'p
i
.i
.
-
.
(
-
'
'
j
-
,
,
- .
-
.
.
'
i
r
.
'
a
,
DETAILS
1.
Pers,ons Contacted
'
Coorior.wea'th Edison
m#***R. D. Bishop, Administrative and Support Service,
Assistant Superintendent
.
mK. L. Groesser, Division V. P. Nuclear Station Division
'
- K. C. Wittenberg, Technical Staff Engineer
'
- D. S. Berkman, Operating Engineer, Assistant Supervisor
- P. F. Manning, Technical Staff Supervisor
a
m**H. L. Massin, Licensing-LaSalle
mD. L. Farran Licensing
'
- A. C. Settles, Technical Staff
- D. Winterhoff, Technical Staff
- H. Mulderink, Master Electrician
- R. M. Jeisy, QA Supervisor
- D. J. Pedersen, Staff Assisstant
- K. Kehring, M. M. Work Analyst
iW. Kirchhoff, Assisstant Technical Staff Supervisor
- C. Pershey, Staff Assisstant
mR. F. Janecek, Station Nuclear Engineer
mJ. L. Bieronski, Station Nuclear Engineer
mB. M. K. Wong, Station Nuclear Engineer
mK. C. Wittenburg, Station Technical Staff
mD. S. Berkman,
Sargent and Lundy
mC. H. Furlow, Electrical Project Engineer
mB. V. Pikelny, Senior Components Engineer
NRC
mA. Davis, Deputy Regional Administrator
mC. J. Paperiello, Director, Division of Reactor Safety
mJ. J. Harrison, Branch Chief Engineering
m***M. J. Jordan, Senior Resident Inspector
- N. C. Choules, Region Inspector
- P. R. Wohld, Region Inspector
.
me. C. Wright, Section Chief Projects
mR. B. Landsman, Project Manager
mC. C. Williams, Plant Systems Section Chief
mT. E. Taylor, Reactor Inspector
- Denotes the persons who attended the site meeting on October 23, 1985.
- Denotes the perscns who attended the exit meeting on October 31, 1985.
(
'
,l
2
,
- k
^"
7
m
,
,
,
4
- Denotes the persons who attended both the, site meeting of October 23'
and exit meeting of October 31, 1985,
~
f Denotes the persons who attended the. exit tre'eting on October 23, 1985.-
,
E
m Denotes the persons who attended the treeting at the NRC Region III
office Noveber_1,1985.
t
-In~ addition t'o the above, other licensee and contractor personnel were
L
contacted during this inspection.
2.
Drywell Insfe_ctio_n
a.
Inspection Scope
Electrical- cables', wires, pigtails, jackets, terminal lugs, conduits
and other components of Units l'and-2 drywells were examined for Y
~
'
' degradation, stiffness or embrittlement. Conditions pennitting,
junction boxes.and equipment covers were removed _to allow inspection
of internal areas.- Insulation and cable routing were examined for/
conditions which might cause localized hot spots.because of insulation
gaps or the ' proximity _ of cables to hot surfaces. The inspection of
-
. Unit 1 drywell- was conducted in conjunction with a licensee /AE
inspehtion team. This team inspection.was perfonned in accordance-
with CECO Procedure LTP-100-2, Revision 9. "First Refuel Inspection
of Unit 1 D/W Cables," which was reviewed by the NRC ~ inspectors _ and
found to be satisfactory.
C
,
b.
Observations
The NRC inspector's-made the following observations during the
Units 1 and 2 drywell inspection:
g,
'
(1) Flexibleconduihdamagewasifoundat*thefollowingpie'ct
.f
' equipment: IJB308C, IEX-F005C, 1E12-F020, IE12-F0410, 2B'1-N004F,-
c
2JB105C, 2JB194C, 2E22-F038, and 2B21-N004L. At.2B21-N0045 the-
3~
flexible conduit was separated from.the coupling.-
_(2). The inspectors noted that many of the mirror insulation' panels
were distorted, and holddown clamps were found open r. ear the
Safety Relief Valves (SRVs), creating gaps at .the joints which.
cculd cause localized hot-spots. The distortion appeared td'have
lbeen caused by personnel using the-insulation'as a step.; %
!.
- (3) Ativalve IE12-F041C.:in iiddition to the~dmage flexible conduit
ideptified in (1) above, the yellow termination-lugs ~1nside'the
- upper snost limit switch box were dark brown and appeared to be:
charred (an indication'of. overheating). The lugs in the-lower
switch box, located approximately one foot below, were yellow.
Fending licensee evaluation of'the=cause of overheating in the-
' upper [boxthismatterisconsideredopen-(373/85034-01(DRS)).
.
}
,
-f
je
,
n
,
,
.
y
/ ;y
,
g
-
-
.
.
-
-.
-
-
-
7 (
.
.
r
b
(4) On October 21, 1985, while removing the cover of the right angle
'
pull box, at the end of the flexible conduit connected to the
v
ASCO solenod valve on 1E12-F327B, the technician dropped the
.gj
cover through the floor grading. On October 22, 1985, the cover
> ^
had not been replaced and the box was not tagged to identify the
cover was missing.
In the same area the cover en a similar pull
s
box for valve 1E31-F004C3 was missing and there was no tag to
identify this missing cover.
(5) SRVs in Unit I have not been identified by metal stamping (as
~
found in Unit 2) or permanent tags. The only ide:tification was a
single letter made with a black marker on the body of the SRV.
The IB21-F013 SRV next to the one identified as "J" has no
.
identification marking. Licensee failure to identify this valve
and to provide permanent stamping or identification tags is
considered to be a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria VIII
(373/85034-02(DRS)).
(6) Spare solenoids on the Unit 1 SRVs are missing protective caps on
the connectors. One. cap is missing on G H and L SRVs and two
caps are missing on the U SRV and the unidentified SRV next to J
SRV.
(7) Zipper tubing is parted on the wires connected to the solenoid
of SRV IB21-F013U. The zipper tubing hose clamps on 2-SRVs of
Unit 2 (cables 2NB881 and 2NB822) are loose.
(8) Individual wires routed from the Unit 2 SRVs into Junction Box
~
s
2JB115C appear to have heat damaged insulation. . There was a
'
radial crack and a section with reduced diameter in the outer
jacket. Pending an evaluation of the condition'of these cables
and review of infonnation on the qualification of these wires,
this matter is considered an open item (374/85035-01(DRS)).
"
(9) Regarding Valve IE51-F063, it was observed that the limit switch
compartment cover was very rusty and at least two of the ten bolts
were loose, with a gap between bolt head and flange.
(10) Regarding Valve IE12-F009, it was observed the limit switch
compartment cover was missing four of'the ten t<olts and the
gasket was not positioned properly, as evidence by a portion of
the gasket extending beyond the cover-flange.
(11) Regarding Valve 2E51-F063, RCIC Steam Supply, what appeared to be -
bronze or brass grinding products were found on the valve stem
screw between the operator and the valve. One area'of grinding
products was the width of the thread, approximately 1/8 inch
deep and 1/2 inch long. This same material was found in the
bell casting of the operator. Pending licensee evaluation of
the source of this metal grinding products and correction of the
cause,-this. matter is considered an'open item (374/85035-02(DRS)).
4
.
~
-
1
- .
.
.
i
(12) A Valcor Engineering solenoid valve identified as 2E31-F005A3
(located in Unit I drywell) had its junction box hanging loose
supported only by its pigtails. This valve and a similar valve,
installed in series, on what appeared to be a drainline, had their
power lines cut off at the junction boxes. A similar conditSn
was also found at 282*, 743' elevation.
In a discussion win
he
.
licensee, at the exit meeting, the inspectors were informed that
these valves are no longer required and have! been scheduled to be
removed. The inspectors had no further er arns on this matter.
(13) Valve 1821-F539 had an out of service tag D 951-84) dated in
1984. The licensee informed the inspectors, at the exit meeting,
that this valve is no longer required and is scheduled to be
removed. .The inspectors had no further concerns on this matter.
(14) In Junction Box IJB200C, two unidentified cables passing through
the box were deformed.
In a discussion with one of the AE
inspectors, who also observed this condition, he stated that
this may have been caused during the cable pull.
Pending
licensee evaluation to determine if this cable has been damaged
this matter is considered an open item (373/85034-03(DRS)).
(15) In Junction Box IJB455C, two unidentified cables have an
extremely sharp 90* bend. Pending licensee evaluation to
determine if cable bend radius requirements have been exceeded,
this matter ir, considered an open item (373/85034-04(DRS)).
(16) The inspectw's reviewed test data sheets for Unit 1 and Unit 2
Main Steam 5afety Relief Valve manual cycling tests which were
conducted July 28, 1985. This data indicated that all valves
operated properly at that time.
(17) Reactor Recirculation Pump 1A motor cooling line valve wheel was
found laying on the floor at approximately 745' elevation and
140*. This valve was approximately 12 feet above the floor.
No tags were on this valve to indicate status or. valve number.
(18) In Unit 2, the unprotected temporary thermocouple' cables above
elevation 807', from 325*-35' exhibited extensive heat damage.
The jacket on these cables was cracked and brittle. Several
places were found where the-individual thermocouple _ wires were
exposed.
Pending licensee evaluation and corrective action and
NRC review this item remains an unresolved item.
(374/85035-03(DRS)).
c.
Inspection Results
Exceptforthespecificitemsidentifiedabove(visually)theredidnot
appear to be degradation of equipment or cables in the Units 1 and 2
drywells as a result of higher than anticipated operating ambient
temperature.
Items (1),(2),(4),(6),'(7),(9),(10)and-(17)above.
-
are all examples of conditions which are adverse to quality.
Additional examples are identified in 3.b.(1) and (2). ' Adequate -
5
.
i
measures have not been implemented to assure that the identified
conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.
This failure to implement measures to promptly identify and correct
conditions adverse to quality is considered a violation of
10 CFR 50, Ap endix B, Criteria XVI (373/85034-05(DRS);
(374/85035-04DRS).
3.
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque Inspection
a.
Inspection Scope
i
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Motor Operator Valve (MOV) Limitorque internals were
examined for adverse conditions and switch settings. -This part of the
inspection was conducted in conjunction with the CEC 0 plant personnel
maintenance and modification program to replace t' e Limitorque internal
n
wiring which could not be identified as environmentally qualified.
This program also included verification of torque switch settings in
accordance with the Central File Copy of the " Master Operator Data"
list and an inspection of the' geared limit switch compartment to
,
insure that the grease used was environmentally qualified. The
>
Unit 2 work was being performed under Work Request L52489.
b.
Observations
The NRC inspectors made the following observations during the MOV-
Limitorque inspection:
(1) Regarding Valve 2WR179, it was noted that a 6 inch long by
approximately 1/4 inch diameter piece of insulation tubing was
found laying loose above the limit switch circuit gear compart-
ment. The insulation on one of the internal wires was fractureo
about 1/2 inch from the ring tongue insulated terminal. This
condition was corrected by the CECO technician who removed this
section of wire and replaced the insulated terminal.
(2) On Valve 2WR029, the inspector found a loose washer under the
internal wiring which was immediately removed by one of the
+
CECO technicians.
(3) The inspector observed CECO. technicians at several locations-
performing inspection for environmentally qualified wires and
grease. Wires which did not have the complete identification
marking visible were replaced and records were maintained of all
wires replaced. The gear compartments were removed and taken to
a cleaning station where uncertain grease was removed,.the units
were cleaned and refilled with environmentally qualified grease.
The full cycle ratchet crimp tools used. were within current
calibration. The two technicians observed doing this work in.
Unit 2 were following good work habits in that they used drop
clothes below their work and had a bucket for collecting
scraps of wires and insulation.
a
6.
j
,
.
,
,
.
, _ _ _
- -
-
. .
-
.
.
- --
.
- . - . -
i
.r. .
.
(4) The inspectors found one stud with three terminals in the.
following MOV Limitorques: _ IE12-F0528,IVQO34,2E22-F004,2VP114A,
2WR029 and 2WR040. Other examples of three. terminals on a' stud-
4
- (identified on drawing :1E-1-4391AH,' Revision G, " INT./ EXT. Wiring
Diagram Reactor Building 480V MCC136Y-1 PT8,") are: - Valves 1HG018,
,
IE12-F312B,1VP113A ~and B and IVP1148. . = This;is contrary to
<
-
i
Conanonwealth Edison Company System Standard C-2325, " Wiring
Standard" which states in Note 12 that no more than.two teminals
are to be connected to.a stud. Licensee failure-to. follow.the
requirement of wiring ~ standard C2325. limiting the number of
tenninals:on actud to two is considered a violation of 10 CFR,
Appendix B, Criteria. V, '(373/85034-06(DRS); (374/85035-05(DRS)). .
.
,
(5) The inspectors recorded the vendor name-plate MOV Limitorque
a
.
switch settings identified'on the' equipment and theLfield actuali
switch. settings. Table 1 is a tabulation of this recorded data
!
and the setting range identified in the plant " Motor _0perated
,
1
Data"(MOD) list. The inspectors identified Limitorques which
!
were set?at higher than the. vendor name plate recommended maximum
(1WR179,1WR180,2WR029,2WR040and2WR179). Three of these
'
(1WR179, 2WR179 and 1WR180) were set at a higher setting.than the
.
maximum identified in the.M00. 'Of.the=15 Limito. ques checked,-
2
i -
the MOD maximum exceeded the vendor recommended maximum for. three
In discussions with plant Technical Staff engineers,
management and technicians, the_-_ inspectors determined that there
was inconsistency among licensee personnel as to.where and how
,
the switches are set and- the relationship between the vendors -
}
name plate recommendation.and the MOD.- ' Pending licensee-
,
!
establishment of a standardized. method for ' setting these switches,
'
'
'
this matter is considered an unresolved item (373/85034-07(DRS)*
(374/85035-06(DRS)).
'
.
.
c.
Inspection Results
.
Exceptfortheconditionsidentifiedin(1),;(2)and(4)above,the'
,
general conditions of the Limitorques internals (visually) appeared
i
to be satisfactory.
Items (1) and (2) are additional examples of
t
U
conditions. adverse to quality previously identified as a violation.
in Paragraph 2.c.
From information available it could not be
r
detemined if; the Limitorques switches were set properly. This
,
conditionisconsideredunresolvedin(5).above.
4..
Motor-0perated Valv ' Setup Maintenance, and Testiug Inspection
.
An inspection was't.onducted of the licensee's programs for setup,
4
- maintenance, and testing of motor-operated. valve torque and limit
switches. The inspection was initiated because of:recent problems
=
-
. identified at other. plants; inspection findings were-as_follows:
,
"
,
- 6
e
s -
1
'
37
.
[-
ir
e
-ey-
T
r.---%
.-e
--etar e . +We,,=e+W
"wt<--t-e+c -et -t-*
rie-
T
f es e
J
f
""-4g
4
?W=
-mi
3-
w
e,---
e++--
e-
e
t,--
-ef-.
~
i
.
.
a.
Design Control (10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III):
(1) Recomended torque switch settings for motor-operated valves
(MOV's) were provided to the licensee by their Architect-
Engineer and NSSS vendor. These settings have been incorporated
into a " Motor Operator Data" book which is a controlled document.
Changes to torque switch settings require submittal and approval
of a Field. Change Request. As such, design control of torque
switch settings appears to be adequate.
-(2) The licensee has not validated recommended MOV torque switch
settings by test under limiting modes of system operation;
however, in the case of open stroke torque switches, this need
for testing has been elimiated by bypassing.the switches with
jumpers.
(3) Reconnended setting for M0V torque switch bypass switches and
other geared limit switches are inadequately specified in plant
design documents.
In certain cases, as discussed below, the
licensee has developed detailed procedures for these settings
in the absence of design information; however, these settings
are not unifonnly verified by post adjustment testing under
limiting system operating conditions.
The above was discussed briefly with the Station Nuclear
Engineering Department (SNED) and will be considered an
unresolved item pending further licensee evaluation of design
control adequacy over both valve swit::h setting and testing
concerns (373/85034-08(DRS); 374/85035-07(DRS)).
b.
Field Instructions and Procedures (10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Criterion V):
The inspector reviewed LaSalle procedure LEP-GM-102 "Limitorque
Valve Post Maintenance Verification by Electrical Maintenance",
Revision 8, October 7,1985, and had the following coments:
(1) The procedure for establishing the setting of the open torque
switch bypass limit switch (Step F.16.) is qualitative and
subject to interpretation. As such, it could result in a
failure to bypass the high torque condition mulse that may
exist on a wedge seat type valve on opening under differential
pressure conditions.
(2) The field procedure for setting the limit switch which stops
valve motion in the open dire:: tion has_ been developed to assure
that valve backseating does not occur due to motor coast down
and other inertial affects; howt:yer, the validity of the
setting is not checked by test..
8
- - . -
.
.
(3) Procedural _ Step F.25.b. refers to the vendor manual for
~
setting torque switches; however, because of potentially
confusing labeling next to the torque switch set screws -
inside the motor-operators,_the inspector' recommended that
some clarification be provided directly in the procedure.
(4) The procedure requires that a , valve be.strok d following
switch setting. During the stroking, stroke time and valve-
motor current values are required to be taken by the procedure,
but no criteria are assigned to highlight a need for further -
evaluation and previous data is, as a practical matter,
unavailable for comparison between old and new values.
,
Further, the procedure does'not require formal review of the
a
accumulated data.
(5) The procedure does not caution-the valve mechanic to' assure -
that the valve spring pack is relaxed before setting
Limitorque Type SMB-000 and older Type SMB-00 torque switches.
This has caused problems for at least one other plant and,
since it is not addressed-elsewhere, should be part of the
maintenance instruction.
Resolutionofitemsa.(2),a.(3),andb.(1)through(5)aboveis
considered an unresolved item pending action by the licensee and
subsequent inspector review (373/85034-09(DRS); (374/85035-08(ORS)).
c.
Surveillance Testing
Surveillance testing performed to assure valve operability is not
normally done at design differential pressures; and, test techniques
are not adequate to allow an extrapolation of test data: to account
for the difference between actual test and design basis conditions.
The licensee currently depends on valve stroke timing to assure
operability; however, while meeting current NRC requirements in this-
area, there are serious weaknesses in the test techniques and stroke
time criteria currently applied.. The inspector recomended improved
techniques, measuring stroke times to 0.5% accuracy, and tighter
criteria, using small percentage changes in stroke times as a' key to
identifying important changes.on valve performance...The-licensee's
staff acknowledged the inspector's comments on this item.-
1
5.
Open Items
Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee,- which
will be reviewed further. by the inspector, and which involve some action
on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.. Open items disclosed during
.
the inspec_ tion are discussed in Paragraphs 2.b(3), (8), (11), (14);and (15).
1
_
,
l
9
'
..
i
'
- .
'6.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required
in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of
noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the
inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2.b.(18),3.b.(5), 4.a. and 4.b.
7.
NRC/LaSalle Station Drywell Meeting
The NRC met with the licensee and contractor representatives denoted in
Paragraph 1 on November 1,1985, at the Region III office. At this meeting
the licensee identified the past and future corrective actions.in regard to
high temperatures in the Unit 1 and 2 drywells. An environmental qualifica-
tion analysis was presented by the licensee, to show that drywell equipment
and cables had not been significantly degraded by the temperatures
experienced during the-current operating cycle and will function properly
tin the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
In addition, the
licensee presented his augmented temperature monitoring program which has.
been implemented by LaSalle Test Procedure LTP-300-17. "Drywell
Temperature. Monitoring Program." This program identifies temperature
trigger setpoints at specific areas, which if exceeded, requires a Station
Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) reanalyzes of remaining qualified
life for environmentally qualified equipment in this area. A proposed
change to the plant FSAR which reflects this monitoring program was also
presented.
The NRC concerns at this time regarding remaining qualified life and the
ability of the equipment to withstand a LOCA have been resolved. Future
NRC inspections will review the licensee's implementation of. this program.
8.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with the licensee and. contractor representatives denoted
in Paragraph 1 on October 22, 23 and 31,1985. The inspectors summarized
the scope and findings of the inspection. The inspectors also discussed
the likely informational content of.the inspection report with regard to
documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
The licensee acknowledged the statements by the inspectors with respect to
open and unresolved items.
,
9
h
10
_
.
.
. , _
_
.
--
_. . . . _ _ _ - _
_-_
..
_ _ _ . . . ~
. . . - . .
_. _._
.-_ _
_ _ _ _ >~
~_-
.-
- -
1
", '-
i
'
.
TABLE 1-
. %
LIMITORQUE SWITCH SETTINGS
~
^
..
(Referenc Section.3.b.(5) of this~ Report)
'-
,
,
- , ,
'
.
_ Vendor Nameplate
I
Actual Field _
l
Motor Operator Data List Torque Settinos-
.
,
,
' Valve.
Recommended
Valve Settinos
l
-Recommended
l
Maximum Setting
l Maximum Setting-
j.
E
. Number
Nominal
Maximum
-Open
-Close
Settina for Valve
For Valve
For Operator
IVE12F0528
4
.
'
I
1 _
4.5
4
4
4
4.5-
4.5-
1;
l
l
l
l
l
l-
IVP1148
-l
.1
l
4
l
1.
l
1
1
1
l
1
l-
4
-l
.
- -
l
l
l
l
l
1
I
I
- 1VQO34
l
.1.25 l
1.5
I
1
l
1.5
l.
1.25
l
1.25
l
1.5
l
4
'
.;
o
.
l
'l-
1
I
I
I
'l
I
~
9
1WR179
l-
l'
l-
1. 5
1
2.75""I-
1
l
1
l
1.5
l
1. 5
l.
l
I
I
i
_I
I
l
l
'
1WR180.
l
1
l
1. 5 .
.1
2.75""I
1.
I
1.
I
1. 5 ;
-l
1.5
.l:
i
'l
l'
I
i
I
I
i
I
.
F-
_2E12F009z
l
.2.75 1
3.25 1
3
l
3-
l
2.75
1
3.25
l-
3.25.
-l
.
l
'
..
I
l-
'l
l
I
l
l
1:
'
-
L4
2E22F004
. l-
2.25 1
4.5
l
2.5
1
2.25
l
2.25
l
4.5;
I
N/A
I-
1
I
l-
1
I
l
I
I
'
- 2E51F063:
l
2
l.
2.5
l
2
I
2
1
2.5
l
3^
l.
3"
.l.
"
'l
l'
I
l
I
i
l
l;
'
- 2E51F076
_l.
1
I
4
l
2.5
l
2.5
1
2.5
1
_
2. 75 - -
l-
4..
- l;
l
I
1
l
l
~l.
1
l
,
- 2VPll38
1-
1.
l
4<
l-
1
.I
1
I
l-
I-
1
l
4;
.. l ;
'
,
!. . .
~l-
-l
l
'l-
I
-l-
-
l-
l
'
2VP114A;
l
1
l.
4
1.
1. 5 -
l.
1.5
.i
.1:
-l
1
l
4.
- 1-
-
>
-
21
'l
"I
-l
l
I
I
- I
~
-
.
2WR029.
I
c1
I;
-_1. 5
l :1.13
1
1.87"" l
1
1
2. 5"
l-
2.5"-
-l
7
'
I
-l
l
l
l
l
1
l-
-
a
.2WR040
.l.
1
.l.
1. 5
.i
1.25.I-
2 "" l
1
-l
2.5" .
I
2.5"
l
'
.l.
l
.l
- l
l
-l-
1
l
-
.
.2WR179
l
., l o
l
1. 5 :
l .l.75""l,,
1. 5
1
1
l.
. l.5
1
1.5"
l-
l
1
~l'
l__
-l
I
'
.1-
I
-2WR180-
l-
1
.I
1. 5
I
-1.5
1
1
1
1
I
o
1. 5 .
I
1. 5
1
l
l:
l
l
I
i
-
l
l-
- Motoi Operator Data List'
l
cxceeds' Vendor recommended. maximum.
L
,
M ctual settins exceeds vendor maximum.
A
NOTE: ~1WR179, 2WR179 and LWR 180, also exceed maximum on motor operated data-listi
~,
.
,
J
.
i..
'
,.
,
., . .: ,
.
. --
- . , .=.
-.:-.
. . . - -
. .
. = .
-