ML20137B151
| ML20137B151 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/09/1986 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1479, NUDOCS 8601150129 | |
| Download: ML20137B151 (107) | |
Text
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ORIGINA1.
'N O U lN 1 1 E D S T A T E S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 309TH GENERAL MEETING
. ('")
'n.)
LOCATION: Washington, D. C. PAGES: 1 - 87 DATE: Thursday, January 9, 1986 J
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--' 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 4 309TH GENERAL MEETING S
6 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 1046 7 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
8 Thursday, January 9, 1986 The general meeting met at 8:45 a.m., David A. Ward presiding.
11 12 ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT:
/~~ , MR. DAVID A. WARD nj 13 MR. JESSE C. EBERSOLE DR. ROBERT C. AXTMANN 14 DR. MAX W. CARBON DR. CARSON MARK 15 MR. CARLYLE MICHELSON DR. DADE W. MOELLER 16 DR. DAVID OKRENT MR. GLENN A. REED MR. HARCLD ETHERINGTON 17 DR. FORREST J. REMICK DR. PAUL G. SHEWMON 18 DR. CHESTER P. SIESS MR. CHARLES J. WYLIE 19 20 21 22 23 l 1
24 nwomn. um. 1 25 l
l
4
-( PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONERS' i
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS THURSDAY, JANUARY 9, 1986 The contents of this stenographic transcript of the proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory .
Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the discussions recorded at the meeting held on the above date.
No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at this meeting accepts any responsibility for errors or inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this -
transcript.
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5390 01 01 2
'( DAVbw 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 MR. WARD: Let's go ahead to our second agenda 3 item with the recent operating events at nuclear 4 facilities.
J 5 Mr. Ebe rsole?
6 MR. EBERSOLE: ,We had the two-day discussion of ,
7 events this week. Out of these we picked the four topics 8 which you see on the list out here. I hope you all see 9 this. I might comment on why we picked these.
.10 The Rancho Seco and Curry are both B&W plants and 11 they reflect on the history, i
12 I'd like to have each member listen to these. I h 13 realize some of the members here dpn' t really like to take a 14 look at the events and all the grimy details that we're 15 going to talk about. So we won ' t ge t in to i t.
16 The third topic is an exhibit mostly of a loss of 17 , units due to a minor failure and the cascade of events that 18 resulted from that minor failure and general lack of 19 interactive attention to many little things and the :
20 mechanism which can trip out, not maybe one but two, maybe a 21 small fan somewhere. In this case, it was a crack in a 22 little air pipe.
23 The next I have is the vessel internal lif ting 24 rig failure. This is not a case to be looked at as an O
V 25 individual unique case, but it called out a need for the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 resolution of the current matter.
2 It turned out in this case -- it will be gone 3 over in more detail -- that when the lif ting rig failed and 4 the apparatus became cocked, the operator didn' t know what 5 would happen if he dropped it. I thought that worth noting, 6 in view of the fact that you don' t lif t when you have the 7 potential for dropping them, or you know what happens when 8 they do ' drop.
9 Lastly, the USI A-44 is just a brief summary of 10 where the whole thing stands.
11 I'll turn the meeting over to Ernie Rossi. We've 12l got about an hour and a half for this.
l
() 13 MR. ROSSI: Okay. We ' re
- going to start with the 14 Crystal River pre-item, which will be given by Harley 15 Silver.
16 MR. SILVER: Good morning. My name is Harley 17! Silver. I'm NRR Project Manager on Crystal River Unit 3.
18l I've used very slightly dif ferent slides than the 19 one you have in your handout.
20 (Slide.)
t 21 The event on November 22, 1985, at Crystal River 22 involved a partial main feed failure, actuation of the aux 23 feed system and a reactor trip on overpressure.
24 The significance of the event is that the event (3
N_) 25 involved questions regarding procedures by the operators for ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ,
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1 training the operators. The post-trip review effectiveness (TL ) DAVbw 2 operability of one or two components and, of course ,
3 unnecesary challenges to the auxiliary feed system.
4 The circumstances were as follows:
5 The plant was at approximately 20 percent power 6l on its way down to repair a dropped control rod. In this I
7l plant, feed flow is controlled down to around 45 percent of 8 pump speed, at which time the main block valve in the feed l
- 9) system is closed. Around that block valve , there are two 10 bypasses. They start up feedwater bypass, which is a 11 l six-inch control valve and block valve, and a ten-inch 12l low-load valve , which is a control valve also with a
() 13 separate block valve. There's such an arrangement on each 14 steam generator. At about 20 percent the operator had 15 switched to control by the start-up feed control valve, the 16 six-inch valve, in preparation for going all the way down.
17 ; He apparently then recalled that on the s te am i
18 ' genera tor A, the six-inch valve had on a previous shutdown 19 exhibited unsatisfactory control characteristics and decided 20 to switch back to the ten-inch control valve on steam 21 generator A, to take the plant all the way down. In doing 22 this, he simply closed the six-inch block valve, which 23 closed rather quickly.
24 The ten-inch valve was almost couple tely closed
() 25 at that time and is , by nature , a slow-acting valve anyway.
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()DAVbw 1 In addition, it apparently was acting even more 2 sluggishly on this day, due , it turned out later to the 3 lubrication and control point set point problems, and it 4 could not maintain steam generator level in steam generator 5 A only. The level decreased very quickly and the EPIC 6 system recently installed in the last shutdown very properly 7 initiated aux feed, as it got to its set point.
8 The ope rators, since the system was relatively 9 new, apparently have not fully accepted the proper 10 functioning of the EFIC aux feed system and feared a 11, cool down transient, with what they assumed to be main feed 12 on and aux feed on, as well. They cuickly tripped the pump,
- () 13 that is, tripped the electric pump immediately and attempted 14 to close the steam admission valve on the axuiliary feed 15 pumps and had some difdficulty closing the steam admission 16 valve, which was connected with a lack of understanding on 17 the part of one operator anyway, with the interrelationship 18 be tween the EFIC system and the aux feed steam pump. EFIC 19 having to be reset in order to close the steam admission 20 valve.
21 In any event, that was quickly straightened out, 22 and they did, in fact, close the valve.
23 The cold aux feedwater had caused a slight 24 increase in power by this time. The reactor was, in fact,
) 25 running at 26 percent by that time, because the 10-inch ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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r 5390 01 05 6 1 contol valve was still acting sluggishly, and because of t
( )DAVbw 2 slightly increased reactor power, the steam generator level 3 was still inadequate to avoid increasing reactor pressure, 4 although it was adequate to avoid another initiation of aux 5 feed and the reactor did, indeed, trip on high pressure.
6l Along the way, the operator had attempted, when 7 seeing the pressure rise, and incidentally, there was only 8 about.100 pounds dif ference between the operating condition 9 and.the ' trip point, so this happened quickly. The operators 10 had attempted to open the PORV to avoid the trip. The open 11 command was given to the valve. It apparently did not 12 open. At least there was no indication of flow on the tail
() 13l pipe acoustic monitor or on the temperature indicators. The 14 operators then commanded the valve closed and also closed >
15 the PORV block valve.
16 Af ter the event, they later found the PORV to be 17, open and were unable to close it.
18 Also af ter the trip, the auxiliary feedwater 19 steam admission valve on the steam-driven pump opened 20 spuriously causing a mild overcooling event well within 21 plant limits, however. That failure , that is, that spurious 22 opening has not been duplicated and there's no indication 23 what the problem is.
24 Late r on , I think, in fact, it was the next
() 25 day, while doing some calibration work, there was also a ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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()DAVbw 1 spurious aux feed initiation, due primarily to the level 2 transmitter's sensitivity to various thing. In fact, the re 3 have been several spurious aux feed activations due to level 4 transmitter sensitivity caused by pressure pulses in the 5 secondary system.
~
6 That was, essentially, the even t.
7 Any questions on the details so far?
8 MR. EBERSOLE: What did you draw from this so far 9 as to what were the actions taken to diminish the chances of 10 an evolution like this in the future? What will you do now 11 to respond to this event? In the event of another event 12 liko this , what are they oning to do to keep it from (n_) 13j happening again?
i 14 (Slide.)
15 MR. SILVER: Le t me put the next slide up.
16 Perhaps that will answer some of the cuestions. I divided 17! the follow-up actions -- and I hope this will answer your 1
18' question -- into several categories. The problems, as we 19 see them, are again aux feed reliability involving, for one, 20 excessive challenges to aux feed. The initial problem, of 21 course, was the reliability of the main feedwater system, 22 which subject is being addressed by the B&W Owners' Group on 23 a broader level than simply the reliability of these two 24 procedures invol"ed and the valves involved.
Q
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5390 01 07 8 1 at very hard by B&W and Florida Power.
(G'l DAVbw 2 B&W is, in fact, working out a design change, 3 presumably to put in a time delay or some sort of 4 electronics number to eliminate reactions of this kind to 5 pressure spikes.
6 Florida Power tells me that they hope they can 7 get something in the plant during the current shutdown, 8 which is the result of yet another event, mainly, the 9 apparent failure of one of the reactor coolant pumps, where 10 the propeller, it appears, has separated from the shaf t in 11 some unknown way. The pump is still being removed, and the 12 plant has not yet been examined, so there is still no Tha t
( -)x 13 information on what specifically happened there.
14 shutdown is expected to last probably six weeks, possibly 15 more.
16 MR. ETHERINGTON: In this complicated chain of 17l events, is it possible to say how many independent l
18l malfunctions, how many independent operator errors have 19lj definitely occurred?
20 MR. SILVER: The equipment malfunctions I've 1
21 listed here , and I think that does summarize the total. The 22 operator errors of judgment -- well, there were several 23 things, and again, perhaps this list, I think, summarize 24 them, but le t me proceed through it. If, indeed, there are
() 25 other items , we can talk about them.
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') DAVbw 1 In the area of operator training and procedures, 2 the question of the nebulization of valves, our 3 understanding of the speed of operation of the various 4 control valves, the sequence of operation to be selected, 5 if, indeed, there are problems with one of another valve ,
6 has been gone through by the training people. All the 7 operators have been trained in this particular event, and in 8 procedures to be followed, should not unusual operations be 9 necessary.
10 MR. MICHELSON: It might be important to point 11 out that Crystal River does not have a plant-specific 12 simulator. They have to be trained on the B&W simulator, as
(') 13 ,
I understand it, and that simulator doesn' t have this 14 function on it. So it's a little hard to see how you are 15 going to train them.
16 MR. SILVER: That's probably correct, but I think 17 as far as EPIC is concerned, the principal problem was their 18' lack of confidence, perhaps, in the performance of the EFIC 19 sys tem.
20 MR. MICHELSON: That may be so, but I just think 21 it's important for the fact that there is the simulator to 22 train them on.
23 MR. SILVER: That is correct;.there is not.
24 They have been instructed again in the (n,) 25 performance of the EFIC system and the fact that it will, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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z 5390 01'09 10 i
( ' }DAVbw 1 indeed, control perfectly acceptably, without jumping on the 2 pumps. In fact, in several subsequent trips, the EFIC aux 3 feed system was allowed to continue to function and, indeed,<
4 control the plant very nicely. The operators , presumably, 5 seeing that, have gained in their confidence that this will, 6 indeed , happen.
7 The preferred method of securing the EFIC or aux
. . i 8 feed, if, indeed, it's necessary, is to manipulate -he 9 control valve and not trip the pumps, in any event. They 10 have been advised of that.
11 One of the principal problems, I think, of this 12 event, was the apparent lack of adequate posttrip review.
() 13 !
1 There are two illustrations of this, the fact that on a 14 previous trip, the previous trip, where the main fe'ed 15 start-up problem was identified, that problem was not 16 corrected prior to that restart, and again, that was the l
17 item that precipitated this sequence.
18 Likewise , on the restart from this trip, the PORV 19 problem was not taken care of, and while the re is no 20 prohibition against operating the plant where they blocked 21 PORV, it is certainly not a desired mode of operation.
22 Ite company has now decreed that the plant review
\
23 committee or at least the subcommittee of the plant review 24 committee will review all restart decisions prior to the
() 25 re s ta rt . This presumably will provide the multidisciplinary ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS,1MC.
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5390 01 10 11 (jDAVbw 1 review and high level review that should be applied to the 2 actions taken.
3 MR. EBERSOLE: Is the PORV called in af ter 4 failure of the spray system to depressurize?
5 MR. SILVER: It's at the operator's option to use 6 the PORV, i f -- j 7 MR. EBERSOLE: Isn' t that second choice? ,s 8 MR. SILVER: I would consider it second choice.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: If you didn' t use the spray as 10 first choice.
11 MR. SILVER: Sprays, I think, were used. Again, 12 this happened very quickly.
+
(). 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Everything happens quickly in a I
14 plant.
15 MR. REED: Everything .happens very happens very 16 quickly on a B&W plant.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: The whole system is extremely 18 t ig ht , and I guess that that tried to --
21 MR. EBERSOLE: I might point out to the full 22 Committee that they can take some comfort in the fact that 23 this plant can do a full pressure safety -- this is a spring 24 safe ty -- relief , full flow, from the operator injection
() 25 pumps and cool by bleed feed and recover on the aux feed
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5390 01 11 12 DAVbw I sys tem .
2 . MR . SILVER: Tha t is absolutely correct. In 3 fact, with one HPI pump.
4 4 MR. EBERSOLE: This brings up an interesting sort 5 of a message in respect to the concern about thermal shock.
6 .I'm not sure at this time, but we wouldn' t want to look at 7 whether or not the PTS issue covers 2500 psi relief in cold 8 water going into the vessels. I'm not sure now that it 9 does.
i 10 Any other questions or comments on this?
11 MR. REED: I always like to try to focus on root 12 issues, root causes and not focus so much on the activities O . 13) ea e ="rr ==6 eat t ue- # v opt =1on we == e s v en e 14 the B&W concept places large burdens on operators and the 15 E&W concept moves very quickly to drive out other problems 16 that jeopardize decav hes t removal. As far as root issues 17 for' consideration h~Q , .: think that we should keep our I
18 i focus on whe ther or not this concept needs an alternative 19 means of decay heat removal.
l 20 Now they can say that it's through the PORV.
l 21 Here again, a root issue. The PORV did not function. And l l
22 le t me get to the safety valve back up to the PORV. Here 23 again, a root issue is that internal pilot operated relief 24 valves probably won' t function well on hydrogen fluoride O 25 systems envwar, end we ere noe che ino that tesee.
. '+,
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(^^) DAVbw 1 MR. SILVER: The licensee does inform me that in
'n.J 2 previous examinations of PORVs, they have not seen any 3 indication of boron build-ups of any kind.
4 MR. REED: Exactly right, because once you cool 5 down the plant and prepare the valve for disassembly or take
~
6 it off, the evidence has been erased.
7 8'
9 10 11 12
/-
(s 13 .
14 15 16 j 17i l
18l 19 20 21 22 23 24
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l 5390 02 01 14 1 MR. EBERSOLE: Any further questions?
(]DAVbur 2 (No response . )
3 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you have anything further?
4 MR. SILVER: I simply have listed the equipment 5 malfunctions, I think all of which have been discussed.
6 They have been prepared one way or the other except for the 7 f ac t tha t the PORV has not been removed for examination.
8 The licensee's plans in this regard are not yet firm.
9 DR. MOELLER: Glenn, could you elaborate for me 10 on how in cooling down and so forth you wash away the boron 11 evidence?
12 MR. REED: It takes days to cool down a
(~
v )
13 pressurizer and the whole system to get to the point where -
14 you can disassemble it and evaluate, and during this, in all 15 the maneuvering that takes place in the valve openings and 16 the fillings and the sloshings, I think the evidence that 17 relates to what I call boron scum that can ge t into internal i
18 pilot-operated relief valves and af fect the friction factors 19 is erased. Of course, the hydrogen is erased, too.
20 Se e , the hydrogen in continuous operation fills 21 the riser and up into the valve with pure hydrogen because 22 of a condensing stripping action, and you can' t duplicate 23 those things or see those things or evaluate those things 24 after you have done the cooling.
() 25 DR. MOELLER: Thank you.
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(' 1 DR. CARBON: Do you consider this number of
\ e} DAVbur 2 equipment malfunctions as quite unusual? l 3 I notice the number of operator actions.
4 MR, SILVER: It is certainly more than we would 5 like to see and more than the licensee would like to see .
6 .They took all of these actions voluntarily without any --
7 such as the actions are -- without any pressure from us, so 8 to speak, and they were disturbed about the fact that, for 9 example, the startup valve had not previously been repaired 10 when it was first identified.
11 DR. CARBON: Does this indicate to you that you 12 are getting poor plant performance?
() 13 , MR. SILVER: Interestingly enough, we had had the l'4 feeling that the plant performance had been quite good 15 recen tly. In fact, prior to the last refueling they got the 16 best run in their history. So they had a 90 percent capacity factor.
17l I
18' The plant prides itself on having an excellent 19 preventive maintenance program, and I am sure they were
~20 disturbed to see this sort of thing occur. None of these 21 things individually are particularly major, but collectively 22 they do indicate some problems.
23 MR. REED: I can' t le t that one pass because we 24 have debates here about challenges, whether it is good or
() 25 bad to have challenges te systems. Many of us are ge tting 4
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.['N q) DAVbur 1 on the horse that long runs are great. Quite frankly, I 2 haven' t gotten on that horse ye t, and I won' t .for another 10 3 years because I think that challenges to some of these 4 reactors are good because it will expose hopefully someday 5 some basic flaws with respect to equipment and conceptual 6 creation. So the fact that they had the 90 percent run, I 7 look upon that as maybe bad.
8 MR. HERNON: Then I guess you would consider this l 9 good?
10 MR. REED: Sure, ifwe follow up on these root i
11 issues of the integrated control system and the way in which 12 I this concept can move very fast to dry-out and follow up on 1
() 13 the PORV issue , we will begin to optimize. design someday.
14 MR. EBERSOLE: Another thing, these events tend 15 to be the only real catalysts that get thir'gs done in this 16 environment.
17 , MR. HERNON: Ron Hernon, with the staff. I had a 18 couple of comments.
19 First of all, in response to Mr. Reed's question 20 on PORV contamination by hydrogen-boron, Harley, do you know 21 if this has a loop seal?
22 MR. SILVER: It does not have a loop seal.
23 MR. HERNON: That would make a dif ference.
24 The other thing I would like to re ite ra te that O
(_/ 25 Harley mentioned, during the 1985 refueling at Crystal ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 5390 02 04 17 l 1 Rive r , they did put in this new emergency feed initiation
({})DAVbur 2 control system, which was new to the operators and responded 3 somewhat differently than the old system.
t 4 Harley mentioned that there have been a number of 5 inadvertent actuations of aux feedwater since the event he i 6 was talking about. Since then the operators have become 7 believers that the system does work and if they let it do 8 its thing it will probably control events.
9 I think Mr. Michelson made a good point, that had 10 they had plant specific simulators the operators might have 11l been able to gain this confidence on the simulator rather 12 than having to see it on the plant.
() 13 But I think that is a factor, that you are 14 dealing with a new system that responded dif ferently than 15 what the operators are used to seeing. They are responding 16 to cooling events which we will hear in the Rancho Seco 17 : event, which we are talking about next. It is kind of a 18ll toss-up between overcooling, or do you take a chance on high l
pre ssure trip?
19 l 20 I guess my feeling is the staff has confidence 21 that the operators now understand this event and subsequent 22 ovents, and other than the design problem in the EFIC system 23 they have come to accept the system as something that is 24 going to do its thing if they don' t in te rfe re .
() 25 MR. SILVER: I think that is quite correct.
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5390 02 05 18 1 There have been several subsequent trips in which
( ' }DAVbur 2 aux feed did actuate and the operators did allow it to 3 function, and it did indeed function and control the plant 4 quite well.
5 MR. MICHELSON: There is another factor which 6 hasn' t been brought out in the subcommittee or thus f ar 7 today, and that is Crystal River is the case wherein I think 8 something approaching 80 percent of the operators failed 9 their requalification examination.
10 Whe ther or not that human f actor has any bearing 11 on this particular event, I don' t know, but it is an 12 established f act. Maybe if they' had had a be tter
() ,
13 requalification program and better training 'during that 14 time, they might have been be tter prepared. I just don' t 15 know.
16 I might just make a comment on that.
17 MR. REED: Carl, I would like to ask another 18 ll Question on Crystal River. Are Crystal River personnel's l
19 ' aptitude and ability screened?
20 MR. MICHELSON: I don' t know about that.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: I expect we are going to have to 22 move along or we are going to run out of time.
23 MR. ROSSI: W'e have Sid Miner here , who is going 24 to talk about a number of events that have occurred in the
() 25 last two or three months at Rancho Seco. Sid Miner is the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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5390 02 06 19 l)
L/ DAVbur 1 project manager for the Office of Nuclear Reactor 2 Regula tion .
3 MR. EBERSOLE: This is a summary on the AC power 4 situation?
5 MR. ROSSI: Right. We are going to move that one 6
1 ahead. I acologize for the changing around in the 7 schedule. Alan Rubin has a conflict, and he needs to give 8 his presentation next in order that he can make anothe 9 engagement.
10 When we were down here on Tuesday, we discussed 11 three loss of of fsite power events that occurred at plants.
12 There was one on Indian Point 2 in December. The
(%
i) 13i plant was in hot shutdown following reactor trip. The 14 personnel bumped a relay panel and opened up breakers, and 15 we had loss of of fsite power for 10 to 20 minutes.
16 ! There was one on Waterford 3, actually on the I
17' same_ day as the one at Indian Point Unit 2. The plant was 18 in cold shutdown. The re they had a lightning strike plus a 19 j number of equipment problems. They were without of fsite 20 power for 40 minutes during that. Again , they were in cold 21 shutdown at the time.
22 The third one was River Bend, which occurred on 23 New Year's Day. They we re in hot shutdown. They opened 24 some breakers due to a security guard's use of a radio
() 25 transmitter at the plant, and they were without offsite ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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5390'02 07 20 DAVbur 1 power for one hour and 15 minutes.
- 2 In all these cases the diesels did pick up the 3 loads.
4 When we came down on Tuesday, we discussed these 5 events in detail, which we don' t intend to do today. But
- 6 Alan -Rubin is going to now give you some information on the i
i- 7 status of USI A-44, which is the blackout unresolved safety 8 issue.
9 MR. RUBIN: I am task manager of Unresolved 10 Safety Issue A-44, station blackout. I am just here to give 11 you this morning a brief presentation on the status of that 12 issue , where it stands, and a summary of some recent losses
~
O 13 of off ite vower a t- from 1 e re r, 198s, #a previce-14 years.
15 (Slide.)
, 16 Let me start with the data summary.
This slide shows a breakdown for various years, 17l l 18 the numbers of losses of offsite power events to total 19 losses and the f requency of events per site-year.
20 On average, there has been a loss of offsite 21 power about once in every 11 site-years at nuclear plants, 22 and we expect to see and have seen fluctuations in that data 23 from year to year. There have been some years where there 24 have been no losses of offsite power or years where the re !
l 25 have been frequencies of greater than .2 losses per l
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-5390 02 08 21
- DAVbur 1 s i te-ye ar.
! 2 In the resolution of A-44, we used data through
'3 1984 that showed a frequency of about .08 losses of of fsite 4 powe r pe r year , pe r si te-ye ar. We issued a NUREG report, 5 NUREG-1032 as a result of that.
6 Public comments were received, primarily from 7 industry, where industry looked at the data and presented a i
8 breakdown for years before 1981 through 1981 into the
, 9 three-year period from 1982 to 1984, and in that time they 10 said, gee, the loss of offsite power for the years before
! 11 1981 were about . I and the data for 1982 to '84 were 1
12 significantly better in terms of less than half of the b) 13 frequency of losses of of fsite power in the past, and they 14 expected that trend to continue into the future.
15 We have data for 1985, where there were eight 16 losses of offsite power, with frequencies slightly above the 17 l average for the past 20 some odd years. So we see there are
.l 18 changes from year to year. '
i 19 And the particular point I want to make is that 20 one has to be careful when looking at limited sets of data 21 either at a specific site or at a particular year or few 22 years in evaluating the experience on losses of offsite 23 powe r.
24 DR. MOELLER: Do you classify an unexpected loss
! 25 the same as an anticipated one? I am saying like with i
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(~)
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DAVbur 1 Hurricane Gloria. Didn' t they anticipate this'at some 2 site s?
3 MR. RUBIN: They anticipated the possibility, for 4 example , at Millstone. They prepared for the hurricane , as 5 we ll as othe r si te s.
6 DR. MOELLER: But those are counted the same?
7 MR. RUBIN: That is counted as a loss of of fsite 8 powe r , ye s .
9 M9. EBERSOLE: Are you going to comment on the 10 distribution of this numerical data here, to poin t out where 11 the worst 10 plants are, where our principal concerns would 12 re s t?
f s,
! ) 13 MR. RUBIN: There are plants that have had a 14 numbe r of losse s of of f site power. I didn' t bring the 15 report with me. There are two reports tha t we re issued:
16 one, the report by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and then 17 the contractor report that was presented to the committee i
18! when we discussed USI A-44. I guess NUREG. I don' t recall 19 the number. I can get the number for you. I believe you 20 have it in your package. -
21 Also, an EPRI report, NSEC-85, that lists all the 22 plants and the number of losses of of fsite power. There are 23 several plants in there that have had a higher frequency 1 24 than average. You looked at those and you evaluated the
() 25 data in the so-called framework of A-44.
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(",1) DAVbur 1 MR. EBERSOLE: Could you comment on the status of u
2 A-44?
3 MR. REED: Be fore you go to that, as we all 4 know, we seem to have very good reserves in the electrical 5 world right now as opposed to the early '60s, where the 6 re se rve s we re ra the r le an .
.7 What is your thinking here about loss of offsite 8 powe r? Are you thinking about the lessening of reserves 9 that are apt to occur, when grids will be more heavily 10 loaded and spinning reserves will be down?
11 MR. RUBIN: It is one of the uncertainties with 12 fewer plants being built and the reduction in the reserve e
(m,) 13 margin. However, the dominant cause of these losses of 14 offsite power plants has not been grid failures. They have 15 been either -- primarily from causes that occurred at the 16 site , operator errors.
17 j We categorize the losses of offsite power into i
18 three types. Those that were plant centered caused roughly 19 80 percent of the losses, I believe. There we re then grid 20 failures, causing about another 10 percent, and weather 21 events, hurricanes, causing another --
22 MR. REED: Gee, I would think that weather, ice, 23 lightning would be the number one cause.
24 MR. RUBIN: Those are the ones you hear about
() 25 primarily because they tend to cause longer duration losses ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l 202 347 3700 Natnwide Coverage 804336-6M6 l l
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w:DAVbur 1 of of f site powe r.
2 MR. REED: The only experience I ever had in loss 3 of of fsite power was ice.
4 MR. RUBIN: There were three reported losses of 5 of fsite power to the subcommittee in the earlier part of 6 this week, and I believe they were all plant-centered 7 los se s .
8 MR. ROSSI: We ll , ye s . The Indian Point one was 9 personnel bumping a relay panel and opening breakers. River 10 Bend was causeq by a radio transmitter. .The Wa terford one 11 was a combination of a lightning strike and some equipment i
12 problems.
() 13 The one on Millstone was storm-related, salt 14 spray.
15 MR. RUBIN: Storm-related to Hurricane Gloria.
16 MR. ROSSI: But as I recall, when they thought l
17l they had all that problem solved and wanted to connect back i
18 i up, they had another problem. I think it was lightning that 1
i 19 delayed the hooking up.
20 MR. MICHELSON: Bu t the se we re initiators, and 21 the response of the grid to that initiation will vary 22 according to the fragility of the grid.
23 MR. ROSSI: If you just bump control circuits or 24 actuate control circuits with the radio transmitter, they 25 just go through the breakers.
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i 5390 02 12 25 j] DAVbur 1 MR. MICHELSON: But that grid may have held the 2 switchyard together, and it may not have. It depends on 3 whether there is a problem. Did the switchyard remain
+
i 4 energized is the key question.
5 .In one case I think it did, or two cases. t 6 MR. ROSSI: I think it did. ,
7 MR. MICHELSON: And those cases were really valid ,
]
8 equipment or personnel? -
9 MR. ROSSI: At the site problems , yes.
10 MR. MICHELSON: But if the switchyard remains 11 energized, you can' t depend on the grid to make a i
- 12 dif fe re nce . l O 13 "R- Roar == rae iecav ara 1oe eena to de or .
}
~
14 shorter duration. There is a recovery time in duration of i l
15 I about half an hour or so.
16 MR. EBERSOLE: I might point out to the committee r 17 that this question about the bumping in of relays, of I
18 ' course , raises the further question of why isn' t the relay 19 brought in over the fence?
20 The second is, does that raise the issue that 21 maybe in the excitation of these relays by seismic events 22 they could reconnect the desired load to an onsite plant 23 configuration?
24 I think we will be looking into that.
O 25 MR. HeRnOn: 1 ehink it wee gointed eee durino 4
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'5390 02 13 26 1 the subcommittee meeting that during normal operating
'I']DAVbur 2 conditions this bump would not have caused the symptoms that l 3 occurred. But we will be addressing that as part of the 4 A-46 on seismic requalification.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: In tha t connection, I would like 6 to ask the committee at large to look in these reports here 7 for possible sources as we hear what happens.
8 9
10 11 12 0 12i 1
-14 15 16 17; I
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5390 03 01 27 1 MR. RUEIN: Le t me just brie fly remind the
.(V7 DAV/bc 2 commi t tee . . .
3 (Slide.)
4 . . . that back in March 1985, the proposed 5 resolution resolving A-44 really has two parts. One is to 6 publish a proposed rule for comment, which we are about to 7 do. The rule would state that all plants should be able to 8 cope with a station blackout for a certain period of time.
9 We would issue along with that rule a regulatory 10 guide that would provide guidance to plants for maintaining 11 reliable AC power sources, with setting procedures for 12 coping with the station blackout, having procedures for
) 13 training to re s tore AC powe r .i f los s o f o f f s i te powe r 14 occurred; and then guidelines considering differences in 15 plant characteristics, as to how long a time plan should be 16 able to withstand this kind of station blackout.
17 We've proposed in the draf t regulatory guide 18 guidance that would come up with durations of four hours or 19 eight hours.
20 MR. EBERSOLE: When is that coming out?
21 MR. RUBIN: When I ge t to the next slide , I'll 22 show when it's coming out.
23 (Slide.)
24 Le t me j us t run through the status. We heve made O
() 25 presentations to ACRS. As I stated earlier, we published a ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 draf t technical report, NUREG 1032, in the middle of 1985.
(v ] DAV/bc 2 We presented the proposed rule to the Commission and had 3 mee tings in September and November, 1985.
4 December 31st of 1985, we received a letter from 5 the Commission with a vote of 5/nothing approving the 6 proposed rule going out for comment. We plan to issue that 7 proposed rule shortly. The Commissien has requested to see 8 a backfit analysis before that rule is issued. We expect to 9 have that proposed rule out for comment within about a 10 month.
11 Going through the cycle, once the proposed rule 12 is issued, there will be public comments. We'll go through 13 the preparation of the final resolution of the issue and, as
( 14 you can see, it is not until about mid-1987 that we expect 15 to have a final rule on the station blackout resolution. 16 We've had some industry groups that have been 17j formed to work on this issue, and they've had meetings with i 18 ! the staf f over the past months , the past year. Tha t's all I 19 wanted to present this morning. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Any questions? Thank you. 21 MR. RUBIN: W'e will keep the ACRS advised and 22 will present the proposed rule to the Commission. We'll 23 also send a copy to you. 24 MR. EBERSOLE: Further questions? () 25 (No response.) ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 80433 M M 6
5390 03 03. 29 1 MR. ROSSI: Next we'll go back to Sid Miner, who ('/\ A- DAV/bc 2 is going to talk about the event at Rancho Seco. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: Rancho seco, you will recall, is 4 having some exciting times. It's anoth$r B&W. 5 MR. MINER: My name is Sid Miner. 7 am project 6 manager for the Rancho Seco plant. Th!a morning, I am going 7 to talk about three reactor trips that have occurred since 8 the beginning of October. 9 The last one, which happened on December the 10 26 th , is being investigated by an incident investigation 11 team, so I'm just going to touch on it briefly. I expect, 12 or I have been informed, that the team will probably brief () 13 you at a later date on that one. 14 (Slide.) 15 The first one happened on October 2,1985, when a 16' reactor trip occurred from 15 percent power. It happened at 17; the same time they had a loss of vacuum and the original 18 analysis seemed to indicate that the vacuum caused the 19 trip. It did not. 20 The trip was due to high primary system pressure 21 caused by the trip of both the main feedwater pumps. The y 22 had an uncontrolled cooldown of around 110 degrees 23 Fahrenheit in 15 minutes. And the primary cause of the 24 cooldown was the lif ting of the steam valve that stayed cpen () 25 on one of the feedwater heaters. Actually, the fourth poin t ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
5390 03 04 30 (^] DAV/bc 1 he a te r. \._/ . 2 I am repeating again that the vacuum trip did not 3 initiate the reactor trip nor did it affect the resulting 4 transient. 5 MR. EBERSOLE: May I make a comment at this 6 s tage? This situation flags the fact that this plant and 7 several others do not have a main steam isolation valve to 8 intercept this steam flow. And on a more generic basis, 9 we ' re looking at the implications of not having that valve 10 in the direction of excessive rates of overcooling. 11 MR. MINER: On this transient, an MSRV would have 12 cu t o f f the s te am , ye s . Somebody asked why did it have a 13 reactor trip. A large relief valve or safety valve on the (~)
's l 14 reactor, separator reheater, at low power, like 15 percent, 15 steam is admitted into this valve because they hit vacuum 16l all the way back to the reheaters and that keeps the valves 17l of those closed.
18 This steamline was isolated, i t wa s no t ope n . So 19 air leakage in through that valve reduced vacuum about seven 20 inches.. Feed vacuum, I think, went down to about 22 or 23 21 inches of mercury. 22 DR. OKRENT: Steam rushed in rather than steam 23 rushed out? 24 MR. MINER: Well, the valve itself, because of () 25 low powe r , the valve itself sees vacuum conditions so air ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Natlonwide Coverage 800 336-6646
5390 03 05 31
/'} DAV/bc 1 would go in as you go up in power, it's pressurized and the v
2 steam keeps the valve closed. 3 I didn' t bring a picture of the valve. DR. OKRENT: 4 All right, tha t's enough. 5 MR. MINER: Well, the main feedpurap trip, a 6 defective high pre'ssure switch t -ips the first pump. And 7 af ter much investigation, the lice'see concluded that the 8 most probable trip of the B-pump was operator manual 9 action. When running at this 15 percent power, the A-pump 10 was feeding the steam generator. The B-pump was idling at 11 low RPM. 12 At low RPM, you' re cetting the discharge pressure 13 on the pump is low and you' re ge tting no feedwater. The (~) x_ g 14 operator tried to increase the speed to establish flow in 15 feedwa te r. He couldn' t establish flow fast enough. Ste sm 16 pressure was dropping. The vacuum was low. 17j He saw the auxilliary feedwater pumps going. 18 Now, low discharge pressure on the main feedpumps at this 19 particular time started the auxilliary feedwater pumps, but 20 did not open the ICS control valve. 21 With the control valve on the discharge side of 22 the pump, the operator knew that if he tripped the pump, the 23 valve would open. So he tripped the pump to ge t aux 24 feedwa ter flow. Corrective action: () 25 They've changed that switch. They added l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ! 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
5390 03 06 32 (~}DAV/bc 1 monitoring circuitry so that they wouldn' t have as much v 2 difficulty diagnosing a main feedpump trip in the future , 3 and they modified their instrumentation so the aux feedwater 4 valve opens on the same parameter as the aux feedwater 5 pumps. That is, low main feedwater discharge pressure. 6 The cooldown at low loads, they take steam off 7 the main header, reduce it and feed it to two heaters, or a 8 fourth single point heater containing steam. 9 There's a pressure controller controlling steam 10 in the range of about 135 pounds. On the fourth point 11 he a te r , the relief valve setpoint was very close to the 12 control setpoint and over time, I guess they sort of matched because the relief valve opened up and stayed open.
-( ]) 13l 14 Correction: They rese t the set points of the 15 relief valves on both the fourth point and the second point 16 heaters from about 150 to about 175 pounds. Then I'm 17 l looking at the overall transient with 110 degrees. The 18 licensee looked at it. We did an independent evaluation on 19 it and we all concluded that there was no adverse ef fect on 20 the vessel.
21 MR. REED: I always worry about modifications to 22 original specifications. The original creator knows all the 23 influences and he weighs them and he creates certain 24 controls, and so on. () 25 When you modify corrective action, it goes back ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
1 5390 03 07 33 DAV/bc 1 to the original designer and gets the validation and 2 verification and approval. 3 MR. MINER: From what I understand, that was the 4 original design; it was changed in a subsequent 5 modification. I think the original design had this and 6 then, in 1983, refueling outage , they installed a new 7 control system on the main feedpumps and they made the 8 modification that we see up here. 9 MR. REED Maybe I should ask the question did 10 they go back for verification and validation and approval on 11 the previous modification? 12 MR. DIETRICH: My name is Bob Die trich. I am () , 13 with SMUD. Yes, we have extensive VOV programs and that was 14 utilized at this time. The original designers were in on 15 this decision. 16 MR. REED: Both decisions? 17 MR. DIETRICH: Ye s . 18 MR. REED: The first modification and the second 19 modification to put the first modification back where it 20 was? 21 MR. DIETRICH: There was not a formal VOV program 22 when the first modification was put in. 23 MR. REED: There was a gap in the first 24 modification? () 25 MR. DIETRICH: Ye s . ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverase 800 336 66 4
5390 03 08 34 DAV/bc 1 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask a question. I was a 2 little bit surprised to find the absence of main steam 3 isolation valves and there's a whole set of plants that 4 don' t have those . 5 Behind that is the thesis that while you might 6 not have the worst interrupted cooldown, you might have them , 7 more frequently, since you are faced with a possibility of 8 the stuck bypasses every time you have a turbine trip. And 9 you have quite a few turbine trips. 10 So you invite a little problem every time. So I 11 guess I'd like to ask you at this time are you satisfied 12 with the consequences if you have a full-out stuck bypass (] 13 and you can' t stop steam flow through that much larger valve 14 than this reheater relief valve? 15 MR. DIETRICH: The most recent transient we had 16 December 26th; it involved a stuck-open -- not stuck open 17, but they were controlled open bypass and atmospheric dump 18 valves. That was not an unacceptable cooldown. It did l 19 exceed the tech spec limits. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Did they continue to be stuck open 21 bleeding the steam down? 22 MR. DIETRICH: They stuck open for about 15 23 minutes until an operator could get out to the valve and 24 shut it down. O 2s aa seenso'e= waet ata vo= a tea reeaweeer t# ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
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5390 03 09 35 (~) DAV/bc 1 th t event? Did ' you keep it up to level? \_/ 2 MR. DIETRICH: Auxilliary feedwater was used. 3 MR. MINER: That's a significant transient in 4 that a lot of things happened on this last. I would suggest 5 we wait until the te am . . . because they did acknowledge that 6 they could keep the feedwater up. They overfi'lled the steam 7 generator, so there's a whole series of things that 8 happe ned . 9 MR. EBERSOLE: All right, we 'll wait. 10 Dave? 11 j MR. MINER: Well, one of the things this last I 12 l transient did show, that in this modification, the aux 1 f~D wJ 13 l feedwater system came on and if they hadn' t had the 14 modification, they would have had to wait for about two or 15 three minutes before they tripped the pumps to bring it on. 16 So it sort of verified that this was a good 17! move. I i 18 MR. EBERSOLE: Dave. 19 DR. OKRENT: The position of the Regulatory staf f 20 on pressurized thermal stock is predicated in part on some 21 frequency of overcooling transients of dif fering severity. 22 I'm wondering whether the regulatory staff has gone back and 23 looked at the experience of the last year, not with myopic 24 vision, but in a broader perspective, looking upon these () 25 first as some indicator of frequency, but also as some ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Na:ionwide Coverage 800-336-6686
5390 03 10 36 1 frecuency of initiating events, which, if compounded further (a~) DAV/bc 2 in some way, could lead to still more severe events. And 3 then, af ter doing this, still judges that they have no 4 problem with their PTS criterion. 5 Have there been any systematic formal 6 evaluations, experiences of the last year, in te rms of the 7 PTS overall? Reevaluating its bases? 8 MR. EBERSOLE: In tegra ting the transients that 9 might have occurred over a long period of time? 10 MR. MINER: Are you talking about the utilization 11 factor of the number of transients you put on the system? 12l This would affect the utilization factor. We didn ' t look a t I () 13 this particular transient. The pressurized thermal shock 14 calculations for Rancho were done in an event that happened 15 in '78 which was much more severe than either this one or 16 the December 26th one. 17 MR. ETHERINGTON: I think the reason it was based 18 on the total eight cooldown incidents over a period of many 19 years. I think Dr. Okrent's question was does this indicate 20 greater frequencies for this event. 21 Is that what you had in mind? 22 DR. OKRENT: Tha t's the first part of the 23 question. The second part of the question is have they gone 24 to look to see whe ther these kinds of transients might () 25 cascade with one more failure into something in fact that ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverase 800-33 & 6646
- 5390 03 11 37 1 b rought them below the limits that they find acceptable?
(}DAV/bc~ 2 And what's the likelihood _ of such an event? Because they' re 3 claiming a very, very low likelihood of vessel failures from 4 pressurized thermal shock. And they're getting a 5, significant number of cooldowns and not necessarily each has
~
6 its own little character and each could go another way with 7 another thing added to it. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: What's the maximum bypass value of 9 these plants without a main steam isolation valve?
' 10 l Thirty-five percent? Forty percent?
11 MR. MINER: You' re talking about the bypass 12 valve? I think it's something like 15 percent, isn' t it, () 13l Bob? , 14 MR. EBERSOLE: It's not as large. 15 MR. MINER: I think the turbine bypass is 15, and 16 I think the atmospheric dumps are about the same. 17 MR. DIETRICH: Fif teen percent turbine bypass, 25 18 percent atmospheric dump. A total of 40. Some of the 19 atmospheric is brought down because of the overcooling. 20 MR. EBER SOLE: Only one of these would probably 21 fail at one time. So tha t's 25 pe rce n t to a tmosphere . 22 MR. MINER: The atmospheric was somewhat blocked 23 out. I think, yesterday, in discussions with the licensee , 24 the regulatory response, they said something like 15, about () 25 equal between the two. ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
5390 04 01 38 1 MR. EBERSOLE: It is legitimate to do that. Has {}DAVbur 2 that been done because. of the degree of concern? 3 MR. MINER: Looking at it and the results of what 4 happens when you have these valves open? 5 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. 6 MR. MINER: I think the last transient did that. 7 MR. EBERSOLE: They are getting nervous about 8 a tmospheric dumps. I think they should be . squally nervous 9 about a bigger bypass, looking into a full vacuum. 10 There are many of these , plants that don' t have a 11 main steam isolation valve.
- 12 Does Oconee have a much bigger bypass?
() 13 MR. DIETRICH: I think all B&W plants have the 14 same 15 percent turbine bypass.' Wo have the largest i 15 atmospheric dump capability. 16 MR. EBERSOLE: So they kept the bypass down? 17 MR. DIETRICH: The bypass I think is ats 15 18 percent, and I don' t know what their dump capability is. 19 MR. EBERSOLE: But that is 15 percent into a full-20 vacuum, isn't it? 21 MR. DIETRICH: Right. 22 MR. HERNON: Mr. Ebe rsole , in response to 23 Dr. Okrent's concern, I think the staff shares this 24 concern. We have an investigative team out at Rancho Seco () 25 at this point in time, and the number of cooldown's during ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6M6 h
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l 5390 04 02 39 1 the last several months is certainly one thing they are
}DAVbur 2 looking at.
3 You will have an opportunity to talk to our 4 specialists in BTS tomorrow. We are having a discussion 5 with Dr. Catton and one of the ACRS fellows. We will have 6 Roy Woods down there. 7 DR. OKRENT: I have ancther comment along the 8 same line. 9 The staff declared that water hammer was a resolved 10 issue. Then they ran into some real water hammers. I 11 suppose they may still consider it a resolved issue, but to 12 this day I have never seen a staff report which tries, using 13, some kind of fault tree logic where the top event is an f( ) 9 14 unacceptable water hammer, examine the kinds of transient 15 conditions which in fact could lead to such an unacceptable 16 water hammer. I think they are waiting for experience to l 17! , tell them the answer. i 18 1 Tha t is my opinion. 19 MR. MINER: Are we finished with this one? 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Further questions? 21 (No response. ) 22 (Slide.) N 23 MR. MINER: On December the 5th, the plant now is 24 at 91 percent power and they are on manual control, doing () 25 some calibrations of flow meters in the reactor coolant ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6M6
5390 04 03 40 (' L/
) DAVbur 1 system.
2 On returning from manual to. automatic, the flow I 3 suddenly increased in the main feedwater pumps. The 14 operator then returned to manual and tried to reduce flow. 5 The A me te r responded. The B meter started to decrease in ' 6 flow and then hung up. The operator didn' t recognize this 7 and kept reducing flow further, and the reactor scrammed on 8 high pressure. 9 Be twee n the time the pin hung up and the pressure 10 scram was about 30 percent, I am told. Again, the safe ty
?
11 valve on the feedwater heater -- on the fourth point 12 feedwater hea ter opened. It was due to a 20 percent (m_) 13
- overshoot on the pressure control in the pegging steam. So 14 it caught -- the 20 percent overshoot caught the higher set 15 point on the set point.
16 They manually shut of f the steam to the heater, 17 and the plant stabilized without excessive cooldown or 18 pressure transient. They now rese t the pegging steam 19 pressure controller down to about 60 pounds, 60 percent.
. 20 The last transient was this one that happened on 21 Decembe r 26 th. The plant is down. There is an 4
22 -investigation team at the site. Fred Hebdon is the team 23 leader. 24 \ The plant was at 76 percent power when a power A s) 25 loss in the ICS system caused the reactor to trip and a ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 4 47-3700 Nationwide Coverage 80 4 336-6646
5390 04 04 41
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1 number of valves changed position. The ne t result was an (us] DAVbur 2 uncontrolled cooldown of about 200 degrees. Actually it was 3 180 degrees, from later information, in about 24 minutes. 4 That is about all I plan to say. 5 MR. REED: The four events at Rancho Seco, I 6 guess since October 1st, are all related to steam flow, 7 auxiliary feedwater flow, and, in my opinion, to the 8 reliability of decay heat removal. Four events in three 9 months bothers me. 10 MR. MINER: Actually three events. 11 MR. REED: You had four. 12 MR. MINER: The other one, the plant was shut () 13 l down on standby, and it basically related to af ter the aux 14 feedwater coming on and the pump failing af terward.s. 15 MR. REED: Low auxiliary feedwater reliability. 16 Four events. 17{ I am very concerned about the very interwoven i aspects, the interaction aspects of main feed flow on B&W 18 ll 19' systems and auxiliary feed flow, which is absolutely 20 required for decay heat removal unless there is an 21 al te rna tive . 22 So I think we have to look very carefully and 23 pursue very carefully the alternative means of decay heat 24 removal on this system, where you have such complicated () 25 integrated controls and emergency feedwater integrated ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
5390 04 05 42 / N DAVbur controls that tie toge ther. \-) 1l 2 DR. OKRENT: I think we are going to look, and we 3 are going to look until something happens. 4 MR. REED: I strive to try to sell people on the 5 alternative me thods. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: These B&W plants go through tight l 7l quarters , where the steam flow and the aux feedwater flow 8 are nervously tied together and they can' t deviate. There 9 is no capacitor at the top end, you might say, and you have 10 this eternal race between feedwater and steam flow, and if 11j it gets out of line you are in trouble. 12 Has there ever been an attempt to do a sidearm ()
~
13 type feedwater storage in which there is rather more water 14 on standby? 15 MR. MINER: I don' t know. Maybe Bob does. 16 Do you know if they have tried to add additional 17 capacity to the system by putting some more water storage 18' on? 19 MR. EBERSOLE: Just a sidearm supply. 20 MR. DIETRICH: It is not in direct response to 21 your question, I guess, but we do have an onsite -- 22 MR. EBERSOLE: He is Falking about the equivalent 23 of a pressurizer. 24 MR. DIETRICH: The reservoir supplies water to (r )j 25 the auxiliary feedwater system. ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 80433H646
5.~..,0 04 06 43 DAVbur 1 MR. EBERSOLE: But it must be pumped. 2 MR. DIETRICH: It is spray feed. 3 MR. MINER: Bob, I think he is talking about the 4 fast response of the system because you don' t have very much 5 water on the secondary side. If he had more water, it 6 wouldn' t respond as f ast. That is what he is talking 7 about. 8 MR. DIETRICH: I am sorry. No, we haven't 9 considered looking into that. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you follow me? 11 The usual wet flow would have the big reservoir 12 on top and you would need one on the side. () 13 Okay. Any other questions? 14 (No response.) 15 MR. EBERSOLE: Shall we go on? 16 MR. ROSSI: Next, we have an event at McGuire I, 17 l Units 1 and 2, where they had a problem in the instrument 18 air system which caused both units to trip from 100 percent 19 power. 20 Joe Glitter, from the Of fice of Inspection and 21 Enforcement, will give the report. 22 MR. EBERSOLE: This is a primary example of one 23 minor failure which kills two units. It is a cascade of 24 undesired events. 25 MR. ROSSI: This failure of course occurred in ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 3)2-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 80 4 336 6646
l 5390 04 07 44 (( ) DAVbur 1 nonsafety-related instrument air systems. 2 MR. GIITTER: My name is Joe Glitter. I work in 3 the Events Analysis Branch of the Of fice of Inspection and 4 Enforcement. 5 This morning I would like to briefly discuss an 6 event that happened at McGuire Units 1 and 2 on November 2, 7 _1985 and , following tha t, briefly respond to some of the 8 comments raised at the ACRS subcommittee meeting on 9 Tuesday. 10 What makes this event interesting is that a 11 nonsafety orade system -- a single failure for nonsafety 12 grade systems resulted in a challenge to the safety systems (3 13. in both McGuire Units 1 and 2. ts_/ 14 This occurred when a section of braided flexible 15 pipe on the discharge of the B instrument air compressor 16 ruptured at a welded seam. This caused the instrument air 17 system to depressurize. Since the instrument air system is 18 common to both McGuire Units 1 and 2, it caused loss of 19 instrument air in both units. 20 on loss of instrument air, the main feed control 21 valves failed closed and as a result both units tripped on 22 lo lo steam generator level. 23 In addition, loss of instrument air causes the 24 aux feed control valves to go open to their full travel ( 25 position, which caused an excess flow of auxiliary feedwater ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 8003364 46
I . 5390 04 08 45 "T DAVour 1 to the steam generators. (O
- 2 MR. EBERSOLE: May I make an observation at this 3 poin t?
4 Isn' t it true that the presence of a check valve 5 compressor would have averted this? 6 MR. GIITTER: A check valve at each of the 7 instrument air compressors would have precluded the type of 8 failure that occurred. 9 MR. EBERSOLE: How does that get missed in common 10 design considerations? 11 The reason I ask, it flags the fact that the re 12 does not appear to be a degree of depth of thinking about I 13 the design to miss something like this. If it is at this ( [) 14 place, then I am suspicious it is somewhere else. 15 MR. ROSSI: Let me point out that again this is 16 the instrument air system, which is considered nonsafety 17, re la te d . 18 MR. EBERSOLE: But it cost a lot of money to lose 19 two units. 20 MR. ROSSI: My only point is that I am not sure 21 the staf f can answer your question. We share your concern. 22 MR. EBERSOLE: I am sure if it is not the staff, 23 it is the utility. DR. OKRENT: Why is it not safety related to trip 24 l () 25 two plants? ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationside Coverage 800 336-6646
5390 04 09 46 1 MR. EBERSOLE: We ll , that is another question. ( )) DAVbur 2 It is a challenge. 3 DR. OKRENT: No, I would like to hear from the I 4' staf f why that is nonsafe ty related. 5 MR. ROSSI: That comes to the question of I
~
6 challenges of safe ty systems. The staff is concerned about 7 transients that challenge safety systems and cause reactor 8 trips and cause the need for emergency core cooling systems, 9 and so forth. 10 At the current time we don' t have regula tory 11 provisions for addressing challenges directly. The way they 12 are handled is that for these kinds of transients we assure
,.~
(. ) 13 ourselves that safety-related systems within the plant are 14 capable of handling the event. 15 The reason that we have this particular transient 16 or this particular event on the subject for discussion today 17l is exactly what you are saying. It is a challenge to the 18 safety system, which currently we don' t regulate , and it is 19 here because of the interest from that standpoint. 20 DR. OKRENT: Is there somo kind of unresolved 21 safety issue which is called excessive challenges to the 22 plant? 23 MR. EBERSOLE: The re is expressed in A-17, where 24 you don' t le t this happen. 25 MR. ROSSI: I think there are a number. ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
9 5390 04 10 47 f()DAVbur 1 DR. OKRENT: No, I want a gensric. Is there some 2 kind of generic unresolved safe ty issue , excessive 3 challenge? 4 The reason I ask -- 5 MR. ROSSI: To my kncwledge, the re is not one 6 specifically addrecsing the . challenges. 7 DR. SIESS: Isn' t this like of f site power? 8 MR. EBERSOLE: That is what I am saying. GC-17 9 is a design instruction saying not to allow this sort of 10 thing to happen. 11 MR. ROSSI: There are a number of unresolved 12 safety issues that touch on this kind of issue , but the ("M (_) . 13 I question you ask is: is there a specific generic issue or 14 unresolved safety issue specifically addressing whether we 15 ought to have regulatory requirements to look at challenges 16 to safety systems? 17, As far as I know, the answer is no. i 18 DR. SIESS: Have you asked yourself if there 19 should be? 20 MR. HERNON: The answer to the first question is: 21 to the best of my knowledge , there is not a specific issue. 22 Tomorrow morning you will hear Mr. Denton talk about what 23 the agency -- not only NRR, but the agency -- what it is 24 doing to look at factoring operating experience that we see 25 happening as a result of things in the balance of plant. ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
. 1 5390 04 11 48
()DAVbur 1 I think the answer is, yes, we are looking at 2 possibly new regulations. 3 MR. REED: I hope we are not looking at new 4 regulations. Le t me make the point: the balance of plant 5 functioning -- and it is not causing trips -- is an 6 important utility issue with respect to providing continuity 7 of electric power production. They should be very
~8 interested in these things.
9 The NRC's business is the real safe ty issues. I , 10 have found that almost every challenge that is coming down 11 the pike -- and I saw three or four this norning -- should 12 teach us something, and as long as challenges haven' t taught ([ ) 13 us what we need to know, I would like to see them continue. 14 I MR. EBERSOLE: But the ratepayers pay for this. 15 MR. HERNON: To reiterate , we are looking at 16 challenges and the safety implications and specifically 17l. pe rformance indicators. We possibly may change our 18 sel f-evaluation process. 19 DR. OKRENT: I would like to continue my point. 20 Rightly or wrongly, the bulk of the PRAs that I have seen 21 have concluded the transients are either ~a very important 22 contributor to overall plant risk or a dominant contributor 23 to plant risk. 24 This is just one example of the transient. It is () 25 a challenge. And the fact that you have safe ty equipment ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ll32-347-3700 Nationwide Coven:;e 8043364646
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5390 04 12 49 1 here that is supposed to be there to deal with it doesn' t {}DAVbur 2 mean it will always work. 3 We frequently see compounding ef fects, failures 4 of equipment, and so forth, and it seems to me that right 5 now what exists within the staff is a relatively unfocused 6 effort to consider the problem of challenges. There are 7 some specific kinds of challenges in a single valve, and 8 others as far as I can tell are lef t almost untouched, the 9 same status as 15 years ago. 10 I think the staff should only reach that 11, conclusion af ter consciously, systematically exploring the I 12I question. Otherwise, indeed they are not learning from the () 13 PRAs and they are not learning from experience. - 14 MR. EBERSOLE: In following this up, I might ask, 15 is this same rationale -- since the same designer, I guess, 16 did it -- did it allow water pumps handling standard cooling 17 wa te r to be' pu t in place without reversible checks which 18 contained the water flow of a pump? 19 MR. GIITTER: I can' t . address that specific 20 design de tail with the plant, but I guess one importan t 21 thing to keep in mind is that they did consider a loss of 22 instrument air in designing .the system and provided check 23 valves upstream of the point -- or I should say downstream of the instrument air compressors that would provide some 24 l () 25 instrument air for valves that need instrument air for what ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationeide Coverage 800-336-6646
5'390 04 13 50 ( DAVbur 1 they call a blackout situation, in the case of the Section 3 2 analysis, the blackout in conjunction with the need to leave 3 the control room. 4 MR. EBERSOLE: So they have air storage systems 5 that hold for a while. 6 How do they know that those check valves hold? 7 8 9 10 11l 12 13l ,
' 14 15 16 l
17
. 81 19 20 21 22 23 24 A
V 25 -l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-M86
1 1
- j 5390 05 01 51 1 MR. GIITTER: Pre sumably , they're required by (v~') DAV/bc 2 their surveillance requirement, technical surveillance 3 requirements to check those valves on a routine basis.
4 MR. ROSSI: I don' t think we can say that. We 5 don' t know to what degree these are checked. This is again 6 a nonsafe ty-rela ted system so, presumably, it's not covered 7 in the technical specifications. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: And how do they know that there is 9 persistant leakage which is overridden by the capacity of 10 the valves already in the storage system? You never see 11 it. You know, it's simply overridden. 12 Go ahead. ( ,) 13
- MR. GIITTER: Anyway, as a result, they did 14 receive a safety i'ajection in Unit one. The pressurizer 15 pressure went down to 1827, which is below the 1845 SI 16 se tpoin t. Because of some heater failures they did receive safety injections. In Unit two, the operators recognized 17l 18 the problem with Unit one and secured the reactor coolant 19 pumps that provide the driving head for pressurizer spray.
20 And as a result of that in part prevented a 21 safety injection in unit two. Other than the 22 above-mentioned heater problems there were no other 23 problems. All other plant systems functioned as required , 24, for this particular type of transient. () 25 MR. EBERSOLE: What's the contemplated followup ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6 4 6
I 5390 05 02 52 1 action, do you know? (~))
- x. DAV/bc 2 MR. GIITTER: Ye s , that's my nice slide.
3 (Slide.) 4 They replaced the Group B pressurizer heater that 5 failed. The flexible pipe on the instrument air compressors 61 was replaced. The use of braided flexible pipe on the 7 instrument air system will be reviewed to determine if other 8 replacement or modifications are necessary to increase 9 reliability. 10 DR. MOELLER: Is that a generic problem, or is it 11 reviewed at other plants? 12 MR. GIITTER: I was going to get to that in a () 13 m inu te . The y d id . They have looked at other systems, at 14 McGuire , and at other plants, such as Catawba. And they 15 have de termined that the kind of situation they had here 16 would not be likely at another plant, primarily because they 17 didn' t use that type of braided, flexible pipe on the 18 instrument air compressors. 19 MR. ROSSI: I think perhaps your question was 20 directed more at other plants other than just the new 21 plan ts . We have not done a look ourselves at other plants 22 on this issue. What we are planning, I believe, is that 23 we're looking at issuing an information notice , and it's 24 likely we will do that but that has not gone out ye t. () 25 MR. EBERSOLE: When you do that, will it say ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
5390 05 03 53 1 that you're looking for a trivial failure of equipment some (Jj R DAV/bc 2 place that precipitates entire multi-unit trips? 3 MR. ROSSI: Well, the information notice will 4 carry that message. Of course, the information notices 5 don' t carry any requirements with them, or any requirement 6 to respond and tell us wha t's been done . 7 What it does is it makes everyone in the industry 8 aware of this problem and we try to write them so that the 9 lessons are there. And then rely on them to pick up and 10 solve their own problems. MR. EBERSOLE: Does that say anything about 11 f i possible coincidence on nonsafety equipment to include the 12l ( ), 13f failure of relays and other trivial things precipitating i multiple trips? 14l 15l MR. ROSSI: It's a little hard for me to know l 16i exactly what will be in there ye t. l MR. EBERSOLE: Go a he ad . 17l 18 MR. GIITTER: Okay. We're going to install 19 checkvalves on the discharge of the three reciprocating 20 instrument air compressors. I understand that's going to be 21 done next month. And, as I indicated earlier, the flexible 22 pipe applications in other plant systems at McGuire and also 23 other Duke stations will be reviewed. And that has been 24 reviewed . () 25 MR. EBERSOLE: Any further questions? ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3709 Nationwide Coverage 2 336-6646
5390 05 04 54 1 MR. WYLIE: You ' re no t through, are you? [s-)/ DAV/bc 2 MR. GIITTER: I had some responses to the 3 questions that were raised. 4 MR. REED: I see this incident as a serious 5 utility issue. But I feel tha t, in this question, this 6 dilemma of how far you're going to balance of plant versus 7 staying in the safe ty envelope , I lean to saying that the 8 regulatory can never encompass balance of plant. 9 In the air system there's a lot of spaghe tti, 10 there's a lot of complexity and it should stay in balance of 11 plant, the utility focus. 12 MR. WYLIE: I agree with what Glen is saying (1 13! except I think that there is a responsibility that the 14 utilities analyze their systems interactions. And I 15 consider this bordering on system interaction because what 16 you ' re talking about is the system triggers challenges to 17 the nuclear plant which could have been picked up by systems 18 interactions studies, which are not done. 19 That's the real point as I see it. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Undue challenges. 21 MR. WYLIE: That doesn' t mean you've got to go in 22 and put regulations on the design valves of the plant. All 23 you've got to do is say take a look. 24 MR. GIITTER: There was a question brought up in D)
's_ 25 the subcommittee mee ting about whe ther, or not the licensco ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
5390 05 05 55 ()DAV/bc v 1 had done a formal safety analysis on loss of instrument 2 air. What they have done , they have not done a formal 1 3 safe ty analysis on loss of instrument air, pe r se . However, 4 the licensee has_ implied that the net effect of a loss of 5 instrument air on plant systems is bounded by the existing
~
6 safe ty analysis. 7 In other words, loss of instrument air would 8 cause a loss, as I described here , a loss of main 9 fee dwa te r . Well, they have considered loss of main 10 feedwater in the safety analysis. As far as systems 11 interaction analysis goes, they did not believe that there 12 had been auf formal systems interaction analysis done () 13j involving the instranent air system. 14 They did indicate the fact that a single failure 15 of nonsafety-related systems causing both units to trip was 16 somewhat of a surprise to them as well. So it was not something that they had previously 17l 18 con side red . 19 MR. EBERSOLE: I thought Duke Power Company was 20 one of our utilities that sort of smelled like a rose for 21 doing good thingd. 22 MR. WYLIE: He hasn' t gotten around to tell you 23 how well everything else performed, like the electrical 24 sys tems , n i) s_ 25 ( Laug hte r . ) ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-si46
5390 05 06 56 1 MR. EBERSOLE: He didn' t le t you touch the air f'_-)DAV/bc x 2 there. I know the compartmentalization of the process. 3 MR. MICHELSON: Did the utility perform the total 4 loss of air tests that were under discussion in the 5 subcommittee meeting? 1 6 MR. GIITTER: I believe that was a startup test. 7 MR. MICHELSON: This problem didn't.show up at 8 that time, I guess, because unit two wasn' t concerned with 9 t tha t? 10 MR. ROSSI: The people are not here today to 11 discuss those test results , you know, and rather than us. . . 12 MR. MICHELSON: We ' re just speculating. r (_m) 13 MR. ROSSI: Speculating on what they did. I'd 14 rather just say we don' t know. You know, if you have 15 specific questions on these, we prefer that they come from 16 the committee in writing and we can get back to you. We 17l don' t normally try to go back and address each. l 18' MR. EBERSOLE: These sessions are supposed to 19 boil up le tters , if necessary, 20 MR. ROSSI: Okay, thank you. 21 MR. EBERSOLE: Anything else? 22 MR. GIITTER: There was a question about 23 electrical perturbations in the system in the plant itself. 24 There were no known electrical perturbations. Howeve r , O) ( 25 recognize the fact that when you lose nearly 2,400 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 8N-336-6646
l 4
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l l 5390 05 07 57 (~')DAV/bc v 1 megawatts almost instantaneously of f the grid, it's going to
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2 cause some problems. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: The electrical department, we were 4 just told, has already anticipated that. 5- MR. ROSSI: They didn' t lose offsite power, as 6 far as we know. 7 MR. GIITTER: Oh, no. 8 MR. MICHELSON: The question was, of course , did 9 the loss of the air system in both units cause other things - 10 to happen that were of concern, like ventilation problems 11 and that sort of thing, not necessarily electrice' l 12 perturbatiens? () 13' , MR. GIITTER: I did ask that question. That's 14 one other question . I had to answer. 15 MR. EBERSOLE: What were the margins to grid 16 instability failure? Do you know? 17l MR. GIITTER: I'm not sure I know that answer. l 18i The event happened at 6:40 in the morning on November 2nd, I i 19 which was a Saturday, I believe. 20 MR. EBER! OLE: It's a good thing. 21 4Ht. GIIT1ER: Okay. As far as other systems that 22 actuated the licensee , although they still haven' t comple ted 23 the entire analysis ye t, it seems as though there were no 24 unexpected or no unanticipated system actuations directly O) (_ 25 attributed to the loss of instrument air. ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4 46
5390 05 08 58 1 All valves went t'o their failsafe position. (~}DAV/bc 2 MR. MICHELSON: Tha t of course wasn' t the 3 question. The question was: 4 As a consequence , did somebody realize funny 5 things happened? Ye s , sure . But, af ter having gone to the 6 new mode or .the new decision, did that give you a problem 7 that you hadn' t anticipated, like loss of ventilation in the 8 room and the room is starting to heat up more rapidly than 9 they had thought? 10 And as a result, they were getting in trouble? 11 MR. GIITTER: In my experience , there were no 12 unexpected actuations of that nature. (') 13! I MR. EBERSOLE: What in fact did happen when loss 14' of air occurred, which was not aligned with the ideal 15 conditions? That was the particular point at which they had 16 cut the main duction pipe. This was on a doughnut boiler 17 and they wound up with 14 fee t of water. 18 MR. GIITTER: I believe that was hatch. 19 MR. EBERSOLE: Tha t's right , that was hatch, 20 true. So that would have been a consequence had you not 21 been already aligned and in good shape for this loss of 22 air. 23 MR. ROSSI: We in the Events Analysis Branch at 24 I&E are noting and watching and sort of accumulating the air I TD) 25 system problems because we do note tha t there are a number ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5390 05 09 59 (') Lj DAV/bc 1 of them, that it is a nonsafe ty-related system. And this is 2 one that has a big effect on the plant. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you really expect that you'll 4 turn out something like GD-17 for the air system? 5 MR. ROSSI: I don' t anticipate that in the near I 6l future. It's more likely we will summarize our findings and 7 information. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: Anything else? 9 MR. GIITTER: That's all I have. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: This was just brought-to your 11 attention to show. you that a relatively minor failure can i 12l result in successive events. 13 I would like to point out that when ( )) MR. ROSSI: 14 we were here on Tuesday, we also discussed the Susquehanna I 15 and II event, whe re they had a partial loss of of fsite 16 power, which interferred with the feedwa te r con trol . And 17 l that was both units the re . i 18i So tha t was in the power system and control 19 sys tem. We did not have that on the list for today. 20 The last item tha t we have today was to discuss a 21 little bit heavy loads. This was precipitated by an event 22 that we discussed on Tuesday at the St. Lucie I plant. 23 What I'm going to do is ask Steve Long to give 24 you a very brief summary of the specific event that occurred r3 (_) 25 at St. Lucie I. He's not going to give you viewgraphs or ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
5390 05 10 60 1 anything. He's just going to give you a brief summary to (d'DAV/bc 2 sort of set the stage. 3 And then there were a number of questions on 4 Tuesday of how that related to the unresolved safety issue 5 on heavy loads, and we have Ron Hernon from NRR who will 6 address those. I don' t think either one of them plan to go l 7 up to the podium for this. 8 But, first, we'll have Steve Long just give you a 9 quick rundown of the St. Lucie I event. Steve is from the 10 Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement, Events Analyais 11 Branch. 12 MR. LONG: I'll at least stand up so you can see () 13 me. The problem at St. Lucie cccurred beginning 14 Novembe r 6 th , whe n the y we re trying to defuel the vessel. 15 They had the head of f and they were lif ting the upper guide 16 structure at the head of the vessel. This involves 17 attaching a lif ting rig and the bolts to the upper guide 18l structure. 19 There were three attachment bolts. The problem 20 that occurred was that about eight feet over the vessel, 21 af ter about eight feet of lif t, one of those three bolts 22 disengaged and the rig cocked up about 6 degrees at that 23 point and the upper guide structure cocked downward. 24 They were unable to safely lower the guide (~T l structure back to the installed position. So they had this (_/ 25' ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. E-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 m_
5390 05 11 61 (~') DAV/bc 1 load hanging there until November 9 th, when they comple ted \/ 2 installation of a supplementary rig and could move the load 3 over to its normal parking position in the refueling pool. 4 The reason that this bolt became disengaged was a 5 failure, first of all, in the procedures, the requirement 6 that you check the thread engagement and procedures had been 7 eliminated during a revision. That was just an error in the 8 revision. 9 And the actual personnel action of installing the 10 bolts failed to properly check the thread engagement on at 11 least tha t one bolt. 12 There are some difficulties with installing the se () 7s But the in te re s t , I 13 l bolts that may have led to that. 14 understand, here is more towards the analysis of 15 consequences of this kind of situation, which is explored in 16 this area under 836. So , i f you ' re re ady , I'll turn it over to them. 17 l I 18 MR. EBERSOLE: Jus t one comment. We want to now 19 hear from Ron to see where this issue stands in the context 20 of if you' re going to drop some thing, you'd better know what 21 happens if it does drop. 22 MR. REED: I'd like to ma ke a poin t. In my 23 opinion, as I listen to the incident, it was the fault of 24 the maintenance personnel and their craf tsmanship and the ir I (^T (,j 25 ' a t te n tion . And even though it was stated that a procedural l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Covnage 800-336 6646
I o 5390.05 12 62 l v(~) DAV/bc 1 step was dropped out of the procedure, you cannot function 2 totally on paper. Paper can get lost, fall in the spent 3 fuel and refueling cavity, and all sorts of things. 4 So, in my opinion, I was worried about the 5 aptitude of these opinions so I checked with the licensee 6 and found that there are no aptitude examinations of 7 personnel at the St. Lucie plant. MR. EBERSOLE: 8 But, Glen , isn' t it also true tha t 9 even with aptitude, you could booby-trap the operator by not 10 giving him clear and distinct visual pictures of what he's 11 done or hasn' t done? 12l MR. REED: I think a person of appropriate (n,) 13 aptitude will see the picture. The design wasn' t bad; it 14 could have been be tter. 15 MR. EBERSOLE: But they did change the design. 16 Go ahead. 17 MR. HERNON: Jesse , based on your questions the 18 other day at the subcommittee meeting, I wanted to give 19 basically an overview of how the staff handled unresolved 20 safety issue 836, which dealt with the control of heavy 21 loadc. 22 This issue was initiated, I guess, about five or 23 six years ago. The staf f evaluated what the areas of 24 concern should be and attempted to determine if there was () 25 any such thing as a generic resolution that would apply ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nathmwide Coverage 800-336 6546
5390 05 13 63 1 pretty much uniformly at all plants, and concluded that, due (J3 DAV/bc 2 to the difference in configurations, the differences be tween 3 BWR's and PWR's, there really wasn' t any one thing that we 4 could go out to the industry and say: Here 's what you have 5 to do to make your heavy lif ting practices safer. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 ()
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13 14 15 16 17, i l 19' 19 20 21 22 23 24 4 0 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4646
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3900 06 01 64 f')DAVbw 1 We decided at that point to document our v 2 resolution in,a document called NUREG 0612, entitled 3 " Control of Heavy Loads.: 4 That document was sent out by generic letter to 5 all licensees with a request to do two things, two phases of 6 evaluation. 7 One was called Phase 1, which was the six-month 8 response. The other was the nine-month response called 9 Phase 2. The overall gist of this effort was to do a number 10 of things. 11 One, to insure that design of the handling 12 systems in the field was basically adequate. It was to
-s j 13 insure that there was adequate operator training,
(_) 14 instructions and appropriate inspections of the equipment. 15 It was to require the utilities to define in advance the 16 safe load travel paths, so they didn't unnecessarily move i 17 ! heavy loads over critical components, either fuel in full or i 18 fuel in the reactor vessels or those pumps, valves and 19 ' components required to move decay heat. 20 They all focused on providing mechanical stops 21 and/or electrical interlocks on electrical devices, 22 primarily cranes. And if mechanical stops and electrical 23 interlocks could not be provided, then the utilities would 24 be provided to make their cranes single failure proof, as () 25 one option, or to perform specific evaluations for load ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4 646
3900 06 02 65
'^ DAVbw (J 1 drop analyses and demonstrate if they did drop a load over a 2 critical component, that the consequences were acceptable.
3 As of about the middle of 1985, we had received 4 the Phase 1 responses and the Phase 2 responses from all 5 utilities. The Phase 1 responses primarily causes the
- 6. utilities to take a look at all the things I just discussed r
7 and decide what they had to do to improve their lifting 8 practices and reduce the consequences of the drop to an 9 ' acceptable level. 10 We had both the staff and Brookhaven National Lab 11 , or the Franklin Institute, I'm sorry, review in detail all 12 the responses from all the utilities to Phase 1 evaluation. I A () 13 l On that basis, we decided that we would do a e 14 pilot review on Phase 2 responses, which went a little bit 15 deeper into such things as single-failure proof cranes, and 16 so forth. 17 l Based on the 20 detailed reviews we did on 18 l Phase 2 reports, we concluded the last year that enough had 19 been done to give us a comfortable feeling that the 20 utilities both understood the problem and had taken action 21 responsive to the concerns, that it would not be necessary 22 to go through a detailed review on all the Phase 2 reports. 23 MR. EBERSOLE : So the situation is stable then? 24 l MR. HERNON: We do have Phase 2 reports from all I () 25 l utilities. We can talk somewhat about the 20 that we ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 N6nwide Coverage 800-336-6646
' l 3900 06 03 66 1
'~') DAVbw 1 reviewed in detail. U 2 The Staff also did -- I hate to use the word 3 " cursory," but a review of the remaining Phase 2' reports, 4 from the standpoint, are there any outliers there we should 5 be concerned about. We found none. 6 On that basis, we concluded, in June of 1985, 7 that no further action would be required. We had all the 8 reports. We encouraged the utilities to do what they had to 9 do to make their' loads safe, but based on the pilot program 10 ' of the 20 we looked at, things were under control. There 11 i was a mixture of responses. There were five BWRs, for 12 example, that did have single failure proof cranes, (..,) 13 ! including the three Browns Ferr units and the two Peach l 14 j Bottom units. 15 There were some utilities that opted to do load 16 drop analyses rather than spend -- in the case of some plant 17 ' it was an enormous sum of money to make their cranes single 18 f failure proof. I So I guess I can say that we have a feeling that 19 l 20 the heavy load issue is understood, and the utility has 21 responded, and we consider the chances of a load that may 22 cause severe consequences to be relatively small. 23 MR. EBERSOLE: I guess there is a sing 1t spot 24 check that you might do on TVA and QA problems. -That's one A 25 that resides in the boiler aspects of carrying 15-ton (_j ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
s k ". 3900 06 04 67 f;DAVbw 1 concrete blocks over an open-faced boiler. w 2 Has there been a specific examination made to 3 confirm the safety of that lift and the slings that are 4 used, et cetera? The so-called single failure proof 5 dropping? 6 MR. MICHELSON: It can't be single failure 7 proof. q- 8 MR. HERNON: We did take some specific action 9 along those lines. I'd like to have Git Singh, formerly of 10 the Aux Systems Branch, who was the cognizant technical 11 reviewer, say a few words on what we did. t. 12 MR. MICHELSON: Maybe before you start, you can (m (,) 13 tell us what you mean by " single failure proof." Do you 14 mean just the crane design, or do you mean the lifting 15 arrangement and the design of the device being lifted, or 16 where, where is the single failure? 17 MR. SINGH: A single failure proof crane design, 18 just a crane. 19 MR. MICHELSON: It's not the device being lifted? 20 One failure in the device being lifted will drop the 21 device. So the postulation is that you drop the concrete 22 block because of the way they're designed. There's no OA on 23 the concrete block, and I don't know that it will help us "1 - 24 much to hear all about the crane. (n i,_) 25 MR. EBERSOLE: They'll pull out the lifting eyes, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 804 336 6646
3900 06 05 68 1 for instance.
. wf)T DAVbw 2 MR. MICHELSON: Sure. Have you looked at the OA 3 on the lifting eyes of the devices being lifted, and that 4 sort of thing?
5 MR. SINGH: My name is Git Singh. What we did 6 was, we asked the BWR plants. They responded, most of the 7 concrete blocks are encased in stell. 8 MR. MICHELSON: Did you just that as a nice 9 answer then, or did you look to see what kind of encasement 10 l there was, relative to the effects of dropping the device? i 11 { They could be encased in quarter-inch-thick sheets of t
.e 12 l stainless steel. Good. That won't do you a bit of good, i
f ~ - (-m) , , 13 ! when you have a quarter ton concrete block. I 14 I The whole thing is an arrow directly into the 15 ! core of the reactor. Being encased in steel is of dittle
. i 16 ,I help.
17 i MR. EBERSOLE: You' re talking about pulling the 18 eye off the steel case. 19 MR. MICHELSON: The eyes aren't in the case. 20 They're embedded in the concrete. Do you know whether it's 21 non-reinforced concrete, or is it reinforced concrete? 22 MR[. SINGH: I can't answer that question. We 23 don't know. e , 24 MR. MICHELSON: You might want to ask them if the
'[
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25 rebar in the concrete, in the fuel plugs, whether there are ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. f I 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
3900 06 06 69 DAVbw 1 any or not. They're encased in stainless steel, all right. (~j'S
~-
2 That's to keep the water away. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: You see, there's a little slack in 4 this room. This might make an interesting point on which to 5, do a penetrative investigation. And again, I invite you to 6, use that particular plant as a point of access in this 7 area. 8 MR. MICHELSON: I think a subcommittee meeting 9 sometime is the place to discuss it. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: I wouldn't waste time on it here, 11 and maybe we need to say something via a letter. Okay. 12 I think this whole issue -- 13 MR. MICHELSON: I happen to have reviewed a ( [) 14 number of the heavy load reports. I get them from the 15 plants that I follow. Some of them are good. Some of then 16 aren't much good. I don' t know how you reviewed some of 17 them. I couldn't do it. 18 [ MR. EBERSOLE: Carl, I'd like to request, in 19 fact, that you take this in my bailiwick. 20 MR. MICHELSON: I don't have any subcommittee tht 21 deals with this. 22 MR. EBERSOLE: It doesn' t matter whether you' ve J 23 got anything on it, since I know that this whole issue was 24 initiated by yourself. 25 MR. MICHELSCN: Yes, but you need to have a
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3900 06 07 70
. flDAVbw V
1 subcommittee meeting first. The situation may not be as 2 bleak as one might imagine. I just don't know. 3 MR. HERNON: Your question on the concrete blocks 4 -was specifically directed to the Browns Ferry? 5 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, it's a good place to start. 6l MR. HERNON: We do have a response. We asked the i 7 question of Niagara Mohawk. I can answer some of the 8 questions for that plant. For example, they state in their 9 response that the concrete rebars are welded to the lifting 10 l lugs by canville sleeves. This design eliminates any 11 possibility of the plug falling apart, should the lifting 12 lug fail. [s-') 13 ! i MR. MICHELSON: That's the way to do it. Now you 14 l might ask for some other plants. 15 MR. HERNON: In closing, I have distributed to 16 the Committee members our June 26th Generic Letter, which is 17 ! Generic Letter 85-11, which provides the basis and notifies i 18 the industry of the fact that we have closed out the 19 controlled heavy load issue. 20 - MR. EBERSOLE: What's the margins of strength 21 that they use on these lifting eyes and the lifting slings? 22 Is there anything in the investigation about that? 23 MR. HERNON: There's a comment here, again, on 24 Niagara Mohawk. In addtion to special lifting device, p) (_ 25 there's been static load testing to 250 percent overrated ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
3900 06 08 71 p DAVbw 1 lo,ad. v 2 MR. MICHELSON: That doesn' t mean anything. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: That's pretty chintzy, in view of 4 the cheapness of getting 500 percent. I want the Committee 5 to get the flavor of the so-called ultimate resolution of 6l this. 7 So I guess that's it, unless there are any other 8 questions. 9 DR. CARBON: I have one question. 10 Are we doing enough, are we concerned enough 11 about B&W reactors? 12 ! MR. EBERSOLE: You mean as a set? I heard you 13 say, Glenn. ( }) 14 MR. REED: I say that we're not. l 15 MR. EBERSOLE: But you opened the issue, Glenn, 16 that these were as a set, the concept of a set, that these , 17 are clearly our trouble spots, whether that means we're I 18 j doing enough or not, I don't know. l 19 l DR. OKRENT: I think we are not. l 20 MR. WARD: I think we've been asked that question 21 by the Commissioners, and we've charged our Subcommittee, I 22 think that's Charlie Wylie. I'm not aware of what his plans 23 are, but I'll point out, we're going to talk about the 24 l Research Report this afternoon. That's one of the issues (m. () 25 there, is the need for research in the thermal hydraulic ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6686
- .? , . _. _ _ ._ __ _ . _ ._ . ~ . _ _ _ ,
i l
, i 3900 06 09 72
(')DAVbw \_j 1 area, specifically related to the B&W plants. I think it's 2 all part of the same package. It's related. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: Is this transient? < 4 MR. WARD: No, small break LOCAs and trat;sients. 5 That's not the whole answer, but that's part of the same
~
6 package. 7 DR. OKRENT: I think it's a minor part of the 8 question. 9 MR. WARD: I disagree that it's minor, but I 10 think it.is just a part. 11 l DR. CARBON: It seems to me that we ought to 12 really face this question and decide, yes, we are or no, f') x_- 13 we're not. It's a nagging, dragging thing. I do,n ' t think l 14 ' we're facing it properly. 15 MR. WARD: What would you suggest? 16 DR. CARBON: I don't know. Maybe we ought to 17 have a finn schedule and B&W should be asked to come in with 18 some kind of analysis or recommendation. 19 ! DR. SHEWMON: Are you suggesting the risk from I 20 I these is greater than would show up in a PRA? 21 DR. CARBON: I'm suggesting that there seem to be 22 problera with B&W reactors all the time, year after year. 23 DR. SHEWMON: There's LERs and things with all 24 reactors. '( ) 25 DR. CARBON: The serious problems seem to keep ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
3900 06 110 73 1 coming from B&W.
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Q./ DAVbw 2 DR. CARBON: These would be the best candidates 3 for Glenn's approach to emergencies. 4 MR. REED: I have no comment at this time. 5 DR. OKRENT: I would say PRA, plus a serious 6 evaluation of the implications of operating these, not just 7 a PRA. 8 DR. SHEWMON: There's some operating experience. 9 I assume they did some of those things with operating 10 experience. 11 DR. OKRENT: The last PRA I can recall for a B&W 12 plant was Midland. Maybe there's been one since. () 13 MR. MICHELSON: That's a different kind.of 14 operating experience. They used statistical failure rates. 15 DR. SHEWMON: It's not operating experience with 16 l regard to things that would lead to events. Then I 17 I something's screwed up. Either we're worrying about things I that can't lead to events, or they're using the wrong 18 l 19 statistics. 20 MR. MICHELSON: They're using statistics from 21 another kind of valve information, for instance. 22 MR. WARD: Yes, but I think Paul's point is, if 23 we perceive there is a serious problem with B&W plant 24 operations, and if PRAs aren't telling us that, there's () 25 something wrong with the PRAs, or there's something wrong l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-316-6646
3900 06 11 74 () DAVbw 1 with the general perception. v 2 MR. MICHELSON: That's right. It could not be 3 just B&W plants. 4 MR. EBERSOLE: Are we having more trouble with 5 these than with standard coal burning plants? 6' MR. REED: I think if you look at the history on 7 superheater type plants, there's been more trouble with 8 superheater plants than with regular steam plants. 9 MR. EBERSOLE: They can always trip the coal. 10 l MR .' REED: Whenever you make the process more 11 complicated in fossil power production or with pressurized 12 water production with superheat, you invariably get into () 13 ) f complexities and compromises, in my opinion. Let's say 14 better quality main steam compromises the controllability of i the PWR in the B&W concept,.but it should have a different 15 l i 16 j approach to take care of safety functions, quite frankly. 17 l I think we've been rapping on the door for a long i 18 l time. It began with Three Mile Island with a big rap, and 19 the little raps are still coming, but we're not responding 20 to it. 21 MR. EBERSOLE: Are we seizing and holding the 22 degree of superheat beyond the level that we should in any 23 of these B&W plants? 24 MR. REED: I don' t think we should debate work on O) (, 25 the main steam, steam that's being produced. I think we ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
3900 06 12 75 1 should work on our safety. That's what our job is. Do we
'}DAVbw 2 have comparable improvement of safety, response for this 3 compromise?
4 MR. EBERSOLE: Compensatory conservatism. 5 Okay. Any other questions? We're just about 6 five minutes behind. 7 (No response.) 8 MR. EBERSOLE: If not, thank you very much, 9 Ernie, for a fine presentation. 10 Mr. Chairman, it's all yours. 11 MR. WARD: Let's take a break until about 10:45. 12 (Recess.) (] 13. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 102-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5390 07 01 76 (~N DAVbur 1 MR. WARD: Our next topic is Agenda Item 3 on the \,J 2 security of nuclear facilities. 3 Dr. Mark. 4 DR. MARK: This had been scheduled for an hour's 5 discussion. At this time we observe from the new agenda 6 that it has been cut back to a 15-minute corament. 7 We are talking about the insider rule package, 8 which has had a long history, beginning about 1977. It was 9 the subject of a special hearing board established by the 10 Commission. It was the subject of a full committee report 11 i two and a half years ago and has not changed very much since 12 . then. () 13 There is now a proposed final rule, on which 14 there has been 120 days worth -- no, 210 days worth of l 15 j public comments, and we just received about six weeks ago a 16 proposed final rule with an analysis of public comments. 17 We nad a subcommittee meeting on Tuesday with McCorkle, from NMSS, to discuss what was in that final rule, 18 l 19 which indeed is pretty much what was in the draft rule. 1 20 There have been a few slight amendments -- I believe they 21 are slight -- in response to public comments. 22 It had been thought that we would get through 23 that on Tuesday and be able to encourage the Commission to 24 go ahead, to issue the rule, perhaps with a few () 25 suggestions. The rule is on its way from NMSS to the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 80 4336-6646
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5390 07 02 ~77 1 Commission. I guess it is already upstairs but has not yet 4 . (}DAVbur
, 2 been scheduled for a Commission vote.
3 In the course of Tuesday's meeting, the question
- .. 4 came up -- which was new since two years ago -- as to 5 whether this ought to be a rule or would be better as a 6 policy statement on the part of the Commission, to be 7 adhered to and implemented by industry, which is in some 8 respects, maybe in major respects, a proposal being made on i
9 the part of NUMARC and, as we understand it, a major 10 fraction of the licensees. That is a fairly new, year or year and a half 11 l i
'12 proposal on the part of NUMARC.
() 13 j The rule, as proposed, contains a background 14 I investigation of behavioral observations, psychological 3 15 screening. I am talking of the access rules. 16 There is a couple of things having to do with the 17 regulations for ~ entry search and the things said about vital j 18 areas. 4 19 There seems to be no tendency for debate, but 20 there is tendency for debates on this question as to the 21 exact status and format of the access authorization 22 business. 23 In the course of the Tuesday discussion, we came 24 to the feeling, particularly strong on the part of some of
. () 25 the people attending -- we actually had a quorum of the full ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646 ;
5390 07 03 78 1 committee there if eight is a quorum. It is a majority -- a ()DAVbur 2 feeling that we needed to hear more from some representative 3- of NUMARC and from some representative of the legal statf in 4 the Commission, since there seemed to be a debate and a 5 strong difference of opinion on the thing referred to as an 6 appeals process for an employee who has gone through the l 7 screening and had been denied authorization to have 8 unescorted access to vital areas of the plant. 9 I think the difference is that if the thing is a 10 rule on the part of the Commission there will have to be -- 11 in order to meet the requirements of due process, the First 12 Amendment of the Constitution or something -- there will () 13 I have to be a fairly carefully spelled out mechanism for an 14 employee who has received a negative judgment to mount an 15 appeal. 16 Industry does not like the idea of there being a 17 i formal, prescribed track for conducting an appeal. Industry i 18 I does not seem to object to the notion that there should be 19 something in the way of a grievance procedure, of which they 20 think they have adequate arrangements. 21 Apart from that, it doesn't really seem to me as 22 if the things being asked to be done are very different when 23 proposed by NUMARC or proposed by NMSS. 24 This quickly gets back, as you will see, to the O (_j 25 question: are we or are we not in favor of passing as many ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ll02 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5390 07 04 , 79 ()DAvbur 1 things for industry's self-policing as seem reasonable, or .v 2 should they be kept in the hands of the regulators? 3 One of the arguments made for a rule by the 4 staff, which seems strongly to support a rule, is that it 5 will make it more straightforward to exercise enforcement.
~
6 That is almost enough to make you think that we should be 7 looking in a different direction. 8 But that is perhaps the main difference that they 9 see, and I am not even sure if it is a real difference. 10 Anyway, because of all this it was felt that we 11 should defer the idea of attempting to bring this to the 12 full committee for a final discussion this morning. It has () 13 been arranged to get someone representing NUMARC to come 14 here and of course, in the February meeting, to get someone 15 from the Legal Director's office here for February to make 16 it clear to us just what is the difference on this due 17 1, process item between what industry might be thinking of and l 18 i what the NRC might feel. i 19 The NRC doesn't feel they need much on due 20 process if it isn't a rule, if it is a policy. All they 21 would ask for is an assurance that there is some means for 22 the grievance to be raised and seriously heard. 23 The reg guide which would be attached to the rule 24 gets very specific. () 25 Anyway, that is about what I have to say on this ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coserage 800-336-6646
5390 07 05 80 (')DAVbur 1 point. v 2 We have arranged for a presencation to the full 3 committee for two hours instead of one with NMSS's Legal 4 Office and NUMARC to tell us what it is that they are
/5 inclined to be arguing about and leave us free to decide if 6 we would rather see this as a self-policing activity from 7 the point of view of protection against sabotage.
8 I, myself, do not see that there is any 9 difference. Even the psychological test, which is in the 10 rule now and was in quastion two years ago, is admitted by 11 the psychologists not to have anything in particular to do 12 with sabotage, anyway. It just means you keep unreliable -- () 13 l or the current word must be " flaky" -- guys out of the 14 l system. 15 DR. SIESS: Unless they work for NRC? 16 , DR. MARK: NRC people are not to be screened l 17 : because they have O clearance. I 18 DR. SIESS: That doesn't apply to ACRS. I 19 l DR. MARK: We all have O clearance. 20 Anyway, that is where things stand. 21 MR. WARD: So there is not a correlation between
- 22. O clearance and lack of flakiness, obviously.
23 DR. OKRENT: In fact, that is a conclusion drawn 24 by a group at Los Alamos. O 25 DR. MARK: What, that there is a correlation? (_j ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
5390 07 06 81 [^] DAVbur 1 DR. OKRENT: No. G' 2 DR. SIESS: That there is no correlation? 3 MR. WARD: I thought we had local evidence. 4 DR. OKRENT: I confirm your evidence. 5 DR. MARK: I can subscribe to the notion that 6 there are some rather strange characters who succeed in 7 getting 0 clearance. 8 I have a question, however, and that is whether 9 those who were in the discussion on Tuesday or anybody 'else 10 feels we should attempt to. stage a further subcommittee 11 l meeting in advance of the full meeting in February, for i 12 l which I think the way has been cleared on Wednesday
<N l IJ 13 ! afternoon of that week in which the full meeting occurs and 14 which would have to recommend it, as far as I can see, only 15 the possibility of saving a little time in the full 16 committee. But I am not sure that that would result.
17;I We have two hours requested of Ray for the full 18 committee discussion, with three presentations, all to be 19 packaged, and I would like opinions from the people who are 20 either here or present on Tuesday on whether we want the 21 Wednesday af ternoon, two to three-hour subcommittee 22 following the other subcommittee that is supposed to meet 23 Wednesday morning. 24 MR. REED: Carson, I think the issues are () 25 narrow. I don't feel that a subcommittee meeting is ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-66 4
5390 07 07 82 1 necessary. (J'SDAVbur 2 I would ask one question: are you putting this 3 off to the full committee meeting with respect to Ccykission 4 action? - 5 DR. MARK: Yes. I should have added that. There 6 has been contact with the chap handling this upstairs, who 7 has apparently given Schiffgens the assurance that it will 8 not come before the Commission until after our February 9 meeting if we request, so say that we would like to give at 10 least a comment before they consider it. That has been I 11 ' arranged. 12 DR. SIESS: Carson -- go ahead. .() 13 DR. CARBON: I was going to ask Carson if you 14 really meant Wednesday because there are three all-day 15 meetings. 16 DR. SICSS: One of them is highly questionable. 17 DR. MARK: I would ask Schiffgens to comment on I i 18 ; this. I would look into this, l 19 MR. SCHIFFGENS: It might have to be Wednesday 20 l evening. I haven't actually tried. 21 DR. CARBON: I know I have a meeting on 22 Wednesday. 23 Why couldn't we put it on Tuesday? 24 MR. SCHIFFGENS: The only reason we are going to (q_) 25i try to put it on Wednesday is so that people who are coming ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
5390 07 08 83
; 1 in from out of town don't have to stay a day to make a V( DAVbur 2 presentation to us on Tuesday and another on Thursday.
3 MR. WARD: So it would be Wednesday evening 4 possibly? 5 DR. MARK: I personally think we ought.to be able 6 to skip it, but if enere is a feeling that we need it we are 7 trying to see if we can fit it in. 8 DR. SIESS: I have a question, which may be 9 trivial in comparison to the question of what day the 10 subcommittee meets. But the way Carson has put this, I am 11 wondering whether it is worth any ACRS time to referee an 12 issue between the staff and the industry that relates to the (( ) 13 l rights of the employee rather than to the safety of the 14 plant. 15 ,l DR. MARK: In my view, it is a little more than 16 that. It relates also to whether the agency wishes to stay 17 on the track of prescriptive regulation or is trying to get i 18 l things on the track of being handled. 19 j DR. SIESS: If we want to treat it generically as 20 to prescriptiveness, prescriptiveness is in the regulatory 21 guide, which is at least one step removed from the 22 prescriptiveness that we normally think about as 23 regulations. 24 MR. WARD: What is the status of tha guide if () 25 there is not a rule? ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33H646
5390 07 09 84 [v') DAVbur 1 DR. SIESS: It goes with the rule. It should 2 make the rule clear, I think. 3 MR. WARD: But if there is just a policy 4 statement which is saying the same thing, is there still 5 going to be a guide? 6 DR. MARK: The policy statement would, as far as 7 I can picture it, lay down the same requirements. There 8 will be a five-year background investigation. There will be 9 a psychological test that will be administered by a 10 psychiatrist, et cetera. 11 MR. WARD: Would the same regulatory guide exist 12 then? () O 13 1 i DR. SIESS: Look, the part of the guide that 14 there is some objection to is that relating to the due 15 process, if the man is denied access to the Title II 16 process. The guide apparently specifies that you have got 17 30 days to do this, 30 days to reply, and so forth. 18 It is a very prescriptive thing, and the industry 19 doesn' t like prescriptive. 20 NRC insists that we don't know how to inspect 21 against something unless it is prescriptive, and this is the 22 basic argument that we hear time after time. 23 The staff admits that most plants have these 24 procedures in place, but I&E can't inspect against them () 25 because they are not prescribed. The plan hasn't been ACE-FEDERAL REPCRTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 4646
5390 07 10 85 1 approved, and they don't have a piece of paper to inspect {}DAVbur 2 against. 3 This particular issue of the due process is, I 4 think simply on that basis, they preferred not to have it. 5 Now, KMC, Don Knuth, who is representing one 6i group, said they were willing to go with the thing before it
,7 was revised on the basis of public comments. They would 8 just like to see the thing settled and let's get on with the 9 business, we have kicked it around long enough.
10 But if the only issue is the due process, that 11 doesn't seem to be related to reactor safety. It may be a 12 point that there ought to be another forum for that to be e ( w) 13 i settled, if we want to talk about prescriptiveness. I 14 ' DR. CARBON: I share Carson's view that it is a I 15 matter of whether there should be regulation. To me that is 16 , a matter of safety. I 17 j DR. SIESS: If you are talking prescriptive i 18 l regulation in general as opposed to prescriptive regulation 9 r on this particular thing, I get your point. 19 l 20 DR. MARK: Look, I really have nothing to add. 21 MR. WARD: I think there seems to be a consensus 22 that we don't need another subcommittee meeting. 23 DR. MARK: That would suit me fine. 24 , We will try to keep these presentations short and () 25 try and get some focus on the things which are serious ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
5390 07 11 86 f) N_/ DAVbur 1 rather than reciting provisions of the rule and talk rather 2 about the provisions which will go into effect one way or
~3 the other.
4 And there is another question for us here. I 5 don't think it really relates to next month on this point. 6 Here they are writing a rule. Some of the 7 tremendously significant features of the rule are not in 8 it. They are in a parallel reg guide which is being 9 ' prepared at the same time. 10 For instance, there will be a background 11 investigation. They really wanted to cover five years, but 12 five years is not mentioned in there. It is only in the reg () 13 guide. - 14 Why on earth does one thing of regulations in 15 this bifurcated fashion, where you can't from reading one 16 piece of paper learn what the whole story is? 17 If there is a complaint about the NRC's 18 regulatory obscureness, it is surely emphasized by that kind 19 of procedure. 20 I have nothing else, Mr. Chairman. 21 We won' t have a subcommittee. We will try and 22 get a two-hour slot in next month, and I think we have the 23 people that we wanted to hear from lined up. So all we will 24 have to do is to stay close, to say that if they have 20 () 25 minutes they had better talk for five because the members ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33Mi646
5390 07 12 87 1 will have questions, each one at least a minute each. '(]DAVbur 2 Thank you. 3 MR. WARD: All right. Thank you, Carson. 4 We will move on then to the next topic. 5 (Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the committee 6 proceeded to an unrecorded section of the meeting.)
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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER ,n 'L] This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of: , NAME OF PROCEEDING: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 309TH GENERAL MEETING DOCKET NO.: PLACE: Washington, D. C.
/~'N
(,,/ DATE: Thursday, January 9, 1986 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of.the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (sigt) . m (TYPED) David L. Hoffman Official Reporter RephrtehsA$hi$$tk '
- O
O Agenda for ACRS Meeting on January 9,1986 9:00 a.m. Room 1046, H Street . RECENT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Presenter /0ffice Date Plant Event Telephone Pg 10/2/85 Rancho Seco Reactor Trip & Excessive Cooldown S. Miner, NRR y 10/7/85 (ACRS Request) (Update); AFW Pump Bearing Failure 492-8352 12/5/85 (Update) 12/26/85 Reactor trips 11/22/85 Crystal River 3 MFW Failure /AFW Actuation H. Silver, NRR f Reactor Trip 492-7900
- 11/2/85 McGuire 1 & 2 Dual Unit Trip on toss of J. Glitter, IE 7
Instrument Air 492-9001 0 11/6/85 St. tucie 1 vessei Internais Liftiao Rio S. teao. IE y Failure 492-7159 Status of USI A-36 R. Hernan, NRR - 492-4755 #[*[7e Status of USI A-44 A. Rubin, NRR // 492-8303 - O
h ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON REACTOR OPERATIONS MEETING JANUARY 7, 1986 O RANCHO SEC0 REACTOR TRIP AN] UNCONTROLLED C00LDOWN OCTOBER 2, 1985 UPDATE (S. MINER, NRR) , REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER DUE TO HIGH PRIMARY SYSTEM PRESSURE REACTOR TRIP CAUSED BY TRIP OF THE MAIN FEED WATER PUMPS UNCONTROLLED C00LDOWN OF 110*f IN 15 MINUTES PRIMARY CAUSE OF C00LDOWN WAS LIFTING OF THE STEAM RELIEF VALVE ON ONE OF THE FEEDWATER HEATERS (4TH POINT) VACUUM LOSS DID NOT INITIATE REACTOR TRIP NOR EFFECT THE RESULTING TRANSIENT MAIN FEED PUMP TRIP (MFP) CAUSE , DEFECTIVE HIGH PRESSURE TRIP SWITCH TRIPPED A PUMP _ MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF B PUMP TRIP WAS OPERATOR MANUAL ACTION , B MFP AT MINIMUM SPEED COULD NOT INCREASE SPEED FAST EN0 UGH TO ESTABLISH FLOW TO SG p\_/ - AUXILIARY FEED PUMPS (AFW) OPERATING TRIPPED B PUMP TO OPEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW VALVES) CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1. REPLACED HIGH PRESSURE SWITCH
- 2. ADDED TRIP MONITORING CIRCUITRY _
3.~ MODIFIED INSTRUMENTATION S0 THAT AFW VALVES ODEN ON SAME PARAMETER AS AFW PUMPS (LOW MFP DISCHARGE PR;5SURE) UNCONTROLLED C00LDOWN CAUSE STEAM PRESSURE CONTROLLER ON STEAM TO HEATER (PEGGING STEAM) SET CLOSE TO RELIEF SET POINT OF SAFETY VALVE l CORRECTIVE ACTION INCREASED SAFETY VALVE SETPOINTS ON HEATERS USING PEGGING STEAM (2ND AND 4TH POINT HEATERS) EVALUATION
- LICENSEE CONCLUDED C00LDOWN WAS WITHIN ANALYTICAL LIMITS MEETING
(] - REQUIREMENT OF 10 CFR 50 APPENDIX G INDEPENDENT NRC EVALUATION CONCLUDED NO ADVERSE AFFECT ON STRUCTURAL l INTEGRITY OF THE REACTOR VESSEL e a
O
- I t
i i RANCHO SECO - AFW PUMP FAILURE (UPDATE)
.AFW PUMP THRUST BEARING FAILURE SLINGER ~ RING INSTALLED IMPROPERLY BEARING REPAIRED WITH SLINGER RINGS PROPERLY INSTALLED ENDURANCE TEST OF REFAIRED PUMP COMPLETED I
OTHER SAFETY RELATED PUMPS WITH SLINGER RINGS INSPECTED
;O- !
i
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l l I 2 l i i ! u .! '. j i 'O : i I I
(~') v . RANCHO SECO REACTOR TRIP DECEMBER 5, 1985 AND CECEMBER 26, 1985 DECEMBER 5, 1985 REACTOR TRIP PLANT AT 91% POWER TRANSFERRING CONTROL FROM MANUAL TO AUTOMATIC MFW FLOW INCREASED RETURN TO MANUAL TO REDUCE MFW FLOW B FLOW METER PEN HUNG UP OPERATOR REDUCED FLOW FURTHER HIGH PRESSURE SCRAM SAFETY VALVE ON FEEDWATER HEATER OPENED DUE TO 20% OVERSHOOT
. OF PEGGING STEAM PRESSURE CONTROLLER MANUALLY SHUT OFF STEAM TO HEATER
{') - PLANT STABILIZED WITHOUT EXCESSIVE C00LDOWN OR PRESSURE TRANSIENT SET POINT OF PEGGING STEAM PRESSURE CONTROLLER LOWERED DECEMBER 26, 1985 REACTOR TRIP _
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PLANT AT 76% POWER LOSS OF ICS CAUSED A REACTOR TRIP RCS UNCONTROLLED C00LDOWN OF ABOUT 200 F IN 26 MINUTES IIT AT SITE, FRED HEBDON (AE00) TEAM LEADER O 1 _ _______ __ -_ _ _ _ L
. . , . ~ . . .
l (VD
- CRYSTAL RIVER 3 - MFW FAILURE /AFW ACTUATION / REACTOR TRIP JANUARY 7, 1986, (H. SILVER, NRR)
- PROBLEM:
o PARTIAL MFW FAILURE, AFW ACTUATION AND REACTOR TRIP
- SIGNIFICANCE:
o OUESITONS REGARDING PROCEDURES AND TRAINING, POST-TRIP REVIEW, OPERABILITY OF COMPONENTS, UNNECESSARY AFM CHALLENGES
- CIRCUMSTANCES:
i o PLANT AT 20% POWER, BEING SHUTDOWN TO REPAIR DROPPED ROD o INAPPROPRIATE MFW VALVE MANIPULATION, SLUGGISH VALVE OPERATION CAUSED LOW SG LEVEL IN SG "A" l l - o AFW ACTUATED PROPERLY, SECURED QUICKLY BY OPERATORS (DIFFICULTY IN CLOSING AFW STEAM ADMISSION VALVE) 0) N- o LOW SG LEVEL CAUSED REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH PRESSURE o PDRV FAILED TO OPEN ON COMMAND; BLOCKED CLOSED. LATER FOUND TO BE FAILED OPEN o AFTER TRIP, AFW STEAM ADMISSION VALVE OPENED SPURIOUSLY, CAUSING l MILD OVERC00 LING EVENT -- o LATER, EFIC LEVEL TRANSMITTER SENSITIVITY CAUSED SPURIOUS AFW INITIATIONS FOLLOWUP ACTIONS: PROBLEMS ACTION I AFW RELIABILITY o EXCESSIVE CHALLENGES TO AFW ! - MFW RELIABILITY B&W OG l - EFIC TRANSMITTER SENSITIVITY DESIGN CHANGE O
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O . PROCEDilRES. CHANGE; OPERATOR
.o OPERATOR TRAINING AFD PROCEDURES '
TRAINING
- MFW OPEPATION
- SEClR!MG EFIC (TIMING, METHOD) -
UNDERSTANDING 0F AND CONFIDENCE IN AFW/EFIC (NEED TO SECURE Ol101Y, METHOD OF SEClRING,
._ CLOSING OF STEAM ADMISSION VAI.\E)
POST TRIP DEVIEW
~o EXTENT OF INTER-DISCIPLINARY HIGH-LEVEL PRC REVI&!
REVIEW PREVIOUS IfW STARTIP VALVE PROBLEM _- PORV EQUlFENT MALRINCTION
. n PORV RELAY CONTACTS - PEPLACED O STEAM ADMISSION VALVE CANT 0T DIPLICATE O 0 SLUGGISH ITW LLV-LOAD MFW VALVE OPEPATION CONTPOL SETPOINTS - REPAIRED o START 1!P ITW VAL'E OPEPATION TilBE AFD CORTROL PRESSURE '
PEPAIPED e>. 4 I a,.
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_ MCGUIRE UNITS 1 AND 2 - DUAL UNIT TRIP ON LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR (_) NOVEMBER 2, 1985 (J. GilTTER, IE) PROBLEM: LOSS OF COMMON INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM CAUSED BOTH UNITS 1 AND 2 TO TRIP SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: NON-SAFETY GRADE SYSTEM FAILURE RESULTS IN CHALLENGE TO SAFETY SYSTEMS - TWO UNITS AFFECTED BY SINGLE FAILURE DISCUSSION: A SECTION OF BRAIDED, FLEXIBLE PIPE ON THE DISCHARGE OF THE "B" INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSOR RUPTURED AT A WELDED SEAM CAUSING THE INST. AIR SYSTEM TO DEPRESSURIZE AIR SYSTEO COMMON TO BOTH UNITS
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BOTH UNITS TRIP FROM 100% POWER ON LO LO STEAM GENERATOR () LEVEL CAUSED BY CLOSURE OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW CONTROL VALVES ON LOSS OF AIR PRESSURE AUX. FEED FLOW CONTROL VALVES GO OPEN ON LOSS OF AIR RESULTING IN EXCESS AFW FLOW AIR RESTORED IN ABOUT EIGHT MINUTES UNIT 1 DEPRESSURIZED TO SI INITIATION POINT (1845 PSIG) (INJECTION FOR ABOUT 10 MINUTES) UNIT 2 OPERATORS RECOGNIZED UNIT 1 PROBLEM AND TRIPPED TWO l , REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS TO SLOW COOLDOWN CAUSED BY PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE LEAKAGE. NO St OCCURRED ALL OTHER PLANT SYSTEMS PERFORMED AS EXPECTED FOR THIS s TRANSIENT UNIT 1 COOLDOWN WAS 86*; UNIT 2 COOLDOWN WAS 74* N
FOLLOWUP: PRZR HEATER G'ROUP B ON UNIT 1 WAS REPAIRED THE FLEXIBLE PIPE ON THE INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSORS WAS REPLACED ,,.
- THE USE OF THE BRAIDED, FLEXIBLE PIPE ON THE INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM WILL BE REVIEWED TO DETERMINE IF OTHER REPLACEMENT OR it - MODIFICATIONS ARE NECESSARY TO INCREASE RELIABILITY CHECK VALVES.WILL BE INSTALLED ON THE DISCHARGE OF THE THREE RECIPROCATING INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSORS FLEXIBLE PIPE APPLICATIONS IN OTHER PLANT SYSTEMS AND AT ALL DUKE POWER NUCLEAR STATIONS WILL BE REVIEWED m-e W
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\~/ ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 - UGS LIFTING RIG FAILURE NOVEMBER 6, 1985 (S. LONG, IE)
PROBLEM: WHILE REMOVING THE UPPER GUIDE STRUCTURE (UGS) 1 OF 3 BOLTS CONNECTING THE UGS TO THE LIFTING RlG FAILED WITH THE UGS STILL OVER THE CORE SIGNIFICANCE: THE 50 TON LOAD COULD FALL BACK INTO REACTOR VESSEL, POSSIBLY CONTACTILG AND DAMAGING FUEL, RESULTING IN RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE GASES TO THE CONTAINMENT CIRCUMSTANCES:
- WHILE LIFTING THE UGS, LIFT WAS STOPPED WHEN RIG WAS SEEN TO TILT AFTER IT WAS RAISED 8 FEET.
1 OF 3 BOLTS ATTACHING RIG TO UGS HAD DISENGAGED. RIG CANTED
~6" UP AND UGS CANTED ~6" DOWN
- ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO LOWER UGS TO INSTALLED POSITION, BUT LOAD
- CELLS INDICATED BINDING Ns - LICENSEE DECLARED AN UNUSUAL EVENT, ENHANCED CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY AND IMPLEMENTED PROCEDURES TO MONITOR LOAD STAB'lLITY
- SECONDARY LIFTING RlG WAS DESIGNED, TESTED AND INSTALLED
~
ASSEMBLY WAS JACKED LEVEL AND THEN MOVED TO ITS NORMAL _ PARKING POSITION IN REFUELING POOL ON 11/9 FINDINGS: INSPECTION REVEALED THAT FAILED BOLT WAS ONLY INSERTED ABOUT 1/2 TURN, AND STRIPPED DURING LIFT CE PROCEDURES FOR RlG ATTACHMENT INCLUDE VERIFICATION OF THREAD ENGAGEMENT; THIS WAS OMITTED FROM LICENSEE'S PROCEDURES DAMAGE: LIFT RIG.AND ONE VESSEL GUIDE PIN WERE BENT. (:)- iP
2-
' FOLLOWUP:
- LICENSEE RETURNED UGS TO INSTALLED POSITION USING ,LONG ATTACHMENT BOLTS WITH HEADS THAT BEAR ON RIG SURFACES ABOVE-WATER LEVEL LICENSEE IS REVIEWING OTHER LIFT PROCEDURES TO ENSURE PROPER VERIFICATION OF BOLT THREAD ENGAGEMENT
'~ REVIEW OF USI A36 PilASE 2 ANALYSIS FOR WATERFORD INDICATES THAT FUEL WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGED BY DROP IE PREPARING INFORMATION NOTICE m O .
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v l NRR STAFF PRESENTAT,10N TO THE ~ ACRS i
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SUBJECT:
STAhjSOFUSIA-44,STATIONBLACK0'Ji DATE: JANUARY 7, 1986 i >
.3 PRESENTER: ALAN M. RUBIN PRESENTER'S TITLE / BRANCH /DIV: TASK F.ANAGER, REACTOR SAFETY ISSUES BRANCH, DIVISION OF, SAFETY REVIEW s OVERSIGHT l
I I PRESENTER'S NRC TEL. NO.: 49-28303 l l SUBCOMMITTEE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON OPERATING REACTORS O ~ \ ._ U
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k STATUS OF USI A-44, STAT!ON BLXKDUT )! }l i- t t i
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- - PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON 4 c j 1 1-
~ OPERATING REACTORS , t 4 , 5 i BY ALAN M. PUBIN ', [h
- -DIVISION OF SAFETY REVIEW 8 OVERSIGHT !
t Y !. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION ' .\ . . 1 JANUARY 7, 1986 _ [ ! A .. I p 1 l 1 ' \ e , i 1 l l I l I t l:g i 1 l l I, 4 f
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s ('J. x-LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (LPSP) FRE0!JENCY TOTAL FPEQUENCY OF LOSP SITF-YEARS LOSP (PER SITE-YEAR)_ YEARS 588 A9 0.08 ALL YEARS THROUGH 1984 431 42 0.10 ALL YEARS THROUGH 1981 157 7 0.046
-1982 - 84 60 8 0.13
([') 1985 643 57 0.09 , ALL YEARS THRCUGH 1985 CONCLUSIONS INDUSTRY AVERAGE TOTAL LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWEP IS ABOU EVERY 1] SITE-YEARS. THE FRE0VENCY OF TOTAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWEP CAN VAR YEAR TO YEAR. ONE MUST BE CAUTIOUS WHEN USING A LIMITED SET OF DATA TO ESTIMATE FUTURE LOSP FREQUENCIES. b 18
.O RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESOLVING USI A-44 PUBLISH PROPOSED RULE WHICH WOULD REQUIRE ALL PLANTS TO BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND AND RECOVER FROM A STATION BLACK 0UT OF A SPECIFIED DURATION.
ISSUE DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE IN SUPPORT OF RULE GUIDELINES FOR ALL PLANTS PROCEDURES AND TRAINING TO COPE WITH STATION BLACK 0UT MINIMUM EDG RELIABILITY GUIDELINES CONSIDERING PLANT DIFFERENCES O HOW TO DETERMINE ACCEPTABLE TIME TO WITHSTAND STATION BLACK 0UT e i M
l ([) . USI A-44 SCHEDULE AND MILESTONES MILESTONE DATE PRESENTATION TO ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEBRUARY 1985 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS PRESENTATION TO FULL ACRS MARCH 1985 LETTER FROM ACRS TO ED0 MARCH 1985 DRAFT NUREG-1032 PUBLISHED MAY 1985 PROPOSED RULE (SECY-85-163) TO COMMISSION MAY 1985 SEPTEMBER 1985 ([) SECY-85-163A TO COMMISSION SEPT., NOV. 1985 COMMISSION BRIEFINGS JANUARY 1986 COMMISSION DECISION PROPOSED RULE AND DRAFT REGULATORY FEBRUARY 1986 GUIDE TO BE PUBLISHED FOR COMMENT MAY 1986 END OF PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD OCTOBER 1986 FINAL RULE TO CRGR JANUARY 1987 FINAL RULE TO COMMISSION MAY 1987 FINAL RULE TO BE ISSUED O
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0 0 0 9 em O .8 A C Id - uP SL iOES W 9 O
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e DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE ONSITE EMERGENCY AC POWER SYSTEMS RELIABILITY PROGRAM TO MAINTAIN EDG RELIABILITY MAXIMUM EDG FAILURE RATE PROCEDURES FOR RESTORING EMERGENCY AC POWER OFFSITE POWER PROCEDURES TO RESTORE OFFSITE POWER AND USE NEARBY OFFSITE POWER SOURCES.
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ABILITY TO COPE WITH STATION BLACK 0UT
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. EVALUATION OF ABILITY TO COPE WITH STATION BLACK 0UT SELECTION OF MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE STATION BLACK 0UT DURATION CAPABILITY MODIFICATIONS TO PLANT (IF NECESSARY)
PROCEDURES AND TRAINING . () 17
O PROPOSED RULE ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH TO APPENDIX A, GDC 17 THE REACTOR CORE AND ASSOCIATED COOLANT, CONTROL, AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS, INCLUDING THE BATTERIES, SHALL PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY TO ASSURE THAT THE CORE IS COOLED AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED IN THE EVENT OF A STATION BLACK 0UT FOR A SPECIFIED DURATION, THE FOLLOWING FACTORS SHALL BE CONSIDERED IN SPECIFYING THE STATION BLACK 0UT DURATION: (1) THE REDUNDANCY OF THE ONSITE EMERGENCY AC POWER SOURCES, (2) THE RELIABILITY OF THE ONSITE EMERGENCY AC POWER SOURCES, (3) THE EXPECTED FREQUENCY OF LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER, AND (4) THE PROBABLE TIME NEEDED TO RESTORE OFFSITE POWER.
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