ML20136F518
| ML20136F518 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 01/02/1986 |
| From: | Breslau B, Bundy H, Constable G, Filippo T, Flippo T, Luehman J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20136F504 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-85-28, NUDOCS 8601070417 | |
| Download: ML20136F518 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1985028
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APPENDIX B
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-382/85-28
License:
Docket:
50-382
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Licensee:
Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)
142 Delaronde Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70174
Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Inspection At:
Taft, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted:
October.1 through November 30, 1985
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[p.[G.'Luehman, Senior Resident Inspector
Inspectors:
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T. A. Flippo, Resident Inspector
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B. A. Breslau, Project Engineer, Project
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Section C, Reactor Projects Branch
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H. F. Bundy, Project Inspector, Project
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Section C, Reactor Projects Branch
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Approved:
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T LT Constable 7 Chief, Project Section C
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Reactor Projects Branch
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Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted October 1 through November 30, 1985 (Report 50-382/85-28)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of:
(1) Plant Status;
(2) Licensee Event Report Followup; (3) Monthly Maintenance; (4) Monthly
Surveillance; (5) ESF System Walkdown; (6) Routine Inspection; (7) License
Conditions; and (8) Wet Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Water Basin Level. The
inspection involved 198 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the areas inspected, two violations were identified (failure
to perform work in accordance with maintenance procedures, paragraph 5, and wet
cooling tower water level below technical specification requirement,
paragraph 10). One unresolved item was identified (annunciator setpoint
errors, paragraph 8).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees
R. S. Leddick, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- R. P. Barkhurst, Plant rianager, Nuclear
T. F. Gerrets, Corporate QA Manager
S. A. Alleman, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Technical Staff
N. S. Carns, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance
J. N. Woods, QC Manager
A. S. Lockhart, Site Quality Manager
R. F. Burski, Engineering and Nuclear Safety Manager
K. L. Brewster, Onsite Licensing Engineer
G. E. Wuller, Onsite Licensing Coordinator
- Present at exit interview.
In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions
with various operations, engineering, technical support, maintenance, and
administrative members of the licensee's staff.
2.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or
deviations.
An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is
discussed in paragraph 8.
3.
Plant Statur
At the beginning of the inspection period the plant was at about 20%
power, reaching 100% power later on October 1,1985.
On October 2, 1985,
a reactor trip occurred on low steam generator level following a feed pump
trip which resulted from a failure in the feedwater control system.
The
plant again achieved criticality at 1:58 p.m. on October 2, 1985, however,
another reactor trip, this time on high steam generator level, occurred
that day at 8:35 p.m.
The plant remained shut down to replace reactor
coolant pump seals and was not returned to criticality until
7:34 p.m. on
October 10, 1985.
On October 20, 1985, at 7:20 p.m., with the plant again
at 100% power, a reactor trip occurred resulting from an auxiliary high
pressurizer pressure trip after loss of one of the main feedwater pumps
The plant achieved criticality on October 30, 1985, the following day.
On November 15, 1985, with the plant at 100% power, a number of turbine
steam transients occurred due to problems with Governor Valve 4 on the
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In each case, turbine output increased to about 105% power.
These increases were detected by the core protection calculator (CPC)
channels but no pretrip setpoints were reached.
The plant operators took
actions to control the transients and, subsequently, the governor valve
was closed and isolated.
The plant operated the remainder of the
inspection period at or near full power.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4 ..
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup
The following LERs were reviewed and closed.
The NRC inspectors verified
that reporting requirements had been met, that causes had been identified,
that corrective actions appeared appropriate, that generic applicability
had been considered, and that the LER forms were complete. Additionally,
the NRC inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were
involved and that violations of regulations or Technical Specification
(TS) conditions had been identified.
(Closed) LER 50-382/84-01
Engineered Safety Features Actuation on
Control Room Isolation
(Closed) LER 50-382/84-02
Fire Door Technical Specification
Surveillance
(Closed) LER 50-382/85-01
Failure to Post a Fire Watch
(Closed) LER 50-382/85-08
Uncomplicated Reactor Trip
(Closed) LER 50-382/85-11
Missed Samples
(Closed) LER 50-382/85-12
Fire Protection Configuration in Fire
Zone 27C
(Closed) LER 50-382/85-15
Inoperable Liquid Effluent Monitor
Rev. O and Rev. 1
(Closed) LER 50-382/85-16
Pressurizer Heat Capacity Less than
Technical Specifications
(Closed) LER 50-382/85-19
Missed Sample on Gas Decay Tank
(Closed) LER 50-382/85-26
Inoperable Fire Wall
(Closed) LER 50-382/85-27
Manual Actuation of the Reactor
Protective System
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(Closed) LER 50-382/85-30
Inadvertent Actuation of Radiation
Monitors - The NRC inspector suggested
to the licensee that a review of the
response to IE Circular 80-09 may be
appropriate.
(Closed) LER 50-382/85-31
Automatic Actuation of Reactor Protective
System Due to Feed Pump Trip
(Closed) LER 50-382/85-35
Reactor-Trip Due to Inadvertent Turbine
Runback
Additionally, the NRC inspector noted that the licensee had not been
including the identifiers required by 10 CFR 50.73(b)(2)(ii)(F) in the
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event reports.
Subsequent reports have contained the identifiers as
required.
5.
Monthly Maintenance
Station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and
components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that the activities were
conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and
industry codes or standards, and in conformance with TS.
The NRC inspector reviewed two completed Condition Identification Work
Authorization (CIWA) packages which involved the replacement of packing in
Charging Pumps A and AB.
The completed CIWA packages were reviewed to
verify licensee conformance to the following:
Licensee administrative requirements, including format, approval, and
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control
Post-maintenance testing was appropriate for the repairs made
.
Inspection and hold points were identified in the procedure or in a
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documented plan, and are based on a set of established guidelines
Supplementary reference material, such as drawings and technical
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manuals, are adequate and controlled
Activity is described in sufficient detail
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Consideration is given to radiological controls
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Provisions for cleanliness and housekeeping are adequate
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Provisions for obtaining approval from operations as well as method
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for notifying operations when affected systems are removed from
service and ready to be restored to normal service
The licensee's Administrative Procedure UNT-5-002, Attachment 6.2, page 7,
requires work group supervisor and Shift Supervisor (SS)/ Control Room
Supervisor (CRS) initials to be noted in block 29 of the applicable CIWA
indicating concurrence on proposed work instructions.
However, the NRC
inspector observed that the work group supervisor and SS/CRS did not
initial block 29 in CIWAs 022173 and 022169 charging pump maintenance for
Pumps A and AB respectively.
UNT-5-002, Attachment 6.3, page 7, requires technical manual numbers and
applicable sections be entered in block 28 of the CIWA.
However, neither
CIWA 022173 nor 022169 had the applicable technical manual sections
referenced in block 28.
UNT-5-002 further requires that part numbers for those items replaced be
inserted in block 48 of the CIWA.
CIWA 022173 had numbers inserted in
block 48 which were procurement document numbers, not part numbers.
Maintenance Procedure MM-6-003, Section 4.0, " Precautions," and
Section 5.0, " Initial Conditions," state these items will be included in
the CIWA.
CIWAs 022173 and 022169 did not include " Precautions / Initial
Conditions."
Procedure QP-10-001, Attachment 6.2, outlines the requirements for
inspection hold points in the work packages.
CIW'., 022173 and 022169
required hold points for verifying cleanliness; no hold points were
established in the work instructions for verifying cleanliness of
components prior to reassembly.
The above items are considered a violation and are identified as
50-382/8528-01.
6.
Monthly Surveillance
The NRC inspectors observed / reviewed TS required testing and verified
that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that
test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for
operation (LCO) were met, and that any deficiencies identified were
properly reviewed and resolved.
On November 21, 1985, the NRC inspector observed the performance of
PE-5-004, Revision 2, " Control Room Air Conditioning Surveillance," on
Train A.
This test was performed to, in part, meet TS Surveillance
Requirement 4.7.6.
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For some portions of the surveillance test the licensee used contractor
personnel, equipment, and procedures.
The NRC inspector verified that the
contractor personnel had proper documentation of their qualifications as
well as documentation of the calibration of their equipment.
Additionally, it was verified that all contractor procedures used had
received the proper licensee reviews and approval.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
ESF System Walkdown
The following selected ESF system was verified operable by performing a
walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of the system on
November 19-20, 1985.
Emergency Feedwater System (Drawing LOU 1564-6-153, Sheet 2 and
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OP-9-003, Revision 3, Attachment 8.1)
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Routine Inspection
By observation during the inspection period, the NRC inspectors verified
that the control room manning requirements were being met.
In addition,
the NRC inspectors observed shi't turnover to verify that continuity of
system status was maintained.
ihe NRC inspectors periodically questioned
shift personnel relative to their awareness of the plant conditions.
Through log review and plant tours, the NRC inspectors verified compliance
with selected TS and limiting conditions for operations.
During the course of the inspection observations relative to protected and
vital area security were made including access controls, boundary
integrity, search, escort, and badging.
On a regular basis, Radiation Work Permits (RWP) were reviewed and the
specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being
conducted per the RWPs.
Selected radiation protection instruments were
periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency
were verified.
The NRC inspectors kept informed on a daily basis of overall status of
plant and of any significant safety matter related to plant operations.
Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the
operations staff on a regular basis.
Selected portions of operating logs
and data sheets were reviewed daily.
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The NRC inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits
to the control room.
Observations included:
witnessing work activities
in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems
and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder
readings, annunciator alarms; and housekeeping.
While verifying annunciator status in the centrol room the NRC inspector
reviewed the unnunciator response procedures for wet basin level and
selected other annunciators associated with TS required systems.
The
results are outlined below,
a.
OP-500-012, Revision 1, Annunciator C-11 and OP-500-011, Revision 1,
Annunciator C-1 - Wet basin level low setpoints not the same and
below TS minimum value. For details see paragraph 10 of this report.
b.
OP-500-009, Revision 1, Annunciators A-17, E-19, E-20, G-19, G-20,
C-17, C-18, L-19, and L-20 as well as OP-500-011, Revision 1,
Annunciator H-4 and OP-500-012, Annunciator H-14 - Specify wrong
containment pressure high setpoint. TS setpoint is 17.1 psia while
procedures specify 17.4 psia (except H-4 and H-14 which specify 18
psia),
c.
OP-500-009,. Revision 1, Annunciator A-13 - Specifies an incorrect
value for the setpoint for log PWR high channel trip setpoint.
TS setpoint is .257% while the procedure specifies .895%.
d.
OP-500-009, Revision 1, Annunciators G-19 and 20 - Specify different
pressurizer pressure setpoints.
One procedure specifies 1684 psia while
the other specifies 1889.
Both setpoints are greater than or equal to
TS required minimum setpoint.
e.
OP-500-009, Revision 1, Annunciators M-19 and 20 - Specify steam
generator level setpoints below that of TS.
TS setpoint is $27.4%
while the procedures specifies 26.9%
f.
OP-500-0012, Revision 1, Annunciator A-20 - Specifies a low refueling
pool water storage level below that required by TS. TS setpoint is 82%
while the procedures specifies 78.6%.
g.
OP-500-011 Annunciator K-1 and OP-500-012, Annunciator K-11 - Steam
Generator 2 response indicates setpoint if Safety Injection Actuation
System (SIAS) signal is present.
Steam Generator 1 does not.
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Each procedure should contain two setpoints, one with and one without
SIAS present.
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h.
OP-500-011, Revision 1, Annunciator M-7 and OP-500-012, Revision 1,
AnnunciatorM-17-Specifydifferentsubcoolingmarginsetpoints.One
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channel specifies 20 F while the other specifies 30 F.
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1.
Other annunciater response procedures for systems such as toxic gas
monitoring and loose parts monitoring indicate that setpoints were to
be added "later." The annunciators are operable and have some
setpoints but they have not been reflected in these procedures,
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Finally, in an effort to address some of the problems identified above,
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the NRC inspector and a senior reactor operator (SR0) attempted to consult
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the plant setpoint document.
In many cases this document was of little
use because setpoints were expressed only in terms such as inches or
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volts.
Setpoints expressed only in such terms are of little use to
control room operators if questions of annunciator and/or equipment
operational setpoints arise.
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Though annunciators serve as operator aids and are not the means by which
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TS parameters are verified, havir.g the correct setpoints on the respc.1se
procedures is necessary to help the operators determine if a valid
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abnormal condition exists.
Presently, this is especially true for the
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Waterford 3 control room with the large number of continuously illuminated
The correction of the setpoint errors in the above
procedures is identified as an Unresolved Item 50-382/8528-03.
9.
License Conditions
(Closed) 2.c.9.g., Continuous fire watch in the relay room at the
isolation panel - In a letter to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
(NRR) dated June 7, 1985, the licensee informed the NRC of the completion
of the changes required to terminate the continuous fire watch.
The
changes necessary had earlier been outlined to the NRR in a letter dated
February 22, 1985.
The NRC inspector reviewed the procedure changes
associated with this license condition change.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Wet Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Water Basin Level
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As a followup to the annunciator response procedure problems for the wet
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tower basin level discussed in paragraph 10 of this report, the NRC
inspector requested licensee support engineering to review the basis of
the setpoints used.
The subsequent review revealed that the level
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indication instrumentation for the two basins had been calibrated so that
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100% indicated level corresponded to the minimum level required by TS
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3.7.4 (-9.86 ft. MSL).
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(Under the assumption that 100% indicated level equated to 100% actual
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level, licensee operations personnel have maintained basin levels above
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97%. indicated level. 'However, maintaining indicated level below 100%
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violates.the1TS requirement. When this calibration problem was
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identified, the-licensee promptly filled both basins to overflowing and
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initiated ~ action to recalibrate the level instrumentation.
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[TS 3.7.4 ACTION b. requires that with both towers inoperable due to basin
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low water level, one tower has to be restored to OPERABLE status within
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and both restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Being
unaware of the level calibration problem, licensee personnel had not
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followed the TS requirements.
Thisisanapparentviolation(50-382/8528-02).
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11.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope'and findings were suninarized on December 2,1985,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee
acknowledged the NRC inspectors' findings. The licensee did not identify
as proprietary any' of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC
inspectors during this inspection.
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