ML20136E606

Forwards marked-up Fr Notice Re 10CFR50 on Proposed Emergency Planning & Preparedness.Concurrence W/Version Subj to Mods on marked-up Notice.Editorial & Stylistic Changes Appear Throughout Text

ML20136E606
Person / Time
Issue date:	09/28/1984
From:	Felton J NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
To:	Jamgochian M NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
Shared Package
ML20136D809	List: ML20136D806 ML20136E606 ML20136E685 ML20136F238 ML20136F289 ML20136F441 ML20136F940 ML20136G130 ML20136G165 ML20136G173 ML20136G275 ML20136G290
References
FOIA-85-653, RTR-NUREG-0396, RTR-NUREG-0654, RTR-NUREG-396, RTR-NUREG-654 NUDOCS 8511210534
Download: ML20136E606 (16)

Text

.

/

i .

(

( (

SEP 2 81984 l MEMORANDUM FOR: Michael Jamgochian Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research FROM: J. M. Felton, Director Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration

SUBJECT:

REVIEW OF PROPOSED EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS RULE - 10 CFR PART 50 We have reviewed the proposed rule noted above that would revise Part 50 and we concur in this version of the rule subject to the modifications contained in the enclosed marked-up copy of the Federal Register notice. Specifically, please note the items discussed below.

1. Office of the Federal Register regulations require that the

SUMMARY

section contain additional information which explains what the impact of the proposed rule provisions would be if they were adopted. You should add infomation to cover this issue.

2. On page three of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of the Federal Register notice NUREGs 0396 and 0654 are referenced for general background information to support the Commission's proposal. You should contact TIDC to obtain information concerning the correct language to insert as a footnote on page three to announce public availability of the NUREGs and to check on their actual availability. We have enclosed a guidance document dated 5/4/84 which explains staff responsibilities when documents are referenced in a Federal Register notice. Please review carefully the requirements which assure public availability of documents.

3. The Environmental Impact Statement is incomplete. It does not mention an environmental assessment report which is required when there is a finding of no significant impact. Current practice requires that the environmental assessment report be sumarized in tM finding of no significant impact statement, while the report is placed in the NRC Public Document Room. You should check gith OELD for the correct NEPA language for this particular rule and fof a determination on whether this proposed rule is eligible for a categorical exclusion pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(c).

4. A copy of this rule has been sent to Brenda Shelton, TIDC, for review of the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement. You can check with her on extension 28132 for further information on this matter.

0511210534 B51106 PDR FOIA , I BELL 85-653 PDR b

( ( ( C SEP 2 81984

'Micha'el Jamgochian l Several editorial and stylistic changes appear throughout the text and in the margins of the marked copy. These changes should be made prior to submission of the rule for EDO approval.

I If you have any questions, please call John Philips, Chief, Rules and Procedures Branch, on extension 27086, or Alzonia Shepard on extension 27651.

\$I J. M. Felton, Director Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration

Enclosure:

As stated cc: Brenda Shelton, TIDC RDG SUBJ ASHEPARD

. JCAWLEY JPHILIPS PGNORRY MSPRINGER l

l l

hd JTCT i w ADM:DRR 4.,

ADM:DRR R AShepard/BKG JPhilips n 9/ 24 /84 84 9/SS/84

W ( (

(W)O-O

/

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Emergency Planning And Preparedness for Production W And Utilization Facilities 7

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Comission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking; statement of interim policy.

• T A

SUMMARY

lIn previous adjudications] ihe Comission has ruledj that its impacts of

" regulations do not require the consideration of potential earthquakes on emergency planping for nucleat reactor sites. The Comission in 10 CFf Srf 6D, Ove%h Ahtdedof th:t now proposes to so provide 4xplicitly p its regulationsf M ct:t::

9)pending completion of -Ris rulemaking, the interpretation of its rules set out in the adjudications remains in effect. hM d d b e d I" 10 9 h* (q, DATES:

Coment period expires (t::rt d;t: 00 d:p h puoiisos.ve). AIw k*

-{s) do So Coments received af ter this date will be congidered if 1) is practical, but received Oh a bebrc 4b h ,

assurance of consideration can be given only for coment ^ti=,.3 fi .h d .

Mail coments to: Secretary of the Comission, U.S. Nuclear

" ADDRESSES:

20555, ATTN: Docketing and Service Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C.

Branch. Deliver coments to: Room 1121, 1717 H. Street N.W., Washington, D.C.) A C., week ays. Copies of com rts received may between 8:15 a.m. and1 5:00 11~1p.m.

9 % ce<t3 N. W. , WA rb w3 D.C.

'th O dd.i . :,

be examined at the NRC Public DocumentYRoom "l\ : :r:

4 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Jamgochian, Division of Risk Analysis and Operations, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Telephone: (301) 443-7615.

Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.J. 20555.

Enclosure 1 l

.. l

( ( ( (

2 [7590-01]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On December 8, 1981, the Commission ruled in a then,-gending adjudication that its emergency planning regulations do not require consideration of potential earthquake effects on emergency plans for nuclear power reactors. In the Matter of Southern California Edison Comoany, et al.

(San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33,14 NRC 1091 (1981). In so ruling the Commission stated:

The Cosmission will consider on a generic basis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe earthquake on emergency planning. For the interim, the proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earthquake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not warranted. 14 NRC at 1092. ,

The Cocaission recently affimed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceeding. In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-12 [ NRC (August 10 -

1984). In this decision the Commission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warranttheamendmentoftheregulationstospecificallyconsiderthog impacts." Slip Opinion at 9. The focus of the rulemaking was toj"obtain additional information to determine whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration of severe earthquakes in emergency response planning." Id_.

l

s

( ( ( ( '

l l

3 [7590-01]

It should be noted that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reviews offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness to insure the adequacy of Federal, State, and local capabilities in such areas as emergency organization, alert and notification, communications, measures to protect the public, accident assessment, public education and ir. formation, and medical support. Detailed, specific assessment of potential earthquake consequences and response are not part of this process related to radiological emergencies. FEMA does have, however, an active program of earthquake preparedness which includes estimates of damage and casualties, planning for Federal response to a major earthquake, and assistance to State and local governments in their earthquake planning and preparedness activities. FEMA 4CK believes that these separate activities would complement each other in the o event that a concurrent response to a major earthquake and a serious accident k at a nuclear power plant were required. %Q g

For general background on emergency planning at nuclear facilities, the Nd

'4 -

public is referred to NUREG-0396, " Planning Basis for the Development of y$

State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support Ih

%4 of Light water Nuclear Power Plants," and NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, g

" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." The latter l document, developed jointly by the NRC and FEMA, forms the basis for both NRC and FEMA regulations on emergency planning at nuclear power facilities. Also available for public inspection are the complete case records for the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon proceedings, both of which deal specifically with the earthquakes / emergency planning interface.

a. dd +gyafge O

~ma-pK.Am~r An d o n a snc w, w&' _ y~, D'_'~ i_ hhh l a v eCM u _- nhr n c3"f

l b

( ( ( (

'l i

I 4 [7590-01]

i Statement Of Interim Policy The Consission, in its review of the record and consideration of

' arguments in the Diablo Canyon proceeding, reached the view that its previous San Onofre holding was correct, i.e., that the potential impact of earthquakes on emergency plans need not be' considered. The rationale for this holding was 3

restated in the Diablo Canyon (Slip Opinion at 4-6), and may be summarized as follows. Nuclear power plants are required to be designed to safely shut down for all earthquakes up to and including the " Safe Shutdown Earthquake," or l

SSE. See 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. General Design Criterion 2; 10 CFR Part i

100. Appendix A. Accordingly, the probability of earthquakes large enough to cause major onsite damage that would result in a significant radiological release from the plant is extremely low, and for such large earthquakes, offsite damage could make prior offsite emergency plans premised on normal i

conditions marginally useful at best. In addition, the probability of the proximate occurrence of an earthquake of substantial magnitude and a radiological release from the plant for reasons unrelated to the earthquake itself is even lower. Therefore, there does not appear to exist a set of I

circumstances at all likely where the consideration of earthquake impacts f would significantly improve the state of emergency planning at a nuclear power I

reactor.

In addition, as the Commission noted in its Diablo Canyon decision (Slip Opinion at 5-6), emergency plans are not rigid documents which become useless if offsite conditions are less than ideal: ,

., ,,-. -. , . - - - - , - . - - - - , - --.e- - - - - . - - - -.- ---...-c ,w.-, . .--~,--~~-,rw--,.,w..e , . . . , - g--.,r,.

t 5 [7590-01]

Specific consideration has been given in this case to the effects of other relatively frequent natural phenomena. The evidence includes the capability of the emergency plan to respond to disruptions in connunications networks and evacuation routes as a result of fog, severe storms and heavy rain. In the extreme, these .

phenomena are capable of resulting in area-wide disruptions similar to some of the disruptions which may result from an earthquake...

Thus, while no explicit consideration has been given to disruptions caused by earthquakes, the emergency plans do have considerable flexibility to handle the disruptions caused by various natural phenomena which occur with far greater frequency than do damaging earthquakes, and this implicitly includes some flexibility to handle disruptions from earthquakes as well.

l Although the Connission's remarks were directed to the Diablo Canyon emergency plan, the noted flexibility is found in all nuclear power reactor emergency

' M plans. plans do address the contingency that emergency actions may need to be taken under less-than-ideal conditions and with less-than-maximum i emergency response capabilities.

The ability to take protective actions throughout the plume exposure pathway (EPZ) could be hampered during the life of the plant by temporary adverse conditions resulting from' natural phenomena such as rain, snow, flooding or by activities in the vicinity of the plant such as major road repair. Existing NRC regulations require that emergency plans be i

comprehensive and flexible enough to assure the capability to take appropriate protective action to mitigate the effects of a nuclear emergency under such conditions. Similar types of adverse conditions could result from earthquakes below the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), which occur proximate in time with an unrelated accidental release of nuclear material from the facility. l j

However, emergency plans which meet'the standards in 10 CFR 50.47 and i

(

~ .- ..

I i

( ( ( (.

J 6 [7590-01]

1 Appendix E provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures i

can and will be taken under such circumstances.

• While the Connission intends to consider this issue carefully in this rulemaking and to weigh all arguments before reaching a final decision to be embodied in the regulations, it should be clear from the San Onofre and l

Diablo Canyon decisions that the existing rule established by precedent is i not to consider the effects of earthquakes in emergency planning. This interpretation of the Connission's regulations must be considered binding unless altered by the outcome of this proceeding. All Connission

(

adjudicatory panels should follow the rule of these cases pending its modification, if any, as a result of the rulemaking. Parties to adjudicatory proceedings may attempt to show "special circumstances" pursuant to 10 CFR j

2.758 if they believe this interpretation of the Connission's rules should not be applied in a particular case.

Technical Information When considering the possibilities of plant damage from seismic events, it is important to understand the severity of seismic events, their range of probabilities, and the potential for reactor accidents caused by seismic events. Three classes of seismic events are considered in this discussion.

The first class includes earthquakes of relatively low ground motion, up to s

the Operating Basis Earthquake (08E). The 08E ground motion depends on plant location. These accelerations vary in the range of about .05g to .10g (higher in areas of high seismicity). During an OBE -

j all safety related plant

! systems would be expected to remain operating.

i

c ( ( (

7 [7590-01]

i The second class of events includes earthquakes with ground motion l higher than the OBE but equal to or less than the Safe Shutdown Earthquakes (SSE); the ground motion of the SSE is typically about twice that of the OBE.

Probabilities of occurrence for the SSE have typically been estimated to be on the order of one in a thousand to one in ten thousand per year. NRC regulations require that plants be designed to achieve a safe shutdown after I an SSE. Given an SSE, all seismically qualified equipment would be expected An earthquake up to and to function to bring the plant to safe shutdown.

including an SSE would be cause for an alert emergency action level classification, but would not cause failures that would result in a significant accidental release from the plant. Thus, although such an event i would initiate certain emergency plan actions, no offsite response would be

' required. Only in the event of multiple unrelated failures of safety related 2 systems due to some undiscovered consnon cause failure mechanism (such as a major design error), coincident with the SSE, would there be a chance of an accident which would require offsite emergency response. The probability of these two events occurring proximately in time is very much lower than the l

l probability of either one, perhaps on the order of one in a million per reactor year.

The final class of events includes all earthquakes with ground motion levels above the SSE. Fragility analysis has been used to estimate the probability of failure as a function of ground motion associated with these and Limerick Probabilistic Risk earthquakes. The Zion, Indian Point, Assessments estimated that, in general, ground motion on the order of 0.5g to 0.75g acceleration would be required to damage a nuclear power plant to the i

. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ . . , _ _ .__ -. _ . _ _. ,_._._.,..- __ _ __ m.___. , _ _ . . . . . - . , _ . . . , - _ , , , _ _ , . . . . . ~ . _

4

( ( (

8 [7590-01]

extent that significant release of radioactivity could occur. Of course, some plants, such as those in high seismic regions, are designed to withstand earthquakes with ground motion this high; they would resist damage to still higher levels of ground motion. The probability estimates for such ground accelerations are significantly less than the probability estimates for the SSE for these plants (the Zion, IP, and Limerick SSEs are .17g, .15g, and

.15g respectively). The absolute probabilities for earthquakes at and beyond the SSE are extremely difficult to estimate and thus have large associated ~

uncertainties.

Based upon the probabilistic risk assessment results, the NRC staff has considered that for most earthquakes (including some earthquakes more severe than the SSE) the power plant would not be expected to pose an imediate offsite radiological hazard. For earthquakes which would cause plant damage leading to immediate offsite radiological hazards but for which there would be relatively minor offsite damage, emergency response capabilities around nuclear power plants would not be seriously affected. For earthquakes which cause more severe offsite damage, such as disabling a siren alerting system, the earthquake itself acts as an alerting system. For those earthquakes which cause very severe damage to both the plant and the offsite area, emergency response would have marginal benefit because of its impaiment by offsite damage. However, the expenditure of additional resources to cope with seismically caused offsite damage may be of doubtful value considering the i

modest benefit in overall risk reduction which could be obtained.

I m - , - n - e-- w -e -- -,-w w q w -- ~ -w--sr-,-,-w- ya o- - - - - e

( ( ( (

9 [7590-01]

Proposed Rule The Comission is proposing to amend 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E to codify the position it has taken in the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon cases. A new (e) would be added to 10 CFR 50.47 and a N$$$$ would be added to the " Introduction" section of Appendix E. While these amendments are simple in form, the Comission recognizes that they represent a significant policy detergingion. The Comission therefore Qu}- o+ We rde invites comment not only on the proposed tat;[ ut also on the fundamental question of the relationship between earthquakes and emergency planning at nuclear power facilities. Comenters should, at a minimum, address the merits of three possible alternatives:

1. Adoption of the proposed rule codifying San Onofre a'nd Diablo Canyonj -

4

2. Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; or-4

3. Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address the impact of earthquakes.

(~

The Comission would be most assisted by coments which ih6 offer specific policyh hhg 3

andtechnicalreasonsforpreferringonealternativeoverfothers. (E %)

(O x!

Finding Of No Significant Environmental Impact-The Comission has determined under the National Environmental Policy "'

Act of 1969, as amended, and the Comission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 f

CFR Part 51, that this proposed rule, is not a major Federal h action.g-}

significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore an 3

environmental impact statement is not required. See 10 CFR 51.20(a)(1).1 h Moreover, the Comission has detennined, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, that the $F 3

h s i

• D.),

m

(

g F y Vg V *

/ ,

'p -

)p NEh B0 ^

> s TO BE USED WHD4 THERE IS NO DWIRONMDUAL IMPACT FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT DNIRONMENTAL IMPACT: AVAILABILITY The Comission has detemined under the National Environmental Policy Act .

of 1969, as amended, and the Comission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if adopced, is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the humn envimnment and therefore an environmental impact statement S

< m, .

is not mquired. [ere you must briefly present the masons why the action will not have any significant impact, summarize the environmental assessment, and note any other related environmental documents) -

The envimnmental assessment and finding of -

i w

no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspec-tion at the NRC Public Document Rocm, 1717 H Street NJ, Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Roce, 1717 H Street N4, Washington, DC. Sing'le copies of the environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact are available from (insert name, address, and telephone number of contact person.). ,

twx l anb;l L +nea x 4 mt 0

l l

n ,: . . . . . . - . - .

\

( (

( C 1

l

, a 10 [7590-01]

1 proposed rule has no significant environmental impact. This determination i

has been made because the Conunission cannot identify any impact on the human environment associated with requiring or not requiring consideration of earthquakes in emergency planning.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement- I f S t *dd d2 e /c/

,ep. ,- zu vewps.

Qoh The proposed rule contains no information collection requirements and J

therefore is not subject to the" requirements of the paperwork Reduction Act l of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). ,

! Regulatory Analysis j

The Cosuiission has prepared a' regulatory analysis of this proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the rule as considered by the Comunission. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available i

for inspection and copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research,

! U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC 20555. Telephone (301) 443-7615.

t y C mscVi N  ;

i Regulatory Flexibility Certification In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.

I 605(b), the Cossaission hereby certifies that this proposed rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The proposed rule clarifies requirements for the issuance of

~~

(

~

( ( (

11 [7590-01]

i an operating license for a nuclear power plant, licensed pursuant to Section 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134b. The electric utility companies which own and operate nuclear power plants are dominant in their service areas and do not fall within the definition of a small business found in Section 3 of the Small Eesiness Act, 15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121. Accordingly, there is no significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of

. 1980.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 Part 50

- Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention.

Incorporation by reference. Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear Power plants and reactors, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, g/ Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy act of 1954, as amended, the Energy j

l Reorganization' Act of 1974, as amended, and section;552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 is contemplated.

Part,50 - Domestic Licensing of Production and Utiljzation Facilities d Cor

-g Af

1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Sections 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, l

l

- . _ . _ , m -

-w_ -

7 q

(

(

~

. . c (

t .' -

i l

12 [7590-01]  !

I 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 i

U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846), unless l otherwise noted.

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L 95-601, sec.10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 1

j U.S.C. 585'.) . Sections '50.57(d), 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L.97-415, 96 Stat. 2071, 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2239). Section 50.78 l

also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.8{ also issued under sec.184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec.186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).

For the purposes of Sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273),

il 50.10(a ), and (c), 50.44, 50.46', 50.48, and 50.80(a) are issued i under 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); [it 50.10(b), and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2201(1); and 50.55(e), 50.59(ti), 50.70, 5 , 50.72, 50.73, and 50.78 are l issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

Y &g fn f 50'Wy __..g (e) is added to 4 50.7 to read as follows: 5^ 27 0 2. A/ new . . . . . . . _

[555Y55eT'my 5 N* ' . * * * .- 3 l

(e) Offsite emergency response plans [ubmitted to satisfy the standards set f

forth in this sectio [need not consider the impact on emergency planning of earthquakes which cause, or occur proximate in time with, an accidental i

release of radioactive material from the facility.

I a,n,-,en,_ , ~ , . - - -

m. . .- . ~ . . -

( ( ( (

. , 13 [7590-01]

nm an AJ2ijb[

3. Aj sentence is added as : I l l :0 . :t: paragraph at the end of the -

Introduction section of Appendix E to read as follows:

1. Introduction Neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time analyses need consider the impact of earthquakes which cause, or occur proximate in time with, an accidental rele'se a of radioactive material from the facility. j ff-Yg (Sec. 161b, i and o. , Pub. L. 83-70 68 Stat. 948 (42 U.S.C. 1);[c c k Sec. 201, as nded, Pub. L.93-438, Stat. 1242, Pub. L. 94-7 , 89 Stat. hb 413 (42 U. .C. 5341))

_+ . . . .

Dated at Washington, D.C., this day of 1984 J # . ea FOR THE NUCLEARforfw REGULAT Samuel J. Chilkj Secretary of the Cossnission .

l l

l f

I

_, _ _ .__ _ . _ _ . . . _ . . . _ _ _ . _ . , . . _ . , , , _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . .