ML20135E485

Responds to Requesting NRC Exercise Discretion Not to Enforce Compliance W/Actions Required in TS 4.5.2.f. Based on Evaluation of Request,Staff Concluded NOED Warranted

ML20135E485
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	03/05/1997
From:	Roe J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Jeffery Wood CENTERIOR ENERGY, TOLEDO EDISON CO.
References
NOED-97-6-003, NOED-97-6-3, TAC-M97941, NUDOCS 9703070092
Download: ML20135E485 (5)

Text

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, g j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g WASHINGTON D.C. 2006H001 March 5, 1997 Mr. John K. Wood Vice President - Nuclear, Davis-Besse '

Centerior Service Company c/o Toledo Edison Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station ,

5501 North State Route 2 i Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449-9760

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FOR TOLED0 EDIS0N COMPANY, CENTERIOR SERVICE COMPANY, AND THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY REGARDING DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT N0. 1 l (TAC NO. M97941, N0ED NO. 97-6-003)

Dear Mr. Wood:

By letter dated February 13, 1997, you requested that the NRC exercise discretion not to enforce compliance with the actions required in Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.f. This surveillance requirement requires each Emergency Core Cooling System subsystem to be demonstrated operable by performing a vacuum leakage rate test of the valve pit leaktight enclosure for valves DH-11 and DH-12 to assure that the motor operators on these valves will not be flooded for at least 7 days following a loss-of-coolant accident.

Your letter documented information previously discussed with the NRC in telephone conversations during the evening (between approximately 5:00 p.m.

and 8:00 p.m.) of February 12, 1997. You stated.during those conversations that the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station was not in compliance with surveillance requirement 4.5.2.f, and that TS 3.0.3, which requires a plant shutdown to begin in I hour, had been entered at 9:15 that morning. You further stated that TS 4.0.3 had also been entered, which allows you to delay the actions of TS 3.0.3 for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> so the surveillance requirement can be completed. At 2:35 p.m., you determined that the surveillance requirement could not be performed at power. This determination is based on the fact that the surveillance includes a test which draws a vacuum on the leaktight enclosure, and if a loss-of-coolant accident were to occur during the test, the pressure in the area of the enclosure combined with the vacuum inside the enclosure would fail the pit cover, potentially flooding the valve operators.

Therefore, you exited TS 4.0.3, and a plant shutdown was begun at 3:21 p.m.,

in accordance with TS 3.0.3.

You requested that a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) be issued pursuant to the NRC's policy regarding exercise of discretion for an operating facility, set out in Section VII.c of the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. You requested that the N0ED be effective immediately and remain in force until the NRC approves your license amendment request (submitted by letter dated February 14,1997) to revise the TS requirements, or until Davis-Besse enters Mode 4 in an outage of sufficient duration to perform the required test.

NRC FE CENTER CDP 7 p* "

9703070092 970305 PDR ADOCK 05000346 G PDR

O J. Wood 1 i

In your letter, you stated that a plant modification was completed in 1986 on the decay heat valve pit to install level switches and to add an inspection port to the pit leaktight enclosure. One use of the inspection port is for insertion of a camera during performance of American Society of Mechanical '

Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code-required visual inspections, which, at Davis-Besse, must be performed in Mode 3. You previously had concluded that the port could be opened and closed without the need to perform surveillance requirement 4.5.2.f after closure. On February 11, 1997, Davis-Besse staff identified the concera regarding whether opening and subsequent closure of the decay heat valve pit port constituted a breach in the leaktight enclosure, hence requiring performance of surveillance requirement 4.5.2.f.

Followup by plant staff discovered that the port had been opened and closed since the last performance of surveillance requirement 4.5.2.f. At that time, TS 3.0.3 was entered, as discussed above.

Your safety rationale for requesting the N0ED was based on the design and previous test performance of the special coupling that was employed in the ,

port design, and the compensatory measures that you have taken. This coupling is designed for a temperature of 380*F and a pressure of 150 psig, significantly above the temperature and pressure expected in the area of the port post-accident. In addition, no sealing problems have been identified with the port coupling during the survei'llance requirement 4.5.2.f tests that have been conducted since the port was installed in 1986. Further, the proper closure of the port is always verified after usage in accordance with plant procedures. As a compensatory measure, after entering TS 3.0.3, the port was '

opened and inspected, found to be in good condition, and then verified to be properly closed.

The valve pit serves as a leaktight enclosure for motor-operated valves DH-11 and DH-12 in the " drop" line that connects the reactor coolant system loop I hot leg to the decay heat pump suction connections. These valves are normally closed. They must be opened in order to establish the shutdown cooling mode of operation. They would also be opened under loss-of-coolant accident recovery procedures, for the boron dilution mode of operation, an action that would be taken to reduce the possibility of boron precipitation in the core region. If the pit enclosure is not leaktight, the high water level in containment that results from a loss-of-coolant accident could flood the DH-11/12 electric motor operators and thereby preclude their opening. The enclosure is provided with non-safety, high and high-high water level switches. An alternate method of boron dilution is available by use of auxiliary spray as described in FSAR Section 6.3.3.1.2.

The port closure device is a Kamlok cap which consists of an adapter that is welded to a 4-inch pipe that rises from the pit cover, and a cap and gasket assembly that clamps over the adapter. To seal the cap in place, it is placed on the adapter and two levers are positioned such that cams on the levers engage a groove in the adapter while compressing the gasket in the cap. If the gasket is in place and the levers properly psitioned, gasket compression, and thus tight sealing, is assured. The licensee's procedures verify that the cap is correctly reinstalled.

The staff considered the design features and test history of the Kamlok cap, as described by the licensee, and concluded that it provides a high degree of assurance of proper sealing. The staff also determined the consequences of

- - . = _ _ . . .

• J. Wood failure of the cap to seal under post-loss-of-coolant accident conditions and noted that any failure of leaktightness would not affect the short-term cour.se of the event, and that for the longer-term boron dilution capability, an alternate method is available. The staff also considered the compensatory measures taken to ensure that the port is currently properly closed. Based on these considerations, the N0ED was granted at 8:05 p.m. on February 12, 1997, under Criteria 1(a) of NUREG-1600, to avoid undesirable transients as a result of forcing compliance with a license condition and, thus, to minimize -

potential safety consequences and operational risks.

On the basis of the staff's evaluation of your request, the staff has concluded that an N0E0 is warranted because we are clearly satisfied that this  !

action involves minimal or no safety impact and has no adverse radiological impact on public health and safety. Therefore, it is our intention to exercise discretion not to enforce compliance with TS surveillance requirement 4.5.2.f for the period from February 12, 1997, 8:05 p.m. ET, until the NRC j approves your license amendment request to revise the TS requirements, or  !

until Davis-Besse enters Mode 4 in an outage of sufficient duration to perform the required surveillance test. I This letter documents our telephone conversations during the evening (between approximately 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.) of February 12, 1997, when we orally issued this N0ED. However, as stated in the Enforcement Policy, action will normally be taken, to the extent that violations were involved, for the root 4 cause that led to the noncompliance for which this N0ED was necessary.

Sincerely, Original signed by:

Jack W. Roe, Director Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-346 cc. See next page Distribution:

Docket File PUBLIC PDIII-3 R/F G. Hill (2 cys)

S. Collins /F. Miraglia C. Grimes ACRS W. Long R. Zimmerman A. Thadani J. Caldwell, RIII J. Lieberman J. Roe E. Adensam G. Marcus DEDR & DRPE TA OGC EMail - N0ED TGD -

DOCUMENT NAME:G:\DAVISBES\DB97941.LTR

• See previous concurrence Te receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy 0FFICE LA:PDIII-3 l C PM:PDIII-M C SCSB:DSSA l SRXB:DSSA D:PD III-3 l NAME EBarnhill CP( AHanseryfdMf CBerlinger

• JLyons

• G. Marcus

• DATE 03/06/97 03/ 5 /V 2/19/97 A 2/19/97 2/18/97 0FFICE D:DRP: Rill C D:DSSA D:QRPW,3 DI NAME JGrobe (Phone) GHolahan

• JRof DATE 2/19/97 3/5/97 3/ F/97 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

J. Wood .

, failure of the cap to seal under post-loss-of-coolant accident conditions and noted that any failure of leaktightness would not affect the short-term course of the event, and that for the longer-term boron dilution capability, an alternate method is available. The staff also considered the compensatory measures taken to ensure that the port is currently properly closed. Based on these considerations, the N0ED was granted at 8:05 p.m. on February 12, 1997, under Criteria 1(a) of NUREG-1600, to avold undesirable transients as a result of forcing compliance with a license condition and, thus, to minimize -

potential safety consequences and operational risks.

On the basis of the staff's evaluation of your request, the staff has concluded that an N0ED is warranted because we are clearly satisfied that this action involves minimal or no safety impact and has no adverse radiological impact on public health and safety. Therefore, it is our intention to exercise discretion not to enforce compliance with TS surveillance requirement 4.5.2.f for the period from February 12, 1997, 8:05 p.m. ET, until the NRC approves your license amendment request to revise the TS requirements, or until Davis-Besse enters Mode 4 in an outage of sufficient duration to perform the required surveillance test.

This letter documents our telephone conversations during the evening (between >

approximately 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.) of February 12, 1997, when we orally l issued this N0ED. However, as stated in the Enforcement Policy, action will normally be taken, to the extent that violations were involved, for the root cause that led to the noncompliance for which this N0ED was necessary. l Sincerely, .

Original signed by:

Jack W. Roe, Director Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-346 4

cc. See next page Distribution:

Docket File PUBLIC PDIII-3 R/F G. Hill (2 cys)

S. Collins /F. Miraglia C. Griines ACRS W. Long R. Zimmerman A. Thadani J. Caldwell, RIII J. Lieberman J. Roe E. Adensam G. Marcus DEDR & DRPE TA OGC EMail - NOED TGD -

DOCUMENT NAME:G:\DAVISBES\DB97941.LTR

• See previous concurrence Ta receive a copy of this docurnent, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without enclosures *E' = Copy wrth enclosures *N" = No copy 0FFICE LA:PDIII-3 C PM:PDIII-M C SCSB:DSSA SRXB:DSSA l D:PD III-3 l NAME EBarnhill C H AHansepfC4f CBerlinger

• JLyons

• G. Marcus

• umans names s'im !am aus 0FFICE D:DRP:RIII C D:DSSA D:QBPW-NAME JGrobe (Phone) GHolahan

• JRof DATE 2/19/97 3/5/97 3/ F/97 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

Mr. John K. Wood Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station l Toledo Edison Company Unit No. 1 CC: ,

Mary E. O'Reilly Robert E. Owen, Chief  !

Centerior Energy Corporation Bureau of Radiological Health 300 Madison Avenue Service Toledo, Ohio 43652 Ohio Department of Health ,

P. O. Box 118 l Mr. James L. Freels Columbus, Ohio 43266-0118  !

Manager - Regulatory Affairs l Toledo Edison Company l

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Attorney General I 5501 North State - Route 2 Department of Attorney Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449-9760 30 East Broad Street Columbus, Ohio 43216 Gerald Charnoff, Esq.  ;

Shaw, Pittman, Potts Mr. James W. Harris, Director i and Trowbridge Division of Power Generation 2300 N Street, N.W. Ohio Department of Industrial Washington, D.C. 20037 Regulations P. O. Box 825 Regional Administrator Columbus, Ohio 43216 U.S. NRC, Region III 801 Warrenville Road Ohio Environmental Protection Agency Lisle, Illinois 60523-4351 DERR--Compliance Unit ATTN: Zack A. Clayton Mr. Robert B. Borsum P. O. Box 1049 ,

i Babcock & Wilcox Columbus, Ohio 43266-0149 Nuclear Dower Generation Division 1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525 State of Ohio l Rockville, Maryland 20852 Public Utilities Commission '

180 East Broad Street i Resident Inspector Columbus, Ohio 43266-0573 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l 5503 N. State Route 2 Mr. James R. Williams Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449 , Chief of Staff Ohio Emergency Management Agency  !

Mr. James H. Lash, Plant Manager 2855 West Dublin Granville Road '

Toledo Edison Company Columbus, Ohio 43235-2206 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 5501 North State Route 2 President, Board of County Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449-9760 Commissioner of Ottawa County Port Clinton, Ohio 43452