ML20135A478

Insp Rept 70-1100/85-05 on 850702.No Noncompliance Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Physical Protection Measures for SNM of Low Strategic Significance

ML20135A478
Person / Time
Site:	07001100
Issue date:	08/28/1985
From:	Keimig R, Madden W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20135A465	List: ML20135A462 ML20135A478
References
70-1100-85-05, 70-1100-85-5, NUDOCS 8509100170
Download: ML20135A478 (3)

Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Report No. 70-1100/85-05 Docket No. 70-1100 License No. SNM-1067 Licensee: Combustion Engineering, Inc.

P. O. Box 500 i

Windsor, Connecticut 06095 Facility Name: Combustion Engineering - Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing

Inspection At

Windsor, Connecticut Inspection Conducted: July 2, 1985 a

Inspector: n.; 4A b[

Wriliam J. Madden, Physical Security

- date 28- N

+

Inspector Approved by: / f hdf- 8[

R. Keimi , Chief feguards Section date Inspection Summary: tine, Unannounced Physical Security Inspection on July 2, 1985 (Report No. 70-1100/85-05):

Areas Inspected: Physical protection measures for special nuclear material of low strategic significance. The inspection involved 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> onsite by one NRC region-based inspector. The inspector also followed up on a telephone report to NRC Region I by the licensee concerning a suspected tampering event which proved false.

Results: .The licensee was in compliance with the NRC approved Security Plan.

i E

8509100170 850904 PDR ADOCK 07001100 C PDR ug r. , , - - - . - . . - - -

p DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

• R. E. Sheeran, Manager Nuclear Licensing, Safety, Security and Accountability P. A. Ferwerda, Quality Control Manager

• M. Wanik, Branch Manager, Globe Security Systems Office, Waterbury, CT

• present at exit. interview

2. 30703 - Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives indicated in para-graph I at the conclusion of the inspection on July 2, 1985. The purpose and scope of the inspection _ were reviewed and the findings were presented.

At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.

3. 81485 - General Requirements for Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic Significance The licensee was protecting special nuclear material in conformance with the NRC approved physical security plan for the facility. Implementation of the physical security plan meets the general performance requirements and objectives of the governing regulations. The inspector confirmed this by examining barriers and access controls, procedures, testing and maintenance records, and by observations of a licensee test of alarm system features.

4. 92713 - Independent Inspection Effort for Safeguards Inspections At 5:00 p.m. on June ~ 26, 1985, the licensee discovered that several tubes, containing samples of commercial reactor fuel pellets which were awaiting hydrogen analyses, were found to be contaminated with an unknown-liquid. The licensee initially suspected that the liquid was deliberately introduced into the sample. tubes to cause production problems. The licensee initiated an investigation and increased supervision over the production process. On June 27, the Itcunsee confirmed that the contam-inating substance was isopropyl alcohol which is used to clean the sample tubes. The licensee also resampled fuel pellets from the fuel rods which had been Icaded with pellets from this batch. Analyses of the resampled fuel pellets found that they were within specifications. The licensee discussed the suspected tampering with employees and solicited.information.

3 An employee came forward and described how, during the sample tube cleaning operation, alcohol could be accidentally left in the tube. The employee, who had been pressed to prepare the sample tubes and apparently was un-aware of the importance of drying the tubes after cleaning , had inadver-tently loaded the sample tubes with fuel pellets before the tubes were completely dry. The inspector' interviewed the employee and had the em-ployee demonstrate how the handling error occurred. The licensee's cor-rective actions were reviewed, including the documented resampling of at least one pellet from each fuel rod in the affected batch for hydrogen analyses and the revision of the cleaning procedure. The procedure now provides specific instructions on how to clean and dry the sample tube.

This revision is documented as number 76. The licensee had telephonically notified Region I of the initial suspicion regarding this event at about 8:52. a.m. - on June 27, 1985. Later that day, the licensee called Region I to advise of the final determination as to the cause of the event. Based upon' interviews and observations conducted by the inspector during this inspection, he ccacurred with the licensee's determination and found that no violatior, of NRC requirements had occurred.

>