ML20134N666
| ML20134N666 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1985 |
| From: | Verrelli D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Parris H TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8509050265 | |
| Download: ML20134N666 (2) | |
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AUG 141985
- Tenness e Valley Authority ATTN:
- r. H. G. Parris Manager of Power.and -
Engineering (Nuclear) 6N11 B Missionary Ridge Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
FEMA FINAL REPORT - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE OF FEBRUARY 6, 1985 Enclosed is the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Final Report of the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Exercise conducted on February 6,1985, regarding exercise participation by the State of Tennessee and Bradley and Hamilton Counties.
Your attention is directed to the suggested areas for improvement identified by FEMA.
We encourage you to. assist the State of Tennessee and Bradley and Hamilton Counties to resolve the improvement items identified by FEMA.
Resolution of these items should be ' completed prior to the next full scale emergency preparedness exercise.
We also encourage you.to work closely with the State and counties in development of the scenario for the next full scale exercise that will' effectively test those areas in which the previous deficiencies were disclosed.
Your cooperation'in' this. matter is appreciated.
1 Sincerely, F
David M. Verrelli, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 11 f
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
FEMA Exercise Report-s cc w/ encl: (See page 2)
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Nuclear Safety Staff bM..!= Williams, Jr.
Supervisor, Licensing Section W B. Kirk, Compliance Staff: Supervisor k E. Wills, Project-Engineer-bec w/e'ncl:
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan Di rector Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.
clear Regglatory Commission FROM:
icnard.Krimi Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs
SUBJECT:
Exercise Report for the February 6,1985, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)
Plans for the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)
Attached are two copies of the Exercise Report for the February 6,1985, partial participation joint exercise of the of fsite REP plans for the Sequoyah NPP. The Sequoyah NPP is located approximately 18 miles northeast of Chattanooga, Tennessee in Hamilton County along the Tennessee River.
Hamilton and Bradley Counties, both located in the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone, fully participated in the exercise along with partial participation by the State of Tennessee.
The exercise report was prepared by Region IV of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). There were five NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. I deficiencies observed during the exercise that require a schedule of corrective actions. These deficiencies, which are typically classified as Category B deficiencies, can be corrected through training and additional resources. These deficiencies did not detract from the overall capability demonstrated by the State of Tennessee and Hamilton and Bradley. Counties to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on August 7, 1980, will remain in effect.
FEMA Region IV sta'i will furnish a copy of this exercise report to the State of Tennessee and w'.ll obtain a schedule of corrective actions. The Region will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions.
If you nave any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2860.
Attachment As Stated
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EXERCISE Conducted on February 6, 1985 Exercise Report March 5, 1995 Utility:
Tennessee Valley Authority Plant Location:
Hamilton County, near Chattanooga, Tennessee Participating State and local governments:
State of Tennessee Hamilton County Bradley County t
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TABLE OF CONTENTS i'
page
',3 1.
EXERCISE
SUMMARY
l i
II.
DETAILED DISCUSSION 3
Introduction 3'
State of Tennessee 5
State' Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 5 Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) 7 Joint Information Center (JIC) 8-Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) 9 Field Radiological Monitoring 9
Risk Counties 10 Medical 10 Transportation / Evacuation 11 Hamilton County 11 Bradley County 13 III.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES-16 IV.
APPENDICES A.
Evaluator List and Assignments B.
Exercise' Objectives C.
Exercise Scenario 1:
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EXERCISE SUMf1ARY f
I The Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant conducted an emergency response exercise on February 6, 1985.
An off-site emergency response capa-bility was fully demonstrated by Hamilton and Bradley Counties, i
The State of Tennessee participated in the exercise providing partial support.
This exercise is referred to as a partial parti-l cipation exercise.
I The off-site exercise activities were observed by 18 Federal eval-uators representing seven Federal agencies (FEMA, NRC, DOE, DOT, FDA, EPA and USDA).
This was the fifth test for local and State governments to demonstrate off-site preparedness for the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant based on NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1,
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".
The Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant is located in Hamilton County along the Tennessee River.
The plant site is approximately 18 miles north-east of Chattanooga, Tennessee.
Parts of Hamilton and Bradley Coun-ties lie within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and are risk counties.
These counties will also serve to host any evacuees from the 10-mile EPZ should evacuation be necessary.
All objectives for the exercise were met.
There were five deficien-cies observed during the exercise.
These deficiencies can be cor-rected through training and additional resources.
Only one defi-ciency was a recurring deficiency from the previous exercise.
The following is a brief summary of the off-site exercise activities.
State of Tennessee The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in Nashville is an outstanding facility with excellent communication systems and per-sonnel who effectively directed the emergency response to the incident at the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant.
One State Liaison Officer was sent to the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).
There continues to be a concern in the breakdown of communications between the TVA dose assessment group in the CECC and the State's dose assessment group in the SEOC.
The Joint Information Center (JIC) was activated during the Sequoyah Exercise and adequately demonstrated a public information operation.
The limited availability of State Public Information Officers, due i
to other-State activities, created the opportunity to use this exer-cise as a training activity, which was effective for response staff.
l The State Division of Radiological Health personnel in the Radio-logical Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) worked very effectively with TVA personnel to coordinate the radiological monitoring field 1
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teams.
The RMCC could perform more effectively if they received more information such as plume and dose projections and meteorological conditions from the State EOC in a timely manner.
Radiological field monitoring teams are generally adequately trained and equipped to carry out their assigned tasks.
Some minor training and equipment weaknesses were noted.
I Risk Counties The hospital staff and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) nersonnel performed all functions adequately.
Recommend direct communications be exercised between transport personnel and the receiving facility to ensure the receiving facility is aware of the incoming problem.
Bradley and Hamilton Counties demonstrated an adequate capability to evacuate the populace of an endangered area.
The Hamilton County EOC is an excellent facility with exceptional staff.
Leadership was good.
Staff knew their responsibilities and effectively demonstrated their ability to manage the emergency response.
Although there are some internal ccmmunication refinements needed, the Bradley County EOC demonstrated it could adequately handle an emergency situation.
Leadership, elected officials' support and a dedicated and cooperative staff were the strong points of this operation.
Bradley County demonstrated the ability to protect the ponulation by activating a Shelter Information Point and a shelter.
Participatino personnel exhibited a high level of interest and were able to iden-tify several areas that need further imnrovement to ensure the smooth handling of evacuees.
I S
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DETAILED DISCUSSION
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Introduction The Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant is located in Hamilton. County ap-5 l
Hamilton proximately 18 miles northwest of Chattanooga, Tennessee.
Both risk and Bradley Counties are located.in the 10-mile EPZ.
counties participated'in the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Exercise, I
1 No activities were conducted in the 50-mile Ingestion _Pathuay.
The State provided partial support and participated at the State EOC,
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RMCC,.JIC.and field monitoring activities.
This exercise is
- CECC, referred to as a partial. participation exercise and was conducted on February 6,.1985.
This.was the fifth. exercise for State and local. governments in the
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The off-site response was conducted in accordance Sequoyah area.
with the " Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Response Plan for the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant."
Criteria used to evaluate the exercise are contained in the " Modular f or Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exer-Format cise Observations," issued by FEMA on August 5,'1983.
(For a detailed
' listing of evaluators'and assignments, see Appendix A.)
The exercise objectives were successfully integrated into the sce-nario.
All objectives were accomplished during the exercise (see Appendix B - Exercise Objectives).
The scenario established exer-cise activities for one. day (see Appendix C - Exercise Scenario).
the scenario: established acti~ities for full emeroency v
In summary, response from' Hamilton and Bradley Counties.'
The Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant. Exercise included the following participants:
Sequoyah Nuclear Power 1 Plant Tennessee Valley Authority Tennessee Emergency _ Management Agency Tennessee Department ofl Health and Environment I
-Hamilton County Government Bradley County Government Tennessee Department of. Acriculture l
Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency Tennessee Governor's Office Tennessee Public Service Commission 3
Tennessee Department of Transportation d
American. Red Cross
'U.- S.1 Coast Guard i-l Emergency Broadcast System-Federal Emergency ManagementfAgency-l 4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Department of Energy Other Federal agencies-(DOT, EPA, USDA and FDA) l t
3 l
During the exercise demonstration, several deficiencies were noted for the local governments.
These deficiencies are identified in i
the following Detailed Discussion and a summary listing is included in Section III.
Overall, five deficiencies were observed, three in Hamilton and two in Bradley County.
One of the Bradley County j
deficiencies is a recurring deficiency involving facilities.
How-ever, plans are well underway for the new EOC and this should be corrected within the next.several months.
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'!ne following detailed discussion highlights the specific activities oemonstrated during the Sequoyah Exercise.
Activities are discussed i
by the location of the demonstration becinning with the State of j
Tennessee and concluding with the local governments.
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State of Tennessee State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) l The activities and staffing of the State Emergency Operations Center 8
(SEOC) were prompt and effective once the notification of Alert status was received from the plant.
Essential TEMA personnel were notified i
to report to the EOC at the Alert classification.
Other State per-i sonnel representing various. departments arrived following the Site Area Emergency declaration.
The radio pager system functioned effec-tively in mobilizing the emergency personnel.
Mr. John White, Deputy Director for Operations, TEMA, was ef fectively in control of directing the State's emergency resoonse.
Frequent briefings were held to keep the staff notified of the changing emer-gency conditions.
State agency emergency management personnel parti-cipated in the briefings and were an effective part of the decision-making process.
Emergency responders effectively coordinated their actions with each other.
All players at the EOC exhibited a professional attitude.
Copies of the Sequoyah REP Plan were available for reference and were used throughout the exercise.
Message logs were kept current and message handling procedures were efficient.
Although security at the entrance of tla EOC was not established for the purposes of this exercise, access %a;, controlled through distri-bution of passes which allow participants tv enter through the secured doors.
The State EOC was propptly notified by the utility of all changes in emergency classification levels.
The State EOC in Nashville is an excellent, undercround enercency facility.
The facility is now complete after undergoing extensive renovation.
Emergency operations are divided into two separate areas:
communications and operations.
The communications systems were effective and worked well throughout the day.
There are ade-quate telephones, space and equipment to support the State's emer-gency response.
I The operations room is large and well-equipped with adequate naos and. status boards which were kept up-to-date and reflected the f
changing emergency conditions.
Internal. communications were excellent.
Frequent briefings were held to update the State staff.
Microphones were used in the brief-ings which aided in the direction of the managers.
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1 Communication equipment between the utility, State, local covern-ments and the Joint Information Center (JIC) was reliable and worked i
effectively.
The dedicated ring-doun system was consistently moni-tored throughout the day.
It provided current information.from the utility on plant conditions and provided an effective means for the i
State and local governments to learn of the emergency conditions.
I A telecopy machine was available to transmit hard copy messages to all locations.
This machine experienced some backlog.
An additional
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telecopy machine would be helpful in expediting message flow to the JIC and other locations.
Messages dispatched and completion time ranged from 5 minutes to 15 minutes.
The radiological health portion of the exericse at the State EOC was performed in a well organized, efficient and professional manner.
All personnel carried out their assignments according to previously established SOP's and situations as dictated by the scenario and TVA at the Sequoyah Plant.
There were no significant communications problems within the EOC or with TVA at the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).
There was radiation exposure of 53.5 REM to some of the population being evacuated one mile from the plant, 20.5 REM at two miles from the plant, and 6.2 REM at five miles from the plant.
All of those doses were to the thyroid against the PAG of 75 REM.
The number of people receiving those doses could not be calculated at the time of this report due to lack of information on the scope of the plume and the acceleration at which the evacuation was being performed.
This population dose could possibly have been reduced by as much as 25% if TVA had reported the reaction data upon which it based its
" General Emergency" declaration, as soon as it was available, to the State Radiological Health Unit at the State EOC.
In this way the State could have made its off-site population dose calculations in parallel with TVA and thus eliminated a 15 to 30 minute time laa.
KI administration to the general population was recommended.
The State Radiological Health Unit at the State EOC indicated it did not have sufficient data to recommend an evacuation prior to the TVA
" General Emergency" declaration at 1318 (EST) - 1218 (CST).
At the State EOC, prompt notification was adequately handled by coordinating siren sounding with both risk counties.
EBS messages I
(tapas) were prepared in advance and are available for immediate use at the EBS stations.
Announcements were made at the EOC that l
the sirens had been sounded and that EBS had released emergency I
information.
Representatives from the Coast Guard were present at the EOC and r
coordinated with Tennessee Wildlife Resource Agency in blockadino and evacuating the Tennessee River within the 10-mile Energency ~
Planning Zone (EPZ).
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l Decisions to require protective actions were thoroughly discussed and were implemented in a prompt manner.
The EOC followed the evacuation /
I sheltering process with status board updates concerning evacuation j
times and shelter situations.
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Protective Actions was adequately i
t-Current agricultural handled by the State Department of Agriculture.
information was available both at the EOC and at the Ellington Aari-I cultural Center in Nashville.
Press releases were issued throughout I
the day advising farmers of the current agricultural recommendations.
Animals were sheltered and placed on stored feed and water.
Evacu-ated farmers were instructed not to try to move any livestock from their farms.
Farmers would probably be allowed to return to the evacuated area for a short period to tend to their livestock during the evacuation period.
In accordance with the Public Information Plan, there were no media briefings conducted from the State EOC.
Contents of news releases were prepared at the SEOC and forwarded to the JIC for release or prepared at the JIC and forwarded to the SEOC for approval prior to release.
The scenario was adequate to test the energency response capabilities of the State EOC.
Central Emergency Control Center (CECC)
The State dispatched one representative to the CECC to serve in a liaison capacity.
This emergency manacement representative was instrumental in enhancing communications and coordination between the State Energency Director (TEMA) and the TVA Energency Director.
Overall, these communications at this high level between TVA and the State EOC were effective and timely.
There were sone ninor problems which were corrected during the course of the exercise dealing with telefaxing of hard copy data to the State EOC in Nashville.
However, there continues to be a concern in the breakdown of commu-nications between the TVA dose assessment group in the CECC and the i.
States' Division of Radiological Health located in the State EOC in Nashville.
Each of these technical organizations functions independ-ently of-each other which hampers the ability of the' State.to oerform l
a timely, independent analysis of the emergency conditions.
The State Division of Radiological Health at the Stawe EOC is in need of cer-tain raw technical data to perform this assessment, which during this exercise was generally received in an untimely fashion or not at all.
I This concern was noted in the previous exercise and again the State is. requested to give serious consideration to dispatching a technical representative from the State Health Department to the CECC to facili-tate coordination and communications.
In the event this is not fea-sible, as a minimum, interface procedures (formal or infornall'must be developed and implemented to ensure optimum coordination between the State-EOC and the CECC.
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e Joint Information Center (JIC) l i
The Sequoyah Exercise was adequate to address a reduced function Joint Information Center (JIC).
The activities demonstrated satis-fied the objectives for this partial exercise.
The limited avail-ability of State public information officers created the ooportunity to use this exercise as a training tool for staff nornally partici-pating in other response operations.
Approximately fifteen staff participated in the JIC operation.
All staff demonstrated a sincere dedication to getting the job done and done well.
The enthusiasm was high and continued throughout the exercise play.
Two new staff positions in the plan, a Radiolocical Health Advisor and JIC Operations Officer, added greatly to the Tennessee capability.
These two added positions resolved previously noted weaknesses in the JIC staff.
Alerting and staff activation were not objectives for this exercise.
All staff were prepositioned.
However, an alerting system is in place and staff could be notified at any time.
The facilities for the JIC operations are excellent.
The work space for the State and' local operation is adequate.
The briefing facili-ties provided for the media offer the most up-to-date equipment to support live coverage.
In addition, the State and TVA supported an Up-Date Desk to respond to the needs of the media between press briefings.
Comnunications however, are a problem area.
Additional telephone lines are needed to adequately allow State and local PIOS the oppor-tunity to coordinate information.
During the exercise both Hamilton and Bradley County PIOS shared a telephone line which caused the counties to be delayed in receiving or collecting cublic information.
Internal communications were good.
Status boards were nosted and message logs well maintained bv all staff.
Releases to the public were prepared and coordinated with all parties involved.
Media briefings were held and the appropriate State and
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local representatives were available to respond to media guerries.
Where answers were not instantaneous, follow-up was managed effec-i tively.
I The mock media used for the exercise were excellent.- University of Tennessee students asked questions of the PIO players, giving a real-istic aspect to the play.
Some of the questions were not easily i
addressed and did indeed test the players.
The mock media did a good job and added greatly to the exercise.
Many players expressed the difficulties of cetting everything done during a rapidly escalating scenario.
But media briefings were con-ducted and press releases prepared as the emergency scenario developed.
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Rumor control was incorporated in all aspects of the JIC operation, from broadcasting the toll-free number to responding to rumors called in through media briefings and releases.
County PIOS were an added measure of imorovement as this tied the State and local information more closely.
When better communications I
capability is available, this could be even more effective.
Radiological Monitoring Control' Center (RMCC) i The new location for the RMCC worked effectively, however, minor com-munication problems were experienced in the SEOC DRH ring-down phone and facsimile verification phone.
Communication between the RMCC and the field teams was effective and minor problems were corrected quickly.
Shift changes were made in some personnel and these activities were conducted smoothly.
Additional information from the State EOC should be provided in a timely manner to the RMCC, esoecially dose projections, plume projections and meteorological data which effect the oositioning of field teams and their safety.
Overall, there were no major prob-lems at the RMCC, and the State and TVA personnel worked effectively to define the problem as directed from the State EOC.
Four RMCC staff were under-utilized.
If given sufficient information and decision-making authority they could assist the State EOC in con-firming plume projections and doses.
Suggestions for improvements for the RMCC include:
Additional phone line is needed for facsimile verification in the RMCC.
Phone lines set aside for EPA and DOE should be moved to the new RMCC location and additional consideration oiven to accommodating the Federal coordinators in this room.
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RMCC Director's ring-down phone to SEOC DRH should connect directly to the DRH Director.
Posting information about plant status, emergency classifications, and meteorological data in the RMCC would be helpful.
A wall clock in the RMCC would be useful.
Field Radiological Monitorino Mobilization of field teams was not demonstrated.
Team members were prepositioned for the exercise, but well-versed in mobilization and reporting requirements.
Mobilization has been demonstrated in pre-vious exercises.
i-9 Equ'ipment was generally adequate.
However, the air samplers did not have calibration stickers reflecting the date of the most recent calibration, and one air. sampler (Team #1) was inoperative.
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Generally, teams have adeguate training to carry.out technical field i
operations.
However, some difficulties were noted:
- 1) the initial The air samolers equipment check out did not use checklists or SOPS.
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were not checked -- one was later found to be inoperative, 2)
Team No. 3 did not use SOPS although they were present, 3) Team No. 3 got lost and had difficulty reading the mans, and 4) the monitoring noint e.
j reference descriptions had several inaccuracies.
We suggest that training in map reading include the noting of mileages from the map and comparing to odometer readings, cross referencing to actual. landmarks, and double checking with the monitorino point j
descriptions.
I Communications were generally adequate, but occasional dead spots
. Teams should be encouraged to move to high ground to were noted.
transmit,.use other teams to relay, or use the PSC backup communica-tions (Team No. 3 was unfamiliar with these procedures).
Team members never used the prefix "This is a Drill" for transmis-sions.
This is particularly important for transmissions of radia-tion readings.
Field-teams were not advised generally of plant status, emergency actions level, meteorological data, dose projections or protective actions underway.
Teams had adequate dosimetry and knew when to read them.
The SOPS indicated exposure limits although Team No. 3 was not aware of either the limits or the fact.they were available in the SOPS.
Only.one PSC driver had dosimetry.
There are insufficient anti-contamination outfits and respirators for team members and PSC driver.- The respirators are a particular concern.
Risk Counties Medical i
The medical drill observed included the EMS managing a contaminated individual, transporting the individual-to Erlanger Hospital, and the hospital staff _ treating the: individual as well as decontamination.
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Even though radio communications exist,- the ambulance in transit did not communicate with the receiving hospital.
Erlanger Hospital does
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not want:to talk with the incoming ambulance service in advance of 8
arrival.
-The EMS'ccordinator at the County EOC did not inform theLhospital
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that_an ambulance was dispatched to_the shelter to pick up a contami-nated person-and.would transport that person to the hospital.
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s The hospital staff performed the required orocedures for handlino a contaminated individual.
However, since they were not informed of the person's expected arrival, the transport vehicle, EMS cersonnel and the contaminated individual sat in the vehicle until the receiving area could be prepared.
In this case, the person was not injured.
The hospital, however, made no attempt to contact the EMS nersonnel to determine the contaminated person's condition.
8 Transoortation/ Evacuation i
Four traffic-control points were observed during the exercise:
I-75 and S.R.
60 (Bradley County)
I-75 and Exit 20 (Bradley County)
S.R. 58 and Chapion Road (Hamilton County)
I-75 and Hunter Road.(Hamilton County)
All of the traffic control point personnel observed were veteran Deputy Sheriffs.
They were aware of their resconsibilities and no deficiencies were noted.
Route alerting uas observed and the Deputy Sheriff adequately demonstrated actual nrocedures to be.used in an emergency.
Evacuation route signs are well-placed and in sufficient numbers to-aid evacuation.
Personnel was not exactly sure of the naximun doses allowed.
How-ever, they were in close contact with their comnand costs and could easily obtain the correct answer.
Hamilton County issues both lou-range and mid-range dosimeters.
Bradley County issues only low-range dosineters.
Worker exposure control appears to be adequately managed.
Field uorkers have received training in this area, but like all things, refresher training would be helpful.
Hamilton County The Hamilton County EOC is an excellent facilitv and has an excen-tional staff.
Leadership was good.
Authority was effectively dele-gated among emergency management staff.
EOC nobilization was timelv.
Response personnel were aware of their responsibilities and demon-strated their ability to respond quickly and effectivelv.
Cocies of the Sequoyah Plan were available for reference, if necessary, as voll as procedures.
A shift change was demonstrated, although it did not aopear as if all second shift staff had the opoortunity to nlav.
Continued train-ing should assure maintenance of hiqh_ level performance and assist newcomers and alternate staff in. understanding their responsibilities.
As noted above, the EOC facility is excellent.
It is spacious and well-equipped.
Security for the facility was maintained effectively by uniformed police officers.
Maps were large-and easily readible.
It would be helpful to include information on population by sector, for quick reference.
(J.10.b.).
f-11
Communications equipment was adequate and redundancies nroved effec-tive and were used as needed when minor problems developed.
The system for. message handling was satisfactory.
Logs of incoming messages and responses were kept.
A standard message form was useful to personnel.
It is suggested that responders be advised to urite t-how to contact the originator of messages, as they are relayed.
There was confusion regarding the necessity of takina KI, with the t
g county expecting to receive information at 2:00 p.m. EST.
This was not forthcoming.
The county finally learned of ordern to take F.I about two hours later through news release 55.
(J.10. f. )
The information on the location of individuals requiring assistance in the event of evacuation is five years old and is currently being updated.
This should assist the county in meeting the needs of these persons.
(J.10.d.)
A minor point; terminology regarding emeroency status levels needs to be understood.
Occasionally, terms for status levels nere nixed, 2.~.,
reference to a " site area ale:t."
This could lead to confusion.
Further training would be helpful in this regard.
In summary, the Hamilton County EOC operated smoothly throughout the exercise, and demonstrated the county could effectively manage their responsibilities in an emergency situation at the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant.
The. Command Post West was located at a fire station with ample space and facilities.
Activities during the time observed were limited.
There was an indication that additional training would be beneficial, especially on the use of radiological monitoring equipment.
The Command Post East was located at a fire station on Highway 58 and moved to another fire station when evacuation was ordered.
Both locations provided ample space and facilities.
The Command Post Ccordinator and his staff were well-informed and operated in an efficient manner.
Support agencies were alert and performed well.
The Shelter Information Points'(SIPS) were manned by knowledgeable individuals from the Tax Assessor's Office.
There was some confu-8 sion about maps, but it has been resolved.
Dosimeters'had been explained,'but were not issued.
The SIP personnel could benefit l
from some detailed radiological monitoring training.
Since these i
people will be the first line of official contact for evacuees, they probably.should know more about nuclear power plant accidents, I
radioactivity, etc.
Overall, however, these people did a good job, j
and they knew the things they were supposed to know -- where the shelters were, and how to direct evacuees to them.
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Activity at the shelter was also well-managed.
Red Cross, Hamilton County Health Department, and City High School were represented, j
The Red Cross is responsible for shelter management and nursing.
Both positions were filled by qualified individuals.
The Health Department is responsible for radiological monitoring, and they did j
a good job as well.
The shelter is short in numbers of radiological monitoring equipment (one CDU-700 low-range survey instrument).
Two e
of these were available during the exercise, but representatives i
from the Health Department stated that only one would be available
}
for a real situation.
Low-range dosimeters should be made available.
The question about the availability of proper instrumentation, low-range survey meters and low-range dosimeters, needs to be resolved.
Bradley County The Bradley County EOC facility contains adequate space but could be better arranged.
Because of its location next to a basement garage, ventilation and noise control are extremely poor.
There are no provisions such as restrooms, hitchen and bunking.for long-term operation.
(H.3.)
This deficiency remains unresolved from previous years.
- However, there is a new EOC under construction across the street which should correct the above-mentioned inadequacies and, we understand, will be completed in 90 to 120 days.
l Leadership was excellent in that the Director was effectively in charge,-made logical decisions, and engendered enthusiasm and coordination among the staff.
Staff was prompt in reporting to the EOC and adequate in number.
Fourteen departments and agencies were present in the operations room and were well-coordinated.
External communications were ade-quate.
Staff was activated during the Alert because the Director saw that plant conditions were deteriorating.
Internal displays were largely adequate, however, we would suggest a larger, more permanent status-board for the operations room, as well j
as a large EPZ map with population figures by sector.
(J.10.b.)
Security was adequate.
The single entry to the EOC was guarded by a uniformed guard, and personnel were required to sign in and out.
Federal evaluators, however, were overlooked in this process until late in the afternoon of the exercise day.
The briefings made by the EOC Director-were well done but infrequent.
We.would suggest more frequent briefings, and, during the course of j
those briefings, we would suggest that concise briefings be given by agency chiefs so that all operations personnel could be kept fully informed.
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f Although the internal message system was adequate, we would suggest that the duplicate numbering systems used for incoming and outgoing messages be changed to a single, sequential numbering system.
The County Sherif f's Department and rescue squad vehicles dispatched route alerting vehicles with sirens, lights and public address sys-3 tems twice during the exercise.
Seven of the 14 routes were run.
Route times averaged about 20 minutes, and alerting was accomplished I
in a total time of about 45 minutes.
1-The two local radio stations did not broadcast their prepared mes-sages, apparently because the control station, WDOD in Chattanooga, did not notify them.
We would suggest that a radio and TV be set up in the EOC and moni-tored so that the Director and PIO could.know what information is being given to the people of the county.
There was some time confusion in the EOC during'the exercise because of the mixed use of Eastern Standard Time and Central Standard Time.
We would offer for consideration the use of both " CST" and "EST" on all messages, and the use of two wall clocks appropriately designated.
A Shelter Information Point and the shelter demonstration at the Waterville Elementary School were observed.
The American Red Cross, assisted by Bradley County Public Health Department, and Human Services Department workers demonstrated the opening of a shelter.
Fourteen evacuees were processed through registration.. Staff on hand had good attitudes and worked.well together.
It was apparent that Shelter Manager, Ms. Noelck, had done a great deal of pre-planning regarding activities and where they would occur.
Some additional support is clearly needed.
Again this year no security personnel-were present for_ control of evacuees and security.
The County Plan calls for this presence, as well as local amateur radio l
representation -- but none was there.
l The 14 evacuees were not monitored.
There is some confusion as to
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exactly what procedures are to be followed in.the event of a contami-nated. evacuee.
The Shelter Manager stated decontamination would lue
.done in school restrooms (where.there are no showers).
Ambulance i
drivers (Mr. McCullum and Mr. Sink) arrived and-very capably demon-j strated the handling and transporting of a contaminated evacuee to the hospital; however, they indicated that in a real emergency, a fire truck would come to the shelter and evacuees would be decontam-inated on the spot..This needs to be clarified with all involved.
personnel.
I Closer interaction and understanding is needed between participatinc agencies and organizations.
For example, shelter personnel were unaware of-the function of Shelter Information Points, registrars did L !
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14
not know evacuees would be arriving with pre-numtered tickets (in order to control shelter capacity).
The County Plan (page 416) calls for emergency management to provide Red Cross a computer print-out I
indicating the location of non-sheltered evacuees.
The emergency j
management personnel were unaware of this requirement.
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Overall, Bradley County does have the capability to protect the popu-lation.
Eowever, some of the weaknesses noted at the last exercise e -
have not been addressed during the past year.
All personnel inter-
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viewed seemed eager and willing to work together in the coming months l
to strengthen and perfect their response efforts.
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III.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES NUREG 0654 Deficiencies
-f State of Tennessee None ii 1
Hamilton County J.10.b. - Protective. Response J.10.d. - Protective-Response J.10.f. - Protective Response Bradley County
- H.3.
- Emergency Facilities and Equipment J.10.b. - Protective Response A
Recurring deficiency from the last exercise in July 1983.
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4 IV.
APPENDICES A.
Evaluator List and Assignments l
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B.
Exercise Objectives I
C.
Exercise Scenario
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. c FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS ny SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE February 6-8, 1985 D
CHIEF OF EVALUATORS AND RAC IV CHAIRMAN Glenn Woodard (FEMA)
STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC) - NASHVILLE, TN John Heard (FEMA) l 7
Cheryl Malina (USDA) 3 Dick Payne (EPA)
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RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING CONTROL CENTER (RMCC) - CHATTANOOGA, TN Jeff Slack (DOE) 4 i
JOINT INFORMATION CENTER (JIC) - CHATTANOOGA, TN Cheryl Stovall (FEMA)
CENTRAL DiERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (CECC) - CHATTANOOGA, TN rj Bob Trojanowski (NRC)
MOBILE TRANSPORTA" ION / FIELD ACTIVITIES l
Al Hall (DOT)
MEDICAL SERVICES Brad Eichorst (FDA) i MOBILE RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH Brad Eichorst (FDA) s RADIOLOGICAL FIELD MONITORING Ray Boyett (FEMA)
Tony Foltman (FEMA)
Don Fingleton (FEMA) i Don Dodson (FDA)
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HAMILTON COUNTY - CHATTANOOGA, TN 4
Shana Aucsmith (FEMA)
Russell Yarbrough (FEMA)
)
Doug Hoell (FEMA)
J BRADLEY COUNTY - CLEVELAND, TN Tom Hawkins (FEMA)
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t STATE OBJECTIVES (Change 1)
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1985 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE I
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The 1983 partial exercise will be aimed primarily at demonstrating the capability of local government to provide timely and effective warning and i
j protection to those citizens who might be affected by an incident or accident at 4
TVA's Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant. The following objectives will be met:
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1.
To test, evaluate, and confirm the. capabilities of TVA, and local governments to carry out their respective responsiblities as specified in the Tennessee Multi-3urisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant.
2.
To activate partial state and local emergency operational facilities and evaluate their functior,al adequacies with emphasis on internal / external comrnunication, coordination, and security.
3.
To activate a reduced function Joint Information Center (JIC)
-(replacing the Near-site Media Center) to test its functional adequacies with respect to direction and control, internal / external coordination,
~
facilities, security, and ability to meet the needs of the Public Information Function as it relates to the counties only.
4.
To demonstrate timely notification, on a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis of local, state, and federal emergency response staffs and public officials following an incident at the facility.
5.
To exercise external communication systems among TVA, state, and local emergency operations centers, and some field locations (e.g.
l RMCC). Federal agencies will also be notified.
3 6.
To demonstrate the organization, control, leadership, and support of emergency response personnel (primarily on the local level) and their ability to make timely and effective decisions during an incident at the 1
facility.
]
7.
To 'est the reliability of public alerting and notification systems in the l
risk area.
Timely response of County alerting officials, will be evaluated. NOAA and EBS will activate one time with subsequence activations to be simulated.
i f.
To test and evaluate the adequacy, appropriateness, and effectiveness of the flow of information, the maps and other visual displays within
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210C022 20111 91/10 3
the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC),31C, and local EOC's.
9.
To test monitoring equipment adequacy, field team coordination, technical cal::ulations, and the accuracy and timeliness of overall accident asscssment. The ability of the RMCC to coordinate and direct state and federal teams, synthesize reports and issue timely recommendations to the SEOC also will be evaluated.
10.
To evaluate the staffing capability and operational readiness of n sss f
care ' shelters by the American Red Cross and other private organizations.
l 11.
To demonstrate state and local governments' ability to evacuate affected populations, including those with special needs within the 10
]
mile EPZ (in both Bradley and Hamilton Counties) by simulating a safe j
and expeditious evacuation using designated routes and prescribed proceedures.
l 12.
The exercise scenario will provide for the identification and classification of all emergency classes.
13.
The scenario will provide for inplant post-release sampling and for health physics response both on-site and off-site.
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210E022 80:11 91/10 t.,
2 SEQUOYAH PARTIAL EXERCISE 1985 OFF-5ITE RESPONSE NARRATfVE r
2 February 6,1984 l
a 0800 - 1000 (CST)- ALERT j
State:
The off-site response begins with notification from TVA's Central Emergency
'I Control Center (CECC) uy ring down telephone to the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) duty officer that an ALERT has been declared at the SEQUOYAH Nuclear Power Plant. The Director of TEMA (or his designee) will be notified. The Director of TEMA will notify the Governor, State of Tennessee, and the Adjutant General, State of Tennessee. The duty officer will notify:
- a.
Division of Radiological Health (DRH) to standby.
1 b.
Field Coordinator of the Field Coordination Center (FCC) to standby.
4 c.
Tennessee Highway Patrol (THP) to standby.
d.
Hamilton County Civl! Defense.
e.
Bradley County Civil Defense.
f.
Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) and National Oceanic and i
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Radio to standby, g.
31C Coordinator and TEMA PIO.
'The Division of Radiological Health notifies other Divisions of the Department of Health and Environment to standby and to be prepared to man the FCC.
The Director of TEMA has the option to activate the prompt notification system depending on the situation at the plant. He may selectively man the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and the JIC if he so desires. Once the primary notifications are complete, the duty officer will notify the following agencies to standby or report to their assigned duty stations as the State Director j
may order.
a.
Governor's Press Secretary b.
Tennessee Department of Transportation - Standby to man FCC 9
c.
Tennessee Department of Agriculture - Standby to man FCC l
d.
Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency - Standby to man FCC i
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216f622 60111 91/10 i
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American Red Cross f.
Public Service Commission - Sta.ndby to man FCC 2
g.
Department of Tourism - Standby to man FCC h.
' U.S. Department of Energy - Standby to man FCC
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1.
Host counties, Meigs, Rhea, Sequachie - Standby to open shelters.
Local:
j Hamilton and Bradley County Civil Defense Directors proceed to notify the l}
County Executives / City Mayors of municipalities within the 10 mile EPZ and l
essential response staff and volunteers.
The County EOC may be selectively l
manned at this' time at the Directors' discretion.
F j
1000 - 1200 (C5T)- SITE AREA EMERGENCY State:
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When SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, TVA's CECC will notify the SEOC as in ALERT. The TEMA Director will order the activation of the SEOC, the RMCC, and the 3IC and simulate the activation of the FCC.' DRH and TVA field monitoring teams will be dispatched from their present locations and ordered to assemble at the RMCC for further instructions. They will be dispatched from the
. RMCC to various locations as the situation requires. When in place, the field monitoring teams provide off-site monitoring data to the RMCC where the data is jointly assessed. TVA will make recommendations for off-site protective actions, t
if warranted. These actions are ' confirmed by DRH and provided to the TEMA Director and the Governor for action. The TEMA Director will consider activating the prompt notification system soon after notification of the classification. When activated, the fixed siren system, mobile alerting routes, and EB5/NOAA weather radio systems will be exercised. (All other activations of these systems will be simulated).The entire 10 mile EPZ should be notified by this means within 45 i j minutes. Residents should secure their homes and remain tuned to EBS for further instructions.. The Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (TWRA), the U.S Coast l
Guard, and volunteers, will provide notification to commercial river traffic within the 10 mile EPZ. They will restrict ingress into the zone. Persons in recreation
'I areas will also be notified by this means. Since no release has occurred at this J
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210C022 11:11 91/10 4..
point, no further protective action will be warranted.
All State Emergency Services Coordinators (ESCs) assemble at the SEOC, r
RMCC and the 31C. The FCC function will be simulated. All field forces remain in place and are on standby status. The Tennessee Department of Agriculture
)
(TDA) assesses the need for protecting dairy animals and milk processing plants.
TDA in coordination with the 3IC should release "get ready" instructions to the agricultural community.
The JIC is activated and the public information system is put in place. Media releases are prepared and briefings are planned and carried out under the direction
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of the State and TVA JIC coordinators. TEMA staff members will perform the functions of PIO's for cross training purposes.
Local:
Hamilton and Bradley County Civil Defense Directors are notified immediately of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY. They activate their county EOC's.
County Department heads and other respo.,se leaders pre-position equipment and staff as required. County Sheriff notify and/or coordinate all necessary support (municipal police departments, THP, fire, rescue, - etc.) resources.
Traffic Assistance Teams (TAT's) are notified and placed on standby.
School superintendents and their transportation s aff, and the Chattanooga Area Rapid Transit Authority (CARTA), are notified that school buses and a limited number of r
CARTA buses may be needed for general population evacuation.
1200 - 2000 (CST)- GENERAL EMERGENCY
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State:
A GENERAL EMERGENCY is acclared when a significant release occurs.
The SEOC is notified of the change by ring cown phone and immediat-ty notifies:
a.
Staff present in the SEOC a
b.
County EOC's c.
State Field Centers (RMCC/JIC)(FCC will be simulated)
' d.-
Any state agency required Due to the magnitude of the release, TVA and DRH recommends to the TEMA Director that an evacuation be ordered within the two mile zone and five
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miles downwind within the 10 mile EPZ. At the recommendation of the Director of TEMA, coupled with the advise of TVA and DRN, the Governor declares a state of L'
emergency and orders the recommended evacuation.
DRH and TVA continues to assess the need for further evacuation and sheltering downwind from the plant and continue to jointly assess field monitoring results and make appropriate recommendations. Plume tracking commences and
{ [11 field teams are dispatched to selected areas. TDA orders the sheltering of dairy animals and live stock within two miles of the plant and sectors downwind out to 10 4
i miles. They may also assess the need for further protective actions out to 20 i
miles.
All state and local off-site responders are activated and positioned at County EOC's and field locations.
The 31C continues to provide the media with information regarding conditions at the plant, evacuation, and other public inf orrnation.
Hamilton and Bradley County Civil Defense Directors proceed with Implementing the evacuation plans for the sectors affected. All responders are activated or remain on standby. The Sheriffs, having confirmed the completion of alerting the public, dispatches personnel to man critical road blocks, assist in the j
orderly evacuation along control routes, and provide security to the evacuated areas. Traffic Assist Teams (TATS) are dispatched to critical locations along the evacuation routes.
All law enforcement support (police, THP, rescue, etc.)
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resoures are utilized as needed. Sheriffs continues to coordinate this function.
The County Road Departments, assisted by TDOT personnel and equipmer.s set up 1
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road blocks and barriers at predetermined points in the affected sectic'n.
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The American Red Cross (ARC) mans shelters as needed and begins their locator ser < ice. ARC staff are assisted by Tennessee Department of Human J
Services in managing shelters. Shelter Information Points (SIPS) are established along the evacuation routes and provide information to those in need. The EMS sj.
personnel sirnulate transpo: ta tion uI non-smbulatory evacuees in need of transportation and respond to any medical evacuation needs.
,j Bradley County will simulate evacuation of effected sectors to demonstrate their ability to conduct general population evacuation. At least one contaminated victim will be transported to Bradley Memor.at Hospital for treatment.
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Following the initial release from the plant, TVA and DRH field monitoring teams will be instructed by the RMCC to broaden their area of monitoring. They will continue to report back to the RMCC at 15 minute intervals. This intensified j
monitoring effort will continue until the plant reaches stability.
i 1900 (CST)- Pl. ANT RECAINS STABILITY l
At this point the plant reports to the CECC, SEOC, etc. that the plant has i
returned to normal following the resumption of main power to the plant. Recovery
't plans are formulated and recovery begins at this time.
2000 (CST)- TERMINATE THE EXERCISE I
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