ML20134N623

Amend 89 to License DPR-69,allowing More Flexible Limits for HPSI Sys Flow & Increasing Time Period to 7 Days for Scram Test to Be Performed Prior to Reducing Shutdown Margin Below Specified Limits

ML20134N623
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	08/30/1985
From:	Butcher E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20134N627	List: ML20134N623 ML20134N629
References
NUDOCS 8509050230
Download: ML20134N623 (22)

Text

-

Og UNITED STATES j

g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

/

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-318 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 89 License No. DPR-69 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The applications for amendment by Baltimore Gas & Electric Company i

(the licensee) dated February 26 and April 10, 1985, comply with as amended (the Act)quirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the standards and re j

and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter-I; B.

The facility will operate in confonnity wi^h the applications, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be j.

conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations;

}

D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

}l E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 3

il of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

l

~

8509050230 850830 PDR ADOCK 05000318 P

PM

' * * "P M ",f7

• Vt"""amf T 's'*" FP *'04-ig W

yew g

• --++r

• ~ n - v% ++

ne--,w-

+ +-

s..

, 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this ifcense amendment, and paragraph 2.C.2 of Facility Operating License No. DPR-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2.

Technical Specifications The Tech'nical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 89, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Edward J. Butcher, Acting Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Licensing c

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

August 30, 1985 i

1 y, m i.

.; g,

- - - -. w-c=,

s ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT N0.89 FACILTIY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-69 DOCKET NO. 50-318 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change..The corresponding overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Pages.

Insert Pages 3/4 1-9 3/4 1-9 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-16a 3/4 1-16a 3/4 2-11 3/4 2-11 4

3/4 5-Sa-3/4 5-Sa 3/4 10-1 3/4 10-1 B 3/4 1-2 8 3/4 1-2

~ o B 3/4 5-2 8 3/4 5-2 p

)r

- I f

?

Y 0

4 e

Y_W -

MW?

' WW Mg99 p

2 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths and one associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Two flow paths from the' boric acid storage tanks required to be OPERABLE pursuant'to Specifications 3.1.2.8 and 3.1.2.9 via either a boric acid pump or a gravity feed connection, and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System, and b.

The flow path from the refueling water tank via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: HODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at leastHOTSTANgBYandboratedtoaSHUTDOWNMARGINequivalenttoatleast 3% ak/k at 200 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated' OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heat traced portion of the flow path from the concentrated boric acid tanks is above the temperature limit line shown on Figure 3.1-1.

b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying on a SIAS l

test signal that:

(1) each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position, and (2) each boric acid pump starts.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-9 Amendment No. 31, 89

% w ;___-

L_y,,.g--,

"*1P M h" EP

• ""***"N*

e e,

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one of the required pumps is restored to OPERABLE status.

a i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

{

\\

i

{

I T

9 CALVERT CLIFFS-UNIT 2 3/4 1-10 l

- ~~ v~ w~m.

- mw=m w4 w. mgggn n_ n-cc-wan :-2 :~.m*"~

~ ~tw ~r* ~ ' ~

~ "'

/

4 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: M6 DES 1,2,3and4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY 4

and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3% ak/k at o

200 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 18 months by verifying that each charging pump starts automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Test Signal.

b.

No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those

~

required by Specification 4.0.5.

• Above 80% RATED THERMAL POWER the two OPERABLE charging pumps shall have independent power supplies.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. 3J,89 i

I

_m,.

w REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORIC ACID PUMPS - SHUTDOWii LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.5 At least one boric acid pump shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus if only the flow path through ;the boric acid pump in Specification 3.1.2.la above, is OPERABLE.

' APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no boric acid pump OPERABLE as required to complete the flow path of Specification 3.1.2.la, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERA-TIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one boric acid pump is restored to OPESABLE status.

G SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-1 r

4.1.2.5 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

i h

i v

1 4

CALVERT CLIFFS-UNIT 2 3/4 1-12

~.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l

50RIC ACID PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 At least the boric acid pump (s) in the boron injection flow path (s) required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus if the flow path through the _ boric acid pump (s) in Specification 3.1.2.2a is,0PERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one boric acid pump required for the boron injection flow path (s) pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a inoperable, restore the boric acid pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3% ak/k at 200*F; restore the above required boric acid pump (s) c to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.6 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specifications 4.0.5 and 4.1.2.2.

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-13 Amendment No. 37,89

• L($

7

• .-rJSA*W_u h h y h--W em.mgp pg yy.

_h e e m er. awMw aan -hammam estr=m n

-f'* % mM-re _- __

XW'i.-?-L L"

t-F M7

+ --

s_M

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B0 RATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1. 2. 7 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One boric acid storage tank and one associated heat tracing circuit with the tank contents in accordance with Figure 3.1-1.

b.

The refueling water tank with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 9,844 gallons, l

2.

A minimum boron concentration of 2300 ppm, and l

3.

A minimum solution-temperature of 35'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

c ACTION:

f With no barated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at-least one-borated water source is restored to OPERABLE status.

~

SURVEILLANCE RE0UIREMENTS 4.1.2.7 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated

.h OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

7 1

1.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 1

i 2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume of the tank, and 3.

Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWT temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is < 35'F.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-14 Amendment No.5, 31 l-

-~

iY7 D

)~

.Matad 4c. '<W' Y

e e

170

'c::

. "I;". h-E EE!i:~xi=5El=~

E

, _ "5klS=

5 5C.555dE:2 fNE E

D -t-h J.

- = -== t = - = t = r==.

.:=

.::= :

= b.....

... I~= = =~:I:

130

=

n:

...risE.... -E.. ; ~.- E__.i.i:

=..=_w=-:E: '..- = _ _ -=i.--_...*,=.=..T"._.=..=_-2.. _... i-i.i. n Ex.i.-i:

.=

.... =. =

=.1._.__-...=_==,===,:== = h...

,_..r... _=:r=.==,,.

-r 150

=..m.

.=

=

=

m =

= =

._. _f

.-_=..u.

-I n, =_._y _..

-g-.

-r =

ET--

- -t :2.. x. _

- e

:

-.=

s

_....=_=

s=== l =_._:. :=_=.

a__- - = =::..

=-

a_

=

_ _/__ -

_.- 120

==

s 130 =__ x-Z55):-

.=-Tr

_..-=:

7--'

=

.. =

w r

2 x

v s-

.u=

\\t-

=

u

-s e----

110 m

Z

. =

- - - -..I =.t-/,r 2

E z.=i.

Iw 110

.g __._ %.

- - + - -

1-~

.s.

m w

_a w

a, 100 g

y

-f-- ;i;%._

__h--

-,f _._ _.

p

=:=--+-

p

==

=

-.: =: R, ODES 1, 2, 3, it 4=

- - - =X=

90 M

b?EE--- m - im

! -- t i

... 1 ::

\\- - _- _-: - :*=- -

__1_.: ===. :. - -- ---

q

=.

.a

=

=

u n-

g

- = -- : = c--===.:-----

g o

=- 7_ ' '

~

. _. _.. '=5= = "3-

-~" ::"r==4 --

---"~

^ ";

=-

_.. =

.=-

g m.._..

84

_=g

_ i t 7_.~

.:EE 2;-.--

-"h"'aiiQ h

/' _=___ir=_

f N3".;=_=____:._

..... _Z

=.._.EIS_ _ _ _

Z Z

'%Ie E _-

EE

1..-

4

.__t--

=

.._.___=.:=:_

=mr

_:.=_.

. =.-

80 O

O R_,_

_ -._..=..u.=r_=. - - -

__ :=.._. =., > _ _

c

=

=_

=<

a__... _ =. _ _

=:=

_:i :.

.=

~.E

_. =. ", _ - - + -_.

.d_ =_ _-_ - - -.._

-~~-

n.

r

==

-"#= =- : -

25.i=._II_:._.-

ri::- --=_

=

' =i E T. ' h. _. :.! 5E=

= t.E__.'

= e=:

3 t==

=.=.

p

. -f5--

..-I._

__=_t=._=.

_2

=_. 3..____._.::_.

3

==

==

_Z

~_ _ __ _. ". _

_._. _.~~-;~.'

_ _, _ - ~

1

_. :: =-

g 20

=..

+--

_ _ ___t

.=

. := _

=, _ _.__==y= r-

..;. _3

)

.._.===r== _ _. _

_-_ - - _ i. :. _ l_..:: : f='

--I=_-

==- - -

= =.. _.

'7-

=i_ iii: = = :.. _......_4._._ -

=: t--

= _..

. _ _. =.:.=..-

_ - ~ ~~_%51Ek_.

Ni: MODES 5 ft 6:NEE i: =

9:g=- -;iff Eii.- Ediir Ep_~;} Ii: =_;-i::.

i=== ~i[F -

g : ji@

= _ _ _...

+

. -.;.= = _5-..

.=

.g... _w

2==

r

--==t---

- -.m -t =-- - IN.- =$

C EIN@~ h.--

-- NEI-0 9

10 11 12 -

8 67 8

STORED BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION (WT%)

FIGURE 3.1-1 Minimum Boric Acid Storage Tank Volume and Temperature as a Function of Stored Boric Acid Concentration CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 Amendment No. 27, 48 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-15 Amendment No. 6. 31 Iw. _.-

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B0 RATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.8 At least one of the following two combinations of borated water I

sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Two boric acid storage tank (s) and one associated heat tracing circuit per tank with the contents of the-tanks in accordance with Figure 3.1-1 and the boron concentration limited to < 8%, or i

b.

Boric Acid Storage Tank 22 OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.2.8.a and the refueling water tank with 1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 400,000 gallons, 2.

A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2700 ppm,

.3.

A minimum solution temperature of 40 F, and 0

4.

A maximum solution temperature of 100 F in MODE 1.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 > 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

I ACTION:

a.

With neither combination of borated water sources OPERABLE but at

~

least two of the individual borated water sources OPERABLE, restore at least one of the combinations defined in Specification 3.1.2.8 to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or reduce power to less than 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With only one borated water source OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either c

restore at least two of the individual borated water sources to j

4 OPERABLE status or reduce power below 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER j

and comply with Specification 3.1.2.9.

t i

SURVEILLANCE REQUI'REMENTS

(

4.1.2.8 At least two borated water sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- l

-~ :

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

)

1.._ Verifying the baron concentration in each water source, 2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume in each water source, and Serifying th' boric acid storage tank solation temperature.

3.

e b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by vgrifying the RWT temperature when the outside air temperature is < 40 F.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-16 Amendment No. 3J./38,89

_s x

Tf

,g

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B0 RATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.9 At least two of the following three borated water sources shall be i

OPERABLE:

a.

Twoboricacidstoragetank(s)andoneassociatedheattracing circuit per tank with the contents of the tanks in accordance with Figure 3.1-1 and the boron concentration limited to 1 8%, and b.

The refueling water tank with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 400,000 gallons, 2.

A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2700 ppm, 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 40 F, and 0

4.

A maximum solution temperature of 100 F in MODE 1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1*, 2, 3 and 4.

l

~

ACTION:

With only one borated water source OPERABLE, restore at least two borated water sources to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANMI withinthenext6hogrsandboratedtoaSHUTDOWNMARGINequivalenttoat least 3% ak/k at 200 F; restore at least two borated water sources to OPERABLE status within the-next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

t 4.1.2.9 At least two horated water sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

l a.

At least once per 7 days by:

4:

1.

Verifying the boron concentration in each water source,

~!

2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume in each water

-source, and 3.

Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verif ing the RWT temperature when f

the outside air temperature is < 40 F.

• At i 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-16a Ameridment No.37, 38,89 I

p-

, _-- m m.

e- %,_g,m.ey a-,,

- as r

1

l 1.2 l

l 1

I i

1.1 m

^ (0.15,1.0) yz 1.0

( 0.10,1.0)' -

09

n. r "jz UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE mE OPERATION OPERATION l3 REGION REGION 0 8 0.s

' a.

40 EE ll3 0 EE RH 4E ACCEPTABLE (0.30, 0.80)

E5 0.8

(-0.30, 0.80) i OPERATION Em REGION 00 za 9Ei b5

<a E

0.7 0.6 I

I I

I I

0.5

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2 0

0.2 0.4 0.6 PERIPHERAL AXIAL SHAPE INDEX. Y, Figure 3.2-4 DNB Axial Flux Offset Control Limits CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 2-11 Amendment No. 9,JE,3J,gJ, 89

. ~.. -

.. - - - -,.. = = _ = _...

1 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS i -

AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - T_*

l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.4 The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T ) shall not exceed 0.030.

l q

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.*

ACTION:

a.

With the indicated AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT determined to be >

O.030 but < 0.10, either correct the power tilt within two hours or determine within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and at least once per subsequent 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, that the TOTAL PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR (Ffy) and the TOTAL INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR (Ff) are within the limits of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

b.

With the indicated AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT determined to be >

0.10, cperation may proceed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> provided that the TOTAL INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR (Ff) and TOT PLANARRADIALPEAKINGFACTOR(Ffy)arewithinthelimitsof j

Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

Subsequent operation for the purpose of measurement and to identify the cause of the tilt is allowable provided the THERMAL POWER level is restricted to

< 20% of the maximum allowable THERMAL POWER level for the existing Reactor Coolant Pump combination.

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 2.4.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.4.2 The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT shall be determined to be within the

~

limit by:

a.

Calculating the tilt at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and b.

Using the incore detectors to determine the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when one excore channel is inoperable and THERMAL POWER is > 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

!x.

• See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

f CA[. VERT CLIFFS-UNIT 2 3/4 2-12

' Amendment No. 9 n

,n.

e.,ru y = namw=m

=w

- - ~ -

I EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) e.

At least once per.18 months by:

1.

Verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the shutdown cooling system from.the Reactor Coolant System when the Reactor Coolant System pressure,is above 300 psia..

2.

A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying' that the. subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components.(trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

'3.

Verifying that a minimum total of 100 cubic' feet of l

solid granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP. storage baskets.

4.

Verifying that when a representative sample of.4.0 + 0.1 W

grams of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged 7 without agitation, in 3.5 ! 0.1 liters ~of 77 10 F borated water from the RWT, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to

> 6 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

f.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1.

Verifying that1ach automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection l

Actuation test signal.

2.

Verifying that each of the following pumps start auto-l' matica11y upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation

-Test Signal:

a.

High-Pressure Safety Injection pump.

4 sb.

Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump.

g.

-By verifying the correct' position of each electrical position stop for the following Emergency Core Cooling System throttle valves:

' 1. ' ' During each perfonnance of valve cycling required by Specification 4.0.5 by observation of valve position on the control boards.

i.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5.

' Amendment No M,31 L

i

.s 1

l l

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 2.

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of maintenance on the valve or its operator by measurement of stem travel when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE:

HPSI SYSTEM Valve Number Valve Number MOV-616 MOV-617 MOV-626 MOV-627 MOV-636 MOV-637 MOV-646 MOV-647 h.

By performing a flow balance test during shutdown following comple-tion of HPSI system modifications that alter system flow character-istics and verifying the following flow rates for a single HPSI i

pump system *:

I 1.

The sum of the three lowest flow legs shall be greater than 470** gpm.

1.

By ve.ri.ying that the HPSI pumps develop a total head of 2900 ft.

on recirculation flow to the refueling water tank when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

6 9

• A HPSI pump system is a HPSI pump and one of two safety injection headers.

l

• • These limits contain allowances for instrument error, drift or fluctuation.

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-Sa Amendment No. JE,/56,89

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of CEA worth and shutdown margin provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated CEA worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE CEA(s).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2.

ACTION:

a.

With any full length CEA not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immediately initiate and continue boration at 2,40 gpm of 2300 ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

b.

With all full length CEAs inserted and the reactor subcritical C

by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at 3,40 gpm of 2300 ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN

}

required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.1.1 The position of each full length CEA required either partially or i

fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

4.10.1.2 Each CEA not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insartion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 7 days prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3.1.1.1.

~

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 10-1 Amendment No. JB, 3J,89 m__.__

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT, CEA INSERTION AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS O

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.2 The moderator temperature coefficier.t. the CEA insertion and the power dis;ribution limits of Specifications 3.1.1.4, 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6 3.2.2, 3.2.3, and 3.2.4 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS prcvided:

a.

The THERMAL POWER is restricted to below 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and 9

b.

The limits of Specification 3.2.1 are maintained and determined as specified in Specification 4.10.2.2 below.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With any of the limits of Specification 3.2.1 being exceeded while the require-ments of Specifications 3.1.1.4, 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6. 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 are suspended, either:

Reduce THERMAL POWER sufficiently to satisfy the require-a.

[

ments of Specification 3.2.1, or b.

Be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.2.1 The THERMAL POWER sha'll be determined at least once per hour durino PHYSICS TESTS in which the requirements of Specifications 3.1.1.4, 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.E, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 or 3.2.4 are suspended and shall be verified to be within the test power plateau.

l 4.10.2.2 The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within the limits of Specification 3.2.1 by monitoring it continuously with the Incore Detector Monitoring System pursuant tp the requirements of Specifications 4.2.1.3 and 3.3.3.2 during PHYSICS TESTS above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER in which the i

requirements of Specifications 3.1.1.4, 3.1.3.1 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6. 3.2.2, 3.2.3 or 3.2.4 are suspended.

q l

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 10-2 Amendment No. 38' i

e A

n g

,y

{_

_-]

"OE

• [Ahj

3/4.1 -REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTR0!.

3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion RCS boron concentration and RCS T The minimum available SHUTDOWN MARGIN for no load operating conditions N9beginning of life is 4.3%

Ak/k and at end of life is 4.3% ak/k. The SHUTCOWN MARGIN is based on the safety analyses performed for a steam line rupture event initiated at no load conditions. The most restrictive steam line rupture event occurs at EOC conditions.

For the steam line rupture event at beginning of cycle conditions, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of less than 4.3% Ak/k is required to control the reactivity transient, and end of cycle conditions require 4.3% Ak/k. Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting conditgon and is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. With T 200 F, the reactivity transients resulting from any postulated accidEE <are minimal and a 3% Ak/k shutdown margin provides adequate protection. With the pressurizer level less than 90 inches, the sources of non-borated water are restricted to increase the time to criticality during a boron dilution event.

3/4.1.1.3 BORON DILUTIOR A minimum flow rate of at least 3000 GPM provides adequate mixing, prevents stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual during boron concentration' reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. A flow rate of at least 3000 GPM will circulate an equivalent Reactor Coolant System volume of 9,601 cubic feet in approximately 24 minutes. The reactivity change rate associated with boron concen-tration reductions will therefore be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

3/4.1.1.4 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC)

The limitations on MTC are provided to ensure -tfiat the assumptions used in the-accident and transient analyses remain valid through each I

fuel cycle. The surveillance requirements for measurement of the MTC during each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC.value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. The confirmation that the measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurances that the coefficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

/

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2

'B 3/4 1-1 Anendment No. Z8, 3I,83/, 72 I

[

f 1

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1.5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the. reactor will not be made critical g

This with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 515 F.

limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is Ebove its minimum RTNDT temperature.

+

3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS 1

The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The system also provides coolant flow following a SIAS (e.g., during a Small Break LOCA) to supplement 1

flow from the Safety Injection System.. The Small Break LOCA analyses assume flow from a single charging pump, accounting for. measurement uncertainties and flow maldistribution effects in calculating a conservative value of charging function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) perform flow actually delivered to the RCS. The components required to separate flow f

paths, 4) boric acid pumps, 5) associated heat tracing systems, and 6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators, 0

i 1

With the RCS average temperature above 200 F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoper-able. Allowable cut-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUT-g DOWN MARGIN frog all operating conditions of 3.0% ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F.

The maximum boration capability requirement occurs at E0L s

from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 6500 gallons of 7.25% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 55,627 gallons of 2300 l

ppm borated water from the refueling water tank. However, to be consistent with the ECCS requirements, the RWT is required to have a minimam contained volume of 400,000 gallons during MODES 1, 2, 3 rnd 4.

The maximum boron concentration of the refueling water tank shall be limited to 2700 ppm and l

the maximum boron concentration of the boric acid storage tanks shall be t

limited to 8% to preclude the possibility of boron precipitation in the core j

during long term ECCS cooling.

.With the RCS temperature below 200 F, one injection system is acce table without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the' additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single infection i

~

system becomes' inoperable.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-2_

Amendment No. 31, 89 j

H

-i

& w ;< c~f;n.7 w. mwn

. www

.m,

- u -_-

j

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the RCS safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.

The safety injection tank power operatsd isolation valves are considered to be " operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protection function be removed automatically whenever pemissive conditions are not met.

In addition, as these safety injection tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The Ifmits for oepration with a safety injection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temper-atures.

If a closed-isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

Portions of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) system flowpath are common to both subsystems. This includes the low pressure safety injection flow control valve, CV-306, the ' flow ~ orifice downstream of CV-306, and the four low pressure safety injection loop isolation valves. Although the portions of the flowpath are common,_the system design is adequate to ensure i

reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI system operation following a design basis Loss of Coolant Incident prior to recirculation.

The LPSI system design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 85

,g, EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS j

BASES The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibi,11ty of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to > 7.0.

The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed i'n the ECCS-LOCA analyses. Minimum HPSI flow requirements are based upon Small Break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following a SIAS. Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system leakage uncertainties. The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the associated flowpaths is assured by the Boration System Specifications 3/4.1.2.

Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump performance consistent with safety analysis assumptions.

3/4. 5.'4 REFUELING WATER TANK (RWT)

The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWT minimum volume and baron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recircula-tion cooling ficw to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.

These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. H,89 l

l -- - m m.~..pn, gmy e nyyg.v

_._m ; n g _-<,.-. w

,7 v- - ~ q