ML20134M388
| ML20134M388 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1985 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8509040105 | |
| Download: ML20134M388 (4) | |
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ti DUKE Po*ER GOMPANY r
l P.O. HOX 33180 CHAMLOTTE, N.C. 28242 l
HAl.H. TUCKER Ter_rrisose l
vms renamen (704) 373-4538
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l:4 August 14, 1985 l
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Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator ce r'U; S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I
5 Region 11 l
101 Marietta Street, NW,' Suite 2900 N
I Atlanta, Georgia 30323
- b Re: RII:PKV/PHS iES l
50-413/85-26 50/414/85-21 c3 en
Dear Dr. Grace:
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Please find attached a response to Violation No. 413/85-26-02, as identified
/ in the above referenced Inspection Report.
Very'truly'yours.
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Hal B. Tucker LTP/hrp Attachment ec: NRC Resident Inspector i
Catawba Nuclear Station Robert. Guild, Esq.
,,1 P. O. Box 12097 l'
Charleston,' South Carolina 29205 Palmetto Alliance l
213515 Devine Street l
Columbia, South Carolina 29205 l/
j Mr. Jesse L. Riley' l:
Carolina Environmental Study Group l
854 Henley Place l
Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 l
l 8509040105 850814 l
PDR ADOCK 05000413 G
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l DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAW3A NUCLEAR STATION VIOLATION 413/85-26-02 VIOLATION:
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires written procedures be established, implemented and maintained for safety-related activities.
The following examples relating to this requirement are provided.-
1..
Performance Test (PT)/1/A/4350/02C, Available Power Source Operability Check, Step 8.1 requires the diesel generator (DG) to be aligned per Operating Procedure (OP)/1/A/6350/02, Diesel Generator Operator Operation, for operation of DG 1B.
OP/1/A/6350/02 requires the "DC Control Power On" light to be energized for this lineup.
Operations Management Procedure (OMP) 1-4, Use of Procedures, Section 8.1.D, requires if desired results are not. achieved, the individual should not proceed but contact a supervisor and use resources available to resolve the procedure or problem.
Station' Directive (SD) 4.2.2, Independent verification Requirements, Section 9.4.1 requires personnel signing the documentation to either have performed or observed the action required by the procedure stop.
Contrary to the above, on March 7, 1985:
a.
The operator noted that the "DC Control Power On" light was not on as required prior to performing PT/1/A/4350/02C but continued performance of this test.
b.
Upon completion of running DG 1B during post test lineup.
verification, the "DC Control Power on" light was not on and although the operator contacted his supervisor, available resources were not used to resolve the problem or change the procedure.
c.
Upon completion of running DG 1B, a procedural step was independently verified that stated the "DC Control Power on" light was on when the light was not on.
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2.
Administrative Policy Manual (APM), Section 4.2.7, specifies the process for completed procedures which involve documentation of compliance with procedure acceptance criteria and requires that this documentation be retained.
3.
Station Directive 3.1.1, Safety Tags and Delineation Tags, Section 4.2.2, states " white safety tags shall be attached to i
any component the operation of which could cause material or equipment damage."
Contrary to the above, the nuclear safety injection pump 1A was not safety tagged for maintenance being performed on this component.
As a result of this failure to tag this pump, the pump was operated on June 1, 1985, without adequate cooling which caused extensive damage to this component.
l Response (Example 1):
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Duke Power Company admits the violation.
2.
Alternate means were used to verify DC control power available to the Diesel Generator (D/G) engine.
A procedure change should have been initiated to sign off the step if the "DC Control Power On" light was not energized.
The alternate action taken resulted in the incorrect conclusion that the DC power was still available and also caused the Independent verification of the step to fail, when the verifier also believed power was still available.
Personnel involved were not able to make a valid determination that DC control power was or was not available.
This was compounded by the fact that our operators signed off 1
the step by feeling that the intent of the step was met after their efforts to make a valid determination, but without the knowledge that the tripped breaker even existed.
3.
We have added to the Operator Training D/G Lesson Plan, an explanation of the function and location of the breakers involved in this incident.
4.
In addition to the action outlined in paragraph (3), we will revise the D/G ES Checklist in OP/1/A/6350/02, Diesel Generator Operation, to provide written guidance on an alternate means to verify, that should the DC Control Power light not be lit, DC control power is available, install an annunciator to warn of loss of DC Control Power to the Diesel Engineer Control Panels, and issue an operator update to caution operators on bypassing the procedure change process.
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5.
The change to the D/G ES Checklist and operator update will be completed by August 31, 1985.
The annunciator will be installed before the end of the first refueling outage.
Response (Example 2):
1.
Duke Power Company admits the violation.
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2.
The checklist for OP/1/A/6350/02 was not retained since it was felt that the acceptance criteria was adequately documented by PT/1/A/4350/02C.
3.
A review of documentation retention requirements was conducted.
4.
A change will be made to PT/1/A/4350/02C to require that the ES Checklist from OP/1/A/5350/02 be retained with the PT.
5.
This change will be implemented by August 31, 1985.
Response (Example 3):
1.
Duke Power Company admits the violation.
2.
This incident resulted due to a failure to tag the pump motor
- breaker, poor communications between our operators in the control room and a failure to follow procedures.
3.
Personnel directly involved have been counselled on this event to ensure their understanding of their roles in the incident.
This incident was presented to and discussed at the Shift Supervisors meeting on July 12, 1985.
4.
In addition to the actions outlined in paragraph (3),
Operator updates have been issued to operators stressing the importance of following procedures, good communications and of properly tagging components for maintenance.
5.
The operator updates will be completed by August 31, 1985.